1111111111111111111111111111111 High-Speed PB97-192041 Ground Transportation for America
- August 1996 U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
August 21, 1996
The Honorable AI Gore President ofthe Senate Washington, DC 20510
Dear Mr. President:
I am pleased to transmit the Overview to the Report ofthe Commercial Feasibility ofHigh-Speed Ground Transportation requested under Section 1036 ofthe Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act. The main body ofthis comprehensive report will be transmitted in the near future.
The Report examines the potential for operating various high-speed ground transportation technologies in populous regions ofthe United States.
I look forward to workiI}g with the Congress as we continue to examine the potential ofthese and other surface transportation options to enhance the Nation's mobility for the future.
Sincerely,
Federico Pena
Enclosure THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
August 21, 1996
The Honorable Newt Gingrich Speaker ofthe House ofRepresentatives Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
I am pleased to transmit the Overview to the Report ofthe Commercial Feasibility ofHigh-Speed Ground Transportation requested under Section 1036 ofthe Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act. The main body ofthis comprehensive report will be transmitted in the near future.
The Report examines the potential for operating various high-speed ground transportation technologies in populous regions ofthe United States.
I look forward to worki~g with the Congress as we continue to examine the potential ofthese and other surface transportation options to enhance the Nation's mobility for the future.
Sincerely,
Federico Peiia
Enclosure Overview Report
High-Speed Ground Transportation for America
Federal Railroad Administration u. S. Department ofTransportation
REPRODUCED BY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERViCE SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161 August 1996 INTRODUCTION
High-speed ground transportation (HSGT)-a family oftechnologies ranging from upgraded existing railroads to magnetically levitated vehicles-is a passenger transportation option that can best link metropolitan areas lying about 100 to 500 miles apart. Common in Europe and Japan, HSGT in the United States already exists in the Northeast Corridor between New York and Washington, and will soon serve travelers between New York and Boston. To provide an objective basis for transport policy formulation and planning at the State and Federal levels, this report examines the economics ofbringing HSGT to well-populated groups ofcities throughout the United States. The intention is to draw nationwide-not corridor-specific---conclusions from projections ofthe likely investment needs, operating performance, and benefits ofHSGT in a set ofillustrative corridors in several regions. Although useful collectively, these case studies cannot substitute for the more detailed, State and privately-sponsored analyses ofspecific corridors that would be prerequisite to HSGT implementation.
Mandate
As evidenced by Executive Branch support ofthe 1993 High-Speed Rail Development Act, the Swift Rail Development Act of 1994, and the Next-Generation High-Speed Rail Program, the Department ofTransportation has begun to emphasize the value ofconsidering HSGT along with other available transportation options. Moreover, Section 1036 ofthe Intermodal Surface Transportation Act of 1991 requires the Secretary ofTransportation to perform a study ofHSGT's commercial feasibility. Meanwhile, several States have expressed a strong interest, and some have taken concrete steps, in developing HSGT as part ofa balanced intercity transport system.
What Is HSGT?
HSGT is self-guided intercity passenger ground transportation that is time-competitive with air and/or auto on a door-to-door basis for trips in the approximate range of 100 to 500 miles. This is a market-based, not a speed-based, definition: it recognizes that the opportunities and requirements for HSGT differ markedly among different pairs ofcities. A corridor is a natural grouping ofmetropolitan areas and markets that, by their proximity and configuration, lend themselves to efficient service by ground transport.
Why Consider HSGT?
HSGT activity in the United States will only occur because ofpressing transportation needs. As population and income growth spurs additional travel demand, intercity transportation by ~:tir and auto increasingly suffers from congestion and delay. This is particularly true within metropolitan areas, at surrounding airports, and during weekend, holiday, and bad-weather periods. This declining quality ofservice adversely affects intercity travelers, other transport system users, carriers, and the general public. To counteract these trends requires additional capacity. Increasingly, expansion of airports and highways poses environmental and dollar costs and typically elicits public hesitation in the affected communities. HSGT, however, comprises a family oftransportation options that can, in some instances, offer social, economic, and environmental benefits, maximize the use ofexisting facilities, and come about through a strictly limited, one-time public investment. In short, HSGT options-while not necessarily the optimal mobility enhancement in every region--ean expand the range ofpotential responses to transport needs in heavily populated corridors. HSGT Technologies
The HSGT options fall into three groups: accelerated rail service ("Accelerail"), new high-speed rail systems ("New HSR"), and The Accelerail Options· magnetic levitation ("Maglev"),2 in order of increasing performance capabilities and initial Speed Non- Electrified4 (mph) electrified3 cost. 90 "Accelerail 90" [not addressed] Accelerail constitutes upgraded intercity rail passenger service on existing railroad rights 110 "AccelerailllO" [not addressed] of-way, most ofwhich belong to the freight "Accelerail 125F" "Accelerail 125E" 125 railroads. The Accelerail options considered in 150 "Accelerail 150F" "Accelerail 150E" this report have top speeds ranging from 90 to 150 mph. At the lower speed levels, only non electrified systems3 undergo scrutiny; the higher speed regimes include both electrified4 and non-electrified motive power. Typical Accelerail-type systems include tilt trains such as the X-2000 in Sweden, Talgo in Spain, and Pendolino in Italy; the InterCity 225 service in the United Kingdom; and today's Metroliners between New York and Washington. In most corridors, Accelerail would rely on the cooperation ofthe freight railroads. The ongoing participation ofthe Burlington Northern Santa Fe in the Pacific Northwest corridor
1 The analysis did not address every Accelerail option in every corridor. In particular, review ofexisting railroad alignments suggested that Acceleraill50 would be impracticable in California South, the Pacific Northwest, • Florida, and the Southeast Corridor. 2 The equipment and services cited and/or depicted herein are only examples. They are not exhaustive, nor do they represent endorsement by the U.S. Department ofTransportation ofany particular design, product, or manufacturer. 3 That is, powered by on-train Diesel or turbine heat engines that rely on fossil fuels (hence the distinguishing letter "F" in "Accelerail125F" and "Accelerail150F"). 4 Relying on remote power plants with electrical power distributed to trains via a system ofoverhead wires.
[0-2] exemplifies the kind ofpartnerships that will be prerequisite to HSGT development on existing rights-of-way.
Accelerail Example: Swedish X-2000
Accelerail Example: British InterCity 225
Accelerail Example: Amtrak's Metroliner
New HSR represents advanced steel-wheel-on-rail passenger systems on almost completely new rights-of-way. Through a combination ofelectrification and other advanced components, expeditious alignments, and state-of-the-art rolling stock, New HSR can attain maximum practical operating speeds on the order of200 mph.5 On the other hand, because the trains are able to operate on existing track, New HSR can combine new lines with existing approaches to urban terminals. The ability to operate over existing rights-of-way at their prevailing speeds, as well as on new routes, means that New HSR service can be extended beyond the New HSR line to other cities. Prominent examples ofNew HSR include the French TGV, the Japanese Shinkansen, and the German Intercity Express (ICE).
5 The French National Railways (SNCF) has successfully tested steel-wheel-on-rail systems at speeds well in excess of200 mph.
[0-3] Example ofNew HSR: Japanese Nozomi Shinkansen
Example ofNew HSR: French TGV
Example ofNew HSR: German InterCity Express (ICE)
Maglev is an advanced transport technology in which magnetic forces lift, propel, and guide a vehicle over a specially designed guideway. Utilizing state-of-the art electric power and control systems, this configuration eliminates the need for wheels and many other mechanical parts, thereby minimizing resistance and permitting excellent acceleration, with cruising speeds on the order of300 mph or more. This high performance would enable Maglev to provide air-competitive trip times at longer trip distances than other HSGT options. Germany has a Maglev technology ready for commercial use; Japan has a competing and technologically different system under test. There are no Maglev systems currently operating in commercial service.
[0-4] Maglev Example: German Transrapid
COMMERCIAL FEASIBILITY AND PARTNERSHIP POTENTIAL
Conceptual Framework
In requesting this report, the Congress asked for an analysis ofthe "commercial feasibility" ofHSGT.6 The private-sector concept of"commercial feasibility" invokes a basic criterion: "Will the project pay for itself?" Traditionally, that question means: "Will the future net revenues provide an acceptable return on the initial capital investment?" Freight railroads, as largely self-contained enterprises owning, maintaining, operating, and marketing their fixed facilities, vehicles, and transport services, properly apply the traditional criterion of commercial feasibility to every project that they consider, be it a track capacity expansion, a line extension, or a new line ofbusiness. Other types offirms, such as manufacturing, similarly scrutinize proposals for their effects on the business as a whole. Under this study's assumptions, procedures, and resultant projections, the HSGT options analyzed in this report do not meet the traditional private-sector criterion for "commercial feasibility." That criterion, however, may provide too narrow a perspective on the benefits and costs ofHSGT, because intercity passenger transportation in the United States is a joint product ofpublic and private investments. Each travel mode-air, highway, and rail-shows distinctly split responsibilities for such essential functions as the provision, maintenance, and operation ofrights-of-way, terminals, and vehicles. Thus, every means of intercity passenger transport in this country represents an implicit or explicit private/public partnership that-while incorporating user financing in large measure-also demonstrates governmental support and involvement.
6 Public Law 102-240, section 1036(d).
[0-5] Partnership Potential Defined Recognizing the current structure ofthe intercity passenger transport industry and the encouragement historically afforded by governmental entities to technological initiatives, this report assesses HSGT cases for their partnership potential-their apparent capacity to draw the private and public sectors together in planning, negotiations, and, conceivably, project implementation. Broadly gauging the attractiveness ofan HSGT project, partnership potential does not address the project's advisability, equity, or worth from the public policy perspective, nor its practicability from the financial viewpoint. Only detailed studies at the State level can fully treat the latter topics. To exhibit partnership potential as defined in this report, the projections for an HSGT technology in a particular corridor must satisfy at least the following two conditions: First, private enterprise must be able to run the corridor-once built and paid for-as a completely self-sustaining entity. Thus, over the planning period, the HSGT operator's total revenues would need to cover not only the corridor's operating and maintenance expenses but also its continuing investment needs, such as for new vehicles to replace and expand the fleet. This condition would assist in attracting a private operator and would provide reasonable assurance to the public that its initial investment in HSGT is, indeed, a one-time contribution, not a prelude to continuing operating or capital subsidies. By positing a system free ofoperating subsidies, this report clearly differentiates between future HSGT corridor development and existing intercity passenger rail transportation. Second, the total benefits ofan HSGT corridor must equal or exceed its total 7 costS. ,8 This approach encompasses the full range ofbenefits and costs, including environmental and other nonmarket benefits and costs, irrespective ofthe parties on whom they fall-for example, HSGT system users, the general public, and the HSGT operator. (As described further below, other approaches to measuring benefits and costs may be ofequal or greater interest to policy makers as they consider specific HSGT projects.) Total benefits, as measured in this report, comprise the following components: • Benefits to HSGT users consist of- - System revenues, which measure the benefits for which HSGT users are projected to pay; and - The users' consumer surplus, which represents the difference between the full value ofHSGT transportation to passengers and the
7 Total benefits and total costs are expressed as net present values, as ofthe year 2000, over the planning period (2000-2040). 8 In the Main Report, Chapter 5 describes in detail the methodology for developing demand, revenue, and cost projections, while Chapter 6 does the same for the projections ofusers' consumer surpluses and benefits to the public at large.
[0-6] fares they would pay. The surplus arises because fare levels are set to maximize net revenues rather than to exact payment from each traveler for the full worth ofthe transportation provided.9 • Benefits to the public at large redound to the general public and to users of modes other than HSGT. These benefits recognize the effects ofdiverting significant passenger volumes from existing modes to HSGT, and consist of savings from alleviated congestion and reduced emissions in air and highway travel. Total costs consist ofoperating and maintenance expenses, continuing investments necessary (after initial system construction) to assure capacity for future traffic growth, and the initial investment in HSGT infrastructure and vehicles. Viewed from the perspective of incidence, total costs fall into two fundamental categories: • Costs borne by users (this equates to system revenues); and • Publicly-borne costs (total costs less system revenues).
This report uses "partnership potential" as an indicator ofthe aggregate financial and economic impacts ofHSGT alternatives in a set ofillustrative corridors. Detailed State studies ofindividual corridors would benefit from additional evaluation measures as well as site-specific investigations and data. Thus, while "partnership potential" may offer useful insights in assessing the likelihood ofHSGT development by State and local governments and their private partners, it does not constitute an express or implied criterion for Federal approval or funding. Owing to locally perceived transportation conditions and business opportunities, States and private entities may still see partnership potential in options that lack it according to this report. Clearly, as long as States can develop the requisite financing, they can choose their own measurement techniques and thresholds to reflect local and regional public priorities. Additional Measures Bearing on Partnership Potential
State studies will inevitably use additional measures to assess whether early indications ofpartnership potential lO can withstand further, necessary scrutiny. Examples ofthese additional measures include, but are not limited to, the following.
9 The models used to project revenues in studies ofthis type do not incorporate the oft-changing fares-keyed to such factors as the precise date and time oftravel, overnight stay requirements, amount ofadvance booking time, and competing carriers' prices-that characterize yield management in modem passenger transport companies. To the extent that an actual HSGT operator exceeds this report's projections by implementing sophisticated yield management techniquesthat maximize net system revenues while forcing each rider to pay a fare that approaches the full value ofthe transportation to him or her, then "users' consumer surplus" will be converted to "system revenues." 10 Such as the findings ofthis report and ofother preliminary investigations at the State level.
[0-7] Financial Measures It is highly desirable that the private sector should be able to make a substantial contribution, based on operating surpluses, toward the initial capital investment. Indeed, the potential for private/public partnerships becomes larger the higher the percentage ofinitial investment that can be covered by operating surpluses. Furthermore, the absolute size ofthe initial investment requirement will strongly influence partnership potential, since different States and private consortia will have different capacities for assembling the financing required for a proposed HSGT project.
Benefit/Cost Measures In performing definitive feasibility studies ofHSGT systems, policy makers and the public may deem it essential to compare not just total benefits with total costs, but also the benefits and costs accruing to users and the public at large respectively. Comparisons ofbenefits to the public at large with publicly-borne costs, for instance, would allow policy makers to determine the degree to which the public at large would obtain a return on its investment in HSGT. Analytical Components
In assessing the private/public partnership potential ofHSGT in the United States, this report consistently applies a set ofanalytical components to a series of"cases"-specific technological options in illustrative corridors. The figure below summarizes the relationships among these components. For consistency, the analysis uses Year 1993 constant dollars throughout and assumes that construction and vehicle acquisition is complete by the Year 2000, which is the first year ofoperations. The planning period, for which projections are prepared, extends through Year 2040. Present values are stated as ofthe Year 2000, cover the period through 2040, and incorporate two real 11 discount rates: ten percent for system revenues, expenses, and continuing investments (all assumed to pertain to the HSGT operator); and the OMB-mandated seven percent for benefits to the public at large, user benefits, and public investments. The HSGT system is assumed to acquire (and is charged for) its own right-of-way in New HSR and Maglev options, but is a tenant on existing freight railroads in most Accelerail options.
II In keeping with the use ofconstant dollars, real discount rates include no allowance for inflation. Nominal discount rates, which include inflation, would be three or four percent higher currently.
[0-8] Simplified Flow ofAnalytical Components
I Assumptions I • • J. Capital Operating ..- Demand Costs Expenses Revenues ~l / Operating Results/ Ancillaries Investment Needs !+-l I Discounted Cash Flow, 40 Years
Capital Costs
Cost estimates reflect the specific needs ofeach technology, appropriate Federal Railroad Administration safety guidelines and regulations (for example, regarding highway/railroad grade crossings), the characteristics ofeach corridor, and prevailing unit costs. 12 The initial investment includes upgraded or new track ; structures; communications and train control systems; electrification (where applicable to the technology); highway/railroad grade crossing safety enhancements; fencing and environmental mitigation measures; right-of-way acquisitions and realignments; stations, yards, and shops; locomotives, cars, and other vehicles; and an allowance for contingencies, engineering, and program management. 13 For the Accelerail options, the entire cost ofthe fixed plant improvements is assumed to rest with the HSGT system, even though the freight railroad operation may also stand to gain from some project elements. Any tangible benefits ofAccelerail to the freight railroad would enter into the latter's partnership negotiations and financial arrangements with the public HSGT sponsors and the HSGT operator. In addition to the initial investment, assumed to be borne by the public, this study addresses continuing investments by the HSGT operator-for instance, expansions and replacements ofthe vehicle fleet during the 40-year planning period.
12 "Guideway" in the case ofMaglev 13 Ranging from approximately 30% ofbase costs for Accelerail to 41% for New HSR and Maglev.
[0-9] Demand andRevenue Forecasts
For each case, the analysis first projects The DemandlRevenue Projection ridership demand by mode in the absence of Process HSGT. Fares for HSGT are then set to maximize net revenue given HSGT's Project market competitive stance versus other modes in city demand by ~ to-city markets. (The capital investments and existing mode '------I consequent total travel times powerfully Develop fares influence that competitive stance.) A series of (competitive diversion models projects the ridership that the w/auto, air) new HSGT service would attract from air, auto, existing intercity rail, and bus. Depending upon Estimate the market, up to 10 percent ofdiverted traffic is diversion from other added to reflect "induced demand," trips that modes; add would not take place at all by any mode without induced .,. the introduction ofHSGT. Passenger ~demand transportation revenues ofthe HSGT system are the product ofthe ridership and fares in the IRevenue Forecast I constituent city-to-city markets.
Operating andMaintenance Expenses The projections for each case include a build-up ofoperating and maintenance (O&M) expenses in the functional areas ofmaintenance ofway; maintenance ofequipment; transportation; passenger traffic and Expense Components services; and general and administrative. Maintenance ofWay Maintenance of Equipment In each functional area, the O&M model • Track Inspection and repair • Service and inspection identifies all the required activities and • Structures • Short turnaround cleaning • Train Control • Maintenance and repair calculates the resources-personnel, • Electric Traction materials, energy, and purchased
Passenger Traffic/Services services-needed to perform those
• Marketing, service design, pricing • On-hoard services activities at the projected level of • Information, reservations. ticketing • Station operations and maintenance ridership demand and operations.
: Transportation Management!Administration Ancillary Activities • General and administrative management • Superintendence and dispatching • Personnel • Train movement In addition to intercity passenger • Procurement, finance • Yard operations • Security service, the HSGT operator could conduct • Insurance and liability ancillary activities that conform with or support its main line ofbusiness. This
[0-10] analysis estimates, on an activity-by-activity basis, the net revenues from mail and priority express service, parking, station concessions, and certain on-board service amenities (e.g., telephones). Varying in importance from case to case, these net ancillary revenues cumulatively amount to.between three and ten percent ofsystem revenues.
Operating Surpluses
The HSGT operator's annual operating surplus is the difference between system revenues (i.e., passenger transportation revenue plus net revenue from ancillary activities) and O&M expenses. The "surplus after continuing investments" is the present value ofthe future operating surpluses, less the present value ofcontinuing investments projected to be made by the HSGT operator in future years.
Benefits
As described above, total benefits include, in addition to system revenues: • Users' consumer surplus-gains to HSGT users over and above the fares that they pay; and • Benefits to the public at large-congestion reliefin the air and highway modes and reductions in emissions. 14 Both ofthese categories can be quantified in dollar terms; since they involve neither double counting ofbenefits nor transfers from one region or type ofproject to another, they can be included in total HSGT corridor benefits. IS On the other hand, total benefits do not include certain items that-although quantifiable-either duplicate the included benefits or represent "transfer effects" that might just as well accrue in other locations due to other major investments. Examples include economic impacts from HSGT operations and construction; capital savings on airports and highways; and energy savings. From the nationwide viewpoint ofthis report, such duplicative or transfer impacts-while ofinterest to potential partners in the development ofspecific corridors--eould not appropriately enter into the projected total benefits ofeach HSGT corridor. In addition, some impacts did not readily lend themselves to systematic quantification (for example: benefits to the American HSGT equipment industry; impacts on the automobile or aircraft industries) or required site-specific data exceeding the scope ofthis national study (for instance, such environmental impacts as noise and water pollution). Such items may merit scrutiny in studies ofspecific corridor proposals at the State level.
14 Integration ofintercity HSGT-regardless oftechnology-with existing metropolitan area transit systems would help to maximize the public benefits from congestion reduction and clean air. 15 See Chapter 6 in the Main Report for the criteria for inclusion in total benefits.
[0-11] The Illustrative Corridors The analytical components were consistently applied to a set ofillustrative corridors depicted in the following map. Providing a broad spectrum oflengths and travel densities, these corridors represent:
The Illustrative Corridors
• Existing corridors in which passenger trains regularly operate at speeds of 110 mph and above: - Northeast Corridor (Boston-New York-Washington) - Empire Corridor (New York-Albany-Buffalo) • All corridors designated by the Secretary ofTransportation under Section 1010 ofthe Intermodal Surface Transportation Act of 1991, as eligible for special funds dedicated to grade crossing safety on potential HSGT routes: - Pacific Northwest (Eugene, Oregon-Portland-Seattle-Vancouver, B.C.) - California ("North/South": Bay Area-Los Angeles-San Diego; and "South": Los Angeles-San Diego alone); - Chicago Hub (Chicago to Detroit, Milwaukee, and St. Louis as a network; and Chicago-Detroit and Chicago-St. Louis by themselves); - Florida Corridor (Miami-Orlando-Tampa); - Southeast Corridor (Washington-Richmond-Charlotte, N.C.); and • The Texas Triangle, which presents a unique spatial configuration ofheavily populated metropolitan areas.
[0-12] Summary ofProjections
The following observations synthesize the projections as contained in the corridor profiles that follow in this Overview Report. 16
Total Benefits and Total Costs
On a basis incorporating total benefits and total costs, every illustrative corridor has at least one technology, and every technology has at least one corridor, that meets the threshold conditions for partnership potential. Corridors with the highest base traffic densities generate positive ratios for a broad range oftechnologies, including those with the highest speed capabilities; conversely, corridors with the lowest base traffic densities develop positive ratios only for the lower-speed options.
The projections suggest that-subject to the assumptions and scope ofthis study-the less expensive technologies, relying on upgraded existing rail lines and freight railroad cooperation, could typically provide higher ratios ofbenefits to costs than the very high-speed options, which may offer higher benefits but would ordinarily cost much more. However, cases where public benefits do not exceed public costs need not be ruled out for consideration by States or private concerns. In these cases, unmeasurable transfer effects or mobility concerns may justify further consideration.
User Benefits and Costs; Public Benefits and Costs
When both benefits and costs are disaggregated according to their incidence, it becomes clear that users invariably obtain benefits in excess ofwhat they pay for HSGT services. In fact, benefits to the public at large exceed the publicly-borne costs in only about one-quarter of the illustrative HSGT cases. Such effects on users versus the public at large merit further attention in State analyses ofHSGT and in reaching decisions on public funding ofhigh-speed rail and Maglev. When benefit-cost analysis ofHSGT is approached in this way, lower-cost HSGT options appear to generate higher ratios ofbenefits to costs. Along with this finding, public benefit-cost analysis may yield valuable information necessary for fully apprising the value of HSGT options.
Importance ofState Studies
In contrast with a nationwide study such as this one, individual State studies can more closely examine specific corridors, with greater sensitivity to the State's underlying reasons for considering HSGT. Such detailed examination may favor a non-HSGT solution, Accelerail, New HSR, or Maglev. A State, for example, may wish to provide a high-reliability, high-
16 These observations pertain to all illustrative corridors except those treated as incremental extensions ofthe Northeast Corridor.
[0-13] frequency HSGT option and may believe that only New HSR or Maglev can offer a sufficient quality ofservice. Likewise, a State may place an extraordinarily high value on environmental benefits, and would seek the HSGT option that maximizes those benefits. A State may regard the cooperation ofits freight railroads as impossible to achieve, thereby precluding Accelerail; or a State may perceive Accelerail as the ideal compromise between its fiscal constraints and its desire for improved intercity transport. Financing issues, moreover, would call for detailed scrutiny, since the absolute size ofthe required initial investment (in conjunction with the available resources ofthe private and public participants) will heavily influence the feasibility ofHSGT proposals. Finally, the States and localities, through their intermodal planning processes, are uniquely qualified to judge the synergy between HSGT corridor development and the enhancement ofregional public transit services, highways, and airports. Taken together, these examples underscore the importance ofsite-specific, State-sponsored studies to the definitive characterization ofHSGT and other intercity transport options.
Selected Sensitivity Analyses
In addition to analyzing 66 combinations ofcorridors and technology options,-a scope that reveals the effects ofa host ofvariables on HSGT system performance,-this study analyzed the sensitivity ofrepresentative cases to selected changes in key assumptions.
Effects ofLower Air Fares
This study assessed the potential effects ofexpanded low-cost, low-fare air service on the operating results ofHSGT. Low-fare air service was already widespread in 1993 17 and influenced this study, particularly in California, the Chicago Hub corridors, and Texas. The other illustrative corridors may be less hospitable to low-fare aviation, owing to heavy existing airport congestion or short stage lengths, both ofwhich raise unit operating costs. Nevertheless, an expansion of"low-fare" air carriers into specific HSGT markets could adversely affect the projected HSGT revenue base. In two sample markets, a simple simulation ofair fare reductions of30 percent (with no other changes in the size ofthe base air market or in HSGT fares) showed reductions in diversions from air to HSGT ofabout 30 percent, and overall HSGT ridership losses ranging from 10 to 25 percent. In specific city-pairs that appear susceptible to pronounced air fare competition, prospective HSGT partners would reduce their uncertainties by simulating, in detail, the long term implications ofdirect air/HSGT fare rivalry.
17 1993 was the base year for establishing air fares, trip times, frequencies, and travel volumes for the demand projections.
[0-14] Effects ofHigher Operating Expenses
IfHSGT operating and maintenance expenses prove to be 25 percent higher than those developed for this report, the following cases would no longer meet the requirement ofa surplus after continuing investments-Le., they would no longer be projected to be self sustaining once built: - Accelerail 90 in California North/South, Chicago Hub Network, and Chicago-St. Louis; and - In Chicago-Detroit: AccelerailllO, 125E, and 150E. No material changes would occur in the ratios oftotal benefits to total costs, thus confirming the relatively small part that O&M expenses play in this ratio. Therefore, a 25 percent hike in expenses would eliminate the indication ofpartnership potential for six cases at most, all ofwhich are in either the Accelerail 90category or the Chicago Hub region. In two typical cases, a 75 percent increase in liability expenses would produce an eight to ten-percent increase in total O&M expenses. Such an increase would have no perceptible effect on the benefit/cost ratios.
Effects ofLower Discount Rate
Application ofa uniform seven percent discount rate to the present value analyses would enhance the apparent partnership potential ofthe HSGT cases by raising the present value ofthe operating surpluses.
Effects ofMixing andMatching Technologies
Normatively, the study developed each case by matching one corridor with one technology. However, a more detailed approach-segmenting each corridor and applying different, yet compatible, technology levels to each segment based on market conditions could materially improve the projection results. Indeed, in one illustrative corridor, the simultaneous application oftwo technologies yielded benefit-to-cost ratios that were higher than for any single technology ofcomparable performance.
CORRIDOR-BY-CORRIDOR PROJECTIONS The following sections summarize the projections for each ofthe illustrative 18 corridors. ,19 While each corridor summary discusses the partnership potential ofthe
18 By their very nature, projections depend on the reasonableness oftheir underlying assumptions (described in Chapter 4 ofthe Main Report) and are subject to divergences between the assumptions and actual conditions. For
[0-15] various options, it is up to the States and their public and private partners to determine, through detailed studies, what to build-ifanything.
California North/South
Since the 1980's the State ofCalifornia has supported and expanded Amtrak rail service. The California High-Speed Rail Commission, created in 1993, is conducting a series ofstudies to determine the feasibility ofimplementing an HSGT system between Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area with future extensions to San Diego and Sacramento. The State's studies are scheduled for completion by December 1996.
As delineated for this report, the California North/South corridor covers the entire distance between the Bay Area, Los Angeles, and San Diego?O The projections suggest that this corridor could generate up to 6 billion annual passenger-miles by the year 2020. Offering Los Angeles-San Francisco line-haul travel times ofthree and two hours respectively, a New HSR or Maglev system in California is projected to produce an annual operating surplus. The initial investment in such a California North/South corridor could reach the $20-$25 billion range for the higher-speed options due to the challenging terrain and extensive route-mileage involved. The State ofCalifornia could also adopt a more gradual approach to HSGT, for which the State's diverse geography provides many potential avenues. This report examined a small sample ofthe possibilities. Accelerail 90 and 110 via the Coast Line, for instance, could cost between one and three billion dollars and generate ridership equal to that oftoday's Northeast Corridor. Accelerail125 and 150 through the Central Valley would serve a somewhat larger population base but would necessitate (for expeditious service) significant civil works across the Tehachapi Mountains. [The profile for California North/South follows.]
these and other reasons, the results ofthe systems described in this report may vary materially from the projections. This further underscores the need for detailed studies prior to initiation ofcorridor development. 19 Additional data appears in the Main Report. 20 This study does not address the Sacramento market.
[0-16] California North-South
Corridor length (miles): Accelerail 90, 110 595 Other Accelerail, New HSR 546 Maglev 527 Metropolitan area population (miL): Bay Area (San Francisco/Oakland) 6.3 Los Angeles 14.5 San Diego 2.5 Intermediate points (via coast, via valley) 0.7,2.5 Total (via coast, via valley) 24.0,25.8 1990 population higher than 1970 by: Via coast, via valley 44.6%,46.5% Current Scenario:
2% Rail & Bus 24% Air Total intercity passenger-miles: Existing Market Share 19,533 million by Mode (All city-pair markets on a passenger Intercity travel density mile basis) (Passenger-miles per route-mile): 74% Auto 32.8 million
HSGT in 2020: (Refers to entire corridor except as notl'd) Line-Haul Travel Times Frequencies & Fares (San Francisco-Los Angeles as an example) (San Francisco-Los Angeles as an example for frequency) 10 9 Technology Frequency Fares '(Daily round trips\ (Cents/mile) !i'l . 7 Amtrak 1993' 5 14.0 • 6 -- r--"'" Accelerail 90 29 16.6 h Accelerailll0 31 15.7 := 4 ':'I,., I·'··.~ Accelerail125F 39 16.9 Accelerail125E 44 16.6 3 Accelerail 150F 44 16.4 2 Accelerail150E 53 16.1 ~ .!\- -- ::::':;~~ NewHSR 92 16.2 Maglev 91 19.4 > .~ .• ~ ~ U) ~ "" 'e wu. wUJ wu. wUJ *Amtrak 1993 fares are estimated yields. Amtrak serVice E~ ~o 00 ..!!l§( ..!!lU) ..!!lo ..!!lo• :r:'" E.... - .... ~N ~U) ~U) ~ consisted of four rail/bus frequencies via the valley and '*~~ .... ~ .... ~ ~ .... -< e ~~ .... ~ i -< -< -< -< -< Z of one thru-train via the coast. Technology
Diverted Air and Auto Trips Passenger-Miles
12,000,000 -c------·00 ---._~------.----.---•••• - Air Trips Diverted ,- ~ 10,000,000 ..5 [0-17] California North/South Projection Results (Dollar Amounts are Present Values in Millions for the Period 2000-2040) Accelerail 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E NewHSR Maglev Surplus After Continuing Investments21 $276 $714 $870 $864 $1,151 $1,232 $2,489 $5,584 Total Benefits: $5,848 $8,657 $9,781 $11,176 $11,307 $13,288 $23,181 $30,429 Benefits to HSGT Users: System Revenues $1,582 $2,210 $2,627 $2,902 $3,051 $3,429 $6,208 $9,162 Users' Consumer Surplus $2,153 $3,055 $3,374 $3,745 $3,913 $4,396 $7,688 $10,324 Total Benefits to HSGT Users $3,735 $5,265 $6,001 $6,647 $6,964 $7,824 $13,896 $19,486 Benefits to the Public at Large $2,113 $3,392 $3,780 $4,530 $4,343 $5,464 $9,285 $10,943 Total Costs: $2,619 $4,410 $9,688 $10,985 $9,925 $11,400 $19,511 $27,007 Components ofTotal Costs: Initial Investment $1,314 $2,914 $7,931 $8,948 $8,024 $9,203 $15,792 $23,430 O&MExpense $1,222 $1,365 $1,611 $1,854 $1,724 $2,034 $3,318 $3,348 Continuing Investments $84 $132 $146 $184 $176 $162 $401 $230 Incidence ofTotal Costs: Costs Borne by Users $1,582 $2,210 $2,627 $2,902 $3,051 $3,429 $6,208 $9,162 Publicly-Borne Costs $1,038 $2,200 $7,060 $8,084 $6,873 $7,971 $13,303 $17,846 Total Benefits Less Total Costs $3,228 $4,247 $93 $191 $1,383 $1,889 $3,670 $3,422 Benefits to HSGT Users Less Costs Borne by Users $2,153 $3,055 $3,374 $3,745 $3,913 $4,396 $7,688 $10,324 Benefits to the Public at Large Less Publicly-Borne Costs $1,075 $1,192 ($3,280) ($3,554) ($2,530) ($2,507) ($4,018) ($6,902) Ratio ofTotal Benefits to Total Costs 2.2 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 Ratio of Benefits to HSGT Users, to Costs Borne by Users 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 Ratio ofBenefits to the Public at Large, to Publicly-Borne Costs 2.0 1.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 Partnership Potential, by Option [Options with black background are projected to satisfy this report's two preliminary screening conditions for partnership potential: (1) a surplus after continuing investments and (2) a ratio oftotal benefits to total costs of 1.0 or more. In conducting detailed studies, States may wish to consider additional financial measures, as well as the ratio of "benefits to the public at large" to "publicly-borne costs." "Partnership potential" does not constitute...... an express or implied criterion for Federal approval or funding.] 21 Equals: System Revenues less (O&M Expense plus Continuing Investments). [0-18] California South A heavily traveled Amtrak route, the San Diego-Los Angeles corridor serves a population ofapproximately 12 million, or nearly 40 percent ofthe total population ofthe State ofCalifornia. This is a mixed-use commuter and intercity corridor, already publicly owned over most ofits length, in which the State has already made improvements. HSGT would reduce Amtrak's scheduled trip time ofnearly three hours to two hours or less for Accelerail, one and one-third hours for New HSR, and 45 minutes for Maglev. These line-haul time savings are projected to result in higher traffic levels. Should the State elect to consider further Accelerail-type improvements, the potential effects on both commuter and intercity service would need to be taken into account. The initial investment for California South would range from about $500 million for Accelerail 90 to $5 billion for Maglev. [The profile for California South follows.] [0-19] California South Corridor length (miles): Accelerail options 128 NewHSR 142 Maglev 123 Metropolitan area population (mil.): San Diego 2.5 Los Angeles 14.5 Total 17.0 1990 population higher than 1970 by: 50.2% Current Scenario: 9% Rail & Bus 4%Air Total intercity passenger-miles: Existing Market Share 1,968 million by Mode (All city-pair markets on a passenger Intercity travel density mile basis) (Passenger-miles per route-mile): 15.3 million 87% Auto HSGT in 2020: Line-Haul Travel Times Frequencies & Fares Technology Frequency Fares 2.5 ~ (Daily round trips) (Cents/mile) 2 Amtrak 1993" 9 15.0 ~1.5 Accelerail 90 25 27.6 :>:: ~ AccelerailllO 26 28.5 Accelerail125F 26 28.5 0.5 f-- i- I- 1Rz::l Accelerail 125E 27 28.5 1;:Ii{~~1 NewHSR 26 24.4 '-+--- '-+--- ~ ~ ~ Map;lev 55 31.2 '"~~ -,,- -w :c Diverted Air and Auto Trips Passenger-Miles (see note 2) 450.000 ,-----..-----.-.------..------. 400 400.000 ...... ~ ~ 1 350 - -!: 350.000 .- •• j - - - ~ f"l..---=------~/----: ~~ r- 300,000 r- r- '= ...... :.. !.250 f-- f-- .. - - }250,000 +------r-.,------ ...... :.: ~ 200 I-- I-- - < '0 200,000 ~ 150 r- - j 150,000 ..- 4l"~ ~ .... ~ -AlrTr'~DI\'erted ~ :f ...... B '" N I>. Iii > I ::100 - i.1OO,ooo 'F------AutoTrlp'Oivert"d--; i- - I-- f-- ~ liili .: ..... :.. 50 -- -- I-- 1- - - ... I ..... :.•... 50.00: JI----+---+----t---t------il . ~ .~ .~ .;;; .~ -;;; .;;; > ~ g~ "e ~ ] ~ ~ "- -w ~'" '" ~o ~o ~~ '"~ be 0 ..!!'" ~ ..!!'"-'" ~ § '"~ ~N ~ ::E'" E'" ~'" ~::: ~N ~N ~ '" ~ ~ «- ~~ tj- ~ ::E ~ ] « «tj - z ~ .( « z Technology Technology Note 1: Accelerail150F and 150E not analyzed_ Note 2: The New HSR peak in passenger-miles reflects a longer route rather than a higher ridership. [0-20] California South Projection Results (Dollar Amounts are Present Values in Millions for the Period 2000-2040) Accelerail 90 110 125F 125E NewHSR Maglev Surplus After Continuing Investments $206 $241 $252 $214 $176 $284 Total Benefits: $2,197 $2,438 $2,487 $2,607 $2,946 $3,742 Benefits to HSGT Users: System Revenues $614 $652 $662 $668 $725 $848 Users' Consumer Surplus $752 $807 $827 $843 $976 $1,249 Total Benefits to HSGT Users $1,366 $1,459 $1,488 $1,511 $1,701 $2,096 Benefits to the Public at Large $831 $979 $999 $1,096 $1,246 $1,646 Total Costs: $867 $1,068 $1,104 $1,423 $4,661 $5,569 Components ofTotal Costs: Initial Investment $459 $657 $694 $969 $4,112 $5,006 O&MExpense $380 $387 $386 $430 $498 $531 Continuing Investments $28 $24 $24 $24 $51 $32 Incidence ofTotal Costs: Costs Borne by Users $614 $652 $662 $668 $725 $848 Publicly-Borne Costs $253 $416 $442 $755 $3,936 $4,722 Total Benefits Less Total Costs $1,329 $1,370 $1,384 $1,184 ($1,715) ($1,827) Benefits to HSGT Users Less Costs Borne by Users $752 $807 $827 $843 $976 $1,249 Benefits to the Public at Large Less Publicly-Borne Costs $578 $563 $557 $341 ($2,691) ($3,076) Ratio of Total Benefits to Total Costs 2.5 2.3 2.3 1.8 0.6 0.7 Ratio ofBenefits to HSGT Users, to 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 Costs Borne by Users Ratio ofBenefits to the Public at Large, 3.3 2.4 2.3 1.5 0.3 0.3 to Publicly-Borne Costs Partnership Potential, by Option [Options with black background are projected to satisfy this report's two preliminary screening conditions for partnership potential: (1) a surplus after continuing investments and (2) a ratio of total benefits to total costs of 1.0 or more. In conducting detailed studies, States may wish to consider additional financial measures, as well as the ratio of "benefits to the public at large" to "publicly-borne costs." "Partnership potential" does not constitute an express or implied criterion for Federal approval or funding.] Accelerail IAccelerail IAccelerail IAccelerail New 90 110 125F 125E HSR [0-21] Chicago Hub Network As portrayed in this study, the Chicago Hub Network consists ofthe routes from Chicago to Detroit, Milwaukee, and S1. Louis. The states along these routes are pursuing implementation ofHSGT. For example, in 1994 Illinois completed a study of 125 mph service for the Chicago-S1. Louis line, and is now examining financing options. Michigan and Amtrak are working to develop a high-speed plan between Chicago and Detroit, and are testing a state of-the-art train control system on the Amtrak-owned segment ofthat line. This analysis treats the three Chicago Hub routes as an integrated network that employs a common operator, fleet, and fixed facilities; realizes operating cost efficiencies; and benefits from traffic which crosses Chicago when traveling between cities on two legs ofthe system. According to the projections, the current Amtrak ridership of 1.2 million annual trips on the Chicago Hub routes increases five to six times in the Accelerail cases, rises to 8.1 million with New HSR, and reaches 9.3 million with Maglev. All options are projected to generate operating surpluses that cover their continuing investment costs. Total initial investments range from $1.1 billion for Accelerail 90 to $18 billion for Maglev. When the Hub Network results are compared to the sum ofthe individual results ofthe constituent routes, the effects ofnetworking become very clear: depending upon the technology case, passenger miles are 37 to 49 percent higher, annual revenues 35 to 48 percent greater, annual operating surpluses 53 to 178 percent higher, and O&M expenses per passenger-mile from 14 to 27 percent lower. [The profile for the Chicago Hub Network follows.] [0-22] Chicago Hub Network Accelerail alignment shown below: Corridor length (miles): Accelerail options 662 NewHSR 648 Maglev 646 New HSR, Maglev alignment Metropolitan area population (mil.): (Not all cities shown) Chicago 8.1 Detroit 4.7 M~~:;~V°it Milwaukee 1.6 : S1. Louis 2.4 Intermediate points 1.2 Iem'"! Total 18.0 1990 population higher than 1970 by: 1.6% , St. Louis Current Scenario: 2% Rail &Bus 16%Air Total intercity passenger-miles: Existing Market Share 10,451 million by Mode (All city-pair markets on a passenger Intercity travel density mile basis) (Passenger-miles per route-mile): 16.2 million 82% Auto HSGT in 2020: (Refers to entire corridor except as noted) Line-Haul Travel Times Frequencies & Fares (Detroit-Milwaukee as an example) (Detroit-Milwaukee as an example for frequency) , ... Technology Frequency Fares I (Dailv round trips (Cents/mile) Amtrak 1993' 2 11.0 I~"~' Accelerail 90 12 14.5 m;; Accelerail110 13 16.6 ~m: Iii", "\'''' Accelerail125F 13 18.1 Ijllji V Accelerail125E 14 18.1 Accelerail150F 14 18.8 ;; 'II':"" Accelerail150E 14 18.8 I:I:!III-~Iii, i<,'; 1i!;;;I~ II!< NewHSR 13 23.0 Maglev 46 30.9 .~ ~ ~ ~ ~ > "§ if> ..!I "'"~~ ~e ",,- "Ul '" Amtrak 1993 fares are estimated yIelds. Detrolt ..!Ie ..!1m ]~ jig; ~~ :r: C>O ~~ ];: l:J~ .m ~ ~.'" .;: .;: ."ti~ ~- ti~ . ::E Milwaukee service is via connection at Chicago. -< -< Z Technology Diverted Air and Auto Trips Passenger-Miles 5,000,000 4,500,000 . 1800 .------+. ~ 4,000,000 1ffXJ t------j 1: I ~ 3,500,000 ::; l-lOO------;=c,---;="'"-J ~ 3,000,000 !.m) 1-~---c----I l>< 'j; 2,500,000 ~ 100) ~ 2,000,000 ~800 :'0 "6 1,500,000 - Air Trips Diverted ~(ffi i 1,000,000 -0- Auto Trips Diverted ..~4CO 500,000 O+----+--+----+--+----+--+---j > ~ (f) '" "- '" Ul '" "- Ul '" {h ] ~ ~ :r: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ::E ] ~ 1 -< J ~ Technology [0-23] Chicago Hub Network Projection Results (Dollar Amounts are Present Values in Millions for the Period 2000-2040) Accelerail 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E NewHSR Maglev Surplus After Continuing Investments $257 $560 $708 $584 $835 $690 $1,371 $2,974 Total Benefits: $5,395 $6,781 $6,986 $7,176 $7,505 $7,619 $10,146 $13,824 Benefits to HSGT Users: System Revenues $1,396 $1,831 $1,977 $2,013 $2,167 $2,175 $3,217 $4,962 Users' Consumer Surplus $1,888 $2,363 $2,392 $2,454 $2,594 $2,606 $3,478 $4,491 Total Benefits to HSGT Users $3,283 $4,194 $4,368 $4,468 $4,761 $4,781 $6,694 $9,453 Benefits to the Public at Large $2,111 $2,587 $2,618 $2,709 $2,745 $2,838 $3,452 $4,371 Total Costs: $2,201 $2,758 $3,706 $5,058 $5,039 $6,622 $14,130 $19,775 Components ofTotal Costs: Initial Investment $1,062 $1,487 $2,438 $3,628 $3,708 $5,137 $12,285 $17,787 O&MExpense $1,041 $1,167 $1,179 $1,333 $1,237 $1,394 $1,663 $1,904 Continuing Investments $98 $104 $90 $97 $95 $91 $182 $85 Incidence ofTotal Costs: Costs Borne by Users $1,396 $1,831 $1,977 $2,013 $2,167 $2,175 $3,217 $4,962 Publicly-Borne Costs $805 $927 $1,730 $3,045 $2,872 $4,448 $10,913 $14,813 Total Benefits Less Total Costs $3,194 $4,023 $3,280 $2,118 $2,466 $997 ($3,984) ($5,951) Benefits to HSGT Users Less Costs Borne by Users $1,888 $2,363 $2,392 $2,454 $2,594 $2,606 $3,478 $4,491 Benefits to the Public at Large Less Publicly-Borne Costs $1,306 $1,660 $888 ($336) ($128) ($1,609) ($7,461) ($10,442) Ratio ofTotal Benefits to Total Costs 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.4 1.5 1.2 0.7 0.7 Ratio ofBenefits to HSGT Users, to Costs Borne by Users 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9 Ratio ofBenefits to the Public at Large, to Publicly-Borne Costs 2.6 2.8 1.5 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.3 Partnership Potential, by Option [Options with black background are projected to satisfy this report's two preliminary screening conditions for partnership potential: (1) a surplus after continuing investments and (2) a ratio of total benefits to total costs of 1.0 or more. In conducting detailed studies, States may wish to consider additional financial measures, as well as the ratio of"benefits to the public at large" to "publicly-borne costs." "Partnership potential" does not constitute an express or implied criterion for Federal approval or funding.) Accelerail IAccelerail IAccelerail IAccelerail IAccelerail IAccelerail New 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E HSR [0-24) The Chicago-Detroit and Chicago-St. Louis corridors represent subsets ofthe Chicago Hub Network, chosen to exemplify the performance ofroutes in the 200-300 mile range. Chicago-Detroit The Chicago-Detroit route is 279 miles long with a population ofabout 14 million. The Chicago and Detroit areas account for over 94 percent ofthe population, with 8.1 million and 4.7 million residents respectively. Amtrak currently offers three round trips taking about five and one-halfhours each way between Detroit and Chicago. Running time would drop to three hours and forty minutes with Accelerail125F, under two and a halfhours with New HSR, and about an hour and a halfwith Maglev. Frequencies would start at 15 with Accelerail and rise to 44 with Maglev. In this corridor, HSGT traffic would show increases from Amtrak's level of390,000 passengers in 1993. Operating surpluses in all options but Accelerail90 are projected to cover continuing investments. The total initial investment ranges from about $500 million for the lower speed Accelerails to $7 billion for Maglev. [The profile for Chicago-Detroit follows.] [0-25] Chicago-Detroit Corridor length (miles): 279 Metropolitan area population (miL): Chicago 8.1 Detroit 4.7 Intermediate points 0.8 Total 13.5 1990 population higher than 1970 by: 1.4% Current Scenario: 3% Rail Total intercity passenger-miles: & Bus 14%Air Existing Market Share 4,217 million by Mode (All city-pair markets on a passenger Intercity travel density mile basis) (passenger-miles per route-mile): 15.1 million 83% Auto HSGT in 2020: Line-Haul Travel Times Frequencies & Fares 7 , . Technology Frequency Fares I(Daily round trips) (Cents/mile) 5 Amtrak 1993- 3 10.0 Accelerail 90 15 13.4 I- e-- Pll-- Accelerail1l0 17 15.6 Accelerail 125F 17 17.0 i-- l-- I-- l-- Accelerail125E 17 17.0 I'Dl ll':l-- - e-- Accelerail150F 17 18.2 " I~:l i Accelerail150E 17 18.2 -" .~ .~ <>: > NewHSR 22 24.0 ~'" ~ ~ ~ ~ til wo ~~ J!~ ~~ !l~ ~ .t:s: :c ~ Maglev 44 32.9 ~~ ~~ WN WN won won ~ '*~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ::E ~ ~ « « « « Z -Amtrak 1993 fares are estimated yields. Teclutology Diverted Air and Auto Trips Passenger-Miles 2,500,000 ; lCf--- 1l 2,000,000 IC 1--,1- i - Air Trips Diverted I ~ --. Auto Trips Diverted e-- - • 1,500,000 e- li: I-- I- 'S'" ~::e--J:i II-- .._...... I ~ 1,000,000 ...... /1-- i-- f--- ~ hI-- i-- I--II-- I-- I--II- i 500,000 I: I :< e-- e-- I-- I-- l- 1-1 I I: I. o - <>: -" .~ .~ .~ <>: > '"~ '" til ~ ..si :c ,g'" ~o ~"" [fJ btl ~ "" "" 0 ~~ ..sio 0 ;§ "' wU') ~ "'~ ~ ~ ~ ~ «~as: ""~ WN "' ~ i ~ 1 '" 1;:: tj~ tj~ ~ ~ « « z [0-26] Chicago-Detroit Projection Results (Dollar Amounts are Present Values in Millions for the Period 2000-2040) Accelerail 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E NewHSR Maglev Surplus After Continuing Investments ($16) $114 $189 $82 $184 $115 $457 $1,160 Total Benefits: $1,958 $2,524 $2,559 $2,658 $2,625 $2,672 $4,349 $5,783 Benefits to HSGT Users: System Revenues $479 $652 $696 $715 $745 $749 $1,327 $1,996 Users: Consumer Surplus $635 $811 $804 $837 $813 $820 $1,380 $1,721 Total Benefits to HSGT Users $1,113 $1,463 $1,500 $1,552 $1,558 $1,570 $2,707 $3,717 Benefits to the Public at Large $844 $1,061 $1,060 $1,106 $1,067 $1,102 $1,642 $2,066 Total Costs: $979 $1,225 $1,657 $2,381 $1,890 $2,580 $6,154 $7,881 Components ofTotal Costs: Initial Investment $484 $688 $1,151 $1,748 $1,329 $1,945 $5,284 $7,044 O&MExpense $449 $503 $472 $598 $531 $604 $798 $801 Continuing Investments $45 $34 $34 $35 $30 $30 $72 $35 Incidence ofTotal Costs: Costs Borne by Users $479 $652 $696 $715 $745 $749 $1,327 $1,996 Publicly-Borne Costs $500 $573 $961 $1,666 $1,146 $1,831 $4,826 $5,885 Total Benefits Less Total Costs $979 $1,300 $902 $277 $735 $92 ($lj805) ($2,098) Benefits to HSGT Users Less Costs Borne by Users $635 $811 $804 $837 $813 $820 $1,380 $1,721 Benefits to the Public at Large Less Publicly-Borne Costs $344 $488 $98 ($560) ($79) ($729) ($3,184) ($3,819) Ratio ofTotal Benefits to Total Costs 2.0 2.1 1.5 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.7 Ratio ofBenefits to HSGT Users, to Costs Borne by Users 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 Ratio ofBenefits to the Public at Large, to Publicly-Borne Costs 1.7 1.9 l.l 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.4 Partnership Potential, by Option [Options with black background are projected to satisfy this report's two preliminary screening conditions for partnership potential: (l) a surplus after continuing investments and (2) a ratio of total benefits to total costs of 1.0 or more. In conducting detailed studies, States may wish to consider additional financial measures, as well as the ratio of"benefits to the public at large" to "publicly-borne costs." "Partnership potential" does not constitute an express or implied criterion for Federal approval or funding.] Accelerail New Maglev 90 I I I HSR [0-27] Chicago-St. Louis The 282-mile Chicago-St. Louis corridor has 10.8 million residents, ofwhom 300,000 live outside the two endpoint metropolitan areas. From Amtrak's current Chicago-St. Louis trip time offive and one-halfhours, HSGT would reduce travel time to as low as three hours with Accelerail, two hours with New HSR, and one and one-halfhours with Maglev. Frequencies would start at ten daily round trips for Accelerail, and increase to 32 for Maglev. With HSGT, traffic is projected to grow beyond Amtrak's current level of300,000 annual passengers. Initial investments would range from $500 million for Accelerail 90 to over $9 billion for Maglev. [The profile for the Chicago-St. Louis corridor follows.] [0-28] Chicago-St. Louis Corridor length (miles): 282 Metropolitan area population (mil.): Chicago 8.1 St. Louis 2.4 Intermediate points 0.3 Total 10.8 1990 population higher than 1970 by: 3.3% Current Scenario: 4% Rail & Bus 20%Air Total intercity passenger-miles: Existing Market Share 2,234 million by Mode (All city-pair markets on a passenger Intercity travel density mile basis) (Passenger-miles per route-mile): 7.9 million 76% Auto HSGT in 2020: Line-Haul Travel Times Frequencies & Fares Technology Frequency Fares (Dailv round trips) (Cents/mile) Amtrak 1993 3 10.0 Accelerail 90 10 14.7 -- - AccelerailllO 13 16.7 Acceleraill25F - - - 12 18.8 Acceleraill25E 12 18.8 -- - Ill' Accelerail150F 14 18.7 111,111 Accelerail150E 14 18.7 -" ~ ~ ~ ~~ ]f,I.. Diverted Air and Auto Trips Passenger-Miles 1,200.000 CTI' ." 1,000,000 ~ , :a 800,000 Ii> >1 I D D r- I, ~ ; 600,000 'li ,'·',1 > ,-I '.',' I ,illl: .li 400,000 .- W - Air Trips Diverted 1""-"'1 ~ -~, > Z AulD Trips Diverted '.1," I > I - 200,000 'i'" I .... I: t. t 0 n > ... ~ > ~ ~~ ]f,I.. [0-29] Chicago-St. Louis Projection Results (Dollar Amounts are Present Values in Millions for the Period 2000-2040) Accelerail 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E NewHSR Maglev Surplus After Continuing Investments $33 $111 $169 $131 $215 $154 $218 $618 Total Benefits: $1,162 $1,672 $1,740 $1,785 $2,088 $2,128 $2,765 $3,474 Benefits to HSGT Users: System Revenues $344 $494 $541 $550 $636 $640 $893 $1,286 Users' Consumer Surplus $459 $642 $649 $662 $799 $805 $1,027 $1,225 Total Benefits to HSGT Users $803 $1,136 $1,190 $1,211 $1,434 $1,445 $1,920 $2,511 Benefits to the Public at Large $359 $536 $551 $573 $654 $683 $845 $963 Total Costs: $811 $1,040 $1,446 $1,935 $2,412 $3,102 $6,575 $9,959 Components ofTotal Costs: Initial Investment $500 $657 $1,074 $1,516 $1,991 $2,617 $5,900 $9,291 O&MExpense $291 $349 $346 $393 $388 $453 $616 $621 Continuing Investments $20 $34 $26 $26 $32 $32 $59 $46 Incidence ofTotal Costs: Costs Borne by Users $344 $494 $541 $550 $636 $640 $893 $1,286 Publicly-Borne Costs $468 $545 $905 $1,385 $1,776 $2,463 $5,682 $8,673 Total Benefits Less Total Costs $350 $632 $294 ($151) ($324) ($974) ($3,810) ($6,485) Benefits to HSGT Users Less Costs Borne by Users $459 $642 $649 $662 $799 $805 $1,027 $1,225 Benefits to the Public at Large Less Publicly-Borne Costs ($109) ($10) ($354) ($812) ($1,123) ($1,779) ($4,837) ($7,710) Ratio ofTotal Benefits to Total Costs 1.4 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.3 Ratio ofBenefits to HSGT Users, to Costs Borne by Users 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.0 Ratio ofBenefits to the Public at Large, to Publicly-Borne Costs 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 Partnership Potential, by Option [Options with black background are projected to satisfy this report's two preliminary screening conditions for partnership potential: (1) a surplus after continuing investments and (2) a ratio of total benefits to total costs of 1.0 or more. In conducting detailed studies, States may wish to consider additional financial measures, as well as the ratio of"benefits to the public at large" to "publicly-borne costs." "Partnership potential" does not constitute an express or implied criterion for Federal approval or funding.] Accelerail IAccelerail IAccelerail Accelerail 90 110 125F 125E [0-30] Florida The Florida Department ofTransportation has actively pursued HSGT implementation during the last decade. In 1995 it requested proposals to build, operate and maintain an HSGT system along a Tampa-Orlando-Miami route, to which the State has committed to provide $70 million annually. Five prospective operators submitted franchise applications; in February 1996 the State Department ofTransportation selected the Florida Overland Express (FOX) consortium to develop New HSR, subject to satisfactory completion ofa financing agreement with the State. At this writing, such an agreement is still under negotiation. A Tampa-Orlando-Miami HSGT corridor would serve over halfofFlorida's population, as well as many visitors to this southeastern state. As projected for this report, HSGT is expected to reduce travel time for Miami-Tampa from the current Amtrak/bus combination of5 hours 14 minutes to as low as two andthree-quarters hours with the Accelerail options, two and one-halfhours with New HSR, and less than two hours with Maglev.22 Frequencies would range from eight to nine daily trips for Accelerail to 30 for New HSR and 59 for Maglev. This is primarily an auto-oriented, fairly short-distance corridor, with an average trip length of130-140 miles, less than halfthe total route length. Initial investment requirements are projected to range from about $1 billion to $7 billion, depending on the selected technology. The State ofFlorida and its HSGT franchise applicants have conducted their own detailed studies ofa range of HSGT options in the Miami-Orlando-Tampa corridor. Those studies yielded less favorable results for Accelerail-type systems in Florida than those reported on an illustrative basis in this nationwide study. [The profile for the Flodda corridor follows.] 22 The circuity imposed by the assumed shape ofthis corridor (see the profile for Florida) limits the time savings in the higher-speed options, a problem that would require more detailed route studies to resolve. [0-31] Florida Accelerail alignment shown below: Corridor length (miles): Accelerail options 306 New HSR, Maglev 317 Metropolitan area population (mil.): Tampa 2.1 New HSR, Maglev Miami 3.2 alignment: Intermediate points 2.6 Orlando Total 7.9 1990 population higher than 1970 by: 91% Ta~West Palm npa__ .[ Beach Miami Miami Current Scenario: 1% Rail & Bus 6%Air Total intercity passenger-miles: Existing Market Share 7,774 million by Mode (All city-pair markets on a passenger Intercity travel density mile basis) (passenger-miles per route-mile): 93% Auto 25.4 million HSGT in 2020: Line-Haul Travel Times Frequencies & Fares 3.5 Technology Frequency Fares (Daily round trips' (Cents/mile) 2.5 Accelerail 90 8 21.3 ~ 2 AccelerailllO 9 22.6 ~1.5 Accelerail125F 9 22.4 Accelerail125E 9 22.3 NewHSR 30 27.4 0.5 Maglev 59 33.7 ~ 0 ]~ '"!l! ii' ~ ]~ ~ ~ Z Technology Diverted Air and Auto Trips Passenger-Miles 5.000.000 r···················----············--..·····-..· --····..·· --_ _, 4,500,000 ~ ~ "'"900 i 1 4,000))00 / ...... ~ - ! 3,500,(0) . Ii / ~ 3,000,000 :> ·E2,500.000 -~ .. --,.- - ;7 ;..... ;H t 2.cXJO,OOO - Air Trips Diverted "'7 - AutoTripsDivcrted :: ~1,500,000 1-- t-- >: .. >~ :::'::::: :i! 1,000,000 H ,. » .:.: 500,000 L------' >. ,. .. :.... : 0-1---+---+---+---+----1 > ~ '" '"~ '" '"~ '" ~o ... ~"' !:!'" ~~ ~~ 11~ ~~ } "*~~~ ~ f ~ :;: ~.-. « ~ Technology Note: With the exception of 2 daily bus/rail offerings requiring 6 hours of travel, Amtrak currently has no comparable passenger rail service in operation; Accelerail150F and 150E not analyzed. [0-32] Florida Projection Results (Dollar Amounts are Present Values in Millions for the Period 2000-2040) AcceleraiI 90 110 125F 125E NewHSR Maglev Surplus After Continuing Investments $152 $244 $270 $239 $915 $1,552 Total Benefits: $1,941 $2,252 $2,392 $2,495 $5,671 $6,818 Benefits to HSGT Users: System Revenues $663 $790 $834 $865 $2,060 $2,718 Users' Consumer Surplus $681 $787 $847 $886 $2,435 $2,781 Total Benefits to HSGT Users $1,344 $1,577 $1,680 $1,752 $4,494 $5,499 Benefits to the Public at Large $597 $675 $712 $743 $1.176 $1,319 Total Costs: $1,746 $1,850 $2,057 $2,668 $5,461 $8,220 Components ofTotal Costs: Initial Investment $1,235 $1,305 $1,494 $2,041 $4,316 $7,054 O&MExpense $462 $482 $499 $562 $1,028 $1,091 Continuing Investments $49 $64 $64 $65 $116 $75 Incidence ofTotal Costs: Costs Borne by Users $663 $790 $834 $865 $2,060 $2,718 Publicly-Borne Costs $1,082 $1,061 $1,224 $1,802 $3,401 $5,502 Total Benefits Less Total Costs $195 $402 $335 ($173) $210 ($1,402) Benefits to HSGT Users Less Costs Borne $886 $2,435 $2,781 by Users $681 $787 $847 Benefits to the Public at Large Less Publicly-Borne Costs ($486) ($385) ($512) ($1,059) ($2,225) ($4,183) Ratio ofTotal Benefits to Total Costs 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.0 0.8 Ratio ofBenefits to HSGT Users, to Costs Borne by Users 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.0 Ratio ofBenefits to the Public at Large, to 0.3 0.2 Publicly-Borne Costs 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 Partnership Potential, by Option [Options with black background are projected to satisfy this report's two preliminary screening conditions for partnership potential: (1) a surplus after continuing investments and (2) a ratio of total benefits to total costs of 1.0 or more. In conducting detailed studies, States may wish to consider additional financial measures, as well as the ratio of"benefits to the public at large" to "publicly-borne costs." "Partnership potential" does not constitute an express or implied criterion for Federal approval or funding.] Accelerail 1 Accelerail ·1 Accelerail Accelerail Maglev 90 110 125F 125E [0-33] Northeast Corridor Through an exemplary-and relatively inexpensive-private/public partnership among freight railroads, suppliers, the Department, States, and localities,23 the New York-Washington segment ofthe Northeast Corridor in 1969 offered the first modem HSGT in North America with the introduction ofthe Metroliners. Upgraded as a result ofthe Northeast Corridor Improvement Project, Amtrak's Metroliner service now reliably links its endpoint cities with timings under three hours. Amtrak is completing the upgrading ofthe New York-Boston segment ofthe route, which will include electrification between New Haven and Boston. Planned work will raise speeds to 150 mph over parts ofthe Washington-Boston line by the end ofthe decade, reducing New York-Washington running times to two and a halfhours, and New York-Boston to three hours. Since Accelerail 150E is already planned for implementation by the year 2000, this study fully addressed only the two highest-speed options, New HSR and Maglev. Between New York and Washington, trip times would shrink to two hours with New HSR and one and one-third hours with Maglev. New York-Boston trip times would be even shorter: one and two-thirds hours with New HSR and just over one hour with Maglev. Train frequencies would be extremely high-about 100 round trips daily between New York and Washington, and 80 to 90 round trips daily between New York and Boston. Passenger-miles on the corridor are projected to expand significantly over the comparable 1993 level of 1.3 billion. The quality ofthe service offered would allow fare yields to be moved forward aggressively, and revenues are projected to cover all expenses, continuing investments, initial vehicle investments, and over halfofthe initial infrastructure investment. The total initial investment would be in the $20 billion bracket due to the need to build through the most heavily developed area in the country, and the need for extensive tunneling and bridgework. [The profile for the Northeast Corridor follows.] 23 See Walter Shapiro, "The Seven Secrets ofthe Metroliner's Success," Washington Monthly, March 1973, p. 7. [0-34] Northeast Corridor Corridor length (miles): 441 Metropolitan area population (mil.): Boston 4.2 New York City 18.1 Philadelphia 5.9 Baltimore 2.4 Washington D.C. 3.9 Intermediate points 1.3 Alternate Maglev route Total 35.8 (see note below) 1990 population higher than 1970 by: 4.4% Current Scenario: 7% Rail & Bus 15%Air Total intercity passenger-miles: Existing Market Share 20,879 million by Mode (All city-pair markets on a passenger Intercity travel density mile basis) (Passenger-miles per route-mile): 47.3 78% Auto million HSGT in 2020: (Refers to entire corridor except as noted) Line-Haul Travel Times Frequencies & Fares (Boston-New York City as an example) (Boston-New York City as an example for frequency) Technology Frequency Fares I(Daily round trips\ (Cents/mile) Amtrak 1993· 13 24,0 NewHSR 84 33.2 Maglev 85 37,9 Amtrak 1993 fares are estimated Yields. Diverted Air and Auto Trips Passenger-Miles 7,000,000 r····················································· / , 600J r·········································· ···············0 6,000,000 f------/---"..e------' 1~ 5,000,000 /' /' I:1------1 E.4,OOO,OOO f------.-..i :E __ AlrTripsDivertNl ~ 300:11------1 ~ 3,000,000 ~_~'."toTri"Dim..d ---.1 f j !'o2lUl +------1 S 2,000,000 +------i ~ i ~ 1 ~ ~ Technology Technology Notes: Amtrak 1993 figures which refer to the entire corridor included Metroliner service (i.e., express service from Washington DC to New York City). The alternative Maglev route has undergone state scrutiny but in not analyzed herein. [0-35] Northeast Corridor Projection Results (Dollar Amounts are Present Values in Millions for the Period 2000-2040) NewHSR Maglev Surplus After Continuing Investments $8,277 $11,607 Total Benefits: $24,941 $28,943 Benefits to HSGT Users: System Revenues $13,442 $16,285 Users' Consumer Surplus $7,861 $8,538 Total Benefits to HSGT Users $21,303 $24,823 Benefits to the Public at Large $3,638 $4,121 Total Costs: $24,293 $26,815 Components ofTotal Costs: Initial Investment $19,127 $22,137 O&M Expense $4,687 $4,328 Continuing Investments $478 $349 Incidence ofTotal Costs: Costs Borne by Users $13,442 $16,285 Publicly-Borne Costs $10,851 $10,530 Total Benefits Less Total Costs $648 $2,128 Benefits to HSGT Users Less Costs Borne by Users $7,861 $8,538 Benefits to the Public at Large Less Publicly-Borne Costs ($7,213) ($6,410) Ratio ofTotal Benefits to Total Costs 1.0 1.1 Ratio ofBenefits to HSGT Users, to Costs Borne by Users 1.6 1.5 Ratio ofBenefits to the Public at Large, to Publicly-Borne Costs 0.3 0.4 Partnership Potential, by Option [Options with black background are projected to satisfy this report's two preliminary screening conditions for partnership potential: (1) a surplus after continuing investments and (2) a ratio oftotal benefits to total costs of 1.0 or more. In conducting detailed studies, States may wish to consider additional financial measures, as well as the ratio of"benefits to the public at large" to "publicly-borne costs." "Partnership potential" does not constitute an express or implied criterion for Federal approval or funding.] New I I\laglev IISR [0-36] Pacific Northwest The Pacific Northwest corridor in the States ofOregon and Washington and the Province ofBritish Columbia exemplifies the private/public partnerships on which future HSGT would need to build. The States and the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (BNSF) have committed funds and planning expertise to Accelerail-type improvements in this corridor.24 These partnerships have led to recent service improvements, including demonstrations ofrecent European trainsets and Amtrak's return to the Seattle-Vancouver, B.C. market. The projections for this study characterize the Pacific Northwest as a potential locale for further Accelerail-type development. This result accords with the corridor's length and traffic patterns-at 469 miles, it exceeds the Northeast Corridor's route mileage, yet has shorter average trip lengths and less travel density. The initial investment for HSGT in this corridor is projected to range from about $600 million for the lowest-cost Accelerail upgrade, to $14 billion for Maglev. [The profile for the Pacific Northwest corridor follows.] 24 Also in the Pacific Northwest region, the Union Pacific Railroad has joined the BNSF in a project to provide positive train separation using improved train control technology. [0-37] Pacific Northwest Corridor length (miles): 454 Metropolitan area population (mil.): Vancouver 1.6 Seattle 2.6 Portland 1.5 Eugene 0.3 Intermediate points 0.6 Total 6.5 1990 population higher than 1970 by: 42.6% Current Scenario: 1% Rail &Bus 5%Air Total intercity passenger-miles: Existing Market Share 4,170 million by Mode (All city-pair markets on a passenger Intercity travel density mile basis) (passenger-miles per route-mile): 9.2 million 94% Auto HSGT in 2020: (Refers to entire corridor except as noted) Line-Haul Travel Times Frequencies & Fares (Eugene-Vancouver as an example) (Eugene-Vancouver as an example for frequency) Technology Frequency Fares (Daily round trips) (Cents/mile) Amtrak 1993" 3 9.0 Accelerail 90 15 20.3 Accelerail110 15 24.8 Accelerail125F 15 24.8 Accelerail125E 15 24.7 -" > ~ ';; .~ u. '@ I1J .SJ NewHSR 17 33.9 ~~ ~o ~ ~~ ~~ il~ i;~ ]~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ r Maglev 35 41.3 Technology "' "Amtrak 1993 fares are estimated yields. Diverted Air and Auto Trips Passenger-Miles 1,400,CXJO +-~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1l / .. 500 j-~~-r=~~~~~~~,-~-I .ll,200,OOO 1~~~~~~~~~~/----o.L-~~ .§ ~4ooj-~~- "tfl,{XXI,OOO +-~~~~~~~~+~~~ j~_~===--=~ --"J~~~~---, f 8lX),CXlO __ ~~ - ~ , +-~~~~~~~~~~~~~, 1: 600,000 r200 -- § 400,000 +-~~~~~~~~_--+---Ai,T,ir·Di"er~d i .Au~~I~D"M~ ~lool-~--i 200,000 +-~~~~~~~~~~~~- '"~'" ~ ~~ '"~ ~~ Technology [0-38] Pacific Northwest Projection Results (Dollar Amounts are Present Values in Millions for the Period 2000-2040) Accelerail 90 110 125F 125E NewHSR Maglev Surplus After Continuing Investments $181 $333 $359 $324 $521 $859 Total Benefits: $2,675 $2,925 $3,038 $3,090 $4,168 $5,028 Benefits to HSGT Users: System Revenues $810 $964 $996 $1,004 $1,492 $1,935 Users' Consumer Surplus $1,216 $1,304 $1,363 $1,379 $1,899 $2,310 Total Benefits to HSGT Users $2,027 $2,268 $2,359 $2,384 $3,391 $4,245 Benefits to the Public at Large $648 $657 $679 $706 $777 $783 Total Costs: $1,227 $1,490 $1,869 $2,757 $8,790 $15,057 Components ofTotal Costs: Initial Investment $598 $859 $1,233 $2,076 $7,819 $13,980 O&MExpense $590 $589 $595 $620 $893 $985 Continuing Investments $40 $42 $42 $61 $78 $92 Incidence ofTotal Costs: Costs Borne by Users $810 $964 $996 $1,004 $1,492 $1,935 Publicly-Borne Costs $417 $526 $873 $1,752 $7,298 $13,121 Total Benefits Less Total Costs $1,447 $1,434 $1,168 $333 ($4,622) ($10,028) Benefits to HSGT Users Less Costs Borne $2,310 by Users $1,216 $1,304 $1,363 $1,379 $1,899 Benefits to the Public at Large Less Publicly-Borne Costs $231 $130 ($194) ($1,046) ($6,521) ($12,338) Ratio ofTotal Benefits to Total Costs 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.1 0.5 0.3 Ratio ofBenefits to HSGT Users, to Costs Borne by Users 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 Ratio ofBenefits to the Public at Large, to Publicly-Borne Costs 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.1 Partnership Potential, by Option [Options with black background are projected to satisfy this report's two preliminary screening conditions for partnership potential: (1) a surplus after continuing investments and (2) a ratio of total benefits to total costs of 1.0 or more. In conducting detailed studies, States may wish to consider additional financial measures, as well as the ratio of"benefits to the public at large" to "publicly-borne costs." "Partnership potential" does not constitute an express or implied criterion for Federal approval or funding.] Accelerail IAccelerail 1101 Accelerail I Accelerail New Maglev 90 125F 125E HSR [0-39] Texas Triangle The State ofTexas has a population ofapproximately 18 million, ofwhom 54 percent live in the metropolitan areas ofthe Texas Triangle corridor. Efforts to bring HSOT to the Texas Triangle resulted in the 1991 franchise award to the Texas TOV consortium to build and operate a New HSR system. However, Texas TOV was unable to obtain the necessary funding. A potential HSOT operator has expressed interest in Accelerail for the Houston-Dallas route; this type ofservice is under scrutiny locally. To serve the growing population living along the Triangle, the present study considered two HSOT routes: a 790-mile triangular configuration for Accelerail and a 436-mile wishbone configuration for New HSR and Maglev. Using the Dallas-San Antonio market as an example, HSOT could achieve travel times ofas low as three hours with Accelerail, two and one-half hours with New HSR, and one and two-thirds hours with Maglev. Frequencies would start at ten daily trips for Accelerail and increase to 22 for New HSR and to 47 for Maglev. Owing to the abundance ofshort-haul flights in the Texas Triangle, the projections show travelers to be highly time-sensitive; accordingly, traffic is projected to rise with travel time improvements. Operating surpluses are expected to be sufficient to cover continuing investments across all technologies. The initial capital costs would range from about $900 million for Accelerail90 to $5 billion for New HSR and $10 billion for Maglev. New HSR in this analysis actually costs the public less than Accelerail 150E because the former's shorter, wishbone route requires lower initial infrastructure costs, which are further offset by higher revenues from a larger contingent ofriders. [The profile for the Texas Triangle follows.] [0-40] Texas Triangle Accelerail alignment shown below: Corridor length (miles): Accelerail options 783 New HSR, Maglev 436 Metropolitan area population (mil.): Dallas-Ft. Worth 3.9 Houston 3.7 New HSR, Maglev San Antonio 1.3 alignment: Intermediate points 1.3 Total 10.2 Fort worthl Dallas 1990 population higher than 1970 by: 67% Austin ( ~usto San Antonio Current Scenario: 2% Rail Total intercity passenger-miles: &Bus 28%Air Existing Market Share 7,300 million by Mode (All city-pair markets on a passenger Intercity travel density: mile basis) (Passenger-miles per route-mile): 16.7 million (based on New HSR/Maglev distance) 70% Auto HSGT in 2020: (Refers to entire corridor except as noted) Line-Haul Travel Times Frequencies & Fares (Dallas-San Antonio as an example) (Dallas-San Antonio as an example for frequency) 4.5,.;=················································ . Technology Frequency Fares 3.5 I (Daily round trips) (Cents/mile) Accelerail 90 10 17.7 AccelerailllO 15 17.8 r: Acceleraill25F 16 17.7 1.5 Acceleraill25E 17 17.7 Acceleraill50F 18 18.8 0.5 Acceleraill50E 18 18.8 0 NewHSR 22 21.7 ~ ~ ~ ] 1a 11 (J) I\1aglev 47 28.4 ]~ Ji15 ..!!o~'" :r:'" ]~ ~~ ~~ ~~ von von e~ e~ e~ e~ ~ <: ~ <: <: <: <: z Technology Diverted Air and Auto Trips Passenger-Miles 6,000,000 T·.. ···················································...... , = 11 Note: Amtrak had no comparable passenger rail service in operation. [0-41] Texas Triangle Projection Results (Dollar Amounts are Present Values in Millions for the Period 2000-2040) Accelerail 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E NewHSR Maglev Surplus After Continuing Investments $195 $456 $586 $486 $797 $646 $1,168 $2,453 Total Benefits: $2,311 $3,779 $4,326 $4,414 $4,868 $4,966 $7,382 $9,682 Benefits to HSGT Users: System Revenues $894 $1,399 $1,586 $1,604 $1,837 $1,847 $2,909 $4,311 Users' Consumer Surplus $1,050 $1,814 $2,116 $2,146 $2,395 $2,412 $3,654 $4,543 Total Benefits to HSGT Users $1,944 $3,213 $3,702 $3,750 $4,232 $4,259 $6,563 $8,853 Benefits to the Public at Large $367 $566 $624 $664 $636 $707 $819 $829 Total Costs: $1,562 $2,657 $4,768 $5,732 $5,389 $6,981 $6,812 $11,984 Components ofTotal Costs: Initial Investment $863 $1,714 $3,767 $4,613 $4,349 $5,780 $5,071 $10,127 O&MExpense $646 $871 $918 $1,046 $971 $1,134 $1,510 $1,735 Continuing Investments $53 $72 $83 $73 $69 $67 $232 $122 Incidence ofTotal Costs: Costs Borne by Users $894 $1,399 $1,586 $1,604 $1,837 $1,847 $2,909 $4,311 Publicly-Borne Costs $668 $1,258 $3,182 $4,128 $3,552 $5,134 $3,903 $7,674 Total Benefits Less Total Costs $749 $1,122 ($441) ($1,318) ($520) ($2,015) $570 ($2,302) Benefits to HSGT Users Less Costs Borne by Users $1,050 $1,814 $2,116 $2,146 $2,395 $2,412 $3,654 $4,543 Benefits to the Public at Large Less Publicly-Borne Costs ($301) ($692) ($2,557) ($3,464) ($2,916) ($4,427) ($3,084) ($6,845) Ratio ofTotal Benefits to Total Costs 1.5 1.4 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.7 1.1 0.8 Ratio ofBenefits to HSGT Users, to Costs Borne by Users 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 Ratio ofBenefits to the Public at Large, to Publicly-Borne Costs 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 Partnership Potential, by Option [Options with black background are projected to satisfy this report's two preliminary screening conditions for partnership potential: (1) a surplus after continuing investments and (2) a ratio of total benefits to total costs of 1.0 or more. In conducting detailed studies, States may wish to consider additional financial measures, as well as the ratio of"benefits to the public at large" to "publicly-borne costs." "Partnership potential" does not constitute an express or implied criterion for Federal approval or funding.] Accelerail IAccelerail Accelerail 90 110 125F [0-42] Incrementally Treated Corridors The Empire and Southeast Corridors received special treatment because they would serve as natural extensions ofthe Northeast Corridor-an existing HSGT operation that is undergoing improvement. A single entity (Amtrak) currently operates intercity rail passenger service in the Northeast, Empire, and Southeast Corridors; this study therefore assumed that the Northeast Corridor entity would take responsibility for future HSGT in the extensions as well. These factors allowed for an incremental approach which modeled the performance of(a) the Northeast Corridor alone and (b) the combination ofthe Northeast Corridor with either25 its Empire or Southeast Corridor extension, and derived the incremental projection by simply subtracting (a) from (b). The projection results for the incrementally treated corridors are preliminary in nature because ofthe multiplicity ofavailable options for analysis26 and the sheer size and complexity ofcombining the Nation's most densely trafficked corridor with very long extensions (leading to route lengths in the 800-900 mile range-tantamount to the distance from New York to Chicago). Since a complete study ofeach ofthese incremental corridors exceeded the scope of this analysis, their presentation is restricted to general indications for sample options?7 Empire Corridor Linking New York Empire Corridor as Extension ofNortheast Corridor City with most major cities ofUpper New York State Corridor length (mile, NewYork-Bnffalo): 431 Metropolitan area population (mi I.): (Albany, Utica, Syracuse, NewYork City 18.1 Buffalo Buffalo 1.2 ~-_J Rochester, Buffalo, and Intermediate points 3.1 !-+------t Total 22.4 intermediate points), the 1990 population higher than 1970 by: -0.6% Empire Corridor traditionally represents one ofthe Nation's richest Map Legend intercity rail passenger --- Empire Corridor markets. Further Northeast Corridor (NEC) strengthening that market, (through or connecting service) the completion ofAmtrak's direct access between the 25 A combination ofHSGT in all three corridors-Northeast, Empire, and Southeast-was not modeled, nor were other potential Northeast Corridor HSGT extensions (e.g., Hartford/Springfield and Harrisburg). 26 For instance, each ofthe Accelerail options in the extensions can theoretically be matched with either Acceleraill50E or New HSR in the Northeast Corridor. Thus, instead ofthe eight technologies modeled elsewhere in this report, the Empire and Southeast Corridors can each have at least 14. 27 This study matched Accelerail options in the extensions with New HSR in the NEC. Future detailed studies would do well to couple Accelerail options in the Southeast and Empire Corridors with electrified Accelerail service in the Northeast Corridor. [0-43] Empire and Northeast Corridors has created the potential for through Accelerail service between Upper New York State and New Jersey points, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington. Such connectivity would, ofcourse, be fundamental to the design ofany New HSR or Maglev systems. On an incremental basis, preliminary projections for the Empire Corridor suggest that both Accelerail125F and Maglev could have partnership potential. Because ofthe Northeast Corridor connection, average trip lengths and average per-passenger revenue for Empire Corridor trips would exceed those for most other illustrative corridors?8 The substantial traffic volumes and revenues foreseen for the Empire Corridor, coupled with the constancy ofNew York State's interest in HSGT over this established intercity rail passenger route, suggest that it might serve as a useful object offurther incremental study along the lines described above. Southeast Corridor The Southeast Corridor, linking Washington, D.C. with Richmond, Greensboro, Charlotte, and other important Virginia and North Carolina points, also represents a natural extension ofthe Northeast Corridor. In fact, the potential for traffic and revenue synergy is even greater in the Southeast than in the Empire Corridor: while the Empire Corridor directly serves New York City, every Southeast Corridor traveler bound for New York must traverse some 200 Northeast Corridor route-miles as well, with potentially lucrative revenue consequences for the HSGT operator. Southeast Corridor as Extension ofNortheast Corridor29 The projections reflect the synergies inherent in the Corridor length (miles, Washington-Charlotte) 390 Metropolitan area population (mil.): Northeast Washington DC 3.9 Baltimore 2.4 Corridor/Southeast Richmond 0.9 Raleigh 0.7 Greenshore 0.9 Corridor combination: Charlotte l.l Total 10.0 the average trip on the 1990 population higher than 1970 by: 21.8% Southeast Corridor would be longer and Map Legend generate more revenue than on any other Southeast Corridor (SEC) Northeast Corridor (NEC) illustrative route, (through or connecting service) including California North/South. 28 The exceptions are New HSR and Maglev in California North/South; and the Southeast Corridor. 29 The Secretary ofTransportation recently added to the designated Southeast Corridor, an extension from Richmond to the Hampton Roads region ofVirginia. This analysis does not address that extension. [0-44] Because ofthese ridership and revenue prospects, this study applied to the Southeast Corridor the same analytical approach and assumptions that characterized the Empire Corridor. Viewed incrementally, the preliminary Southeast Corridor projections suggest that all three sample options (AcceleraiI90, New HSR, and Maglev) could have partnership potential. In light ofthese preliminary results, the Southeast Corridor states and Amtrak might consider jointly exploring the incremental economics of a wide range ofSoutheast Corridor scenarios (including various routing and segmentation alternatives) as extensions ofprospective Northeast Corridor services. CONCLUSIONS Taken together, the following conclusions suggest that States should consider HSGT along with other options for improving intercity passenger transportation. Investment Needs • HSGT can cost from less than $2 million to $50 million per route-mile to build. The less expensive options-upgraded existing railroads with 90-150 mph maximum speeds---ean, in some corridors, represent affordable travel improvements that would expand the range of transportation choices. With top speeds up to 200-300 mph, the costlier options can provide very fast, reliable, and comfortable transportation service, as in a Maglev timing of just over an hour between midtown Manhattan and downtown Boston. • In the design and application ofall HSGT technologies, the Department regards safety as paramount. Evolving safety research and regulation could thus influence the capital cost structure for Accelerail, New HSR, and Maglev. Similarly, research and development in other facets ofrailroad and Maglev system design could reduce the investment levels for HSGT technologies. As the effects ofthese regulatory advances and technology development efforts become known, they will enter at the State level into the conceptual and detailed design ofspecific HSGT infrastructure and equipment investments. Demand Levels • HSGT is projected to develop appreciable ridership. For example, by the year 2020 in the most heavily trafficked corridors (California North/South and the Northeast Corridor), New HSR and Maglev could exceed by as much as a factor offour Amtrak's current Northeast Corridor travel volumes. Likewise, Accelerail in California, Texas, and the Chicago Hub Network could approach or exceed existing Northeast Corridor patronage levels by 2020. Operating Results • In most ofthe illustrative cases, HSGT is projected to function on a self-sustaining basis independent ofpublic subsidies-once the initial investment is in place. [0-45] • Beyond covering future operating and maintenance expenses and continuing investment needs, revenues in most ofthe illustrative cases could cover a portion ofthe initial investment. • In specific instances, the operating results ofHSGT may be strengthened when individual corridors are linked in a network, or when existing corridors are extended, because demand and revenues increase while unit costs may decrease. Further detailed studies would be necessary to confirm this potential in specific locations. Benefit/Cost Analysis • HSGT's total benefits exceed total costs in most ofthe illustrative cases. • Each HSGT technology would have one or more corridors that provide a favorable ratio of total benefits to total costs: New HSR, for example, is projected to have partnership potential30 in four ofnine applicable illustrative corridors,31 and Maglev in two ofnine. • In a given corridor, the less expensive Accelerail technologies, relying on upgraded existing rail lines and freight railroad cooperation, could typically provide higher ratios of benefits to costs than New HSR and Maglev. • On the basis oftotal costs and benefits, each illustrative corridor would have one or more HSGT technologies that would meet the threshold conditions for partnership potential. The more heavily traveled corridors would generally show partnership potential over a broader spectrum oftechnologies. • When benefits and costs are analyzed and compared insofar as they affect HSGT users and the public at large, respectively: - Users invariably enjoy an excess of benefits over costs. - The public at large has a favorable ratio of benefits to costs in only a subset of corridor cases (approximately one-fourth ofthose analyzed), all ofwhich are Accelerail options. 30As defined in this report, "partnership potential" is the apparent capacity ofan HSGT corridor to draw the private and public sectors together in planning, negotiations, and, conceivably, project implementation. To exhibit partnership potential, the projections for an HSGT technology in a particular corridor must satisfy at least the following two conditions: First, private enterprise must be able to run the corridor--once built and paid for-as a completely self-sustaining entity. Second, the total benefits ofan HSGT corridor must equal or exceed its total costs. This report uses "partnership potential" as an indicator ofthe aggregate financial and economic impacts of HSGT alternatives in a set ofillustrative corridors. Detailed State studies ofindividual corridors would benefit from additional evaluation measures as well as site-specific investigations and data. Thus, while "partnership potential" may offer useful insights in assessing the likelihood ofHSGT development by State and local governments and their private partners, it does not constitute an express or implied criterion for Federal approval or funding. For further particulars on "partnership potential," the reader is referred to earlier sections ofthis Overview Report. 3\ That is, corridors other than the incremental extensions to the Northeast Corridor. [0-461 • Accelerail's potential for HSGT at a modest initial investment cost validates the Department's Next-Generation High-Speed Rail technology development program-which supports use ofexisting railroads-and confirms several States' decisions to implement Accelerail options. Importance ofPartnerships • Successful private/public partnerships are essential to the construction and implementation ofall HSGT systems. While necessarily varying among corridors and technologies, the potential for such partnerships will be strongest where self-sustaining operations can attract a private HSGT entity, where the benefits provide the State with a convincing rationale for the public investment, and where a State regards HSGT as a preferred approach to enhancing intercity travel mobility in an intermodal setting. State Planning Needs • The States have specialized knowledge oflocal conditions and priorities, and the very nature ofcorridor planning also calls for detailed consideration ofvarious complex staging, routing, and mixed technology options from a State and local perspective. Where public policy considerations dictate, States may also wish to pursue an examination ofthe incidence ofbenefits and costs in conjunction with their detailed corridor studies. Further details on the scope, procedures, assumptions, and results ofthe study appear in the Main Report. [0-47] Photo Credits [All photos are used by pennission. Photo use does not represent endorsement by the U.S. Department of Transportation ofany particular design, product, or manufacturer.] Cover (clockwise from top left) • RTL-2 Turboliner photo courtesy ofthe New York State Department ofTransportation. • Maglev illustration courtesy ofFlorida Maglev Consortium, Inc. • California Department ofTransportation locomotive photo courtesy ofElectro-Motive Division, General Motors. • American Flyer illustration courtesy ofBombardier/GEC Alsthom Consortium, Inc. Section on "HSGT Technologies" • Metroliner photo courtesy ofAmtrak, Washington, DC. • British Intercity 225 photo courtesy of Intercity East Coast Ltd., York, England. • X-2000 tilt train photo courtesy ofABB Traction Inc., Elmira, NY. • TGV photo courtesy of Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, Paris, France. • Nozomi Shinkansen photo courtesy ofJapan Railways Group, New York, NY. • Intercity Express photo courtesy of Clay Moritz, Silver Spring, MD. • Maglev photo courtesy ofThyssen Henschel. [0-48] Reproduced by NTIS National Technical Information Service Springfield, VA 22161 This report was printed specifically for your order from nearly 3 million titles available in our collection. For economy and efficiency, NTIS does not maintain stock of its vast collection of technical reports. Rather, most documents are printed for each order. Documents that are not in electronic format are reproduced from master archival copies and are the best possible reproductions available. 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