Buying Into the American Dream

Buying into the American Dream

Reforming National Symbols in Bulgaria

Deema Kaneff

Kaneff, Deema 2002: Buying into the American Dream. Reforming National Symbols in Bulgaria. – Ethnologia Europaea 32:1: 35–48.

In this paper I examine the way in which national political symbols have changed in Bulgaria during the last decade. Using a comparative approach with examples from both the socialist and post-socialist periods, I observe two important trends. The first is that changes in the use of symbols reveal rural-urban divisions that have arisen as a consequence of post-socialist reform. The second trend is that there has been a notable shift away from symbols that give primacy to the political domain and towards ones rooted in the economic sphere of social life. Such observations provide a valuable insight into the particular direction that post- socialist reforms are taking in one east European context.

Deema Kaneff, Dr., Max-Planck-Institut für ethnologische Forschung, Max Planck

Institute for Social Anthropology, Postfach/PO Box 11 03 51, DE-06017 Halle/ Saale, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]

While post-socialist reform is primarily thought society toward the West and some of the of as political and economic transformation, implications of this for post-socialist society. and indeed much of the social science literature In the case of Bulgaria the shift in symbolic concentrates on these dimensions, it also in- meanings associated with the reforms was par-

ticularly evident through national politics. volves a change in national symbols. The dis- mantling of a centralised political and economic Phrased differently: political relations seem a system, and the establishment of market rela- particularly fruitful site of focus when explor- tions, has included a shift in the use and mean- ing nationally significant shifts in symbols. ing of symbols. Even production, a central arena This paper focuses on the symbols used both in of reform, is more than just about the creation the socialist and post-socialist period in the of material objects since objects always have domain of politics; such a comparison is one particular use and significance within a broader valuable means of examining the transforma-

tion in national symbols. Further, in the discus- context. As Sahlins (1976: 169) reminds us, objects are not only useful, but also meaningful. sion of post-socialist Bulgaria, I concentrate on While advocates of capitalism present the the period when political divisions – and sym- reforms as economically rational – in contrast bolic battles – were at their height in the early to the way in which socialist production is to mid 1990s. While the reform of symbols is represented – the capitalist economy is no less always underway, focussing on this period is detached from symbolic meanings than any particularly useful, for the political symbols

used at this time were especially powerful in other economic order. We would therefore expect that in adopting a capitalist type of economy, a shaping social processes in the crucial early reassessment of Bulgarian national symbols – phase of the reforms. It was during this time, for those that “accompany” the political-economic example, that a stark contrast between political structure – has also occurred. Below I examine symbols of rural and urban areas – in terms of the situation in post-socialist Bulgaria: how what symbols were employed and what dis- symbols have changed in the last decade, the course was used – became evident. It is a con- role they have played in re-orienting Bulgarian trast which emerged in the post-1989 period

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and which laid bare the essential political dif- throughout the socialist period (in contrast to ferences between rural and urban regions in the relationship between other east European

Bulgaria. This rural/urban division may no long- countries and the former Soviet Union). er be as prominent, but it is still a crucial factor Indeed the closeness portrayed between the in understanding ongoing relations between two countries went beyond political rhetoric the countryside and cities. Further, the use of and was evident in a wide range of ways: from different symbols after 1989 and re-valuation of common linguistic, cultural and historical the old ones, provides insights into the specific heritage, to economic and ideological factors. way in which the re-orientation of the country Even outside the capital of Sofia, in the provin- towards ‘the West’ has occurred and is still cial areas, Russians were spoken about in a occurring. Symbols have played a vital role in positive way. Thus Bulgarian villagers referred the legitimation of the post-socialist political- to the Russians as their “brothers” who had economic order. The new symbols therefore given their lives to help Bulgaria attain free- reveal something about the particular “brand” dom from 500 years of Turkish rule. On spotting of capitalism that is “on offer”. red poppies growing in fields by the road side, Before moving onto the next section, I con- people were quick to elaborate that each poppy clude this one with a brief note on the data represents a place where Russian blood has presented here. Ethnographic sources for this been spilt in the battle to free Bulgaria. This paper are varied: historical “documents” from image, which holds historical complexity and the socialist and post-socialist period provide a symbolises annual renewal, displays the depth foundation, but these are complemented with of the relationship that existed between the two both fieldwork data and anecdotal materials nations. from both times. By virtue of the open-ended Such shared ties were reflected – and at the nature of symbolic systems, I can but describe same time provided a basis for – Bulgaria’s what must always be the tip of the iceberg, only close economic relationship with the USSR. a limited rendition of the meta-narrative or Bulgaria was acknowledged to be receiving metaphors which ‘speak’ to the different “...sustained favoured Soviet treatment...” where symbolic structures of the different systems the Soviet Union provided the east European (socialist and capitalist). nation with important raw materials on favour- able terms, trade and investment credits, tech- nical assistance and an ‘unlimited’ market for National Socialist Political Symbols agricultural and industrial products (McIntyre During the socialist period it was Bulgaria’s 1988: 69). The statistics emphasised the de- relationship to the Soviet Union rather than to pendency and importance of trade links be- any other country that was given primary state tween the two countries: for example in 1985 importance. In a speech in 1980 to the Father- the USSR received 56.5% of all Bulgarian ex- land Front (a government organisation with a ports and provided 56.1% of the latter’s imports membership comprising approximately one-half (McIntyre 1988: 79). Further the USSR provid- the total population of the country), Todor Zhivk- ed the model for both Bulgarian agriculture and ov, the leader of the Party and government for industry. The degree of closeness has been such the last 35 years of socialist rule, stated that that some have doubted the autonomous cate-

“...we declare with profound conviction and pride gory of foreign policy for Bulgaria. But as McIn- that our country has never had a more loyal, tyre correctly observes “...this is a less provoca- more interested, more sincere and secure ally tive question in the Bulgarian case than for than the Soviet Union...” (Todor Zhivkov. A other Eastern European countries since funda- Biographical Sketch1 1981: 313). Of course, as mental differences in interests are hard to find” with any political rhetoric, we need not take the (1988: 77). McIntyre also realistically points out declaration too literally, but nevertheless it that the closeness between the two countries is does reflect the warm relations between the two in part due to the “persistent efforts of the USA nations which continued relatively unchanged to resurrect the Tsarist army and political groups

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that had collaborated with the pro-German close relationship between the Bulgarian Com- wartime government” (1988: 67). (Notably, such munist Party (BCP) and the Communist Party

USA involvement in sponsoring anti-socialist of the Soviet Union (CPSU) “...was reflected in movements continues in the present as, for the prominence accorded to leading BCP figures example, in the 1992 elections, see Smollett in the international communist movement, in 1993.) While there have been brief moments particular the Soviet dominated comintern which when relations between the USSR and Bulgar- was headed by Dimitrov from 1935 until 1943” ia have wavered – for example, in the mid-80s – (McIntyre 1988: 42). Dimitrov, who had worked bilateral relations were generally described as with Blagoev, was a confidant and adviser to of fundamental, even ‘organic’ importance. A Stalin (McIntyre 1988: 43). view reflected in a comment made by Dimitrov This tradition of Russian influenced Bulgar-

(Bulgaria’s first socialist leader after World ian socialist leaders provided, in turn, the root War II) when he said that “...for the Bulgarian for following Bulgarian leaders. Chervenko, who people friendship with the USSR is just as preceded Zhivkov, had spent two decades in necessary for life as the air and sun is for any Moscow and was “a favourite of Stalin’s” (McIn- living creature” (Crampton 1987: 174). tyre 1988: 68). Of course the falling out of Stalin Much of the closeness between the two coun- in Moscow contributed to Chervenko’s down- tries was embodied in the symbols of the leaders fall, since his political reputation was built and what I term fictive relations of kinship that upon his close association with Stalin. Bulgar- were constructed between them. ia’s long serving leader, Todor Zhivkov, made no Schwartz (1971) has shown how all USSR such mistake. He asserted his closeness to leaders after Lenin built their political reputa- Dimitrov, who in turn was re-presented as “Len- tions and authority on the basis of their estab- in’s loyal disciple” (Todor Zhivkov. A Biograph- lished ties to Lenin. The ‘cult’, as Schwartz de- ical Sketch 1981: 141), any previous association scribes it, began with Lenin’s death which Stalin with Stalin being played down. In 1952, when used for his own political purposes. Ever since – speaking to the members of the Central Com- and especially after Stalin’s public demise – mittee (of the BCP), Zhivkov said “Comrade leaders have portrayed themselves as in the Dimitrov tirelessly taught us to master the direct line of ideological succession from Lenin. experience of the Bolshevik Party, to master the In a similar way, Bulgarian socialist leaders Marxist-Leninist teaching. There can be no from 1944 – when the socialist state was estab- doubt that had Comrade Dimitrov been alive lished – onwards have all linked themselves today, he would have shown no less exigence with the two ‘founding fathers’ of Bulgarian towards our cadres. We are steadfastly follow- socialism – Blagoev and Dimitrov – who in turn ing Comrade Dimitrov’s directives. We are learn- were depicted as direct descendants of Russian ing from the experience of the Bolshevik Party” Bolshevism. (Todor Zhivkov. A Biographical Sketch 1981: Blagoev was a Bulgarian revolutionary elite 159–160). When Brezhnev presented Zhivkov educated in the USSR. He was one of the found- with the honoured title of ‘Hero of the Soviet ing members of the first Marxist groups in the Union’ he declared that “During the trying country and his followers took part in the Rus- years of the war, you were one of the organisers sian uprising against tsarism in 1905 and the and leaders of the partisan movement in unsub-

October revolution in 1917. Indeed much of the dued Bulgaria. And when freedom triumphed 19th century Bulgarian revolutionary elite was in the Bulgarian land, you devoted all your educated in Russia while an autonomous Marx- energies to the building of socialism and showed ist tradition in Bulgaria created a strong ‘Lenin- yourself a worthy disciple and contributor of ist’ following well before the October revolution the work of that great revolutionary, Georgi (McIntyre 1988: 67). During periods of political Dimitrov.” (Todor Zhivkov. A Biographical Sketch upheaval – such as the military-royalist seizure 1981: 312). Apparently unimportant communi- of power in 1923 – the Bulgarian Communist cations between Zhivkov and Dimitrov are giv-

Party leadership was sheltered in Moscow. The en considerable attention in his biography.

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Zhikov was noted to have taken part in numerous of metaphoric ‘kinship’; a kinship based on the demonstrations and meetings in displays of shared associations between revolutionaries support for Dimitrov at the time of the Reich- who all held the common goal of the realisation stag Fire trial in 1933 (Todor Zhivkov. A Bio- of a communist order. This kinship was ‘sealed’ 2 graphical Sketch 1981: 39) . Photographic ‘proof’ with the spilling of Russian blood on Bulgarian of the associations between them is included, soil. This image, often evoked by ordinary showing their attendance at the same events individuals as well as political leaders by refer- (Todor Zhivkov. A Biographical Sketch 1981). ring to the Russians as ‘brothers’, had historical Perhaps a quote will best serve to display the depth: it extended back at least to the freeing of way in which Zhivkov’s political authority in the Bulgaria from Turkish oppression and was late socialist period was validated in terms of strengthened by the close political affiliations past Bulgarian socialist leaders, who I empha- the former had with the Russian hero – Lenin. sise, in turn legitimated their own historical Further, the fictive relationship of kinship be- importance in terms of Russian Leninist tradi- tween the leaders was represented as funda- tions. In Zhivkov’s biography (Todor Zhivkov. A mental in the country’s development of socialist Biographical Sketch 1981: 364) it is noted that: goals and for its pursuit of the age of communism. Those leading the Bulgarian state to-

“For half a century now Todor Zhivkov’s name wards this goal were exemplary figures in rela- has been associated with the heroic struggles tionships worthy of imitation. Through the and constructive work of the Bulgarian Com- Bulgarian leaders, the nation was linked to the munist Party. He is a loyal disciple of Dimiter Soviet Union which ‘…blazes the trial to com- Blagoev and Georgi Dimitrov, their successor munism for entire mankind’ (Zhivkov 1985: and continuator, who has carried on their revo- 101). In short the relationship between the two lutionary work under qualitatively new social is one of ‘brotherhood’ created on the basis of conditions...To the invaluable political and the- the commonly shared ideology of the states. My oretical heritage of Dimiter Blagoev and Georgi impression is that the idiom of brotherhood – 3 Dimitrov, Todor Zhivkov has been making a one which also existed in other socialist sites – fresh contribution connected mainly with the was not so much ‘imposed’ from Moscow, as advances of the Party and the people along the much as a strategy adopted by Bulgarian leaders. road to mature socialism. Events in different countries of eastern Europe The history of the Bulgarian Communist – Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland – had made Party and of our country assigns to him a it obvious that open resistance to the USSR was rightful place alongside Dimiter Blagoev and futile. On the other hand, apparent compliance

Georgi Dimitrov. Since the Liberation of Bul- brought with it rewards; good relations with the garia from Ottoman domination, these three USSR were necessary for privileged access to men have been the most eminent political fig- resources and special assistance. In much the ures, the most outstanding leaders of the Bul- same way that local village leaders connected to garian Communist Party, who elevated the pres- the Bulgarian state centre (see below), it seems tige of the revolutionary workers’ movement that national Bulgarian leaders associated and that of the country far beyond its borders.” themselves to the USSR centre for similar

reasons and in the same way (by fictive kin).

This publicly legitimated portrayal of Bulgarian- Importantly, this constructed ‘kinship’ be- Soviet relations via an exemplary leadership, tween the leaders provided justification for – however selective and thus narrow in what it and generated further – economic activity be- reveals, nevertheless underlines a few themes tween the two countries. As Zhivkov comment- which I believe to be instrumental in under- ed during a speech at an award ceremony con- standing some of the crucial symbols of the veying to Brezhnev the highest of all Bulgarian period. distinctions, the title of ‘Hero of the People’s

The relationship associating Bulgarian lead- Republic of Bulgaria’, “...The profound mutual ers ultimately to Lenin may be viewed as a type respect and the personal example of the two

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Party and state leaders generate powerful im- 1996), how an individual or community con- pulses for the further expansion and deepening nected to the state centre was particularly sig- of Bulgarian-Soviet friendships and co-opera- nificant. At the local level, officials would en- tion which are becoming a great material force gage in the state administrative process both of our development” (Todor Zhivkov. A Biograph- through the official/formal hierarchical struc- ical Sketch 1981: 310). The close relationship ture and informally. In both instances the fic- between leaders was put forward as a model to tive kinship connections between national lead- be imitated across Bulgarian society in every ers was significant. Individual local leaders, on realm of social life. Economic development was behalf of a community, would make connections justified and enabled on the basis of mutual and directly with the state centre, through establish- close ties of ‘kinship’ between the two, not the ing his/her historical connections to the fictive reverse. Bulgarian (and Soviet) socialist state ancestral leadership discussed above. ideology thus defined the particular way in Thus, for example, in village Talpa where I which both countries were ‘bound’ together: a have conducted research5 , the head of the Com- community based on shared ideological goals munist Party – Comrade Pashev – made known and legitimated by the state through the con- his acquaintanceship with Zhivkov, an associa- structed ‘kinship’ of its leaders. tion that originated in the late 1930s. During

To date I have described at the national level this time Zhivkov had lived in Talpa for two how constructed relationships between Bulgar- years, in hiding from the fascist government. ian and Soviet political leaders served as vital Pashev legitimated his contemporary power symbols in the legitimation of socialist ideology. (during 1980s) in local politics by regularly It is now important to add that the significance recounting, both in meetings and during of these symbols extended all the way down to informal conversations, his memories of past the local administrative level. Further, this had times. The village museum also commemorated practical implications for the everyday func- Zhivkov’s stay in the village (or more accurately tioning of state socialism. Elsewhere I have it commemorated the period that Zhivkov and stressed the importance of the centralised na- his fiancée spent in Talpa, the latter in her ture of the socialist state when considering the professional capacity as village doctor) and nature of political relations (Kaneff forthcom- documented villager’s relations to the Bulgarian ing). During socialism, the state centre4 played head of State. Both the museum and historical a fundamental role in the control and allocation recountings became a centre-piece in local acts of resources: the village was a ‘primary’ unit of of legitimation, in displays of commitment to the administrative hierarchy subordinated to socialist ideology. The benefits to the commun- the district, that in turn was subordinated to ity for displays of dedication to socialism was the region, which in turn was subordinate to the privileged access to the wide range of resources national capital, Sofia. The direction of goods and privileges controlled by the state centre. and resources along the administrative This was by no means the only strategy employed hierarchy reflected a vertical pattern of move- to connect a peripheral village with the state ment where everything was valued with re- centre, but it was a particularly significant spect to the centre. In this sense the socialist method. In using his established connections to system differed from market-oriented systems Zhivkov, Pashev and other prominent village where goods flow in a lateral direction (Verdery figures were able to obtain resources that 1991). I would add that this vertical flow not otherwise a bureaucracy with all its hierarchical only explained the movement of goods but also hurdles would have made much harder to attain. was equally relevant to the movement of power The advantages of this were evident to anyone – to political careers and social capital more visiting the village: it was better serviced – for generally. The significant fact to grasp about example, more of its roads were asphalted – the centralised state is that because it was than many other communities in the same those at the very peak of the hierarchy who administrative district. controlled resources and privileges (Verdery

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Cashing-in Socialism for Capitalism existing at every level of government, from the dying economy, from militarism, from every After 1989, the Bulgarian state adopted a very viciousness of a totalitarian system, a deper- different relationship with foreign powers. This sonalised nation – which raised generations of involved swapping its traditional ally, Russia, human culture, raised nations which have lost with ‘the West’, a result achieved by two simulta- faith in communist imperialism [while their neous processes: rejecting its established rela- people have] … become immersed in alcohol- tionship with the former Soviet Union and creat- ism, drug abuse, prostitution and with devel- ing a new association with Western allies. Below oped levels of crime which compete with the I look at both these dimensions and the different American mafia” (Semkov 1993: 135). The de- symbols that were employed in this process. cay of Soviet society is underlined when it is The severing of ties with the former Soviet described as developing into “...the biggest beg- Union was achieved largely through rewriting gar that has ever existed” (Semkov 1993: 137). the role of the Soviet Union in Bulgarian histo- Semkov continues to explain that in order for ry, not only the history of the past 50 years, but the Soviet population to survive, an ever-in- also that which extended back to Bulgarian creasing amount of food and medicines have independence from the Turks. Russia was no been diverted to the USSR. The author then longer presented as having ‘freed’ Bulgaria from lists in the 6-month period from January to July Turkish oppression, but as fighting the Turks 1991 the amount of aid given by western coun- for its own imperialist aims. Again 1944 was not tries. Such a depiction of the USSR at the same the point at which Russians aided Bulgaria in time elevates “the West” to the moral, political attaining freedom from fascism but the point at and economic high ground. which Bulgaria was incorporated into the Rus- An important way in which the long-stand- sian communist empire. The rewriting of the ing alliance between Bulgaria and the former past to reject any positive contribution made by Soviet Union was questioned after 1989 was Russia to the Bulgarian nation represents a through discrediting previous political leaders very different way in which the historical who were once society’s “model” citizens. The relationship between the two was conceived. fictive ancestral link extending between Bul- The process was led by urban intellectuals and garia’s Zhivkov and Russia’s Lenin that was anti-socialists.6 Historian Tzvetkov, for example, discussed in the previous section was made writes that “...the occupation of Bulgaria by the irrelevant and devalued. Semkov (1993: 138), Red Army in September 1944 and the subse- describes the Soviet Union as a nation run by quent forced Sovietization brutally interrupted “sclerosis-ridden high-ranking nomenclature”. the country’s natural development” (1993: 37, Breshnev and Chernenko, members of Politbu- my emphasis) and he frequently uses phrases ro, members and candidates of the Central such as “Bulgaria’s humiliating subservience to Committee, ministers, marshals and generals Moscow”, describing communists as having an were all part of a “never before seen in con- “ingrained subservience” to Russia (1993: 38). temporary times gerontocracy (government by Along with such a rewriting of history has come geriatrics)” (Semkov 1993: 134–135). In 1991, the usage of ‘new’ public symbols and rituals Dimitrov’s embalmed body was taken out of the (eg. the importance of the church), and the mausoleum and cremated, thus destroying the destruction of others (eg. statues of Lenin). country’s most important socialist symbol9 . In Soon after 1989, high school children across 1999 a decision was taken to dynamite the Bulgaria were issued with new history text- empty mausoleum and thus totally wipe-out books. 7 Semkov, the author of such a book the structure. This took repeated attempts as presents the Soviet Union8 in very negative the building was designed to withstand nuclear terms. His attack is primarily focussed on the attacks – the staying power of the building government and Communist Party. Thus the proved an apt symbol of the resistance to the people in the USSR were “…detrimentally af- changes shown by the rural areas (see below). fected by the …incompetence and corruption The importance of political leaders as social-

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ist symbols set the stage for the type of symbols also interesting. Kennedy was at once something that became prominent in the post-socialist era; to aspire to (much in the same way that previous with “old” socialist leaders situated in contrast socialist leaders had been) and a tool which to the “new” capitalist ones. We need search no gave a particularity to the political-economic further than the Bulgarian elections of 1991 to system that was under reform. find how the new anti-communist leaders were The importance of material wealth becomes represented. Philip Dimitrov, the leader of the a particularly dominant concern of post-social- Union of Democratic Forces (the UDF was a ist political symbols. “The West” and more spe- coalition formed by 19 different parties who cifically the USA are raised as representative of held one thing in common, their anti-commu- a high standard of living, evidenced through the nist stance) was a young, Sofian lawyer who wide ownership and display of material goods. was soon given the nick-name “Philip Kennedy” “Being western” is to be prosperous and in turn because, to quote a supporter, “he’s young, a new this indicates a high level of civilisation (Smol- face and new stimulus”. This name, which his lett 1993: 10). From the high school text we see supporters frequently used, underlined the fea- not only evidence of this, but can learn more tures considered important by the anti-commu- details about it. In a number of places the text nist camp. The new Bulgarian leader (a position discusses the advanced nature of western Eu- he held only temporarily due to factional rivalry rope and its high standard of living and com- that led to the loss of power of his elected party) pares this with the more impoverished eastern symbolised a new relationship between Bul- Europe (Semkov 1993: 130). (No mention is garian leaders and “the West” and significantly made of the fact that industrialisation in Bul- with one country in particular – the USA. But garia only began in the middle of the 20th his nickname “Kennedy” did more than connect century, unlike much of western Europe, nor of the Bulgarian leader to the USA. It also served the fact that the latter’s wealth was largely to graft onto Bulgarian politics a new symbol accumulated through the colonisation of other with the intention of establishing a new countries.) Thus, for example, the book quotes narrative which implicated the importance of figures from Bdzedzinski who compares the material wealth, youth and power, using one of USSR with the USA, European Union and Japan the wealthiest and most powerful US families in respect to the number of computers in 1983. and one of their youngest and most charismatic (The author notes that in 1992 the discrepancies presidents. The Kennedy symbol stood in deep are even greater, Semkov 1993: 136.) contrast to those of the socialist period, where The table (Semkov 1993: 136) is followed by the leaders age, financial or charismatic appeal the following comment, worthy of being quoted were qualities irrelevant to their symbolic in full. powers. The fact that it was Kennedy rather than more contemporary USA leaders – Bush, “If added to this example you consider also the Reagan – who was given symbolic signifiance is quality of used computers and items in the

Table 1: Comparison of computer ownership between USA, EU, Japan and USSR

USA EU Japan USSR

Large and middle sized computers 96 500 23 400 16 900 3 040

Per 1 million population 412 135 142 11

Personal computers 1 000 000 240 000 70 000 22 200

Per 1 million population 4 273 1 387 588 80

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USSR (if they are not from the west)... it in itself had grown to 29 million, during 1960 – 83 explains why the USSR collapsed. As once the million, during 1969 – 114 million, by 1992 sheep ate [out] feudalism, so now computers every family has at least two television sets. But have carried out the same function towards that is also now the situation in most European socialism, computers and the totalitarian sys- countries...” (Semkov 1993: 150). tem are incompatible – at the moment that the mass production of computers began, it [social- In addition to defining the advanced nature of ism] died. The reason is, that democracy and the the USA in terms of technology, “uniform” own- totalitarian system are incompatible and be- ership of technology is viewed as a indicator of cause of that the USSR could not be saved by the equality between all people. The old concern for reforms of Gorbachev” (Semkov 1993: 136–137). socialist equality based on the attempt to elim-

inate class difference has been replaced with Some implications from the quote deserve high- the elevation of technology and material goods lighting. Socialism and the USSR at its head is in general which are viewed as measurers and viewed as “backward” and this “backwardness” levellers of social parity. Semkov (1993) creates is measured in terms of technology. Technolog- the illusion that there is no poverty in the West ical progress – consumer objects of a particular by failing to mention the great levels of internal type – becomes one means of measuring the disparity of wealth – a problem that did not

“stage” of development of a social system, it is exist to the same degree in socialist countries. also directly associated to levels of democracy. Nor does his work raise the morally questionable Material goods, including technology such as fact of one country consuming so many of the the number of televisions, radio’s, computers world’s resources. Further, he clearly sets up that are owned, are used as direct indications of the association between technology, high standard of living. The USA is credited as the standard of living and democracy as if the three source of the knowledge which led to the are necessarily consequential of each other. computer age (Semkov 1993: 148) and by The promise of future wealth, of democracy, implication this country is the most progressive is conjured up by the symbol of the USA flag or 10 and most democratic. In short, capitalist in the reference to Philip “Kennedy”. Impor- democracy and high level technology are equat- tantly, it is particular groups in Bulgarian soci- ed, while simultaneously viewed as incompati- ety who adopted this new symbolism – namely, ble with the socialist system. the young, urban Bulgarians seduced by USA Example after example in the school text mania. Smollett writes “...these young people raise the USA as the model of technological who have literally wrapped themselves in the advancement, high standard of living and thus USA flag, printed on their T-shirts ... are con- as being the most democratic. The president of vinced that the market equals democracy and the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences is quoted in brings prosperity...” (1993: 12). It is the same the Washington Post (1992): “Right now the young Bulgarians who believe that there is American is the ideal. Bulgarians believe that universal wealth in the West (Smollett 1993: Americans never lie, they never steal, they 12). As the socialist system in this history book never throw rubbish on the streets” (cited in is associated with an “administration of the

Smollett 1993: 9). Thus: aged” (Semkov 1993: 135) so “the West” with the

USA as its flagship is linked to youth, vitality “In these countries [the West] the tendency is and contemporanity. “The youth is searching for towards a levelling out in standard of living. its own place in society, different from the life of During 1954 the USA (then having 6% of the its own parents” (Semkov 1993: 153), and so the worlds population) owned 60% of all cars in the chasm is formed between socialism/backward- world, 58% of all phones, 45% of radio’s and so ness/old on the one side and capitalism/progress/ on. Revealing is the example of number of new on the other. American symbols represent televisions in the USA. During 1950 they a significant break with the past; they become numbered ‘only’ one million, during 1954 they the ‘natural’ domain of, and are held in high

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regard by, the youth. In adopting these symbols, lege in the new capitalist-oriented order where which emphasise technology, the promise of previous connections to Party officials are no wealth and prosperity, Bulgaria comes out as longer of benefit. The breakdown in relations the poor partner, backward in terms of “the between the village and the state centre was West” but with the promise of gaining material most strongly evident in the early 1990s when prosperity. This promise binds Bulgaria to “the the village museum, Talpa’s most visual symbol West”; it is a relationship founded on material- of close local associations with the state centre, ism and the anticipation of increased standard was shut down. The house was eventually re- of living through the greater availability of turned to its pre-World War II owners under consumer (especially) technological goods. USA privatisation laws. The owners, however, have symbols – spearheaded by Kennedy – become no interest in returning to Talpa and the site all important as measures for technological remains unoccupied and untended. The vil- advancement, materialism and prosperity; in lage’s decline in political status was also evi- short what many in the urban regions at least dent by the return of urban-residing village understand to be the most attractive qualities natives who formerly held high level state offi- of capitalist “democracy”. cial positions but since 1989 have been removed The temporal metaphor aligning the country from office and returned to retire in Talpa. with new capitalist relations was not adopted Those who built their careers on the basis of across the country, however. Indeed the symbol- their links to Zhivkov have lost their individual ism of Kennedy and the popularity of the Bul- power and prestige while the Talpian communi- garian leader who carried this new set of values ty exists “out on a limb”, excluded from the with him, had a following that was largely present political activities. Further, at precisely restricted to the urban areas of Bulgaria – the time when Philip “Kennedy” was running Sofia, Varna and Plovdiv. In the rural areas the for election, there was little, almost no political situation was very different. or any other public activity in the village: Party

To understand this I begin by underlining the meetings were not held, public holidays and fact that rural Bulgarians experienced social- other events once celebrated by large gather- ism in a different way from urban inhabitants. ings passed with no public acknowledgement. As a consequence their response to the reforms The absence of such events was an additional was also different. Villagers’ lives improved dra- sign of the breakdown in relations between the matically during the socialist period; basic con- urban and rural regions. veniences such as running water, electricity, the Village discourse about the reforms posed a establishment of good services (pensions, free spectacular contrast to events as described in medical and educational opportunities) and an the new history texts written by urban, anti- improvement in communication services (roads, socialists. Talpian discourse held Gorbachev as telephones and so on) were all a result of social- responsible for the devastating reforms. Stories ist investment. Post-1989 changes have reversed circulated about the involvement of the CIA in much of this, depriving villagers of many of the the collapse of state socialism and in Gorbachev’s advantages in lifestyle gained in the previous 50 involvement in this plot. One view was that years. Throughout rural Bulgaria, including Gorbachev was educated, in part, in the West

Talpa, this is a central reason stated by villagers and therefore he upheld the interests of the for their own pro-socialist views. West. What was evident during this time was a The links Talpians developed with the previ- revival of the political split, between commu- ous socialist ruling elite, were another impor- nists and anti-communists, that has plagued tant consideration. As noted in the previous Bulgaria on several occasions during the 20th section, successful local pursuit of political con- century. To many Talpians, UDF supporters nections to high-level Communist Party offi- (that is, those from Philip “Kennedy’s” party) cials gave Talpians privileged access to a range were people who had interests in taking re- of resources before 1989. Villagers recognise venge against supporters of socialism. Many their current loss of political power and privi- had had, during the World War II period, asso-

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ciations with the fascist government. In one and the socialist system with considerable village meeting in 1994 – the first year that nostalgia. Until the late 1990s comments such public gatherings were held again after 1989 – as “bring back T. Zhivkov and the earlier times” such anti-socialists were identified as “the and “we lived well with dyado Tosho, but now?” murderers, and their descendants, of the anti- clearly questioned the present in preference to fascists” and “model vandals, inflated from a the socialist times. Such post-socialist rural vindictive class who today are seeking revenge” symbols had little in common with those that (for more detail see Kaneff 1998). The political found popularity in urban Bulgaria during the polarisation between communists and anti-com- same period. munists, a division that rose in intensity during

World War II, was a national wound reopened in Conclusion those first years after 1989. During this time, and indeed until his death Post-socialist reforms are given specificity, in in 1998, Zhivkov remained a central and posi- part, through the distinctive symbols that make tive symbol for villagers and pro-socialist sup- the process meaningful to people. The early porters more generally. Talpians were aware of period of post-socialist reform, with its particu- urban criticisms of Zhivkov, but they did not lar new symbols, played a crucial role in estab- accept these. One elderly woman told me, dur- lishing the future ideological direction of Bul- ing a conversation on the street in 1994 “…they garia. It was also an intense and nationally say in Zhivkov’s time that he heaped a debt of divisive time. millions but at least in those times there was I have suggested above that relations of new construction, while now they’ve heaped as familiarity with the state, the creation of fictive many millions in debt as Zhivkov did in 30 years kin between political leaders, were a central but not one brick has been laid in the last few dimension of state socialism. Such processes years”. The Zhivkov period as one of growth and regulated economic and other relations at all the post-socialist period as one of destruction levels of the administrative hierarchy: between was a common theme. Another elderly villager the village and state centre and even between in 1996 commented “…everything built over Bulgarian national leaders and the USSR centre the last 50 years has been ruined in the last in Moskow. Metaphoric kinship between political three”. At the time when Zhivkov’s opponents leaders was constructed to validate and re- had him under house arrest (despite their at- produce socialism. The constructed kinship tempts they were unable to find any misde- amongst the leaders was intended to be more meanours which held substance in court), a than just exemplary, it actually formed, in fact

Macedonian from Talpa commented “Zhivkov presupposed, the basis of the close ties between may have been a criminal, but bread was 36 leaders which enabled, in turn, a whole range of stotinki (the coinage currency) everywhere in economic, social and other contacts to be Bulgaria”, so indicating the cheapness of living established and legitimated. This was as true at during the socialist period and the stability the international level (between Bulgarian and existing throughout the country as a result of USSR leaders) as it was locally, in Talpa, where fixed prices. In the struggle to make ends meet, references to “dyado Tosho” indicated relations and with the majority in the village dependent of familiarity existing between villagers and on pensions which were worth very little in the the head of the Bulgarian state. It helped place context of steep inflation, another village wom- Talpa in an economically enviable position in an stated in 1993 of the socialist times “dyado terms of access to resources. [grandfather] Tosho [short form of Todor] was While during the socialist period there was well off but so were we”. Note the familiarity of considerable uniformity in the political sym- address – a common way of talking about Todor bols that were used between rural and urban Zhivkov. In short, Zhivkov represented an “era” regions of the country, the situation appears to in which rural Bulgarians had experienced a have changed after 1989. Kennedy and other better quality of life and they spoke about him US-made symbols that were picked up so quick-

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ly by certain sectors of the population – espe- After 1989, the use of different symbols – for cially urban youth and anti-socialist advocates example Kennedy – reveals the new impor-

– emphasised material prosperity. Accepting tance that material wealth and the economy that a prominent characteristic of Western soci- have taken in the post-socialist country. In the ety is “material maximization” (Sahlins 1976: early 1990s economically-driven symbols im- 167), then the adoption of Kennedy as a mean- ported from the West served to fundamentally ingful Bulgarian symbol spoke to this re- reorder the Bulgarian nation: not only away orientation towards “the economy”. The from the Soviet block and towards the West, but difference between these urban based symbols also away from a society whose relations were and those used in the rural regions reflects an predominantly shaped by political relations increasing division that has emerged within towards a society oriented by the importance of the country since 1989. A division due to the economy. Reform has therefore involved a conflicting political and economic interests shift in symbols: from socialist ones that sig- which in turn, I suggest, is rooted in different nalled the importance of political kinship to experiences of socialism that can be traced back ones based on (promises of) material prosperity to World War II, if not earlier. It points to the and the prominence of economic relations. In diverging ideological directions that different the process, local rural communities have been sectors of society wished to push the country excluded from engagement in political and after 1989. economic activity. In trying to make sense of the changes in The situation in the late 1990s and early national political symbols in Bulgaria over the years of the new century has not greatly changed last decade, it is perhaps useful to recall the from that described above. These new economi- societal model put forward by Sahlins. A char- cally-oriented symbols that have played a central acteristic of Western society, Sahlins (1976: role in the post-socialist reforms still disad- 212) suggests, is that the site of symbolic vantage and largely exclude the rural popula- production is the economic domain and all other tion. To rural Bulgarians who have not benefit- relations – political, religious and so on – are in ed materially from the reforms – indeed the positions of subordination. He contrasts this majority are far worse off – and who speak with with “primitive” societies where it is kinship bitterness about young, urban Bulgarians who relations that provide the main site of symbolic have become wealthy overnight (through production and which dominate and shape all presumably dishonest, even illegal means) and other relations – economic, political and others. can afford to eat at McDonald’s and buy Levi This model provides a useful framework within jeans, the economic symbols of capitalism are which to understand the observed shift in not enthusiastically embraced. Rural people national symbols in Bulgaria – from ones that continue to be excluded from the present political were about politics to ones about the economy. arena; marginalized in terms of their restricted During socialism, I have suggested, economic access to state resources and in terms of their relations were subsumed to political relations, engagement in the developing market economy. the main site of symbolic production was not the All they can do is witness and comment on the economic realm, as in the “West”, nor kinship as ever-increasing gap between their standard of in “primitive” societies, but political relations. living and that of urban people. Indeed new

The “nexus” that determined all social relations economically-oriented symbols assist in with respect to production was the political marginalizing rural citizens. For Talpians at ideology of Marxism-Leninism; the political least, such symbols are alien and distant (unlike domain was elevated to the position of domi- the socialist symbols to which they were nance, its leading symbols, socialist political intimately connected) and serve to emphasise leaders11 . I discussed above how these symbols their exclusion from current events. Rural “filtered” down and enabled the participation of inhabitants cannot compete in a society whose local communities in socialist political and con- dominant ideology now values material wealth, sequently economic activity. domination of the economy above all else, and

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whose symbols “speak” to these values. In short, 7. More permanent editions have now been pro- economically-oriented symbols remain duced which somewhat more balanced in their historical appraisal than this volume by Semkov exclusively the property of a new class of pros- (1993). Nevertheless I would argue that the years perous and therefore powerful urban elite. For that Semkov’s (1993) book was used gives an the present at least, these urban wealthy ap- important insight in processes that occurred pear to have a determining influence over na- during the early reform years. 8. I use this term because despite the text’s publi- tional political symbols and over the general cation in 1993, that is, two years after the break- direction of post-socialist reforms in Bulgaria. up of the Soviet Union, the book continues to refer to the “Soviet Union”. 9. Contrast this act and its strong symbolism with Notes the situation described by Verdery (1999) con- cerning the political lives of other “dead bodies” 1. While there are numerous biographies of Zhivk- across eastern Europe. ov, this one must surely hold particular impor- 10. In Bulgaria’s pursuit of everything “western” it is tance as an official publication produced by the the USA that has been given prominence. Why a Communist Party. USA-made brand of capitalism was chosen, rath- 2. Used by Hitler as an excuse to outlaw his com- er than a European version, is an interesting munist opponents, the fire is thought to have question which I cannot delve into here, except to been started by the Nazi dictatorship itself in offer a few speculative comments. Firstly, after

order to consolidate its power. Dimitrov was one WW II, the USA has been a considerable econom- of a number of communists charged with starting ic and political force across Western Europe. the fire. He heroically represented himself in After 1989 the Americans saw the untapped court and won acquittal. market potential of eastern Europe and moved 3. I thank Patty Gray for bringing to my attention quickly to extend their economic and political the use of the idiom of ‘brotherhood’ across the ties in the region. Europe was slower off the USSR. She informs me that the term was used in mark. Secondly, as the USSR was the “flagship” an attempt to ‘Russianise’ the Soviet people. of socialism during the cold war period, so the 4. When I speak of the state ‘centre’ it is the elite USA was, and remains, the “flagship” for capital- Party leadership in Sofia to which I am referring. ism. In this respect European capitalism cannot It would be naïve to believe that this elite was compete with the more influential US symbols. made up of a unified body, rather than of individ- 11. Some commentators may wish to term the rela-

uals with conflicting interests. Nevertheless, I tions of familiarity that were a dimension of this join a number of authors who feel it is useful to system as “corruption”, but to do so tells us distinguish the centre from the rest of socialist nothing about how the system operates and bureaucracy – e.g. Feher, Heller & Markus 1983, indeed masks the particular way in which polit- cited in Verdery 1991: 423–424. ical relations were put in motion – through 5. I first went to Bulgaria in 1986 when I carried fictive kin. I believe it is more useful to under- out 19 months research, mostly in Talpa. Since stand the nature of socialism as a system founded this time I have been returning regularly to the on criteria which gave prominence to the political site, including a further 9 months research in realm, unlike capitalism which gives prominence 1992–93 and most summer months in the years to economically-determined relations. since then. 6. The political split between pro and anti socialist

groups was not new. This division can be traced References back at least to the World War II period – when political differences existed between the fascist Crampton, R.J. 1987: A Short History of Modern government and its opponents (including com- Bulgaria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. munists) – but perhaps even earlier when the Kaneff, Deema 1998: Negotiating the Past in Post- left-wing Agrarian Party held office for some Socialist Bulgaria. Ethnologia Balkanica 2: 31–45. years in the 1920s and was eventually and vio- Kaneff, Deema. Forthcoming: Who Owns the Past? lently ousted from office. The right/left political The Politics of Time in a ‘Model’ Bulgarian Village. division was less obvious after World War II, as Oxford: Berghahn. critics to socialism were silenced, but many of Kideckel, David A. 1994: Us and Them. Concepts of those marginalized during the socialist period East and West in the East European Transition. In: A Jawlowska and M. Kempny (eds): Cultural Di- joined the right-wing faction of post-socialist reformers. This latter group, supported with funds lemmas of Post-Communist Societies. Warsaw: Ifis from the West, especially the US, have once again Publishers: 134–144. gained the political upper-hand. McIntyre, Robert J. 1988: Bulgaria Politics, Econom- ics and Society. London: Pinter.

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Sahlins, Marshall 1976: Culture and Practical Rea- Verdery, Katherine 1996: What Was Socialism, and son. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. What Comes Next?. Princeton: Princeton Universi- Schwartz, H. 1971: The Lenin Cult and Its Uses. In: ty Press. B.W. Eissenstat (ed): Lenin and Leninism State, Verdery, Katherine 1999: The Political Lives of Dead Law and Society. Massachusetts: Lexington Books. Bodies Reburial and Postsocialist Change. New Semkov, Milen 1993: Zapiski Po Suvremenna Istoriya York: Columbia University Press. 1945–1992. Sofia: Svyat Nayka. Institute of History of the Bulgarian Communist Smollett, Eleanor 1993: America the Beautiful. Made Party at the CC of the BCP 1981: Todor Zhivkov. A

in Bulgaria. In Anthropology Today 9: 2 (April): 9–13. Biographical Sketch. Sofia: Sofia Press. Tzvetkov, Plamen S. 1993: The Politics of Transition Zhivkov, Todor 1985: The People’s Republic of Bulgar- in Bulgaria. Back to the Future?. In Problems of ia – Truly Committed to the Nobel Objectives and Communism XLI: 34–43. Ideals of UNESCO. Speech before the 23rd session Verdery, Katherine 1991: Theorizing Socialism: a Pro- of the UNESCO General Conference, Sofia, Octo- logue to the ‘Transition. In American Ethnologist ber 8. Sofia: Sofia Press. 18: 3: 419–439.

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