Daf Ditty Eruvin 52: Conceptualizing Eruvim

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MISHNA: If a person set out to go on a Shabbat eve to a town for which an eiruv is established in order to go there on Shabbat, and another person caused him to return home, he himself is permitted to go to that city on Shabbat, and for all the other residents of the town it is prohibited to go there. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Meir says: Anyone who can establish an eiruv, and negated his residence in his original place, and did not establish an eiruv, i.e., he did not at least state that he seeks to establish residence somewhere else, is likened to both a donkey driver, who walks behind the animal and prods it, and a camel driver, who walks before the animal and leads it, in the sense that he is pulled in two opposite directions. Due to the uncertainty with regard to the location of his Shabbat

2 limit, his movement is restricted as though his residence was established in both his city and at a location along the way to the other city. He may not venture beyond two thousand cubits from either location.

of each other, and all the people of one town מא ו ת There are two towns within four thousand intended to establish residence between the two towns, so that they can go to the other town, but תבש If one person began to walk to the other town before . בוריע they did not actually set up an holds that HE may go to the other הדוהי יבר ,began, and then returned home to his original town is valid for him. The other residents of his town may not go to the בוריע because the , תבש town on .is NOT valid for them בוריע other town, because the

GEMARA: With regard to the Mishna’s statement that according to Rabbi Yehuda, he himself is permitted to go to the other city, while for all the rest of the residents of his city it is prohibited to do so, the Gemara asks: What is different about him and what is different about them? Why is he permitted to proceed to the other city, while they are not? Rav Huna said: We are dealing here with a case where that person has two houses, one in each town, with the distance of two Shabbat limits, four thousand cubits, between them.

תבש that the person who had begun to walk before 'הדוהי ר explains the opinion of וה אנ בר אנ וה establishes residence between the cities because

residence תבש Once he set out on the road, he is considered a poor person who can establish a who שע י ר י ם with just a verbal declaration. The others who never left their town are considered they retain their residence in their 'הדוהי ר this way. However, according to בוריע cannot make an .in every direction מא ו ת town, and can walk 2000

,of their city חת ו ם of the ארמוח R’ Meir says that both he and the other people are limited by the .that they wanted to establish חת ו ם of the ארמוח and the

3 With regard to him, since he set out on his way, his legal status is that of a pauper, as he did not intend to return to his first house but to continue to his other house, and he can therefore establish residence at the end of his Shabbat limit simply by declaring that he wishes to acquire residence in such-and-such place. And the legal status of these other inhabitants of his city, is that of wealthy people, as they are in their houses and have food. Consequently, they can only establish residence at the end of their Shabbat limit by depositing food there prior the onset of Shabbat.

with food - as in our case where they are all home בוריע R’ Meir holds that one who can make an .by declaration בוריע cannot make an - תבש at the onset of

of their town. R’ Meir חת ו ם is not valid, and they may not go further than the בוריע Therefore, their in one direction is a renunciation of one’s בוריע also holds that even a mere attempt to make an right to go in the other direction.

is not valid, they may not go in the other direction further than בוריע Therefore, even though their .location בוריע from the attempted מא ו ת 2000

Like a person leading a donkey from רמח ג למ - - Being restricted in both directions is referred to as behind it, and a camel in front of it - while he’s stuck in the middle.

the following two conditions must be met for the הדוהי יבר The Gemara explains that according to .to be valid, and be allowed to walk to the other town בוריע

-1- He actually started walking on Friday –

.at some given location בש י הת ק ו נ ה He verbally declared his desire to be -2-

That was also taught in a baraita: With regard to one who has two houses, with the distance of two Shabbat limits between them, once he set out on the way, clearly demonstrating his intention to leave, although he did not explicitly say: My residence is at the end of my Shabbat limit, he acquired an eiruv there. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

4 Furthermore, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda said: Even if another found him before he left, and said to him: Spend the night here, it is a hot period, or it is a cold period and inadvisable to set out now, on the following day he may rise early and go to the other town, as his intention to walk is sufficient.

in that he requires only one of these conditions to allow הדוהי יבר is more lenient than ה יברב י יסו ' ר ' יסו י יברב ה him to walk to the other city - however, there is a Machlokes as to which one.

but, בוריע understands that he only requires him to verbally declare that he wants to make an הבר does not require him to actually begin to walk.

understands that he only requires him to begin to walk, but does not require him to verbally ףסוי בר . בוריע declare his desire for an

to fruit בר תנ ן רב א יעשו א .Friday , אתתשיא רב הדוהי בר בר ןתנ בר The Gemara relates an incident where took one step out the door back to his אתתשיא רב הדוהי בר waited until איעשוא of basket a brought away, before asking him to stay overnight and return מא ו ת hometown, which was less than 4000 תבש home .morning

5 that all, הדוהי יברב י יסו ' ר s understanding of‘ ףסוי בר either held like ןתנ בר :The Gemara explains ,that you need both הדוהי יבר one needs to establish residence is to begin the trip, or he held like also verbally stated where he wants his Shabbos residence to אתתשיא רב הדוהי בר and in this case be.

The Mishna states that If a man left his home (on Friday) to proceed to a town with which they may make an eiruv with (for the two towns were within four thousand amos of each other), but a friend of his convinced him to return home, he himself is allowed to proceed to the other town, but all the other townspeople (who did not begin to travel) are forbidden; these are the words of Rabbi Yehudah.

Rabbi Meir says: Whoever is able to place an eruv and did not (but rather, he declared that some place other than his house should be his Shabbos residence), Behold this man represents a combination of a donkey driver and a camel driver. [Such a driver is unable to make any progress. A camel can be led only by pulling its rein and a donkey can be driven only from behind. A man who is in charge of both animals can neither lead the two on account of the donkey, nor can he drive the two on account of the camel.

In this case, he must remain between the areas permitted to his current place and the place he wanted to make his eiruv.]

The Gemora asks: In what respect does he differ from them?

Rav Huna replied: We are here dealing with the case of a man who had, for instance, two houses between which two Shabbos limits intervened. As far as he is concerned, since he had set out on his journey, he has the status of a poor man.

They, however, have the status of rich men. The Gemora cites a braisa in support of this.

There is an argument regarding how to understand the opinion of Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah. The braisa quotes Rabbi Yehudah as saying that once he started on the road, his eiruv is valid. Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah is quoted as saying that even if his friend stopped him by saying it is too cold or too hot, his eiruv is valid.

Rabbah understands that Rabbi Yehudah only says the eiruv is valid if he both started traveling and his friend convinced him not to.

Rabbi Yosi holds that even if his friend convinced him before he started traveling, the eiruv is valid. Rav Yosef understands that Rabbi Yosi is being more stringent than Rabbi Yehudah. While Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah requires both, Rabbi Yehudah only requires that he start traveling.

Even if his friend does not say anything to him and he turns back, it is valid.

6 Rabbi Yehudah is of the opinion that if he merely starts traveling in that direction and is turned back by his friend who tells him it is too hot (according to Rav Yosef even if he is not told this by his friend), he still acquires the techum in the place where he wanted to go.

The first opinion in Rashi is that this is even if he did not explicitly say, “My resting place should be in this area (the place he wanted to go).”

However, the Ritva and others say this opinion is just too difficult to understand. It is a big enough novelty that we permit a traveler to “name his techum.” To say that we do this even when he turns back and does not explicitly say, “My resting place should be in this area (the place he wanted to go),” is such a novel law that it should have to be said explicitly by the Gemora.

The Ritva and other Rishonim therefore say that the correct explanation is that this is even when he does say, “My resting place should be in this area (the place he wanted to go).” Even so there is an argument whether or not his techum is valid, as he turned back.

RASHI'S TWO EXPLANATIONS FOR THE ARGUMENT BETWEEN RABAH AND RAV YOSEF1

The Mishnah discusses a case in which a person departed his city just before Shabbos with intention to be Koneh Shevisah at a point 2000 Amos outside of his city, so that he would be able to walk on Shabbos to another city that was 4000 Amos away from his present city. Just after he departed from his city, his friend stopped him and insisted that he return to his city. The Mishnah states that even though he returned to his original city, his Eruv Techumin is valid and he may walk on Shabbos to the second city.

The other residents of his city, though, may not use the Eruv to travel to the other city. This is the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah. Rebbi Meir says that his Eruv is not valid, and he is limited to the area that is shared by the Techum of his Eruv and the Techum of his original city.

The Gemara then cites a Beraisa which also quotes Rebbi Yehudah. In the Beraisa, Rebbi Yehudah says that since the person embarked on his journey, the Eruv that he intended to make at a certain point far away from him is valid (that is, since he started traveling, he has the status of a poor person (Ani) who is permitted to make a remote Eruv merely by saying, "My Shevisah will be in such-and-such place").

Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah adds that even if his friend kept him back and told him to stay in his present city due to the inclement weather in the other city, the Eruv Techumin is valid.

The Gemara then records an argument between Rabah and Rav Yosef concerning the point of dispute between Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah in the Beraisa (see Chart).

1 Rav Mordechai Kornfeld, daf Advancement Forum

7 ONE WHO STARTED TRAVELING TO ANOTHER CITY BUT WAS KEPT BACK BY HIS FRIEND

(1) (a) According to this Lashon of Rashi, everyone agrees that he does not have to openly state, "My Shevisah will be in such-and-such place." When the Gemara says that "he said" ('Amar'), it is not referring to the person making the Eruv, but to his friend who told him to stay in his present city and not to travel to the other city. The Gemara means that it was his friend who kept him back, in contrast to returning by his own volition. (Since it was his friend who kept him back, we assume that his own intention is to continue traveling the next day and he never had in mind that his Eruv should be annulled.) If he said explicitly, "My Shevisah will be in such- and-such place," everyone -- even Rebbi Meir -- agrees that his Eruv is valid, regardless of whether his friend kept him back or he went back on his own.

(b) According to Tosfos, "he said" ('Amar') refers to the friend who kept him back - the friend said the reason why he was keeping him back (such as "it is excessively hot/cold today"), in contrast o keeping him back without giving any reason. Since the friend gave a reason, which will

8 presumably not apply the next morning, it is assumed that the person will continue on his way to the city in the morning.

(2) Even according to Rebbi Yehudah, only an Ani is able to make an Eruv Techumin by saying, "My Shevisah will be in such-and-such a place." An Ashir, though, cannot make an Eruv in this manner. (This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Nachman on 51b, which the Gemara there proves correct on the basis of our Mishnah.) Therefore, it is necessary that the person has already embarked on his journey, for that gives him a status of an Ani. Even Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah agrees with this (see footnote #3).

(3) Even though -- according to Rabah -- Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah does not require that the person has already embarked, nevertheless he does require that the person at least say that he plans to embark. If he does not say that he plans to embark, then he is not considered an "Ani" and thus he cannot make his Eruv by saying, "My Shevisah will be in such-and-such place."

(4) (a) According to this Lashon, Rav Yosef holds that it is Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah who is Machmir and Rebbi Yehudah who is Meikel. (Rashi mentions that there are those who explain that Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah does not require as much of an act of embarking as does Rebbi Yehudah, but Rashi does not accept that explanation.)

(b) However, Tosfos (DH Lomar) asserts that even according to this Lashon's interpretation of Rav Yosef, Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah is the more lenient opinion. Rav Yosef means that even if the person specified that he was returning "because of the cold," his Eruv is still valid, in contrast to Rebbi Yehudah, who maintains that his Eruv is not valid unless his friend held him back without explaining the reason. If he specified the reason (such as "because it is cold"), then we must assume that the reason will remain valid even on the following morning, and the person did not want his Eruv to be valid at all. (Compare to Tosfos' interpretation of the 1st Lashon, note #1b.)

(5) According to the first Lashon, Rebbi Meir holds that -- when the person who was making the Eruv went back to his place before Shabbos -- we are in doubt whether his intention was still to make his place of Shevisah in the place that he designated, or whether he changed his mind and intended for his place of Shevisah to be at his home. Therefore, he has the status of a "Chamar Gamal" who is limited to the part of the Techum shared by both possible places of Shevisah (Rashi 52a, DH v'Rav Yosef).

(6) This is the second Lashon of Rashi, which seems here (52a) to be his preferred explanation (even though he refuted this explanation on 51b, DH Iyhu; see Insights). According to the second Lashon of Rashi, "he said" refers to the person making the Eruv who said explicitly, "My Shevisah will be in such-and-such place." (Whether his friend kept him back or he stayed back on his own does not affect anything.) According to this, Rebbi Yehudah requires one to verbally declare his intention to make a certain place his place of Shevisah. Rebbi Yehudah did not teach this explicitly in the Mishnah only because he was relying on what was explained in the previous Mishnah (Rashi, DH v'Rav Yosef).

(7) According to the second Lashon of Rashi, Rebbi Meir holds that one who has just departed from his city is not considered an Ani. Only someone who is already traveling and is far from his

9 home is considered an Ani. Therefore, since this person has just left his city, he is considered an Ashir, and he may not make an Eruv by saying, "My Shevisah will be in such- and-such place." As a result, he is not Koneh Shevisah in the other city (Rashi 52a, DH v'Rav Yosef). However, since he wanted to be Koneh Shevisah in another place, he loses part of his Techum, and he is permitted to walk only in the area which is shared by the Techum of both places (the place where he wanted to be Koneh Shevisah, and the place where he is actually located) -- he is a "Chamar Gamal." (Even though earlier, on 35a, we learned that if one wanted to make an Eruv in a given place and the food of his Eruv rolled outside of his Techum, he does have the Techum of his city, Rebbi Meir apparently argues and holds that there as well he indeed loses the Techum of his city and is restricted to the Techum shared by his city and the place where he wanted his Shevisah to be. - Rashi 52b, DH Ela)

(8) According to the second Lashon of Rashi, Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah as interpreted by Rav Yosef is the only one who does not require a verbal declaration of intent to be Koneh Shevisah in a given place. Therefore, the Gemara deduces that the Beraisa and the story of Rav Nasan bar Oshiya are following the opinion of Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah, since they make no mention of verbally declaring one's intent to be Koneh Shevisah.

Rabah states, "Everyone agrees that he must say; they argue whether he must be Machzik." Rav Yosef states, "Everyone agrees that he must be Machzik; they argue whether he must say." It is not clear what exactly these phrases mean.

(a) According to Rashi's first explanation, the argument between Rabah and Rav Yosef is as follows.

1a. When Rabah says, "Everyone agrees that he must say," he means that both Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yosi maintain that in order for the Eruv to be valid even though the person returned to the first city, we must know that he returned not by his own volition but that his friend told him to return. When we see that his friend told him to return, we may assume that he still has in mind to rely on his Eruv the next day, during Shabbos. If the friend did not say anything and the person returned on his own, we assume that he no longer has intention to rely on his Makom Shevisah, and the Eruv is invalid. (This is what Rabah means when he says that everyone agrees that "he must say"; that is, the friend must say something to detain him, as opposed to his returning home by his own volition.)

1b. When Rabah says, "They argue whether he must be Machzik," he means that according to Rebbi Yehudah, although the person does not need to verbally declare his intent to be Koneh Shevisah, he must have departed from his home in order to be considered an Ani. Rebbi Yosi is lenient and does not require him to have actually left his home. As long as he was intended to leave, but his friend kept him back, his intent to be Koneh Shevisah is effective.

2a. When Rav Yosef says, "Everyone agrees that one must be Machzik," he means that both Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yosi require the person to have actually left his home in order to be considered an Ani.

10 2b. When Rav Yosef says, "They argue whether he must say," he means that Rebbi Yehudah does not require that the person return to his home at the urging of his friend. Even if he returns on his own accord, he acquires his intended Makom Shevisah by virtue of the fact that he started on his journey. Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah, though, requires not only that he started on his journey, but that his return homeward was at the urging of his friend. It follows that according to this explanation of Rashi, Rav Yosef holds that it is Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah who is stringent and Rebbi Yehudah who is lenient.

According to this explanation of Rashi, everyone agrees that the person making the Eruv does not need to expressly state, "My Shevisah will be in such-and-such place." When the Gemara says that "he said" ("Amar"), it refers not to the person making the Eruv, but to his friend who told him to stay in his present city and not to travel to the other city. The Gemara means that it was his friend who kept him back, and it was not his own decision to return. If, however, he said explicitly, "My Shevisah will be in such-and-such place," everyone agrees that his Eruv is valid, regardless of whether his friend kept him back or he returned on his own.

(According to this explanation, Rebbi Meir -- who says that the person making the Eruv is a "Chamar Gamal" -- is in doubt whether the person who returned to his city after he started out towards another city still intends to make his place of Shevisah in the place that he designated, or whether he has changed his mind and intends for his place of Shevisah to be at his home. Therefore, he has the status of a "Chamar Gamal" who is limited to the part of the Techum shared by both possible places of Shevisah.)

(b) According to Rashi's second explanation, the argument between Rabah and Rav Yosef is as follows.

1a. When Rabah says, "Everyone agrees that he must say," he means that both Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yosi require that the person making the Eruv say, "My Shevisah will be in such-and-such place."

1b. When Rabah says, "They argue whether he must be Machzik," he means that they argue whether the person making the Eruv must have actually departed from his home and started traveling or not. According to Rebbi Yehudah, in order to be considered an Ani who may make an Eruv merely by saying, "My Shevisah will be in such-and-such place," the person must have actually left home and started traveling. According to Rebbi Yosi, it is enough that he intended and planned to depart in order for him to be considered an Ani. Rebbi Yosi, therefore, is more lenient than Rebbi Yehudah in that he does not require the person to have actually left his home.

2a. When Rav Yosef says, "Everyone agrees that one must be Machzik," he means that both Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yosi require the person to have actually left his home in order to be considered an Ani.

2b. When Rav Yosef says, "They argue whether he must say," he means that they argue as follows. According to Rebbi Yehudah, the person making the Eruv must verbally declare, "My Shevisah will be in such-and-such place." According to Rebbi Yosi, the very fact that he departed from his

11 city towards the other city shows that he had intention to be Koneh Shevisah between the two cities, and that "Giluy Da'as" suffices. According to the second explanation of Rashi, Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah, as interpreted by Rav Yosef, is the only one who does not require a verbal declaration of intent to be Koneh Shevisah in a given place.

(According to this explanation of Rashi, Rebbi Meir -- who says that the person making the Eruv is a "Chamar Gamal" -- maintains that one who has just departed from his city is not considered an Ani. Only someone who is already traveling and is far from his home is considered an Ani. Therefore, since this person has just left his city, he is considered an Ashir and he may not make an Eruv by saying, "My Shevisah will be in such-and-such place." As a result, he is not Koneh Shevisah in the other city. However, since he wanted to be Koneh Shevisah in another place, he loses the part of his original Techum which is not accessible from the place in which he wanted to be Koneh Shevisah, and he is permitted to walk only in the area which is shared by the Techum of both places.)

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:2

The Mishna on our daf brings the case of two cities that were close enough to one another that someone could establish an eiruv and walk from one to the other. According to Rabbi Yehuda, a person who was heading from one city to the other on Friday afternoon – even if he was called back by his friend and did not reach it – can walk there on Shabbat, as he has established his eiruv by walking. Nevertheless, other people in the city would not be allowed to walk there. Rabbi Meir rules that since he did not clearly state his intention to establish an eiruv in that place, he falls into the proverbial “donkey-camel driver” situation (see 35a-b) and is limited in both directions.

According to Maimonides, the explanation for this case is that the person was sent by the community to be their representative in establishing an eiruv so that they would be able to walk to their neighboring city. Instead of placing food to create the eiruv, he simply walked to the edge of the tehum . Such an eiruv works for him, but the community cannot rely on their messenger’s physical presence to create an eiruv for them.

The Jerusalem Talmud has two explanations for this Mishna, both of which suggest that the person involved was sent as a representative of the community to establish an eiruv between the two cities, and it is his friend who called him back who has a different status than the rest of the city’s inhabitants.

According to the first explanation, the messenger successful established the eiruv for the entire city – except for the individual who called him back. So his friend can continue to walk the normal 2,000 amot around the city, while the rest of the city can walk one way only – towards the neighboring city.

2 https://www.steinsaltz-center.org/vault/DafYomi/Eiruvin/Eiruvin_51.pdf

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The second explanation understands the case to be when the messenger did not succeed in establishing the eiruv for anyone. The city’s inhabitants cannot walk to the next city, but the friend who was with him succeeded in establishing an eiruv for himself by virtue of his presence, so he is allowed to walk to the next city.

Rabbi Elliot Goldberg writes:3

The Gemara has thus far dedicated a significant amount of time to discussing the particulars of the eruv techumin, which defines the area in which one is allowed to travel on Shabbat. As we have learned, the general rule is that one can travel up to 2,000 cubits from one’s residence in any direction.

While the Gemara has explored a number of scenarios in which a person might expand or contract the area in which they are allowed to roam, each scenario has some defined travel limit.

Or, maybe not.

On our daf, we see that some rabbis believe that the 2,000-cubit limit is more or less, but not exactly, the limit. In a mishnah on today’s page, we learn:

MISHNA: One who intentionally, not for the purpose of performing a mitzva, went out beyond his Shabbat limit, even if only one cubit, may not reenter. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he went out two cubits he may reenter; however, if he went out three cubits he may not reenter.

The anonymous position in this mishnah holds tight to the rule — one can travel 2,000 cubits and that’s it. If you go even a cubit too far, you cannot return. Rabbi Eliezer presents a more lenient position, permitting one to exceed the prescribed limit by two cubits, but no more.

Later on, the page, we encounter a second mishnah that records a similar disagreement:

3 https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/eruvin-52/

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If it grew dark while one was traveling outside the Shabbat limit of the town where they were heading, even if it was only one cubit outside the limit, one may not enter the town. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if one was 15 cubits beyond the limit one may enter the town, because the surveyors do not precisely demarcate the measures, due to those who err.

Here we are dealing with a case of someone who is approaching a town as Shabbat is beginning. Once again, the anonymous position supports a strict boundary — if they are more than 2,000 cubits from the town as Shabbat starts, they can’t enter. Rabbi Shimon rules more leniently and grants people an additional 15 cubits.

In the first mishnah, Rabbi Eliezer’s rationale for being flexible is left open to speculation. But Rabbi Shimon’s leniency is supported with a reason: We give people an extra 15 cubits because the 2,000-cubit boundary marker isn’t accurate. Those who place the markers indicating the Shabbat boundary site them at a distance of less than 2,000 cubits because they know people will make a mistake.

How so? Some opinions say it is the travelers that err by crossing the boundary. To account for this, markers are placed short of the ultimate boundary. Others say it is the surveyors who, constrained by the local terrain, place boundary markers where it is geographically convenient and not exactly on the 2,000-cubit line.

Either way, the permissive opinions are not adopted. Later authorities rule according to the stricter positions. In their mind, the limit is the limit.

While this makes sense, so do the positions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon. Why not make room for someone who is just outside the line to enter the town? Isn’t it better to forgive a small transgression of a cubit or two than to prevent a person from joining a community on Shabbat? And if what Rabbi Shimon says is true, the boundary markers have been set up to keep people from transgressing, so it’s possible that someone who strays a couple cubits beyond hasn’t actually done anything wrong.

We’ll see more about how the boundaries of a town were established in the next chapter of Tractate Eruvin, which begins tomorrow.

14 Eruvim: Talmudic places in a postmodern world

Peter Vincent and Barney Warft write4

Lodged in the heart of Western urban space, eruvim are religious enclaves important to Orthodox Jewish culture. Eruvim enable acceptable behaviors on the Sabbath as defined by Talmudic theological dogma. Work, and the carrying of all objects associated with work, is prohibited in public spaces on the Sabbath by the Talmud, yet within the boundaries of the eruv, many such restrictions are relaxed, facilitating social interaction and community cohesion.

This paper examines the religious and spatial dimensions of eruvim, including the obsessive detail paid to the demarcation of their boundaries, which serve as metaphorical walls and doorways. It also explicates the local politics through which private space is effectively extended into public space. Conceptually, the paper situates the topic within broader concerns about diasporic Jewish identity, which is threatened by assimilationism, slow demographic growth and secularization. It invokes recent theories concerning the spatialization of consciousness and subjectivity, noting the recent growth of eruvim as part of the global surge in ethnic identity that has emerged as a backlash to postmodern capitalism.

Scattered across the landscapes of Israel and many towns and cities in the Western world, frequently invisible to inhabitants who may be ignorant of their purpose and symbolic meaning, lie a series of Orthodox Jewish places called, in Hebrew, eruvim (eruvin - Aramaic; singular eruv). Defined and erected according to ancient Talmudic law, eruvim are important to the behaviour of their residents.

As spaces of identity that reflect and reproduce traditional religious practices in a largely secular culture, eruvim are miniature worlds that personalize urban space by making, for Orthodox Jews, the public arena private. As sites of embodied cultural practice, they are an intriguing synthesis of local urban geopolitics and reflections of worldwide trends to escape or resist the late twentieth- century wave of time-space compression and commodification that has challenged and undermined many traditional cultures.

The literature on the geography of religion has shifted from earlier apolitical, empiricist concerns with the spatiality of different religious groups (Sopher 1967 1981; Levine 1986; Park 1994) and sacred spaces (e.g. Tuan 1974; Jackson and Henrie 1983) to more explicitly theoretical analyses centred upon, inter alia, the politics of religious dis- courses and symbolic meanings. Fundamental to current perspectives are the power relations that underpin religion as an ideology of domination and subordination whose exercise is fundamentally spatial in nature.

Conceptually, this metamorphosis has witnessed the gradual transition from long-standing Weberian assumptions that religion would gradually disappear in the face of the hegemonic rationality of commodity consumption to a studied preoccupation with religion and identity

4 https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3804454.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A9c0079ddd39b2eda66a77c83df717440

15 (Cooper 1992), including gender, class, nationality and place. Within this body of work, the view that religion constitutes a dying remnant of pre-modern culture has given way to an appreciation of how religious communities reproduce and reinvent themselves in a largely secular world.

Religion and modernity are not seen as diametrical opposites locked in hostile confrontation, but co-evolving, mutually transformative institutions that shape one another. The appropriation and legitimization of sacred spaces is inevitably tied up with the political organization of social relations, a dialectic that is contingent and place-specific in nature. Judaism is one of the oldest known religions in the world, and although some authors have studied Jewish law and spaces such as synagogues (Shilhav 1983a; Cooper 1996), analyses of the geography of Jews have remained predominantly confined to the purely empirical level (Newman 1985; Sheskin 1998 2000). The present paper examines the multiple dimensions of diaspora eruvim and, given the sparse research into this topic, does not seek to be a comprehensive global assessment. Instead, it mainly focuses on eruvim of the United States and the United Kingdom, where most have been established or planned within the last 30 years, and explicates their social, demo- graphic and spatial dynamics, embedding the topic within post-structuralist social theory concerned with the inter-relations between identity, power and space. The paper opens with a brief account of the rapid population decline of diaspora Jewry through assimilationism, inter-marriage, secularization and slow demographic growth, all of which threaten the social basis of contemporary Jewish identity. It next provides a detailed description of the religious roots of eruvim and how they are entwined with the social and spatial practices of Orthodox Judaism.

Third, it summarizes the geography of eruvim outside Israel, focusing on the US and the UK, and delves into the local politics that frequently accompany the erection of eruvim, focusing on the Hampstead Garden Suburb of London as an example. Finally, it conceptualizes eruvim as constellations of subjectivity and power drawing upon Giddens' structuration theory, symbolic interactionism and post- structuralist theorizations of identity and spatiality. It situates eruvim within the broader responses to global time-space compression in the late twentieth century, noting they may be conceived as part of a broader strategy of resistance and withdrawal from the hegemony of commodity fetishism.

Western Jews have long sought a balance between participation and isolation, a dilemma that is particularly intense for those seeking to reconcile tradition and modern life (Lipset 1990). The maintenance of Jewish identity in both the US and the UK has been problematic in the face of low birth rates, intermarriage with non-Jews, rising levels of secularization and out-migration to Israel. One-half of American Jews, for example, marry gentiles.

Indeed, assimilationism brought on by intermarriage, rising wealth and associated secularism is often viewed as the single greatest threat to modern Jewish life (Gamm 1999; Fishman 2000). Wasserstein (1996) laments that the diasporic European Jewish community is on the verge of disappearing and, in the same vein, Dershowitz (1997) writes of the 'vanishing American Jew', and the erosion of a vibrant cultural identity. Chanes (2000) notes that one implication of this loss of identity is the fact that while the majority of American Jews adhere to the performance of Jewish practices and rituals, relatively few are literate in carrying out these rituals.

16 The erosion of diasporic Jewish identity, how- ever, has not occurred equally among the various types of Judaism. Of American Jews who belong to synagogues, 15 per cent affiliate with Orthodoxy, the most conservative wing and the branch most relevant to the subject of eruvim. Of particular relevance to this paper is Chanes' (2000) observation that American Orthodoxy has recently experienced a shift to the religious and political 'right', away from the sustained engagement with American society that characterizes most Jews.

Indeed, their relationship with other non-Orthodox communities has become at times acrimonious, with some non-Orthodox even calling the Orthodox 'ghetto Jews' and Orthodoxy denying the Jewish authenticity of the other communities, an issue hotly debated in Israel as well. In the United States, this vitriol is symbolic of the collapse of dialogue between Orthodox and non-Orthodox communities with the demise of the Synagogue Council of America in 1994, the sole body purporting to represent the entire Jewish religious community.

Of the six synagogue groupings in the UK recognized by Schmool and Cohen (1998), the Mainstream Orthodox community comprised about 57 000 members and the much stricter Union Orthodox community about 6600 in 1996. In the UK, the loss of Jewish identity seems particularly concentrated in the non-Orthodox community, and the more halachically (by Jewish law) observant Orthodox group accounts for higher proportions of younger age cohorts, in part because of their higher birth rates and larger families (Schmool and Cohen 1998, 17).

Within Orthodoxy there is a spectrum of behaviour, although all Orthodox Jews believe that only by strictly following the Torah is it possible to be a 'good Jew'. At one end of the spectrum, the Centrist or Modern Orthodox Jews have generally adapted their lifestyle to that of modern Western society.

At the other end, in tightly knit ultra- Orthodox Haredi, communities show allegiance to the strict observance of traditions and customs that developed in the Jewish communities of eighteen- and nineteenth-century Eastern Europe, with a tendency to prefer the stricter options of halachic rule (Shilhav 1998). As Shilhav (1989) notes, the ultra-Orthodox are not necessarily more religious, but are religious in a different way.

They take it upon themselves to adopt stricter interpretations of halachic rulings where such an alternative exists, alongside their attachment to traditional Eastern European lifestyles.

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Eruvim as religious and social practice

Judaism as a set of moral and ethical codes is highly ordered socially and spatially through practices that can be traced back to the times of ancient walled cities in Israel several thousand years ago, ideologies that continue to structure the daily routines of its adherents (Katz 1991; Felsenstein 1997). For Jews, God endowed the Sabbath with kedusha, a special sanctity.

To help experience the holiness and delight of the Sabbath, a day of rest, the Torah requires that a foundation of observance be established by refraining from melakha - prohibited activities (Weiss 1987). One of the 39 melachot is hotza'ah, which prohibits carrying or transferring items in all areas except private domains that are properly enclosed, i.e. the home.

An extension of the home for these purposes is the eruv, a device by which an area that is not a private domain is halachically converted to one. The private domain is defined as an area enclosed

18 by walls, fences and the like not less than 10 tefachim high (approximately 38-40 inches). Thus an eruv is metaphorically an extension of the family, the fundamental social unit in many pre- industrial societies. The origins of the eruv can be traced back to the fourth century CE Babylonian Talmud, in which the definition of space and territory is rigorously and technically defined (Valins 2000).

The word itself is derived from the verb 'to mix' or 'to blend', since an eruv blends many properties into a single private domain. The primary purpose of an eruv is to enable residents to carry small necessities such as a book, food, keys and the like, and to wheel a baby pram within the designated area on the Sabbath.

Even within an eruv, some articles that are muktzah may not be handled or carried on the Sabbath. Muktzah may be defined as articles whose use is connected with a forbidden activity (e.g. writing materials, money, handbags, pocketbooks and tools), which are set aside before the Sabbath because they are not normally used on the Sabbath, including objects that cannot be used in their present state, such as frozen or uncooked meats. The use of umbrellas is also forbidden, since their use is considered as tent making. In addition, bicycling or visiting the local store is not permitted, letters may not be mailed, and large or heavy packages may not be carried. Even gifts for friends within the eruv must be usable on the Sabbath.

19 In Europe, it is surprising where eruvim are not found. Paris and Budapest both have some of the largest Orthodox Jewish populations in Europe, but neither city has an eruv. France does, however, have eruvim (French erouv) in Metz, Reims and Strasbourg.

It is likely that many eruvim dis- appeared during the Holocaust and were never re-established. One eruv re-established after World War II is located in Antwerp and was originally established in the 1930s. Venice and Gibraltar each have an eruv, though the dates of their establish- ment are not known.

In the United Kingdom, there has been considerable controversy about the establishment of the Hendon, Finsbury, Hampstead Garden Suburb eruv, and although through the final planning stages and Talmudic hurdles, it is unlikely to be fully operational until 2002 at the earliest. As noted earlier, there are several little-known eruvim in small cul-de-sacs and front gardens in the same general area. The one located in Woodlands Close, Golders Green, was quietly established in 1981 with little acrimony. An eruv is planned for north Manchester but the technical Talmudic correctness of the complex urban boundary is likely to hold up the project for several years (Valins 2000).

Eruvim as expressions of a militant, highly traditional Orthodox Judaism are not uncontested. Because they are only meaningful to a relatively small number of people, most urbanites simply ignore their presence.

The political opposition to eruvim originates from several sources, some of the most significant of which is not from outside the Orthodox community (i.e. secular Jews or non- Jews), but from within. Ultra-traditional Jews con- tend that any relaxation of restrictions on work during the Sabbath, within eruvim or without, is sacrilegious. Liberal Jews who are given to assimilationism occasionally fret that militant assertions of Jewish identity may attract anti-Semites and invite acts of aggression. Gentile opposition to eruvim often reflects prevailing assumptions that Christian culture is 'normal'.

In this view, eruvim are seen as privileging a minority religious group, violating modernist norms whereby religion is (or should be) confined to private spaces rather than the public sphere. More broadly, assertions of Jewish identity may even threaten the mythologized equation of nationality with a culturally homogenous citizenry defined, implicitly, by the hegemonic religious norms of the majority. As Cooper (1996, 537) points out, 'Public expression of difference contravenes the right of the dominant/universal community not to confront cultural otherness.' In short, the symbolic politics of eruvim provide the fuel that animates opponents, often heatedly.

Conceptualizing eruvim

Clearly, eruvim have a wider set of cultural connotations above and beyond the pragmatic advantages that they offer to their residents. Any understanding of eruvim, therefore, must situate these meanings within a wider comprehension of the social production of meaning. Geography has long exhibited an abiding interest in the ways in which human consciousness and space are inter- woven with social relations of power.

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Following Giddens (1984), culture may be understood as a matrix of ideologies that allow people to negotiate their way through their everyday worlds. Culture defines what is normal and what is not, what is important and what is not, what is acceptable and what is not, within each social context. Culture is acquired through a lifelong process of socialization: individuals never live in a social vacuum, but are socially produced from cradle to grave.

The socialization of the individual and the reproduction of society and place are two sides of the same coin, i.e. the macrostructures of social relations are interlaced with the microstructures of everyday life (Pred 1984 1990). Hence everyday thought and behaviour do not simply mirror the world, they constitute it. Such a view asserts that cultures are always intertwined with political relations and are continually contested. Giddens' more recent work (1991) on modernity and subjectivity maintains that under the historical conditions of advanced commodity production and consumption, the creation and maintenance of identity is a conscious project, not the product of unwitting socialization.

Spatializing subjectivity, identity, interaction and power has been no easy task and occupies a central role in post-structuralist thought. Lefebvre's (1974) representational spaces, borrowing from the older tradition of Hegelian Marxism, comprise spaces of the imagination in which the dramas of daily life are played out, fusing human consciousness to its geographical context. Such an approach avoids the polarizing oppositions of sterile Cartesian space on the one hand and an overly subjective, individualistic space of unfettered idealism on the other (Entrikin 1991; Merrifield 1993). Soja's (1996) notion of 'Thirdspace', designed to overcome the simple dichotomies of Enlightenment's binary divisions, extends this notion along the same lines, arguing places are neither simply crude material objects nor idealist constructions of a disembodied will, but complex, contingent products of human thought and imagination situated in local historical and spatial contexts that are always and every- where permeated by power relations.

The utility of this perspective in the comprehension of eruvim as dioramas of everyday life and consciousness is clear. The significance of eruvim lies in the shared meanings their inhabitants ascribe to them, which play out in terms of how they define what is permissible and what is not. On the Sabbath, an eruv extends the spatial margins of the permissible for the Orthodox Jews who inhabit it, transcending the boundaries between domestic (private) and public places. As collective projects motivated by, and in turn shaping, the shared understandings of particular groups of Orthodox Jews, eruvim illustrate how local cultural institutions penetrate into the core of their residents' sense of self and of one another.

Eruvim as discursively constructed places exist simultaneously as phenomenological spaces of ideology and as concretized instances of social activity, straddling the boundaries between individual subjectivity and collective praxis. As marginal sites of modernity, eruvim disrupt the convenient closures offered by Enlightenment conceptions of rational, ordered urban space.

A growing concern with the cultural heterogeneity of Western societies has led to a recognition by cultural theorists of the centrality of hybridity in the negotiation of dominant and subordinate identities (Bhabha 1994; Rose 1995; Mitchell 1997). Exceptions to the prevailing imagined communities of nationalism built around essentialized precepts of ethnicity, and occasionally

21 gender, inescapably contest and disrupt hegemonic ideologies, even if unintentionally (Moore 1997). Eruvim in such a context destabilize the convenient assumption of cultural homogeneity by demonstrating sites of difference and voluntary isolation from the world, disrupting prevailing precepts of national com- munity, and identity. For example, the proposed eruv in north-west London triggered opposition from those who saw it as a challenge to acceptable conceptions of Englishness.

Following Foucault (1984), this line of thought allows eruvim to be appreciated as a nexus of ideology, power and space, as a place simultaneously metaphorical and material. Jewish identity - often precarious in a frequently hostile world of gentiles (Boyarin and Boyarin 1996) - has long been explicitly spatialized at scales ranging from the ghetto to Zionist claims to a greater Israel.

An eruv constitutes a fused synthesis of social and personal identity manifested symbolically through the ideology of its residents; a geographical con- figuration of class, gender and ethnic relations; a stage for the performance of personal and collective identity (Goffman 1959); a bundle of signs that encodes and reproduces Orthodox Jewish notions of order, morality and ethics. As an imagined space that unites both ideology and material practice, eruvim thus ritually unify their residents, enhancing their solidarity and sense of community through the symbolic demarcation and enclosure of space as a collective metaphoric home. At another level, therefore, eruvim are important signifiers of religious tradition surrounded by a largely secular, and overwhelmingly gentile, society. The boundaries of the eruvim do not simply differentiate Jews from non-Jews, for both groups are found on either side.

Eruvim are not analogous to ghettos, which may be established through voluntary or involuntary segregation. However, the establishment of precise eruv boundaries cements and solidifies the sense of community within the eruv in the face of a dominant, secular, individualistic culture. In this way, eruvim illustrate the intricate connections between Judaism as an ancient body of beliefs and practices and the lifestyles of contemporary Orthodox Jews (Valins 2000). Eruvim in global context Above and beyond their role as constituent elements of local symbolic communities, eruvim are indicative of a broader pattern of cultural responses to the massive waves of cultural change, political upheaval and ethnic conflict unleashed by global capitalism during the late twentieth century.

A burgeoning literature has sought to document the complex ways in which the rapidly changing world system has brought in its wake rapid and thoroughgoing alterations of local subjectivities, including various forms of nationalism, ethnicity and religion (Featherstone 1990; Wallerstein 1991; Turner 1994; May 1996; King 1997). This genre has ranged far and wide in exploring pressing issues such as orientalism, local responses to globalization and the resurgence of ethnic- based fundamentalism in the face of a seamlessly connected, international information-based economy. While this body of work is far from compromising a homogenous whole, it has produced a remarkably widespread consensus that many forms of local cultural practice, ranging from tribalism to a deliberate retreat into the traditional, can be fruit- fully comprehended only when set within an understanding of worldwide dynamics.

22 Concluding thoughts

As sacred places stretching back to Biblical times, eruvim are constellations of power, knowledge and space lodged in the heart of the secular Western urban spaces. In contrast to the general decline of diasporic Judaism in the face of assimilationism, intermarriage and slow demographic growth, eruvim stand as reminders of an ancient past (both real and imaginary) steeped in religion. Defined according to strict interpretations of Talmudic law, eruvim function as working metaphors of communal space in the face of the highly individualistic culture of commodity fetishism, in which market relations come to define the self and relations among people.

In this light, they serve as manifestations of individual and collective Orthodox Jewish identity, facilitating family life and social interaction on the Sabbath in ways that would otherwise be strictly prohibited. As such, the spaces of eruvim are helpful, but not essential, to the reproduction of Orthodox Jewish culture. Yet eruvim can be seen in quite a different light, as destabilizing hegemonic notions of ethnicity built around the myth of imagined communities of the nation-state.

As Mitchell (1997, 535) notes, The identification of peoples who have multiple loyalties, move between regions, do not occupy a singular cultural space, and who often operate in some sense exterior to state boundaries and cultural effects, has proven attractive for theorists who have sought to disrupt normative narratives and understandings of nation and culture.' In this way, the assertion of Jewish tradition via space also interrupts dominant conceptions of the city built around secular rationality. Eruvim are moments of representation and lived experience, filled with personal meaning and social connotation. The built environment is always constitutive of meaning in ways that extend beyond its instrumental functionality. Architecture is always a dream, a function, an expression of utopia and an instrument of convenience (Barthes 1979); a lived space imbued with symbols as well as purposes.

The eruv suggests interventions in the city, which are small-scale, static and, for the most part, not material. Thus, it provides a model for pluralist uses of the city that do not exclude other readings of the same space. However, it is precisely the symbolic content of eruvim that frequently generates political opposition, from both Jews and gentiles, who contend that it represents the private religious appropriation of public space, the privileging of one group's identity over others, and a threat to the mythical Enlightenment ideal of the culturally homogenous citizen bound by universal norms of rationality.

This paper has argued that the question of eruvim is not one of simply imposing upon urban space an obscure religious practice, but rather the willingness of authorities and residents to sanction the city as a site of multiple readings. Given the heterogeneity of contemporary urban life, endlessly celebrated in the literature on post- modernism, eruvim are important reminders of the diversity of social and spatial practices that permeate the Western world, a diversity that extends to include even pre-modern forms tenaciously persisting in the face of widespread secularism. Indeed, given the global upsurge in ethnic and religious fundamentalism that has occurred as a backlash to

23 globalization, there is no reason to suspect that urban forms such as eruvim will disappear; many have thrived and even grown in size.5

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