A New Mentality for a New Economy: Performing the Homo Economicus in Argentina (1976Á83)

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A New Mentality for a New Economy: Performing the Homo Economicus in Argentina (1976Á83) Economy and Society Volume 39 Number 2 May 2010: 271Á302 A new mentality for a new economy: performing the homo economicus in Argentina (1976Á83) Daniel Fridman Abstract This article examines the construction of the homo economicus in Argentina in the context of the last military dictatorship (1976Á83). While the worldviews of the military and neo-liberal economists of the time were very different, their common concern for distortions in economic and political life made them translatable. These economists provided a new economic identity that would be in tune with monetarist theory, replace ‘distorting’ collective identities and allow individuals to be governed from a distance. I argue that the homo economicus was performed through two sets of tools: consumer campaigns and the financial press. However, individuals did not always behave as expected. The contradictions of neo-liberalism, between its liberalism and its quest to create self-regulating spheres through active government intervention, led to the financial crisis of 1980. Economists later blamed the crash on the irresponsibility of market actors and expressed doubt regarding the self- regulating model they had promoted. In the conclusion, the legacy of the attempt to perform the homo economicus is assessed. Keywords: performativity; governmentality; Argentina; military dictatorship; neo-liberalism; consumer culture; finances. Downloaded by [University of Texas Libraries] at 18:38 22 October 2014 Daniel Fridman, Columbia University, Department of Sociology Á MC9649, 606 W 122nd Street, New York, NY 10027, USA. E-mail: [email protected] Copyright # 2010 Taylor & Francis ISSN 0308-5147 print/1469-5766 online DOI: 10.1080/03085141003620170 272 Economy and Society Introduction In 1977, the Argentine Finance Ministry launched a consumer education media campaign called ‘A Change of Mentality’. The campaign included TV and radio commercials, short movies, newspaper advertisements and thousands of brochures aimed to teach Argentine citizens how to be good consumers. The intention, according to Finance Ministry documents, was not to defend consumers, but rather to teach them to defend themselves. The movie shorts, it was said, did not try to impose behaviours, but rather to raise questions and thoughts. According to the ministry, consumers had not been considered important by previous governments, and the campaign would enhance their freedom of choice. Throughout the campaign, consumption was presented as a synonym for individual freedom. This language, however, was employed in the context of the most brutal military dictatorship in the country’s history. Political parties were banned, press and cultural activities controlled and thousands of Argentines tortured in detention camps. The military regularly detained people in broad daylight, and the bodies of illegally seized citizens were thrown from military planes into the R´ıo de la Plata River (CONADEP, 1986). What is the meaning of pro-consumer policies and the liberal discourse of individual freedom in the midst of repressive terror? While there is an enormous body of writing about the military state terror in Argentina and the structural economic changes resulting from the 1976Á83 dictatorship, little attention has been given to this liberal language and its rationale. This article will argue that it was not merely a rhetorical device, but rather an integral component of governance. Through the aforementioned campaigns and other tools, Argentine economic authorities attempted to perform a specific subject, the homo economicus. According to sociologist Michel Callon (1998), economists have played a significant role in making markets work in specific ways and, more importantly, in performing market actors. Callon holds that some sociologists have tried to denounce the validity of economic theory by criticizing the reduction and abstraction of the concept of homo economicus. Others have tried to enrich it by adding notions such as rules, values and culture. However, Downloaded by [University of Texas Libraries] at 18:38 22 October 2014 sociologists have failed to recognize the actual existence of the homo economicus, and consequently, the processes through which it is performed: ‘what we expect from sociology is not a more complex homo economicus but the comprehension of his simplicity and poverty’.Thehomo economicus ‘is formatted, framed and equipped with prostheses which help him in his calculations and which are, for the most part, produced by economics’ (Callon, 1998, p. 51). This article attempts to contribute to recent debates surrounding the notion of performativity as well as efforts to specify it by applying it to diverse empirical realms (Barry & Slater, 2002; MacKenzie et al., 2007). First, it will analyse the role of economists and the financial press in the construction of Daniel Fridman: A new mentality for a new economy 273 new economic identities (consumers and investors) in Argentina during the dictatorship of 1976Á83. The atomized individual rational chooser, or homo economicus, was an obvious presence in the neo-liberal economists’ framework at the time, but it was not a fact of reality for them. Thus, they tried to shape reality to fit the theoretical description. Second, this article will draw attention to the political relevance and consequences of economics’ performativity. If market actors behave in tune with economic theory, they may also become more legible and predictable for particular forms of government. According to Michel Foucault and other authors, governments establish ways to make subjects legible, understandable and thus governable. They create a language through which they can depict and shape the sphere of life they want to govern (Foucault, 1991; Miller & Rose, 1990). Recent scholarship on governmentality has analysed post-welfare neo-liberal economic policies through this framework, showing that a new set of concerns regarding the governmental shaping of individual behaviour emerged, particularly in terms of techniques that do not affect the autonomy of individuals (Barry et al., 1996; Burchell et al., 1991; Miller & Rose, 1990). Neo-liberalism is characterized by the reluctance to intervene in the autonomous sphere of the individual, and the homo economicus can provide an order based on both the legibility and the autonomy of individual subjects. While it may at first seem hard to imagine how a violent police state found space for such autonomy, both economists and the military shared the view that distortions in economic and political life were driving the country towards decadence and anarchy. Formatting, framing and equipping the homo economicus was a major concern for neo-liberal economists in Argentina, for the purpose not only of making the market work in specific ways, but also providing order and legibility to a society that by the mid-1970s was seen by many as ungovernable. In the next section, I explain the significance of the homo economicus for the problematic alliance between neo-liberal economists and the military. Despite their large differences, their shared diagnosis of long-term distortions in Argentine society and the economy made the homo economicus an attractive alternative for both parties. The third and fourth sections analyse the construction of the concrete forms that the economic concept took: consumers and investors. To make liberal reforms work, economists needed to change the Downloaded by [University of Texas Libraries] at 18:38 22 October 2014 population’s subjectivity. In order to construct a legible market actor, the government also needed the actors to learn the basics of market behaviour. In the third section, I analyse the construction of a ‘new mentality’. The atomized consumer promoted by the government represented the opposite of what neo- liberal economists saw as the evil of the imports substitution economy: economic agents whose collective behaviour was mostly determined by the state intervening in the economy. In the fourth section, I analyse the construction of investors and the role of the financial press in formatting them. Although the financial press was not controlled by the government, it took a very active and crucial role in shaping and equipping the lay investor.In the fifth section, I analyse the neo-liberal response to the financial crisis of 274 Economy and Society 1980. The contradiction of neo-liberalism, between its liberalism and its ‘constructivism’, manifested itself in the protections offered by the state to investors and bankers. When the system crashed, neo-liberals encountered subjects that they could not control without tight policing instead of the legible and responsible individuals they had expected. Finally, in the conclusion, I turn to the legacies of the construction of the homo economicus. Were the economists able to perform a new subject? There is no straightforward answer to this question. Although the neo-liberal policies applied during the dictatorship were very aggressive, they were only partially realized. It was only in the 1990s Á during Carlos Menem’s presidency Á that Argentina fully adopted neo-liberal prescriptions. However, while not absolutely effective, the neo-liberal policies of the dictatorship created the possibility of the new subject. Most of the data for this article come from government documents: annual reports from the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank, two additional reports published by the Finance Minister Jose´ Alfredo Mart´ınez de Hoz and a serial publication for the
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