Università Commerciale “Luigi Bocconi” Facoltà di Economia Corso di Laurea Magistrale in Discipline Economiche e Sociali Anno Accademico 2005/2006 Sessione di laurea Marzo 2007
When the Tigers roar, what's labor market's answer? Conflict migration and social networks in Sri Lanka
Tesi di laurea specialistica di: Giulia La Mattina matr.1021179
Docente Relatore: Prof.ssa Eliana La Ferrara Docente Controrelatore: Prof.ssa Elsa Vila Artadi
Ringraziamenti:
Alla Mia Famiglia: Beatrice, Gianni, Francesca, Alcida, Rosario, Franca e Serafina. Alla professoressa La Ferrara, per il tempo dedicatomi. A Emily e Francesco, che sono la famiglia qua a Milano, per la pazienza. A Betty, Elena, Giulia, e a tutti gli amici che hanno condiviso con me questi anni. A Eleonora, Giovanna, Giulia, e a tutti gli amici di casa, per esserci sempre. Un grazie speciale a Simona, per un aiuto speciale e essenziale. Ad Alessandro, per la gentilezza e la pazienza infinita. A Piragash, per avermi donato il privilegio di ascoltare la sua storia. Al dott. Pietro Gennari, per l’aiuto con i dati e per la disponibilità. Ai professori Pellizzari, Devillanova, Marcellino, Artadi, per il tempo dedicatomi.
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Contents
1. Introduction...... 1 2. Literature review...... 3 3. The Institutional Setting and The Data ...... 6 3.1 The conflict and the society ...... 6 3.1.1 Historical review of the conflict ...... 6 3.1.2 Poverty in Sri Lanka and the effect of conflict on development...... 9 3.1.3 Security dimension of conflict ...... 10 3.1.4 Social dimension of conflict ...... 11 3.2 The Labour Force Survey ...... 12 3.2.1 The design of the survey and the questionnaire ...... 12 3.3 Data on conflict ...... 17 4. Identification Strategy...... 20 5. Empirical results...... 23 5.1 OLS regression ...... 23 5.2 First Stage Regression...... 26 5.3 Second Stage Regression ...... 29 6. Conclusions ...... 31 References ...... 33 Tables: descriptive statistics...... I Empirical results...... VIII Appendix I ...... XIII Appendix II ...... XVII
Abstract The civil war between the separatists Tamil Tigers and the Government has been plaguing Sri Lanka since 1983. It has caused death and destruction, and has affected society and economy. In my work I try to assess the effect of the conflict on labour markets at the micro level. The conflict influences labour market through the functioning of informal institutions, namely migrants’ networks. By affecting internal migration, the civil war indirectly determines the size of migrants’ networks, and the networks provide information and referrals and help migrants in finding a job. I use the variation in migration caused by the war to solve the endogeneity of the network in the employment equation by adopting an instrumental variable approach. In this way, I can test whether the networks enhance labour market outcomes for their members. I analyze data from the Labour Force Survey quarterly held in Sri Lanka from 1996 until 1998 and I present data on the conflict that I collected from news agencies. The results of my empirical analysis suggest that the conflict has a significant, negative effect on migration. I find that the migrant’s probability of being employed is enhanced when his network is larger, by using conflict intensity in the province of origin as an instrument for the size of the network at the destination.
1. Introduction The economic consequences of civil wars have recently become an issue in development economics, as ethnic conflicts continuously plague developing countries all over the world. Chechnya, Colombia, Sri Lanka and Sudan, for example, have been war torn for years, most often in a cone of silence. The effects of a conflict on a country are clearly awful. Death, destruction of human and physical capital, and political instability are the most obvious (and studied) costs of war. It is straightforward that high military expenses crowd out investment and GDP growth, while battles and bombing destroy capital accumulation and infrastructures 1. Wars impose several restraints to human rights. During conflicts, the right to life, liberty and security of person is endangered, and individuals are no more protected by arbitrary arrest, detention or torture. Among others, the right to freedom of movement and residence is often disregarded during wars 2. Conflicts can affect an individual’s freedom of movement and residence by forcing him to leave the place where he is living, or, on the contrary, by preventing him from migrating. In my work I want to analyze how conflicts affect the mobility of the individuals, and how this indirectly influences labor markets at the micro level. I focused my research on the case of Sri Lanka, where more than 64,000 lives were lost during 23 years of conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Government of Sri Lanka. The case of Sri Lanka is emblematic of a conflict that seems to never end. The war broke out in 1983 and lasted continuously until the February of 2002, when the government and the LTTE declared a ceasefire. Actually the situation was very fragile and although the agreement meant an end to large scale militarized conflict, there have been high levels of political violence, including
1 Nevertheless, at micro level the effects of conflicts on firms' performance are ambiguous. While Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) found a negative relationship between firms' conduct in the Basque region and the ongoing of the conflict between Spanish government and ETA separatists, La Ferrara and Guidolin (2005) showed that some industries thrive on war, and it is not only the case of defence and arm industry. Also the effect of conflicts on institutions is not clear at micro level. By analysing the aftermaths of recent civil war in Sierra Leone, Miguel (2005) found that local violence was associated with greater local mobilization and collective action postwar; thus, the conflict seems to have produced a heightened political awareness. 2 Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: 1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. 2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
1 over 3,000 ceasefire violations. This period of "no war no peace" ended in April 2006, when the conflict began once again. Violent conflict has had enormous costs in terms of physical, financial, human and social capital. Apart from the direct impact on human lives and suffering, it has cost approximately 5% of GDP per year. It has also undermined the development gains of previous decades and had a corrosive effect on institutions of governance. During the conflict, mobility within the country was severely constrained. Northern and Eastern provinces were completely controlled by LTTE and it is very hard for civilians to cross the borders and flee to Government controlled areas. High amounts of money were necessary to corrupt both the rebels and security forces at checkpoints, when the prospective migrants were not granted the essential permits. Not only the rebels, but also Sri Lankan Army and security forces tried to hinder migration from the areas controlled by LTTE, as the panic spread out all over the country because of many suicide attacks. In my work I analyse the dynamics of labour market outcomes for persons who migrated within Sri Lanka. In particular, I analyse network effects among migrants and I test whether they improve labour market outcomes for their members. I expect the conflict to be strongly correlated with migration, so I use this statistical relation to solve the problem of endogeneity of the network in the employment regression. Many studies in economics addressed the issue of migrants networks and their impact on labour market. Usually these works analysed networks among migrants who migrated in the U.S. or in Europe from poorer countries 3 and their effects on U.S. or European labour markets. My analysis is different for two aspects. First of all I analyse network effects among individuals who migrated within the same country. Although fundamental cultural differences can occur between different regions in the same countries, some problems that typically affect international migrants, as for example language difficulties and illegal status/clandestine/residence permits, do not occur for internal migrants. By the way, the most innovative contribute of my work is that I assess the consequences of civil conflicts on a country by measuring their effect on some informal institutions that affect labour market. The effect of the war on migration
3 Some studies also explored networks among refugees in the U.S.(see Borjas, Beaman).
2 affects labour market outcomes through the functioning of social network. I find that the network improves labour market outcomes among its members. I also find that the conflict in the province of birth of the migrant is significantly correlated with the size of his/her network, and that the sign of this correlation is negative. My work is organized as follows: in section two I shortly review literature on networks. In Section three I briefly describe the conflict and the data. In Section four I explain my identification strategy and in section five I discuss the empirical results. In section six I draw conclusions. 2. Literature review My work is closely related to the strand of literature that analyses the effects of social networks in labour markets. The studies on network effects are connected to the renewed interest of economists towards the role of non market institutions as devices able to provide solutions to information, enforcement and coordination problems. Networks have an important role not only in labour market, but also in credit market and in welfare participation. Fafchamps widely assessed the importance of networks and relationships in credit markets in developing countries. According to his work, search and screening costs are much higher than in developed economies, and the potential for opportunistic behaviour is higher. Consequently, market participants tend to operate in a highly inefficient way. Increased efficiency can be reached by emphasizing long term relationships with other agents, through networks and relationships. As highlighted by Borjas (1992), it is natural to expect network effects to be stronger in migrant communities, because they tend to be more socially cohesive than native communities. Network effects can provide an explanation to ethnic clustering for migrants. The existence of beneficial network externalities influences the location decision of prospective migrants, because networks provide information about the host region labour market and help in the settlement process. Many studies
3 addressed the role of networks among migrant communities, and their effect on labour market and welfare assimilation. Most of these works analysed the U.S. and European labour markets, where migrants usually come from developing countries and have lower educational attainments than native population on the average. In my work I analyses network effects among migrants who migrated within the same country, and have characteristics similar to the native population. In labour markets, networks can be very effective in overcoming information problems. Their role was first analysed by Montgomery (1991). By developing an adverse selection model, which explicitely incorporates a simple social structure, he shows that the use of employed referrals is beneficial both for workers and firms, because it helps to overtake the problem of imperfect information about an unemployed individual's ability. For an unemployed person, thus, it could be easier to find a job if he has a network of friends and/or relatives with good connections in the job market. This is especially true for migrants because, since they are newcomers in the labour market, they are more sensible to information problems. The research of Munshi (2003) on Mexican migrants in the U.S. has been particularly valuable for my research. Munshi analyzes network effects among Mexican migrants in the U.S. labour market by using individual panel data from a small number of Mexican communities. The communities are set in a region that traditionally supplied a large share of migrants to U.S. His specific objective is to test whether the network improved labour market outcomes for its members. He constructs a simple model following the one created by Montgomery and then tries to test network effects through a linear probability model. The outcome of interest of the regression is the migrant's employment status in the U.S. and the explanatory variable is the number of people from his origin community that were established in the U.S. Migration from this region tends to be recurrent: individuals move back and forth between Mexico and the United States, and only a small fraction settles permanently abroad. If the individual’s network at the destination consists of other migrants from his origin community, then both the size and the vintage of the network would be changing over time. Munshi uses this variation within the community over time rather than across communities to estimate the network effects in this paper. Using variation
4 within each origin community’s network over time to identify network effects has two major advantages. First, the network at the destination is drawn from a well defined and well established social unit: the origin community. The second advantage of his estimation strategy is that the econometrician is in a position to control for both selectivity in the migration decision, as well as for the endogeneity of the network itself, in the employment regression. The individual migrant’s network is measured by the proportion of sampled individuals in his community who are located at the destination (the United States), at each point in time. The basic specification of the regression equation includes the size of the network, the individual’s unobserved ability, and unobserved labor market shocks, as determinants of the migrant’s labor outcome in the United States. If migration is based on both the individual’s ability as well as the size of the network at the destination, then changes in the size of the network will be associated with compositional change in the pool of migrants, biasing the estimated network effects. Since he has panel data, this selection bias can be corrected by including individual fixed effects in the employment regression, under the assumption that individual ability does not vary over time. Endogeneity rises from correlation between the size of the network and an unobserved exogenous shocks to labour market at destination. Munshi solves the endogeneity problem due to correlation with external shocks by adopting an instrumental variable approach. He needs a statistical instrument that determines changes in the size of the network but is uncorrelated with market shocks in the U.S. The ideal candidate is a variable representing lagged rainfalls in the origin community of the migrant. He finds a strong negative correlation between lagged rainfall at the origin and the size of the network of migrants in the United States. Besides, the origin community and the destination were far enough to assume that rainfall at the origin could not be correlated with labour market at destination. Hence he ran an instrumental variable regression, using as outcome of interest at first the employment status of the migrant, and then his occupation. He found that the Network significantly improves labour market outcomes among its members: not only it finds job for its members, it also channels them into higher paying occupations.
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In building my empirical strategy I followed Munshi's path and I adopted a two stages least squares approach. I use exogenous variation in migration caused by the conflict in the province of origin of the migrants to instrument for the size of the networks at destination. I expect the severity of violence to affect migration and thus the numerical strength of migrants’ network. I analyse network effects among internal migrants in Sri Lanka using data coming from Labour Force Surveys, which are held quarterly in Sri Lanka by the Department of Census and Statistics 4. I collected myself data related to the ongoing conflict in the period of interest using several media sources (see below for a detailed description).
3. The Institutional Setting and The Data
3.1 The conflict and the society
3.1.1 Historical review of the conflict
Sri Lanka has traditionally been a multiethnic country. The Sinhala or Sinhalese (74%) constitute the major ethnic group; the Sri Lankan Tamils, who inhabit the north and east, form the 12.6% of the population and the group known as Indian Tamils (19th century migrants for work on plantations) account for 5.6% of the population. While Muslims constitute the third largest ethnic group (7.4%), there are also small minorities such as Burghers (people of mixed decent), and Malays. Each ethnic group has a distinct identity with strongly held myths of origin; the Sinhala are the descendants of Aryans migrants from Bengal, the Tamils claim pure Dravidian origin, and the Muslims aspire to descend from Arabs. Sinhalese and Tamil communities largely have distinct religious affiliations the Sinhalese are predominantly Buddhist, the Tamils mainly Hindu (with a small Christian minority) but the confrontation is based largely on ethno political rather than religious differences.
4 The Department of Census and Statistics (DCS) is the central statistical agency in Sri Lanka. It is responsible for collection, compilation, analysis and dissemination of all statistical data needed for planning, policy formulation. It is also with the function of monitorimg the progress of various development activities and measuring the impact of various governmental policies.
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Sinhalese and Tamils have inhabited Sri Lanka since ancient times and lived largely in harmony, with ethnic differences probably less important than a strong caste system and colonial dynamics, first with the Portuguese, than with the Dutch and finally the British. According to historians, the British colonial system contributed to the ethnic tensions that emerged after independence. The British favoured Tamils in the colonial bureaucracy, and their predominant position became a source of discontent among Sinhalese. After independence in 1948, however, it did not take long for ethnic and social tensions to overwhelm the barriers of parliamentary democracy. Democratic elections inevitably produced governments that tended to favour the Sinhalese majority. The first major discriminatory legislation came in 1956, when the SLFP replaced English as the official language with Sinhala, effectively excluding minorities. The 1972 Constitution further exacerbated the situation, changing the name of the country from Ceylon to Sri Lanka and assigning Buddhism "The foremost place" in the state. This was followed by attempts to roll back the dominant position of Tamils in state employment and education that produced a generation of Tamil educated youth with few job options. Tensions led to the emergence of small, militant ethnic nationalist groups in the Tamil cultural capital of Jaffna in the early 1970. Both the Tamil political parties and the militants began to put forward radical demands for a separate Tamil state but more as a bargaining position than a serious proposition. The refusal to take Tamil demands for autonomy seriously led to a deepening of the crisis and a move away from constitutional politics to violent militancy. Ethnic tensions reached a peak in the early 1980s, as sporadic clashes broke out between Tamil militant groups and the security forces. In the worst of these, in July 1983, Tamil militants murdered thirteen policemen in Jaffna. In response, Sinhalese mobs burned Tamil homes in Colombo and murdered around 1000 Tamils. This pogrom was a great shock to the country but Sinhalese dominated governments did very little to resolve growing crisis. Instead, the clashes of the early 1980s developed quickly into a major conflict. Militant Tamil groups, which had been fairly marginal until 1983, quickly gained new recruits. They also benefited from training, weapons and money from India, whose involvement on the side of the Tamils was partly prompted by geopolitical concerns but also closely linked to domestic politics: its own 60 million strong Tamil population in Tamil Nadu
7 had considerable sympathy for the Sri Lankan Tamil cause. Gradually one group, the LTTE, emerged from among the Tamil militants as the predominant force, led by a young militant, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, who came to prominence through a series of daring attacks on security forces and government officials. As the conflict spiralled out of conflict in 1987, with the armed forces pitted against the LTTE, India intervened by despatching a military force (Indian Peace Keeping Force, IPKF) to the North East of the island and forced the government to accept constitutional amendments that promised a degree of authority for the Tamils. The intervention was a disaster, and IPKF left the country in disarray in 1989. LTTE launched an orgy of violence against the security forces, massacring hundreds of policemen in the east. bombing political leaders in the south and killing rival Tamil leaders in both Sri Lanka and India. Soon it had taken control of most of the Jaffna peninsula as well as large tracts of territory in the north and east. The government response to militancy involved mass human rights abuses, killings and "disappearances" and undermined much of the democratic nature of the state. During this period LTTE gained its reputation as one of the world's most ruthless terrorist groups, thanks to the use of suicide bombers and spread child soldiers recruitment. With the election of the charismatic Chandrika Kumaratunga as president in 1994, there was renewed hope for a resettlement. Talks began with LTTE but soon broke down. The "pro peace" policy of the President soon shifted to a "war for peace" policy, in which military action was meant to dislodge the Tigers, while a political solution was offered to the Tamil people. Most civilians in the north east only experienced the military aspects of the policy, and Kamaratunga's devolution proposals were overshadowed by the ongoing fighting. Although the military scored some quick victories, notably retaking Jaffna in December 1995, it soon got bogged down as LTTE returned to its guerrilla tactics. The Government reverted to media censorship to cover up military reversals and atrocities committed by the security forces against Tamils. Devolution proposals where stuck in Parliament, with the Sinhalese opposition unable to rise above party politics to support them. The LTTE also increased the frequency and intensity of its terrorist campaign in Colombo and the south. Hundreds died from a bomb explosion at the Central Bank in the capital in January 1996. In February 1998 the rebels bombed the centre of Sri Lankan Buddhism, the Temple of the tooth in Kandy, and
8 followed up in July 1999 by murdering Neelan Tiruchelvam, a Tamil member of parliament who supported a moderate devolution proposal. Finally the LTTE attacked President Kumaratunga herself: she escaped with serious wounds, while 23 others died. The attack increased public support for her, just ahead of presidential elections in December 1999, and she scored a narrow victory marred by allegations of fraud. In 1999 the LTTE also struck back in conventional combat, overrunning military bases in the north. In April 2000 it seized the most fortified army base in the country and regained control of the strategic Elephant Pass (that links the country to Jaffna peninsula); as many as 1000 government soldiers died in the fighting. The final indignity or the defence establishment came in July 2001, when, in its most audacious attack to date, an LTTE unit took over Katanayake airport near Colombo, the country's only international airport, and destroyed half the air fleet. At that time the economy was in crisis, with a drop in GDP in 2001 of 1.5 per cent and the constant drain of military expenditure undermining financial stability. There was widespread war weariness in the country, and both sides were ready for a new approach. The LTTE wanted time to regroup and try to gain some political recognition; the Government wanted a breathing space in which to reinvigorate the economy. The result was a ceasefire agreement signed on 22 February 2002 that led to the longest period of peace since the 1980s, which lasted until April 2006. 3.1.2 Poverty in Sri Lanka and the effect of conflict on development. Approximately 21% of Sri Lanka’s population live in poverty. However, the depth and geographical spread of poverty in Sri Lanka has been disputed. The 1995 World Bank report, for example, argued that there had been a significant decline in poverty between 1985 93, whereas other commentators paint quite a different picture of rural misery. However, most agree that there has been a real widening of regional income disparities. There has been a pronounced metropolitan bias in local investment, employment and incomes. The Western Province, in particular Colombo, has been the main beneficiary of growth, while in the south development has stood still. In the north east there has been a marked decline. The conflict has reversed
9 development processes in the north and east provinces and acted as a brake on development throughout the island. Therefore, the conflict has had a major impact on poverty, which aid donors with a poverty focus increasingly recognize. Debt servicing and the conflict absorb about 50% of budget outlays. Some of the human development gains of earlier decades are being undermined. The quality and efficiency of health care, for instance, has declined, the incidence of malaria has increased and there has been a slight worsening in the rate of malnutrition in children under the age of five years. The government has been suffering from a growing credibility gap related to its failure to tackle corruption, to end the war, to dynamise the economy and to ensure a fairer distribution of gains between rich and poor. Owing to the conflict, Sri Lanka has been unable to attract significant foreign direct investment and the current portfolio of investments is negligible. In addition, black economies have developed around the conflict. In the border areas and in the conflict regions, paramilitary groups have developed various systems of taxation of traders and civilians through control of the main transport routes (and the movement of persons and goods), and through an economy of terror, scarcity and fear. In the east, the Razeeq group – a Tamil militant group who are loosely controlled and paid by the Sri Lankan army – control the fish trade and in Vavuniya