Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen T. Michael Moseley Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen William R. Looney III Commander, Air University http://www.af.mil Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz

Chief, Professional Journals Lt Col Paul D. Berg Deputy Chief, Professional Journals Maj James C. Ulman Professional Staff Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Darlene H. Barnes, Editorial Assistant http://www.aetc.randolph.af Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager Air and Space Power Journal Web Site Catherine Parker, Managing Editor

The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air Force Recurring Publication 10-1, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the http://www.au.af.mil presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying Air and Space Power Journal the official sanction of the Department of Defense, 401 Chennault Circle Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6004 Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US e-mail: aspj@max well.af.mil government. [email protected] (alternate) Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in Visit Air and Space Power Journal online part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Air at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil. and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line.

Inside cover.indd 2 11/27/2007 12:48:08 PM Winter 2007 Volume XXI, No. 4 AFRP 10-1

Senior Leader Perspective The Coalition Air Force Transition Team: Rebuilding Iraq’s Air Force ...... 5 Maj Gen (sel) Robert R . Allardice, USAF Maj Kyle “Brad” Head, USAF

Focus Area Airpower and Irregular Warfare ...... 21 Lt Col Paul D . Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals

Features Air-Minded Considerations for Joint Counterinsurgency Doctrine ...... 63 Maj Gen Charles J . Dunlap Jr ., USAF To Bomb or Not to Bomb? Counterinsurgency, Airpower, and Dynamic Targeting ...... 75 Maj Jason M . Brown, USAF Maritime Homeland Defense: A Role for Land-Based Airpower? ...... 86 Lt Col Alexus G . Grynkewich, USAF Dawn of the Cognetic Age: Fighting Ideological War by Putting Thought in Motion with Impact ...... 98 Lt Col Bruce K . Johnson, USAF

Departments Prelaunch Notes ASPJ’s Peer-Review Process and Presenting the Latest Chronicles Online Journal Articles ...... 15 Ricochets and Replies ...... 16 The Merge Israel’s Failure: Why? ...... 22 Lt Col J . P . Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired What Do We Do Next Time? Fighting America’s Wars after Iraq ...... 28 Lt Col Rob Levinson, USAF Reply to “Defining Information Operations Forces: What Do We Need?” ...... 31 Lt Col Kenneth Beebe, USAF Author’s Reply to Lieutenant Colonel Beebe’s Comment about “Defining Information Operations Forces: What Do We Need?” ...... 33 Maj Paul D . Williams, USAF Comments on “The Hyphenated Airman” ...... 35 Lt Gen John D . Hopper Jr ,. USAF, Retired

PIREPs The Paradox of Irregular Airpower ...... 36 Maj Benjamin R . Maitre, USAF

2007-4 contents.indd 1 10/29/07 10:01:00 AM Irregular Warfare and the US Air Force: The Way Ahead ...... 42 Col Robyn Read, USAF, Retired Chinese Servicemen’s Views of USAF Airmen and Education ...... 53 Sr Col Qigui Wang, PLAAF, Political Commissar Sr Col Wang Ximin, PLAAF, Political Commissar, Guilin Air Force College Sr Col Hao Chengming, PLAAF, Political Commissar, Air Force Aviation University Minting COIN: Principles and Imperatives for Combating Insurgency ...... 57 Dr . Conrad C . Crane

Doctrine Note New USAF Doctrine Publication: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, Irregular Warfare ...... 107 Michael Dietvorst

Book Reviews Vietnam Diary: From inside Air Force Headquarters ...... 109 Dr . Herman L . Gilster Reviewer: Col Phillip S . Meilinger, USAF, Retired The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941 ...... 110 Edward M . Coffman Reviewer: Dr . Kevin C . Holzimmer Carriers in Combat: The Air War at Sea ...... 110 Chester G . Hearn Reviewer: Dr . David R . Mets Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror ...... 112 Philip B . Heymann and Juliette N . Kayyem Reviewer: Maj Stephen Pieper, USAF Finding Amelia: The True Story of the Earhart Disappearance ...... 113 Ric Gillespie Reviewer: Maj Robert J . Preston II, USAF The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam ...... 114 Mark Clodfelter Reviewer: Capt Tim Spaulding, USAF The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics ...... 115 James M . Minnich Reviewer: Dr . Bruce E . Bechtol Jr . Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy ...... 115 John J . Klein Reviewer: Col Chris D . Crawford, USAF Into the Unknown Together: The DOD, NASA, and Early Spaceflight ...... 117 Lt Col Mark Erickson Reviewer: Lt Col Joseph P . Bassi, USAF, Retired Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy ...... 117 Frederick W . Kagan Reviewer: Dr . Jack D . Kem, Colonel, USA, Retired All Roads Lead to : Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq ...... 118 Charles H . Briscoe et al . Reviewer: Cadet Jake A . Dugat, USAF

2007-4 contents.indd 2 10/29/07 10:01:01 AM Flying through Midnight: A Pilot’s Dramatic Story of His Secret Missions over Laos during the ...... 119 John T . Halliday Reviewer: Col Karl Polifka, USAF, Retired Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War ...... 119 John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue Reviewer: Dr . David A . Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Retired Al enemigo primero lo descerebramos ...... 120 Comodoro Miguel Angel Silva, Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Retired Reviewer: Lt Col Paul D . Berg, USAF General George Washington: A Military Life ...... 121 Edward G . Lengel Reviewer: Dr . John H . Barnhill Sky Walking: An Astronaut’s Memoir ...... 122 Tom Jones Reviewer: Col Phil Bossert, USAF The Age of Total War, 1860–1945 ...... 123 Jeremy Black Reviewer: Maj Paul Niesen, USAF Atlas: The Ultimate Weapon ...... 124 Chuck Walker with Joel Powell Reviewer: Dr . Roger D . Launius The Tet Offensive: A Concise History ...... 125 James H . Willbanks Reviewer: CSM James H . Clifford, USA, Retired

Mission Debrief ...... 126

2007-4 contents.indd 3 10/29/07 10:01:01 AM Air and Space Power Journal Board of Reviewers

Col Ronald K. Bartley, USAFR Dr. Tom Keaney Air University Johns Hopkins University Lt Col Eric Braganca, USAF Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired Naval Air Station Department of Homeland Security Patuxent River, Maryland Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF Dr. Kendall K. Brown Department of State NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth Col Steven D. Carey, USAF, Retired RAND Montgomery, Alabama Mr. Douglas E. Lee Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Air Force Space Command US Army War College Dr. Richard I. Lester Dr. Mark Clodfelter Eaker College for Professional Development National War College Dr. Conrad Crane Col Edward Mann, USAF, Retired Director, US Army Military History Institute Colorado Springs, Colorado Dr. Dik A. Daso Mr. Brent Marley National Air and Space Museum Redstone Arsenal, Alabama Smithsonian Institution Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Col Michael D. Davis, USAF West Chicago, Illinois Air University Dr. Daniel Mortensen Dr. William L. Dowdy Air University Alabama State University Dr. Richard R. Muller Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Dr. Bruce T. Murphy Dr. Stephen Fought Air University USAF Air War College Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Col Richard L. Fullerton, USAF Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University USAF Academy Col Bob Potter, USAF, Retired Col Thomas E. Griffith Jr., USAF USAF Public Affairs Center of Excellence National War College Lt Col Stephen M. Rothstein, PhD, USAF, Retired Col W. Michael Guillot, USAF USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Air University Lt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Air University Ohio State University Col Michael A. Stanley, USAF, Retired Dr. Grant T. Hammond USAF Air War College Dean, NATO Defence College Dr. Thomas Hughes Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Toffler Associates Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired Air University Sci-Ops Consulting Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Dr. Christopher H. Toner The Pentagon USAF Air Command and Staff College Col John Jogerst, USAF, Retired Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, Retired Navarre, Florida Auburn University Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps Dr. Harold R. Winton USAF Air Command and Staff College USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies



2007-4 Board of Reviewers.indd 4 10/29/07 10:00:40 AM The Coalition Air Force Transition Team Rebuilding Iraq’s Air Force

Maj Gen (sel) RobeRt R. allaRdice, UsaF Maj Kyle “bRad” Head, UsaF

nyone who wAlks into the day- from a nearly decade-long war against its arch- room of the Iraqi Air Force’s 2nd rival Iran, the Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) main­ squadron at Taji Air Base would tained and flew some of the most advanced air­ likely see a group of pilots sitting craft in the world.2 Then it lost most of its air Aaround, talking flying with hand move­ assets in the of 1991 and ments (“shooting their watch”), and withered and regressed during the sipping tea from porcelain glasses— decade of sanctions a scene typical of flyingsquadrons and no-flyzones, with the expected around the world. A closer look degradation of Iraq’s once proud would reveal that half of those air force. By the end of major com­ pilots are American aviators. on bat operations in operation Iraqi this particular day, they re­ Freedom, the aircraft, defense count the events of their mis­ systems, heavy-maintenance ca­ sion that called for moni­ pability, and command and toring the oil pipelines and control (C2) structure had passionately argue about all disappeared.3 All that re­ how to best respond and mained were a few cra­ stay in formation when tered runways and dis­ attacked by a shoulder- tant memories of the firedmissile. At 1400, pre-1991 era. as if on cue, the on 18 August power goes out, 2003, the Coalition and the discussion Provisional Author­ ends. The coali­ ity’s order number tion Airmen head 22 authorized the back to their offices creation of new Iraqi to put in several hours’ armed forces, includ­ work on the next day’s ing a new IqAF.4 letters activities. All in all, it’s of authorization, however, just another day in the life do not build air forces. Air­ of combat aviation advisors men do, when apportioned as they help build airpower capacity for a part­ the appropriate training, education, experience, ner nation. and resources to assemble the essential elements: In August 1990, Iraq possessed the sixth- technically qualified and motivated Iraqi person­ largest air force in the world.1 Battle-hardened nel, adequate infrastructure, mission-suitable



03-SLP-Allardice.indd 5 11/8/07 12:32:24 PM  AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

aircraft, and all the relevant training systems line recommendations to improve the prede­ and tech data necessary to field and sustain a ployment training of combat aviation advisors. credible force. Despite the Coalition Provi­ sional Authority’s declaration and the United states’ generous gift of three 190s-vintage C­ The Importance of a Plan 130s in January 200, it was not until october The CAFTT simultaneously operates across 200 that a United states Central Command the strategic, operational, and tactical spec­ Air Forces assessment team was finally able to  trums of conventional military activities. Avia­ conduct site surveys in Iraq. Comprised of tion advisors work hand in hand with the chief functional experts from across the Us Air of the IqAF and his Air staff to develop the Force, the team rapidly completed its assess­ planning and management processes and ment and published a comparative aircraft practices necessary to develop, field, and sus­ study two months later, which recommended tain the IqAF. These advisors also engage with how best to organize, train, and equip the IqAF members of the IqAF’s operational head­ to effectively meet the needs of the government quarters to facilitate and envision a function­  of Iraq (GoI). This document—the baseline ing air operations center and effective C2, as for the relationship between the IqAF and the well as guide the development of the processes Us Air Force—serves as the foundation that and procedures necessary to function at the defines the mission of the Coalition Air Force operational level. Finally, over 200 Us Airmen 7 Transition Team (CAFTT). from virtually every career field work daily on one of the most effective means of fighting the flight lines, in the back shops, and in the and winning the military element of a coun­ classrooms—from Basra to kirkuk and several terinsurgency (CoIn) environment involves places in between. Their jobs entail assessing, training and fieldinga competent host-nation training, advising, and assisting at the tactical 8 security force. Doing so has the dual effect of level as well as nurturing the fledgling IqAF’s increasing the legitimacy of the host-nation operations.10 Coordination of these efforts government, while simultaneously diminishing takes considerable energy and, of course, a the requirement for international/coalition plan. In fact, according to an old Arabic prov­ forces, whose presence often only exacerbates erb, “The journey of 1,000 miles begins with a 9 the situation. The CAFTT has the responsi­ single step, and a plan.” Planners developed a bility for assisting the GoI in fieldingand em­ campaign plan to establish a common sight ploying an air force capable of helping it fight picture to coordinate and synchronize efforts and win the current conflict while laying the across the CAFTT (fig. 1). foundation for the air force it will need to de­ The essence of the plan is the CAFTT’s mis­ fend its national sovereignty well into the fu­ sion statement: “Build an Iraqi Air Force capable ture. An incredibly complicated process in it­ of conducting sustained operations, focused on self, building an air force in the middle of a the CoIn fight in the near-term, in order to war becomes infinitely more complex. defeat terrorism and create a stable environ­ This article provides only a snapshot—an in­ ment, while setting the conditions for achiev­ complete picture—of the CAFTT’s effort in ing air sovereignty.”11 expanding on this state­ Iraq today. But the approach developed to ment, the CAFTT commander’s intent calls for address the unique challenges facing the IqAF offers a good framework to consider in future build[ing] a credible objective Air Force capable situations, if and when the Us Air Force finds of conducting sustained operations in defense itself helping a struggling nation build or re­ of Iraq. The immediate priorities are getting the Iraqi Air Force in the air, developing operational build an air force. The main lines of operation capacity (weapons systems, training systems, and and lessons learned include examples of what infrastructure development), and a management worked and the challenges that still limit rapid and command and control capacity. longer- progress. Finally, although the CAFTT has only term priorities include setting the conditions a brief history, we continue to establish base­ for Iraq’s air sovereignty, operational sustain­

03-SLP-Allardice.indd 6 11/8/07 12:32:25 PM ThE COALITION AIR fORCE TRANSITION TEAm 7

Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jan Jan 07 08 08 09 09 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 14 15

Multi-National Security Transition Command ­ Iraq Phases Civil Authority Support to Self-Reliance CAFTT Phases Building Operational Capability Sustained COIN Operations Homeland Defense

Line of Operation no. 1 – Build, Train, Educate, and Sustain

$"'55• Initial Operational Capability (IOC) - Iraqi Air Force Training School (AFTS) • IOC - Flight Training School (FTS) • IOC - Air Operations Center (AOC) • Full Training Capacity - AFTS and FTS • Full Operational Capability (FOC) - AOC • FOC - AFTS • FOC - FTS • IOC - Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals (IFF) School • FOC - IFF .*44*0/

Line of Operation no. 2 – Conduct COIN Operations Objective End State • IOC - COIN Nonkinetic Capability • IOC - COIN Kinetic Capability • FOC - COIN Capability

Line of Operation no. 3 – Provide Homeland Defense

• IOC - Airspace-Control Capability • Deliver - First Air Defense Aircraft • IOC- Homeland Defense Capability “Building a Credible Air Force”

Figure 1. CAFTT campaign plan

ability, and homeland defense capabilities. In­ the effort to build a force that can protect Iraq’s troduce and sustain western influence in the air sovereignty. Although these lines of opera­ IqAF through a combination of training, advis­ tion are complementary and occur to some de­ ing, and mentoring.12 gree in parallel, the bulk of the CAFTT’s initial To meet this intent, mission analysis yielded effort focused on the first line of operation— the following objectives: (1) build, train, edu­ building, training, educating, and sustaining air operations. In early 2008, the focus will shift cate, and sustain air operations; (2) exhibit to contributing credible airpower capability to military professionalism; (3) conduct day/night/ ongoing CoIn operations. The homeland- all-weather CoIn operations; and (4) provide defense mission will take years to develop and the GoI with homeland-defense capabilities. will require a genuine commitment by the Fulfilling these objectives requires that the GoI. Until the IqAF becomes capable of con­ CAFTT operate simultaneously along three ducting this mission independently, the coali­ lines of operation: (1) the traditional build- tion’s airpower assets will have to weigh the train-educate-sustain effort, (2) the operational level of synchronization and integration re­ charge to conduct CoIn operations, and (3) quired for continued ongoing operations.

03-SLP-Allardice.indd 7 11/8/07 12:32:25 PM 8 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

Line of Operation no. 1: gap—a method that allowed the CAFTT to make a lasting change to the culture of the Building,Training, Educating, IqAF—involved recruiting and training to and Sustaining produce a new generation of Airmen. As recruiting efforts began generating Although this important line of operation qualified candidates, the herculean task of will take years to fully realize, the Us Air Force, building an entire training and accessions with full cooperation from coalition partners, pipeline fell to the 370th expeditionary Advi­ has made significant progress in a very short sory Training squadron at Taji Air Base, home time frame. The effort to “build” truly started of the Iraqi Air Force Training school. In from the ground. As previously mentioned, March 2007, five members from the 370th the IqAF effectively ceased to exist in 1991 and started the officers Course at officially disbanded in the wake of the coalition the Iraqi Military Academy (the country’s pre­ invasion in 2003. The Coalition Provisional mier military academy, often referred to as the Authority approached former IqAF officersto “sandhurst in the sand”) at Ar Rustamiyah. To form the nucleus of the new IqAF’s Air staff. meet the growing demand for young officers, Following proper screening and vetting, these the CAFTT also developed and won approval officerscontacted other former members and from the Iraqi minister of defense to initiate a convinced them to rejoin. Recruiting of new six-month officer Training school–style com­ members began in earnest in 2007. The IqAF’s missioning program geared toward university ability to field a credible air force will clearly graduates with engineering degrees. In May depend upon its recruitment and retention of 2007, a team of military training instructors quality individuals. Current plans show the from lackland AFB, Texas, ran the first class IqAF growing from 1,000 to 2,900 members by of basic military training for 2 janood (the the end of 2007 and then doubling to almost Iraqi equivalent of airmen). The instructors ,000 by the end of 2008. To support this rapid also addressed a critical shortage of noncom­ growth, the GoI and United states have in­ missioned officers (nCo) by creating a program vested $300 million in construction to provide to enable the IqAF to recruit high-quality can­ the necessary infrastructure at each of the didates for direct commissioning as warrant IqAF’s four main bases. officers—the IqAF’s top nCo rank. The most difficult challenge in building a with the pieces of the accession pipeline credible air force entails quality people. Get­ falling into place, another flight in the 370th ting the right people, in the right place, at the focused on building the basic technical-training right time, with the right training and equip­ pipeline.13 A collection of motivated young of­ ment is critical to the success of rebuilding the ficers and experienced nCos drove the pro­ force. The effort to recruit, educate, train, cess to create the IqAF equivalent of the UsAF’s and integrate technically competent people .14 This Basic Technical Train­ from this war-torn nation has proven ex­ ing Branch of the Iraqi Air Force Training tremely difficult.More specifically, identifying school offers a myriad of courses ranging from and grooming quality leaders takes consider­ air-intelligence applications to crash/fire res­ able time and concentrated effort. To fill the cue. A group of handpicked experts from gap between authorized and assigned posi­ across the Us Air Force began with a baseline tions, IqAF leaders were encouraged to reach curriculum provided by Air education and out to former IqAF members. Unfortunately, Training Command. Before teaching the the average pilot who returned to the IqAF courses, however, instructors modified them was approximately 43 years old, with most fly­ extensively to account for any IqAF-specific ing their last sortie—usually in some variant of equipment and procedures. Instructors faced a MiG—in January 1991. Clearly, rehiring for­ all the challenges of teaching in a foreign envi­ mer pilots was not a viable long-term solution. ronment: translating slides into Arabic, learn­ The only realistic approach to filling the ing to teach through interpreters, and remain­

03-SLP-Allardice.indd 8 11/8/07 12:32:26 PM ThE COALITION AIR fORCE TRANSITION TEAm 9

ing sensitive to differences in educational formed IqAF operational headquarters in systems and learning styles. Additionally, in­ the Victory Base Complex. Attaining initial structors tailored each course specifically to en­ operational capability in April, the center has sure it provided the knowledge, skills, and abil­ become fully integrated into the Iraqi joint ities required by the IqAF. They did this through force’s joint operations center, handling mul­ collaborative efforts and coordination with tiple taskings every day, including flying their their functional counterparts on the CAFTT C-130 aircraft on the daily air tasking order of and IqAF staffs and with continuous input from Us Central Command’s combined force air subject-matter experts in the field. Initially con­ component commander (CFACC). ducted on an ad hoc basis, this process eventu­ As the IqAF develops operational capacity, ally became formalized in a regular series of it becomes increasingly difficult to manage meetings of an organization known as the the balance between continuing training and Training Integration working Group. conducting real-world operational missions. The final piece of the institutional training The long-term investment of training pro­ puzzle fell into place in october 2007 with the duces a more capable and effective air force, opening of the Flight Training school at whereas operations provide an immediate kirkuk. Although the first class started with contribution to the CoIn fight. This fine bal­ only a handful of students, the school is struc­ ancing act happens every day. Combat avia­ tured and designed to produce 130 new pilots tion advisors commonly find themselves both each year by the end of 2008. Beginning with flying an operational mission in support of basic flightscreening in Cessna 172s, students CoIn and conducting training on one or progress through intermediate and advanced more crew positions. As the IqAF continues to training in either a rotary- or fixed-wingtrack. improve its ability to conduct operational mis­ Understanding that attaining credibility de­ sions and provide credible combat capability, pends upon their ability to produce indige­ the demand for such services could quickly nous pilots, IqAF leaders have already identi­ outstrip its ability to supply them. fied several potential instructors. Beyond conducting formal training in schools, CAFTT members also perform the Line of Operation no. 2: more traditional missions of aviation advisors, Conducting Counterinsurgency typically performed by the operational avia­ tion detachments of the th special opera­ Operations tions squadron. In this environment, aircraft Three distinct phases make up the CAFTT maintainers and support personnel—as well campaign. The first, building operational ca­ as Army, Marine, and Air Force pilots—work pacity, runs through December 2008. Major side by side with their IqAF counterparts to fly, milestones during this phase include develop­ fix,and sustain the equipment and infrastruc­ ing nonkinetic CoIn capabilities focused on ture at each base.1 More than just perform conducting battlefield mobility and intelli­ the training mission, these members serve as gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mis­ models for the leadership behaviors they hope sions as well as reaching initial operational the IqAF will adopt. capability on kinetic CoIn. As late as February 2007, the IqAF effec­ Although neighboring countries gener­ tively consisted of a collection of squadrons at ously provided seeker and Ch-2000 aircraft to four separate bases that reported directly to get the new IqAF off the ground, it could not the Air staff. The Iraqis lacked an operational- conduct traditional air force missions until it level C2 capacity to coordinate and prioritize received the C-130s from the Us Air Force, as the IqAF’s limited air assets. To fill that void, mentioned above. These aircraft have flown a CAFTT advisors worked hand in hand with variety of missions, such as humanitarian relief, their IqAF counterparts to build a modest air patient transfer, prisoner transfer, airlift of dis­ operations center collocated with a newly tinguished visitors, troop movements, and re­

03-SLP-Allardice.indd 9 11/8/07 12:32:26 PM 10 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

supply. The C-130s recently moved battalions aircraft, the IqAF offers real-time situational of Iraqi Army troops in support of operation awareness through a combination of surveil­ Fard Al Qanoon and delivered humanitarian- lance and reconnaissance missions in support relief supplies in response to an earthquake in of critical oil- and electrical-distribution infra­ Irbil and a cholera outbreak in sulayminiyah.1 structure for the Iraqi Ministry of oil and Min­ The most common request for the IqAF’s C-130 istry of electricity. Flying a Ch-2000 out of Basra airlift involves the transport of distinguished on 11 July 2007, Colonel karim, commander visitors and high-ranking government officials. of the IqAF’s 70th Reconnaissance squadron, According to an accepted rule of thumb, the spotted a large oil spot in the middle of the hearts and minds of the host-nation popula­ desert—a telltale sign of oil theft. As he ap­ tion represent the center of gravity in CoIn proached the incident area, he discovered operations. Transport of distinguished visitors that a band of thieves had poked a hole in a engenders a sense of pride and dignity in pipeline to suck the oil from the pool and these officials and inspires confidence among transfer it into waiting tanker trucks. After es­ the population. seeing one of their own tablishing a surveillance orbit, Colonel karim C-130s, Uh-1 “huey” helicopters, or Mi-17 called members of his squadron, who contacted helicopters with the Iraqi flag prominently the Iraqi police. he stayed on station, con­ displayed evokes an instant patriotic reaction. ducted real-time surveillance, and guided the whether playing soccer in an empty field, police to the scene, where they apprehended shopping in a crowded market, or gathering the suspects. The Ministry of oil estimates on their roof-top patios, Iraqis will typically that the GoI loses approximately $10 billion stop whatever they are doing, smile proudly, each year due to oil theft. small victories like and wave vigorously at the sight of one of this one serve not only to increase the credi­ “their” aircraft. More than a largely regional­ bility of the IqAF but also to provide a much- ized army or police force, a credible air force needed service to the GoI. serves as a source of national pride in people CAFTT program managers are currently looking for something to unite them. working with IqAF leadership to acquire several The IqAF recently took ownership of six aircraft through the foreign military sales pro­ more huey IIs, and programming should allow gram for the purpose of increasing the range of for a total of 48 by the end of 2008. several of operational effects at the IqAF’s disposal. The these helicopters will form the 1th squadron at latter include the production of kinetic effects Taji—a unit specifically trained and equipped to with weapons such as guns, rockets, or— provide rapid response and mobility to the Iraqi eventually—precision-guided munitions. As special operations forces. Currently training to these kinetic capabilities become operational, develop this capability, the squadron will greatly the CAFTT will shift its emphasis from build­ increase the effectiveness of special operations ing initial operational capability to sustaining forces, enabling them to operate in the third di­ ongoing operations and training. mension and quickly transport forces to achieve a desired effect. special outfitting will permit other hueys at Taji to perform medical- and ca­ Line of Operation no. 3: sualty-evacuation missions in support of ongo­ Providing Homeland Defense ing CoIn operations. A recently delivered fleet of Mi-17 helicopters provides a medium-lift ca­ no nation can remain truly sovereign if it pability, which will enable the Iraqi Army to draw cannot protect its own airspace. key elements much-needed supplies and equipment from the of homeland defense include airspace control, Taji national Depot while avoiding unnecessary air defense, and air interdiction. As the GoI convoys on dangerous supply routes laden with stabilizes and fields a competent security force improvised explosive devices. capable of CoIn, the Multi-national Force- Using a combination of seekers, Ch-2000s, Iraq (MnF-I) coalition will seek to reduce the and specially modifiedCessna Grand Caravan size and scope of its military presence. In the

03-SLP-Allardice.indd 10 11/8/07 12:32:27 PM ThE COALITION AIR fORCE TRANSITION TEAm 11

airpower arena, until the GoI can perform ba­ quirements for foreign internal defense may sic functions such as air traffic control and quickly exceed the capacity of the special op­ weather operations, or more advanced func­ erations community as currently sized. tions such as air defense, the Us Air Force and Is the Us Air Force ready to embrace for­ other CFACC coalition and Us airpower assets eign internal defense as a growing mission that will continue to fill the gap. Building an air will be around for years to come? In a deployed force capable of homeland defense requires war zone characterized by minimally manned national will, as well as the proper resources to functional areas, we must fill these jobs with the field and support the people and equipment right people with the right skill sets and back­ that are core to Air Force operations and sus­ ground. In the long run, the Us Air Force may tainment. only the GoI and its leadership can decide to build a large standing corps of advi­ determine when, and to what level, they want sors specifically trained and equipped to carry to invest in this range of capabilities. out this mission; however, in the short run, it must continue to conduct these specialized missions on an ad hoc basis, using existing line Observations from the Field personnel.18 This situation will drive much- needed changes to the selection process and Most importantly, Us Airmen must prepare training pipeline for future advisors. Advising themselves to advocate the role of airpower from in an Arabic culture, where the strength of the very beginning of an operation. Airmen one’s relationships (which take time to de­ know that the measure of success lies not totally velop) denotes the measure of one’s power, de­ in the numbers of the coaliton ground forces in mands that future advisors serve tour lengths Iraq but in the effects brought to bear by the 17 commensurate with appropriate objectives. force as a whole. some members of the joint The Us Air Force must adjust its personnel sys­ force may not be fully informed about the inher­ tem to effectively screen for people with the ent and wide-ranging capabilities that airpower aptitude to excel in these critical jobs; further­ brings to CoIn operations. All Airmen, regard­ more, these members need to hit the ground less of their specialty, must see themselves as ad­ running, ready to sprint a marathon. vocates who know how to explain airpower’s embracing the fact that a majority of its advi­ critical role in CoIn operations and the suc­ sors will come from regular forces, the Us Army cesses that are enabled by integrating the inher­ has created a three-month training pipeline for ent speed, range, flexibility, and maneuver of an them. The course starts at Fort Riley, kansas, air force into those operations. two months before a scheduled deployment, Traditionally, foreign internal defense falls taught by instructors fresh from the field, who into the realm of Army special forces, with bring a wealth of current knowledge and ex­ specialized combat aviation advisors coming pertise to share with those in the deployment from Air Force special operations Com­ pipeline. Attending training together as a unit mand—most recently the th special opera­ has the effect of building the team before it de­ tions squadron. one hallmark of the special ploys and gives advisors an opportunity to de­ operations community is that it handpicks velop networks they can leverage after arriving members who have excelled in their opera­ in-theater. A five-day layover in kuwait allows tional specialties and runs them through an additional specialized tactical training, includ­ extensive screening process. Those who pass ing convoy and combat lifesaving. Army advi­ the test then endure extensive, extremely rig­ sors in Iraq spend their first week in country at orous training before going on their firstreal- the Phoenix Academy at Taji, where they at­ world mission. Given the growing demand for tend briefings by the commander of MnF-I this capability in Iraq and Afghanistan—which and his senior staff, along with a select group of recently began rebuilding the Afghan na­ subject-matter experts that includes members tional Army Air Corps—and with the new Af­ of the departing advisory team. The academy rica Command looming on the horizon, re­ covers a range of subjects, such as organization

03-SLP-Allardice.indd 11 11/8/07 12:32:27 PM 12 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

of coalition and Iraqi security forces, policies communication skills might benefit from role- and procedures of the Iraqi security forces, ad­ playing scenarios wherein advisors practice vanced CoIn and advisor skills, and additional speaking through an interpreter and negotiate briefings on the most current insurgent tactics, with someone raised in an Arab culture.23 techniques, and procedures.19 Given that their role involves helping the The CAFTT’s predeployment training con­ IqAF build an effective CoIn force, advisors tinues to evolve. The first wave of advisors at­ must know and understand the general princi­ tended a customized five-week course; later ples and specific airpower applications in a groups received only the weeklong Middle CoIn environment.24 The Us Air Force cur­ east orientation Course; and the most recent rently lacks a doctrinal framework to guide the group underwent two weeks of training gener­ building of a CoIn air force.2 The recently re­ ally designed for combat-convoy command­ leased Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) ers. As Air education and Training Command 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 1 August 2007, and AFDD gathers feedback from each group, it continues 2-3.1, foreign Internal Defense, 1 september to adjust the length and focus of predeploy­ 2007, represent a start in the doctrinal frame­ ment training. while designing this training, work required for building fledgling air forces; the Us Air Force must conduct a risk-reward however, the specific mission area of “building assessment to balance competing demands partnership capacity” requires further thought between, on the one hand, dramatic and po­ and may warrant its own doctrine. tentially lifesaving combat skills that advisors A majority of the CAFTT’s flying aviation ad­ probably will not use, and, on the other hand, visors never served in the th special opera­ more mundane practical skills that comprise tions squadron, and several had never learned advisors’ core competencies. basic tactics. They arrived lacking basic skills To assure its effectiveness, we must specifi­ necessary to operate in a combat zone, much cally tailor future advisor training to the chal­ less train Iraqi pilots to function in this environ­ lenges and realities of the unique environment ment. Aviation-related air advisors require tac­ as well as the particular mission—principally, tical flying training in the continental United cultural awareness.20 Beyond merely learning states (ConUs) to avoid longer-than-necessary a few key words and phrases, which earn them theater indoctrinations that expend the host instant credibility, advisors must understand nation’s limited flying hours. Bare-minimum several perspectives: what they believe about qualificationsforongoing considerationshould their counterparts, what they believe about include practicing strafing patterns, formation themselves, what their counterparts believe flying with night-vision goggles, and low-level about them, and what their counterparts be­ threat analysis performed in the ConUs. Air­ lieve about themselves.21 craft mechanics find themselves working on a Gaining a better understanding of their variety of general-aviation aircraft unlike any­ Iraqi counterparts requires that future CAFTT thing they have seen before. Providing airframe advisors possess general knowledge of the his­ and power-plant commercial certifications not tory of the Middle east, with a specific focus on only would produce better-qualified advisors the development of Islam and Arab history— but also would serve as an incentive for poten­ which are not the same thing.22 A basic under­ tial volunteers. standing of tribal-based societies with an em­ The Us Air Force can no longer afford to phasis on social-network analysis helps in treat the advisory mission as a niche endeavor; understanding the overlapping and competing rather, we must embrace it as a core compe­ spheres of influence at play in this complex cul­ tency of our twenty-first-century Air Force. ture. The ability to see the informal networks Current geopolitical reality suggests that the behind the formal bureaucracy enables advi­ need for a highly qualified advisor corps will sors to more effectively comprehend and influ­ grow significantly in the near future.2 effec­ ence the behavior of their IqAF counterparts. tively engaging these opportunities will re­ The development of sufficient cross-cultural quire a well-thought-out doctrine that explains

03-SLP-Allardice.indd 12 11/8/07 12:32:28 PM ThE COALITION AIR fORCE TRANSITION TEAm 13

how airpower, beyond Us Air Force–unique across the spectrum of operations in Iraq’s com­ capabilities, contributes to CoIn operations plex environment differs fundamentally from and concentrates specifically on building anything the Us Air Force has prepared the cur­ fledgling CoIn air forces. The Us Air Force rent generation of Airmen to accomplish. like owes it to future advisors to make available previous generations, today’s Airmen are rapidly both the general skills and specialized train­ stepping up to the challenge. ing necessary to excel in their jobs. To do it Until Iraq can fully defend its own air sover­ right, the service also will have to provide suf­ eignty, Us Air Force–led coalition air assets ficient manpower and resources. will likely assist the IqAF in maintaining a pro­ tective umbrella. Meanwhile, CAFTT mem­ Conclusion bers will continue performing one of the most challenging, exciting, and rewarding jobs in Iraq is a nation torn by a stifling combination 28 of insurgency, terrorism, and communal con­ today’s air force. embracing the mission of flict—all within the confines of a failed state.27 building or shaping a partner’s airpower ca­ no one knows what the future holds for that pacity, if required, as a critical component of country; however, Airmen understand that no any successful irregular-warfare campaign de­ state or government will remain truly sovereign mands that the Us Air Force leverage the les­ unless it can control and defend its own airspace. sons learned by the CAFTT and consider insti­ Building an air force capable of responding tutionalizing this capability. ❑

Notes 1. “Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United has the overall responsibility for training, mentoring, and states Air Force in the Gulf war: A Report, september developing the Iraqi security apparatus, a subset of nation 1991,” 28 August 1997, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ building commonly referred to as foreign internal defense. military/library/report/1991/desstorm.htm. 8. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps war- 2. For more on the lessons of the Iran-, see fighting Publication (MCwP) 3-33., Counterinsurgency, Maj Ronald e. Bergquist, The Role of Airpower in the Iran- December 200, -1, http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/ Iraq War (Maxwell AFB, Al: Air University Press, Decem­ materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf. ber 1988), http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/ 9. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Books/Bergquist/Bergquist_B2.pdf. 3. For a fascinating after-action review of operation Warfare, 1 August 2007, 1, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/ Iraqi Freedom, see kevin M. woods with Michael R. Pease, afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_hTMl/Doctrine_Docs/ The Iraqi Perspectives Report: Saddam’s Senior Leadership on afdd2-3.pdf. Operation Iraqi freedom from the OfficialU.S. Joint forces Com­ 10. Ibid., 28. mand Report (Annapolis: naval Institute Press, 200). 11. “Coalition Air Force Transition Team: Iraq Cam­ 4. “Coalition Provisional Authority order number paign Plan, 2007–201,” 1 August 2007, 7. 22: Creation of a new Iraqi Army” (Baghdad, Iraq: Coali­ 12. Ibid., 10. tion Provisional Authority, 18 August 2003), http://www 13. For a good historical study on the development of .iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030818_CPAoRD_22 tech training to support the Vietnamese Air Force, see Capt _Creation_of_a_new_Iraqi_Army.pdf. Drue l. DeBerry, “Vietnamese Air Force Technical Train­ . For a comprehensive history on the genesis of the ing, 1970–1971,” Air University Review, January–February Coalition Air Force Transition Team’s mission, see Michael 1973, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ Bauer, Training the Iraqi Air force: Lessons from a U.S. C-130 aureview/1973/jan-feb/deberry.html. Advisory mission, Policy Focus no. 71 (washington, DC: 14. second Air Force is the command responsible for washington Institute for near east Policy, August 2007). . Operational Assessment of the Iraqi Air force (shaw AFB, conducting basic technical training for the entire Us Air sC: Us Central Command Air Forces, 30 october 200). Force. 7. CAFTT falls under the Multi-national security 1. Us Army national Guard officers and warrant of­ Transition Command-Iraq (MnsTC-I), a major subordi­ ficers are the primary instructors on the Bell Jet Ranger nate component of the Multi-national Force-Iraq (MnF-I), helicopters at Taji and kirkuk. The Us Marines recently under the command of Gen David Petraeus, UsA, who provided several pilots with tactical experience to advise previously stood up and commanded MnsTC-I. The latter the IqAF’s huey II pilots at Taji.

03-SLP-Allardice.indd 13 11/8/07 12:32:28 PM 14 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

1. operation Fard Al Qanoon refers to the Iraqi Army’s 28articles.pdf; Capt Ryan T. kranc, “Advising Indigenous operations in conjunction with the surge in coalition Forces,” Small Wars Journal 8 (May 2007), http://www forces in the summer of 2007. .smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v8/kranc 17. As of early september 2007, about ,000 Airmen -swjvol8-excerpt.pdf; and sgt Robert M. Massie, “Advice were assigned to MnF-I, which boasts a total force of ap­ for Advisors: lessons learned from a Tour with the new proximately 170,000 personnel. Iraqi Army,” marine Corps Gazette, July 2007, http://www 18. For a proposed comprehensive approach to estab­ .marinecorpsgazette-digital.com/marinecorpsgazette/ lishing a standing corps of army advisors, see John A. nagl, 200707/?pg=44. “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent 24. For the definitivework on this subject from an air- Army Advisor Corps” (washington, DC: Center for a new power perspective, see James s. Corum and wray R. John­ American security, June 2007); and lt Col norman J. son, Airpower in Small Wars: fighting Insurgents and Terrorists Brozenick Jr., “Another way to Fight: Combat Aviation (lawrence: University Press of kansas, 2003). For further Advisory operations,” Research Report (Maxwell AFB, readings on the general principles, see David kilcullen, Al: Air University, June 2002). “Counter-insurgency Redux,” Survival 48, no. 4 (December 19. This description is based on discussions with the 200): 111–30, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/ cadre and staff of the Phoenix Academy during a site visit content?content=10.1080/00393300102790. and review of the academy’s program of instruction on 2 2. Maj kenneth Beebe, “The Air Force’s Missing Doc­ April 200. trine: how the Us Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency,” 20. For an excellent summary of the importance of Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 1 (spring 200): 27–34, cultural awareness in stability operations, see Maj Jennifer http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ V. Chandler, “why Culture Matters: An empirically-Based apj0/spr0/spr0.pdf; and lt Col wray R. Johnson, Pre-Deployment Training Program” (thesis, naval Post­ “whither Aviation Foreign Internal Defense?” Airpower Journal graduate school, september 200). 11, no. 1 (spring 1997): –8, http://www.airpower.maxwell 21. Ike skelton and Jim Cooper, “you’re not from Around here, Are you?” Joint force Quarterly, issue 3 (first .af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/spr97/johnson.pdf. quarter 200), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/ 2. For options on how best to organize this capability, 043.pdf; and Moshe sharon, “negotiating in the Bazaar,” see Col Billy Montgomery, “UsAF Irregular warfare Con­ Jerusalem Post, 10 october 200, http://www.jpost.com/ cept,” white Paper (hurlburt Field, Fl: Air Force special servlet/satellite?cid=119193413129&pagename=JPost operations Command, May 2007), http://www.excaliburrd %2FJPArticle%2FPrinter. .com/docs/AT-Project/AFsoCwhitePaperUsAFIrregular 22. For a good primer on this subject, see edward V. warfare.pdf; and Alan J. Vick et al., Air Power in the New Badolato, “learning to Think like an Arab Muslim: A Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAf Advi­ short Guide to Understanding the Arab Mentality,” March sory and Assistance missions (santa Monica, CA: RAnD Cor­ 2004, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/btw2004/articles/ poration, 200), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/ 003arabs.html. 200/RAnD_MG09.pdf. 23. For further reading on this subject, see lt Gen 27. Dr. David kilcullen, “A Framework for Thinking David h. Petraeus, “learning Counterinsurgency: obser­ about Iraq strategy,” Small Wars Journal Blog, 12 January 2007, vations from soldiering in Iraq,” military Review, January– http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/a-framework February 200, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/ -for-thinking-about. english/JanFeb0/Petraeus1.pdf; David kilcullen, “Twenty­ 28. For regular updates on the overall effort to build eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counter­ the Iraqi security forces, see MnsTC-I’s Advisor at http:// insurgency,” http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/ www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/advisor.htm.

The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fightingdone by fools. — Thucydides

03-SLP-Allardice.indd 14 11/8/07 12:32:28 PM Lt CoL PauL D. Berg, uSaF, ChieF, ProFeSSionaL JournaLS ASPJ’s Peer-Review Process and Presenting the Latest Chronicles Online Journal Articles

s the professionAl journal of referee’s feedback. Articles often pass through the Us Air force, Air and Space Power several drafts before we accept them, some re­ Journal (ASPJ ) offers a forum for de­ quiring 10 or more iterations. During this de­ bating alternative solutions to national­ manding process, many prospective articles fall sAecurity challenges. reasonable people can dis­ by the wayside. agree about proposed solutions but cannot peer review, one of the keys to ASPJ ’s suc­ dispute the underlying facts. therefore, we on cess, relies on the members of our Board of the ASPJ editorial staff ensure that articles reviewers—the Journal’s brain trust. referees contain accurate information and make well- receive no pay, but their efforts are priceless. reasoned arguments. When we receive an ar­ they possess the considerable intellectual dis­ ticle, we examine it carefully because the Journal cipline necessary to rise above their personal can publish only a fraction of the ones submit­ opinions and evaluate submitted articles solely ted. if it appears to have publication potential, on merit. their advice helps authors turn our editors work with the author to address good articles into great ones. All board mem­ any obvious shortcomings. naturally, though, bers have our sincere thanks for their service. the ASPJ staff cannot claim expertise on every All ASPJ editions promote professional dia­ topic. At this point, we engage the peer-review logue among Airmen worldwide so that we process—one of our main ways of screening can harness the best ideas about air, space, prospective articles. and cyberspace power. Chronicles Online Journal specifically, we select from our Board of (COJ ) complements the printed editions of reviewers (see p. 4) an appropriate “referee”— ASPJ but appears only in electronic form. not a subject-matter expert in the fields of air, space, subject to any fixed publication schedule or and cyber power—to examine the article by constraints regarding article length, COJ can means of a “double blind” process that pre­ publish timely articles anytime about a broad cludes rank or other factors from distorting range of military topics. the procedure since neither the author nor Articles appearing in COJ are frequently re­ the referee knows the other’s identity. that is, published elsewhere. the various ASPJ lan­ prior to sending the article to the referee, our guage editions routinely translate and print staff masks the author’s name. the referee them. Book editors from around the world se­ evaluates the submission meticulously, “stress­ lect them as book chapters, and college profes­ sors use them in the classroom. We are pleased testing” it to expose any weaknesses, and then to present the following recent COJ articles sends detailed written comments to us. if the (available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af subject-matter expert supports publication, we, .mil/airchronicles/cc.html): in turn, mask his or her identity and send the comments to the author, who then has the op­ • Maj patricia K. seinwill, “Anatomy of portunity to revise the article to address the Modern Courage: highlights from the

15

Prelaunch Ricochet 2007-4.indd 15 10/29/07 10:04:26 AM 16 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

Career of Colonel Kevin A. ‘Mike’ Gilroy” offer both hard-copy and electronic-publication (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ opportunities in Arabic, Chinese, english, airchronicles/cc/seinwill.html) french, portuguese, and spanish. to submit an article in any of these languages, please re­ • Maj Brian l. Braden, “the labor pool fer to the submission guidelines at http:// Model: effectively Managing Aircrew in www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ today’s Air force” (http://www.airpower howto1.html. to write a book review, please see .maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/ the guidelines at http://www.airpower.maxwell braden.html) .af.mil/airchronicles/bookrev/bkrevguide the ASPJ staff seeks insightful articles and .html. ❑ book reviews from anywhere in the world. We

We encourage you to send your comments to us, preferably via e-mail at [email protected]. You may also send letters to the Editor, Air and space power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112 6004. We reserve the right to edit the material for overall length.

INTRODUCING THE CHINESE ASPJ that a renowned Us military journal would publish a Chinese edition is an unprecedented Air and Space Power Journal is a distinguished event and a positive move for military profes­ military-academic publication. the launch of sionals and readers in both China and the its Chinese-language edition will have a very United states. the journal’s social and political positive impact and help gain more Chinese- significance may even exceed its academic speaking readers. i wish to thank the editors. value. finally, Chinese and American military Sun Dejian professionals may now stand on the same aca­ Library Chief, People’s Liberation Army Air Force Aviation University demic forum, exchanging ideas—a sign of a Changchun, China historical breakthrough. the created misconceptions. in it was a pleasant surprise to discover the on­ retrospect, the Chinese and Us militaries con­ line inaugural version of Air and Space Power fronted each other with minimal ideological Journal—Chinese edition. first of all, the cover exchange. even recently, pointing fingers at design attracted me. the idea of putting the each other dominated what little dialogue Great Wall, a token of the Chinese armed there was. for a long time, the Chinese side forces, and the UsAf emblem close together regarded the United states as a Western devil on the same page is symbolic in itself. then i and bully, while the Us side always referred to eagerly read the journal’s content. i found China as an undemocratic dictatorship. such new and broad topics as well as unique and hostility and mind-sets originated from historical professional insights. But all of these are not confrontations and ideological differences. what i want to discuss here. As a reader with Another important reason was that both sides years of Chinese military experience, i want to looked inwards and refused to reach out for stress the social significance of this new journal. exchange, essentially freezing out any possi­

Prelaunch Ricochet 2007-4.indd 16 10/29/07 10:04:26 AM RICOCHETS AND REPLIES 17

bilities of professional military dialogue. the COALITION OPERATIONS birth of Air and Space Power Journal—Chinese i read lt Col paul Berg’s editorial “Coalition edition, therefore, is all the more important. operations” (fall 2007) and agree that the it is like a spark of firethat spreads to melt the United states has enjoyed many close and per­ ice between China and the United states, dis­ sonal partnerships with other countries; how­ sipating the mist blocking each side’s vision of ever, based on what i have seen of the war on the other. terrorism over the past few years, i wonder if like a stone thrown into water, the Chinese we have overlooked anyone who might have edition of Air and Space Power Journal is creat­ benefited from working with a multinational ing a ripple effect, the dynamics of which will force. Did we inadvertently isolate anyone push the militaries of both sides to engage se­ who could have been a team player? for ex­ riously in professional exchange. together, we ample, russian president Vladimir putin is study war, know war, eventually stop war, elimi­ pulling his military arsenal of ships and nuclear­ nate war, and move towards global peace. capable bombers out of mothballs and trying this, i believe, will be the long-term objective to build coalitions with China, iran, syria, and and contribution of the journal. north Korea. russia has also been having mili­ Zhi Jun tary exercises with China. i guess this is putin’s Retired Military Instructor, Chinese Police Academy way of reacting to Us-led coalitions around Fairfax, Virginia the world. i fear that these developments may lead russia into renewed isolationism and in­ A RESCUE FORCE FOR THE WORLD crease the risk of a nuclear-arms race and new form of Cold War. i really do not foresee China As a rescue professional and advocate myself, being a staunch ally to russia. China is quickly i agree with everything said in the article “A developing its own independent space, ballistic- rescue force for the World: Adapting Air- missile, and naval programs. so how do we as power to the realities of the long War” (fall a superpower tap into those countries for the 2007), but i want to speak to one point that is war on terrorism? missing. the article refers to potential new Capt Steven “Schaff” Schaffhouser, USAF rescue-squadron locations and hints at the im­ Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base portance of properly managing rescue forces. Willow Grove, Pennsylvania none of these proposals could possibly become reality without a much larger rescue force than we now have. our current small force is REVISITING LEADERSHIP already heavily tasked around the globe. sure, IN THE ARMED FORCES we as rescue professionals will jump at the i liked Air Commodore Aslam Bazmi’s article chance to uphold our motto “that others “revisiting leadership in the Armed forces” May live,” but mostly at the cost of our family (fall 2007) for the clear and concrete guid­ relationships due to a constant deployment ance he provided on what it takes to become a schedule. regardless of the rescue force’s will­ great leader—guidance that applies in both ingness to participate in new initiatives, senior military and nonmilitary organizations. i ap­ rescue leadership cannot ignore the impact preciated his scholarship, as evidenced by on our low-density/high-demand forces when highly relevant quotations from the works of a volunteering them around the world to do number of well-respected leaders, and enjoyed more. if we had the force structure today that his erudite presentation. we had in the glory days of the old Aerospace in addition, given the times, it struck me rescue and recovery service, there would not that many Americans might be pleasantly sur­ even be a debate on this subject. prised to realize the source of this splendid Lt Col John “JT” Taylor, USAF work. there are many, unfortunately, who tend Langley AFB, Virginia to diminish the capabilities and contributions

Prelaunch Ricochet 2007-4.indd 17 10/29/07 10:04:27 AM 18 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

of our allies, such as pakistan. Air Commodore ment of Brig Gen Billy Mitchell to have been a Bazmi’s article clearly demonstrates a level of great injustice. in my opinion, General Mitch­ knowledge and professionalism we can all ad­ ell proved his case, never gave up his integrity, mire, founded on values we all share. and epitomized our core value of “service be­ Frank J. Hannaford fore self.” i think that he stands alongside the Omaha, Nebraska commanding general of the Army Air forces in World War ii, Gen henry “hap” Arnold, and should be the second and perhaps only other NASH IN NAJAF Air force general afforded five-star rank. With­ i think that Dr. hank Brightman’s article “nash out the stepping-stones built through General in najaf: Game theory and its Applicability to Mitchell’s sacrifices, General Arnold’s accom­ the iraqi Conflict” (fall 2007) made a valiant plishments might not have been possible. effort to quantify the incentives facing both MSgt Howard White, USAF, Retired the iraqi domestic insurgents and the indige­ Charleston, South Carolina nous security forces (isf). the author’s depth of knowledge in the subject of economics and DEFINING INFORMATION OPERA game theory certainly earns his views great re­ TIONS FORCES spect. however, i believe that he made a con­ siderable assumption with his weight assign­ i agree with the authors of “Definingi nforma­ ments in figure 1 (“iraqi conflict as a simple tion operations forces: What Do We need?” form game”), particularly in the “Active, Ac­ (summer 2007), who note the numerous in­ tive” quadrant. it’s impossible to say what the formation operations career fields within the true outcome of this “game” would be for ei­ Air force and other services. it seems only ther side, but i would argue that it is at least natural that there should be some consolida­ possible that the isf’s continued resistance tion of these career fields. We could then against iraqi insurgents might bring them make sound, effective decisions to better pre­ more benefit than cost, especially within a pare for the vast changes that will take place in context of emerging democracy, human the future. rights, and social freedoms for them and their Mr. Michael Fleenor families. further, the stakes are high for the Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory free World and our war on terror in the re­ gion. therefore, my hope is that unified per­ sistence in iraq by coalition forces will create LEADERSHIP: AN OLD DOG’S VIEW favorable incentives which might prevent isf “the leader is the first into the traces and the defection. for the sake of the great investment last out. the leader eats last and eats least. and sacrifice our soldiers have made and con­ the leader treats every member of the team tinue to make in training and equipping the with meticulous fairness. the leader encour­ isf, i hope that Dr. Brightman’s prediction ages affection for the team but never for him­ proves incorrect. self or herself. the leader is honest, and this Brian MacLean bears repeating—the leader is honest. More Travis AFB, California than any power the leader has, the leader is most judicious with the authority to lead the team into harm’s way” (p. 18). MAJ GEN WILLIAM “BILLY” MITCHELL: After reading Mr. C. r. Anderegg’s article A PYRRHIC PROMOTION “leadership: An old Dog’s View” (summer i disagree with what lt Col Donald rehkopf 2007), i was impressed by the profound depth says in his article “reply to ‘Maj Gen William and wisdom of the above passage, which can “Billy” Mitchell: A pyrrhic promotion’ ” (fall be considered a summary of very useful lessons. 2007). i deem the demotion and early retire­ in my particular case, these lessons will enrich

Prelaunch Ricochet 2007-4.indd 18 10/29/07 10:04:27 AM RICOCHETS AND REPLIES 19

my performance as a leader in the Colombian wars. one thing is certain, and it shows up Air force’s Combat squadron 212, which flies clearly in General peck’s article: aviation is an the t-27 tucano, and will support my teaching arm distinguished by the global nature of its mission as a team instructor. i also wish to action, and modern conflicts—most notably point out that the experiences Mr. Anderegg World War ii and the Cold War—have tended mentions in his article are the result of a spirit to confine high-altitude air superiority and imbued with knowledge that i hope to attain the clashes of air forces to a remote and al­ in the future and towards which i am working most abstract role. We need to rediscover diligently so i can better understand this new close-combat aviation and perhaps also com­ world full of struggles, failures, and successes plete the range of aerial means with slower, that is open to women military aviators. long-endurance aircraft in order to more Lt Liliana Paola Vergara Gutiérrez, Colombian Air Force completely “occupy” the sky during asymmet­ Villavicencio, Colombia ric conflicts. Lt Tim Larribau, French Air Force Reserve Editor’s Note: Lieutenant Vergara read the Spanish Bordeaux, France version of Mr. Anderegg’s article, available at http:// www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/ apj-s/2007/2tri07/anderegg.html. FIT (AND READY) TO FIGHT the iron tiger martial-arts concept mentioned by 2d lt nickolas stewart in his article “fit (and ready) to fight: strengthening Combat AIRPOWER’S CRUCIAL ROLE readiness through Controlled-Aggression IN IRREGULAR WARFARE training” (summer 2007) is a great idea. Un­ i read with great interest Gen Allen G. peck’s fortunately, the UsAf seems more focused on article “Airpower’s Crucial role in irregular sports such as wiffle ball and ultimate frisbee Warfare” (summer 2007). With his experience than on close-quarters combat. the troops and strategic vision, General peck has crafted really need warrior-oriented activities and a a well-considered response and line of thought hard-core training method to instill a warrior adapted to the latest questions about how air- ethos. Gen Curtis leMay was one of the firstto power should meet asymmetric challenges. implement such a program with strategic Air General peck’s article also made me realize Command’s combat judo program back in there is a shortage of historiography on his the 1950s. Many UsAf personnel were trained topic. While reading the article, i was re­ in Japan and sent back to their home units to minded that aviation employment in asym­ teach combat skills and the warrior ethos. metric warfare is nothing new. the ottoman Merely repeating the mantra “i am a warrior” turks used it with a certain degree of success in our minds will not make us warriors. in­ in World War i against lawrence of Arabia’s stead, we must train combat skills with both Arab tribes. Additionally, the french victory in our brains and bodies to become warriors. the 1925 riff rebellion in Morocco cannot running and sit-ups will help but are not entirely be explained without the considerable enough. We must have training in combat to contribution, in all facets of that war against win in combat. Mixed martial arts are not the Abd el-Krim, of the 39th Aviation regiment of correct method or solution, however. i think Colonel Armengaud, who wrote about the that a classical, proven combat system of any subject. one could also talk about the 37th stripe (and there are many) would be a better Aviation regiment’s operations against the choice. the troops would love it. they are eager Druze in the syrian mountains during the and ready to learn combat skills. Would cur­ early 1930s. however, to my knowledge, few rent leadership back and promote an “iron studies have been written about the employ­ tiger Air force” combat hand-to-hand training ment of aviation in these modern, asymmetric program? i don’t know, but one thing i do know

Prelaunch Ricochet 2007-4.indd 19 10/29/07 10:04:28 AM 20 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

for sure is that General leMay would be glad eBAo as a business consultant has made me to see such a program reborn in his Air force. ponder the possibility of designing effects- Mr. Perry Pfeiffer based consulting plans, using as principal ele­ Vandenberg AFB, California ments the constructs presented in the two ar­ ticles mentioned above. in my opinion, those articles are clear evidence of the quality of the THE EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO materials presented in Air and Space Power OPERATIONS (EBAO) Journal. they are valuable, and they represent an important contribution to the community i enjoyed the articles “the effects-Based Ap­ that has access to them. Congratulations on proach to operations: Questions and Answers” your publication. and “five propositions regarding effects- Eustorgio Rodado Fuentes Based operations” (spring 2006). they accu­ Bogotá, Colombia rately and objectively clarify the concept and general idea of effects-based operations as the Editor’s Note: Mr. Rodado read the Spanish version primary element in planning military opera­ of this article, available at http://www.airpower tions. the authors’ presentations are so clear .maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2006/ that they turn this theory into an element that 4tri06/hunerwadel.html and http://www.airpower is clearly applicable to other disciplines, such .maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2006/ as business administration. Being familiar with 4tri06/carey.html.

Integrity, Service, and Excellence are the enduring touchstones of the , and discipline is at the core of all three. A disciplined force puts mission first; flies, fights, and wins as a team; knows the rules; pays meticulous attention to details; and is account able for the final esults.r —Gen t. Michael Moseley, Chief of staff, Us Air force

Prelaunch Ricochet 2007-4.indd 20 10/29/07 10:04:28 AM ASPJ

Lt CoL PauL D. Berg, uSaF, ChieF, ProFeSSionaL JournaLS

Airpower and Irregular Warfare

ir Force doctrine defines ir­ Airmen have the necessary perspective for de­ regular warfare (iW) as “a violent vising innovative ways to exploit them. Airmen struggle among state and non-state do not claim that their areas of expertise can actors for legitimacy and influence meet all iW needs, but they do question the Aover the relevant populations,” adding that validity of military approaches that fail to opti­ “iW and traditional warfare are not mutually mally harness the potential of those domains. exclusive and both are often present in the AFdd 2-3 notes that “the Air Force provides same conflict.”1 this guidance clearly reflects valuable and unique capabilities in iW. in many iW’s complex nature. the United States faces cases, these capabilities provide flexible and per­ many national-security challenges, but iW de­ sistent options for dealing with the iW chal­ mands particular attention in the era follow­ lenges by providing a less intrusive force that can ing the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. respond quickly and improve commanders’ Airpower’s proper role in iW has become a overall situational awareness.”4 Joint force com­ controversial topic. complex challenges typi­ manders deserve a comprehensive articulation cally call for integrated joint and interagency of how all military capabilities relate to iW. We solutions, yet some military doctrine depicts would make a serious mistake by confining our iW as a ground-centric activity in which air- thought to a single operational domain. power serves only a narrow, supporting role. no doctrine manual will ever serve as an iW Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine corps panacea, but, given iW’s status as essentially a Warfighting Publication(McWP)3-33.5, Counter­ war of ideas, doctrine can play a key role in insurgency, exemplifiesthat constricted view by that type of conflict. Air and Space Power Journal confining airpower to a five-page annex in a (ASPJ), the professional journal of the USAF, nearly 300-page document.2 conversely, Gen is another participant in the ongoing war of t. Michael Moseley, US Air Force chief of staff, ideas. realizing the importance of iW and the articulates the broader view that “employed vigorous debate surrounding airpower’s role properly, airpower (to include air, space, and in that struggle, the ASPJ staff dedicates this cyberspace capabilities) produces asymmetric issue to advancing the professional dialogue advantages that can be effectively leveraged by about both topics. ❑ joint force commanders in virtually every as­ pect of irregular warfare.”3 the new Air Force doctrine document (AFdd) 2-3, Irregular War­ fare, which reflects General Moseley’s vision, Notes energizes a more joint conception of airpower’s 1. Air Force doctrine document (AFdd) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 1 August 2007, 1 and 8, https://www.doctrine.af role in iW. Joint approaches often yield syner­ .mil/afdcprivateweb/AFdd_Page_HtML/doctrine gies not found in narrower military perspec­ _docs/afdd2-3.pdf (accessed 6 September 2007). tives, so AFdd 2-3 makes an important contri­ 2. FM 3-24 / McWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, decem­ bution to the ongoing dialogue about how best ber 2006, appendix e, “Airpower in counterinsurgency,” http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf(accessed to integrate all military capabilities into iW. 6 September 2007). experts at operating in the air, space, and 3. AFdd 2-3, Irregular Warfare, foreword. cyberspace domains (all of them vital to iW), 4. ibid., 14.

21

Focus Area.indd 21 10/29/07 10:01:21 AM In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.” In a similar spirit, Air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers can draw their own conclusions or join the intellectual battlespace. Please send comments to [email protected].

Israel’s Failure Why?

Lt CoL J. P. HunerwadeL, uSaF, retired*

SrAel’S 34-dAy cAmPAIgn against reductionist model of warfare and claim that Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 had its supporters believe it can yield magic answers people lining up to place blame for its that eliminate the fog and friction of war. failure even before it ended. Indeed, On the contrary, an effects-based approach IHezbollah’s survival and increased influence does not advocate “immaculate warfare” (to in lebanon does seem to indicate that Israel use Peters’s phrase), and Israel fought its cam­ suffered at least a partial strategic defeat in paign against Hezbollah in contravention to 1 that conflict,despite its claims to the contrary. the effects-based principles advocated by the regardless, many think there is plenty of US military in its own doctrine.4 This article blame to spread around. Some believe that details the manner in which Israel either mis­ Israel’s overreliance on airpower contributed understood or violated the principles of eBAO to the apparent defeat. commentators such as in three fundamental ways: its failure to prop­ Phillip gordon and ralph Peters concluded, erly analyze both the problem and the enemy as summarized by analyst William Arkin (who does not share their views), that “airpower can it faced, its reversion to a mind-set focused on never be decisive in a war, that an airman can­ servicing a list of targets rather than creating not command an army, and that airmen live specificdesired effects, and, perhaps most im­ with a pernicious desire to win wars at the ex­ portantly, its failure to determine a coherent clusion of ground forces.”2 end state for the campaign. If, in fact, Israel One of the bugbears that airpower’s critics did seek to wage effects-based warfare against trot out to scare the faithful is the concept of Hezbollah, then it fundamentally misunder­ the effects-based approach to operations stood and misapplied the tenets of an effects- (eBAO), which they also blame for the failure based approach, and it fundamentally misused of the campaign.3 A number of individuals in both airpower and ground military forces in the antiairpower crowd represent eBAO as a the process.5

*The author is a senior doctrine analyst in the Joint and multinational doctrine directorate at the Air Force doctrine development and education center, maxwell AFB, Alabama.

22

Merge1-Hunerwadel.indd 22 10/29/07 9:56:36 AM THE MERGE 23

Failure to Analyze the saved itself some measure of international condemnation for attacking residential struc­ Problem Properly tures had it realized that doing so could not The first reason Israel failed relates to its prove effective in disrupting a “cellular” orga­ apparent lack of analysis—of its situation and nization’s c2. As it was, Israel seemed content of its enemy, Hezbollah. The doctrinal principles to attack such targets simply because of their of eBAO recognize that knowledge of all actors inclusion on a target list, not considering the and the operational environment is important indirect effects that these attacks would have to success and should be based on analysis of on worldwide public opinion. the operational environment as a system of systems.6 The Winograd commission, an Israeli Target-Servicing Mind-Set board charged with determining the causes of the campaign’s failure, summed up Israel’s The principles of eBAO maintain that wars performance in this regard: “The decision to are not tactical exercises writ large (war entails respond with an immediate, intensive military much more than a single engagement or task­ strike was not based on a detailed, compre­ ing order) and that all operations, from the hensive and authorized military plan, based smallest tactical action to the integration of na­ on careful study of the complex characteris­ tional instruments of power—military, political, tics of the lebanon arena.”7 cultural, economic, and informational—require By examining Hezbollah’s linkages to the integration into a coherent, adaptive whole.9 world outside the immediate battlespace, a eBAO thus seeks to counter the mind-set that systems-based analysis should have indicated sees warfare as an exercise in servicing a list of to Israel the relative insensitivity of substate targets or simply causing attrition of an enemy terrorist organizations to civilian damage; in and his equipment until he gives up. Several fact, they often consider it an advantage. civilian people in the Israeli government, including casualties that can be blamed on an attacker Prime minister ehud Olmert, maintain that reinforce the facade of “victimhood” that Israel won its campaign because it killed up­ many terrorist organizations assume in order wards of 600 Hezbollah fighters.Victor y is not to garner sympathy in liberal corners of the based on body counts, however. Hezbollah developed world. Thus, every bomb dropped suffered tactically but no doubt gladly ex­ on a seemingly “civilian” target, however valid changed the lives of its fighters for increased that target according to the laws of armed prestige and influence in lebanon and the conflict, can represent a small propaganda world arena. victory for the terrorist organization. This risk The Winograd commission’s report states is often outweighed by the target’s legitimate that “the Prime minister made up his mind military value, but commanders must weigh hastily” and that the chief of staff responded such risk and, in most cases, Israel defense to the taking of Israeli hostages “impulsively.”10 Forces (IdF) commanders and Israeli national What evolved after the initial few hours of re­ leadership did not do so. taliatory strikes was not a plan but “the most A systems-based analysis also should have conventional of approaches, with each indi­ shown that organizations such as Hezbollah vidual object justified for its legality and mili­ are composed of many semiautonomous cells, tary importance, almost divorced from the not subject to strong centralized control and overall campaign objective and desired strate­ thus inherently resistant to attempts to disrupt gic outcome.”11 The campaign thus became a command and control (c2)—something that blind effort to service a set of targets that air many of Israel’s strikes on “civilian” residences forces customarily hit, along with an equally in southern Beirut seemed designed to do (by blind effort to attrit Hezbollah’s fighting destroying Hezbollah “command centers” forces. Apparently, the Israelis gave little contained in the buildings).8 Israel might have thought to the consequences of hitting this

Merge1-Hunerwadel.indd 23 10/29/07 9:56:36 AM 24 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

list of customary targets. They carried out this publicly why they were doing what they were effort to coerce the lebanese government in doing. This may have resulted from the neces­ such a manner that it had almost exactly the sities of military security—but more likely be­ opposite effect than the one intended. cause they themselves did not understand the The target-servicing mentality can become relationship between the tactical assignments the default position for the use of airpower in they tasked the IdF to carry out and the strategic the absence of good operational design and objectives and end state they wished to achieve. planning. This became the norm in Vietnam In the words of the Winograd report, “[Israel] for the United States, and it contributed to US authorized the commencement of a military defeat. When employing airpower, good com­ campaign without considering how to exit it.”13 manders must always guard against this mind- With no clear end state in mind, the Israelis pur­ set. likewise, the default position for ground sued varying goals throughout the campaign. military power amounts to pure attrition, usu­ during the first hours, Israel wanted to se­ ally by the most expedient means available— cure the return of two reservists taken cap­ preferably standoff firepower. commanders tive in a raid on a border patrol and to retali­ must guard against this mind-set as well. Israeli ate for Hezbollah rockets fired at Israeli commanders failed in both respects, and their towns and border posts. The first goal led the campaign devolved into a target-servicing, IdF into an ambush. The second triggered a attrition-oriented exercise. rehearsed plan—“Hannibal”—to strike Hez­ bollah’s Iranian-supplied long-range missiles. This initial retaliatory strike, however, lasted Lack of a Coherent End State only 34 minutes.14 From the end of the first day of the campaign forward, Israel found it­ The principle of the objective calls for di­ self “off the script.” recting “every military operation toward a After executing Hannibal, Israel extensively clearly defined, decisive, and achievable bombed civilian infrastructure in lebanon in 12 goal.” eBAO takes this principle one step an apparent attempt to coerce the lebanese further. Attainment of the goal or a set of such government into pressuring Hezbollah to stop goals should lead to a set of conditions that its rocket attacks on Israel.15 Instead of coerc­ defines what the operational environment ing the lebanese, however, these attacks had should look like after the conflict. Further, the effect of coalescing world opinion against these end-state conditions should not simply Israel, thus strengthening its enemies. Israel’s represent a moment in time. The US military attacks also may have undermined the credi­ teaches that operations should be based upon bility of the lebanese government, which had the notion of continuing advantage—of gaining been acting as a de facto ally in reducing the and maintaining a state that confers what we influence of terror-sponsor Syria in lebanon. want while denying our enemies what they Ultimately, regardless of what Israel wanted, want within the operational environment. the end state took the form of a strategically eBAO emphasizes that the desired end state strengthened Hezbollah (albeit weakened tac­ should drive all subordinate considerations of tically) and an IdF that saw its perceived repu­ planning, execution, and assessment, includ­ tation as substantially diminished (however ing the details of targeting. In short, all mili­ much tactical success it may have enjoyed). tary operations not only should strive toward a Finally, military commanders should have a definable and decisive goal but also should stake in determining end-state conditions, contain a plan for what that goal achieves in a which they did not during the campaign. As continuing sense beyond its attainment. part of operational design, the commander Throughout the campaign against Hezbol­ and his or her strategists act like an architect lah, lt gen dan Halutz, the Israeli chief of who creates a design for a client or sponsor. In staff; defense minister Amir Peretz; and Prime the case of military operations, the “sponsor” minister Olmert seemed unable to explain is national leadership, and determining the

Merge1-Hunerwadel.indd 24 10/29/07 9:56:37 AM THE MERGE 25

end state becomes a central part of what the (whether applied to air or any other form of sponsor and the “architect” do through mutual military power) holds that the complex and and continuous dialogue. This is the best way nonlinear nature of systems made up of hu­ to prevent designing an end state that military man beings means that one cannot eliminate force cannot deliver. In contrast, regarding fog and friction, however “perfect” the intelli­ his commanders, Prime minister Olmert ex­ gence, and that operations must thus be de­ plicitly stated that “ ‘they can’t see the entire signed so that even the least tactical action can picture and they don’t need to see the entire be understood in the context of the conflict’s picture. That isn’t their job. Their job is to overall desired end state. clearly this did not carry out their mission in the best, most effec­ happen during Israel’s campaign against Hez­ tive way, that is cheapest in terms of the hu­ bollah. Indeed, “[the chief of staff] did not 16 man cost, and in the best way for Israel.’ ” To alert the political leaders to the complexity of the extent that Olmert crafted a strategy at all, the situation, and did not present informa­ he crafted one that his military could not de­ tion, assessments and plans that were available liver. dialogue with his commanders while in the IdF at various levels of planning and conducting operational design likely would approval and which would have enabled a bet­ have prevented this. ter response to the challenges”; furthermore, Ironically, Israeli brigadier general Shimon he “did not prepare a clear operational plan naveh spearheaded the entire field of mili­ for the campaign,” said maj gen Udi Shani, tary operational design; indeed, his book on who led a team investigating the general operational-design theory is considered a cen­ 19 tral text in the field.17 Israel’s leaders would Staff’s performance. have done well to consult the general, but it When ground operations did start, many appears that his ideas had either fallen from units went into combat with inadequate train­ favor or were unknown at the time of the cam­ ing and supplies, failing to place continuous 20 paign. naveh emphasizes that constant dia­ pressure on Hezbollah and its resources. logue between military and civilian leadership Speaking of the ground as well as the air ef­ is crucial to successful operational design. fort, retired general yoram yair noted that “the basic principles of war were neglected in this campaign. . . . There was no initiative, per­ The Myth of Failed Airpower sistence, onslaught, concentration of effort.”21 One can attribute some of the failure of the From its firstday forward, Israel’s campaign ground effort to long neglect of the IdF’s against Hezbollah was truly joint, involving air, ground, and naval elements. As mentioned, ground forces: “The shortcomings in the pre­ some critics tendentiously point to Israel’s paredness and the training of the army, its misuse of airpower as evidence of the incapacity operational doctrine, and various flaws in its of airpower to bring about a decision. From its organizational culture and structure, were all opening hours, however, the campaign in­ the responsibility of the military commanders volved ground forces (albeit in a haphazard and political leaders in charge years before . . . and uncoordinated fashion), who suffered Prime minister [Olmert], minister of defense equally from a lack of coherent operational [Peretz] and chief of Staff [Halutz] took of­ design and planning. fice.”22 It appears that ground forces were ill Airpower’s critics maintain that, through served by Israel’s government for years and “precision-targeting systems and other super­ that, as it did with airpower, Israeli leadership weapons,” airpower “zealots” promise “blood­ misused them in the campaign against Hez­ less wars” and that perfect information will bollah. All of this resulted from a failure of Is­ dispense with the fog and friction of war.18 raeli grand strategy in the years leading up to This is a straw-man argument. One of the the conflict and the failure to strategize at all central insights of an effects-based approach when the conflict with Hezbollah started.

Merge1-Hunerwadel.indd 25 10/29/07 9:56:37 AM 26 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

Alternatives Olmert’s government failed to analyze and plan for any coherent campaign and there­ All of this raises the question of whether Is­ fore did not consider this option. given the rael could have pursued a coherent strategy short notice it received, Israel’s military prob­ that would have achieved its aims in this conflict. ably was not prepared for such an operation. One military alternative would have involved A final alternative might have entailed lim­ executing a much larger ground offensive iting retaliation to suspected Hezbollah missile­ into southern lebanon to secure Hezbollah launcher sites, much as occurred during the bases and the areas from which rockets were “34-minute attack” and much as Israel is pres­ being fired.Prime minister Olmert apparently ently doing in gaza. This probably would have came under some pressure, both from within involved months of tit-for-tat air strikes, as and outside his government, to do precisely Hezbollah launched missiles into northern Is­ this, but Arkin expresses best why the Israeli rael and Israel struck back. no doubt political government chose not to: “Israel indeed showed pressure would have mounted on Olmert’s initial restraint on the ground, a decision that government to conduct an assault on launcher could and should be interpreted not as some positions in lebanon, but the Israelis thus airpower daydream or a lack in ‘understand­ might have had time to prepare an appropri­ ing’ ground war but as a desire to avoid a pro­ ately joint air-ground operation that properly tracted battle, an occupation, and all of the considered the nature of Hezbollah and the subsequent killing and destruction that would operational environment. Israel still would follow.”23 Israel occupied southern lebanon have faced unpleasant end-state choices, but, for nearly 20 years following the First leba­ again, this might have permitted the IdF to non War, but its occupation failed to prevent create the perception that it had won. the rise of Hezbollah and cost it dearly in In summary, effects-based principles should blood and treasure. have guided the Israelis into understanding Another alternative would have called for a that they could not attain the end state they combined air-ground campaign focusing ex­ desired through attrition and destruction clusively on Hezbollah, concentrated south of alone—that, in fact, an approach based on de­ the litani river. An effects-based analysis of struction could rebound into significant stra­ the operational environment would have sug­ tegic damage to the cause for which Israel gested that this was a better option than the fought. effects-based principles also should have campaign that Israel waged, but then Israel directed them away from a target-servicing still would have faced the problem of the end mind-set and toward a focus on the end state state: would it have to occupy southern leba­ and objectives. Finally, sound principles of op­ non again, or would clearing Hezbollah fight­ erational design should have guided them to­ ing positions and then abandoning them be ward building a framework for the campaign politically viable and militarily prudent? Such that included the political and cultural effects a course of action might at least have had the that their bombing would likely produce. As advantage of creating opportunities for de­ the campaign played out, Israel caused signifi­ feating Hezbollah “units” in open combat. cant tactical damage to Hezbollah through at­ This might have reversed the perception that trition and destruction, but the strategic out­ Hezbollah “won” and the IdF “lost.” It also come, at least in the short run, weakened might have given the IdF the opportunity to Israel’s reputation and ultimately strength­ ❑ destroy much of Hezbollah’s military infra­ ened Hezbollah. structure in southern lebanon. In any event, Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Merge1-Hunerwadel.indd 26 10/29/07 9:56:37 AM THE MERGE 27

Notes 1. For the best overall treatment of the campaign thus 6. AFdd 2, Operations and Organization, 19. far, which makes the case for the defeat of Israel, see William 7. “The Winograd report: The main Findings of the m. Arkin, Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel- Winograd Partial report on the Second lebanon War,” Hezbollah War (maxwell AFB, Al: Air University Press, Au­ Haaretz.com, 5 January 2007, 10a, http://www.haaretz.com/ gust 2007). See also carol migdalovitz, Israel: Background hasen/spages/854051.html. and Relations with the United States, crS report for congress 8. Israel also struck cellular-telephone antennas, which (Washington, dc: congressional research Service, library similarly had little effect. See Arkin, Divining Victory, 115. of congress, 26 July 2006), http://vienna.usembassy.gov/ 9. AFdd 2, Operations and Organization, 18–19. en/download/pdf/israel.pdf. 10. “Winograd report,” 12b, 14a. 2. Arkin, Divining Victory, 140. See also Phillip H. 11. Arkin, Divining Victory, 155. gordon, “Air Power Won’t do It,” Washington Post, 25 July 12. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, appendix A, A-1. 2006, A-15; and ralph Peters, “The myth of Immaculate 13. “Winograd report,” 10c. Warfare,” USA Today, 5 September 2006, http://www.usa 14. See, for example, Aluf Benn, “report: IAF Wiped today.com/news/opinion/editorials/2006-09-05-warfare Out 59 Iranian missile launchers in 34 minutes,” Haaretz.com, -edit_x.htm. 24 October 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/ 3. most notably in Israel itself. See ron Tira, The Limi­ 778485.html. tations of Standoff Firepower-Based Operations: On Standoff 15. Arkin, Divining Victory, 41–42. Warfare, Maneuver, and Decision, memorandum no. 89 (Tel 16. “Winograd Transcripts: Olmert, Peretz, Halutz Aviv, Israel: Institute for national Security Studies, Tel Blame Army, and each Other,” Israel Insider, 10 may 2007, Aviv University, march 2007), http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/ http://web.israelinsider.com/Articles/Politics/11338.htm. memoranda/memo89.en.pdf. This monograph sets up a 17. Shimon naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The straw-man rubric of standoff firepower-based operations Evolution of Operational Theory (london: Frank cass, 1997). that attempts to “impose effects” versus “classical military 18. Peters, “myth of Immaculate Warfare.” operations,” which “directly accomplish military aims” 19. “Winograd report,” 14a; and Alon Ben-david, (9–13). “debriefing Teams Brand IdF doctrine ‘completely 4. See, for example, Air Force doctrine document Wrong,’ ” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 January 2007, 7. (AFdd) 2, Operations and Organization, 3 April 2007, chap. 20. See, for example, Ken ellingwood and laura 2; see also Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 King, “Warfare in the middle east: Israel Wades into September 2006, chap. 4; and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Plan­ Bloodiest day,” Los Angeles Times, 27 July 2006. ning, 26 december 2006, chap. 3. 21. Ben-david, “debriefing Teams Brand IdF doc­ 5. For principal tenets, see lt col J. P. Hunerwadel, trine,” 7. USAF, retired, “The effects-Based Approach to Operations: 22. “Winograd report,” 15c. Questions and Answers,” Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 23. Arkin, Divining Victory, xxiii. 1 (Spring 2006): 56–60, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af .mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/spr06/spr06.pdf.

Cyberspace is not just a computer on your desktop. It is the way that we as an Air Force intend to fly and fight. —lt gen robert J. elder Jr., USAF

Merge1-Hunerwadel.indd 27 10/29/07 9:56:38 AM What Do We Do Next Time? Fighting America’s Wars after Iraq

Lt CoL Rob Levinson, UsAF*

ccording to Field Manual 3-24/ Middle east will play out in the wake of our Marine corps Warfighting Publica­ withdrawal, we must also consider the future tion 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, air- of a post-iraq US military. power plays primarily, if not exclu­ if we fast-forward a few years to the world Asively, a supporting role in counterinsurgency after operation iraqi Freedom, where the next operations such as the ones we are currently occupant of the White House faces an inter­ conducting in iraq and Afghanistan.1 this is national crisis of some sort and seeks to ex­ not to say that the Air Force’s contributions plore the available military options, we have to are not significant—only that the Army and wonder what sort of menu his or her advisers Marine corps do the bulk of the killing, bleed­ will offer. it seems highly unlikely that any op­ ing, and dying. Such is the nature of warfare tions calling for the deployment and insertion against small-scale irregular forces, particu­ of large-scale ground forces (multiple bri­ larly in urban environments. Although we gades) into hostile territory for a lengthy pe­ maintain complete air dominance over the riod of time will appear attractive, even if the battlespace, that alone clearly does not guar­ advisers dare serve them up. tempered by a antee victory. rather, the success or failure of largely unsuccessful experience in iraq, and the guys wearing muddy boots on the ground perhaps Afghanistan, our future president, as will determine the outcome. in the future, well as the Army and Marine corps leader­ however, airpower may become the force of ship, will be loath to enter any situation with a choice—if not by design, then by default. high probability of a drawn-out slugfest. the granted, the United States may yet pull a old adage “never wrestle with a pig in the mud rabbit out of its iraq-shaped hat, but most ob­ since all you get is dirty, and the pig likes it” servers remain rather skeptical that the latest will be foremost in their minds. Most likely, “surge” will have a decisive impact. So far, the the president will look to the Air Force and boots we have on the ground have not proved navy leadership and say, “What do you have?” decisive, and the addition of 20,000 more per­ Air and naval options will become the weapon sonnel will probably not make much of a dif­ of choice, with perhaps a short-term interven­ ference. At this point, the best-case scenario tion by the Marine corps a distant second. would involve a withdrawal in some sort of or­ this same kind of thinking may have already derly fashion, leaving in place a somewhat taken hold in israel, where, given a previous democratic regime able to maintain at least a bad experience, leaders selected airpower as modicum of stability. More-likely scenarios the preferred option for the incursion into run downhill from there. Undoubtedly, a US lebanon. once airpower proved unsuccess­ withdrawal from iraq will have broad strategic ful, the israelis tried a ground option with very implications, the repercussions of which will limited, if any, tactical or strategic success. in be felt for years to come. Although we have this case, a seemingly inferior irregular force paid much attention to how the future of the defeated—or at least fought to a standstill—a

*the author is chief, Strategic Plans, office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Public Affairs, Security and review division, Washington, dc.

28

Merge2-Levinson.indd 28 10/29/07 9:57:11 AM THE MERGE 29

sophisticated, highly technological force that can ground forces already there and backed had overwhelming conventional military power. up by airpower provided by the Air Force and of course, many people can assert that navy, can’t stop the north, then the Army such contingencies do not apply to the sup­ won’t have much of a chance to get in the porting roles played by the Air Force and navy game. We could employ nuclear weapons, a in iraq and Afghanistan today and point to choice that presents a host of additional prob­ many other situations that air and naval power lems, but even in that event, the Air Force and alone can solve. true, but, at least thus far, it is the navy would deliver them. also true that ground power hasn’t solved the two other developments, one technological problem either—and may even have made it and one demographic, may also make the de­ worse. instead of “What’s the best mix of sea, ployment of large-scale ground forces less likely. air, and land power to deal with a given situa­ Such forces—brigade-sized armor, mechanized tion?” the question for the future may become troops, and infantry formations—are best suited “if i can’t do this with primarily air and naval (indeed, they were the only option in past years) power, is it really worth doing at all?” Although for stopping an enemy’s large-scale ground we might like to pretend that in terms of na­ formations. However, in light of the current tional security, the ends are fixed and that we and future intelligence, surveillance, and re­ must use any necessary means to achieve them, connaissance capabilities at the disposal of the the reality is somewhat less black and white. United States, it would seem virtually impossible Short of an invasion by Mexico or canada, or for a brigade-sized—or perhaps even a battalion­ the direct attack on American soil perpetrated sized—formation to hide anywhere on the by or closely linked to a nation-state, the fu­ planet for very long. (our enemies in iraq ture president will always have a choice about and Afghanistan today barely operate at pla­ whether or not to use force—and, as always, toon strength, much less company, brigade, some individuals will counsel against it. like or battalion.) given the precision-strike capa­ his or her predecessors, this president will en­ bilities available from the air—and in the near gage in some sort of cost-benefit analysis and future, even from space—if we can find the come to a decision. However, in a post-iraq enemy brigade, we can likely kill it with near world, perception of the cost of a large-scale impunity. the best way to stop an enemy tank ground-combat operation will outweigh almost may not call for another tank, according to any conceivable benefit. the former mantra of the armor community, this coldcalculus wouldseemalmost scenario­ but a precision-guided bomb dropped from independent. if we look at the high end of the an airplane. the combination of technological spectrum involving conventional conflicts be­ advances in both sensor and shooter technolo­ tween nation-states—say, for example, the gies may have brought the era of combat with armed forces of the United States versus those large-scale ground formations to a close. of a future peer competitor such as china— in addition to advancing technology, chang­ we will still have a hard time imagining the ing demography is also altering the landscape deployment of large Army formations to the of combat. According to the United nations, fight. in a dustup over taiwan, does anyone nearly 3 billion people—50 percent of the seriously contemplate putting the US Army world’s population—live in cities, and that on the ground in mainland china—or even in number is growing at a rate of 180,000 per taiwan, where it could be surrounded and day. Between 1990 and 1995 alone, about 260 trapped? the Korean Peninsula represents million people migrated to cities and towns in another possibility, but here the Army would the developing world. in the developed world, have to get to the fight fast enough to make a urbanization has leveled off at approximately difference. the north Koreans have over­ 75 percent, but in the developing world, where whelming numerical superiority in ground most future conflict will likely occur, the figure forces already in place. if the South Koreans, is about 35 percent—but increasing rapidly.2 with help from the small contingent of Ameri­ We can logically assume that as more people

Merge2-Levinson.indd 29 10/29/07 9:57:11 AM 30 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

move to the cities, more conflictwill take place on the ground also possess asymmetric advan­ there. Short of devastating the place, large- tages, in that they know the terrain and people scale ground forces as well as air forces are not in ways we can never match. Furthermore, their well suited to urban environments. the Fulda moral code, or lack thereof, enables them to gap of cold War days is being replaced by the hide behind and kill civilians—something we Baghdad Alley as the locus of future conflict— would never ask American soldiers to do. and the latter is not a friendly place for either in the domains where the Air Force oper­ “Big Army” or “Big Air Force,” for that matter. ates—air, space, and now cyberspace—it is the But if Big Army and Big Air Force don’t have best. (As the service’s slogan once said, “no roles to play in the urban fights, maybe we one comes close.”) our capabilities in those shouldn’t get into them at all. iraq and Af­ mediums remain unmatched. Although that ghanistan would suggest not. if we do enter doesn’t mean we can rest on our laurels, the these types of fights, we must rethink the way combination of our technological base, entre­ we do business. preneurial and innovative economy, and wealth thomas Barnett has spoken of using a “Sys­ will likely give us the edge in these areas for tem Administrator force,” and gen charles some time to come. in short, the current fight Krulak, former commandant of the Marine may belong to the Army and the Marine corps, has written about the “three Block corps, but the future may belong to the US War.”3 Apparently, these tasks are best suited Air Force. When the nation needs overt mili­ to rangers, special forces, marines, perhaps tary force, perhaps airpower will become the light infantry, specialized aviation, and various weapon of first—and last—resort. ❑ combat-support and combat-service-support Washington, DC capabilities. if we can’t take a city using these types of forces cooperating with local allies and if we can’t level it with airpower, then we should not attempt to take it in the first place. Notes Barnett also spoke of needing the “levia­ 1. Field Manual 3-24/Marine corps Warfighting Pub­ than” (most likely the Air Force and navy) lication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, 15 december 2006, e-1 when we really have to punch somebody, pref­ through e-5, http://usacac.army.mil/cAc/repository/ erably a nation-state, in the nose.4 if the crisis Materials/coin-FM3-24.pdf. calls for a sustained air campaign well inland, 2. “Homo sapiens to Homo urbanus,” Earthbeat, 16 no­ the Air Force will be the star of the show. in a vember 2002, http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/earth/ stories/s726535.htm. sense, this is what economists call playing to 3. thomas P. M. Barnett, “Mr. President, Here’s How our comparative advantage. despite the repu­ to Make Sense of our iraq Strategy,” Thomas P. M. Barnett: tation of American soldiers on the ground as Articles and Books, http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/ the best around, the small units of highly mo­ published/esquire2004.htm; and gen charles c. Krulak, “the Strategic corporal: leadership in the three Block tivated insurgents and terrorists they face can War,” Marines Magazine, January 1999, http://www.au.af probably match them in courage and determi­ .mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm. nation, if not skill and training. our enemies 4. Barnett, “Mr. President.”

Merge2-Levinson.indd 30 10/29/07 9:57:11 AM Reply to “Defining Information Operations Forces: What Do We Need?”

Lt CoL Kenneth BeeBe, USAF*

read wIth Interest the article “de­ works. For others, it concerns conducting fining Information Operations Forces: PsYOP against the enemy. For some, it’s “spin­ what do we need?” (summer 2007). ning the media.” still others consider IO syn­ I’ve been assigned to a joint information onymous with information management. In Ioperations (IO) organization for the last two other words, everybody thinks he or she knows years (including two tours “doing IO” in Iraq) what IO is, but few people really know what and have served as an electronic warfare (ew) the doctrine says it is. officersince I was a second lieutenant, so I am as the authors of “defining Information relatively familiar with IO doctrine. Operations Forces” point out, these different anyone who has spent time with IO in the ideas complicate decisions about how to create joint environment knows that every service a career force. If we as individuals don’t know thinks about it a little differently. For the air what IO is and if each service has a different Force and the navy, IO deals with networks, conception of IO, then deciding how to create especially the global information grid. For the an IO professional becomes a real challenge. I army, IO has to do with influence, which to differ with the article’s authors regarding their that service means psychological operations prescriptions for building IO career paths. (PsYOP). In a business that values words, we their analysis of the state of the ew career have chosen to use a vague and ambiguous force is cursory, to say the least. having ew phrase (information operations) to describe officers trained to operate airborne systems what we do. Perhaps it is time to use terminology does not constitute a well-established career that means something specific—and I believe force that prepares the air Force to dominate that “influence operations” does a better job the battlespace. ew entails more than airborne of identifying our objective than “information jamming platforms. It touches everything that operations.” the technical arts known as ew uses the electromagnetic spectrum, including and computer network operations have their sensors, communications equipment, and jam­ primary effects in the physical domains. mers. Integrated management of that spectrum PsYOP, military deception, and operations se­ is not the strong suit of the air Force or any of curity (OPseC)—the remaining “pillars” of the other services. the authors’ conclusion IO—aim to have their primary effects in the that “the air Force does not require additional cognitive domain. the term “influenceopera ­ capabilities or career forces for the ew mis­ tions” succinctly captures those three activities. sion area of IO” (p. 57) is flat-out wrong. adding to the confusion, it seems that every when it comes to influence operations, I person has a different idea of what IO is. For think we need to ask ourselves if it makes sense some, it involves hacking into the enemy’s net­ to have a separate “influence” career field in

*the author recently returned from Baghdad, where he served in the Information Operations Cell at Multi-national Force-Iraq. he is currently assigned to the Joint electronic warfare Center in san antonio, texas.

31

Merge3-Beebe.indd 31 10/29/07 9:57:40 AM 32 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

the air Force. what does a second lieutenant their prior experiences—fully embedded in influence officer do in a fighter or airlift planning organizations. squadron? since the air Force’s primary the authors make some good suggestions, PsYOP role involves disseminating the army’s such as their recommendations not only for a PsYOP products, the authors’ prescription network-warfare-operations career force and makes this individual essentially a deception OPseC but also for more effectively integrat­ planner. the best such planners aren’t built ing IO into the air Force by improving our from scratch. they first did something else in education and training and providing more their military careers. how many people would airmen with IO experience. what concerns listen to a major or lieutenant colonel who me, however, is that our air Force leadership listed “influence officer” as his or her only ex­ really hasn’t decided what to do with IO. It ap­ perience in the military? this doesn’t require pears to me that the creation of air Force Cy­ a career force so much as it requires dedicated ber Command represents the beginning of ❑ planners whom the air Force can train and the end for IO in our service. educate in influence yet still capitalize on San Antonio, Texas

Merge3-Beebe.indd 32 10/29/07 9:57:41 AM Author’s Reply to Lieutenant Colonel Beebe’s Comment about “Defining Information Operations Forces: What Do We Need?”

Maj Paul D. WilliaMs, usaF*

apprecIate the InsIghtful com­ electromagnetic spectrum both capitalizes on ments made by lt col Kenneth Beebe and enhances our ability to deliver global in the preceding article. When we wrote strike capabilities across the spectrum of war­ “Defining Information Operations forces: fare. It also represents an evolution in our WIhat Do We need?” (summer 2007), my co­ understanding of IO versus kinetic warfare. as authors and I focused on the process of tran­ lt gen robert elder points out in his article sitioning from how to build an IO force to “effects-Based Operations: a command phi­ how to build a cyber force, concentrating on losophy” (spring 2007), all warfare ultimately network warfare as the most badly broken involves influencing the minds and decision piece. We have since served on a team di­ processes of both adversaries and nonadver­ rected by headquarters usaf to tackle the saries (p. 17). to specify influence operations holistic cyber-force development effort, which as a capability akin to eW and nW is confus­ involved treating electronic warfare (eW); ing at best and damaging at worst if we fail to space; intelligence, surveillance, and recon­ focus our efforts on achieving realistic and naissance; and command and control / battle meaningful effects. as the air force continues management as having the same importance to develop in this area, I foresee transforma­ as network warfare (nW). the air force will tion in both service and joint doctrine to re­ use nW and eW forces as the defensive and flect our evolving understanding of both the offensive shooters it provides to combatant cognitive and cyberspace domains. commanders as cyber capabilities. We agree finally, do we need an influence-operations with colonel Beebe’s view that eW needs to career force in the air force? We don’t yet transform to maximize the individual and know the answer to this question. ultimately integrated effects of eW and nW that we the air force presents the combatant com­ can deliver. manders with forces that will need an under­ On the other hand, I disagree with his com­ standing of how to integrate their service’s ment that air force cyber command marks capabilities—such as public affairs (pa), psycho­ the end of IO for our service. I believe that the logical operations (psYOp), military deception air force is tackling cyber matters in a man­ (MIlDec), and operations security (Opsec)— ner that will allow us to concentrate on those into the joint IO fight. successful operations parts of IO that facilitate our bringing the across the entire war-fightingspectrum will re­ most capabilities to the fight. the cyber realm’s quire that senior war fighters understand air emphasis on achieving effects across the force pa, psYOp, MIlDec, and Opsec roles

*the author is an assistant professor of computer science and cyber operations in the Department of electrical and computer engineering at the air force Institute of technology, Wright-patterson afB, Ohio.

33

Merge4-Williams.indd 33 10/29/07 9:58:03 AM 34 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

and responsibilities as well as those of our sis­ skills make sense in a separate career force— ter services, other us agencies such as the De­ or they may fit best into existing forces. partment of homeland security, and coalition We wrote our article in the hopes of spur­ partners. adding those skills to the ones re­ ring discussion, and colonel Beebe’s analysis quired of our war-fighting kinetic and cyber and comments provide exactly that! We are forces may prove too much—we risk diluting in the process of making monumental their combat effectiveness by spreading them changes to the air force’s mission, and now too thinly. We hope that by applying our analy­ is the right time to grapple with some of these sis of this developing area to a notional career difficult issues. ❑ force, we will better cultivate an understand­ ing of which skills we need. perhaps those Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Merge4-Williams.indd 34 10/29/07 9:58:04 AM Comments on“The HyphenatedAirman”

Lt Gen John D. hopper Jr., USAF, retireD*

hen I read Lt Col robert amicus brief (supported by a dozen or so flag Poynor’s “The ‘hyphenated air­ officers from different services) filed in support man’: Some Observations on of the University of Michigan’s affirmative- Service Culture” (Fall 2007), I admissions policy.1 Wgot no further than the fifthparagraph before Passion aside, I share the author’s enthusiasm I was brought up short. how did “multicultural for exploring this topic, but I guess I tripped tribalism . . . a contemporary manifestation of over my expectations. I thought perhaps he cultural Marxism” (23) slip into this discussion? would explore tribalism from the perspective of I’m sure the author had the best intentions of a military service in which the officer corps does setting the stage, but I would like to describe virtually all the fighting. Or take a look at the how paragraph five reads to one airman. ramifications of drawing leadership from out­ That passage comes across as a rather thinly side the tribe. Or how about building a “tribal” veiled, one-sided explanation of the social dynam­ case study for one of the most amazing feats of ics that make up part of the fabric of america. organizational management around: kluging First, it is very clear that the tribes referenced Strategic air Command, Military airlift Com­ here could only be african-americans, hispanic­ mand, , air Force Systems americans, asian-americans, and so forth. It Command, and air Force Logistics Command is also clear that a description of the dominant into , air Mobility Com­ culture as “white, male, and Christian” puts mand, and air Force Materiel Command? I even women in a tribe. (Interesting choice of words thought he might dip into the air University ar­ here; in my experience, I have heard or read chives and revisit Col Mike Worden’s book Rise “white, Anglo-Saxon [sorry for the hyphen], of the Fighter Generals: The Problem of Air Force Lead­ and Protestant.”) The author then goes on to ership, 1945–1982. In my view, this topic is very attach “victimhood” to the tribes and assess important—rich with data for mining. Whether their motivation as the “restructuring of society, it is “black shoes versus brown shoes” in the navy, usually through proportional representation “leg infantry versus airborne” in the army, or (i.e., quotas),” all a rather transparent swipe at “fighters versus bombers” in our air Force, the affirmative action. although I am suspicious services have never needed Karl Marx to key the of the scholarship associated with these state­ mike and declare “fight’s on” when it comes to ments, I guess I should be satisfied with the “tribalism.” Multicultural tribalism and Marxist author’s citing Wikipedia as the main source. philosophy as a foundation for our complex Colonel Poynor seems concerned that social environment was just too much for this these tribes would seek redress for “perceived old airman to handle. ❑ grievances of the past.” I would suggest that Alexandria, Virginia he return to Wikipedia and check “slavery,” “Jim Crow,” “segregation,” “barrio,” “migrant workers,” and “glass ceiling” for a start. Of course, he would find that these were neither Note perceptions nor completely in the past. With 1. For the text of the amicus curiae brief filedwith the regard to affirmative action, he might find it US Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, see http:// useful to look at demographic projections for www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/gru_amicus the america of the future and then review the -ussc/um/MilitaryL-both.pdf.

*General hopper retired in 2005 as vice-commander of air education and Training Command.

35

Merge5-Hopper.indd 35 10/29/07 9:58:25 AM Editor’s Note: PiReP is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot to pass on current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we use this department to let readers know about items of interest.

The Paradox of Irregular Airpower

Maj BenjaMin R. MaitRe, USaF*

he UniTed STaTeS air Force en­ airpower fosters an inwardly focused perspec­ tered the twenty-first century as the tive of optimizing weapons-system operation most capable purveyor of airpower to achieve objectives, the challenges of ir­ in history. Following the success of regular warfare require an outwardly focused theT air campaign in Operation desert Storm, perspective that seeks to engage the very defi­ airpower seemed likely to become a dominant nition of an opponent’s existence. The para­ force in all future conflicts.1 Yet, recent opera­ dox lies in combining these two contradictory tions in afghanistan and iraq have called that concepts into an integrated perspective of ir­ assertion into question. Today, technologically regular airpower. superior air assets face significant challenges in engaging dispersed and oftentimes unseen opponents. The department of defense has Defining Irregular Warfare directed the creation of an “irregular warfare” capability to operate within the scope of con­ To conceptualize irregular airpower, one temporary conflict.2 The air Force must de­ must first examine irregular warfare as a whole. termine how modern airpower can success­ according to the Quadrennial Defense Review fully engage an irregular opponent. Report of 2006, “irregular warfare has emerged One findsa paradox inherent in conceptu­ as the dominant form of warfare confronting alizing irregular airpower. Modern airpower the United States, its allies and its partners; relies upon using complex weapons systems to accordingly, guidance must account for dis­ precisely engage designated objectives to pro­ tributed, long-duration operations, including duce effects; in short, it literally involves hit­ unconventional warfare, foreign internal de­ ting the bull’s-eye. in contrast, irregular warfare fense, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and pertains to operations against nonstate actors stabilization and reconstruction operations.”3 and opponents that blur the distinction between The report’s mandate to foster an irregular- combatants and innocents. This type of war­ warfare capability defines this type of conflict fare involves finding the bull’s-eye. This article as “operations in which the enemy is not a argues that whereas technologically advanced regular military force of a nation-state.”4 Thus,

*The author is a graduate student in the defense analysis department of the naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

36

PIREP1-Maitre.indd 36 10/29/07 9:58:56 AM PIREP 37

irregular warfare exists as a certain definition contending that the essence of armed conflict only inasmuch as it resides outside the “con­ consists of two distinct concepts: attrition and ventions” of conventional warfare. irregular relational maneuver.8 By definition, a force opponents, as seen in operations in afghani­ that uses attrition seeks to defeat an opponent stan and iraq, utilize guerrilla warfare, insur­ by means of its numerical or qualitative supe­ gency, and terrorism to engage american and riority. it follows that an attrition-oriented allied forces.5 a review of related terms and force will strive to maximize its internal ad­ their definitions will facilitate a discussion of ministration and procedures in order to most irregular warfare: efficiently conduct operations on the battle­ guerrilla warfare — Military and paramilitary field. One can consider the perspective of at­ operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile trition inwardly focused in that it maximizes territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous internal processes and minimizes adaptation forces. . . . See also unconventional warfare. . . . to external factors because any large-scale modificationswill hamper efficiency, decrease insurgency — an organized movement aimed at 9 the overthrow of a constituted government through force advantage, and increase risk. use of subversion and armed conflict. . . . in contrast, relational maneuver espouses adaptive capabilities in response to the external unconventional warfare — a broad spectrum of environment. Since a force reliant on rela­ military and paramilitary operations, normally tional maneuver has insufficient resources to of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate prevail in direct armed confrontation with forces who are organized, trained, equipped, the enemy, it must instead strive to modify its supported, and directed in varying degrees by capabilities within the operational context, an external source. it includes, but is not lim­ exploiting any weaknesses the environment ited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, imposes upon the opponent. The concept of intelligence activities, and unconventional as­ relational maneuver is inherently innovative sisted recovery. also called UW.6 in fostering an adaptive structure. One can Though these terms exist as valid, indepen­ consider such maneuver outwardly focused dent concepts, they contain inherent com­ in the endeavor to ascertain the opponent’s monalities that define the basic premise of ir­ weaknesses within the environment. Forces regular warfare: a struggle for control of an postured in this manner then adapt their established population, by coercion and/or own capabilities to compensate for quantita­ support, in a specified area—be it a nation or tive inferiority.10 an otherwise defined geopolitical region. Though all armed forces incorporate ele­ When describing such warfare as a funda­ ments of attrition and relational maneuver, mental struggle for control, and thus for exis­ the extent to which they favor one or the other tence, one must realize that its military dimen­ is driven largely by their societal context. Pow­ sion exists as part of the whole conflict,not as erful nations, such as the United States, gravi­ a sole definition. as stated by a former staff tate towards the attrition end of the spectrum member of the US Commission on national simply because they have the resources to en­ Security, “One of the few areas of consensus gage in open battle with an opponent. Lesser among military analysts is that we are sure to opponents, including insurgents and terror­ see the further blurring of warfare catego­ ists, favor relational maneuver because they ries.”7 irregular warfare is more than an opera­ cannot afford to engage the enemy on the tional methodology; it is a perspective of con­ open battlefield.11 instead, they must engage flict as a whole. the larger foe indirectly and strike where least how then does such warfare differ from a expected, using methods that exist outside conventional perspective? Political-military conventional military operations. irregular theorist edward Luttwak has explored the opponents, whether guerrillas, insurgents, or contrasting relationship between the two views, terrorists, don’t fight unconventionally because

PIREP1-Maitre.indd 37 10/29/07 9:58:56 AM 38 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

they want to but because to do so convention­ Exploring Modern Airpower ally would literally lead to self-destruction. applying the concepts of attrition and re­ The air Force has taken significantsteps to lational maneuver to a spectrum of conflict orient its posture in view of dynamic develop­ intensity illustrates the advantages of rela­ ments in world affairs. The service’s founda­ tional maneuver in irregular warfare. as tional doctrine illustrates the evolution of air- war becomes less “intense,” the number of power doctrine over the past 60 years: “The fielded forces declines, thereby making tar­ ‘american way of war’ has long been described gets less defined, more dispersed, and as warfare based on either a strategy of anni­ harder to quantify.12 The chances of deci­ hilation or of attrition and focused on en­ sively employing superior firepower become gaging the enemy in close combat to achieve increasingly remote, while the enemy’s op­ a decisive battle. air and space power, if portunities to exploit the structural weak­ properly focused, offers our national leader­ nesses of the established authority become ship alternatives to the annihilation and at­ more pronounced. as the nature of the con­ trition options.”16 The evolution of doctrine flict trends away from conventional warfare, serves to shape the airpower perspective of the advantage continuously shifts towards the men and women in the air Force. Given the irregular opponent, for “not even the the shifting nature of modern conflict to­ most accurate of our precision-guided mu­ wards the arena of irregular warfare, what nitions can be aimed at an atmosphere of then are the relevant characteristics of the terror or at a climate of subversion.”13 modern military aviator? it would appear that conducting a different The concept of “airmanship” allows aviators form of warfare is a simple matter of adapta­ to go beyond simply flyingan aircraft to effec­ tion. Yet, historically, this has not been the tively employing it towards a desired objective. case, as demonstrated by an initially rigid ad­ a multifaceted idea, airmanship combines herence to internalized perspectives of ameri­ cognitive and physical skills in a fundamen­ can airpower during operations in Vietnam. tally alien (people don’t have wings) environ­ “Following independence in 1947, U.S. air ment. as both a personal quality and an ac­ Force leaders inculcated what amounted to an quired ability, airmanship can be defined as absolute model of airpower in warfare. . . . But the consistent use of good judgment and well in their new orthodoxy, american airmen re­ developed skills to accomplish mission objec­ sisted any adaptation of the central tenets of tives. This consistency is founded on a corner­ airpower theory as they understood it in order stone of uncompromising flight discipline and to respond to novel demands, such as limited developed through systematic skill acquisition and guerrilla war.”14 a conventional, attrition- and proficiency. a high state of situational minded organization requires an inwardly fo­ awareness completes the airmanship picture cused perspective that incorporates complex and is obtained through knowledge of one’s self, team, aircraft, environment, and enemy.17 structures to optimize processes and efficien­ cies. Such structures inherently inhibit inno­ One can assume that any military professional vation because the latter leads to change, needs “good judgment” as well as “skill acqui­ which in turn challenges the fundamental sition and proficiency.” Though these con­ premises of the organizational structure it­ cepts have specificapplications when it comes self.15 The same logic that limits innovation in to operating aircraft, the term flight discipline complex structures applies to complex tech­ is unique to the aviator and plays an impor­ nologies, a large measure of which definesa ir tant role in the context of modern airpower. Force capabilities. The very nature of techno­ Flight discipline consists of vigilance in logically superior assets requires an inwardly complying with an aircraft’s flightcharacteris ­ focused operator. That nature exists in con­ tics, operating limits, and the acceptable flight trast to the outwardly focused perspective of envelope. The aviator applies it through self- irregular warfare. awareness and reinforces it by compliance

PIREP1-Maitre.indd 38 10/29/07 9:58:57 AM PIREP 39

with operational and regulatory policy.18 These sion was in part supplanted by focused tactical variables are particularly applicable in their applications of close air support and interdic­ relationship to the successful operation of tion operations, both within South Vietnam modern, technologically advanced aircraft. Com­ and along the border with Laos and Cambo­ plex systems require complex methods, and dia. To the extent that efforts of individual air­ the aircrew checklist serves as an easily recog­ men allowed for adaptation to the battlespace, nizable example of procedural methodology. those aviators succeeded and overcame an in­ during the raid on the Son Tay prison camp herent “checklist mentality.” Yet, such adjust­ in north Vietnam on 21 november 1970, “out ments proved varied and localized; still absent of necessity, [the pilots] had developed a was a servicewide “agreement on how airpower comprehensive, one-of-a-kind raid checklist. was to be employed, its relationship to other By running it airborne, [they] made sure all instruments of counter-insurgency, and what the aircraft systems and equipment were practical steps were necessary for airpower to properly set, functioning, and available for contribute to ultimate victory.”22 This situation instant use any time during the flight’s de­ produced the paradox (which still exists) manding needs.”19 The more complex and identified at the outset of this article: the elu­ advanced the aircraft and missions, the more sive integration of the contradictory variables structured and methodical the associated op­ of modern airpower and irregular warfare. erational procedures. Similar challenges face the combat aviator aviators are inwardly focused on optimiz­ in current conflicts.a daptive mission employ­ ing aircraft performance to accomplish a ment in iraq includes the use of fighter air­ particular mission. The successful conduct craft for nontraditional intelligence, surveil­ of irregular warfare requires an outward fo­ lance, and reconnaissance while operating in cus to allow adaptation to the operating en­ conjunction and communication with ground vironment. The United States in particular units.23 Yet, the term nontraditional does not has an illustrative background in applying equate to irregular. air operations continue to airpower in an irregular context. as previ­ focus on optimized systems employment to ously mentioned, at the outset of US involve­ better accomplish the detection, tracking, and ment in during the late 1950s destruction of opposition forces. The means and into the ensuing decades, the focus of of employing airpower may be adaptive, yet american airpower was firmly grounded in a the underlying perspective remains internally Cold War perspective: the strategic applica­ focused. We need to understand that irregular tion of strike platforms against a well-defined warfare, and airpower by association, differs opponent. “U.S. air Force thinking about fundamentally from conventional operations. airpower outside of strategic attack was de­ cidedly lacking.”20 initially, the military ser­ vices tended to regard the conflict in Viet­ Beyond the Paradox nam as a conventional war executed on a smaller scale, while retaining traditional means in common usage, one associates the term of weapons employment. situational awareness (Sa) with an understand­ Those same means faced significant chal­ ing of one’s surroundings. in flying, Sa con­ lenges in the irregular arena, “where the cerns the extent to which an aviator can pro­ unique juxtaposition of political and opera­ cess outside information while maintaining tional constraints invariably plays a major role routine tasks necessary for continued flight. in the application of airpower.”21 The pro­ aviation literature suggests that “the most im­ tracted nature of the Vietnam War allowed for portant aspect of understanding situational graduated efforts to realign airpower employ­ awareness . . . is the list of steps to take to safely ment in response to developments on the return home in the event of an episode of lost battlefield. The predisposition to rely on stra­ Sa.”24 according to this definition, Sa exists tegic bombing to force the north into submis­ primarily as a feedback process to correct

PIREP1-Maitre.indd 39 10/29/07 9:58:57 AM 40 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

flightdeviations. Yet, one can also expand the of irregular warfare. Two basic concepts serve concept to ensure compliance with an entire to instill a perspective of irregular airpower operational context: within the air Force. First, the foundation of irregular airpower Remember, there is a great difference between merely perceiving something and noticing it. a must remain firmly grounded in aeronautical [primitive human], put on an american city proficiency. Regardless of how well one con­ street, would see the traffic lights just as you ceives an irregular perspective, any iteration do—maybe better. he would probably overlook of irregular airpower will fail unless airmen them and watch instead the flashing neon sign, can effectively operate their equipment. The the lights of cars, all sorts of other clues that are focus of training is the operation of modern more impressive but much less important; for weapons systems; aircrews must have familiarity he would not know what a traffic light means. not only with the aircraft themselves but also But we see traffic signs even with bad eyes and with the technological capabilities that define while thinking of something else because we those assets. The modern aviator must also be watch for them and understand their meaning instantly and know that, though they are not familiar with the operating environment. To very attention-catching, they are important.25 that extent, there really is “no substitute for being there.” Multilateral exercises, overseas in highlighting how people function within deployments, and foreign-exchange assign­ an environment, these remarks describe how ments all offer airmen the exposure necessary Sa applies to the irregular-warfare perspective. to expand an operational perspective from They come not from literature on irregular theoretical boundaries to the realities of the warfare but from a definition of the flying in­ global environment. stinct discussed in Wolfgang Langewiesche’s The second concept rests upon effectively Stick and Rudder: An Explanation of the Art of Fly­ educating the aviator. To conduct irregular ing, published in 1944. Clearly, then, the ex­ warfare, the modern aviator must be able to panded role of Sa as encompassing more than perceive actions and operations within the the immediate vicinity of an aircraft is not a overall context of conflict. Such knowledge novel concept. One can enhance Sa to allow results from an education that includes re­ for an irregular-warfare perspective in mod­ gional studies, analysis of historical uses of air- ern airpower. power in irregular conflict, and exposure to Fostering an expanded definition of Sa is sociopolitical debates that define today’s dy­ not as simple as adding a few checklist items namic global arena. education in the varied in combat aviation. doing so would negate context that defines modern conflict allows the fundamental premise of irregular air- the military aviator to optimally assess those power as a conceptual perspective, as opposed contingencies for which training alone can­ to another step in a set of tasks to be accom­ not prescribe a solution. Knowledge of the plished in order to employ air assets success­ underlying “why” of a situation will allow the fully. The process of cultivating Sa and air­ successful application of “how” in unforeseen manship in an irregular-warfare context must circumstances.26 continuously occur during a military aviator’s Ongoing efforts in Operations enduring career. it lies beyond the scope of this article Freedom and iraqi Freedom have demon­ to prescribe a systemic process for creating ir­ strated a need for all aspects of airpower in regular airpower, not to mention an “irregular combating irregular opponents. “hitting the air Force.” nor is such an outcome desirable bull’s-eye” first requires being able to find it. because the creation of a new capability does Within the prevailing era of asymmetric en­ not automatically negate the requirement for gagements and elusive adversaries, finding an established one. Yet, ongoing operations in the opposition necessitates an understanding the global war on terrorism have demon­ of what defines it. Modern airpower requires strated that the air Force faces future chal­ an inward focus to operate technologically ad­ lenges within itself, particularly in the arena vanced air and space assets, but irregular war­

PIREP1-Maitre.indd 40 10/29/07 9:58:58 AM PIREP 41

fare calls for an outward perspective that iden­ today’s air Force to expand its horizons be­ tifiesthe true nature of an irregular opponent. yond the instrument panel if it wishes to suc­ The paradox of irregular airpower requires cessfully engage the enemies of tomorrow. ❑

Notes 1. “Summary: The Future of the U.S. air Force” (see 12. ibid. “Panel One: The air Force in U.S. Military Strategy”), 13. ibid. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 11 14. James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in October 2005, http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventid Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (Lawrence: .1153/summary.asp (accessed 1 February 2007). University Press of Kansas, 2003), 270. 2. See Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, 15. hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future dC: department of defense, 6 February 2006), http:// of Unconventional Warfare (annapolis: naval institute Press, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/ 2006), 3. qdr-2006-report.pdf. 16. air Force doctrine document 1, Air Force Basic Doc­ 3. ibid., 36. trine, 17 november 2003, ix, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/ 4. ibid., 11. The department of defense is currently afdcprivateweb/aFdd_Page_hTML/doctrine_docs/ developing an irregular-warfare joint operating concept afdd1.pdf. that further defines the term. One should note that the 17. Tony Kern, Darker Shades of Blue: The Rogue Pilot underlying premise of the document is descriptive, rather (new York: McGraw-hill, 1999), 212, fig. 11-1. than prescriptive, in nature. 18. Louise ebbage and Phil d. Spencer, Airmanship 5. ibid., 19. Training for Modern Aircrew (Bristol, UK: Bae Systems ad­ 6. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Diction­ vanced Technology Centre, 2004), 6, http://stinet.dtic.mil/ ary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 april 2001 (as oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier amended through 5 January 2007), 229, 263, 558. Though =ada428471 (see “handle/proxy URL”) (accessed 14 the term UW serves to illustrate the concept of irregular March 2007). warfare (iW), UW does not equal iW. UW is waged by sup­ 19. William a. Guenon Jr., Secret and Dangerous: Night of port of an indigenous force; iW includes UW and counter­ the Son Tay POW Raid (Framingham, Ma: Freedom digital insurgency as an overall form of conflict. 7. Frank G. hoffman, “Complex irregular Warfare: Printing, 2002), 31. The next Revolution in Military affairs,” Orbis 50, no. 3 20. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 270. (Summer 2006): 398, http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5003/ 21. ibid., 274. hoffman.complexirregularwarfare.pdf. 22. ibid. 8. edward n. Luttwak, “notes on Low-intensity War­ 23. John a. Tirpak, “eyes of the Fighter,” Air Force fare,” in Dimensions of Military Strategy, ed. George e. Magazine 89, no. 1 (January 2006): 40–44, http://www.afa Thibault (Washington, dC: national defense University, .org/magazine/Jan2006/0106fighters.pdf. 1987), 336. 24. Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 219. 9. ibid. Perhaps the ultimate expression of “attrition” 25. Wolfgang Langewiesche, Stick and Rudder: An Ex­ warfare occurred on the western front in World War i. planation of the Art of Flying (new York: McGraw-hill, This conflict involved several “advanced” technologies, 1944), 72. including the first large-scale uses of machine guns, self- 26. US Senate Committee on appropriations, Defense propelled armor, and the submarine. Subcommittee Hearing on FY05 Army Budget: Testimony of the 10. ibid., 337. The extent to which technological ad­ Honorable R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army, and Gen­ vantage substitutes for quantitative superiority is in this eral Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, case a moot point since the opponent, dependent upon 108th Cong., 2d sess., 3 March 2004, http://www.global relational maneuver, is likely to have neither. security.org/military/library/congress/2004_hr/040303 11. ibid. -brownlee-schoomaker.htm (accessed 14 March 2007).

PIREP1-Maitre.indd 41 10/29/07 9:58:58 AM Irregular Warfare and the US Air Force The Way Ahead

Col Robyn Read, USaF, RetiRed*

rregular warfare (Iw) in general profile for combating terrorism and insur­ and counterinsurgency (COIN) more gency in the continuing long war. specifically require a particular mind-set Two fundamental observations drove much and specific talents not entirely applicable of the discussion at the conference. first, the Ior common to more traditional styles of war­ uSaf has operated with some success in COIN fare. That does not suggest that COIN repre­ environments before but has lost the peculiar sents either a new or separate form of war. as capacities associated with COIN following Colin gray stated during the air force Sympo­ drawdowns or conversions after each conflict. sium on Counterinsurgency held at air uni­ This is an unsurprising result, given the fact versity, Maxwell afB, alabama, in april 2007, that budgets for unused tools are a luxury not “war is war,” and COIN is part of that equa­ easily afforded in any era. But the extended tion. further, COIN is not new at all. However, lead times required to essentially relearn the relative lack of predictability in COIN and COIN each time it becomes necessary have its indifferent boundaries regarding what each significantly affected the uSaf’s ability to ef­ fight constitutes in terms of objectives and re­ fectively contribute early in the fight. Second, sources are troublesome characteristics well we need to change the uSaf’s mind-set from beyond the numbers involved. By definition, fightingCOIN to enabling a partner to fightCOIN . insurgency offers a weaker opponent an op­ In the absence of every other alternative, the tion against a stronger one. Similarly, it is not, uSaf may actually become the fighter in by design, a war wherein the stronger oppo­ COIN, but even at that point, the service nent can easily bring his major strengths to should adopt the mind-set that it will conduct bear against the weaker enemy—a condition a holding action while the supported partner deserving even more emphasis if the stronger spins up its own capacity. as a practical note, opponent is an outside power such as the the uSaf simply does not have the size to united States. function as the air service for every nation it Discussion published in a variety of media fights alongside, even if it sounds like a good sufficientlyestablishes the history of Iw as well idea (it is not). winning strategies are con­ as the successes and failures of COIN.1 Perti­ ducted by, with, and through the supported nent literature has similarly dissected the dis­ partner. furthermore, barring annihilation tance between the terrorist attacks of 11 Septem­ options, no substantial history exists to sup­ ber 2001 and today. Therefore, using the 2007 port the idea that any outside power can win air force Symposium on Counterinsurgency an inside war. The Quadrennial Defense Review as a primary source, this article looks to the Report of 2006 provides an important frame­ future and attempts to outline an airpower work for this discussion:

*This article is the product of many contributors, with special thanks to the workshop facilitators at the 2007 air force Symposium on Counterinsurgency, Maxwell afB, alabama, 24–26 april. Thanks as well to Stan Norris and Chris Cain for repetitive reviews and suggestions. The author is a research analyst with the air force Doctrine Development and education Center, Maxwell afB, alabama.

42

PIREP2-Read.indd 42 10/29/07 9:59:21 AM PIREP 43

long-duration, complex operations involving forum for discussing the use of airpower in the u.S. military, other government agencies and COIN; it included 11 workshops, eight speak­ international partners will be waged simultane­ ers in plenary sessions, and over 170 partici­ ously in multiple countries around the world, pants.3 Joint, interagency, international, and relying on a combination of direct (visible) and civilian participants added substantial value indirect (clandestine) approaches. . . . Maintain­ ing a long-term, low-visibility presence in many with their insights and perspectives. However, areas of the world where u.S. forces do not tra­ the conference focused not on interaction or ditionally operate will be required. Building and interdependence at these higher levels but on leveraging partner capacity will also be an abso­ what the uSaf needed to do to improve its lutely essential part of this approach, and the understanding of the fight and its contribu­ employment of surrogates will be a necessary tions to winning that fight. Seeking to answer method for achieving many goals.2 these questions, the 11 workshops generated The use of indigenous forces in COIN does over 220 suggestions. more than build stakeholders in the outcome. The uSaf is very good at what it does, and as noted, local knowledge translates into very decades of service and excellence have made practical intelligence in ways that a satellite efficiency a highly prized, highly regarded hall­ image does not convey. additionally, in terms mark of uS airpower. But assumptions that of understanding the mechanisms for victory, automatically tie efficiency to effectiveness can COIN emphasizes the human dynamic to a far be in stark contrast with the realities of Iw greater extent than do traditional conflicts. and COIN. The kinetic, tactical efficiencies Differences between COIN and other styles of for which the uSaf has deservedly become warfare (e.g., attrition-based depletion of enemy well known—one target, one bomb, one kill— resources in large-scale, state-on-state conflict) may, in this environment, have to yield to de­ accrue largely from differences in the center cidedly less efficientmeans that are ultimately of gravity and the means necessary to move or more effective at operational and strategic levels. control it. Historically, in state-on-state war­ Balancing effectiveness and efficiency is not a 4 fare, a fieldedarmy could serve as both a prin­ novel concept; uSaf planners do it every day. cipal threat and the principal shield that al­ The difference lies in a broader understand­ lowed the enemy state its freedom of action. ing (and acceptance) of the idea that efficiency Taking away the shield simultaneously re­ as a principal driver at the tactical level may moves the threat and exposes the enemy state. not support (or may even prove counter­ However, in COIN, enemy leadership derives productive to) desired effects at higher levels. its freedom of action not from its “fielded The COIN conference participants noted army” per se but from a permissive environ­ that the solution for this “two kinds of forces” ment often enabled by the ruling establish­ was not in choosing one over the other but in ment’s lack of credibility, legitimacy, and sup­ finding an appropriate balance between the port from its own “governed” population. two. The uSaf should preserve its current ca­ ultimately, in COIN, one must win over the pabilities (if not the same capacity or mass) population, thereby eliminating the sanctuary while creating the same degrees of excellence and the enemy’s freedom to choose where for actions characteristic of Iw and COIN that and when to fight. reside today in its areas of air superiority, global strike, global lift, global connectivity, and global vision. The 2007 Air Force Symposium uSaf excellence, really dominance, in these on Counterinsurgency areas has ensured that enemies will seek other venues to achieve their strategic objectives.5 Held at the air war College and sponsored By maintaining these significant advantages, by Headquarters air force, air Combat Com­ critical to our nation’s security, the service has, mand (aCC), and air force Special Operations in effect, chosen where it will not fight. But a Command (afSOC), this venue provided a fightdoes exist, and will exist, in areas periph­

PIREP2-Read.indd 43 10/29/07 9:59:21 AM 44 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

eral to the uSaf’s fundamental strengths. the credibility of the host government can feed uSaf leaders need to consider multiple op­ the perception of its incompetence and thus tions for engaging the force in these Iw are­ encourage hostile groups to make demands nas. The symposium participants’ suggestions on or attack the central government.8 as a for meeting the Iw/COIN challenge fell gen­ general principle, we should set as a goal work­ erally into four principal fields for consider­ ing by, with, or through a partner nation rather ation: policy-strategy-doctrine, force develop­ than for that nation—or on behalf of or in lieu ment, strategic communication, and building of that nation. we should conduct good works— partnership capacity (BPC). even those uncontested by hostile groups—in the framework of an effective communica­ Policy-Strategy-Doctrine tions plan in order to maximize the potential for establishing, sustaining, or enhancing the Despite the recent publication of air force authenticity of the central government. Doctrine Document (afDD) 2-3, Irregular If the uSaf wishes to become effective in Warfare, and afDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal De­ this “standing-in-the-back-row” style of engage­ fense (fID), the uSaf has not yet established ment, it should acknowledge the necessity of the institutional and systemic changes neces­ fulfilling two (sometimes competing) mission sary to implement these visions for opera­ sets. One, and in the absence of alternatives, tional art in the long war. Pending such the service should have full capability to di­ change, the uSaf continues to view Iw as a rectly engage the enemy—to fight COIN or lesser included case of peer or near-peer con­ COIN-like engagements as a key component 6 flicts—afundamentally flawedconcept. Solu­ of the national effort. This will inevitably oc­ tions in Iw/COIN will be based on unique cur in a joint, interagency, and coalition-based local circumstances of each conflictand result context. Two, the uSaf should have the ca­ largely from political rather than military ini­ pacity to create within the partner nation the tiatives. Overemphasizing attrition warfare “risks requisite skill sets and disciplines in air, space, diverting us unduly into a military box canyon, and cyberspace which enable that partner to at the expense of short changing the implica­ realize its national goals without the large tions of the eternal truth that there is more to footprints or heavy hand of america’s airpower. war than warfare.”7 In short, no history—bar­ This principle—to seek common objectives ring total annihilation of the enemy—supports and enable partners—devolves not only from the notion that external powers can win intra­ the separate discussions above concerning in­ state wars. Today’s Iraq is neither an anomaly ternal wars and the legitimacy of central gov­ nor an exception to this generalized rule; ernment, but also from the very practical realiza­ rather, the situation there confirms it. Victory tionthat the uSaf is not (and will not become) in Iraq will come when the Iraqis win it. Thus, large enough to fight as the principal air service the major role for external powers entails not for every nation affected by the long war. uSaf winning but enabling one side to gain the policy should emphasize early engagement (i.e., wherewithal and capacity to win. during phase zero—shaping) for the purpose But “doing” and “teaching” have different of building sufficient partner capacity to miti­ objectives and require different talent sets, gate or even eliminate the need for a uSaf each engendering different, at times incom­ presence in large numbers later on. The goal patible, mind-sets and tactics (not to mention is to teach, guide, and advise a host air service inventories of people and equipment). In without (and without the perception of) usurp­ constructing these mission sets, however, the ing the host government’s prerogatives.9 uSaf should keep in mind that legitimacy for end-state planning (the aggregate of effects the partner government serves as the over- at a strategic level) requires the development arching filter or backdrop for great-power of connected efforts to produce a desired po­ mentoring. legitimacy is the precursor for litical outcome. further, it envisions the enemy victory. any action perceived as undermining as an interactive and adaptive system that in­

PIREP2-Read.indd 44 10/29/07 9:59:22 AM PIREP 45

cludes both friendly and hostile elements.10 By can routinely prepare and engage with other focusing on the problem sets in these ways, than special operations forces. effects-based approaches provide the neces­ sary framework to ensure that military opera­ Force Development tions stay attuned to the nation’s strategic as it transforms, the uSaf can be justifiably goals rather than drift to tactical, close-in tar­ proud of its close management of skills and gets. Tactical efficiencies should not establish 11 personnel requirements. There is a dilemma the governing metrics for overall strategy. in personnel management, however, when a Similarly, in COIN or COIN-like conflicts, tech­ particular skill set loses its contribution to the niques peculiar to an effects-based approach fight. The loss of relevance may occur due to to operations should ensure that military solu­ advances in technology that have simply obvi­ tions will not become the focus of a funda­ 12 ated an older methodology and, with it, the mentally political problem. To do otherwise requisite skill sets. More problematically, the would concentrate efforts on a relatively small loss of relevance may stem from a change in part of the problem, address no causal factors, circumstance which potentially makes such and, ultimately, resolve nothing. Operational loss more temporal in nature. In the short design in support of a set of definedend-state term, it would seem reasonable to delete this conditions yields an additional pressure for ef­ requirement and use fungible resources in an­ fectiveness over efficiency and minimizes em­ other (previously lower-priority) area. The phasis on peripheral operations not tied to the problem then transitions to one of lead time effects necessary for the strategic end state. re­ to recover those skills if the need should rise cent coalition experiences in Iraq and afghani­ again. The uSaf’s (and other services’) COIN stan exemplify the futility of military opera­ skills have seen this phoenix cycle repeatedly, tions adrift from the complementary political, and today’s strong efforts by uS Central Com­ communication, economic, and sociocultural mand air forces (CeNTaf) are leading the initiatives needed to seal the victory. rebuilding of this expertise within the uSaf’s afDD 2-3 and afDD 2-3.1 have added mo­ general-purpose forces. mentum and visibility to the rise of COIN and we incur incalculable costs by repeatedly COIN-like activities for the uSaf, but, as noted learning, forgetting, and relearning Iw/COIN by symposium speakers and participants, COIN skills. One wonders how much further along is not a new phenomenon. Historically, uSaf the Iraqis might be today if we could have competencies in COIN have simply atrophied made use of current CeNTaf skill sets in 2003. as soon as circumstances permitted. Outside given the nature of the long war, Iw force de­ of afSOC, no systemic protection of these ca­ velopment in the uSaf should assume a long- pabilities has saved the critical core elements term posture. although writing doctrine rep­ from extinction, and it is a difficult and time- resents a critical step in creating a durable consuming task to resurrect the professional capacity for winning this war, the synthesis of competencies that once existed. afDD 2-3 and training, education, and experience will cre­ 2-3.1 are a good start to that resurrection but, ate the necessary mind-set for this fight—and perhaps, insufficient to genuinely affect the that will serve as the critical enabler, not just full spectrum of air force activities necessary for CeNTaf, but for all airmen, who will need in the long war. a stronger statement might be the tools to take on a highly adaptive enemy in made if the uSaf’s topline doctrine docu­ a constantly changing environment. ment, afDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, also re­ force development is a balance of three flected the seriousness of this irregular en­ core efforts—education, training, and experi­ gagement and the dual-mission nature of the ence—designed to ensure that the uSaf has fight(to do and to enable).13 like strategy, doc­ qualified people in place at the right time to trine should assume a top-down direction and fulfill the missions set forth. as stated above, the permeate the entire pyramid so that the uSaf long war presents a different set of needs and

PIREP2-Read.indd 45 10/29/07 9:59:22 AM 46 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

competencies than peer or conventional war­ but the development of an Iw-/COIN-capable fare. Thus, if the uSaf desires capability in this uSaf should be concomitant with its respon­ sense, its force-development system should sibilities to defend the sovereignty of the na­ produce people qualified for Iw as well as more tion against peer competitors. traditional styles of conflict. The uSaf cannot for Iw and COIN conflicts in general, the confine Iw to a single specialty or set of special­ uSaf’s most fundamental job is to help estab­ ties. a winning strategy in COIN demands lish a credible host-nation air force. Today that transferability of virtually every skill necessary capability exists on a permanent basis only in to the uSaf in fightingCOIN to a partner na­ one relatively small squadron in afSOC. The tion. In short, Iw will affect every specialty. 6th Special Operations Squadron certainly has Sanctuaries, for example, provide a degree the talent but lacks the mass necessary for en­ of safety or anonymity to a weak opponent. gagement across the breadth of areas affected for any of a variety of political, physical, cul­ by the long war. By similar logic, it also lacks the tural, or information reasons, the enemy can persistence necessary to sustain its own good stay beyond the reach of the central govern­ works. The uSaf’s general-purpose forces have ment. On this basis, ungoverned or under- the necessary mass and, with the appropriate governed territory is cause for concern in force-development program, can have the every area of operations as a potential source requisite talent as well. The uSaf should step of instability and antigovernment initiatives. up to the challenge and shape its force for a Not simply a land-centric phenomenon, un­ winning strategy in the long war airmen must governed space further extends to all three be able to assess, organize, train, equip, assist, and media noted in the uSaf mission. Air sover­ advise foreign air forces if they are to be suc­ eignty continues as an open issue in africa and cessful.15 what’s the bottom line? In Operation much of latin america. Space is governed, if at Iraqi freedom, the fastest way home for the all, more by the science, technology, and cost of uSaf is through a credible Iraqi air force. doing business there than by any enforceable One of the most difficult issues in this fu­ rule set. and only the relative rates of innova­ ture development cycle will involve establish­ tion among belligerents (e.g., hackers versus ing a culturally and linguistically proficient security specialists) govern the cyber arena. force. “assess, organize, train, equip, assist, The Internet has become much more than and advise” is difficultenough as a mission set just a conduit for a fanatic’s e-mail. In effect, it when everyone speaks a common language. It functions as a safe house—a sanctuary—for is much more so when new languages are terrorists. each of these three media poses a mixed with new technologies and procedures. real and current problem in Iw. The point is regardless of advantages that might accom­ this: force development should prepare every pany teaching everyone else english, uS exit specialty (though perhaps not every airman) strategies should accept that the teaching and for Iw. The battlespace is global in every sense, operational systems left behind will likely re­ and every medium is affected. vert to naturally spoken languages almost im­ The caution here, however, is more of a re­ mediately—but without the in-kind benefit of minder. enemies choose Iw, unrestricted war­ the english-based infrastructure upon which the fare, or other asymmetric tactics because they training is based (e.g., tech data). The current have no alternative. The current force’s ability alternative, going forward with a just-in-time to “do incredible things really well” has shut approach, is similarly bankrupt as a strategy. down any main-force options that may have language offers the gateway to understand­ existed, and this high-end force will not be­ ing culture, serving as a critical first step in come debilitated to the extent that opponents understanding the center of gravity in COIN— see any potential in that arena.14 This remains the people. The uSaf should actively deter­ the force that defends uS sovereignty. This is mine its hard requirements for languages and the fight, however unlikely, that we cannot then plan accordingly. In a break from past lose. Some force adjustments are practical, practice, force-development planning for lan­

PIREP2-Read.indd 46 10/29/07 9:59:22 AM PIREP 47

guages and culture should also include a sus­ as a long-term goal for force development, tainment package to ensure future resource we should ensure that the IO experts men­ proficiency and availability.16 tioned above actually exist. for example, Pa officers whom we have stovepiped as special­ Strategic Communication ists in their career field should broaden their understanding of related areas. One option Strategic communication, military support to might entail combining Pa and intelligence public diplomacy, public affairs (Pa), infor­ career fields with alternate assignments. an­ mation operations (IO), influenceoperations, other option, in light of proposed cuts in the psychological operations (not to mention the number of Pa officers, might involve re-creating peripherally related areas of military decep­ additional-duty options for operators as Pa of­ tion, electronic warfare, and computer network ficers. These 18-month tours (with a 40-hour attack and defense) all currently fall under a front-loaded training course) would give indi­ single umbrella—a plate critically overfull. More vidual wings a Pa officer chosen by that com­ to the point, strategic communication lacks focus mander and, over time, would significantly at strategic, operational, and tactical levels— increase the number of line officers with media an especially critical series of shortfalls, given savvy. Other options exist, but the point is this: the highly astute and sophisticated use of all we must utilize IO in order to win the long information media by our enemies. The prob­ war, and the uSaf should acquire and sustain lem starts at the top for the united States with the necessary resources to do so. a lack of (whole-of-government) consensus on the who-what-how of strategic communication. Building Partnership Capacity uS strategic communication, with its emphasis BPC is not a particularly novel idea. Many coali­ on a persistent, top-down narrative, collides tions and alliances have formed around similar with the reality of timely implementation at concepts; in the North atlantic Treaty Organi­ the military operational level and below. Cur­ zation, for example, “interoperability” initia­ rent doctrine, training, and practice do not tives provided essentially the same effect. with support, in a systemic way, a proactive engage­ the proper Iw/COIN filter, BPC not only ex­ ment in a rapidly changing context. True, we tends military tactical and operational profi­ have experienced successes—but all too often ciency, but also lends itself to the strategic due to individual effort and individual heroes goals of central-government legitimacy and who have used their situational awareness credibility. ultimately, it also provides part of within these fluidenvironments to take advan­ the solution for a very large and diverse long tage of some fleeting opportunity. war in which a relatively small uSaf lacks as­ we should develop IO to the same extent sets to be everywhere at once. To emphasize a as every other weapon system in the combined point about shaping, however, BPC need not air operations center. for example, Pa experts constrain itself to active engagements; rather, should be present at every targeting discus­ we may best view it as a long-range strategy. sion to ensure that we wrap the proper com­ Building an air force or even improving one is munication plan around every kinetic opera­ not an overnight venture. tion and, where appropriate, that we schedule The uS Navy Strategic Studies group pub­ kinetic operations in support of the communi­ lished a report in 2006 that spoke of a 1,000­ cation efforts. additionally, an IO weapon alone ship Navy—a radically different proposition, may constitute the best means of attacking however, from the 600-ship Navy of the 1980s some targets. The key lies in understanding advocated by John lehman, secretary of the that effects drive the targeting option rather Navy at the time. The new concept looks at than the other way around. To date, uS efforts both the type of vessel required in the long war in Iw/COIN have underemployed IO, and (perhaps more river/brown-water emphasis every mission suffers as a result. and less blue-water emphasis) and who might

PIREP2-Read.indd 47 10/29/07 9:59:23 AM 48 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

provide and/or operate that vessel. a shift or John Nagl of the uS army points out that if rebalancing in inventory types for the uS Navy that is true, then the “pool and Olympic re­ might occur but certainly not a fivefold in­ cord” is about 12 years.20 Northern Ireland took crease in hulls—something impossible to somewhat longer.21 as an institution, the uSaf achieve and sustain in the current fiscal envi­ has not historically demonstrated a strong will­ ronment and probably not the most effective ingness to see combat issues in 12-year cycles. solution in Iw/COIN. Instead, under this con­ acknowledging the distinctions between con­ cept, the Navy would increase specific capa­ ventional warfare and COIN becomes espe­ bilities by looking for partner nations in a cially important for airmen as they assess how comprehensive strategy for engagement. air­ to contribute in COIN interventions. In these men should ask themselves whether an appro­ circumstances, the key—the first—strategic priate uSaf version of a 1,000-ship Navy exists. decision calls for determining whether to fight uSaf airmen are already engaged in BPC COIN or to enable COIN. More bluntly, the in many locations—obviously Iraq and af­ choice becomes whether to force an existing ghanistan but also in exchange and education conventional military template onto a set of programs as well as uSaf sections within various largely incompatible circumstances or to build embassies and military groups. In too many up a partner nation’s capacity to win on its examples, though, the selection process and own merit. In strong consensus, speakers and preparation for overseas assignments amount symposium participants warned that no his­ to little more than an availability check. The tory supports the idea that outside powers win uSaf has smart, proficient, and motivated internal wars. Thus, we should choose to en­ people who have shown remarkable agility in able. as counterintuitive as it may seem at first, their ability to adapt and learn.17 unfortu­ this reconceptualization of how to frame air- nately, too much of this learning has occurred power’s contribution is fundamental to actu­ on the job. Institutionally, the uSaf has an ally winning in the long view. opportunity to shape the battlespace. rather Hence, the uSaf operates most effectively than approaching BPC as a bill to pay, the at the strategic level when engaged in support uSaf should adapt its structure to meet a of COIN rather than directly waging it. Ideally, long-term commitment to educate and train it can do so with and through the supported foreign air forces. alternatives to such a strategy government and its institutions before the are not encouraging. fighting actually begins. These uSaf shaping The protracted, complex nature of insur­ and deterrence actions involve assess, orga­ gency challenges war-fightinginstitutions who nize, train, equip, assist, and advise initiatives find themselves culturally affixed to high-speed within the context of other political, informa­ find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess cycles.18 tional, economic, sociocultural, and military This pseudoengineering/scientific approach efforts—ultimately designed to establish and/ to cause and effect falsely establishes near- or sustain a legitimate central government. term time constraints for success, and these well planned, these actions also undermine expectations are exacerbated by an omnipres­ the support structure and rationale for dissent ent, high-speed media that needs to report and/or rebellion. These activities are essential results on a near-continuous basis. These envi­ to conflict avoidance or at least mitigation of ronmental conditions produce a frequently antigovernment complaints and recruiting. an truncated assessment cycle, a lack of patience oft-repeated but subjective assertion regard­ for cascading or long-term effects, and a spot­ ing the optimal mix of actions states that one light on near-term tactical reporting, in stark spends only about 20 percent of a successful contrast to the glacial progress in most his­ COIN effort on military initiatives; the remain­ torical accounts regarding insurgency.19 for ing 80 percent comes from the economic, po­ example, some pundits note the British Malay litical, and sociocultural contributions to the experience as something of a “gold standard” overall strategy. Information remains the life­ in how one should conduct COIN. But lTC blood of every effort.

PIREP2-Read.indd 48 10/29/07 9:59:23 AM PIREP 49

The very practical perspective of uSaf par­ risk are not credible candidates for high-tech ticipation in Iw/COIN activities in the long transfers and sophisticated platforms because war maintains that, even if it were a good idea they lack either a justifying threat or the struc­ (it is not), the uSaf is simply not large enough tural and demographic capacities to maintain to serve as the air force for every contested na­ and operate these air, space, and cyber systems. tion or region at risk. The uSaf’s general- assuming that only old systems have viability purpose forces should have the ability to create would prove equally wrong. In BPC the correct what would have been their own effort from answer involves providing the right tech rather the resources of the host nation. If, in some than low tech or high tech. The current uSaf cases, they should build from the ground up, inventory emphasizes high tech, thus constrain­ they will need to draw upon a broad set of tal­ ing the available options for BPC through ents from throughout the full range of uSaf technical transfer. aircraft do not constitute specialties. To enable similar efforts by the the sole case for BPC, but they have typically supported air force, we should replicate the served as the airpower lead-in for the associ­ processes, disciplines, and inventories (people ated training, doctrine, and long-term military- and things) that enable uSaf efforts (appro­ to-military relationships that have enabled both priate to circumstance and culture). uS objectives and host-nation security. using an enable strategy produces the im­ The Vietnam-era platforms that gave the mediate benefit of significantly reducing the uSaf this entry are gone or rapidly disappear­ profileof americans in a contested nation. as ing, and potential partners with limited re­ seen recently in Iraq, and repeatedly in history, sources and little justificationfor the high-tech large-power footprints can become a signifi­ aircraft typically found in the current uSaf cant rallying factor for traditionally disparate, inventory now look to foreign rather than uS antigovernment groups. even groups that would suppliers to provide relevant, COIN-capable never work together in normal circumstances platforms. Certainly we can employ other uSaf have joined efforts to eject the outsiders. rather competencies in BPC (air traffic control in africa, than helping the central government, a large for instance), but the diminishing market for uS footprint can become a force multiplier uS aircraft should remain a concern. realisti­ for insurgent recruiting and propaganda. an cally, the new right-tech platform may be an enabling strategy with the proper emphasis on unmanned aerial system, but to create the by, with, and through the central government opening for a long-term enabling plan, the diminishes the risk of this footprint virus. uSaf should first develop a strategy for export­ according to Dave Ochmanek, senior raND able COIN technologies. If the f-20 legacy still analyst and symposium speaker, insurgency or applies, it also means that the uSaf should other Iw activity now threatens (or has done operate these platforms in its own inventory.23 so recently, or will do so in the future) roughly half of the approximately 190 nations in the united Nations.22 Potentially this is a very broad Recommendations arena for BPC engagement, but numbers alone can prove misleading without a keen assessment Naming some suitable platform would be a to establish actual conditions. we commonly seductive first choice for beginning discussions err by assuming that the best solution calls for of how airpower can contribute to COIN, but a mirror image of our own force—perhaps true uSaf expertise and the potential for engage­ in some circumstances but a poor assumption ment go well beyond the technical flight-line to make without a validating assessment. Plan­ engagement by operations and maintenance ners therefore not only should understand the personnel. actually controlling airspace or target nation’s requirements, but also should maintaining sovereign control of that space, have a clear understanding of that nation’s for example, remains an issue in most of africa ability to learn, operate, and sustain programs outside of terminal areas. In concert with the developed with uS assistance. Many nations at International Civil aviation Organization and

PIREP2-Read.indd 49 10/29/07 9:59:24 AM 50 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

federal aviation administration, the uSaf is is the uSaf personnel system set up to track uniquely suited to assess, advise, and assist in these qualifications in a manner consistent with this area. ensuring compliance with international finding the right people for each job in the aviation standards for air movement would long war. additionally, the uSaf has adopted clearly prove advantageous in the long war, a somewhat fractured business model for Iw/ and the uSaf could make critical contribu­ COIN. aCC houses the uSaf Coalition and tions to shaping the battlespace. first, how­ Irregular warfare Center of excellence. The ever, the uSaf should decide what Iw/COIN air Staff (a1D) has recently reorganized to fo­ will look like for the institution. If the service cus on force-development issues; a3/5 and a7 chooses to enable its partners to fightand win are considering the creation of an Iw group. on their own, then it should make a near-term CeNTaf has established an expeditionary ad­ investment in ideas and force-development visory group. afSOC is tripling the size of the initiatives that will pave the way. only “fID squadron” in the uSaf. air univer­ Strategy should remain a top-down func­ sity hosted a COIN symposium for its uSaf tion in order to provide coherent guidance in sponsors. all of these are good actions, but do parallel tracks at every level. we should view we have an overall strategy? a top-down vector uSaf doctrine no differently; we have much remains the essential starting point for accel­ work to do in this arena. afDD 2-3 (and 2-3.1) erating the uSaf’s preparation for and con­ represent a good beginning for reestablishing tributions to sustained engagement. Iw activities in the uSaf field of view, but as discussed in various raND reports and third-tier documents will not likely have suffi­ based on the service’s experience in Iraqi cient influence on the whole doctrine pyramid freedom, today’s uSaf inventory is largely for this task. we still typically view Iw, fID, compatible with much of the kinetic work that COIN, and BPC as the purview of special op­ we need to do in COIN (by the uSaf, not nec­ erations forces and outside the full-spectrum essarily by a partner nation).24 The nonkinetic uSaf mission. But because BPC is strategi­ approach, however, has several gaps, and IO cally fundamental to winning the long war, we represents perhaps the single most important should therefore describe it in the uSaf’s ba­ sic doctrine—afDD 1. Placed there, at the deficit in the uS arsenal today. Barring a return top level of uSaf doctrine, BPC can filter ap­ to annihilation strategies, the principal differ­ propriately throughout the doctrine pyramid. ence between military success and political In this way, doctrine for every specialty will grow. victory seems to lie in convincing the enemy In many ways, the establishment of a long-term that he has lost or at least that he has better relationship may be more important than short- options for the future with our side. we can best term, concrete changes. Culturally, americans attain this human dynamic, or social-engineering often find this a hard choice to make because effect, through the use of an integrated, per­ each investment in time or personnel will likely sistent, and comprehensive information pro­ face a bang-for-the-buck assessment, based on gram closely synchronized with the traditional tangible rather than intangible metrics. as with kinetic operations of the military. we should the other recognitions of COIN’s distinction fully incorporate the entire array of IO capa­ from conventional warfare, strategic planners bilities as a weapon system in the combined air should recognize that BPC is not a short-term operations center and give them equal status investment. again, the uSaf’s overall strategy as an accountable, selectable, effects-producing will drive how it configures itself. option for the commander. The uSaf should Structurally, the personnel system is not redesign the relevant planning processes to prepared at this time to find, educate, train, incorporate these capabilities and then orga­ and develop experienced airmen for a long- nize and train to exploit them. finally, every term sustained engagement with partner na­ symposium workshop considered two specific tions. we have no method for identifying de­ questions with regard to how the uSaf might velopment and qualification requirements; nor posture itself for the long war.

PIREP2-Read.indd 50 10/29/07 9:59:24 AM PIREP 51

Does the USAF Need a Concept of Conclusion Operations for Counterinsurgency? In Iw/COIN, our principal strategic objec­ a specific concept of operations (CONOPS) tive calls for a legitimate, credible, and func­ for COIN that uses the current air Staff model tioning host-nation government. from an effects as the reference found little favor at the sym­ perspective, the principal military effort should posium. Once the uSaf decides on its vector provide a sanctuary wherein the political, infor­ for Iw/COIN, if the air Staff needs this func­ mation, economic, and sociocultural initiatives tion for effective acquisition and implementa­ of that government can mature and eliminate tion strategies, it could create such an office and the hostile environment from which the insur­ product. However, workshop participants saw gents operate. This is not a new mission. In fact, the CONOPS function itself as a mechanical the uSaf proved instrumental to the success by-product, rather than a precursor, of an ef­ of a very similar operation over five decades fective Iw/COIN strategy. ago—the Berlin airlift. Coalition and joint air- power in concert with a massive logistics effort Does the USAF Need a Specialized by the army on each end of the airlift pro­ Inventory for Counterinsurgency? vided such a sanctuary. for essentially a year, airlift fully sustained the western-occupied The COIN symposium participants strongly portions of Berlin; ultimately, however, airlift endorsed BPC as an essential element for the per se did not physically open any roadblocks. future of the uSaf. given the fact that few of The Soviets succumbed to diplomatic and the 80-plus nations potentially at risk would economic realities forced on them by the west. have the capability to operate the uSaf’s very Had inadequate airlift limited these other ef­ high-end current inventory, options for incor­ forts to just a week or a month, the results for porating right-technology platforms into the Berlin and the west might have been quite dif­ uSaf inventory become a logical step. Doing ferent. By emphasizing airpower in this case, so would create the necessary expertise and a the military gave the diplomats an apparently suitable menu of relevant choices for an export­ unconstrained time to work, and, ultimately, able air force. Platforms alone cannot create the risk-versus-gain equation ran against the an adequate air service in any country, but at Soviets—a phenomenon commonly the case least for the foreseeable future, they open an in Iw/COIN. Building partnership capacity is effective path for creating credible institutions. the functioning tool to reach that end. ❑

Notes 1. See Terrorism 2007, Special Bibliography no. 332, leader forum, looked at various Iw/COIN issues. The comp. glenda armstrong (Maxwell afB, al: Muir S. “role of education” discussions expanded to “force devel­ fairchild research Information Center, July 2007), opment” in this report. The eight speakers included gen http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/terror07.htm; and Ir­ ronald e. Keys (aCC), Maj gen Donald C. wurster (afSOC), regular Warfare, comp. Joan T. Phillips (Maxwell afB, al: Maj gen Dick Newton (Headquarters air force a3/5), Muir S. fairchild research Information Center, March Colin gray, Jim Corum, Conrad Crane, Dave Ochmanek, 2007), http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/irregular.htm. and lTC John Nagl. 2. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (washington, DC: 4. for example, tanker planners routinely balance fuel Department of Defense, 6 february 2006), 23, http:// required with booms required. The efficient carriage of www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/report20060203.pdf. 200,000 pounds of fuel may necessitate only a single air­ 3. The first six “phase-centric” (per Joint Publication craft to refuel a C-5 or B-52. However, “coasting out” with 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006) workshops looked one boom and a squadron of fighters is simply a non­ at shaping, deterring, seizing the initiative, dominating, starter. Separately, C-130 load-outs are routinely in debate. stabilizing, and supporting civil authority; four additional 5. In Operation Iraqi freedom, the air problem faced by “functional” workshops looked at policy-strategy-doctrine, the Iraqis so confounded them that they buried their front­ strategic communication, the role of education, and build­ line fighters. More likely in the future, enemies will simply ing partnership capacity. The final workshop, a senior- avoid those venues dominated by the united States and/or

PIREP2-Read.indd 51 10/29/07 9:59:25 AM 52 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

allied partners. See also Sr Col Qiao liang and Sr Col wang again begun long-range-bomber missions as of summer Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, february 1999, http://www 2007. “President Vladimir Putin said . . . security threats .fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/unresw1.htm. had forced russia to revive the Soviet-era practice of send­ 6. See alan J. Vick et al., Air Power in the New Counterin­ ing bomber aircraft on patrols beyond its borders. Putin surgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and said 14 strategic bombers had taken off simultaneously Assistance Missions (Santa Monica, Ca: raND Corpora­ from airfields across russia . . . on long-range missions. tion, 2006), 133–35, http://www.au.af.mil/au/aunews/ ‘we have decided to restore flights by russian strategic articles/raND_Mg509.pdf. aviation on a permanent basis.’ ” See “russia restores 7. Dr. Colin S. gray, “Irregular warfare: One Nature, Bomber Patrols,” CNN.com, 17 august 2007, http://www Many Characters” (presentation, 2007 air force Symposium .cnn.com/2007/wOrlD/europe/08/17/russia.airforce on Counterinsurgency, Maxwell afB, al, 24 april 2007). .reut/index.html. 8. for example, a hostile communications campaign 15. “assess,” “assist,” and “advise” are unique, specific could highlight a hospital built from the ground up by a skills typically associated with special operations forces red Horse team as “another example of the central gov­ but are critical talents for the success of uSaf general ernment’s inability to deliver basic services to the people. forces in the long war. This corrupt government must go to the americans who 16. languages learned as an adult can atrophy rapidly are backing and controlling them to get anything done. without an active sustainment plan. for the “less commonly Boycott the hospital in protest of the americans running taught” languages, such as those immediate-investment lan­ this puppet government.” we should specifically adjoin guages found in a memorandum on strategic languages is­ every such “kinetic” operation in this environment to the sued by the Office of the under Secretary of Defense dated communication plan that focuses on delivering the de­ 26 October 2005, voluntary maintenance of difficult dialects sired effects. is indeed a poor investment strategy. The uSaf replaced its 9. for an excellent and concise discussion on working voluntary fitness programs when it saw the need; language with a “host nation,” see T. e. lawrence, “The 27 articles and cultural sustainment needs proactive programs as well. of T. e. lawrence,” The Arab Bulletin, 20 august 1917, 17. for example, the original cadre of Iraqi freedom http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1917/27arts.html. C-130 trainers (or any “in lieu of ” returnee). across the for example, number 15 of 27 articles or principles reads board, they did great work. as follows: “Do not try to do too much with your own 18. “Does fast always mean successful?” See Dr. Thomas hands. Better the arabs do it tolerably than that you do it Hughes, “The Cult of the Quick,” Aerospace Power Journal 15, perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to no. 4 (winter 2001): 57–68, http://www.airpower.maxwell win it for them. actually, also, under the very odd condi­ .af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/win01/win01.pdf. tions of arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, 19. although no commander considers killing insur­ perhaps, you think it is.” lawrence cautioned that his ad­ gents the critical point in, or the foundation of, a winning vice applied to his situation only and that every situation or circumstance engendered different “rules.” strategy in COIN, “body count” remains the ubiquitous 10. Including the supported central government, any metric reported in every contact with the enemy and, by uS forces involved, and so forth. It is patently not true default, becomes the measure of success or failure. that one can see an enemy system in isolation from elements 20. Discussions,2007airforceSymposiumonCounter­ that interact with it (e.g., the uSaf becomes part of the insurgency, Maxwell afB, al, 24 –26 april 2007. system, and the system reacts to actions, nonactions, pres­ 21. The British in Northern Ireland have taken 38 ence, nonpresence of this subsystem interface or element). years to get “the warring parties to the table” (assuming 11. as noted earlier, all military operations clearly that 1969 marked the starting point for this conflict— strive for efficiency in fighting, but efficiency should not some would say 1922, 1916, or even the middle of the be counterproductive to winning; effectiveness should take nineteenth century). See Douglas a. Borer, “from Belfast precedence over efficiency. to Baghdad—what Have we learned?” Christian Science 12. One should not construe this to mean that poli­ Monitor, 16 august 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/ tics is somehow separate from “war.” Clausewitz’s funda­ 0816/p09s02-coop.html. mental assertion that “war is the continuation of politics 22. Dave Ochmanek (presentation, 2007 air force with the admixture of other means” has perhaps even Symposium on Counterinsurgency, Maxwell afB, al, 26 more relevance in Iw/COIN than the set-piece attrition april 2007). conflicts with which readers most frequently associate 23. “Despite lobbying by Northrop, the f-20 was never him. and “admixture of other means” certainly provides seriously considered for uS air force service, and the uS an opening to discuss the whole-of-government approach Navy eventually decided to buy f-16s rather than f-20s for with emphasis on the human dynamic. its aggressor aircraft program. These two facts essentially 13. at the symposium, general Newton talked about doomed the f-20 foreign military sales (fMS), since inter­ the “phoenix cycle,” referring to the mythical bird that national customers tended to buy the f-16 because it was rose from its own ashes. according to him, after world used by the uSaf, and the f-20 was not.” See “f-20 Tiger- war II and the , the country disbanded its Iw shark,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ capability and had to resurrect it for the next conflict. military/systems/aircraft/f-20.htm. 14. although this is certainly more of a political state­ 24. See, for example, Vick et al., Air Power in the New ment at this point than a military threat, russia has once Counterinsurgency Era.

PIREP2-Read.indd 52 10/29/07 9:59:25 AM Chinese Servicemen’s Views of USAF Airmen and Education

Editor’s Note: In 2006 a delegation from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) visited US Air Force (USAF) facilities, including the USAF Academy in Colorado; Air University at Maxwell AFB, Alabama; and Bolling AFB, Washington, DC. China Air Force magazine subsequently published three commentaries written by delegation members and graciously permitted Air and Space Power Journal to translate and republish them.

“Understanding US Airmen that they were sharpening their skills at land­ ing on short runways in order to strengthen from Small Details” capabilities to project forces and supplies quickly in complex situations. Sr Col Qigui Wang, PlaaF US armed forces do not have political units PolitiCal CommiSSar or political officers.Instead, each organic unit What combat-training objectives, officer- has one chaplain. Yet, political education and development structure, and military-base cul­ moral mentoring successfully merge into the ture does the USAF adopt? Some details that I service members’ daily work and lives. In every noticed during our visit to the United States location, we saw the national flag, service en­ signs, and unit banners flying. From the De­ may provide answers. partment of Defense in the Pentagon to a The US military promotes the notion of wing on a base—indeed everywhere—we found joint operations, pursuing the vision of “global museums and heritage offices.Meeting rooms, reach, global awareness, global power” and hallways, and lobbies serve as halls of fame, training its soldiers in real combat environ­ decorated with photos of previous leaders, war ments. One lasting impression that I had from heroes, trophies, and all kinds of souvenirs. At our US trip was that the US military pays great Air University in Alabama, a museum dedi­ attention to developing capabilities for joint cated to the heritage of enlisted members dis­ operations. It believes that war is not the busi­ plays war heroes and their brave deeds, creat­ ness of any single service, theater, force, or ing a full image of heroism. Some of the US soldier; instead, winning a war requires the military bases we visited, such as Maxwell AFB joint operation of all people in all dimensions. and Bolling AFB, are named after war heroes. Each theater has a unifiedcommand made up But we did not see many slogans posted on the of all the US services. A mixture of students walls of their buildings, except perhaps one from these services attends training in military that read “Integrity, Service, Excellence.” schools. For major operations, all services join The US military has a clear vision for per­ to form the centralized command. Even in lo­ sonal development. No later than 18 months gistics and deployments of armaments within after their promotion, company-grade officers a theater, the US military uses joint supply must go to junior-officer schools to take a six- methods. The USAF designs training with com­ week course. Then, for every step up, they bat requirements and effects in mind. For ex­ must attend military schools, some as long as ample, at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, we watched 12 weeks, some as short as two to three weeks. a number of C-130 cargo planes frequently Field-grade officers also must attend military taking off and landing. An officer explained schools for strategic courses as a prerequisite

53

PIREP3-Qigui Wang Hao.indd 53 10/29/07 9:59:50 AM 54 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

for promotion. Even general officers must go they may be, as servicemen, they have no rea­ back to school to take more advanced courses son whatsoever to compromise their commit­ and participate in joint-operation war games. ment. While visiting the USAF Senior NCO A second lieutenant needs to attend at least 10 Academy, I asked a chief master sergeant (who trainings at different times before he or she appeared close to 50 years of age), “Having reaches the rank of brigadier general. During served in the military for so many years and all the past few years, the US military has added a the time staying with soldiers on the grassroots good deal of curriculum about information- level, have you ever thought about changing warfare theory and the art of command. The careers or seeking positions with better bene­ schools invite high-ranking officers with com­ fits?” “Well,” responded the chief, “this is the bat experience and renowned specialists to job that fits me and that I enjoy. I must do it give lectures and speeches. In order to in­ the best I can.” crease their joint-operation capabilities, offi­ cers rotate every two to three years, either dis­ patched to operational forces at the front or “Selected Thoughts from a assigned to military schools or back offices. Currently, most USAF field-gradeofficers have Brief Look at the USAF” had experience in two to three weapon sys­ Sr Col Wang Ximin, PlaaF tems and professional positions. The develop­ PolitiCal CommiSSar ment of noncommissioned officers (NCO) is equally systematic. To progress from the lowest guilin air ForCe College rank to the highest, sergeants must complete As a military-school staff member, I natu­ a training cycle every five years, on average. rally paid more attention to USAF educational Course length ranges from eight days to 18 institutions during our visit to the United weeks each time. States. Understanding the USAF’s modern During our 15-day stay in the United States, educational policy, teaching models, and we also observed that the beautifully land­ school structures will bring new ideas to our scaped military bases attract highly talented own education and training. people. The USAF bases, military academies, The US armed forces believe that military and flying-wing camps that we visited were all training must interface with war. As such, the very well laid out, with buildings dotted neatly US military often makes its war-gaming envi­ with trees and flowers. The people we met, ronments more complicated than real battle­ whether the commandant, a sergeant, or a fields.It has adopted a mind-set of joint opera­ student, all appeared motivated, proud, and tions, the concepts of which are reflectedfully self-confident. Individuals with whom we talked in system structure as well as command and expressed their willingness to deploy to the most coordination, all the way down to the tactical dangerous battlefields for the most treacher­ level. US servicemen and women understand ous taskings and to die for their country. Maj that they will train to fight for the overall stra­ Gen Stephen J. Miller, commandant of the tegic objectives of their country and have an USAF Air War College, told us that in the obligation to do so. Soldiers must prepare United States, servicemen and women all vol­ themselves to win; otherwise, they are fated to untarily join the military. Cadets who have fin­ lose. Putting aside the justificationfor launch­ ished two years of studies may choose to leave ing wars, we can learn something from these the armed forces or sign an agreement to con­ service members, who have such a strong tinue their careers in the military. After volun­ sense of mission, dedication, and obligation. tarily entering the service, they must uncondi­ The USAF not only possesses sophisticated tionally obey orders, strictly follow rules and weaponry but also heavily emphasizes the hu­ discipline, and fulfill personal commitments. man role in high-tech wars. Indeed, that ser­ No matter where, in what position, or in which vice invests substantially in the development profession or stage of personal development of high-quality Airmen. During our visit, I was

PIREP3-Qigui Wang Hao.indd 54 10/29/07 9:59:50 AM PIREP 55

deeply impressed with their military compe­ reflected in performing missions and fulfill­ tence, technical capability, and physical as well ing obligations. We also noted the compassion as mental fitness. Both officers and enlisted and attentiveness to soldiers’ actual needs. For members demonstrated a high level of educa­ example, the military takes care of many ne­ tion. Most of the latter have finished high cessities for the families of soldiers deployed school, and a fairly high percentage of them overseas. On the other hand, people who re­ hold undergraduate or associate degrees. fuse to fulfilltheir military service agreements, More than 95 percent of USAF officers hold desert, or break rules may face harsh punish­ bachelor’s degrees.* Officers of field-grade ment. My most vivid impression was of the cul­ rank and above often have two to three differ­ tural environment of USAF bases. Every unit ent degrees. Faculties of the military schools and school has its own decorated room of consist mostly of professionals with master’s honor and hall of fame. Certainly, all of these and PhD degrees. The US military also stresses efforts imperceptibly influence the psyche of the importance of total development. Through USAF officers and enlisted members, nurtur­ situational teaching, role rotation, field train­ ing them to develop and grow. ing, battlefield deployment, and many other ways, the US armed forces equip their service­ men and women with total capabilities and competencies. Students entering military schools “A Glimpse at the must meet strict requirements. Company-grade Cultivation of Airmen’s officers must graduate from command and staff college to qualify for promotion to field- Core Values in USAF grade rank.† Field-grade officers normally Schools” possess experience in two or three career fields or weapon systems. Sr Col Hao CHengming, PlaaF Political units and political commissar posi­ PolitiCal CommiSSar tions do not exist in the US armed forces, but air ForCe aviation univerSity political and moral education has some dis­ tinctive features. During our tour, I asked our The US military attaches no less impor­ host, “How do you educate your soldiers about tance to moral education than to weapons loyalty to the country, dedication to the na­ and equipment. It holds that patriotism, a tional defense, and commitment to duty?” He sense of national superiority, and dedication answered, “Such education starts from high to national interests are important elements school. When students enter the military of a soldier’s character. These represent the schools, they are taught to understand why highest personal values, serve as the true foun­ they serve in the military, how to dedicate dation of military morale, and are essential to themselves to the country, and how to contrib­ winning future wars. During this study tour, I ute to military development.” paid special attention to the US military’s cul­ The US military holds the national interest tivation of its soldiers’ core values. above all else and regards serving the country The core values of the US military services as its sacred obligation. US servicemen and include “loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, women may attend different military schools honor, integrity, and personal courage” (Army); multiple times. In fact, education in military “integrity first, service before self, and excel­ duty and responsibility permeates one’s entire lence in all we do” (USAF); “honor, courage, military career. Despite the absence of dedi­ and commitment” (Marine Corps), and so on. cated ideological educators, such education is In addition, every college and academy of the

*This percentage reflectsthe author’s understanding, based on his US tour. In fact, a bachelor’s degree is a commissioning prerequisite for all USAF officers. †This comment reflects the author’s understanding, but the promotion system actually works somewhat differently.

PIREP3-Qigui Wang Hao.indd 55 10/29/07 9:59:50 AM 56 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

USAF has its own core values: “integrity, ser­ the USAF. The inscription on the statue of an vice, and excellence” (USAF Academy) and eagle and fledglings at the USAF Academy “institutionalization, service to the country, serves as a reminder to cadets of the impor­ and excellent dedication” (USAF Senior NCO tance of learning: “Man’s flightthrough life is Academy), for example. The USAF Academy sustained by the power of his knowledge.” consistently sets as its firsteducational priority The USAF colleges and academies also at­ the cultivation of US military ethics and values tach special importance to the development in every cadet. Both the Center for Character of students’ and cadets’ leadership and man­ Development and the Cadet Counseling and agement capabilities as an extension of the Leadership Development Center establish the cultivation of core values. At Air University’s curriculum for the moral development of cadets. Officer Training School and at the USAF The academy emphasizes such core values as Academy, the cadet wing—responsible for “integrity first,” “service to the country first,” “the managing, educating, and developing USAF supreme honor of sacrifice to the country,” and cadets—forges and develops their leadership “excellence in all we do.” The USAF Academy skills and command and management capa­ has summarized and expressed such core val­ bilities. Organized much like an Air Force ues in highly concise words and has embodied combat unit, the cadet wing includes various these concepts in a variety of patriotic, inher­ command and staff positions that provide ited, religious, situational, moral, and legal each cadet the opportunity to experience forms so that they guide the behavior of all leadership and learn how to manage a mili­ cadets, who internalize them as moral pur­ tary institution. In the wing, seniors serve as suits. All of these educational efforts and their cadet officers, and both juniors and sopho­ obvious effects left profound impressions on mores serve as cadet NCOs. Freshmen, how­ members of our PLAAF study delegation. ever, who have no cadet rank, must respect USAF colleges and academies do an out­ senior cadets and obey their commands—re­ standing job of creating an environment that quirements that cultivate the Airman mentality subconsciously facilitates the education of stu­ dents through pleasant sights and sounds. At and an attitude of obedience. Sophomores the USAF Academy and each college of Air are held to somewhat less stringent require­ University, one can see that the meticulous ments and assume limited leadership respon­ landscaping and displays on campus, on the sibilities in the cadet wing, with an emphasis training grounds, along the corridors, and in on developing speech skills and communica­ every exterior setting all reflect the distinct tions capabilities. Juniors and seniors focus on educational principles and concepts of differ­ developing a sense of responsibility as leaders ent schools, conveying an atmosphere of cul­ and learning the various functions of the ture, knowledge, and education. On the walls USAF. Senior cadets serve as instructors for of almost every office, teaching venue, and most of the glider and parachute training meeting room at Air University, one can also courses at the USAF Academy; additionally, see pictures and descriptions demonstrating they must assume at least one leadership posi­ the history of the service and of the school. tion in the summer training program for junior Important events relevant to the development cadets. This model of education and manage­ of the USAF and the school, as well as famous ment not only inspires the cadets’ initiative individuals educated by the school, are all on regarding self-education and self-management, display, offering a rich and colorful historical but also facilitates their acquisition of profes­ lesson that influences, inspires, and educates sional knowledge and command skills neces­ people. Static displays of various types of air­ sary for promotion to higher rank. It also en­ planes are placed at prominent locations as a hances their management capabilities and means of stimulating the students’ patriotic gives consideration to the development of feelings as well as their love of and devotion to their personality. ❑

PIREP3-Qigui Wang Hao.indd 56 10/29/07 9:59:51 AM Minting COIN Principles and Imperatives for Combating Insurgency

Dr. ConraD C. Crane*

he world became aware of the that some new tenets also deserved emphasis, existence of a coherent body of theory based on the evolving nature of modern con about insurgency as a result of the flict. as a result, the publication lists not only revolutionary upheavals accompany principles of coIN based mostly on history, Ting the deterioration of empires following but also imperatives derived from more con world war II. along with the propagation of temporary experience. Together they provide ideas from mao Tse-tung, ernesto “che” Guevara, a framework to discuss the pursuit of a suc carlos marighella, and Vo Nguyen Giap came cessful coIN campaign. with some variation, a corresponding attempt by counterinsurgents the principles and imperatives from the new to develop their own set of practices and prin Fm/mcwP form the basis for this article. ciples. The tenets of these mostly british and more detailed explanations are available in French writers were a product of many years that document.3 although much of the discus of struggle in theaters from algeria to malaya sion focuses on applications to american ex to Vietnam, along with observation of many amples, these tenets are broadly applicable to case studies. david Galula, Frank Kitson, robert the operational conduct of any coIN. Thompson, and roger Trinquier still have much useful information for current practitioners of The Importance of Legitimacy counterinsurgency (coIN).1 of recent note for anyone trying to learn about coIN from by definition, combatants on opposing sides of history is the comprehensive work of the Naval an internal war seek political power. based on Postgraduate School’s Kalev Sepp, who looks at their own definition of legitimacy, the people scores of historical cases to develop his own list of the contested region will decide upon the of best and worst practices for coIN.2 victor. That does not mean that illegitimate governments cannot rule. all governments rule by a combination of consent and coer Baseline Principles for cion, and those defined as legitimate rely pri marily on the consent of the governed. Gover Counterinsurgency nance that relies primarily on coercion is when the army–marine corps writing team unstable; as soon as the state’s power is dis for Field manual (Fm) 3-24/marine corps rupted, the people cease to obey it. For long- warfighting Publication (mcwP) 3-33.5, term success, counterinsurgents must aim to Counter­insur­gency, began their deliberations, foster the development of effective governance they turned to these sages of the past to de by a legitimate government. velop a baseline list of principles upon which however, the local definition of legitimacy to build the new doctrinal manual. although may be far different from that of our western this search proved very fruitful, the writers liberal tradition. Some cultures may accept who were observers and veterans of recent theocratic rule or value security over freedoms conflicts in afghanistan and Iraq perceived we consider essential. counterinsurgents must

*director of the US army military history Institute, dr. crane holds the General hoyt S. Vandenberg chair of aerospace Studies at the army war college. he was the lead author of Field manual 3-24 / marine corps warfightingPublication 3-33.5, the counterinsurgency manual published in december 2006.

57

PIREP4-Crane.indd 57 10/29/07 10:00:12 AM 58 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

conduct a thorough sociocultural analysis to resentatives. at the highest levels in-theater, determine what the local people perceive as the US ambassador and country team must be legitimate government. counterinsurgents must involved in all planning, but it seems apparent understand and reconcile differing standards, in both afghanistan and Iraq that State de a task that may present difficulties for americans partment and defense department elements who place high importance on democratic have separate chains of command. many NGos practices and liberal values. They must realize actively resist overt involvement with military that local opinions—not ours—will determine forces, but some effort at liaison must still oc legitimacy. however, in situations featuring in cur. The stark reality is that insurgents wishing tense civil strife in which local definitions of to sow chaos perceive any agency providing legitimacy become exclusionary or genocidal services as a target, and most NGos realize toward competing groups, intervening counter that fact. however, although they desire secu insurgents may have to coerce belligerents, rity, they won’t accept much guidance. The including a supported government, to create best that one can hope for in many situations the possibility of political compromise. is what Gen anthony Zinni, USmc, retired, calls “haNd [ShaKe] coN (handshake con The Primacy of Political Factors trol),” an informal arrangement based on per sonal contact and understanding.5 The involve rarely are counterinsurgents successful with ment of host-nation contributors at all levels is purely military action. Usually, peace is restored also essential in order to meet political goals with some sort of political solution that ad and establish critical legitimacy. military units dresses the root causes of the insurgency or must be prepared to commit considerable re creates broad popular acceptance for the gov sources to liaison duties with these various ernment. The political and military aspects of players. They all have a contribution to make internal wars are inseparably bound and must in restoring stability and improving conditions. always be evaluated in concert. despite the widely quoted dictum of Gen chang Ting-chen, Understanding the Environment popularized by Galula, that revolutionary war is 80 percent political and 20 percent military, contemporary predeployment training for that ratio changes by time and place.4 how units has changed considerably in terms of ex ever, military actions conducted without an as tensive orientation on the society and culture sessment of their political outcome at best will of the area of operation. Insurgents begin result in decreased effectiveness and at worst with a big advantage in local knowledge, and may prove disastrously counterproductive. counterinsurgents must quickly immerse counterinsurgents must stay focused on their themselves in the people and their lives to vision for the political end state that will estab catch up. counterinsurgents must understand lish a legitimate government. the power relationships, values, and ideolo gies within the society in order to understand Unity of Effort the nature and nuances of the existing con flict. accordingly, coIN requires greater em The writing team debated extensively about phasis on skills such as language and cultural whether the new coIN doctrine should strive awareness than does conventional warfare. for unity of command or unity of effort. The consensus was that even though unity of com Intelligence-Driven Operations mand is ideal and preferred, it is also impos sible to achieve in most coIN. military com counterinsurgents need increased cultural manders will find a myriad of players in their understanding to gather, comprehend, and area of operations, ranging from US govern apply intelligence essential for success in coIN. ment agencies to the United Nations to non without timely and accurate intelligence, mili governmental organizations (NGo) (such as tary actions may be ineffective at best—counter doctors without borders) to host-nation rep productive at worst. effective operations must

PIREP4-Crane.indd 58 10/29/07 10:00:13 AM PIREP 59

be shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intel lives and address their grievances. The ability ligence that is gathered, analyzed, and applied to achieve security serves as a foundation of at the lowest possible level—and disseminated government legitimacy. throughout the force. Properly conducted however, how one achieves that security can coIN activities generate more important intel be just as important as instituting it. acting in ligence. a cycle develops whereby operations accordance with a legal system established in produce intelligence to generate and shape line with local culture and practices enhances subsequent operations. every counterinsurgent the legitimacy of the government. but illegiti represents a possible intelligence collector, and mate acts by government officials or security every person a possible source of important in forces can undermine any progress and help formation. reports collected by unit patrols, fuel the insurgency. These actions include un members of the country team, and civilian justified or excessive use of force, unlawful de agencies associated with coIN efforts often tention, torture, and punishment without trial. have greater importance than those from spe Insurgents often capitalize on abuses by host- cialized intelligence assets. nation police or soldiers by making them a key mobilization tool. Participation in coIN opera Isolating Insurgents from Their Cause and Support tions by US forces must comply with our trea Isolation is a common theme among coIN ties and laws. any human-rights abuses or legal theorists: it is much easier to cut off an insur violations committed by americans quickly be gency from its support and let it wither than to come known to the local populace and, eventu kill or capture every insurgent. To achieve ally, to the world—take for example the local long-term success, skillful counterinsurgents and international reaction to the abuses at abu must eliminate the source of an insurgency’s Ghraib. Illegitimate acts undermine both short- recuperative power. Social, political, and eco and long-term coIN efforts. nomic grievances that fuel discontent must be addressed. Population control and border se Long-Term Commitment curity can shut off physical support. In today’s The new coIN doctrine is designed for ap interconnected world, financial support for plication in a theater campaign, but the last an insurgency can come from a variety of principle speaks to decision makers at all levels. sources. International or local legal action resource intensive, coIN always requires may be required to dry up those activities. as considerable money, manpower, and time. In the legitimacy of the host-nation government surgencies are protracted by nature, designed grows, so will participation of the population to wear down opponents who have greater in limiting support for the insurgency. Victory material assets. at the core of many critiques in coIN becomes permanent when the people of the US performance in coIN is an assump actively support the isolation of defeated in tion that americans have neither the patience surgent forces. nor the will required for success in protracted conflicts. Insurgents and local populations of Security under the Rule of Law ten believe that a few years or a few casualties regarding the challenges he faced conduct will cause the United States to abandon coIN. ing coIN in Vietnam, John Paul Vann re bolstering faith in the steadfastness of american marked, “Security may be ten percent of the support requires constant reaffirmations of problem, or it may be ninety percent, but commitment by leaders at the national level whichever it is, it’s the first ten percent or the and in-theater, backed by deeds. firstninety percent. without security, nothing The political activity of maintaining na else we do will last.”6 counterinsurgents must tional public support back home properly lies clear areas of insurgent interference and main outside the realm of the military commanders tain them that way in order to build facilities of intervening forces conducting a coIN cam and institutions that will improve people’s paign. however, commanders should ensure

PIREP4-Crane.indd 59 10/29/07 10:00:13 AM 60 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

that their conduct of operations neither makes can make exorbitant promises about what they it harder for elected leaders to maintain public would accomplish if they were in power, while support nor undermines public confidence. the counterinsurgent must produce actual re also, counterinsurgents must set up support sults, with words matching deeds. structures designed for long-term operations. counterinsurgents have to consider the in Planning and commitments must be based upon formation impact of their actions on many au sustainable operating-tempo and personnel- diences, including international, regional, tempo limits. The United States must also pay and local civilian populations. additionally, attention to extended requirements in order to they must keep friendly military forces in maintain support for host-nation institutions formed, and they should direct an informa even after reduction of american force levels. tion campaign at the enemy. For americans especially, maintaining home-front support is also a factor. but messages to all these audi Imperatives for the Contemporary ences must be consistent. In today’s globalized Counterinsurgency Environment information environment, the local populace can access the Internet or satellite television although all of the cold war–era coIN to monitor messages transmitted to the inter theorists mentioned earlier would recognize national community and US public. any per these principles, the contemporary environ ceived inconsistency reduces credibility and ment is not the same as theirs. Insurgencies undermines coIN efforts. today are rarely monolithic. more commonly, counterinsurgents face a complex, shifting ar Managing Expectations ray of enemies with differing motivations and approaches. Insurgents are often linked Unmet expectations can fuel popular discontent. through dispersed networks, taking advantage Some cultures interpret the failure to keep an of the Internet and new communications means overly ambitious promise of improvement as in that they also use to generate support and tentional deception—not as good intentions spread propaganda. These same technologies gone awry. To limit discontent and build support, have not only increased the responsiveness counterinsurgents must create and maintain a and demands of the global media but also cre realistic set of expectations among the populace, ated a myriad of bloggers uncontrolled by the international community, and even friendly anyone. In addition, the end of the cold war military units. effective counterinsurgents under unleashed many old hatreds and conflicts, stand local norms and tailor approaches to con which combatants can now pursue with a new trol expectations. US forces face a unique chal array of widely available weaponry. So in addi lenge in this arena due to their reputation for tion to the historically based principles listed accomplishment. Some people call this the “man above, contemporary coIN requires consid on the moon Syndrome,” referring to the dis ering an additional set of imperatives. belief expressed by inhabitants of a battered vil lage that a nation able to land a spaceship on the Managing Information moon can’t quickly restore basic services or get everyone jobs. every action has an information reaction. The agencies involved in reconstruction can find old saying “perception is reality” has especial rele themselves especially prone to rosy promises. vance to coIN, in which the attitudes of the counterinsurgents must remember that they populace assume such importance in determin must match their words with deeds. Proper man ing victory. The information-operations logical agement of expectations to build legitimacy does line of operation—perhaps the decisive one for require demonstrating political and economic a coIN campaign—ties together and encapsu progress to show the populace how life is improv lates all the others.7 Insurgents have a substantial ing. Successful coIN operations increase the advantage in the information arena since they number of people who believe they have a stake

PIREP4-Crane.indd 60 10/29/07 10:00:13 AM PIREP 61

in the success of the state and its government. doctrineisjustpartofabroaderprocesstochange eventual victory results in large measure from the way the military thinks. There are new sce convincing a solid majority of members of the nariosattrainingcenters,newcurriculaatschools, population that their lives will be better under the and new programs to prepare units for deploy government than under an insurgent regime. ment. contemporary insurgents are networked The United States has experienced apparently for adaptation, just as our own forces strive to be. greater success in maintaining local support in Successful tactics with improvised explosive de afghanistan than Iraq because initial expecta vicesinIraqsoonappearinafghanistan.counter tions in the former country were much lower insurgent tactics that work in one time at one lo than those in the latter and because afghans have cation will be nullified in another location at a been more appreciative of small improvements. different time. Skillful counterinsurgents must adapt at least as fast as their opponents. every unit Using the Appropriate Level of Force must make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results. commanders must have a pro during the many drafts of the new doctrine, cess to distribute best practices throughout their the imperative regarding the use of force commands and to exchange them with other evolved from “minimum force” to “measured units. because insurgents will shift their opera force” to “appropriate level of force.” many tions, looking for weak links, a counterinsurgent contemporary writings about coIN stress the force must enjoy widespread competence. use of the minimum possible force in any situa tion. It is neither efficient nor effective to con Empowering the Lowest Levels duct a military operation that, by its unintended effects, creates more insurgents than it elimi contemporary coIN is a mosaic war. commonly, nates. however, at times a show of force be in seminars at war colleges, two former battalion comes necessary to demonstrate commitment commanders from Iraq or afghanistan will dis or to intimidate enemies. Furthermore, some agree strongly about the course of the war they implacable foes must be killed or captured. but observed. That is understandable because they counterinsurgents must carefully analyze the did not see the same war. different zones have type and amount of force to use in any opera different sets of conditions and enemies who tion. commanders should adopt appropriate, employ a different combination of approaches. measured levels of force and apply that strength local commanders should have the authority precisely so that it fulfills the mission without and resources to shape their own situations. They causing unnecessary loss of life or suffering. must have access to or control of resources neces The wielder of that force is also important. sary to produce timely intelligence, conduct ef The populace will more likely view urban raids fective tactical operations, and manage informa as legitimate if local police rather than foreign tion and civil-military operations. an atmosphere soldiers conduct them, as long as the former of trust and understanding should permeate the have a reputation for competence and impar force—one that allows the decentralized opera tiality. If the populace sees the police instead tions essential for effective coIN. higher com as part of an oppressive sectarian group, their manders owe it to their subordinates to push as use may prove counterproductive. effective many capabilities as possible down to their level counterinsurgents must understand the char and to encourage and enable initiative. This is a acter of the local police and popular percep prominent characteristic of any coIN force that tions of both police and military units. These can adapt and react as least as quickly as the insur factors are all part of the process to determine gents it is combating. the most appropriate way of applying force. Supporting the Host Nation Learning and Adapting No matter the effectiveness of an intervening The true unifying theme of Fm 3-24/mcwP counterinsurgent force, the host nation will 3-33.5 involves learning and adapting. The new have to bring about and maintain final suc

PIREP4-Crane.indd 61 10/29/07 10:00:14 AM 62 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

cess. The long-term goal of any US coIN ef Some US air Force critics of the new doc fort will entail leaving a legitimate government trinehavedecrieditas“ground-centric.”Though able to stand by itself. This requires the devel one might reasonably expect such a focus in opment of viable local leaders and institu an army–marine corps publication, that label tions. although it may be easier for US forces is really a misnomer. Instead, the doctrine should to conduct military operations themselves or be characterized as “population-centric.” a re for international civilian agencies to conduct cent meeting of NaTo doctrine writers in development programs on their own, it is better Paris exhibited universal agreement that this represented the proper way for militaries to to work to strengthen local forces and institu pursue coIN—within a comprehensive ap tions and then assist them. In the end, host proach that utilizes all elements of national nation governments have the final responsibility power and with the participation of a broad to solve their own problems. eventually, the spectrum of government, international, and indigenous population will see all foreign host-nation agencies.8 There is still a role in armies of liberation or assistance as occupiers achieving security for “warheads on foreheads,” or interlopers, so the sooner the counter- to use a John Nagl term, but long-term success insurgent force can transfer the main effort to depends on a much wider array of activities host-nation institutions without unacceptable than traditional “enemy-centric” approaches degradation, the better. require. The challenge for the world’s mightiest air force lies in how to best adapt its impres sive set of capabilities to work with that myriad Conclusion of participating agencies in the comprehensive approach required for coIN. everyone already The new doctrine reflects the principles recognizes and appreciates the advantages of and imperatives described above. In an attempt air mobility. Plenty of room remains for inno to shape the future, members of the writing vative applications of intelligence, surveillance, team did their best to combine the wisdom of and reconnaissance assets to make significant the past with an appreciation for current re contributions to coIN as well. The air Force alities. In accordance with the imperative to can also wield significant influence in cyber learn and adapt, however, these ideas can’t be space. No service has a better record of learn locked in stone. as the long war continues, we ing and adapting in wartime. and we need must continue to perfect and refine them. that ability again today. ❑

Notes 1. david Galula, Counter­insur­gency War­far­e: Theor­y and 3. Fm 3-24/mcwP 3-33.5, Counter­insur­gency, december Pr­actice (london: Praeger, 1964); Frank Kitson, Low Intensity 2006, 1-20 to 1-26, http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/ Oper­ations: Subver­sion, Insur­gency, Peace-Keeping (london: materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf. Faber and Faber, 1971); Sir robert Thompson, Defeating 4. See Galula, Counter­insur­gency War­far­e, 89. Communist Insur­gency (1966; repr., St. Petersburg, Fl: hailer Publishing, 2005); and roger Trinquier, Moder­n 5. See Tom clancy with Gen Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, War­far­e: A Fr­ench View of Counter­insur­gency, trans. daniel Battle Ready (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004), 215. lee (New York: Praeger, 1964). 6. Quoted in Neil Sheehan, A Br­ight Shining Lie: John 2. Kalev I. Sepp, Phd, “best Practices in counterinsur Paul Vann and Amer­ica in Vietnam (New York: random gency,” Militar­y Review 85, no. 3 (may–June 2005): 8–12, house, 1988), 67. http://calldp.leavenworth.army.mil/eng_mr/200608080803 7. For more on the information-operations logical line 0243/2005/may_Jun/04_sepp.pdf#xml=/scripts/cqcgi.exe/ of operation, see Fm 3-24/mcwP 3-33.5, Counter­insur­gency, @ss_prod.env?cQ_SeSSIoN_KeY=QrSTPUmYTheQ&cQ _Qh=125622&cQdc=5&cQ_PdF_hIGhlIGhT=YeS&cQ 5-3 to 5-11. _cUr_docUmeNT=3. dr. Sepp has just been named a 8. workshop on counterinsurgency and Stability opera deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations tions: US, French, british, and German approaches, Institut and low intensity conflict. Français des relations Internationales, Paris, 4 June 2007.

PIREP4-Crane.indd 62 10/29/07 10:00:15 AM Air-Minded Considerations for Joint Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Maj Gen Charles j. Dunlap jr., usaF

Editorial Abstract: According to the author, the recent publication of Army Field Manual 3‑24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3‑33.5, Counterinsurgency, reflects a distinctly “surface‑minded” perspective. Since airpower possesses unique capabilities, such as speed, range, flexibility, and persistence, he proposes exploiting these “air‑minded” viewpoints to enlarge and enhance what is currently a service‑centric doctrine. General Dunlap suggests that doing so would produce a much‑improved and well‑rounded joint approach.

hat Would joint counter­ trine relegates airpower to a five­page annex insurgency (Coin) doctrine that in a 282­page document. however, an effort is includes “air­mindedness” look now under way to draft joint Coin doctrine like? the army and Marine Corps that, presumably, not only will include a full Whave issued Coin doctrine—Field Manual exploitation of airpower per se, but also be in­ (FM) 3­24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publi­ formed by an air­minded perspective.2 cation (MCWP) 3­33.5, Counterinsurgency—that “air­minded” does not mean “air­centric” or clearly articulates what one might call a “surface­ even dominated by air, space, and cyberspace minded” perspective.1 unfortunately, that doc­ power. Rather, one should look to Gen henry

63

1-Dunlap.indd 63 10/29/07 9:02:17 AM 64 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

h. “hap” arnold’s use of the term to character­ essential to designing the effective use of the ize an airman’s “particular expertise and . . . air weapon in future Coin operations. distinctive point of view.”3 according to air accomplishing this feat proved a consider­ Force doctrine, an airman’s “perspective . . . is able challenge. afghanis, numbered among necessarily different; it reflects the range, the world’s most fearsome fighters, have en­ speed, and capabilities of aerospace forces, as joyed that reputation for thousands of years. well as threats and survival imperatives unique the Soviets sought to tame them with an enor­ to airmen.”4 mous application of raw combat power but air­mindedness actually means more than ultimately failed. Yet, the united States man­ that. it includes, for example, an airman’s aged to oust the taliban and al­Qaeda from predilection to especially value technology power in a matter of weeks. how? By inflicting when seeking advantages over enemy forces. helplessness as only the newest developments it reflects an airman’s desire to avoid the car­ in airpower can. nage of ground­force engagements wherever technology that the Soviets did not possess possible. Moreover, whereas soldiers and ma­ in the 1980s enabled airpower’s decisiveness rines may seek the “close fight,” airmen look in the downfall of these adversaries. Russian for opportunities to obtain the desired effects aviators had neither the sensor suite nor the from long distance—that is, without giving precision technology of today’s uS airpower. the enemy the opportunity to close. Properly typically, Soviet pilots had to fly low enough applied, an air­minded approach provides to acquire their targets visually, which caused many opportunities to create what Coin ex­ devastating aircraft losses once the mujahi­ deen acquired american­made Stinger anti­ perts Steven Metz and Raymond Millen say is 8 needed to win: an “effects­based approach de­ aircraft missiles. although the Russians de­ signed to fracture, delegitimize, delink, de­ vised various tactics to counter that threat, the moralize, and deresource insurgents.”5 missiles eventually forced them to the safety of higher altitudes that, in turn, caused accuracy Providing a full­blown draft doctrine lies 9 well beyond the scope of this article. never­ and combat effectiveness to suffer. theless, one may identify some considerations unlike Soviet airpower in the 1980s, that of the united States in the twenty­first century that an airman might bring to the develop­ can inflict devastating, highly accurate attacks ment of joint Coin doctrine, as outlined in not only by tactical aircraft, but also by heavy the following examples.6 bombers flying at altitudes that rendered the taliban’s already meager air defense com­ Exploit the Psychological Impact pletely ineffective. according to Gen tommy Franks, uSa, retired, the newly acquired link­ of Contemporary American age of ground­based controllers to “B­52s or­ Airpower on Adversaries biting high above the battlefield had proven even more lethal than military theorists could as thorough a job as FM 3­24/MCWP 3­33.5 have imagined.”10 Enemy forces in long­held does in reviewing previous conflicts involving positions often never saw or heard the plane nontraditional adversaries, it does not incorpo­ that killed them. this new­style air onslaught rate the implications of the psychological di­ rapidly collapsed enemy morale and resistance. mension of today’s airpower. this is not a discus­ Moreover, it did so with minimal risk to uS sion about the much­debated effect of airpower personnel. one discouraged afghani told the on civilian morale but about how current preci­ New York Times that “we pray to allah that we sion capabilities influence the morale of com­ have american soldiers to kill” but added batants. it concerns the targeting of insurgents’ gloomily that “these bombs from the sky we “hearts and minds.”7 understanding how air­ cannot fight.”11 the taliban found the preci­ power drove the taliban and their al­Qaeda al­ sion fireof aC­130 gunships—another weapon lies from power in afghanistan, for example, is the Soviets did not possess—equally dispirit­

1-Dunlap.indd 64 10/29/07 9:02:18 AM AIR‑MINDED CONSIDERATIONS 65

ing. an afghan ally related to General Franks Properly employed, the air weapon can im­ that this “famous airplane . . . [has] destroyed pose friction and extreme psychological stress the spirit of the taliban and the arabs.”12 on insurgents.17 airmen may soon have a new these capabilities capture one of the fore­ weapon to carry out such devastating attacks— most features of contemporary american air­ the MQ­9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle.18 power in Coin situations: its ability to impose With a weapons load equivalent to that of the F­ the psychology of “engagement dominance” 16, the Reaper represents a new generation of on otherwise dogged adversaries.13 death per “hunter/killer” aircraft that can relentlessly pur­ se does not extinguish the will to fightin such sue insurgents at zero risk of losing an american. opponents; rather, it is the hopelessness that none of this suggests that airmen believe arises from the inevitability of death from a they should resolve Coin operations in the source they cannot fight. twenty­first century exclusively through the Sheer impotence in the face of superior use of force. it does say that there is still a weaponry and the denial of a meaningful place for its aggressive, offensive use as an im­ death will crush war­fighting instincts. Essen­ portant part of a holistic Coin doctrine, even tially, this amounts to exploitation of an inher­ in today’s highly scrutinized operations. nor ent fear of soldiers of all cultures: confronting does it mean that one should use only air­ technology against which they cannot fight. power when force is required. as operation Enduring Freedom has demonstrated, air­ Even experienced soldiers can be driven to power—along with allied forces on the ground near panic, as happened when British soldiers and enhanced by tiny numbers of uS special faced German tanks during World War ii with 14 forces—can produce results that minimize inadequate weaponry. risk to americans. the psychological effect of air attack’s inflic­ Clearly, however, not all air­minded ap­ tion of helplessness may exceed the physical proaches to Coin involve kinetic attacks against effects. Commenting on British use of airpower insurgents. airmen can also help devise non­ to suppress insurgencies in arab territories kinetic approaches to aid the host­nation popu­ during the 1920s and 1930s, Sir john Bagot Glubb lation caught in the violence. concluded that although aircraft do not gen­ erally inflict heavy casualties, “their tremen­ dous moral effect is largely due to the demor­ Consider Air-Minded alization engendered in the tribesman by his Approaches to Securing feelings of helplessness and his inability to reply ef­ fectively to the attack” (emphasis added).15 Fixed Locations one might say that american precision air­ of particular relevance to Coin opera­ power is analogous (on a much larger and ef­ tions—especially with respect to securing fective scale) to the effect that insurgents try to fixed locations—is the transformation under­ impose on uS and other friendly forces through gone by air Force security forces. it is quite the use of improvised explosive devices, the true that “today’s security forces career [field] 16 most deadly weapon faced by Coin forces. barely resembles its own air Force specialty the seeming randomness, unpredictability, code from a decade ago.”19 as a result of policy and persistence of these attacks are just as ef­ decisions in the 2005 time frame now en­ fective at destroying morale as causing casual­ shrined in joint doctrine, the air Force as­ ties. airpower, though, uses what might be sumed responsibility for defending air bases called “devised” explosive devices that neverthe­ “outside the wire.”20 less share many of the same morale­destroying airmen have shown that ground defense of and stress­inducing qualities. the air Force, a fixed location can succeed by applying air­ however, uses these devices against legitimate mindedness. Specifically, the air Force applied military targets and can employ them in vastly its own organizational theory and technological greater numbers. expertise to develop a unique approach to air

1-Dunlap.indd 65 10/29/07 9:02:18 AM 66 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

base defense, as it did with great success at “the precision airdrop system is seen as a way , iraq, during operation Safe­ of minimizing danger to convoys, which are side, a 60­day drive to quell hundreds of mortar frequent targets of roadside bombs. it can also and rocket attacks launched from a particu­ quickly resupply troops on the far­flungbattle ­ larly vexing sector of the perimeter.21 accord­ fields.”28 although the jPadS will probably never ing to the airmen involved, the operation’s replace surface convoys, experiments will soon achievements “dispelled the perception that begin with bundles weighing up to 60,000 army units are better organized, trained, and pounds, leading experts to conclude that “the equipped than air Force security forces to sky is the limit on where this can go for im­ conduct such operations. unlike previous army proving operations on the battlefield.”29 units, the task force achieved the desired ef­ fect.”22 the air Force now has specially trained ground­force units, including the airborne­ Maximize Airmen’s Expertise capable 820th Security Forces Group, ready to in Cyberspace and apply its distinctive approach to securing par­ ticular areas from insurgent attacks—an obvi­ Information Operations ous advantage in Coin situations.23 Cyberspace—the “physical domain within the air Force continues to look for other the electro­magnetic environment”—is the technological solutions especially suited for newest entry in airpower’s portfolio.30 the air the Coin environment. Currently, security Force has established a cyberspace command forces are testing the active denial System, aimed at maintaining not only dominance in technology originally developed by the air Force communications and information technology, Research laboratory and designed to “engage but also “superiority across the entire electro­ and repel human targets by projecting a beam magnetic spectrum.”31 Given the “inherently of energy that creates an intolerable heating technical . . . nature” of cyberspace operations, sensation on the skin.”24 it fits naturally with the culture of airmen.32 an additional technique for offsetting in­ Moreover, cyber operations are a direct surgent tactics against logistical lines of com­ expression of an air­minded approach. as munication for fixed locations involves airlift­ the air Force’s doctrine on irregular war­ ing vital materials so as to minimize the need fare points out, “like air operations, cyber for surface resupply. one could send air­ operations can strike directly at nodes of in­ landed materiel to those fixed locations with terest.”33 Properly executed, cyber operations airfields. as Gen Barry McCaffrey, uSa, re­ minimize the enemy’s opportunity to inflict tired, tells us, american airlift “flew 13,000 casualties that might otherwise result from truck loads of material into iraq for pinpoint close combat. distribution last year.”25 Such “pinpoint distri­ Consequently, in perhaps no other area are bution” by air, however, no longer requires an the antitechnology views espoused by some in­ actual airstrip. high­technology has reached dividuals more off target.34 actually, in the cy­ airdrop processes, which could significantly ber arena, high tech is both central to twenty­ reduce risk. first­century peer­competitor conventional war Specifically, uS airpower is undergoing a and one of the most revolutionary features of “revolution in airdrop technology.”26 although putatively “low­tech” contemporary Coin en­ the army serves as technical manager for the vironments. Max Boot points out that islamist joint Precision air drop System (jPadS), insurgents rely heavily on information tech­ which enables precision airdrop from 24,000 nologies that “barely existed in 1980.”35 Gen feet and higher—well above the threat alti­ Ronald Keys, uSaF, retired, former com­ tudes that bedevil rotary­wing operations—it mander of air Combat Command, provides was developed from air Force basic research.27 more detail: “the terrorists are using cyber­ the jPadS diminishes the enemy’s opportunity space now, remotely detonating roadside to inflict casualties. USA Today reports that bombs. terrorists use global positioning satel­

1-Dunlap.indd 66 10/29/07 9:02:19 AM AIR‑MINDED CONSIDERATIONS 67

lites and satellite communications; use the in­ For airmen, io includes influence opera­ ternet for financial transactions, radar and tions (although they are separate from tradi­ navigation jammings, blogs, chat rooms and tional public­affairs functions).43 unfortunately, bulletin boards aimed at our cognitive do­ the united States has enjoyed little success in main; e­mail, chat and others providing shad­ this area. in january 2007, the title of a News‑ owy command and control [C2]; and finally week article accurately noted that the united overt and covert attacks on our servers.”36 States is “losing the infowar” in iraq.44 Granted, airmen work to place an “‘information um­ this difficulty is not a new one, but the fact brella’ over friends and foes alike.”37 although that the insurgents are exploiting technology to one encounters legal constraints in many areas defeat american efforts (as General Keys also regarding what one may do in cyberspace, noted) is especially frustrating.45 Specifically, such restrictions may prove less of an issue in Newsweek observes that “insurgents using simple iraq. lt Gen abboud Gamber, iraqi com­ cell­phone cameras, laptop editing programs mander of the Baghdad security effort, de­ and the Web are beating the united States in 46 clared that under iraqi law, the government the fierce battle for iraqi public opinion.” could “search, control, and seize all parcel as suggested above, one can take extreme post, mail, telegraphs, [and] communication measures to deny insurgents access to or use devices as needed.”38 of these technologies. Some situations, such integral to cyberspace capability are informa­ as an unauthorized television station broad­ tion operations (io), which airmen, especially casting from within iraq, ought to be relatively easy to interdict technically (although it has in the air Force, consider a “key operational 47 function” of their component.39 thus, an air­ evidently proven difficult). this particular station’s anti­american invective has made it minded approach would look for opportunities the “face” of the insurgency within iraq, so to exploit technological means to “influence, shutting it down would clearly benefit the disrupt, corrupt, or usurp” the unconventional Coin effort and would seem to be in keeping kinds of C2 systems used by insurgents.40 with democratic values.48 Cyber operations may present opportuni­ in any event, this may be the only way to ties to limit the vulnerability of uS troops. as control enemy propaganda that is danger­ one of its central means of assisting the host­ ously inciting violence in certain areas. if we nation population, FM 3­24/MCWP 3­33.5 take such action, we might use a low­tech air­ advocates a “clear­hold­build” strategy that re­ power means (e.g., air­delivered leaflets—a quires Coin forces to “eliminate insurgent technique used successfully in iraq in the presence” in selected areas, followed by efforts past) to partially replace information that the to keep the location secure and rebuild host­ host­nation population in the affected area 41 nation institutions. unfortunately, these clear­ would lose.49 additionally, Commando Solo ing operations are very high risk. to minimize aircraft can broadcast appropriate messages that risk, one might do better to focus on the to otherwise denied areas.50 “build and hold” portions in more benign and utilizing military deception at this point in cooperative areas. operation iraqi Freedom would prove more that said, one may need an aggressive air­ problematic. although such deception re­ minded approach to prevent “uncleared” areas mains an internationally accepted means of from becoming electronic C2 sanctuaries. one warfare, one must take care to ensure it com­ author offers an “extreme proposal” perhaps plies with uS and iraqi law, as well as the po­ worth considering: “to completely shut down litical aims of both countries.51 Still, Coin ex­ the information technology grid in the insur­ pert Bard o’neill advises that “propaganda gent areas—telephones, cellular towers, and and disinformation campaigns” to discredit so on.”42 the proposal raises complex issues insurgent leaders can be effective.52 but does have the attractive feature of being again, this idea is not especially new. Back virtually casualty free. in 1995, thomas Czerwinski, then a professor

1-Dunlap.indd 67 10/29/07 9:02:19 AM 68 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

at national defense university’s School of infor­ hearts and minds of a potentially decisive mation Warfare, postulated one scenario: “What part of iraqi society. would happen if you took ’s to be sure, many influential iraqis oppose image, altered it, and projected it back to iraq women’s rights. according to Edward luttwak, showing him voicing doubts about his own clerics say that women’s rights are “only pro­ Baath Party?”53 if it can be updated effectively pagandized [by the united States] to persuade to apply to today’s insurgent leaders in iraq, iraqi daughters and wives to dishonor their the concept deserves careful consideration. families by imitating the shameless nakedness influence operations must also have posi­ and impertinence of Western women.”62 nev­ tive, accurate messages—what one might call ertheless, we may have a real opportunity to a “compelling counter­narrative.”54 Such a reach out to such a substantial portion of the narrative will help separate insurgents from population that could benefit so greatly. sources of support, an aim of many Coin strategies.55 in iraq, this becomes an especially complex task because, as one analyst puts it, Develop a Truly Joint Approach there may be as many as four “wars” occurring to Counterinsurgency That simultaneously, which may overlap and vary widely.56 designing messages and selecting tar­ Respects the Airman’s Expertise gets for them that would have the effect of dis­ FM 3­24/MCWP 3­33.5 also raises the seri­ rupting or even severing the insurgents’ sup­ ous and persisting issue of the control of air­ port are extremely difficult tasks. power, indicating that the ground commander one segment, however, cuts across all the should exercise that authority. according to groups and sects and might serve as a potential Air Force Magazine, FM 3­24/MCWP 3­33.5 ar­ uS ally—women, who arguably represent the gues, in effect, “that airpower is best put un­ largest oppressed group in iraq.57 indeed, war der control of a tactical ground commander widows suffer especially now, and women stand or, at the highest level, the multinational force to lose much if extremists take hold.58 the idea commander, but not an airman.”63 of reaching out to women has resonance in it is remarkable that FM 3­24/MCWP 3­33.5 classic Coin theory. david Galula’s book Pacifi­ chooses to resurrect a debate that has been a cation in Algeria, 1956–1958 discusses just such source of acrimony almost from the beginning an effort with the subjugated Kabyle women of the history of the air weapon. airmen hold during France’s algerian Coin operation.59 as an article of faith, embedded in doctrine, Furthermore, recent scholarship indicates that that “airmen work for airmen” so as to preserve the empowerment of women leads to clear eco­ the principles of unity of command and sim­ nomic and political gains, particularly when plicity.64 the air­mindedness of airmen can they assume leadership roles.60 in today’s alge­ ensure that the full capabilities of airpower ria, Muslim women are emerging as the na­ are brought to bear on the Coin challenge. tion’s “most potent force for social change . . . airmen believe that uS ground forces are [and are] having a potentially moderating and the finest in the world. unfortunately, that modernizing influence on society.”61 feeling evidently is not mutual. Many mem­ Positive messages to women about the bers of the ground component have an en­ value of a democracy that respects individual trenched belief that the air Force disdains rights and offers opportunities for participa­ close air support of ground forces—an ironic tion must be matched with complementary notion since, for example, about 79 percent action. one innovative possibility would en­ of the targets struck by airpower during iraqi tail establishing secure compounds explicitly Freedom fell into that category.65 also trou­ designed to aid women. among other things, bling is the report of lt Gen tom Mcinerney, providing a secure environment for women’s uSaF, retired, regarding signs that the army educational and organizational opportuni­ wants to build, in effect, its own air force even ties could catalyze the process of winning the though it has not always demonstrated, as dis­

1-Dunlap.indd 68 10/29/07 9:02:20 AM AIR‑MINDED CONSIDERATIONS 69

cussed below, the same level of expertise in airpower annex of FM 3­24/MCWP 3­33.5— handling aviation assets as it has with its evidently persists. ground forces.66 today’s airpower capabilities can amaze a recent example from iraqi Freedom might ground commanders engaged in the Coin prove instructive. in a Joint Forces Quarterly ar­ fight. one candidly expressed his astonishment ticle, Maj Robert j. Seifert points out that about an incident in iraq in which an F­15 aC­130 gunships are controlled by ground used its sensors to follow individual insurgents commanders who limit them to providing air as they tried to hide in reeds near a river: “ ‘i’d cover to specificunits. this makes the aircraft walked in the dark within ten feet of one guy unavailable to attack emerging targets in an­ and [the aircraft] sparkled the target right be­ other unit’s area of operations. Major Seifert hind me, told the [ground controller] to tell contends that this situation represents some­ me to turn around.’ ”72 he was then able to thing of a reversion to the airpower­control capture the otherwise­hidden insurgents. practices that proved so inefficient in north Given the approach to airpower in FM 3­24/ africa during World War ii. he suggests a MCWP 3­33.5, it is not surprising that ground more air­minded approach that would allow commanders fail to appreciate its potential—a the gunships to achieve their full potential by situation that hurts the Coin effort. one bat­ putting the weapon in an on­call status, con­ talion commander admitted that in his first tinually linked to joint terminal attack control­ few months in iraq, he “ ‘rarely put air into lers in several units (or other aircraft), thus [his] plan . . . because [he] did not under­ 67 stand how it could assist . . . in a counter insur­ optimizing each sortie. 73 in reality, american ground­force command­ gency fight.’” When it does consider airpower, FM 3­24/ ers often do not understand how to use air­ MCWP 3­33.5 clearly favors rotary­wing op­ power effectively and efficiently. Consider the tions. For example, it speaks of “technological army’s nearly disastrous operation anaconda advances” that “greatly [increase] the accu­ in afghanistan. Seymour hersh’s book Chain racy and utility of helicopter airdrops” for sus­ of Command suggests that army leaders mistak­ tainment.74 unfortunately, the survivability of enly thought that they “could do [the opera­ helicopters in hostile Coin environments is tion] on [their] own,” with little assistance 68 becoming increasingly suspect. one of the from the air component. as a result, the air few iraqi successes during the conventional component entered the planning process very phase of iraqi Freedom occurred in March late, forbidden to conduct major preparatory 2003, when iraqis used ordinary cell phones 69 strikes. although fixed­wing airpower even­ to orchestrate an ambush of apache helicop­ tually rescued the operation from serious dif­ ters that left 27 of 33 unable to fly.75 Even more ficulties and accounted for most of the terrorists disturbing are reports that iraqi insurgents killed in the operation, the army commander are fielding capabilities that exploit rotary­ nevertheless denigrated the air Force’s efforts wing vulnerabilities.76 although enthusiasts of in a subsequent magazine interview.70 the army attack helicopter continue to argue that interview really demonstrates the de­ for the efficacy of that weapon in the close gree to which this senior army commander fight, it seems that the air Force’s fixed­wing lacked sufficient understanding of airpower aircraft such as the a­10 (highly survivable in capabilities to ensure optimal planning. al­ the Coin environment) are more prudent though Ben lambeth’s analysis of anaconda in choices for the strike mission.77 his book Air Power against Terror was too gentle, having airmen control airpower produces it still concluded that “those who planned and a unique benefitfor the Coin fightbecause it initiated operation anaconda failed to make enables Coin forces to capitalize on a gap in the most of the potential synergy of air, space, insurgents’ understanding of military power. and landpower that was available to them.”71 in fact, Coin forces can dominate airpower’s indeed, that unfamiliarity—reflected in the asymmetric advantage if airmen are allowed

1-Dunlap.indd 69 10/29/07 9:02:20 AM 70 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

to exercise their advantage in expertise. do­ novation that can help secure vital iraqi oil and ing so has great potential because few insur­ electricity systems.83 to do so successfully still gents really understand the capabilities of air­ requires “boots on the ground,” but in smaller power that the united States can field today. numbers than would otherwise be required Such gaps have caused insurgents to make because of the size of the areas involved.84 catastrophic mistakes. Most Coin studies emphasize the need for in 1968, for example, Gen Vo nguyen Giap border security.85 in a new preface to his clas­ of north Vietnam lay siege to the Marine posi­ sic history, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954– tion at Khe Sanh. he mistakenly assumed that 1962, alistair horne notes that, just as in the american airpower would prove no more ef­ algerian conflict, insurgents in iraq rely on fective than French airpower during the 1954 support from other countries.86 airpower can siege of dien Bien Phu, the surrender of which assist in degrading the insurgents’ ability to spelled the end of France’s colonial empire in obtain that assistance from abroad by surveil­ Southeast asia.78 the result of this “insurgent” ling borders and interdicting unauthorized misperception of airpower? destruction and transits. like infrastructure protection, air­ defeat. under ferocious air attack called, ap­ power has the ability to obviate the need for propriately, operation niagara (B­52s alone large numbers of surface forces. the newly showered over 59,000 tons of bombs on enemy fieldedMQ ­9 Reaper appears ideally suited to forces), Giap’s troops abandoned their at­ provide the persistence required by this sur­ tempt after 77 bloody days.79 veillance mission and to take decisive kinetic there is no reason to believe that iraqi in­ action when needed. surgents have any particular airpower exper­ Besides interdicting cross­border transits, tise, even among members of the former re­ airpower can also deter nations disposed to as­ gime. in the aftermath of the destruction of sist the insurgency. Even if one assumes, as do the Republican Guard by air attack during james S. Corum and Wray R. johnson in their iraqi Freedom, a stunned iraqi army officer book Airpower in Small Wars, that Coin con­ expressed his frustration about his leadership: flicts“rarely present lucrative targets for aerial “they forgot that we are missing air power. . . . attack, and even more rarely is there ever a u.S. military technology is beyond belief.”80 chance for airpower to be employed in a stra­ tegic bombing campaign or even in attack op­ erations on any large scale,” that is not the And More. . . . case with nation­states supporting insurgents.87 they present a surfeit of targets and have Many other possibilities exist for creatively economies vulnerable to air­delivered coercion.88 exploiting airpower and technology to the this latter truth raises another aspect of benefit of the Coin effort—especially those airpower: it is the ultimate “Plan B.” FM 3­24/ capabilities that would reduce reliance on MCWP 3­33.5 identifies “protracted popular american boots on the ground. the following war” as one of the common insurgent ap­ represent some of the innovations already oc­ proaches. in phase three of this method, the curring or nearing readiness to enter the fight. insurgents “transition from guerrilla warfare Protecting iraqi infrastructure has been a to conventional warfare.”89 Because insurgents major challenge—one that Coin efforts his­ rarely have much capability or experience torically have faced.81 Modern airpower, how­ with airpower, they are especially vulnerable ever, has the persistence and ability to use to the air weapon during this stage.90 technology to leverage the ratio of force to not every insurgent movement passes space—elements critical to effective Coin through this conventional stage—it is even strategies.82 thus, techniques such as employ­ questionable whether some ever intend to ing alert to conduct “infra­ take over the governments they are attacking.91 structure­security missions” instead of simply nevertheless, at some point most insurgencies orbiting while awaiting calls is the kind of in­ seek to assume power. if for some reason they

1-Dunlap.indd 70 10/29/07 9:02:21 AM AIR‑MINDED CONSIDERATIONS 71

succeed, airpower can debilitate—if not de­ Obviously . . . stroy—their ability to function as a govern­ ment or threaten uS interests. What Col jeffery this article has certainly not included a Barnett argued in 1996 is just as true today: complete list of all the possible considerations “it’s important to emphasize the ability of high‑ an airman would bring to an air­minded technology airpower to deny insurgent victory over Coin doctrine—or, quite possibly, not even an extended time with minimal risk of US casual­ the most important ones. one might properly ties” (emphasis in original).92 view some or all as tactics, techniques, and Finally, Professors Metz and Millen contend procedures rather than doctrinal elements. at that containment strategies may be “more best, the article has offered a few illustrations logical” than other approaches in “liberation” of how an airman’s perspective might enlarge insurgency scenarios such as in iraq.93 air and and enhance a more joint approach in a doc­ naval power proved quite effective in enforc­ trine that superbly represents the ground­ ing the no­flyzones and sanctions against iraq; force conception of addressing the very diffi­ in conjunction with ground­force raids and cult problem of Coin in the twenty­first strikes, it could again provide a way to protect century. ❑ uS interests by containing the effects of an in­ surgency in iraq or elsewhere.94

Notes

1. Field Manual (FM) 3­24/Marine Corps Warfight­ 9. timothy Gusinov, “afghan War has lessons for u.S. ing Publication (MCWP) 3­33.5, Counterinsurgency, de­ Pilots in iraq,” Washington Times, 21 February 2007, 14, cember 2006, http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/ http://washingtontimes.com/world/20070220­101833 materials/coin­fm3­24.pdf (accessed 21 May 2007). ­6911r_page2.htm (accessed 18 april 2007); and Maj 2. Elaine M. Grossman, “Services agree to Write joint Edward B. Westermann, “the limits of Soviet airpower: doctrine for Counterinsurgency ops,” Inside the Pentagon, the Bear versus the Mujahideen in afghanistan, 1979– 24 May 2007, 1. 1989” (thesis, School of advanced airpower Studies, june 3. air Force doctrine document (aFdd) 2, Operations 1997), 78–79, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi­bin/GettRdoc and Organization, 3 april 2007, 2, https://www.doctrine ?ad=ada391797&location=u2&doc=GettRdoc.pdf .af.mil/afdcprivateweb/aFdd_Page_htMl/doctrine (accessed 14 april 2007). _docs/aFdd2.pdf (accessed 13 june 2007). 10. Gen tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, 4. ibid. American Soldier (new York: Regan Books, 2004), 308. 5. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and 11. Barry Bearak, “a nation Challenged: death on Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing the Ground,” New York Times, 13 october 2001, B01. Threat and Response (Carlisle, Pa: uS army Strategic Studies 12. Franks, American Soldier, 312n10. institute, november 2004), vii (see also 25–26), http:// 13. Brig Gen Charles j. dunlap jr., “neo­Strategicon: www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/insurgency21c.pdf Modernized Principles of War for the 21st Century,” Mili­ (accessed 23 May 2007). tary Review, March–april 2006, 45, http://www.smallwars 6. “Military doctrine presents considerations on how journal.com/documents/milreviewmarch6.pdf (accessed a job should be done to accomplish military goals.” aFdd 17 March 2007). 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 november 2003, 11, https:// 14. Richard holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/aFdd_Page_htMl/ Battle (new York: Free Press, 1985), 227. doctrine_docs/afdd1.pdf (accessed 8 March 2007). 15. j. B. Glubb, “air and Ground Forces in Punitive 7. Maj jon huss, “Exploiting the Psychological Effects Expeditions,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 71, of airpower: a Guide for the operational Commander,” no. 483 (august 1926): 782, as quoted in Maj Michael a. Aerospace Power Journal 13, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 23, http:// longoria, “a historical View of air Policing doctrine: www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/ lessons from the British Experience between the Wars, win99/huss.pdf (accessed 29 May 2007). 1919–1939” (thesis, School of advanced airpower Studies, 8. Stephen tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from May 1992), 23, http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/ Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (new York: da SaaS_theses/SaaSS_out/longoria/longoria.pdf (ac­ Capo Press, 2002), 267. cessed 9 april 2007).

1-Dunlap.indd 71 10/29/07 9:02:21 AM 72 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

16. See, generally, “terrorist tactics,” Operation Iraqi http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyid=123037942 Freedom, 4 january 2007, http://www.mnf­iraq.com/index (accessed 12 February 2007). .php?option=com_content&task=view&id=727&itemid=44 27. uS army Research, development and Engineer­ (accessed 16 april 2007); and “improvised Explosive de­ ing Command, “airdrop/aerial delivery,” in Natick Soldier vices (iEds) in iraq: Effects and Countermeasures,” Con­ Center: The Science behind the Warrior, May 2006, 3, http:// gressional Research Service Report (Washington, dC: li­ www.ssc.army.mil/soldier/media/print/nSC_Brochure brary of Congress, 10 February 2006), http://stinet.dtic _5­15­06.pdf (accessed 12 February 2007); and Erin Crawley, .mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html& “air Force Research Provides Seeds to high­tech Cargo identifier=ada454399 (accessed 16 april 2007). delivery System,” air Force office of Scientific Research, 17. Major huss contends that air operations should Public affairs, 11 january 2007, http://www.afosr.af.mil/ be “designed to convince the enemy forces of four truths: news/nr_2007_01_jPadS.htm (accessed 12 February 2007). 1. their defenses are useless. 2. if they move, operate, or 28. tom Vanden Brook, “ ‘Smart’ airdrops May Save remain with their equipment and/or weapons, they will lives of u.S. troops,” USA Today, 8 january 2007, http:// be targeted and killed. 3. they will receive no rest from www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007­01­07­chute_x the bombing. 4. the worst is yet to come.” huss, “Exploit­ .htm (accessed 12 February 2007). ing the Psychological Effects of airpower,” 32. 29. Maj dan deVoe, as quoted by Sturkol, “jPadS 18. Bruce Rolfsen, “Reaper Squadron Greets First Continues ‘Revolution in airdrop technology.’ ” uaV,” Air Force Times, 26 March 2007, 26 (discussing the 30. lt Col david t. Fahrenkrug, “Cyberspace defined,” possible deployment of the weapon to iraq and afghani­ The Wright Stuff, air university, 17 May 2007, http://www stan); and “MQ9 Reaper unmanned aerial Vehicle,” fact .maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/0209/articles/ sheet, Air Force Link, january 2007, http://www.af.mil/ Cyberspacedefined.html (accessed 18 May 2007). factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsid=6405 (accessed 17 april 2007). 31. Secretary of the air Force Michael W. Wynne, “Cy­ 19. Maj ann P. Knabe, “today’s Security Forces are berspace as a domain in Which the air Force Flies and Expeditionary Combat airmen,” 29 november 2006, Fights” (remarks delivered to the C4iSR integration Con­ american Forces Print news, http://www.af.mil/news/ ference, Crystal City, Va, 2 november 2006), http://www story.asp?storyid=123033104 (accessed 4 February 2007). .af.mil/library/speeches/speech.asp?id=283 (accessed 16 20. “the security environment requires that deployed april 2007); and department of the air Force, “Cyber­ military units, forward­based activities, and forward operat­ space,” in 2007 U.S. Air Force Posture Statement, http://www ing bases protect themselves against threats designed to .posturestatement.hq.af.mil/1_2_intro.htm (accessed 18 interrupt, interfere, or impair the effectiveness of joint april 2007). operations.” joint Publication 3­10, Joint Security Operations 32. “the Cyberspace Vision: developing Capabilities in Theater, 1 august 2006, vii, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ to deliver Sovereign options in Cyberspace,” in Annual jel/new_pubs/jp3_10.pdf (accessed 4 February 2007). Report 2006 (Wright­Patterson aFB, oh: Graduate School 21. Rebecca Grant, “Safeside in the desert,” Air Force of Engineering and Management, air Force institute of Magazine 90, no. 2 (February 2007): 44–48, http://www technology, 2006), 1, http://www.afit.edu/en/enr/PdF/ .afa.org/magazine/feb2007/0207desert.pdf (accessed 4 aFit%20annual%20Report%202006.pdf (accessed 16 February 2007). april 2007). 22. Brig Gen Robert h. “Bob” holmes et al., “the air 33. aFdd 2­3, Irregular Warfare, 1 august 2007, 45, Force’s new Ground War: Ensuring Projection of aero­ https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/aFdd space Power through Expeditionary Security operations,” _Page_htMl/doctrine_docs/afdd2­3.pdf. Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 43, 34. See, for example, Maj Gen Robert h. Scales, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ “Clausewitz and World War iV,” Armed Forces Journal, july apj06/fal06/Fal06.pdf (accessed 4 February 2007). 2006, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/07/ 23. See, generally, “820th Security Forces Group,” fact 1866019 (accessed 18 april 2007). sheet, Moody aFB, Ga, http://www.moody.af.mil/library/ 35. Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4459 (accessed 4 February the Course of History, 1500 to Today (new York: Gotham 2007). Books, 2006), 419. 24. “active denial System,” fact sheet, air Force Re­ 36. as quoted by SSgt julie Weckerlein in “Cyberspace search laboratory, august 2006, http://www.de.afrl.af.mil/ Warfare Remains Serious Business,” air Force news, 2 Factsheets/activedenial.swf (accessed 4 February 2007); March 2007, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=12304 and a1C Eric Schloeffel, “820th SFG Evaluates non­lethal 3232 (accessed 16 april 2007). Weapon,” 23d Wing Public affairs, air Combat Com­ 37. aFdd 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 15. mand, 25 january 2007, http://www.acc.af.mil/news/ 38. joshua Partlow, “Baghdad Plan has Elusive tar­ story.asp?id=123038820 (accessed 4 February 2007). gets,” Washington Post, 26 February 2007, 1. 25. Gen Barry M. McCaffrey to Col Michael Meese, 39. aFdd 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 39. memorandum, 26 March 2007, 6, http://www.iraqslogger 40. aFdd 2­5, Information Operations, 11 january 2005, .com/downloads/McCaffreyiraq.pdf (accessed 16 april 1 and chap. 2, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service 2007). _pubs/afdd2_5.pdf (accessed 19 april 2007). 26. tSgt Scott t. Sturkol, “jPadS Continues ‘Revolution 41. FM 3­24 / MCWP 3­33.5, Counterinsurgency, 5­18 in airdrop technology,’” air Force news, 18 january 2007, (par. 5­52).

1-Dunlap.indd 72 10/29/07 9:02:22 AM AIR‑MINDED CONSIDERATIONS 73

42. Martin j. Muckian, “Structural Vulnerabilities of 1, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/bal networked insurgencies: adapting to the new adversary,” ­te.sheikh29may29,0,6614816.story?coll=bal­home­headlines Parameters 36, no. 4 (Winter 2006–7): 24, http://www (accessed 29 May 2007) (discussing a tribal sheik who .carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06winter/muckian hopes to build a “woman’s center that can help the poor, .pdf (accessed 19 april 2007). the unemployed, and often oppressed,” including “700 43. aFdd 2­5, Information Operations, chap. 2. war widows” in his area). See also james Palmer, “Extrem­ 44. Scott johnson, “We’re losing the infowar,” News‑ ists Force Women to hide under head Scarves,” Washing­ week, 15 january 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ ton Times, 10 april 2007, 1, http://www.washtimes.com/ 16497895/site/newsweek (accessed 19 april 2007). world/20070410­124734­6465r.htm (accessed 20 april 45. See, for example, “toward a Free and democratic 2007); and tina Susman, “Fallout from Girl’s Stoning Em­ iraq: organizing, training, and Equipping to optimize bodies iraq’s discord,” Los Angeles Times, 21 May 2007, influenceo perations in the iraq theater of operations,” http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la­fg aCC White Paper (langley aFB, Va: air Combat Com­ ­stoning21may21,1,1597325.story?coll=la­headlines­world mand, july 2004) (copy on file with the author). &ctrack=1&cset=true (accessed 21 May 2007). 46. johnson, “We’re losing the infowar.” 59. david Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958 47. liz Sly, “Graphic u.S. deaths Broadcast in iraq,” (1963; repr., Santa Monica, Ca: Rand, 2006), 105, Chicago Tribune, 25 February 2007, 1, http://www.chicago http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/Rand tribune.com/news/nationworld/chi­0702250348feb25,1, _MG478­1.pdf. 2576533.story?coll=chi­newsnationworld­hed (accessed 19 60. See, for example, Swanee hunt, “let Women Rule,” april 2007). Foreign Affairs, May/june 2007, http://www.huntalternatives 48. ibid. Even uS law permits restrictions on speech .org/download/488_5_07_let_women_rule.pdf (accessed that would likely cause imminent unlawful activity. See 18 May 2007). Brandenburg v. ohio, 395 uS 444 (1969), FindLaw, 61. Michael Slackman, “a Quiet Revolution in alge­ http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court= ria: Gains by Women,” New York Times, 26 May 2007, uS&vol=395&invol=444 (accessed 19 april 2007). http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/26/world/africa/ 49. jim Garamone, “Coalition aircraft ‘Paper’ iraq 26algeria.html?ex=1337832000&en=d053e21c020d2823 with leaflets,” american Forces Press Service, 19 March &ei=5124&partner=digg&exprod=digg (accessed 28 May 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id 2007). =29278 (accessed 19 april 2007). 62. Edward luttwak, “dead End: Counterinsurgency 50. “EC­130j Commando Solo,” fact sheet, Air Force Warfare as Military Malpractice,” Harper’s Magazine, Feb­ Link, november 2006, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/fact ruary 2007, http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/02/ sheet.asp?fsid=182 (accessed 21 May 2007). 0081384 (accessed 19 april 2007). 51. See, for example, joint Publication 3­13.4, Military 63. john a. tirpak, “Washington Watch” (see “the Deception, 13 july 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ Petraeus doctrine”), Air Force Magazine 90, no. 3 (March jel/new_pubs/jp3_13_4.pdf (accessed 20 april 2007). uS 2007): 14, http://www.afa.org/magazine/march2007/ policy and law properly do not allow directing influence 0307watch.pdf (accessed 16 april 2007). operations towards domestic audiences. air Force instruc­ 64. aFdd 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, x, 61. tion (aFi) 35­101, Public Affairs Polices and Procedures, 29 65. Operation Iraqi Freedom—By the Numbers (Shaw aFB, november 2005, par. 1.13, http://www.e­publishing SC: assessment and analysis division, uS Central Com­ .af.mil/pubfiles/af/35/afi35­101/afi35­101.pdf (accessed mand air Forces, 30 april 2003), 5, http://www.au.af 20 april 2007). .mil/au/awc/awcgate/af/oifcentaf.pdf (accessed 5 Feb­ 52. Bard E. o’neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From ruary 2007). Revolution to Apocalypse (Washington, dC: Potomac Books, 66. lt Gen tom Mcinerney, “Budgeting for the joint 2005), 169. Force,” Human Events.com, 9 February 2007, http://www 53. as quoted by Peter Grier, “information Warfare,” .humanevents.com/article.php?id=19352 (accessed 19 april Air Force Magazine 78, no. 3 (March 1995): 35. 2007). 54. NETworked Radicalization: A Counter‑Strategy (Washing­ 67. Maj Robert j. Seifert, “iraq and the aC­130: Gun­ ton, dC: homeland Security Policy institute, George Wash­ ships unleashed,” Joint Force Quarterly, issue 45 (2d quarter ington university, and the Critical incident analysis Group, 2007): 78, 81, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/ university of Virginia, May 2007), 15, 17, http://www editions/i45/19.pdf (accessed 20 april 2007). .gwumc.edu/hspi/reports/nEtworked%20Radicalization 68. Seymour M. hersh, Chain of Command: The Road from _a%20Counter%20Strategy.pdf. 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (new York: harperCollins, 2004), 137. 55. Muckian, “Structural Vulnerabilities of networked 69. Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective (Wash­ insurgencies,” 16. ington, dC: headquarters united States air Force, aF/ 56. Phillip Carter, “there are Four iraq Wars: how Xol, 7 February 2005), 114–15, http://www.af.mil/ Many of them Can We Win?” Slate, 9 February 2007, shared/media/document/aFd­060726­037.pdf (accessed http://www.slate.com/id/2159460 (accessed 18 april 2007). 19 February 2007). 57. Swanee hunt and Cristina Posa, “iraq’s Excluded 70. Benjamin S. lambeth, Air Power against Terror: Women,” Foreign Policy, july/august 2004, 40. America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa 58. See, for example, david Wood, “anbar at tipping Monica, Ca: Rand, 2005), 226–27, http://www.rand Point, but u.S. Support Falters,” Baltimore Sun, 29 May 2007, .org/pubs/monographs/2006/Rand_MG166­1.pdf (ac­

1-Dunlap.indd 73 10/29/07 9:02:22 AM 74 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

cessed 6 april 2007); and Robert h. McElroy, “afghani­ 82. See, for example, archer jones, The Art of War in stan: Fire Support for operation anaconda” (interview the Western World (urbana, il: university of illinois Press, with Maj Gen Franklin l. hagenbeck), Field Artillery, 1987), 684. September–october 2002, 5, 7–8, http://sill­www.army 83. Belote, “Counterinsurgency airpower,” 57. .mil/famag/Go_to_War_Primer/pdf_files/opanaconda 84. lt Gen Robert j. Elder jr., “Effects­Based opera­ .pdf (accessed 19 February 2007). tions: a Command Philosophy,” Air and Space Power Jour­ 71. lambeth, Air Power against Terror, xxii. nal 21, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 10–17, http://www.airpower 72. Col howard d. Belote, “Counterinsurgency air­ .maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/spr07/spr07 power: air­Ground integration for the long War,” Air and _images/spr07.pdf (accessed 20 april 2007). Space Power Journal 20, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 58, http://www 85. See, for example, austin long, On “Other War”: .airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/ Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research fal06/Fal06.pdf (accessed 14 May 2007). (Santa Monica, Ca: Rand, 2006), 49–51, http://www 73. ibid. .rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/Rand_MG482.pdf 74. FM 3­24 / MCWP 3­33.5, Counterinsurgency, 8­9. (accessed 18 april 2007). 75. See, generally, department of the army, “apache 86. alistair horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, longbow,” army Fact File, http://www.army.mil/fact_files 1954–1962 (1977; repr., new York: new York Review of _site/apache/index.html (accessed 5 February 2007); Books Classics, 2006), 18. See, for example, Sudarsan and Greg Grant, “u.S. Cuts Role of apache for deep at­ Raghavan, “iran Giving arms to iraq’s Sunnis, u.S. Mili­ tack,” DefenseNews.com, 3 april 2006, http://www.defense tary Says,” Washington Post, 12 april 2007, a22, http:// news.com/story.php?F=1607858&C=airwar (accessed 12 www.washingtonpost.com/wp­dyn/content/article/2007/ February 2007). 04/11/aR2007041102121.html (accessed 29 May 2007); 76. associated Press, “loss of 4 helicopters Sparks and Bill Gertz, “top officer Says u.S. Forces Stopping al Procedure Changes,” CNN.com, 4 February 2007, http:// Qaeda Flow in iraq,” Washington Times, 4 May 2007, 6, www.cnn.com/2007/WoRld/meast/02/04/iraq.heli http://www.washtimes.com/national/20070503­115739 copter.ap/index.html (accessed 5 February 2007). ­2909r.htm (accessed 29 May 2007) (discussing al­Qaeda 77. See, for example, Maj Robert M. Cassidy, “Renais­ fighters entering iraq from Syria). sance of the attack helicopter in the Close Fight,” Mili­ 87. james S. Corum and Wray R. johnson, Airpower in tary Review, july–august 2003, 38, http://usacac.army.mil/ Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (lawrence: CaC/milreview/English/julaug03/julaug03/cassidy university Press of Kansas, 2003), 8. .pdf (accessed 27 March 2007); “a­10/oa­10 thunder­ 88. Compare Stephen hosmer, Why Milosevic Decided bolt ii,” fact sheet, Air Force Link, September 2006, http:// to Settle When He Did (Santa Monica, Ca: Rand, 2001), www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=70 (accessed 21 http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1351 april 2007); and Fred Kaplan, “Chop the Chopper: the (accessed 21 May 2007). “the bombing, as it intensified, army’s apache attack­helicopter had a Bad War,” Slate, stimulated a growing interest on the part of Milosevic and 23 april 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2081906 (accessed his associates to end the conflict” (xx, 124). 25 May 2007). See also Robert d. Kaplan, “hunting the 89. FM 3­24/MCWP 3­33.5, Counterinsurgency, 1­25, 1­34. taliban in las Vegas,” Atlantic Monthly, September 2006, 90. one of the very rare instances of insurgents 81, 82, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200609/ launching a manned air attack occurred in Sri lanka taliban­vegas (accessed 29 May 2007). when the tamil tigers attacked a government air base 78. See, generally, Walter j. Boyne, “airpower at Khe with two Czech­built Zlin Z 143 light planes. iqbal athas, Sanh,” Air Force Magazine 81, no. 9 (august 1998), http:// “lttE Mounts its First air attack,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 4 www.afa.org/magazine/aug1998/0898khesanh.asp (ac­ april 2007, 6. cessed 13 april 2007). 91. See, for example, david Brooks, “the insurgent 79. ibid. advantage,” New York Times, 18 May 2007, a25. 80. as quoted by terry McCarthy, “What Ever hap­ 92. Col jeffery R. Barnett, “defeating insurgents with pened to the Republican Guard?” Time Magazine, 4 May technology,” Airpower Journal 10, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 2003, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9 73, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ 171,1101030512­449441,00.html (accessed 27 March 2007). apj96/sum96/barnett.pdf (accessed 19 april 2007). 81. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report to 93. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, vii. Congress (Washington, dC: department of defense, 94. See, generally, department of defense, “iraq no­ March 2007), 20–21, http://www.defenselink.mil/home/ Fly Zone Violations,” Defend America, n.d., http://www pdf/9010_March_2007_Final_Signed.pdf (accessed 21 .defendamerica.mil/iraq/iraq_nofly.html (accessed 24 May May 2007). 2007).

1-Dunlap.indd 74 10/29/07 9:02:23 AM To Bomb or Not to Bomb? Counterinsurgency, Airpower, and Dynamic Targeting

Maj jason M. Brown, UsaF

Editorial Abstract: Air strikes, independent from ground operations, are known as “dynamic targeting.” These types of strikes have typically been counterproductive in counterinsurgency campaigns due to subsequent collateral damage, whether real or perceived. However, Major Brown asserts that commanders and planners who integrate dynamic targeting into the counter­ insurgency campaign using careful target selection; quick, precise employment; and solid as­ sessment of the enemy and population will produce positive, tangible results.

ince the “banana wars” of the early (iSR); and so forth—in counterinsurgency twentieth century, airpower has played campaigns to gain advantages over insurgents. an important role in counterinsurgency airpower in the form of air strikes occurring campaigns. armed forces have used all independently of ground operations has proven Sforms of airpower—airlift; close air support; controversial in small wars. We now call such intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance strikes “dynamic targeting.”1

75

2-Brown.indd 75 10/29/07 9:02:56 AM 76 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

historically, this type of targeting has Determining generally been counterproductive in counter­ insurgencies due to real or perceived collat­ Appropriate Targets eral damage.2 Yet, the US military and others in order to link specific actions to objec­ have good reasons for using airpower for tives that support the strategic end state, the these operations. First, as marines in al­anbar targeting process identifies appropriate tar­ Province have seen, kinetic operations are gets and the best means of engaging them.10 necessary to remove determined extremists effective targeting of insurgents requires un­ in order to conduct security, social services, derstanding the unique characteristics of in­ and economic development.3 thus, in cer­ surgent networks, which reveals critical ele­ tain situations our forces—like natO’s in af­ ments and nodes, and knowing how the ghanistan—will need the advantages airpower population’s attitude and behavior affect the brings.4 Second, in well­publicized cases, air targeting process. strikes have generated good results for gov­ Our forces are well versed in analyzing tra­ ernment forces, such as the air campaign ditional target systems such as an integrated against hamas leaders and the elimination of air Defense System. When looking at tradi­ abu Musab al­Zarqawi.5 third, the combina­ tional systems, we typically focus on the equip­ tion of using high­fidelity iSR feeds and guided ment. the basic element of the insurgent weapons has given militaries a limited ability network—the human being—has mobility, to distinguish insurgents from the population flexibility, survivability, and predictability not and strike them with precision, while mitigat­ limited by the equipment or facilities associ­ ing collateral damage.6 ated with traditional target systems. these Such reasoning carries dangers, however. characteristics make target­system analysis for airpower capabilities may cause counter­ insurgent networks very challenging. to over­ insurgency forces to overemphasize combat come the difficulty of analyzing these com­ operations and the elimination of high­value plex, adaptive systems, we sometimes attempt targets. also, when operational­level com­ to model, classify, or lump insurgencies into groups, applying labels such as “Maoist” or manders can “watch” insurgents in real time “modern” to them in order to frame their be­ by means of iSR feeds, they tend to fall back havior and characteristics. trying to make an to the tactical level, thus reinforcing the “we insurgency fit a specific model is difficult. no must do something now” mentality.7 this re­ two insurgencies are alike because the condi­ active approach can quickly devolve into a tions to which they must adapt are never en­ game of “whack a mole,” which can cause tirely the same. commanders to neglect other important Understanding that insurgencies adapt and lines of operation and lose focus on the stra­ 8 evolve over time, we have attempted to model tegic end state. even today, traditional their evolutionary process. Mao tse­tung be­ problems in using airpower to target insur­ lieved that successful insurgencies had to pass gents can easily emerge. through three phases of evolution, culminating to avoid these pitfalls, commanders and with insurgents becoming a regular force fight­ planners must integrate the use of airpower ing a positional war with counterinsurgency for dynamic targeting into the operational forces.11 although this concept worked for the design of a counterinsurgency campaign.9 chinese communists in the late 1940s, there is Successful conduct of the latter depends upon little chance that the taliban and iraqi insur­ whether commanders and their staffs (1) de­ gencies will evolve into a regular force that termine appropriate targets during planning; can directly challenge the United States. each (2) ensure that air strikes are quick, lethal, insurgency takes a different evolutionary path. and precise; and (3) accurately assess the insurgents will assume whatever form they be­ friendly action, enemy reaction, and response lieve will achieve their common political goal of the population. and adapt to the conditions that exist in their

2-Brown.indd 76 10/29/07 9:02:56 AM TO BOMB OR NOT TO BOMB? 77

environment. that may or may not include the insurgency values most are likely critical large­scale forces and tactics. even if we can elements and nodes that offer the greatest po­ find an appropriate model that fits an insur­ tential for targeting. Valued, tangible traits of­ gency to aid in targeting, it will be short­lived fer the best opportunities for targeting with because of the insurgency’s adaptability. airpower. For example, if an insurgent group Rather than looking to preset models to uses a centralized command structure, its find appropriate targets in an insurgent net­ leaders would serve as critical nodes—poten­ work, analysts could better understand how tially ideal targets for air strikes. insurgents adapt and evolve by using the con­ the criticality of leadership nodes depends cepts of sociobiology. Jeffrey White, a former entirely on structural centralization—not stan­ Defense intelligence agency executive, identi­ dard for all insurgencies. We tend to assume fies traits, adaptation, selection/environmental the appropriateness of targeting an insurgent pressure, fitness, reproduction, competition, network’s structure through a “leadership at­ cooperation, and survival as useful concepts trition” or “[high­value target] strategy.”14 that can illuminate behavior and the prospects Martin J. Muckian argues that the structure of for insurgency.12 an insurgent network’s func­ the iraqi insurgency differs from that of Maoist tion, evolution, and success are tied to these insurgencies, the former so disparate that tar­ factors. When conducting operational design, geting leadership would not have the same ef­ commanders and planners should determine fect. its critical nodes are function­ rather than the best method to influencethese elements— leadership­based. individuals with the most directly, indirectly, kinetically, nonkinetically, importance and least amount of redundancy and so forth. targets appropriate for kinetic have rare skills, such as bomb making, or serve engagement with airpower are tangible and as the only links between insurgent organiza­ distinguishable, which means we can likely tions.15 their elimination would have a greater find them in the traits of the network, such as disruptive effect than the loss of a leader. the ones White identifies as important to the counterinsurgency forces also need to as­ success of an insurgency: sess the population’s attitude toward the in­ • Structure —centralized, decentralized, flat surgency, which may prove hard to do. the bulk of a population falls somewhere along a • Nature/identity—kinship, ideological/religious, spectrum defined by support for the insur­ personal (based on an individual), party/faction, gency at one end and support for the govern­ foreign/indigenous, composite (a blend of ment at the other, with a neutral zone in be­ several identities) tween.16 Military leaders should understand • Purpose/function —operational, support, inte­ where the population falls on that spectrum. grated an insurgency receiving significant support • Scope —narrow or broad relative to functions, from the population can disperse, duplicate, geographic range, and/or goals and potentially decentralize critical elements and nodes, thus making it more survivable. • Knowledge, skills, and abilities —held by group hezbollah insurgents, for example, evolved in leaders and members this manner and became integrated into the • Membership and recruitment base —kinship, other population. forms of association, local, foreign, indigenous israel has experienced both success and fail­ • Resources —arms, money, connectivity (to im­ ure in determining appropriate targets during portant social structures), status (within the its small wars with hamas and hezbollah. the social system) israelis succeeded in disrupting hamas in the Palestinian territories from 2003 to 2004. • Adaptability —ability to learn, ability to change israel’s high­tempo air campaign against behavior based on learning, preadaptation13 hamas leadership and other targets incapaci­ every insurgency places different impor­ tated the organization, but the israelis learned tance on each of these traits. the ones that the wrong lessons from their success when

2-Brown.indd 77 10/29/07 9:02:57 AM 78 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

they decided to engage hezbollah in Lebanon aerial vehicles and precision­guided muni­ in 2006. hezbollah had spent the previous six tions to counter mobile surface­to­air­missile years preparing, dispersing, and decentraliz­ systems.19 they eventually adapted these tac­ ing its logistics and command and control tics to target terrorist leaders in Lebanon and (c2). Furthermore, israel certainly did not the Palestinian territories, giving airpower a have the same quality of human intelligence new role in counterinsurgency warfare. al­ in southern Lebanon that it enjoyed in the though technology has made airpower more Palestinian territories. israel’s limited capacity viable in targeting insurgents and terrorists, for assessing the effects of the air strikes im­ we must improve our processes to achieve the paired its ability to adapt to hezbollah’s coun­ level of speed, lethality, and precision needed tertargeting techniques. to fight them. these examples show how the effectiveness the first criterion, speed, is especially critical of air strikes relates to understanding the in­ in counterinsurgency because of insurgents’ surgents’ network structure and integration mobility and ability to melt away quickly into with the population. the hierarchical struc­ the population. We have only fleeting oppor­ ture of hamas made it vulnerable to air strikes, tunities to strike them. if a commander de­ whereas the decentralized structure of hez­ cides to engage an insurgent target, he or she bollah enabled it to remain combat effective usually does so when the target is distinguish­ despite the destruction of many fighters and able, stationary, and vulnerable to attack with much equipment.17 israel’s experience shows low risk of collateral damage. the target situa­ that, much like treating a cancer, combat op­ tion can change very rapidly, however, espe­ erations prove more effective on an immature cially in an urban environment. insurgents and isolated insurgency. can move, and civilians can become a factor at any time. When commanders see an opportu­ in a counterinsurgency campaign, under­ nity to strike, their forces must do so in sec­ standing what targets to hit represents just the onds or minutes, not hours. first step. the second involves the way we col John boyd argued that the individual who strike them—arguably a more vital process in observes, orients, decides, and acts (OODa) irregular than in regular warfare. because in­ at a faster tempo than his enemy will succeed surgents operate within a population, they are in combat. this notion is just as relevant in ir­ difficultto distinguish from innocent civilians regular warfare as it is in regular warfare. the and can disappear quickly. When targeting OODa loop deals not only with combat suc­ them, counterinsurgency forces cannot afford cess but also with adapting to survive.20 there­ delays, multiple attacks, and occasional misses. fore, insurgents must make every effort to attacking insurgents requires speed, lethality, keep their loop short. in looking for ways to ac­ and precision. celerate our loop, we tend to focus on technical, logistical, and tactical improvements. these can improve aspects of the observe, orient, Speed, Lethality, and Precision and act phases, but the decide portion con­ in 2004 the presence of a few Marine snipers, sists of cognitive processes and comprises the reacting quickly and using deadly accuracy, nexus of “clausewitzian friction.”21 this makes wreaked havoc on insurgents in Fallujah, the decision phase the most time­consuming iraq.18 airpower cannot match the speed, le­ process during the dynamic targeting of insur­ thality, and precision of a sniper, but the sniper gents with airpower. in 1928 Wing cdr R. h. example shows the importance of these fac­ Peck of the Royal air Force discussed his ex­ tors in engaging insurgents kinetically. his­ perience in dealing with decision­making de­ torically, airpower has fallen short with regard lays while fighting insurgents in iraq: to these criteria when engaging insurgents on Long delays have sometimes and in recent times its own. beginning in the 1980s, however, the taken place before permission to take air action israelis developed tactics using unmanned has been given, and the whole advantage of the

2-Brown.indd 78 10/29/07 9:02:57 AM TO BOMB OR NOT TO BOMB? 79

rapidity of air action has been completely digit minutes. in a counterinsurgency effort, thrown away, and the original trouble has we should concentrate on refining decision spread. On other occasions, when air action has making and using an F2t2Dea kill chain, thus been approved in principle, authority to engage emphasizing the importance of the decide particular targets found has had to be obtained step in these operations.25 from distant superiors, and even through two or three successive authorities, when the targets Field Manual (FM) 3­60.1, Multi­Service Tac­ found have of course dispersed long before this tics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time­ permission could be obtained.22 Sensitive Targets addresses many of the challenges involved in dynamic­targeting operations. it to increase the tempo of dynamic­targeting adopts the air Force’s F2t2ea kill chain but also operations, commanders should focus on im­ discusses many joint c2 and decision­making proving processes tied to decision making and processes applicable to counterinsurgency op­ collaboration. Decision making for targeting erations, such as understanding the capabilities insurgents with airpower is a joint process, and limitations of the joint force, decentraliz­ which creates unique challenges when multiple ing and simplifying c2, and anticipating re­ components operate in the same nonlinear quirements in order to conduct processes in battlespace. Unfortunately, doctrine does not parallel. Written for a regular, linear type of give us a consistent picture of how the target­ warfare, however, FM 3­60.1 does not discuss ing process should work in these cases. the unique dynamic­targeting challenges that Published in June 2006, air Force Doctrine insurgencies present to decision makers.26 Document (aFDD) 2­1.9, Targeting, recognizes the new FM 3­24/Marine corps Warfighting the problems that “stability operations” create Publication (McWP) 3­33.5, Counterinsurgency, for the targeting process, but they are not re­ treats the decide step as a major part of the flected in the dynamic­targeting methodology. targeting process (decide, detect, deliver, and the document defines a six­step dynamic­ assess) but includes only a very limited discus­ targeting “kill chain” consisting of finding,fix ­ sion of targeting. it erroneously states that ing, tracking, targeting, engaging, and assess­ “the targeting process occurs in the targeting ing (F2t2ea).23 Unfortunately, deciding is not cell of the appropriate command post.”27 a major step but a subset of targeting, which When we target insurgents with airpower, mul­ focuses on finding a targeting solution, re­ tiple cells collaborating from multiple command viewing restrictions, and validating the target. posts—including the air and space operations combining multiple, disparate processes into center—conduct the targeting process. FM 3­24/ one can result in the air component’s focus­ McWP 3­33.5 simply refers readers to Joint ing on getting the right weapons and plat­ Publication (JP) 3­60, Joint Doctrine for Target­ forms in place to strike but glossing over the ing, for the joint targeting process. however, critical validation step. that publication, updated in april 2007, has the dynamic­targeting process illustrates only fleeting references to insurgency and the air Force’s tendency to favor technical does not get to the level of detail one would rather than human solutions to problems. find in a field manual, which is the level When Gen John Jumper, former air Force needed for this discussion. chief of staff, established the goal of “single­ Since doctrine lacks comprehensive guid­ digit minutes” for dynamic­targeting timelines, ance for joint targeting in counterinsurgencies, the air Force focused on finding technical commanders must determine which aspects (“machine­to­machine”), tactical, and logistical of current doctrine apply and find other ways solutions.24 even if coordination, logistics, and to reduce friction and improve decision­making target­development timelines improve, the timelines. by improving the capabilities and political sensitivity of combat operations and processes of their staffs, commanders can im­ the ambiguous nature of targets in counter­ prove decision­making efficiency considerably. insurgency campaigns will cause decision­ they can have their personnel in intelligence making timelines to extend well beyond single­ and those with the staff judge advocate de­

2-Brown.indd 79 10/29/07 9:02:57 AM 80 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

velop and work through realistic scenarios target yet limit collateral damage. Ultimately, that cause dilemmas for decision makers. For the plethora of potential target scenarios and example, should our forces strike a house oc­ weapons available requires experienced tar­ cupied by a high­level insurgent leader and geting “artists” to confidently produce a solu­ other unknown occupants or attack a funeral tion that will result in the insurgents’ (not the attended by large numbers of insurgents?28 facility’s) destruction while minimizing collat­ (both of these scenarios have actually occurred.) eral damage. Otherwise, commanders must commanders should prepare themselves and either exercise restraint or risk the political price their staffs for these common dilemmas. of an air strike with nothing to show for it. they should also have their targeting per­ as mentioned, because of humans’ unpre­ sonnel continually develop targets appropri­ dictable movements, we require a great deal ate for air strikes and anticipate how they will of operational flexibility to make airpower detect and identify them. Most importantly, consistently lethal. Despite the ability of tactical­ commanders should encourage their staffs to level personnel to conduct targeting functions build relationships with staffs at higher head­ reliably with current technologies in many situa­ quarters and other components in order to tions, the target­development process typically facilitate the cross flow of information during remains time­consuming, inflexible, and cen­ dynamic­targeting operations. Ultimately, the tralized at the operational level.32 Decentral­ artistry of commanders and their understand­ izing these processes has the potential to shrink ing of the enemy and themselves will have the our OODa loop considerably and could even­ greatest effect on the decision process. tually improve both the flexibility and lethality if airpower can get to the target in time, it of airpower, especially against mobile targets. needs to strike with lethal force. although this Of course, commanders will always have to shouldn’t seem much of a concern, terrorists balance these advantages with their ability to and insurgents frequently survive air strikes.29 mitigate collateral damage and hit the right Since insurgents can occupy various types of target precisely. structures and move away at any time, weap­ Precision is perhaps the most important oneering and flexibility will determine the le­ factor in executing an air strike against insur­ thality of the strike. gents. FM 3­24/McWP 3­33.5 warns that the weaponeering process determines the “needlessly harming innocents can turn the number and types of weapons we need to ob­ populaceagainstthecounterinsurgency(cOin) tain the desired effect when our forces attack effort. Discriminating use of fires and calcu­ a target.30 Particularly challenging, weapon­ lated, disciplined response should characterize eering for insurgent targets requires a great cOin operations. Showing kindness and com­ deal of artistry. insurgents survive air strikes passion can often become as important as kill­ for several reasons. First, targeteers often under­ ing and capturing insurgents.”33 if the popula­ estimate the strength of the houses occupied tion believes that we care more about killing by the adversary. Weaponeering programs and insurgents than about the safety of civilians, it methods model military targets and functions may support the insurgency. therefore, we but do not account for attacking typical insur­ should consider precision engagement of para­ gent targets, such as individuals hiding in a mount importance. safe house or rural compound. Second, targe­ Precision does not simply entail a calcula­ teers often focus on destroying the facility in­ tion of weapons’ capabilities although this is stead of killing the insurgents inside. Finally, certainly an important factor. Rather, it in­ commanders may automatically favor smaller volves many variables that go into the positive weapons in order to avoid collateral damage.31 identification of an insurgent target. insur­ this article does not argue that we should gent signatures often appear ambiguous, even bomb insurgents into oblivion to ensure their to snipers on the ground. Dynamic targeting death; rather, it illustrates the commander’s with airpower presents even more ambiguity dilemma of approving enough force to kill the and uncertainty, requiring high confidencein

2-Brown.indd 80 10/29/07 9:02:58 AM TO BOMB OR NOT TO BOMB? 81

the intelligence sources and analysis used to of friendly action, not just the performance of pinpoint an insurgent target’s location. Many weapons. it should address the adaptation of intelligence sources have target­location errors the insurgents—not simply their initial reac­ so large that we cannot confidentlydetermine tion, destruction, or survival.37 Finally, it should an insurgent’s position. intelligence personnel place most of its emphasis on the response of should avoid overreliance on a single source the population affected by the air strike. to ascertain positive identification.Using mul­ an air strike against a dynamic target is al­ tiple sources can refine target­location errors ways a complicated process that needs thor­ and increase precision. Recognizing insurgent ough debriefing and assessment after execu­ signatures through old­fashioned analytical tion. Knowing how a weapon performed techniques can have the same effect as well. against a target certainly remains important, Obviously, we face many challenges in especially before approaching other aspects achieving speed, lethality, and precision for of assessment. however, to avoid the tradi­ airpower as we fight insurgents. although the tional bDa paradigm when considering the capabilities and limitations of technology play friendly action, commanders and their staffs a role in each of these aspects, they are not the should look at all aspects of the OODa pro­ deciding factor in success or failure. because cess, paying close attention to timelines. crite­ success depends more on targeting processes ria for operational assessment may include than on technology, we must strive to improve logistical, coordination, and c2 aspects. Most them continuously. importantly, commanders should identify both US forces improved coordination processes the amount of time they spent on deciding to and response timelines during their three­ strike and any causes of delay. year hunt for Zarqawi, ultimately achieving an air strike will likely cause the insurgent success. Following a quick, lethal, and precise network to react by adapting in some fashion dynamic­targeting operation, ground forces to the loss of a critical element or node. We can­ immediately occupied Zarqawi’s safe house to not easily anticipate how or when this adapta­ assess damage and exploit intelligence, lead­ tion will occur, but our counterinsurgency ing to more raids against al­Qaeda in iraq.34 forces should attempt to observe and under­ beyond showing the necessity for a quick, lethal, stand it. Posturing iSR before, during, and af­ and precise strike, the operation demon­ ter the strike can assist in this process. again, strated the vital role assessment plays in con­ analysts should not limit this effort to bDa but ducting a successful air attack. watch how the other links and nodes adjust over time. noting how quickly the adversary replaces these leaders or other critical nodes Assessing the Strike will provide insight into the adaptability of the insurgency. Until recently, any airman asked to define a successful air strike can cause insurgents the assessment process would focus on tradi­ to change their emphasis on certain traits, de­ tional battle damage assessment (bDa), a re­ centralize their leadership, or expand their ductionist process that calls for acquiring im­ operations in order to become more surviv­ agery of targets attacked by aircraft. airmen able. Writing in 1929 about his experiences have also attempted to consistently find tech­ fighting“bandits” in nicaragua, Marine corps nological ways to get “real­time bDa” to their aviation pioneer Rusty Rowell said, “Occasion­ commanders.35 although latter phases of bDa ally the enemy may establish a large strong­ focus on analyzing effects on the target sys­ hold that would be a suitable target for bom­ tem, this is a long, often­ignored process cen­ bardment. it is certain, however, that he would tralized at the level of combined Forces com­ never make that mistake twice.”38 mand.36 these approaches to assessment are targeting planners must constantly watch simply inadequate in a counterinsurgency cam­ for changing links and nodes of an insurgent paign. assessment should focus on all aspects network and avoid reductionist approaches in

2-Brown.indd 81 10/29/07 9:02:58 AM 82 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

their targeting methods. Of course, the insur­ ued.42 Since we had no forces on the ground gents may not adapt at all, especially if a high­ in the city, we could conduct only traditional tempo counterinsurgency operation does not bDa. the insurgents continued to tighten allow them time to do so. not all insurgencies their grip on Fallujah and its population dur­ have proven as adaptable as the current ones ing this time. in Fallujah’s dense urban envi­ in iraq and afghanistan, but counterinsurgency ronment, collateral damage occurred fre­ forces should always assume they are until quently. Rather than dissuading the insurgents, they conduct a thorough assessment. the air strikes created a sense of paranoia. the a very adaptive insurgent network will react insurgents responded to this situation by exe­ to air strikes by quickly dispersing and inte­ cuting civilians as well as increasing their con­ grating into the population. assessing the cealment and dispersal efforts to avoid air population’s response can help determine the strikes.43 although the strikes took out several success of insurgents at adapting. We must ob­ insurgent targets, they generally proved inef­ serve how the population may have shifted in fective in achieving lasting results that made a its support of the insurgents or the government difference to the marines who attacked the after an air strike. Most importantly, we must city in november 2004. understand the impact of collateral damage. Understanding the limitations of traditional For either political or practical reasons, the bDa, the air Force has adopted a new, com­ United States has avoided incorporating civilian prehensive approach to assessment in aFDD 39 casualties into its assessment processes. this 2­1.9 that goes beyond the tactical level. the seems logical in large wars, but in small wars doctrine even recognizes the challenges of as­ counterinsurgency forces need this informa­ sessment in counterinsurgencies by stating tion if they want to prevent insurgents from that “these operations will require analytical gaining further support of the population. skills ranging far beyond weapons effects into heavy reliance on airpower, as in afghanistan, political, socio­economic, cultural­ideological, will inevitably lead to (real or perceived) col­ psychological and international arenas. it will lateral damage and can quickly undermine a 40 also require coordination with analytical and government. if such damage occurs, counter­ academic centers outside the [Department of insurgency forces need to be on the ground, Defense].”44 Unfortunately, the discussion stops assessing the facts to challenge false claims of there, and despite the attempt to distance it­ the insurgents and addressing the needs of self from traditional bDa, the US military has the victims. although extremely difficult, this found it difficult to move on. mission has proven successful in rebuilding relationships with people whom we otherwise would have lost to the insurgent cause.41 Conclusion Without a vigorous attempt at assessment, commanders can find themselves caught in the although kinetic operations alone will not trap of attrition warfare—something not fea­ win the war, they can slow down or suppress sible for the United States in counterinsur­ the insurgency while political efforts gain gency campaigns. During the buildup to the strength and momentum. thus, we should second battle of Fallujah in late 2004, we used make combat operations persistent enough to airpower repeatedly to strike insurgent safe eliminate insurgents’ critical nodes and ele­ houses throughout the city. the strikes began ments faster than they can replace them.45 air­ in June 2004 and steadily increased over the power can play an important role in this effort next several months. although Lt Gen Ricardo through dynamic targeting; however, we have Sanchez, the outgoing commander of the often employed it in these operations without joint task force in iraq, believed in July 2004 understanding the consequences of incorrect that only massive force, not precision strikes, planning, execution, or assessment. We tend could win in Fallujah—a politically unaccept­ to call on airpower hastily in an effort to take able concept at the time—the strikes contin­ out the bad guys we see on a Predator’s video

2-Brown.indd 82 10/29/07 9:02:59 AM TO BOMB OR NOT TO BOMB? 83

feed. commanders and their staffs should re­ ploying into theater on the art of killing insur­ sist the temptation to do something simply be­ gents with the multitude of weapons now cause they can. they firstneed to determine if available. it should also teach them to balance they are hitting the right target in the correct the requirements of avoiding collateral dam­ manner and if they have postured themselves age, becoming aware of the population and its to learn from their effort so they can adapt culture, and making assessments. faster than the enemy. Finally, our forces need to understand what they could do this more effectively if the the insurgents value and determine whether or US military implemented the following pro­ not kinetic airpower can affect it without alienat­ posals. First, targeting is a joint process, yet no ing the local population. the solution to this comprehensive joint doctrine exists for con­ complicated problem requires input from sev­ ducting it in a counterinsurgency. because of eral disparate groups, many of them isolated the lengthy timeline for updating joint doc­ from each other in both doctrine and practice. trine, the air Land Sea application center they include air component strategists, plan­ should develop multiservice tactics, techniques, ners, targeteers, and iSR personnel as well as and procedures for targeting time­sensitive human­intelligence experts, counterterrorist/ targets specific to counterinsurgency in the counterinsurgent analysts, and ground forces. short term; it should focus on c2 processes to Such a problem requires the kind of constant speed up decision making; and, recognizing discourse that personal, face­to­face relation­ that the air strike is just the beginning of the engagement, it should concentrate on flexible ships can promote. this currently exists in the tactics to engage fleeingtargets and on efforts air support operations group (aSOG) construct, to conduct a comprehensive assessment. but its staff does not have the manning, expe­ Second, we should provide targeteers the rience, or expertise to serve as all­encompassing 46 tools and education they need to make effects­ airpower advocates. in order to achieve the based weaponeering predictions in counterin­ kind of relationships and decentralized execu­ surgency environments. the Joint technical tion of dynamic targeting described in this ar­ coordinating Group for Munitions effective­ ticle, the air component should establish ro­ ness should update weaponeering models with bust planning and targeting nodes at the level regional information that includes typical resi­ of an army division, piggybacking on the dential structures as well as other potential in­ aSOG organization. We should staff these surgent facilities and provide a tool that calcu­ nodes with graduates of the USaF Weapons lates probabilities of killing the personnel inside School, targeteers, and iSR experts who could these structures. Until we develop these tools, develop the kinds of relationships needed for the air Force should design a short targeting comprehensive planning, decentralized exe­ top­off course that can educate targeteers de­ cution, and thorough assessment. ❑

Notes

1. air Force Doctrine Document (aFDD) 2­1.9, Tar­ 4. David S. cloud, “the Reach of War: U.S. airstrikes geting, 8 June 2006, 114, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdc on increase to aid natO in afghanistan,” New York Times, privateweb/aFDD_Page_htML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd 17 november 2006. 2­1­%209.pdf. 5. ed blanche, “hammering hamas,” Middle East, De­ 2. James S. corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in cember 2003, 28–31. Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (Lawrence: 6. these include the aGM­114P hellfire missiles, the University Press of Kansas, 2003), 428–30. 250­pound GbU­39 small­diameter bomb, or the venerable 3. Field Manual (FM) 3­24 / Marine corps Warfight­ ac­130 gunship with its suite of direct­fire cannons. ing Publication (McWP) 3­33.5, Counterinsurgency, Decem­ 7. benjamin Lambeth, Air Power against Terror: America’s ber 2006, 4­7, http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/ Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa Monica, ca: materials/coin­fm3­24.pdf. RanD corporation, 2005), 350.

2-Brown.indd 83 10/29/07 9:02:59 AM 84 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

8. Senator John Mccain defines “whack a mole” in 24. adam J. hebert, “building battlespace awareness,” the context of iraq. “transcript for aug. 20: John Mccain, Air Force Magazine, 87 no. 9 (September 2004): 66–71, barry Mccaffrey, Vali nasr, John harwood,” Meet the Press, http://www.afa.org/magazine/sept2004/0904isr.pdf (ac­ 20 august 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14390980 cessed 21 February 2007). (accessed 20 February 2007). 25. Lt col Phillip Pratzner, USaF, interview by the au­ 9. commanders and planners who influence and/or thor, 15 February 2006. direct dynamic targeting in counterinsurgency operations 26. the manual mentions neither insurgencies nor are often located in multiple components at the opera­ small wars. Many techniques recommended in the docu­ tional or tactical level—or both. this article does not ar­ ment to aid in decision making such as time­sensitive­ gue for specific command relationships in these situations, targeting matrixes and lists are infeasible due to the but it does argue for the importance of effective collabo­ changing and ambiguous nature of insurgent targets. See ration. it also does not explore which level—operational FM 3­60.1, Multi­Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures or tactical—is more appropriate to conduct these opera­ for Targeting Time­Sensitive Targets, 20 april 2004. tions. Overall, we must often carry out many functions at 27. FM 3­24 / McWP 3­33.5, Counterinsurgency, 5­29. the operational level, but commanders should delegate as 28. US forces decided not to strike a group of over many of them as practical to the tactical level in order to 100 members of the taliban, including several high­value attain the necessary operational tempo needed to fight targets, because of their location in a cemetery, consid­ insurgents. ered a “culturally sensitive area.” Yet, they bombed the 10. aFDD 2­1.9, Targeting, 3. house where Zarqawi was hiding even though the other 11. thomas X. hammes, “the evolution of War: the occupants were unknown (three women died in the air Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette 78, no. 9 (Sep­ strike). See nbc news and news Services, “U.S. Passes Up tember 1994): 37. chance to Strike taliban,” 13 September 2006, http:// 12. Jeffrey White, An Adaptive Insurgency: Confronting www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14823099 (accessed 21 Febru­ Adversary Networks in Iraq, Policy Focus no. 58 (Washing­ ary 2007). ton, Dc: Washington institute for near east Policy, 2006), 29. During multiple dynamic­targeting operations, 2–3, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templatec04.php the author has seen insurgents crawl out of half­destroyed ?ciD=249 (accessed 20 February 2007). buildings and others move away seconds before impact, 13. ibid., 6. escaping certain death. 14. ibid., 15. 30. For the definition of “weaponeering,” see Joint 15. Martin J. Muckian, “Structural Vulnerabilities of Publication 1­02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military networked insurgencies: adapting to the new adversary,” and Associated Terms, 12 april 2001 (as amended through Parameters 36, no. 4 (Winter 2006–7): 19, http://www.carlisle 13 June 2007), 579, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ .army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06winter/muckian.pdf. new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 16. christopher M. Ford, “Speak no evil: targeting a 31. counterinsurgency forces may develop a bias to­ Population’s neutrality to Defeat an insurgency,” Parameters ward smaller munitions such as the aGM­114 hellfire or 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 53, http://www.carlisle.army the GbU­39 small­diameter bomb, which limit collateral .mil/usawc/Parameters/05summer/ford.pdf. damage but may not pack enough punch to obtain de­ 17. anthony h. cordesman, “Preliminary ‘Lessons’ of sired effects in certain scenarios. the israeli­hezbollah War,” working draft (Washington, 32. according to Maj Kasandra traweek, USaF, PhD, Dc: center for Strategic and international Studies, 2006), a “fieldcollateral damage estimation” is an alternative oc­ 2–23, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060911_isr casionally available to tactical­level commanders when _hez_lessons.pdf (accessed 20 February 2007). they can determine with available resources that the esti­ 18. Jason Keyser, “Snipers Keep Fallujah under mation is mitigated in accordance with the rules of en­ Shroud of terror,” San Diego Union­Tribune, 19 april 2004, gagement. Major traweek, to author, e­mail, 19 February http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20040419/ 2007. One option calls for allowing aircraft to derive their news_1n19snipers.html (accessed 20 February 2007). own “Joint Direct attack Munition–quality coordinates,” 19. Rebecca Grant, “the bekaa Valley War,” Air Force currently possible with advanced targeting pods. See Magazine 85, no. 6 (June 2002): 58–62, http://www.afa.org/ Lockheed Martin, “Sniper: the World’s Most advanced magazine/june2002/0602bekaa.pdf. targeting Pod,” 2005, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/ 20. Grant t. hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd data/assets/7820.pdf (accessed 21 February 2007). and American Security (Washington, Dc: Smithsonian insti­ 33. FM 3­24 / McWP 3­33.5, Counterinsurgency, 5­12. tution Press, 2001), 15. 34. Sean D. naylor, “inside the Zarqawi takedown: 21. barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future Persistent Surveillance helps end 3­Year Manhunt,” De­ War, Mcnair Paper no. 52 (Washington, Dc: institute for fenseNews.com, 12 June 2006, http://www.defensenews.com/ national Strategic Studies, national Defense University, story.php?F=1861193&c=landwar (accessed 17 February October 1996), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Mcnair/ 2007). mcnair52/mcnair52.pdf (accessed 20 February 2007). 35. Lt col John t. Rauch Jr., “assessing airpower’s ef­ 22. R. h. Peck, “aircraft in Small Wars,” Journal of the Royal fects: capabilities and Limitations of Real­time battle United Services Institution 73, no. 491 (august 1928): 537. Damage assessment” (thesis, School of advanced air­ 23. aFDD 2­1.9, Targeting, 49. power Studies, Maxwell aFb, aL, 2004), passim, http://

2-Brown.indd 84 10/29/07 9:03:00 AM TO BOMB OR NOT TO BOMB? 85

www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/saas_theses/Rauch/ 42. bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Rauch.pdf (accessed 21 February 2007). Battle for Fallujah (new York: bantam books, 2005), 234. 36. aFDD 2­1.9, Targeting, 57. 43. ibid., 228. 37. Maj Lee K. Grubbs and Maj Michael J. Forsyth, “is 44. aFDD 2­1.9, Targeting, 62. there a Deep Fight in a counterinsurgency?” Military Review 45. White, An Adaptive Insurgency, 15. 85, no. 4 (July–august 2005): 29, http://calldp.leavenworth 46. the aSOG has tactical air control parties through­ .army.mil/eng_mr/2006080808030243/2005/Jul_aug/ 06grubbs.pdf#xml=/scripts/cqcgi.exe/@ss_prod.env? out the army corps structure, consisting of air liaison of­ cQ_SeSSiOn_KeY=WVYLnZtSQFeQ&cQ_Qh=125 ficers (aLO) and/or enlisted joint terminal attack con­ 432&cQDc=5&cQ_PDF_hiGhLiGht=YeS&cQ_cUR trollers (Jtac) whose primary expertise is close air _DOcUMent=1. support (caS). Dynamic targeting in counterinsurgency 38. Ross e. “Rusty” Rowell, “aircraft in bush Warfare,” is being mistakenly used as a form of caS because of the Marine Corps Gazette 14, no. 3 (September 1929): 186. nonlinear nature of the battlefield,thus placing a consid­ 39. Mark Garlasco, interviewed for “What’s in a num­ erable burden on the aLOs and Jtacs to provide more ber?” This American Life, WbeZ chicago, 28 October 2005. sophisticated targeting advice than their area of expertise 40. Rachel Morarjee, “air War costs natO afghan normally requires. to better understand the new roles ex­ Supporters,” Christian Science Monitor, 18 December 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1218/p01s02­wosc.html pected of aLOs and Jtacs in counterinsurgency, see col (accessed 20 February 2007). howard D. belote, “counterinsurgency airpower: air­ 41. cPt Ryan Gist, USa, interviewed for “What’s in a Ground integration for the Long War,” Air and Space Power number?” This American Life, WbeZ chicago, 28 October Journal 20, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 55–64, http://www.airpower 2005. .maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/fal06/Fal06.pdf.

2-Brown.indd 85 10/29/07 9:03:01 AM Maritime Homeland Defense A Role for Land-Based Airpower?

Lt CoL ALexus G. GrynkewiCh, usAF*

Editorial Abstract: Given the increasing frequency and resourcefulness with which terrorists have planned and carried out attacks, it is reasonable to believe that maritime operations at US ports and on the high seas are in danger. Lieutenant Colonel Grynkewich contends that airpower can and should assist in countering this threat, and could do so with modest in­ creases in personnel and/or equipment by using currently available manned and unmanned aircraft and space platforms.

*Several individuals kindly reviewed this article. The author would like to thank Maj Chris Reifel, Maj Braxton Rehm, Maj John Dev­ ane, and Maj Bob Seifert for their comments on an early version. Thanks also to Dr. Craig Hooper of the Monterey Institute for Interna­ tional Studies for his suggestions and guidance, as well as the guidance from three anonymous referees. Any strengths of this article are due to their insights; any weaknesses are the sole responsibility of the author.

86

3-Grynkewich.indd 86 10/29/07 9:19:43 AM MARITIME HOMELAND DEFENSE 87

n July 1921, eight of the Army’s Martin commercial vessels to clandestinely deliver bombers, participating in a series of joint weapons of mass destruction, detonating their Army-navy tests, sank the captured Ger­ cargo once in port. lacking such weapons, man battleship Ostfriesland.1 Shortly there­ terrorists could take control of an ocean Iafter, Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell, deputy freighter and use its cargo or even the ship it­ chief of the Army Air Service, declared that self as a weapon.5 Detonation of a large tanker “the problem of destruction of seacraft by carrying liquefied natural gas in port could [air] forces has been solved and is finished.”2 destroy a major uS city.6 less dramatically, at­ This declaration proved premature, however: tackers could use any large ship “as a collision attacking ships from the air remains complex. weapon for destroying a bridge or refinery lo­ The sequential requirements of finding the cated on the waterfront.”7 target ship, identifying it as a hostile enemy Al-Qaeda understands and appreciates the vessel, and neutralizing it still pose significant potential modes of attack from the maritime tactical and technical problems. The challenges domain. The group reportedly has as many as become especially salient when one faces an 23 freighters at its disposal, one of which may asymmetric threat. nonetheless, examining have delivered explosives to Saudi Arabia for a each of these steps can identify areas in which car-bomb attack in 1995.8 Another may have the inherent flexibilityof land-based airpower transported bomb-making materials for the might enhance uS maritime defenses. At the attacks on uS embassies in Kenya and Tanzania same time, it reveals several command and in 1998.9 Closer to home, Richard Clarke, for­ control (C2) issues that the government must mer White House counterterrorism director, resolve if it decides to use land-based airpower asserted that terrorists affiliatedwith al-Qaeda in a maritime-defense role. Prior to address­ “infiltrated Boston by coming in on liquid ing these issues, however, this article briefly natural gas tankers from Algeria.”10 Others re­ examines the contemporary maritime-defense port that terrorist-affiliated pirates have forcibly environment. boarded vessels and practiced steering “at varying speeds for several hours.”11 As the united States defends against this The Contemporary Maritime- new kind of enemy, it must also adapt to a Defense Environment changing operational environment. Prior wars had defined combat zones. In today’s conflict The conflict in which the united States with terrorism, however, the combat zone defies finds itself today differs significantly from ear­ attempts at geographic confinement. Accord­ lier wars. In previous conflicts, conventional ingly, maritime-defense activities must comply forces waged a largely symmetric war. In con­ with peacetime international law. The law of trast, the 2003 National Strategy for Combating the Sea, based on various international norms Terrorism correctly noted that today’s enemy and treaties, including four 1958 conventions “is a flexible, transnational network structure, to which the united States is a party, seeks to enabled by modern technology and character­ facilitate and encourage global commerce, ized by loose interconnectivity both within and and the united States shares this interest.12 between groups.”3 The attacks of 11 Septem­ Both the National Security Strategy and National ber 2001 (9/11) demonstrated the potential Strategy for Maritime Security recognize that the power of this new way of war. On that day, “safety and economic security of the united “transnational terrorists, organized in widely States depends upon the secure use of the dispersed, networked nodes, . . . swarm[ed] world’s oceans.”13 In this context, traditional together swiftly, on cue, then pulse[d] to the uS doctrine that calls for the application of attack simultaneously.”4 overwhelming force does not always work. Although terrorists used aircraft to attack Simply put, blowing up ships that appear to on 9/11, they could easily adapt this highly ef­ threaten the homeland is incompatible with fective mode to the maritime domain by using facilitating global commerce.

3-Grynkewich.indd 87 10/29/07 9:19:44 AM 88 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

In 2003 approximately 6,000 vessels made discern which specific maritime track consti­ roughly 60,000 stops in uS ports.14 The united tutes a threat. land-based airpower could pro­ States must maintain this global commerce yet vide significant enhancements to the first of also protect its 98,000 miles of shoreline; 3.5 these problems.21 In the best-case scenario, in­ million square miles of ocean area; 1,000 har­ telligence will identify a specific vessel of con­ bor channels; and approximately 300 ports.15 cern, at which point commanders can task as­ In the contemporary operational environ­ sets to fixits location and track it. Space-based ment, finding, identifying, and neutralizing assets have some utility in this regard, but or­ the enemy requires a far different skill set bital patterns generally do not meet capabili­ from that developed for conventional con­ ties requirements for persistence, timing, or flicts.Despite some progress, the united States location. Although the space-based radar pro­ still faces several critical gaps between its re­ gram could potentially eliminate this shortfall, quired and resident capacities. Fortunately, at present, adjusting orbital patterns in order the speed, range, and flexibility of land-based to image emerging targets requires significant airpower have the potential to close or elimi­ time.22 Additionally, “most low Earth Orbit nate many of these gaps.16 (lEO) satellites have a specific target in view for less than 10 minutes at a time and revisit the same sites only infrequently.”23 Finding the Threat unmanned aerial vehicles (uAV) possess For maritime homeland defense, finding a the range, altitude, and payload to bridge this threat means detecting its existence and locat­ capability gap. For example, the RQ-4A Global ing it with enough precision to allow follow-on Hawk can fly 1,200 miles and still have an on- steps in the engagement chain. To fulfill this station time of 24 hours, during which the objective, the uS government has outlined aircraft’s synthetic aperture radar as well as its the maritime domain awareness (MDA) initia­ electro-optical and infrared cameras “can im­ tive, defined by Homeland Security Presidential age an area the size of Illinois.”24 With a re­ Directive (HSPD)13 as “the effective under­ ported one-foot radar resolution and a ground standing of anything associated with the global moving target indicator (GMTI) mode able to Maritime Domain that could impact the secu­ track moving targets down to four knots, the rity, safety, economy, or environment of the RQ-4A is more than capable of finding and united States.”17 An effective MDA surveillance tracking most seaborne vessels.25 system identifies threats by looking for anoma­ Manned aircraft also offer a means of find­ lous patterns of behavior and fusing that in­ ing threats to maritime defense. For example, formation with other intelligence, such as that the u-2 reconnaissance aircraft reportedly has derived from human or technical sources.18 the following range capabilities: electro-optical For example, vessels that failed to comply with imaging of 120 kilometers (km), radar-imaging standard procedures, those operating from of 180 km, and signals intelligence out to 280 nonfriendly ports, or those crewed by suspect km.26 Additionally, although primarily known personnel would trigger a flagin the MDA sys­ for its ability against ground targets, the E-8C tem, prompting a response.19 Primary respon­ Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System sibility for fusing and analyzing maritime in­ has a potential maritime search-and-track ca­ telligence under MDA belongs to the national pability as well.27 The E-8’s radar field of view Maritime Intelligence Center, which includes covers over 19,000 square miles and can de­ intelligence elements from the navy, Marine tect targets over 250 km away.28 Finally, despite Corps, Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Agency, their limited utility for searching broad areas, and uS Customs Service.20 most fighter and bomber aircraft can use radar, MDA is attempting to solve two parts of the infrared, and television imaging to generate maritime-defense problem: an ability to track high-quality targeting information on surface maritime traffic in general and an ability to tracks.29 Once cued to a target’s general loca­

3-Grynkewich.indd 88 10/29/07 9:19:44 AM MARITIME HOMELAND DEFENSE 89

tion, aircrews can use these systems to aid in near-space airship, “you could probably roll its identification. about 40 of these off the line for the price of unfortunately, no concepts of operation one Global Hawk.”36 currently exist for using long-range manned aircraft or uAVs to track maritime vessels. To­ day most uAV platforms belong to the Air Identifying the Threat Force although the Coast Guard and navy The united States reportedly used a combi­ both have programmed future purchases. The nation of space-based and navy assets in De­ Coast Guard plans to acquire four Mariner cember 2002 to track the So San, a north Ko­ aircraft, a derivative of the Predator B, as part rean vessel carrying a cargo of Scud missiles of its Integrated Deepwater Initiative.30 The between the reclusive regime and navy’sBroadAreaMaritimeSurveillance(BAMS) yemen.37 To some extent, this capability mirrors program has a requirement for “enough sys­ that required for nontraditional maritime- tems to cover five major areas of the world 24 defense missions. However, it is important to hours a day, year round.”31 Although the navy note that uS intelligence provided advanced has not further quantified the number of knowledge of the So San prior to its departure uAVs it plans to purchase, estimates suggest from north Korea, enabling the united States that the BAMS will “require dozens of aircraft and associated systems that could cost more to position its orbital and surface assets appro­ than $50 million each.”32 priately in order to track the vessel once it de­ For the short term, using Air Force assets parted for yemen. Another significant differ­ for sea surveillance offers a partial solution to ence between the So San episode and certain the challenge of finding maritime-defense maritime homeland-defense scenarios is that threats. However, each current Air Force plat­ in the So San case, intelligence provided a spe­ form has to make trade-offs among persis­ cificvessel as a target to fixand track. In mari­ tence, resolution, and wide-area coverage. For time homeland defense, it is more likely that the longer term, the near-space platform (op­ intelligence will indicate only the existence of erating above an altitude of 75,000 feet but a threat without precise information on the below 62.5 miles) may be able to overcome specific vessel. For example, a foreign intelli­ these limitations. Such platforms—usually gence service might inform the uS govern­ some type of blimp or rigid airship—can pro­ ment that it has credible information that a vide more persistence than space-based assets group of terrorists had stowed away on a vessel and uAVs. Since “near-space platforms are bound for the West coast sometime in the last 10–20 times closer to their targets than a typical 48 hours. More precise information on the 400-kilometer lEO satellite,” they “can be 10–20 type of vessel may or may not be available, times smaller for similar performance, or the leading to a high number of suspect vessels.38 same size optics can get 10–20 times better Standoff sensors—whether space based, air resolution.”33 near-space platforms cruise “more breathing, surface, or subsurface—will have slowly than most air breathers, so getting to only limited utility in these circumstances. In their assigned stations will take longer. How­ a conventional maritime battle, signals intelli­ ever, once there they can stay for a very long gence or imagery intelligence can “find” tar­ time,” perhaps as long as six months.34 Further­ gets of significance: a conventional naval ves­ more, because of their extreme altitude, near- sel emits various signals, making it detectable space assets have an especially wide field of by signals intelligence, and any imagery of the view. At 120,000 feet, a near-space platform vessel will likely reveal its type, if not specific would have a sensor footprint 1,700 miles in identification. Against an asymmetric mari­ diameter.35 Finally, near-space platforms are time homeland-defense threat, however, few if relatively cost-effective. According to a spokes­ any external indicators exist that will distin­ man at the uS Air Force Space Battlelab proj­ guish the actual threat vessel from surround­ ect, at a cost of $500,000 for each 175-foot ing suspect vessels. A vessel used as a launch

3-Grynkewich.indd 89 10/29/07 9:19:45 AM 90 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

platform conceivably could have some visual ligence warning resulted in inadequate time or emission-based distinguishing features, but, to board and inspect all suspect ships, and (2) just as likely, no such features will exist at all. a simultaneous attack from multiple ports in­ Similarly, onboard explosives or weapons of creased the number of vessel-boarding require­ mass destruction may or may not be visible via ments, overwhelming current capabilities.40 In spectral or air-sample analysis. Cases involving both instances, the size of the maritime do­ a band of unconventional fighters on board a main did not allow the limited number of vessel (with the intent to commandeer it or boarding forces to move with enough speed use it to infiltrate personnel) also present to meet operational requirements. problems. Except when members of the group To solve this problem requires rapid delivery foolishly expose themselves—either to visual of a long-range boarding party. With a top observation on the vessel’s surface or through speed in excess of 45 knots, the littoral Com­ some type of exploitable communications link bat Ship (lCS) partially meets these require­ such as a satellite phone—stowaway groups of ments.41 In modeling of single-axis, single-vessel fighters will likely remain undetected and un­ attack scenarios, the increased speed of the detectable from standoff sensors. lCS either decreased the number of boarding MDA aims to overcome this shortfall by fus­ teams required (since the same team can leap­ ing information on vessels, cargo, and crew frog through a series of suspect vessels) or, al­ members to identify unconventional threats ternatively, increased the available search time to maritime defense. Still, it likely will not re­ per vessel.42 nonetheless, because we need veal them all. The asymmetric maritime enemy even faster boarding-party delivery, the navy is will seek to maintain anonymity against the considering maritime-defense missions using backdrop of a massive volume of legitimate the MH-60, including helicopter delivery of maritime traffic, thus creating a problem similar boarding teams in rigid-hull inflatableboats. 43 to that found in other types of unconventional using the lCS (or legacy vessels) to ferry warfare. Mao Tse-tung noted that guerrillas boarding teams to within helicopter ranges are the “fish”that swim in the “sea” of a coun­ and then employing helicopters to deliver try’s population.39 In the case of maritime them would provide an additional four hours homeland defense, the fish are threat vessels of search time per boarding. that hide in the sea of legitimate traffic.T o de­ The V-22 Osprey could further increase feat all or part of the MDA system, a hostile available search time. The Air Force and Marine force merely needs to avoid suspicious behavior. Corps are testing their respective versions of By following all appropriate procedures, operat­ the V-22, an aircraft that can take off like a ing from friendly (or at least nonenemy) ports, helicopter and then tilt its rotors forward to crewing ships with personnel traveling under cruise like a fixed-wing aircraft at approximately aliases, or stowing away on a ship with a legiti­ 250 knots.44 With aerial-refueling support, land­ mate crew, unconventional bands of fighters based V-22s could lengthen search time by an could slip under the MDA radar and carry out order of magnitude. Current procurement plans their mission prior to detection. call for 348 Marine Corps MV-22s, 50 Air Force These limitations suggest that, for the fore­ CV-22s, and 48 navy HV-22s. Marine Corps seeable future, boarding parties will remain variants will perform the heavy-lift mission, re­ the most effective means for distinguishing placing older helicopters. The Air Force ver­ between friendly and hostile maritime traffic. sion is slated for special operations. The navy Recent maritime-defense scenario modeling will use its HV-22s for search and rescue as at the naval Postgraduate School revealed well as logistics.45 Adding the mission of mari­ that, with nominal intelligence warning, par­ time defense to any of the services’ V-22 fleets ties would need to board and search about 20 would require additional aircraft purchases at vessels in order to find the actual threat. un­ a cost of approximately $40 million each. Still, fortunately, modeling also revealed two sig­ delivery of boarding teams using V-22s would nificantcapability shortfalls: (1) delayed intel­ allow the united States to rapidly discern

3-Grynkewich.indd 90 10/29/07 9:19:45 AM MARITIME HOMELAND DEFENSE 91

whether or not a specific vessel presented a the team during its boarding attempts. Ironi­ maritime threat to homeland defense. cally, acts of noncompliance without hostile behavior—resulting from the crew’s desire to conceal illegal activities (e.g., smuggling) rather Neutralizing the Threat than its intent to carry out an act of war—pres­ Finding and identifying a threat comprise ent the greatest problem. In such ambiguous only the first half of the maritime-defense situations, destroying the vessel is not an op­ problem. During limited scenarios in which tion, thus suggesting an urgent need for non­ command authorities declare a vessel hostile lethal or ship-disabling standoff weapons. (implying kill authority), aerial-refueled fight­ Because one can most effectively disable a ship by neutralizing its propulsion or steering ers, long-range bombers, or uAV platforms system, a small-warhead kinetic weapon that could provide rapid, lethal response over the homes on a ship’s screws, engine room, or vast distances inherent in the maritime realm. bridge would serve as an appropriate attack The Air Force has demonstrated its ability to tool. Capable of applying this type of small act against moving maritime targets with the warhead and highly accurate firepower, the Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement AC-130 gunship “incorporate[s] side-firing (AMSTE) program (which uses the Joint Direct weapons integrated with sophisticated sensor, Attack Munition guided by the global posi­ navigation and fire control systems to provide tioning system, updated by aircraft with GMTI- surgical firepower or area saturation during capable radar) and the CBu-97, a guided clus­ extended loiter periods, at night and in ad­ ter munition also known as the sensor-fuzed 46 verse weather. The sensor suite consists of a weapon. Other weapons capable of striking television sensor, infrared sensor and radar.”50 moving maritime targets include the AGM-65 47 “With its extremely accurate fire control sys­ Maverick and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. Fi­ tem, the AC-130 can place 105mm, 40mm and nally, the navy’s P-3 and F/A-18 aircraft and 25mm munitions on target with firstround ac­ the Air Force’s B-52 bomber can employ the curacy.”51 Strafing from fighter and attack air­ 48 AGM-84D Harpoon antiship missile. craft offers another option. In general, how­ Destroying a vessel is the option of last re­ ever, gunfire from a fighter/attack aircraft is sort, however. Commanders probably would somewhat less accurate than that from a gun­ not approve such action without perfect intel­ ship. With fixedgun positions and limited sys­ ligence—a chimerical commodity. This sug­ tems to assist in cueing, the accuracy of such gests that the largest gap in the uS military’s strafing depends primarily on visual acquisition ability to engage maritime threats is a lack of of the target and the pilot’s gunnery skills. nonlethal or ship-disabling weaponry. Since nonkinetic weapons could also disable a boarding teams can use the minimum re­ vessel. The Coast Guard has experimented quired force to subdue a threat, they them­ with nonexplosive devices for fouling propul­ selves represent a potentially nonlethal or sion or steering systems, including both sur­ ship-disabling weapon. Thus, we can improve face- and air-delivered entanglement systems. this capability through faster delivery of these To date, it has focused on small boats, but the teams. Accordingly, the lCS, helicopter, and Joint non-lethal Weapons program is exam­ V-22 options for rapid and long-range delivery ining future entanglement devices, and larger discussed above also would add capability to versions lie within the realm of possibility.52 the neutralize phase of engagement. The nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) In certain scenarios, delivering a boarding weapon—a second nonkinetic option for dis­ party to a suspect vessel might prove impossible abling a ship—produces a short but intense because small arms or man-portable missiles pulse that “can result in irreversible damage could threaten air- and surface-based inser­ to a wide range of electrical and electronic tion methods.49 Alternatively, a noncooperative equipment, particularly computers and radio vessel might maneuver to imperil the lives of or radar receivers.”53 using such a weapon

3-Grynkewich.indd 91 10/29/07 9:19:46 AM 92 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

against large commercial vessels that depend Rather than waiting for development of a on onboard computer systems for control and static defensive system based on shore batteries, navigation would significantly degrade those land-based airpower offers a flexible-response functions. The los Alamos national labora­ capability. Aircraft on combat air patrol (CAP) tory first demonstrated EMP weapons in the could rapidly engage vessels that emerge as 1950s, and “since that time a wide range of threats as they approach or enter uS ports. [EMP-weapon] configurations has been built Command authorities can stand aircraft CAPs and tested, both in the uS and [Russia].”54 up or down and move them to different geo­ nonlethal entanglement or EMP weapons graphic locations as the threat dictates. Intel­ have the potential to quickly neutralize any ligence would determine which ports to de­ potential maritime threat to the homeland fend and how long to maintain the CAP. until without destroying the vessel, compromising the fielding of nonlethal weapons, the 20–30 any evidence or intelligence on board, or mm cannons on most fighter/attack aircraft threatening the lives of noncombatants. Air or the various-caliber weapons on the AC-130 delivery of these systems would enable rapid gunship (or perhaps even attack helicopters) employment over long distances. nonetheless, could disable threat vessels by targeting screws, these nonlethal options must undergo testing bridges, or engine rooms. When nonlethal and analysis to confirm their effects, particu­ weapons become available, slow movers—in­ larly with respect to the possibility of collateral cluding manned or unmanned helicopters damage from EMP employment near other ships and light fixed-wing aircraft—represent the or in port. Ideally, using a nonlethal weapon best choice for their employment. Thus, we would leave the suspect threat vessel adrift should consider fighters, bombers, or gun­ without significant collateral damage, allowing ships only an interim solution until nonlethal boarding parties to search it at their leisure. weapons reach full maturity. Despite the promise such weapons hold for simplifying the maritime homeland-defense problem, mission complexity increases expo­ Command and Control nentially as intelligence specificity decreases. Considerations An especially problematic scenario emerges when intelligence indicates that an attack is in using Air Force assets for maritime defense progress without knowing either the specific raises several C2 issues. Although the Depart­ target or its port of origin. In such cases, every ment of Defense (DOD) has responsibility for ship is suspect. Such a scenario effectively pre­ maritime defense in the forward areas, the cludes maritime interdiction. Without stop­ Maritime Operational Threat Response for the Na­ ping and inspecting every vessel bound for tional Strategy for Maritime Security gives the De­ the united States, we have no way of knowing partment of Homeland Security (DHS) au­ which vessel is hostile. Furthermore, by re­ thority to interdict maritime threats in waters maining hidden until shortly before the actual subject to uS jurisdiction.56 nonetheless, if the attack, stowaway terrorists can limit our re­ DHS asks the DOD for assistance, the mari­ sponse time to as little as 20 minutes. With no time homeland-defense mission would then indicators to distinguish the attacking ship fall under the jurisdiction of uS northern from others until endgame and inadequate Command (nORTHCOM) and uS Pacific time to deploy boarding teams, the latter be­ Command. unfortunately, current maritime come largely ineffective. One solution to this homeland-defense capability exists largely on problem calls for using nonlethal shore bat­ an ad hoc basis. nORTHCOM in particular teries as a defense of last resort. If authorities has received criticism for not devoting enough suspect that a ship has come under hostile attention to the maritime mission.57 Because control, an in-place and on-call shore battery the command does not have assigned naval could respond in time to disable it.55 unfortu­ forces, it relies “on contingency planning for nately, we are years away from such a capability. future events and theoretically acts as a coor­

3-Grynkewich.indd 92 10/29/07 9:19:46 AM MARITIME HOMELAND DEFENSE 93

dinating bridge between the navy and Coast plans, and policies to reflectthe service’s inte­ Guard for Maritime Homeland Defense / gration into the combatant-command structure; Security issues.”58 Furthermore, although the and detailing personnel to the Office of the north American Regional Aerospace Defense Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and the com­ Command agreement between the united batant commands.63 Indeed, a Coast Guard States and Canada recently expanded to in­ rear admiral currently serves as nORTHCOM’s clude a maritime-surveillance role, the com­ deputy director of operations (J-3).64 mand “will not exercise operational control The final—but perhaps most challenging— over maritime assets.”59 question with respect to C2 for maritime home­ The question then arises as to who will ex­ land defense has to do with which service or ercise operational control over maritime assets. services should have responsibility for orga­ One option would have combatant command­ nizing, training, and equipping the land-based ers assign all forces performing the maritime- air forces intended for the maritime-defense defense mission to their joint force maritime mission. On the one hand, the Coast Guard’s component commander (JFMCC). Air Force dual role as a law-enforcement agency and and joint doctrine account for situations in military force under Title 14 might make it which the JFMCC might “plan and direct lim­ the logical steward of such forces. On the ited Air Force support operations.”60 Another other, the navy, with its long history of per­ option calls for the combatant commander to forming maritime-intercept operations, might establish a Joint Task Force for Maritime qualify as the service with the greatest knowl­ Homeland Defense (JTF-MHD). In this case, edge of how to conduct maritime-defense mis­ land-based air assets could remain under a sions. Although both arguments have merit, separate subordinate component command we must consider whether or not the Air Force at the discretion of the JTF commander. In ei­ should assume responsibility for employing land- ther case, having all surface- and air-based based airpower assets for maritime defense. maritime-defense forces under the authority of One of Phillip Meilinger’s propositions re­ a single commander (e.g., the nORTHCOM garding airpower is that “airpower’s unique JFMCC or JTF-MHD commander) would ensure characteristics require centralized control by unity of effort during maritime-interdiction airmen.”65 He notes that, historically, the Air missions.61 Force has felt that without centralized control, Another C2 question in maritime homeland airpower would be parceled out to surface defense concerns how DOD forces under the commanders who would jealously guard their combatant commander should interact with air assets to the detriment of the theaterwide the Coast Guard. Confusing the issue somewhat effort.66 An analogous concern exists with re­ is the fact that the Coast Guard could serve as spect to airpower in the maritime homeland- the supported or supporting command, de­ defense mission. Most of the air assets that pending on whether or not the maritime mis­ have a potential maritime-defense role could sion took the form of homeland security or also be used for other missions critical to the homeland defense.62 The president makes this war on terror. In this type of warfare, persis­ decision when he assigns lead-federal-agency tent surveillance, precision targeting, and authority during a crisis, but the Coast Guard long-range delivery of personnel constitute is taking steps to integrate its forces with those critical airpower capabilities regardless of the of the DOD in order to make the transition composition of the surface underneath. Giving from supported to supporting command as responsibility for air assets used for maritime seamless as possible. These include pursuing homeland defense to maritime services might changes to the law that clarifies the Coast constrain their use either in other theaters or Guard’s role as a force provider to the com­ for other missions. We could avoid this prob­ batant commanders under the Goldwater­ lem by assigning responsibility for organizing, nichols Department of Defense Reorganization training, and equipping these forces to the Act of 1986; adapting Coast Guard doctrine, Air Force.

3-Grynkewich.indd 93 10/29/07 9:19:46 AM 94 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

Conclusion limited numbers of aircraft (and required tanker support) on 24-hour alert status for CAP The Air Force needs to start thinking about over major ports would guarantee minimal its role in maritime defense now. The fact that disruption. If intelligence ever indicated an Air Force forces are already spread thin by vir­ increased maritime threat, aircraft could be tue of air defense requirements at home and added to the alert packages. the war on terror abroad may drive resistance Over the longer term, the service that gains to picking up a new mission. upon close in­ responsibility for developing land-based air- spection of this matter, however, we find that power capabilities for maritime defense will only modest investments of current Air Force need to innovate. The enemy is adapting, and assets can produce a significant increase in the threat of a maritime 9/11 is real. Innova­ maritime-defense capability. We would need a tive concepts of operation—such as using the limited number of long-range surveillance V-22 for long-range maritime insertions— missions for prescribed time periods (defined could significantlyenhance maritime defense. by intelligence and availability of the surface likewise, innovative technological advances— fleet) to find and track suspect vessels. Simi­ such as the development of nonlethal weap­ larly, placing a single long-range bomber on ons—would increase military flexibility and 24-hour alert status for maritime interdiction bolster the nation’s security. Although legiti­ would ensure rapid, immediate, and long- mate reasons exist for assigning responsibility range firepower. In both cases, these aircraft for developing such innovations to the mari­ could operate out of their home bases, with time services, equally valid reasons suggest giv­ no need to forward deploy to the coasts. We ing this responsibility to the Air Force. Either would have to make a slightly larger invest­ way, we must act now. The armed forces and ment to provide maritime CAPs over uS ports their civilian leadership must decide which as the last line of defense. Although aircraft service should provide airpower capabilities to (whether fighter/attack, gunship, uAV, or heli­ defend the maritime domain against asym­ copter) would need to fly CAP only a limited metric threats. Failure to do so delays the de­ number of times, this mission would necessi­ velopment of the maritime defense that we so tate additional training. Regardless, placing desperately need. ❑

Notes

1. Isaac Don levine, Mitchell: Pioneer of Airpower (new 6. Eben Kaplan, “liquefied natural Gas: A Potential york: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943), 251–57. Terrorist Target?” Council on Foreign Relations, 27 Febru­ 2. Billy Mitchell, report to the chief of the Air Service, ary 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9810/liquefied September 1921, quoted in Harry H. Ransom, “The Battle­ _natural_gas.html (accessed 21 July 2006). Some early ship Meets the Airplane,” Military Affairs 23, no. 1 (Spring studies of terrorist attacks on liquefiednatural gas (lnG) 1959): 23. ships and facilities disagree with this assessment, and 3. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, many argue that attacking and detonating an lnG vessel DC: Executive Office of the President, February 2003), 8, is particularly problematic. See Bryan Bender, “Report http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/ Cites Risk of Wide Damage in lnG Blast,” Boston Globe, 15 counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf. See May 2004, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/ Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadel­ 2004/05/15/report_cites_risk_of_wide_damage_in_lng phia: university of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 170, for a _blast (accessed 19 February 2007). discussion of al-Qaeda’s networked structure. 7. John F. Frittelli, Port and Maritime Security: Back­ 4. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The underside ground and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress no. of netwar,” Institute of Public Affairs Review 54, no. 4 (Decem­ Rl31733 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Ser­ ber 2002): 3, http://www.ipa.org.au/files/review54-4.pdf. vice, library of Congress, updated 27 May 2005), CRS-5, 5. The National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/Rl31733.pdf. In DC: Department of Homeland Security, September 2005), April 2006, a 600-foot cargo ship overshot its dock in Bos­ 3–5, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/4844-nsms.pdf. ton Harbor, missing the city’s lnG terminal by a margin

3-Grynkewich.indd 94 10/29/07 9:19:47 AM MARITIME HOMELAND DEFENSE 95

of only 200 feet, highlighting the exposure and vulnera­ 18. Department of Homeland Security, National Plan bility of critical infrastructure to attack from hijacked ves­ to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy sels. See “One Sunny April Day near the lnG Tank, a for Maritime Security (Washington, DC: Department of Home­ Close Call on Mystic: A 600-foot Ship Overshoots Dock, land Security, October 2005), ii, http://www.dhs.gov/ and Charges Fly,” Boston Globe, 7 May 2006, http://www xlibrary/assets/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf. .boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/05/07/one 19. Ibid., 9, 12. This document lists several of the cri­ _sunny_april_day_near_the_lng_tank_a_close_call_on teria used to provide “knowledge” in the maritime domain _mystic (accessed 21 July 2006). (p. 9) and describes how a vessel is “flagged” (p. 12). 8. James Russell and Iliana Bravo, “Homeland De­ 20. “Our Mission,” national Maritime Intelligence Cen­ fense: Ramping up, But What’s the Glidepath?” Strategic ter, Office of naval Intelligence, http://www.nmic.navy.mil/ Insights 1, no. 1 (March 2002), http://www.ccc.nps.navy mission.htm (accessed 14 September 2006). Additionally, .mil/si/mar02/homeDefense.asp (accessed 17 March 2006). the Coast Guard’s Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers See also Colin Robinson, “Al Qaeda’s ‘navy’: How Much for the Pacific and Atlantic coasts can analyze and fuse of a Threat?” Center for Defense Information, 20 August data from “local and international maritime, intelligence 2003, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm and law enforcement partners.” Clare Maranda, “Mari­ ?documentID=1644 (accessed 15 March 2006); and Peter time Intelligence Fusion Center Opened,” Pacific Tides Grier and Faye Bowers, “How Al Qaeda Might Strike the Online, 1 november 2003, http://www.uscg.mil/pacarea/ uS by Sea,” Christian Science Monitor, 15 May 2003, http:// news/ptol/features/MaritimeFusion (accessed 14 Sep­ www.csmonitor.com/2003/0515/p02s02-usgn.html. tember 2006). 9. Christian Weber, New York State Office of Homeland 21. The navy is also examining several ways to en­ Security Focus Report: Maritime Terrorist Threat (new york: hance surface and subsurface capabilities in this area. See new york State Officeof Homeland Security, 21 February David W. Munns, “Vital links: The Coast Guard and navy 2006), 5. Are Cooperating across the Board to Increase u.S. Aware­ 10. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s ness of What Is Happening in the Maritime Arena,” navy War on Terror (new york: Free Press, 2004), 15. league of the united States, May 2005, http://www 11. Frittelli, Port and Maritime Security, CRS-7. .navyleague.org/sea_power/may_05_22.php (accessed 12. Devon Chaffee, “Freedom or Force on the High 19 February 2007). 22. “Space-Based Radar (SBR),” Global Security.org, Seas? Arms Interdiction and International law,” nuclear http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sbr.htm Age Peace Foundation, 15 August 2003, http://www.waging (accessed 19 February 2007). peace.org/articles/2003/08/15_chaffee_freedom-of-force 23. As just one example, during the buildup to Opera­ .htm (accessed 25 May 2006). It is important to note that tion Iraqi Freedom, six satellites tasked exclusively against although the united States adheres to several customs the Baghdad regime resulted in only 12 overflights with and conventions with respect to maritime law, it has optimal viewing angles. Craig Covault, “Secret nRO Re­ signed but not yet ratifiedthe united nations Convention cons Eye Iraqi Threats,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, on the law of the Sea. 16 September 2002, http://cndyorks.gn.apc.org/yspace/ 13. National Strategy for Maritime Security, ii. The Na­ articles/nrorecons.htm. tional Security Strategy states that, “to expand economic lib­ 24. “Global Hawk,” fact sheet, Air Force Link, October erty and prosperity, the united States promotes free and 2005, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=175 fair trade, open markets, a stable financial system, the in­ (accessed 4 December 2005). tegration of the global economy, and secure, clean energy 25. Additionally, Global Hawk has already proven it­ development.” The National Security Strategy of the United self in the maritime domain, performing sea surveillance States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, during several maritime exercises. See “RQ-4A Global March 2006), 25, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/ Hawk (Tier II+ HAE uAV),” Global Security.org, http:// 2006/nss2006.pdf. www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/global_hawk.htm 14. Frittelli, Port and Maritime Security, CRS-2. (accessed 4 December 2005). 15. Maryann lawlor, “Maritime Defense undergoes 26. “Senior year/Aquatone/u-2/TR-1,” FAS [Fed­ All-Hands Evolution,” Signal 58, no. 3 (november 2003): 54, eration of American Scientists] Intelligence Resource Program, http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGnAl http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/u-2.htm (accessed _Article_Template.asp?articleid=63&zoneid=28; and An 18 August 2006). Assessment of the U.S. Marine Transportation System: A Report 27. “E-8 Joint-STARS—Improvements and upgrades,” to Congress (Washington, DC: uS Department of Transpor­ Global Security.org, 26 March 2004, http://www.globalsecurity tation, September 1999), http://www.dot.gov/mts/report/ .org/intell/systems/jstars-up.htm (accessed 5 October mtsfinal.pdf. 2006). 16. For a similar assessment from our British allies, 28. “E-8C Joint Stars,” fact sheet, Air Force Link, October see Group Capt B. C. laite, Maritime Air Operations (lon­ 2005, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=100 don: Brassey’s, 1991), 138. (accessed 5 October 2006). 17. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 29. For example, Robert Wall, “F/A-18E/F Radar up­ 13, Maritime Security Policy, 21 December 2004, 5, http:// grade Readied,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 157, www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf (accessed 17 no. 26 (23 December 2002): 57; and “Two Bombers Par­ March 2006). ticipating,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 164, no. 20

3-Grynkewich.indd 95 10/29/07 9:19:47 AM 96 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

(15 May 2006): 18. See also Andrew Dardine, “Avionics in December 2005). In november 2004, a B-52 flewnonstop Demand,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 164, no. 3 from Guam and successfully employed an AMSTE-equipped (16 January 2006): 203. JDAM against the decommissioned uSS Schenectady (lST 30. “High Altitude Endurance unmanned Air Vehicle 1185), destroying the vessel offshore from Hawaii. See (HAEuAV),” uS Coast Guard, 2 February 2006, http:// TSgt Tonya Keebaugh, “Resultant Fury Successful Thanks www.uscg.mil/deepwater/system/hauav.htm (accessed 18 to ‘Test’ Airmen,” Air Force Print news, 14 December 2004, August 2006). http://www.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?storyID=123009411 31. Otto Kreisher, “Two S.D. Firms Could Be Competing (accessed 4 December 2005). In June 2005, B-1B bombers for navy Contract: BAMS Is Called Huge undertaking,” successfully employed a CBu-98 on a moving maritime San Diego Union-Tribune, 18 May 2006, http://www.signon target in the Gulf of Mexico. A1C Kiley Olds, “Dyess AFB sandiego.com/uniontrib/20060518/news_1b18bams.html Demonstrates B-1B’s upgrades, Combat Capabilities,” Air (accessed 18 August 2006). Force Print news, 19 August 2005, http://www.af.mil/ 32. Ibid. news/story_print.asp?storyID=123011369 (accessed 4 De­ 33. lt Col Ed “Mel” Tomme and Col Sigfred “Ziggy” cember 2005). Dahl, “Balloons in Today’s Military? An Introduction to 47. “AGM-65 Maverick,” fact sheet, Air Force Link, Octo­ the near-Space Concept,” Air and Space Power Journal 19, ber 2005, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=72 no. 4 (Winter 2005): 43, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af (accessed 17 March 2006); and “MQ-1 Predator unmanned .mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/win05/win05.pdf. 34. Ibid., 48. Aerial Vehicle,” uS Air Force fact sheet, October 2005, 35. Ibid., 44, fig. 2. http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID= 36. Maj Robert Blackington, uS Air Force Space Battle- 122&page=1 (accessed 17 March 2006). lab project, quoted in Alan Boyle, “Airship Groomed for 48. “AGM-84 Harpoon SlAM [Stand-Off land Attack Flight to Edge of Space: Developer Says ‘Baby Steps’ Will Missile],” FAS Military Analysis Network, 1 December 2005, Someday lead to Orbit,” MSNBC, 21 May 2004, http:// http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/agm-84.htm www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5025388 (accessed 14 September (accessed 18 August 2006). 2006). 49. During situations in which a suspect vessel per­ 37. Thomas E. Ricks and Peter Slevin, “Spain and u.S. forms such a hostile act, we could craft the rules of en­ Seize n. Korean Missiles: Scuds Were on Ship Bound for gagement to allow destructive kinetic options, ironically yemen,” Washington Post, 11 December 2002, A01. simplifying the tactical problem. 38. The Meyer Institute for Systems Engineering at 50. “AC-130H/u Gunship,” fact sheet, Air Force Link, the naval Postgraduate School recently analyzed a similar October 2005, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp scenario. See lCDR Andrew Kessler et al., Maritime Threat ?fsID=71 (accessed 15 September 2006). Response, final report (Monterey, CA: naval Postgraduate 51. “AC-130H Spectre / AC-130u Spooky,” FAS Mili­ School, June 2006), 30–31. tary Analysis Network, 8 January 2000, http://www.fas.org/ 39. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel man/dod-101/sys/ac/ac-130.htm (accessed 15 September B. Griffith (Baltimore, MD: nautical and Aviation Pub­ 2006). lishing Company of America, 1992), 113. 52. “nonlethal Weapons in law Enforcement Opera­ 40. Kessler et al., Maritime Threat Response, 30–31, 252. tions,” briefingslides, uS Coast Guard, 2002, http://www 41. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): .dtic.mil/ndia/2002nonlethdef/Jacobs.pdf (accessed 15 Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report to Congress September 2006); and Doug Beizer, “DOD Taps Ameri­ no. RS21305 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research can Systems for nonlethal Weapons Work,” GCN [Govern­ Service, library of Congress, updated 18 August 2006), ment Computer News], 6 January 2006, http://www.gcn CRS-2, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS21305.pdf. .com/online/vol1_no1/37919-1.html?topic=defense 42. Kessler et al., Maritime Threat Response, 250–51. -technology (accessed 15 September 2006). 43. Frank Colucci, “navy, Marine Helicopter Fleets 53. CarloKopp, “TheElectromagneticBomb:AWeapon Will See Steady Arrivals of new Aircraft,” National Defense, of Electrical Mass Destruction,” Air and Space Power Journal— September 2005, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ Chronicles Online Journal, n.d., http://www.airpower.maxwell issues/2005/Sep/navy_Marine.htm (accessed 15 Septem­ ber 2006). .af.mil/airchronicles/kopp/apjemp.html (accessed 15 44. Christopher Bolkcom, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft, September 2006). CRS Report for Congress no. Rl31384 (Washington, DC: 54. Ibid. Congressional Research Service, library of Congress, up­ 55. Kessler et al., Maritime Threat Response, 253. Shore dated 13 March 2007), CRS-2, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ batteries could also benefitfrom air-asset support, such as weapons/Rl31384.pdf. airborne spotting. lethal shore batteries are less desir­ 45. “MV-22 Osprey,” fact sheet, uS Marine Corps, 30 able, given the fog and friction present under the ex­ December 1997, http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/factfile.nsf/ tremely short timeline during which authorities would 0/006111164d72c407852562de00720540?OpenDocument attempt to determine whether or not a vessel was hostile. (accessed 15 September 2006). 56. Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee, 46. “Ground Moving Target Engagement System Hits Maritime Operational Threat Response for the National Strategy Tank with JDAM,” Space Daily, 22 December 2003, http:// for Maritime Security (Washington, DC: national Security www.spacedaily.com/news/gps-03zzh.html (accessed 4 Council/Homeland Security Council, October 2005), 6.

3-Grynkewich.indd 96 10/29/07 9:19:48 AM MARITIME HOMELAND DEFENSE 97

57. Roxana Tiron, “northern Command not Direct­ 62. Adm Thad Allen, commandant of the Coast Guard, ing Enough Attention to Maritime Defense,” National De­ “State of the Coast Guard Address,” All American Patriots: fense 89, no. 614 (January 2005): 14. United States News and Information, 13 February 2007, http:// 58. Carlos urbizu, “Shielding Achilles’ Heel: Challenges www.allamericanpatriots.com/m-news+article+storyid Facing northern Command in the Maritime Domain” -19692.html (accessed 18 February 2007). Determining (master’s thesis, naval Postgraduate School, March 2004), 1. whether or not a particular mission falls under homeland 59. David Pugliese, “nORAD Expands: Aerospace Com­ security or homeland defense is not always easy. During a mand Takes on Maritime Surveillance Role,” C4ISR: The crisis, the president would decide whether the DOD or Journal of Net-Centric Warfare, 3 July 2006, http://www.isr DHS has lead-federal-agency responsibilities. Supported/ journal.com/story.php?F=1854792 (accessed 18 August supporting command relationships would follow from 2006). that decision. 60. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.4, 63. The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Se­ Countersea Operations, 15 September 2005, 18, https:// curity, and Stewardship (Washington, DC: uS Coast Guard, www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_HTMl/ 19 January 2007), 46. Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-1-4.pdf. See also Joint Publication 64. “Biographies for Coast Guard leaders,” united (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and States Coast Guard, 31 January 2007, http://www.uscg.mil/ Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 1 flag (accessed 19 February 2007). March 2007), 283–84, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ 65. Col Phillip S. Meilinger, “Ten Propositions Re­ new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf; and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 Sep­ garding Airpower,” Air and Space Power Journal 10, no. 1 tember 2006, II-12 through II-13, http://www.dtic.mil/ (Spring 1996): 53. doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf. 66. Ibid., 66. 61. For a discussion of JTF organization, see JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, 16 February 2007, http:// www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_33.pdf.

Air Force Mission Statement

The mission of the United States Air Force is to deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its global interests—to fly and fight in Air, Space, and Cyberspace.

3-Grynkewich.indd 97 10/29/07 9:19:51 AM Dawn of the Cognetic Age Fighting Ideological War by Putting Thought in Motion with Impact

Lt CoL BruCe K. Johnson, usAF

Editorial Abstract: Colonel Johnson uses the term “cognetic” to mean put­ ting thought into motion, ideally with global impact. Militant Islam has prov­ en very adept at exploiting the cognetic realm to foment disillusionment and advance its agenda. The author urges the United States, starting with policy makers responsible for national securi­ ty, to adopt and apply cognetic think­ ing in order to reorient US grand strat­ egy so that the nation can wage and win ideological warfare.

his arTicle inTroduces the (the internet and transnational television) term cognetic, coined by the author and their effect on public opinion and behavior. from the root words cognitive (relat To be cognetic is to put thought in motion with ing to thought process) and kinetic impact. Thought takes the form of messages T(relating to, caused by, or producing motion). created by specific arrangements of images, currently, the term lacks a single, accepted sounds, and words. Motion signifiesthe global meaning. i intend to use it in a unique way in media’s unrestrained and rapid movement of order to define the essence of today’s fast- messages to a target audience. impact repre moving, unrestrained, nonstop global media sents the effect on public opinion and behavior

98

4-Johnson.indd 98 10/29/07 9:55:43 AM DAWN OF THE COGNETIC AGE 99

caused by perceptions generated by the mes ence requires understanding the nature and sage. Violent public reactions in the Muslim dynamics of ideological warfare in the cognetic world to the publication of cartoons depicting age. doing so necessitates building a lens to Muhammad in the danish newspaper Jyllands- see the underlying operational doctrine used Posten and to Pope Benedict XVi’s remarks about by enemy forces to carry out ideological war. islam epitomize the term cognetic —putting looking through this lens, national-security thought in motion with a global impact.1 un policy makers will find themselves in a better like bombs and bullets—the effective conven position to formulate policies, strategies, and tional weapons of the industrial age—imagery, doctrines needed to promote an effective war sounds, and words serve as the effective ideo time grand strategy for the long term with an logical weapons of the cognetic age. eye toward shortening the war. To build this The us government recognizes the impor lens, we need shared terminologies, concepts, tance of the ideological component of its war and principles to help us think differently and with militant islam, calling it a battle of ideas, communicate clearly about the ideological war. but lacks a shared, systematic way to conceptu alize, communicate, and carry out this type of war. Top-level us strategy documents, such as Think Differently— the National Security Strategy, National Strategy Communicate Clearly for Combating Terrorism, and Quadrennial Defense Review Report all state the importance of coun adopting shared terminologies, concepts, tering militant islam’s ideology.2 however, the and principles is critical to developing a new united states continues to emphasize tangible, capability for ideological warfare if the mili conventional military solutions to fight an in tary services and various government agencies tangible war of ideas while pursuing security wish to avoid the misperceptions and negative policies counterproductive to building and baggage associated with old terminology and maintaining public support. symptomatic of thinking. Many terms and concepts held over an unsustainable and ineffectual grand strategy, from the industrial age prevent us from think these facts are largely responsible for increas ing and communicating clearly about new ing the strain on the military and for rapidly threats we face in the cognetic age. For ex decreasing domestic and international support ample, propaganda does not fit today’s decen­ for the “long war.” tralized information-communication environ This article advocates adopting cognetic ment because we associate it with the centralized thinking to create a shared, systematic way of control and management of information and conceptualizing, communicating, and carrying communications that reflectedthe concentra out ideological warfare against militant islam. tion of power during the industrial age. With it does so by applying principles of maneuver the advent of the internet and globalization, warfare so that we can understand our enemy’s this concentration of power no longer exists use of global media as an ideological weapon in the hands of the few; indeed, many people of mass influence. additionally, it encourages now have access to it. This shift in power is the the use of cognetic thinking to conduct a rigor defining feature of the cognetic age. More ous risk-versus-return analysis of post-9/11 se over, considerable negative baggage has at curity policies vis-à-vis militant islam in an ef tached itself to propaganda, a word continually fort to create a sustainable and effective grand used to describe almost any activity having to strategy to win the long war. This requires do with influencing perceptions, whether for championing policies that constructively build good or ill. This intellectual burden stiflesour and maintain us and allied resolve to fight, ability to fight ideological war by tying our attract the uncommitted to our side, and drain minds and tongues to the dogmas of the past. away militant islam’s desire to continue fighting. By providing perceptually neutral terms and understanding militant islam’s use of global concepts, cognetics eliminates the knee-jerk media as an operational weapon of mass influ reaction to propaganda, thus freeing our

4-Johnson.indd 99 10/29/07 9:55:43 AM 100 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

minds and enabling us to think differently as to that of the civilized world. a self-admitted well as communicate more clearly about the al-Qaeda member, commenting on the Madrid ideological battle we face. train bombings in 2004, summed up the op cognetics is a new concept of ideological posing systems by saying, “We choose death warfare, based on principles of maneuver war while you choose life.”4 Given this mind-set, fare. referred to as “blitzkrieg of the mind,” it threatening militant islamists with death will occurs in a virtual place created by global media. not deter them because that is what they seek. Time and space, which constrain physical Furthermore, under the intense media maneuver, are almost nonexistent here. The spotlight of the cognetic age, just a flash of term cognetic effect expresses how the emotive an image can neutralize conventional military content of messages delivered by global media power. Pictures of dead women and children, influences public opinion and behavior. a the “collateral damage” of war, carry more ex force multiplier, cognetic effect empowers plosive weight than a B-52—a weight mea nonstate actors to influence public opinion sured not in tons of explosives but in negative and behavior on a global scale. By means of perception, which translates to reduced pub cognetics, the united states can win ideological lic support for government policies and initia warfare by advancing truth, dispelling rumors, tives. acting like a ball and chain, reduced correcting misinformation, and combating support impairs the ability of governments to enemy psychological operations and percep prosecute a long-term war without suffering tion influence. For militant islam, the cog significant political consequences. likewise, netic effect offers disproportionate power to unintended killing and maiming of civilians drive people to action. seen most vividly, the only motivate the uncommitted to join the fight, cognetic effect of the Jyllands-Posten’s Muham creating an uncontainable spiral of events that mad cartoons struck the Muslim world like a depletes limited resources and hinders the meteor, setting off shock waves of anger and ability of the united states and its allies to sus sparking violent demonstrations from lon tain the level of effort required to kill and cap don to lahore. ture new recruits. an operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of 50 more.5 Nature and Dynamics of the The us defeat in Vietnam, as well as con Cognetic Age tinuing political and military difficultiesin af ghanistan and especially iraq, underscores the opening the window of understanding to limits of america’s hard-won conventional this dawning age requires a new interpreta military supremacy. That supremacy has not tion of warfare—one better suited for the delivered decisive success against nonstate nonstop global-media environment. in this enemies who practice protracted irregular environment, the nature and dynamics of war warfare. on the contrary, america’s conven fare take on different forms and emphases as tional supremacy and approach to war—espe the conventional concepts of ordnance, deliv cially its paramount reliance on firepowerand ery platforms, and targets quickly morph from technology—often prove counterproductive.6 the physical to the virtual. it follows, then, that our overreliance on conventional war—the kind for which we have Warfare spent trillions of dollars to organize, train, and The nature of warfare in the cognetic age is equip—cannot produce the decisive results we ideological—something inherently antithetical seek. in fact, this overreliance prolongs the to conventional war because “an idea cannot war by continually feeding new recruits into be destroyed with a bullet or a bomb; it must the islamic cult of death. conventional war be replaced by a better idea.”3 on a deeper fare in the cognetic age has clearly lost its ef level, militant islam’s belief system runs counter ficacy. internalizing this stark reality is the

4-Johnson.indd 100 10/29/07 9:55:43 AM DAWN OF THE COGNETIC AGE 101

most important step in changing the way we al-Manar incessantly before blowing herself think about and approach the current war. up in front of a Jerusalem supermarket in March 2002, killing two israelis and wounding Ordnance and Content 28—a chilling example of cognetics putting thought into motion with a deadly impact.8 The physical weapons of the industrial age— like hezbollah, al-Qaeda promotes its plane, tank, and rifle—use a wide variety of long-term strategic agenda through a public ordnance, including bombs, shells, and bullets relations and media production company known specially designed to create specific effects on specific targets. similarly, the virtual weapons as as-sahab. osama bin laden uses as-sahab of the cognetic age (the internet and trans to address the governments and citizens of national television) have a wide variety of content europe as well as the united states directly in (imagery, sounds, and words) specially designed an effort to discourage support for their foreign to create specificpsychological and behavioral policies in the islamic world. in the absence of effects on specific audiences. cognetics offers major attacks, as-sahab has become al-Qaeda’s a needed alternative to conventional-warfare only means of making a strategic impact on the world outside the afghan-Pakistani border thinking; it provides the means to effectively 9 engage militant islam ideologically by using region. al-Manar and as-sahab are examples images, sounds, and words—the ordnance of of the multitude of militant organizations that choice in this new age. make use of global media to promote their strategic goals. The absence of a capability to Delivery Platforms: Global Media defend the united states against cognetic at tacks means that these organizations go un Many terror groups have media capabilities to challenged as they influence public opinion propagate their ideology and launch cognetic and behavior with their messages of hate and attacks against their enemies. hezbollah was incitements to violence. the firstorganization of its kind to establish its own international television station, al-Manar, Target: Public Opinion for use as an operational weapon and an inte gral part of its plan to reach not only the citi abraham lincoln once observed that “our zens of lebanon but also the broader arab government rests in public opinion. Whoever and Muslim worlds.7 al-Manar employs sophis can change public opinion, can change the ticated methods to influence public opinion government, practically just so much.”10 his and behavior, targeting every segment of Pal message cuts to the heart of a major lesson of estinian society, beginning with children. hez war, namely, that those who most effectively bollah seeks to incite and mobilize people to master the medium of communication which take action against israel and the united influences public opinion can determine the states, specifically by propagating repetitive outcome of wars. Many examples from our messages of hate and violence designed to in own short history reinforce this statement. duce the young and impressionable to join during the london blitz of World War ii, the cult of death or, at a minimum, induce cBs reporter edward r. Murrow effectively sympathy for hezbollah’s cause. built us public support for coming to the aid al-Manar officials assert that they strive to of Great Britain by bringing the war and sto create music videos with the level of profes ries of British heroism into the living rooms of sionalism that they see on us television net america: “he was just a journalist, but he real works, specifically Music Television (MTV). ized he could use the young medium of radio The videos tend to feature violent images and to galvanize public opinion and push us policy incendiary language designed, by the station’s makers.”11 one analyst noted that “the Tet of own admission, to foster suicide operations by fensive of February 1968 had a huge impact inciting individual viewers to violence. ayat al on american public opinion and led to sub akhras,ayoungPalestinian,reportedlywatched stantial changes in american support for the

4-Johnson.indd 101 10/29/07 9:55:44 AM 102 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

[Vietnam] war.”12 north Vietnamese leader hannibal’s victory over the romans at cannae ho chi Minh, enabled by widespread television and Germany’s blitzkrieg invasions of Poland reporting, grabbed a psychological victory from and France during World War ii typify maneu the jaws of military defeat. his perceived vic ver warfare.14 tory decisively undermined american public Warfare by maneuver stems from a desire support for continuing the war, leading to the to circumvent a problem by attacking it from eventual withdrawal of us forces in 1973 and a position of advantage rather than meeting it the collapse of south Vietnam in 1975. straight on. With its goal the application of Viewing today’s situation in the context of strength against weakness, maneuver, by defi these past examples underscores the use of nition, relies on speed and surprise because global media—the most effective communica withouteither,onecannotconcentratestrength tion means available—by adherents of mili against an enemy’s weakness. Tempo, itself a tant islam as a strategic weapon of mass influ weapon—often the most important—in turn ence. They use these weapons to attack requires decentralized control. although at america’s spirit, morale, and value system— trition operates principally in the physical realm our psychological center of gravity—to influ of war, maneuver produces both physical and ence public opinion and behavior. The enemy moral results. Maneuver seeks not so much to seeks to do so through tactical, media-amplified destroy physically as to shatter the enemy’s co terror and intimidation operations in an at hesion, organization, command, and psycho tempt to force us to do his will by abandoning logical balance.15 our vital strategic interests in the Middle east. Maneuver warfare focuses on the human ironically, mainstream media becomes an (moral-psychological) element—the true cen accessory to militant islam’s messages of terror ter of gravity of any type of warfare—making it and hate through repetitive broadcasting to an excellent basis for cognetics. on close in the Western viewing public. The number of spection, the principles of maneuver warfare mainstream-media channels massively ampli largely apply to the way militant islam employs fies and disperses terror, directly aiding the global media to carry out cognetic attacks on assault on america’s psychological center of public opinion. drawing on these similarities, gravity. Furthermore, us government actions the following five principles help build a lens perceived to run counter to its culture and values offer militant islam opportunities to ex needed to see how militant islam uses global ploit the moral level of war to its advantage. media as an ideological weapon. hot-button issues such as the abuses at abu Ghraib prison, indefinite detention and al Principle One: Speed and Surprise to Pit Strength against Weakness leged torture at Guantánamo, secret cia pris ons, and apparent favoritism toward israel, in the opening stages of World War ii, Ger among others, fuel a highly negative, charged many launched surprise invasions of Poland, background, opening the united states up to norway, denmark, Belgium, holland, and increasingly powerful cognetic attacks. France. The Germans bypassed enemy strong points—such as the Maginot line—and, using tanks and airplanes with radio communica Building the Cognetic Lens tion, punched through enemy weaknesses. Throughout military history, two distinct They followed the path of least resistance, styles of warfare have existed: attrition, based drove deep into the enemy’s rear, cut lines of on firepower, and maneuver, based on move communication, disrupted movement, and ment.13 These fightingstyles reside at opposite paralyzed command-and-control systems. Ger ends of the spectrum of warfare. attrition-style man forces moved so fast that the enemy simply warfare includes such bloody slugfests as the could not understand what was happening american civil War and World War i, whereas and came unglued.16

4-Johnson.indd 102 10/29/07 9:55:44 AM DAWN OF THE COGNETIC AGE 103

unable to attack the united states directly and-control system into multiple, indepen since 9/11, al-Qaeda uses global media to by dently acting, decentralized elements focused pass the strength of our homeland defenses, on the same goal. For decentralization to work, follow the path of least resistance through our subordinate commanders must make decisions open society, and attack our psychological on their own initiative, based on their under center of gravity. Because we do not censor standing of the senior’s intent, rather than the internet or transnational television, im pass information up the chain of command ages of death and destruction from terror at and wait for a decision. Further, a competent tacks speed unimpeded (like Germany’s tanks subordinate commander at the point of deci and aircraft) across the flatplains of the global sion will naturally have a better appreciation media directly to our TV screens and com for the true situation than a senior at some puter monitors, delivering a mental blitzkrieg distance removed. individual initiative and re attack measured not in explosive weight but sponsibility are of paramount importance.18 in the weight of perception. similarly, militant islamic groups use the de centralized nature of the internet to launch Principle Two: Tempo cognetic attacks simultaneously on many fronts. Broadly, these groups share the same goal—to The decisive application of maneuver warfare overturn the current order of things and re requires operating at a faster tempo by staying place it with one of their choosing. one or two steps ahead of the enemy—specifi cally by acting inside the enemy’s time scale, Principle Four: Fingerspitzengefuhl generating a rapidly changing environment by engaging in quick, disorienting activity that someone possessing the quality of Fingerspitz­ appears uncertain or ambiguous to the enemy. engefuhl, literally “fingertipfeeling,” has such a a sufficiently fast tempo inhibits the adversary’s high level of competence that he or she can ability to adapt and creates confusion, which make decisions without hesitation, based on in turn causes the enemy to over- or under- intuitive competence at all levels—from pri react. Whoever can handle the quickest rate vate to general. in addition to proficiencywith of change survives.17 weapons at the individual level, “intuitive com Members of militant islam can easily stay petence” also applies at command level, where two steps ahead by using the speed of global it refers in general to the “feel” that great com media to launch cognetic attacks. They do so manders have for the progress of the battle unimpeded and with great speed, enabling and in particular to their seemingly uncanny them to lash out at their enemies worldwide abilities to detect and exploit openings while with near-instantaneous psychological effect. they still present opportunities. it comes from unencumbered by the physical size and weight years of practice at ever-increasing levels of of conventional military hardware or the en complexity.19 demic sloth of government bureaucracy, they set their own tactical and operational tempo and Principle Five: Schwerpunkt compress time by generating a rapidly changing carl von clausewitz introduced the term Schwer­ environment. conversely, strategically speak punkt, sometimes loosely translated as “center ing, militant islam uses a longer time scale. By of gravity,” in his classic book On War.20 over its own admission, al-Qaeda employs a strategy time, the word shifted in meaning somewhat of exhaustion, forcing the united states to ex until by World War ii, German general heinz pend resources and effort in an open-ended Guderian used it to orchestrate a new form of struggle outside our time scale. decentralized warfare called blitzkrieg. For Guderian, Schwerpunkt represented a unifying Principle Three: Decentralized Control concept that provided a way to rapidly shape unleashing the power of maneuver warfare focus and direction of effort as well as harmo requires breaking the centralized command- nize support activities with combat operations,

4-Johnson.indd 103 10/29/07 9:55:45 AM 104 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

thereby permitting a true decentralization of lies upon the media amplification of violence tactical command within centralized strategic and threats of violence to divide and conquer guidance—without losing cohesion of the the “coalition of the willing” and create cleav overall effort.21 ages between the american government and in terms of cognetics, successfully applying its people. The following examples exhibit these principles requires first knowing the principles of cognetics used to carry out sun Schwerpunkt to bring a decentralized group to Tzu’s strategy of winning without fighting. gether for a common cause. once each inde pendent element of the group understands Frustrate Plans the focus of effort, it is free to act according to The daily news is filled with negative stories the on-scene commander’s feel for the situa about iraq and afghanistan, giving a strong tion (Fingerspitzengefuhl). doing so helps the perception that us plans to bring democracy entire enterprise achieve harmony of action, to the Middle east are being frustrated. un allowing on-scene commanders to take the questionably, both iraq and afghanistan remain initiative, control tempo, and maximize speed central to the war on terror; Pres. George W. and surprise to pit strength against weakness Bush has said so repeatedly. al-Qaeda and its when opportunities present themselves. in to affiliates understand this and do their utmost day’s relentless media environment, employing to confound us plans. allowing democracy to these principles will enable national-security take root would signal a major strategic blow policy makers to first see and understand the to our adversaries. conversely, failure of de contours and dynamics of the cognetic age. mocracy to take hold in iraq and afghanistan once they understand, they will find them would stymie the american goal of promoting selves in a better position to mitigate cognetic it as the antidote to militant islam’s ideology. effects and employ cognetic thinking to wage ideological warfare. Break Up Alliances on 11 March 2004 and again on 7 July 2005, Looking through the Lens loosely affiliated terror groups inspired by al- Qaeda’s Schwerpunkt of resurrecting the islamic samuel B. Griffith’s translation of The Art of caliphate carried out large, well-coordinated War offers insight into how sun Tzu sought to surprise attacks that struck at the hearts of win without fighting, eerily paralleling how Madrid and london, killing hundreds and militant islam and other us foes employ cog wounding thousands of civilians. The attacks netics to divide and conquer america and its galvanized the populations of each country, allies. according to Griffith,“The master con aided by widespread, real-time media coverage. queror frustrated his enemy’s plans and broke up The repeated images of death and destruction his alliances. he created cleavages between sover magnified the psychological effect of each at eign and minister, superiors and inferiors, tack. Both were timed for maximum impact. commanders and subordinates. his spies and in terms of Fingerspitzengefuhl, al-Qaeda made agents were active everywhere, gathering in the most of leveraging the Madrid train-bombing formation, sowing dissension and nurturing terror attacks immediately before the spanish subversion. The enemy was isolated and demor­ election by successfully focusing the weight of alized; his will to resist broken. Thus without battle spanish voter perception against the pro his army was conquered, . . . his state overthrown” american ruling party of José Maria anzar to (emphasis added).22 elect the antiwar socialist José Zapatero. By examining a cross section of significant shortly after the election, spain pulled its terrorist attacks since 9/11 through the cog troops out of iraq. as for the British, large- netic lens, one clearly sees that militant islam scale opposition to the war jumped to new is pursuing a cohesive and comprehensive heights following the attacks of 2005. The on strategy similar to sun Tzu’s. This strategy re line newspaper Telegraph reported one year

4-Johnson.indd 104 10/29/07 9:55:45 AM DAWN OF THE COGNETIC AGE 105

after the london bombings that 80 percent of not win the war. To win, we must neutralize those polled believed that england should split militant islam’s advantage in the global media. from the united states and pursue its own doing so takes new thinking. cognetics course in the war on terror.23 Both examples gives us both the system to think within and a highlight militant islam’s use of cognetics to way to conceptualize ideological warfare. Based pursue its strategic goals by attacking popula on the well-known doctrine of maneuver war tions directly and amplifying the psychological fare, cognetics lends itself to the decentraliz effect of vulnerability through the media in an ing world. Business, finance, manufacturing, already negatively charged atmosphere to under and the service industries, to name a few, are mine us foreign policy. undergoing massive change due to the decen tralization of information and the pressure to Cause Cleavages compete in a dynamic environment. after six-plus years of war, the time has in terms of causing cleavages within the ameri come for the us government to take advan can electorate and government, a quick tour tage of decentralization by employing global of the headlines since 9/11 bears witness to media to fightthe ideological war. To do so, it Griffith’s observation of sun Tzu’s methods. a must adopt the new terminology, concepts, significantturn of events marks the years since and principles of cognetics. More importantly, 9/11. initially, President Bush attained a popu our leadership must leave behind the indus larity rating in excess of 80 percent, along with trial age–centralized mind-set, along with its solid bipartisan support for an aggressive re outdated terminologies and concepts, and em sponse to the terrorist attacks. Fast-forwarding brace a new way of thinking better suited to to november 2006, we see a deeply divided fighting ideological war in the cognetic age electorate dropping that rating to less than 40 by putting thought in motion with impact. percent, resulting in a tectonic shift in leader ship that transferred power from republicans to democrats in both the house and senate.24 Recommendations We must adopt cognetic thinking to create Conclusion a shared, systematic way of conceptualizing, communicating, and carrying out ideological By its very nature, every form of warfare is warfare against militant islam. The top us competitive. Winning requires finding and strategy documents all recognize that winning employing the most effective means of gain the war against this foe requires winning the ing an advantage over the opponent. in the battle of ideas. cognetics provides the termi cognetic age, the global media’s power to in nology, concepts, principles, and system needed fluence vast numbers of people worldwide to harmonize diverse government entities into gives militant islam an advantage over the a coherent and cohesive whole, thus enabling West in the ideological war. the government to mount a well-coordinated continuing at a disadvantage by emphasiz and effective ideological assault on militant ing conventional military solutions to fightan islam. ideological war will only draw out this conflict. Moreover, we must reorient us grand strategy Thus, counteracting the long-war premise re to create a sustainable and effective strategy quires a decisive change in thinking to reorient needed to win the long war by conducting a our current grand strategy away from its heavy thorough risk-versus-return analysis of post emphasis on conventional military force toward 9/11 security policies that apply cognetic one that focuses on fighting an ideological thinking. We must ask tough questions to de war. This does not mean abandoning the pun termine whether our policies promote or hin ishing stick of military force. We will still need der our ability to maintain the vital support of it for coercive effect to some degree, but it will the american people and our allies for con

4-Johnson.indd 105 10/29/07 9:55:45 AM 106 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

ducting a long war. our leadership plainly uncommitted to our side, and drain away mili states that we are engaged in such a war, pos tants’ resolve to continue the struggle. if our sibly lasting a generation or longer. our grand policies support the objectives, we should stay strategy must reflect this basic assumption. with them; if they do not, we must change Therefore, policy objectives must bolster our them. ❑ resolve to continue the struggle, attract the

Notes

1. The Jyllands-Posten controversy began after 12 edi 9. “as-sahab: al Qaeda’s nebulous Media Branch,” Strat­ torial cartoons, most of which depicted the islamic for Crisis Center, 8 september 2006, https://www.stratfor.com/ prophet Muhammad, were published in this danish news offers/alerts/index.php?ref=FoX&camp=stratforalert&. paper on 30 september 2005. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclope­ 10. douglas l. Wilson, Lincoln’s Sword: The Presidency and dia, s.v. “Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy,” the Power of Words (new York: alfred a. Knopf, 2006), 145. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_cartoons. 11. Philip seib, Broadcasts from the Blitz: How Edward R. The Pope Benedict XVi controversy arose from a lecture Murrow Helped Lead America into War (Washington, dc: he delivered on 12 september 2006 at the university of Potomac Books, 2006), ix. regensburg in Germany. The lecture received ample 12. John a. nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: doses of both condemnation and praise from political Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (chi and religious authorities. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, cago: university of chicago Press, 2005), 167. s.v., “Pope Benedict XVi islam controversy,” http:// 13. us Marine corps staff, Warfighting: The U.S. Marine en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pope_regensburg_speech. Corps Book of Strategy (new York: doubleday, 1994), 35. 2. according to the national security strategy of 2006, 14. hannibal’s carthaginian army annihilated a nu “in the long run winning the war on terror means win merically superior roman army. although the battle ning the battle of ideas.” The National Security Strategy of the failed to decide the outcome of the war in favor of car United States of America (Washington, dc: The White thage, today it is regarded as one of the greatest tactical house, March 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ feats in military history. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. nss/2006/nss2006.pdf. see also National Strategy for Com­ “Battle of cannae,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle bating Terrorism (Washington, dc: executive office of the _of_cannae. Kenneth Macksey, Guderian: Panzer General, President, september 2006), http://hosted.ap.org/specials/ rev. ed. (Mechanicsburg, Pa: stackpole Books, 2003), interactives/wdc/documents/wh_terror060905.pdf; and 80–96, 97–126. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, dc: depart 15. ibid., 36–37. ment of defense, 6 February 2006), http://www.defenselink 16. ibid., 333. .mil/pubs/pdfs/Qdr20060203.pdf. 17. robert coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed 3. insight provided by col Gary l. crone, chief, air Force the Art of War (Boston: little, Brown and company, 2002), reserve strategy division, Pentagon, Washington, dc. 328. 4. steven stalinsky, “dealing in death: The West is 18. us Marine corps staff, Warfighting, 78–79. Weak Because it respects life? Too Bad,” National Review 19. chester W. richards, A Swift, Elusive Sword: What If Online, 24 May 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/ Sun Tzu and John Boyd Did a National Defense Review? (Wash comment/stalinsky200405240846.asp. on the morning of ington, dc: center for defense information, May 2001), Thursday, 11 March 2004, 10 explosions occurred at the 27, http://www.cdi.org/mrp/swift_elusive_sword.rtf. height of the Madrid rush hour aboard four commuter 20. see Vom Kriege (Berlin: dümmlers Verlag, 1932), trains, killing 200 people and wounding scores more. Wiki­ http://www.clausewitz.com/cWZhoMe/VomKriege/ pedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “2004 Madrid Train Bombings,” VKToc2.htm. The english version translates Schwerpunkt http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madrid_Train_Bombing with a number of subtle variations ranging from center of #description_of_the_Bombings. gravity and center of attraction to center of effort. 5. Field Manual 3-24/Marine corps WarfightingP ub 21. John r. Boyd, “Patterns of conflict [december lication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, december 2006, 1–25, 1986],” slide 78, Defense and the National Interest, January http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf. 2007, http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/patterns.ppt. 6. Jeffrey record, The American Way of War: Cultural 22. sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. samuel B. Griffith Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency, Policy analysis no. (oxford: clarendon Press, 1963), 39. 577 (Washington, dc: caTo institute, 1 september 23. Toby helm and Philip Johnston, “ditch us in Terror 2006), 1, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa577.pdf. War, say 80pc of Britons,” Telegraph.co.uk, 17 august 2006, 7. avi Jorisch, Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah’s al- http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/ Manar Television (Washington, dc: Washington institute news/2006/08/17/nterror17.xml. for near east Policy, 2004), xiii, xiv. 24. “President Bush: Job ratings,” PollingReport.com, 8. ibid., xv–xvi. http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob1.htm.

4-Johnson.indd 106 10/29/07 9:55:46 AM New USAF Doctrine Publication Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, Irregular Warfare

Michael Dietvorst

s Airmen, we have a unique war­ lesser­included form of traditional warfare. fighting perspective shaped by a rather, iw encompasses a spectrum of war­ century­long quest to gain and main­ fare where the nature and characteristics are tain the high ground. we must be significantlydifferent from traditional war. . . . Aable to articulate Air Force capabilities and Traditional warfare and iw are not mutually contributions to the irregular warfare [iw] exclusive; both forms of warfare may be present fight, with its unique attributes and require­ in a given conflict”(1, 3). Along with ongoing ments. employed properly, airpower (to in­ counterterrorism, shaping, and deterring ac­ clude air, space, and cyberspace capabilities) tivities, the document includes information produces asymmetric advantages that can be about counterinsurgency (COin); support to effectively leveraged by joint force command­ COin; and support to insurgency activities. ers in virtually every aspect of irregular war­ AFDD 2­3 highlights Air Force capabilities fare.” so reads a portion of the foreword by and outlines how they should be employed, Gen T. michael moseley, chief of staff, to the new Air Force doctrine publication: Air Force addressing seven of the 17 Air Force functions Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2­3, Irregular War­ (described in AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, fare, 1 August 2007. 17 november 2003): The new publication notes that “the United • building partnership capacity: a strategy states’ overwhelming dominance in recent to obtain “international cooperation and conventional wars has made it highly unlikely commitment” (27). that most adversaries will choose to fight the Us in a traditional, conventional manner. • intelligence: “may constitute the primary Thus, for relatively weaker powers (including function of . . . [airpower] in iw” (30). non­state entities) irregular warfare . . . has become an attractive, if not more necessary, • information operations: “the integrated option. iw presents different challenges to employment of . . . influence operations our military and to the Air Force. . . . it will . . . [with] electronic . . . and network also increase Airmen’s understanding of the warfare operations” (36). different nature inherent in iw” (1). • air mobility: “essential when . . . support­ embracing the definition of the iw joint ing Us ground forces . . . and enabling operating concept, AFDD 2­3 definesiw as “a [partner nation] capabilities” (40). violent struggle among state and non­state ac­ tors for legitimacy and influence over the rele­ • agile combat support: “a unique support vant populations,” adding that it “is not a capability of the Air Force” (41).

107

Doctrine Note-Dietvorst.indd 107 10/29/07 9:01:25 AM 108 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

• precision engagement: “includes the full ing out their missions, commanders need to spectrum of capabilities . . . to precisely consider both the contents of this AFDD and achieve effects in support of the desired the particular situation. Airmen should read end state” (44). the document, discuss its content, and put its guidance into practice. AFDD 2­3 describes • command and control: “not only critical Air Force capabilities and operations required to Air Force operations but . . . also critical to effectively defend and counter adversaries. for [building partnership capacity]” (46). Due to the political nature of iw, Airmen must AFDD 2­3 also includes a chapter on strategy be able to articulate those capabilities to civil­ and planning as well as an appendix on the ian leadership and decision makers. Although topic of understanding insurgencies. this document focuses on Air Force doctrine, The doctrine in this document is authorita­ iw inherently remains a joint and interagency tive but not directive. Therefore, when carry­ fight. ❑

The Airman’s Creed

I am an American Airman. I am a warrior. I have answered my nation’s call. I am an American Airman. My mission is to fly, fight, and win. I am faithful to a proud heritage, a tradition of honor, and a legacy of valor. I am an American Airman, guardian of freedom and justice, my nation’s sword and shield, its sentry and avenger. I defend my country with my life. I am an American Airman: wingman, leader, warrior. I will never leave an Airman behind, I will never falter, and I will not fail.

Doctrine Note-Dietvorst.indd 108 10/29/07 9:01:25 AM won’t do a thing for themselves” (p. 73). Remem ber, however, that Gilster saw very little of Vietnam or its people beyond the confines of the air base at Tan Son Nhut. This is a rather numbing account of each of the 365 days Gilster spent in Vietnam, attempting to understand air operations, analyze them, and pass on useful advice to his superiors. In truth, there are few insights here into how the air war was planned and conducted. It appears that Gilster spent the bulk of his time preparing briefings and slides for his boss, who in turn briefed the operations chief and the commander. His boss, a colonel referred to here simply as D1, is portrayed as a bit of dunderhead, seldom taking Gilster’s ad vice or sharing his insights. Consequently, the war continued to lurch along with little purpose and even less positive effect: “The trouble is no one Vietnam Diary: From inside Air Force Headquar­ thinks. Everyone is just stewing around with num ters by Dr. Herman L. Gilster. RoseDog Books bers trying to justify their existence” (p. 162). (http://rosedogbooks-store.stores.yahoo.net/ Surprisingly, Gilster provides almost no statistics index.html), 701 Smithfield Street, Pittsburgh, in this book dealing with statistical analysis. He Pennsylvania 15222, 2005, 370 pages, $30.00 mentions econometric concepts and regression (softcover). analysis, complaining that most commanders and Herman Gilster was a lieutenant colonel with a high-ranking staff officersdid not understand such Harvard PhD in economics when he left the faculty things. But he never makes a case as to why such at the Air Force Academy for Vietnam. He arrived methodologies should have been used or ex at Headquarters Seventh Air Force outside Saigon plains that they would have produced different in November 1970. The air war had been raging for air-campaign plans—and, more importantly, dif over six years by that point; the cataclysmic Tet of ferent results. Nonetheless, he raises some useful fensive that broke American political will was two thoughts. What was the meaning and importance of years past; and the bulk of US attack sorties were the reams of statistics generated by intelligence agen directed against enemy supply lines—the Ho Chi cies during the war? Reading Gilster’s account, Minh Trail—stretching through Laos and into one is forced to conclude that the majority of South Vietnam. The bombing of North Vietnam such statistical analyses were grossly in error— had halted in November 1968. Gilster served on various offices and agencies could not even agree the headquarters staff for one year, attempting to on the most basic numbers, such as the number of analyze the effects of those thousands of interdic sorties flown and the types of ordnance dropped. tion sorties. Clearly, it was a frustrating experience, Yet entire books have based their arguments on and this book reproduces his diary of that year. these tainted numbers. I might add that Gilster’s Like many Americans, by 1970 Gilster had be account does not indicate whether the numbers gun to lose faith in the utility and perhaps even the were slanted either deliberately or in a particular morality of the Vietnam War. The first impression direction (i.e., it does not appear that the books of his new home was not favorable: “This base is were cooked to make US air operations appear one of the ugliest, filthiest, dirtiest places I have more or less successful than they actually were). seen. . . . Sandy was also right about it smelling so They were simply wrong. bad over here” (p. 11). As for our South Vietnamese One must also say that the people generating allies: “This is really a good-for-nothing lazy bunch the statistics were not fools; nor were they limited of people and it makes me mad to be over here to counting on their fingers—computers were away from my family defending them and they available both in-country and in Washington. Yet,

109

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 109 11/8/07 12:35:44 PM 110 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

argues Gilster, the data amassed were generally the firsthalf of the twentieth century as officersand of the wrong type, erroneously crunched, and soldiers morphed from an old service to a modern improperly analyzed. How could the most power one, organized around management ideas that ful and most technically advanced nation in the have played such an important part of this century world make such amateurish blunders? as well as the last. Coffman is not content, however, Gilster provides no clear answers, but the ques with analyzing the combat arms of the Army (infantry, tion remains a vital one. The United States is now cavalry, artillery, air corps, and armored force); he engaged in a global war on terror, and the enemy is takes the reader into the private lives of his subjects ubiquitous, clever, and adept at using the most and re-creates their world. We are introduced to modern information technology. Are our present the early lives of such men as Joseph W. Stillwell, analytical tools and methods any better today than Omar Bradley, Forrest Harding, George S. Patton they were during the Vietnam War? Let us hope so. Jr., Jacob Devers, William H. Simpson, and many others. With these men, we are taken back to see Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired what life was like serving in the Philippines, fight West Chicago, Illinois ing in Europe during World War I, living during the lean years of the Great Depression, and mobiliz ing for total war in the late 1930s and early 1940s. In all, it is a compelling tale of an important phase of The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941 by US Army history—one that contains many lessons Edward M. Coffman. Belknap Press of Harvard about a military organization’s response to vast so University Press (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/ cial changes. Even an Airman would profit from index.html), 79 Garden Street, Cambridge, this examination. Massachusetts 02138, 2004, 528 pages, $35.00 Coffman spends considerable time examining (hardcover); 2007, $21.95 (softcover). the birth of aviation within the Army. The story of this development helps explain much of the cur With the publication of The Regulars, Dr. Edward rent organizational culture of the US Air Force. In M. Coffman—professor emeritus of history at the addition, Coffman’s analysis will render great ser University of Wisconsin–Madison—has completed vice to the Airman who must work in an increas his two-volume social history of the US Army from ingly joint environment. After all, understanding 1784 to 1941. The current book is a fittingand wor the unique perspectives of fellow services and, sub thy companion to the first volume, The Old Army: A sequently, how these services can work together is Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898 one of the fundamental requirements for efficient (Oxford University Press, 1986). In the present and effective joint warfare. For the Airman or for book, Coffman charts the lives of Army officers those interested in a thorough understanding of and soldiers, specifically regarding their efforts Army history in the first half of the twentieth cen in transforming their institution from a frontier tury, Coffman’s The Regulars is the best place to start. constabulary force to a modern army. Coffman argues that this transformation was due to the Dr. Kevin C. Holzimmer managerial revolution at the turn of the century, Maxwell AFB, Alabama a revolution that affected almost every aspect of American society. Coffman demonstrates once again his mastery of historical research. He not only exploited the vast Carriers in Combat: The Air War at Sea by Chester riches in the National Archives, US Military History G. Hearn. Praeger Security International, Green Institute, and Special Collections and Archives Divi wood Publishing Group (http://psi.praeger.com), sion of the US Military Academy at West Point, New 88 Post Road West, P.O. Box 5007, Westport, York, but also conducted more than 75 interviews. Connecticut 06881-5007, 2005, 336 pages, $49.95 Furthermore, in the 1970s, he developed his own (hardcover). questionnaire, which garnered over 320 replies. Coffman has accumulated research material that Chester G. Hearn has published 18 books, most only few other people—perhaps none—ever have. of them about maritime affairs and the American In short, it is an impressive achievement, and, for Civil War. Carriers in Combat purports to be the his tunately, he has put his research to good use. tory of naval aviation, mostly that of the United The book is extremely well written and convinc States, with some attention to the subject in the ingly creates a composite biography of the Army in Japanese and British navies. The first combat for

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 110 11/8/07 12:35:44 PM BOOK REVIEWS 111

American naval aviation came in 1914 at Vera Cruz, an O-6 (captain) when he went through pilot train Mexico. That makes the story over 90 years old. ing at Pensacola. Hearn discusses the first30 years or so in 228 pages Like the Bible, the United States Strategic Bombing and the last 60 in 52 pages. The whole book is not Survey (USSBS) is so voluminous that it can be used authoritative, but that part covering the postwar pe to justify all sorts of sin. Hearn, who seems not to riod is strictly superficial. have delved very deeply into it, uses it to buttress The author devotes the bulk of his attention to his claim that aircraft carriers are the greatest con World War II, and it certainly behooves Air Force ventional weapon in history without noting that the professionals to know something about naval avia USSBS credits a combination of the submarine tion in that period. The naval officersthat they will campaign and strategic bombing as being decisive meet in joint assignments will be well versed in that against Japan. According to Hearn, the Army and part of their history, and Air Force officers can de Air Force (when he recognizes them at all) also ran velop good relations if they too are conversant with in a minor way in that war, as well as in the combat the story. Moreover, since World War II, command we have had since then. of the sea has hardly been contested, and the mis Bias and imbalance are not the only problems sion of the Navy has increasingly become power with this book. Every reviewer can nitpick every bib projection ashore, especially since the collapse of liography there ever was for its omissions. However, the Soviet Union. Thus, aside from the takeoff and there are simply too many important ones here to landing location, the missions of the two services ignore that problem. Hearn frequently refers to have largely converged. But Air Force officers Adm U. S. Grant Sharp in connection with his should look elsewhere for their knowledge. tirades against Pres. Lyndon Johnson, who gets At least Hearn does nothing to hide his preju all the blame for the Vietnam fiasco. Yet he does dices, identifying aviators with all that is good and not refer at all to Sharp’s own book on that subject. true in the Navy and painting everybody else as in He sides strongly with Sharp’s view of things but does not point out that the good admiral was not competent or worse. He is especially hard on Adm an aviator any more than Spruance had been. Both Raymond Spruance but is a stout fan of Adm Marc the Navy and Air Force came out of the Vietnam Mitscher. Spruance was not an aviator; Mitscher War with the determination to change many things belonged to the first generation of aviators. Yet about their approaches to air war, yet Hearn seems Spruance—victorious air leader of the Battle of to be building a stab-in-the-back legend, heaping Midway—comes in for criticism with regard to the all the blame on politicians in Washington. Here, Battle of the Philippine Sea because all of the Japa he depends heavily upon secondary sources (almost nese carriers were not sunk, though by far the all of them coming from naval people), especially greater part of their airplanes went down, and articles in the US Naval Institute Proceedings (a three of the flattopsfollowed them to the depths of worthy journal that every Air Force professional the ocean. That was really the last chapter in the should know, but there is more to research than winning of air superiority in the Pacific(aside from that). The author also omits Clark Reynolds’s fine the kamikaze problem). As Hearn reluctantly ad biography of Adm John Towers, whose story covers mits, the point is that Spruance’s mission was the most of the same ground as this work—but does so protection of the landing forces in the invasion of authoritatively. Granted, Hearn cites the definitive the Mariana Islands—which was accomplished. work of Norman Friedman in his bibliography but The author criticizes Adm Harry Fletcher for does not show much evidence of having read it, as abandoning the landing forces at the time of the is the case with the work of Norman Polmar. I could Guadalcanal invasion, and here he condemns go on and on with this, pointing to the works of Jeff Spruance for not abandoning them. It now appears Barlow, Eliot Cohen, Robert Futrell, and Conrad that Spruance could have chased off after the retir Crane, all of whom would make much better fodder ing Japanese, but that is easier to see now than it for the Airman’s professional reading program. was then. That is but one example of Hearn’s Finally, Carriers in Combat is full of mistakes of blatant bias—never sufficiently recognizing that both a technical and historical nature. To cite only Adm Chester Nimitz was the Pacific commander. a few, Hearn at least implies that the Saratoga and He too was not an aviator but seems to have done Lexington of 1927 were powered by diesel engines; well enough. Furthermore, Adm Ernest R. King— in fact, both were driven by steam turbines. He chief of naval operations, stationed in Washing later says that the Saratoga suffered the flooding of ton—escapes the author’s wrath. King won wings, three fireroomsas a result of torpedo attack—with but he never served as a crew member since he was out wondering why a diesel-powered ship would

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 111 11/8/07 12:35:45 PM 112 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

need a fireroom! He mistakenly seems to identify ography of Ernest R. King or that of Reynolds on the Navy’s conversion from coal to oil with conver Towers, cited above. sion to a diesel engine. Sometimes he calls the 20 mm gun a machine gun and elsewhere a cannon. Dr. David R. Mets (It is a cannon, with the dividing line at .60 caliber.) Maxwell AFB, Alabama He suggests that the two great ships came on the line with 16 five-inch guns each. Actually, they did so with eight-inch cruiser weapons that were re moved at the beginning of World War II in favor of Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror by Philip B. more antiaircraft guns, those of the five-inch cali Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem. MIT Press ber among them. Later he confuses the USS Enter­ (http://www-mitpress.mit.edu), 55 Hayward prise with the Saratoga and elsewhere equips them Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142-1493, with 22 mm (instead of 20 mm) antiaircraft artil 2005, 160 pages, $20.00 (softcover). lery guns. He calls sonar waves “supersonic” even though we know that the speed of sound is much Authors Heymann and Kayyem seek to provide faster underwater than in the air. He calls the Sky- specific guidelines for appropriate application of raider an evolution of the Dauntless. Far from it; democratic principles to the prickly aim of finding the latter was a scout bomber, and the former came and targeting substate terrorist networks, both at along much later, designed not only for bombing home and abroad. Far from a light read, Protecting but also for the delivery of torpedoes. He claims Liberty in an Age of Terror is the updated culmination of debate, discussion, research, and policy recom that Nimitz went to Germany to study diesel en mendations by Harvard’s Long-Term Legal Strategy gines to facilitate the conversion of the Navy from Project for Preserving Security and Democratic coal to oil. Quite wrong; the conversion had begun Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. Comprised of long before and had nothing to do with those en an impressive list of legal minds, mid- and cabinet- gines. Rather, they were being studied as the sur level administration officials from both political face power plants for submarines in a Navy that had parties, and British consultants, this panel met pe already largely converted to oil. The author claims riodically over an 18-month period to discuss “the that the TBD Devastators were old and sluggish at fundamental changes in domestic and international the onset of war; they were sluggish all right—but laws and accepted practices that have occurred not old. They had come on the line in 1937 and since 9/11” (p. 2). Although the terrain is easily po were only four years old at the time of Pearl Harbor, litical, the authors have removed all traces of parti when the Royal Navy was still flying open-cockpit san sentiment to let the applicable laws, treaties, biplanes as torpedo bombers. In one place, and traditionally accepted practices speak for them Hearn asserts that tactics determined the out selves. Most people agree that war against terrorists come of the Battle of Midway (from time to time, should not compromise democratic liberty; never he made me worry about whether he knows the dif theless, the devil is in the details. ference between tactics and strategy); elsewhere he The authors, directors of the Harvard project, credits the victory to luck or the breaking of the admirably address the obligatory lightning-rod is Japanese codes. He credits the escort carrier with sues of torture and detainment. No circumstances winning the campaign against German submarines warrant disregarding the “due process prohibition but ignores the importance of breaking their code. against actions that U.S. courts find‘shock the con Hearn describes the Valley Forge as having a displace science’ ” (p. 11), and there are no acceptable con ment of 36,000 tons and the Leyte 21,000. Both were ditions allowing extradition to countries that will of the Essex class, the standard displacement of likely engage in torture. Substantive domestic and which was 27,000 tons. When he gets around to the international precedents illuminate the blurry line Korean War, he misspells Gen Matthew Ridgway’s between acceptable “highly coercive interrogation” name every time he uses it. (HCI) techniques and torture. Recognizing the in Again, I could go on and on. It is not good herent difficulty of the topic, the panel recom form to nitpick an author’s work, but the errors in mends that the US attorney general provide spe Carriers in Combat occur so frequently that one cific definitions of allowable HCI techniques, subject must suspect that Hearn simply did not do his to congressional review and public scrutiny. Per homework, a problem which disqualifies this book haps the most restrictive recommendation calls for from inclusion on Airmen’s professional reading requiring issuance of case-by-case HCI permission lists. Instead, they should try Raymond Buell’s bi by a senior government official, a stipulation that

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 112 11/8/07 12:35:45 PM BOOK REVIEWS 113

may severely reduce tactical intelligence available rity in extraordinary times. It often indicts policies to troops in an active combat zone. adoptedbyboththeexecutiveandlegislativebranches The panel also recommends clear application of in the wake of 9/11, advocating systematic and US constitutional protections to noncitizen detain public review. Although commendably apolitical ees unless a specificprivilege would pose a threat to and moderate in tone, the work challenges the cur national security. Aside from the debate over civil rent administration’s opacity since “the core prin liberties, a very practical motivation underlies this ciple of the U.S. government is that ultimate ac recommendation as well: a state cannot demand countability is and must remain in the hands of an legal protection of its citizens abroad unless that informed citizenry” (p. 6). An important effort with state demonstrates similar consideration. If indi long-term civil and international implications, Pro­ viduals are detained within an active combat zone, tecting Liberty in an Age of Terror is a valuable resource then they should be afforded the right of a tribunal for policy makers and commanders charged with to review justification for such detainment; if indi prosecuting the current unconventional conflict viduals are collected in an active combat zone but without compromising civil liberties. detained elsewhere, then they should be afforded the widest range of Fifth Amendment rights practi Maj Stephen Pieper, USAF cable. Finally, the panel recommends strongly against Naval Postgraduate School collecting individuals for detainment from within a cooperative foreign sovereignty. If adopted, these recommendations will drastically change the land scape of current American detainment policy. Finding Amelia: The True Story of the Earhart Other less-publicized areas of the post-9/11 civil- Disappearance by Ric Gillespie. Naval Institute liberty debate involve the government’s right to ob Press (http://www.usni.org/press/press.html), tain and use electronic data on citizens, corpora 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402 tions, religious and political groups, and legal 5034, 2006, 296 pages (with DVD supplement), aliens. The majority of the panel’s conclusions are $28.95 (hardcover). reasonable and well articulated, but one surprising recommendation gives pause: the board argues Finding Amelia is an exhaustively researched ac against collection or surveillance on US soil with count of the disappearance of famed aviator Amelia out specific judicial warrant, as in a criminal case. Earhart on 2 July 1937. A serious historical work, Although this requirement is certainly appropriate the book contains many details and documents, for individual surveillance, the counterterror pro but author Ric Gillespie succeeds in making it ap ceeds of sophisticated data-analysis tools should proachable for the average reader. Executive direc not be legally excluded if they point coincidentally tor of the International Group for Historic Aircraft to origination on US soil. It seems counterproduc Recovery, he draws upon the work of his organiza tive to make US territory the enemy’s best commu tion in analyzing more than 5,000 documents re nication sanctuary. lated to the Earhart disappearance. Although the loss Perhaps the most structurally significant recom of Amelia Earhart and her navigator Fred Noonan mendation entails establishing an executive-oversight remains an unsolved mystery, Finding Amelia mar body whose sole purpose is review of the substance shals available data to paint a picture of the doomed and application of extraordinary measures taken in flight and subsequent futile searches that capti times of crisis and war. Such a board would moni vated the press and public in the late 1930s. tor, document, and evaluate the conduct and effec Finding Amelia provides a look back to a time tiveness of extraordinary measures that have the when everything about aviation made news and the capability to erode established civil liberties. Rather country followed developments in flight with great than approve individual actions, the board will ad anticipation. Earhart’s flight marked a transition vise legislative and executive officialsregarding the from a unique aspect of American culture, such as legality and effectiveness of exceptional actions un the publicity stunts of aviation pioneers like Billy dertaken in special circumstances. The panel would Mitchell and Jimmy Doolittle, to the routine of ci help both branches of government determine vilian airlines and commercial aircraft production. whether and to what extent extraordinary measures Amelia Earhart turned out to be one of the last of ought to continue. the great aviation barnstormers and showmen of Heavily legalistic and somewhat academic, this the aviation-as-novelty era. Indeed, one could ar work nevertheless speaks authoritatively on the gue that the pressure to complete her transworld contentious clash of civil liberty with national secu flightderived in part from her reasonable fear that

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 113 11/8/07 12:35:46 PM 114 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

some other aviator or, worse, Pan Am would meet restraint, quoting as an example Gen William Momyer, this daunting challenge. commander of Seventh Air Force at the time, who The book offers contemporary lessons as well. complained in 1969 that “we had the force, skill, Intense media scrutiny and significant financial and intelligence, but our civilian betters wouldn’t pressure demanded a very strict timetable for the turn us loose” (p. 145). Clodfelter then looks closer Earhart flight, and Gillespie makes a strong case at the nature of the conflict, concluding that al that these external forces led to important lapses in though civilian restraints played an important role, training and preparation. The author notes, with airpower’s effectiveness changed most dramatically some measure of understatement, that “as in most as the war itself changed—from an insurgency in aviation accidents, the loss was not due to a single 1963 to a conventional campaign in 1968 and be catastrophic event, but rather to the snowballing of yond. His conclusion warned airpower advocates to a number of mishaps and errors” (p. 103). Some be cautious because airpower has limited utility interesting details emerge about the flight,particu against nonconventional forces. larly in the way of miscommunication and lapses that This new edition reiterates this warning and may have contributed to the tragedy. For instance, adds a new introduction and epilogue. The intro neither Earhart nor Noonan (an aviation pioneer duction points out that the situation in both Iraq in his own right) were conversant in Morse code (the and Afghanistan today “resemble[s] that encoun radio-communications standard at the time). Fur tered by Johnson in Vietnam—an intensely moti thermore, when rebuilding the aircraft after her vated but sporadically waged insurgency employing first failed transworld effort, Earhart chose not to guerilla warfare methods and receiving resilient as reattach a low-frequency antenna that might have sistance from outside sources” (p. xi). Indeed, in allowed her to navigate by radio beacon. Inexplicably, some respects it does—meaning that understand Earhart and her team indicated that they planned ing Clodfelter’s message is even more critical today to navigate by high-frequency radio beacon—more than in 1989. or less a technical impossibility at the time. The epilogue (originally a journal article: “Air For the serious history buff, both the book and power versus Asymmetric Enemies: A Framework accompanying DVD are invaluable resources. The for Evaluating Effectiveness,” Air and Space Power DVD includes over 5,000 messages, telegrams, let Journal 16, no. 3 [Fall 2002]: 37–46) uses his original ters, maps, government and aircraft-manufacturer analysis of Vietnam to create a generalized frame reports, Navy and Coast Guard logs, technical stud work for analyzing airpower. This framework pro ies, and newsreel footage about the Earhart case. vides detail to his concept of “positive” objectives Readers can examine Finding Amelia on more than (those that seek to accomplish a specific goal) and one level: casually, for those interested in taking a “negative” objectives (those that seek to avoid an look back at a well-known tragedy that captured the undesired outcome). It also proposes a set of “key public’s imagination, or seriously, for those inter variables”: the nature of the enemy, type of war ested in separating myth from reality regarding the waged by the enemy, nature of the combat environ disappearance of and subsequent search for two ment, magnitude of military controls, and nature great aviation pioneers. of the political objectives. His model maintains that understanding these factors means understanding Maj Robert J. Preston II, USAF the conditions under which airpower must oper Maxwell AFB, Alabama ate—and therefore its likely effectiveness. Applying this framework to current conflicts,he points out that negative objectives remain crucially important. In fact he suggests that in attempting to The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing balance the positive objective of eliminating terror of North Vietnam by Mark Clodfelter. University ists against the negative one of losing the hearts of Nebraska Press (http://unp.unl.edu), 1111 and minds of the Islamic world, “the long term Lincoln Mall, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588-0630, harm of applying lethal airpower is likely to eclipse 2006, 312 pages, $16.95 (softcover). its short-term benefit” (p. xi). Whatever one’s opinion on that assertion, Clod The firstedition of The Limits of Air Power (1989) felter’s revision of the original edition is timely, and sought to challenge traditional Air Force thinking the new sections are brief and readable. Although on airpower’s failure in Southeast Asia. That book massive differences remain between Vietnam and began by outlining the view that blamed Washing Afghanistan/Iraq (most notably regarding levels of ton for diluting the war effort through unnecessary the counterair threat faced in Vietnam), the com

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 114 11/8/07 12:35:46 PM BOOK REVIEWS 115

parison is worth considering—and the updated does not address in detail how missile forces have edition of The Limits of Airpower offers an excellent now become integrated doctrinally with artillery place to start. units to form a lethal “first punch” in any war with South Korea. Nor does he examine how the signifi Capt Tim Spaulding, USAF cant increase in the number of large-scale artillery Royal Air Force Lakenheath, United Kingdom systems that North Korea has deployed along the demilitarized zone has largely altered the status quo of conventional military forces on the penin sula. In the book’s second part, the author seems to The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Cur­ make the assessment that North Korea would at rent Tactics by James M. Minnich. Naval Institute tack the South in nearly the same way it would have Press (http://www.usni.org/press/press.html), 20 years ago—a very unlikely prospect. 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402 This short text is interesting in that it provides 5034, 2005, 164 pages, $27.95 (hardcover). some context for the history and philosophy of the NKPA in its early stages. It runs into problems in its The occurrence of certain events over the past later chapters because Minnich does not address decade has resulted in the publication of many important issues such as doctrine, evolving organi books on North Korea’s nuclear program, diplo zation, the impact of materials and resources on macy between North Korea and the United States, training, leadership development of personnel, and the geopolitical problems created by Kim Jong and the ability (and motivations) that the NKPA Il’s Stalinist regime. For the most part, the litera has for large-scale aggression, based on the current ture has lacked a work that offers in-depth, schol capabilities of its conventional military forces. For arly analysis of the North Korean People’s Army readers seeking a book that will educate them on (NKPA)—a military force that remains the world’s the current readiness, capabilities, and threat of fifth largest and continues to pose a threat to the North Korea’s conventional military forces, The stability and security of the Korean Peninsula. This North Korean People’s Army falls far short of the mark. work, written by a US Army foreign-area officer, at For those who would like a short, broad-brush look tempts to fill that void. at the history and early philosophy of the NKPA, Minnich divides his book into two parts. Chap the text provides some useful context. On the whole, ters in the firstportion address the NKPA’s partisan this book does not fill the void in the scholarly lit lineage; its original, formal organizing under the erature for readers who desire in-depth analysis of close tutelage of the Soviets; the expansion that oc North Korea’s military threat. curred prior to the invasion of South Korea; and the status of the NKPA in 1950. The surprisingly Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. short chapters lack the important depth and detail Marine Corps Command and Staff College that would allow readers to truly understand the origins of the NKPA, the driving forces behind its formulation and capabilities, and the reasons for its initial stunning successes in the first months of Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy by the Korean War. The second section addresses cur John J. Klein. Routledge (http://www.routledge rent tactics in chapters that examine national strategy .com), Taylor and Francis Group, 2 Park Square, and the formulation of military policy, offensive and Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxford OX14 4RN, defensive tactics, and artillery-grouping tactics. United Kingdom, 2006, 196 pages, $115.00 The second section is particularly disappointing (hardcover). because it does not consider the large-scale changes to North Korean conventional military forces that Extremely provocative? No. Earth shattering? have occurred since Kim Jong Il came to power in Probably not. Needed? Definitely. Meaningful? 1994. Because of a changing geopolitical environ Time will tell, but the possibility certainly exists. ment and resource constraints beyond Pyongyang’s John J. Klein has arguably achieved what many oth control, the military’s offensive capabilities have ers have only attempted in the past. He has devel largely evolved so that they now threaten South Ko oped a “comprehensive” set of space principles that rea with asymmetric forces such as long-range artil captures the unique aspects of the space medium. lery, special operations units, and a ballistic missile In response to his perceived need—which many corps that boasts at least 600 Scuds and other short- share—and based on a thorough review of existing range ballistic missiles in its inventory. The author space literature, Klein tries his hand at establishing

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 115 11/8/07 12:35:46 PM 116 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

an in-depth space bible from which doctrine and dent in an advanced math class where “the proof is tactics development can build. He exhibits a solid left to the student.” This book is listed as firstin the grasp of past military strategic thinking as he sys publisher’s Space Power and Politics series, so per tematically develops his strategy. haps the follow-on works will satisfy this need. How Sir Julian Corbett’s maritime strategy is the ever, the titles of the books comprising the rest of model for Space Warfare, but Klein also draws fre the series do not encourage confidence. quently from other strategists such as Carl von Klein compares his strategy to the various space Clausewitz, Henri Jomini, and Mao Tse-tung for “schools of thought,” current joint doctrine, and critical aspects of his strategy. Despite the relatively the Space Commission Report. His discussion of the short length of the work, he covers a vast set of is schools of thought offers convincing support for his sues. He begins with the role of space as an aspect argument that a more comprehensive approach is of national power, describes its unique features as needed. The doctrinal discussion points out defi well as those common to other mediums, and fi ciencies and the eternal need, often ignored, for nally articulates a systematic and relatively compre strategy and doctrine. Certainly the Space Commis­ hensive series of constructs to shape the discussion sion Report is the most thorough effort yet under of space. He introduces or redefines such terms as taken to analyze national-security space topics and celestial lines of communication, strategic positions, dis­ to prescribe policy initiatives. However, regarding persal, and concentration. The principles, in total, are the commission report and joint doctrine, Klein sufficiently comprehensive to underpin the major seems overly concerned with explaining away dif ity of specific operational-level activities that one ferences in terms and concepts rather than articu can imagine in space over the next few decades. lating the greater need for a fundamentally new Because Klein clearly grasps many of the unique framework. One then wonders, “Why the new aspects of the space medium, he does not give in to model if the differences are not significant?” the temptation to rely on one specific set of historical Finally, Space Warfare goes beyond this new principles to ensure complete labeling of various framework for space and dives into the more dan space missions and attributes—as Air Force and gerous waters of specificpolicy options and recom joint doctrine have done often in the past. Instead, mendations, the latter well grounded and flowing in many areas he brings a fresh perspective that reasonably well from the articulated strategy. They forces a different angle on space thinking. From also shed additional light on the strategy by describ this thinking flowa significantlymodified space vo ing natural outcomes one might foresee if the strategy cabulary and some concepts different enough from is adopted. He argues for the incorporation of a conventional writing as to approach novelty. How more defensive strategy as the “stronger” form of ever, very few of his specific recommendations are warfare. Strategic positions for defense, he maintains, new; in fact, most go back years. Despite this, his ensure “a significant level of access” and a “measure framework builds an underpinning that, if accepted, of self-defense against surprise attack” (p. 149). would drive the US national-security space commu Klein persuasively argues that greater emphasis on nity in new directions. the concept of dispersal, an idea not sufficiently As he develops various principles within the captured in previous writings, is critical to any future strategy, Klein predominantly uses examples of ex strategy. He also calls for the establishment of a isting capabilities or ongoing activities to explain Space War College based on the need for military particular aspects of his structure. Here, however, “culture and strategy . . . to acknowledge that space the effort falls short. Many career space professionals, is a relevant medium of warfare” (p. 151). Such a others who have worked closely with the space com move, he believes, would “foster a conducive environ munity, or those who have relied heavily on space ment where more fully developed strategies for space capabilities will grasp his principles and may reso warfare can be contemplated” (p. 152). nate with his argument that they call for new lines The significanceof Space Warfare will depend on of reasoning in several areas. However, these indi the degree to which its terms and principles are ad viduals may find themselves feeling less than satis opted. While the space community certainly has its fied with the depth and creativity exemplified by own technical language, with multiple dialects, a his examples. More explanation of how the various need exists for a strategy language to underpin principles fit together as a strategic whole would policies, doctrine, acquisition decisions, and tactics have added to the work. One has a sense that Klein development. John J. Klein has given us, at mini is very capable of providing a more in-depth de mum, an alphabet and a structure from which that scription and of tying together his concepts, but language could evolve. As with Jomini and Alfred the reader may feel somewhat like the college stu Thayer Mahan, some—as this reviewer has done—

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 116 11/8/07 12:35:47 PM BOOK REVIEWS 117

will point to shortcomings with the arguments. But haps more suited to the serious academic or policy members of the space community may perceive, as researcher than someone wanting to obtain a broad naval- and land-warfare professionals did in the overview of the development of early US space past, that in the end the benefitsof having the basis policy. In this regard, Benjamin S. Lambeth’s for a strategy—to support development of detailed RAND report of 2003, Mastering the Ultimate High policies and to guide decisions—eventually over Ground, is much shorter and covers many of the come the value of continuing debate over its mer main points that Colonel Erickson treats in signifi its. Time will tell. cantly greater detail for the early US space pro gram. The initial chapters of William E. Burrows’s Col Chris D. Crawford, USAF This New Ocean (1998) would also serve as a good Peterson AFB, Colorado alternative for anyone seeking a quick overview. In addition, this work focuses squarely on orga nizational, bureaucratic, doctrinal, and management issues. As a result, much of the personal dimension, even drama, of this history is not represented. Im Into the Unknown Together: The DOD, NASA, and portant characters such as army general John Me Early Spaceflight by Lt Col Mark Erickson, USAF. daris, presidential science advisor James Killian, Air University Press (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/ DOD science policy maker Herbert York, firstN ASA au/aul/aupress), 131 West Shumacher Avenue, administrator James Webb, Air Force general Ber Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-5962, 2005, 682 nard Schriever, and many others come and go as pages, $50.00 (softcover). Available free from characters, but we really don’t learn much about http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/ what made them tick or how they formed their Books/Erickson/erickson.pdf. ideas and visions for US spaceflight or military space issues. Into the Unknown Together is a comprehensive re In sum, for the professional space-policy “wonk” view of the political and management terrain in or historian of US space (and science) policy, Into volved in the early US space program—especially the Unknown Together is a must reference for a study those aspects dealing with human spaceflight. In or library. Colonel Erickson has done the academic deed, the work is encyclopedic, coming in at a hefty fields of space history and policy a great service. 682 pages, including endnotes. Primarily covering the period from the birth of the National Aeronau Lt Col Joseph P. Bassi, USAF, Retired tics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1958 to Lompoc, California the end of the Apollo program in 1972, the book discusses in great detail the complex, sometimes byzantine, interactions that characterized the rela tions among NASA, the Department of Defense Finding the Target: The Transformation of American (DOD), and the Air Force. The book is particularly Military Policy by Frederick W. Kagan. Encounter strong in its tracing of the development of these Books (http://www.encounterbooks.com), 900 interactions and the manner in which each presi Broadway, Suite 400, New York, New York 10003, dential administration put its own stamp not only on 2006, 432 pages, $29.95 (hardcover). the overall US space program, but also on the na ture of the relationship between NASA and its DOD Historian Frederick Kagan has captured the es counterparts. These interactions varied in time and sence of transformation in the United States mili intensity, ranging from cooperation to conflictand tary from the experience of defeat in Vietnam, benign disregard. The work certainly represents an through an overwhelming victory in Operation important contribution to the serious academic lit Desert Storm, to recent operations in Afghanistan erature relating to space history, clearly refuting and Iraq. Various authors have characterized any notion that NASA was merely a puppet of the changes in the military over the last three decades DOD or the Air Force. The 108-page bibliography as a “revolution in military affairs,” “transformation,” alone, current through the early 2000s, is a most “reinvention,” and “military reform.” impressive resource for the writer on space issues. Kagan begins his treatment of military transfor As happens many times in life, a strength can mation by describing in detail the changes in strategy, also represent a weakness—and we see this, I think, technology, organization, training, and military in Erickson’s work. Because of the great detail in doctrine that occurred after the Vietnam War. This the narrative, it is not an easy read and thus is per transformation was “all encompassing” and threat

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 117 11/8/07 12:35:47 PM 118 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

based, focusing on the Cold War. Thus, true trans prisingly, Kagan recommends increases in both the formation took place because of the lessons of Viet defense budget and manpower levels of the ground nam; Kagan warns that attempting to transform forces as well as shifting from a capabilities-based while at the “height of power and success” after approach for military development to a threat- Desert Storm is the “most difficultof undertakings” based approach on obvious current threats (pp. (pp. 70–71). 389–90). Throughout the book, one finds a number of Finding the Target is an exceptional book, well re interesting threads that strengthen the author’s ar searched and relevant for military audiences. For guments. One of the most striking (and satisfying) those who have served in the military during the 1970s is the treatment of transformation in the military and 1980s, it provides an excellent treatment of the services. Each has transformed in its own way, par remarkable transformation that took place in the ticularly in terms of equipment and organization, services during that period, while making a chilling although one finds striking parallels among the comparison to current transformation efforts. services regarding some transformation activities, such as training. Dr. Jack D. Kem, Colonel, USA, Retired The author’s treatment of the “Value of Diver Fort Leavenworth, Kansas sity” also proves interesting. He describes different solutions that each service developed for some of the problems of warfare as well as the apparent re dundancy of systems resulting from multiple re All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Opera­ sponses. Kagan sees this phenomenon as a source tions Forces in Iraq by Charles H. Briscoe et al. of great strength—for example, the overlapping USASOC History Office (http://www.gpo.gov), capabilities of the F-16, F-15, and F-14, and the Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307, 2006, 517 Apache’s “daunting array of capabilities” that “en pages, $45.00 (softcover). sures that there is no single threat that can unhinge the U.S. air campaign” (pp. 66–67). Having a single Written by people involved in Operation Iraqi “perfect” aircraft would have involved compromises Freedom, All Roads Lead to Baghdad is an eye-opening whereas our current suite of systems provides com account of that operation, including the occupa plementary capabilities. tion of Iraq. The staff of the The author addresses the contributions of mili Special Operations Command (USASOC) History tary theorists, most notably those of John Boyd and Office has composed a superb picture of this war John Warden, particularly the revolution-in-airpower and its aftermath. theory initially developed by Boyd and expanded The book relates the importance and effect of by Warden during Desert Storm—together with les special forces in Iraq through the eyes of the sol sons from that operation. He concludes that the diers involved, from planners and generals to op key to success in Desert Storm was a “well-prepared eratives in various special-forces teams. Despite the ground offensive . . . launched in a timely manner subtitle, the study deals not only with USASOC but to take full advantage of the disruption and disag also with many of the conventional operations dur gregation caused by the well-planned and skillfully ing the war, including deployments and the history conducted air campaign” (p. 141). of Iraq under Saddam Hussein. USASOC also pro Critical of network-centric warfare, Kagan notes vides a wide variety of information, much of it con its three fundamental flaws:it is a solution in search veyed by charts, graphs, and maps, as well as first of a problem, the technical requirements needed hand accounts of soldiers and airmen. to produce the capabilities sought and promised The first chapter, one of the book’s most valu are unattainable in the real world, and it proceeds able sections, explains the importance of Iraq to the from a misunderstanding of the nature of war (p. Middle East and the United States. Many Americans 353). He describes this type of warfare as an indica still have false perceptions of the state of Iraq be tor of the “movement away from the political objec fore coalition forces invaded in 2003. It describes tive of war toward a focus on killing and destroying Saddam and his regime as “not a toothless lion” (p. things” (p. 356). 6), explaining that he could call on 400,000 regular The book concludes by proposing a “new way” forces and twice that number of reservists. The au of approaching transformation efforts in the US thor also discusses Saddam’s fedayeen and the capa military and provides some possible scenarios for bilities of these fanatically dedicated brigades. This conflictin the future, including potential scenarios discussion includes diagrams of the Iraqi order of in China, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. Not sur battle prior to Iraqi Freedom. I was surprised to see

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 118 11/8/07 12:35:47 PM BOOK REVIEWS 119

that, at that time, Iraq boasted 325 combat aircraft. found so many errors in fact in the first 100 pages Only 20 of them remain operational today. that I began to doubt that Halliday was ever in Another section of the book that I found fascinat Southeast Asia. The fact that he was indeed there ing addresses the employment of Combined Joint makes things even worse. I found his accounts irri Special Operations Task Force-North and the trouble tating. The events may have happened more than experienced by coalition special forces because of 35 years ago, but even at a distance of three de Turkey’s refusal to allow their deployment during cades, one does not confuse Barrel Roll’s night air Iraqi Freedom. This impasse led to the creation of borne battlefield command and control center Operation Ugly Baby, a flight path so ugly “only a (Alley Cat) with the one in Steel Tiger (Moon mother could love it” (p. 117). The war would have beam). Nor does one forget the name of Udorn proceeded much more quickly with Turkey’s support. Royal Thai Air Force Base—a primary recovery Written chronologically, the study covers details base for Barrel Roll missions that went badly. Doz down to the hour when the planning stage began ens of other questionable recollections in this book and provides a “five-monthsnapshot” of Iraqi Free will make any veteran of that time and place won dom (p. 451). Some portions seem repetitive, how der about the author’s veracity. ever, and several times the authors’ clear recounting Flying through Midnight provides some light en of operations makes the summaries unnecessary. tertainment. However, for readers knowledgeable All Roads Lead to Baghdad gives readers a chance about the events Halliday describes in this book, I to see Iraqi Freedom through the eyes of the people suggest a ready supply of antacid tablets. who fight on and behind the front lines. It also al lows them to understand how special forces of all Col Karl Polifka, USAF, Retired branches affect the outcome of major operations. Raven 45, 1969 Overall, I would highly recommend this book to Williamsburg, Virginia anyone who has any interest in special operations and Iraq.

Cadet Jake A. Dugat, USAF Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain Air Force ROTC, University of Houston War by John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue. Stan ford University Press (http://www.sup.org), 1450 Page Mill Road, Palo Alto, California 94304-1124, 2006, 384 pages, $60.00 (hardcover). Flying through Midnight: A Pilot’s Dramatic Story of His Secret Missions over Laos during the Viet­ John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue have written a nam War by John T. Halliday. Scribner, imprint of superbly researched and enlightening history of Simon and Schuster (http://www.simonsays.com), the transformation of Chinese military power since 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New 1949 and the birth of the People’s Republic of York 10020, 2005, 432 pages, $27.50 (hardcover). China. They smartly detail the evolution of its de fense philosophy—from Mao and his extreme para Flying through Midnight is the personal account noia over perceived enemies and their inevitable of a C -123 pilot flying Operation Candlestick mis attack on China to the present day. What makes sions in 1970 and 1971 to illuminate enemy targets this book unique, relative to others addressing the by dropping flares over the Steel Tiger area of subject, is its depth of firsthandinformation, analy southern Laos and the Barrel Roll area of northern sis, and interpretation of the inner workings of the Laos. The author tells several entertaining stories Chinese government and military leadership that before he arrives at the central focus of his book—a influenced the development of China’s foreign night landing at Long Tien, Laos, and the subse policy and its version of a national security strategy. quent takeoff the next day. The study delves into the nation-state friendships A reader not familiar with air operations during China has forged over the years out of military ne the war in Southeast Asia might find Halliday’s cessity or for political leverage against a more press book quite amusing. However, I am intimately fa ing foe. miliar with those operations, having spent 27 Regarding strategic challenges and the struggle months there as a forward air controller (FAC), a for power, the authors candidly reveal how infight Raven (a particular breed of very independent, vol ing, internal rivalries, mistrust, repeated purging of unteer FACs who flew unconventional but highly the senior leadership, shifting defense priorities rela successful missions in Laos), and an RF-4 pilot. I tive to perceived enemies, and defense budgetary

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 119 11/8/07 12:35:48 PM 120 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

limitations have adversely shaped China’s defense what the future may hold in US/Taiwan/China re posture: “Foreign conflicts and crisis seldom take lations on the international stage. precedence over internal stability and the political power of the established rulers” (p. 26). Lewis and Dr. David A. Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Retired Xue describe government and military leadership US Army Command and General Staff College hierarchies in a relevant and purposeful manner— how they have evolved and influenced defense ca pability’s priorities. They pay particular attention to the Chinese air force and second artillery (strate Al enemigo primero lo descerebramos by Como gic rocket forces)—forces/capabilities perceived as doro Miguel Angel Silva, Fuerza Aérea Argentina, critical to China’s active defense strategy. retired. Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra Imagined Enemies effectively presents a compre Aérea (RESGA), Argentina, 2003, 168 pages. hensive articulation of contemporary defense and (Not sold commercially.) foreign-policy challenges facing China in light of their ever-increasing complexities. The authors Al enemigo primero lo descerebramos, a primer pub emphasize such challenges as the technological su lished by the Fuerza Aérea Argentina (Argentine air periority of the US military and its proven effective force), deals with command, control, communica ness in Iraq and the Balkans, coupled with the tions, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and re growing obsolescence of Chinese military equip connaissance (C4ISR). Divided into two chapters ment, inadequate levels of relevant operational and three appendices, it emphasizes how C4ISR concepts affect conventional warfare. Chapter 1, training, and the struggles of its military to operate “First Analysis: The New Way of Waging War,” derives jointly. China’s pressing concerns over the ongoing basic doctrinal concepts from a brief survey of past North Korean crisis and its precarious relationships wars. Most of the discussion is serious, but one light with Russia and Japan further push China onto the hearted passage quips, “When talking about infor international/regional diplomatic stage. These issues mation warfare, the image that comes to mind for are underpinned by China’s domestic and inter most people is a teenager seated in front of a com national economic aspirations, its emergence in the puter, holding a soda in his hand as the cheese from global economy, and its growing account balance: his hamburger drips on the keyboard” (p. 18). Chap “While many current powers can still boast an edge ter 2, “Second Analysis: Information to Degrade/ in such critical areas as science and technology, Protect,” makes insightful comments about many China is working to lessen that advantage through topics, including the dangers of information over favorable business deals, strategic technology ac load (pp. 71–72). Written from the perspective of a quisitions, and targeted scientificprograms. Should country that possesses limited military resources, the that effort continue unimpeded, China’s race to study cautions against “trying to imitate the USA, greatness could succeed within the next twenty which is a utopia for countries like ours” (p. 77). The years” (pp. 1–2). appendices offer concise technical overviews of the Lewis and Xue also assess the sensitivity and un radar, laser, infrared, and other types of sensors that easy tolerance over the Taiwan situation, the proba operate in the electromagnetic spectrum. bility of US military intervention in response to The book is not about information warfare per military conflictbetween China and Taiwan, or the se but systematically analyzes C4ISR concepts and likely response of China if Taiwan declared itself an technologies. Much of the book deliberately adopts independent nation. Furthermore, they postulate a repetitive, didactic style to drive home precepts the likely military responses of China, Taiwan, and such as “Everything that transmits can be inter the United States under varying circumstances and cepted. Everything that can be intercepted can be their likely outcomes in a thought-provoking way. degraded” (p. 49). Although a handy reference Imagined Enemies will leave readers with a mean that examines its topic primarily from an air force ingful appreciation of the Chinese struggle for a perspective, it focuses more on the component stable existence and the extent to which China has parts of information systems than on the synergies gone in securing its borders, as well as the hardships that can result from integrating those systems as en and sacrifices it has endured to do so. The book is visioned by network-centric warfare. The author also a great professional read for anyone interested in says little about how the Internet relates to informa the evolution of Chinese defense philosophy and tion operations or about how one uses information the psychology behind it, as well as individuals systems against terrorists, organized criminals, or wanting a sound vantage point in understanding other nonstate threats. Readers seeking more in

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 120 11/8/07 12:35:48 PM BOOK REVIEWS 121

formation about the topics discussed will find nei ans and biographers began looking at aspects of ther footnotes nor a bibliography, but the glossary, Washington as the fashion shifted to “the-man-and index, and simple illustrations are helpful. How his-times” or psychohistory. Historians either turned ever, the book’s very fineprint will be hard for some to history from the ground up or turned inward people to read. Most of the information is factually and deconstructed history into meaninglessness, accurate, but a few minor errors do intrude them and other fads came and went. Good, old-fashioned selves. For example, the text states that the human military/political studies fell by the wayside. eye can see only 64 colors (pp. 56 and 70); in reality, Meanwhile, the University of Virginia began an the number is in the millions. And the 1942 battle effort to make the Washington collection the most of Alam Halfa occurred in North Africa—not in a complete in the world. Tens of thousands of docu place that is now part of Israel, as the author asserts ments poured in. Presumably, most of them added (p. 71). only bulk to the collection, but others provided This primer is useful in at least two different new insights into Washington’s leadership during ways. First, it is designed as a textbook for military the revolution and earlier. audiences such as war-college students in Spanish- General George Washington uses the new material speaking countries. Second, the appendices offer to create an old-style portrait of the man. Though military readers who are not scientists or techni incorporating scholarship of the twentieth century cians an understandable explanation of the basic to create more nuance than did the earlier warrior/ technical characteristics of typical C4ISR systems. leader portraits, it stays firmlyin the school that de The underlying scientificprinciples discussed have finesW ashington, in Thomas Flexner’s term, as the enduring value; nevertheless, C4ISR technology “indispensable man.” By no means does indispens and operational methods evolve quickly. The book ability mean that all works in this school are little uses many historical examples to illustrate its points more than hagiography. Washington, after all, was about the changing nature of warfare, but, although merely a man—one with flaws. Vain and cold, he published in 2003, it does not refer to the terrorist kept a watchful eye out for both his accounts and attacks of 11 September 2001 or to subsequent his place in history. He made all sorts of poor stra events. Hopefully the Argentine air force will up tegic and tactical decisions and could well have date the text in light of recent warfare experience. come down as the loser of America’s aborted war for independence had it not been for a bit of luck Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF and a couple of British generals whose errors Maxwell AFB, Alabama proved more egregious or more disastrously timed than his. The book follows a standard chronological struc ture, beginning with Washington’s childhood and General George Washington: A Military Life by Ed youth and touching on his formative relationship ward G. Lengel. New York: Random House Pub with his older stepbrother, who died prematurely. lishing Group (http://www.randomhouse.com/ It recapitulates his early career and ambition to be rhpg), 1745 Broadway, 18th Floor, New York, come a British officer—in keeping with his urgent New York 10019, 2005, 496 pages, $29.95 (hard need for status. Another key element of that need cover); 2007, 512 pages, $16.95 (softcover). is his dedication to self-improvement. Connections, favors, and occasional rewards for merit were also Thousands of books on George Washington are important to the young Washington, elements that available. Researchers study him as much as they do continued throughout his life. Abraham Lincoln. Why would anyone waste time on Most of the narrative naturally deals with the yet another biography of the nation’s number-one wars—first the French and Indian War but mostly founding father? Well, maybe because Washing the American Revolution. The approach remains ton’s biographers have gotten off track and are pre chronological, with no side tours or flashbacks. senting a false or partial portrait of the man. Maybe Old-fashioned though straight narrative might be, because there is a large collection of primary docu when an author wishes to move clearly and simply ments just begging to be used. Actually, for both from one point to the next, it works. Lengel writes reasons. with enthusiasm and clarity, telling an old story well As author Edward Lengel notes, for a century enough to engage the attention of those who have the focus remained on Washington as the political heard it many times before. He narrates with ample and military leader, particularly during the Revolu explanation and depth; those new to these events tionary War. Then in the twentieth century, histori will come away with a good grasp of Washington

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 121 11/8/07 12:35:49 PM 122 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

and the revolutionary era. His explanation of the human elements of astronaut life. His first two military structures of the competing forces is par shuttle missions—Space Transportation System ticularly impressive. Still thrilling and compelling (STS) 59 and 68, launched in April and September are the descriptions of battle and camp life—hard 1994, respectively—utilized his unique academic ships unimaginable in today’s military. background with the Space Radar Laboratory, There is no mystery as to why General George which mapped Earth’s surface while it remained in Washington is on the chief of staff of the Air Force’s the shuttle’s large cargo bay. During these missions, reading list. It is not the most sophisticated scholar he proved himself—something astronauts continu ship available on Washington, but it is as good a ously do because of the keen competition and small work as exists on him and the American Army dur margin of error in their work. This mind-set is sum ing the Revolutionary War. It is a must-read. marized in the astronaut’s prayer “God, please don’t let me screw up” (p. 172). Dr. John H. Barnhill Engineers, scientists, and other technical pro Houston, Texas fessions are often criticized for their lack of human ness, but Jones is clearly an exception. Some of the most memorable aspects of his memoir are his de scriptions of the “office” and home life of astro Sky Walking: An Astronaut’s Memoir by Tom Jones. nauts. Although training for missions makes for HarperCollins Publishers (http://www.harper long days, when astronauts are awaiting a crew as collins.com/hc), 10 East 53rd Street, New York, signment, they involve themselves in various proj New York 10022, 2006, 369 pages, $26.95 (hard ects: assisting crews in training, escorting family cover). members during missions, making public appear ances, and so forth. Clearly, astronauts experience Most readers of Air and Space Power Journal prob few dull moments and contend with many demands ably wanted to be astronauts at some point in their on their families. lives. Some may still strive for this goal, and a select For Jones, a very human aspect of spaceflight is few others may actually be astronauts. Readers who his deep faith. He recounts celebrating mass with fall into any of these categories or simply have an his crew in orbit and receiving communion. He interest in manned spaceflightwill love Sky Walking. also describes how his parish priest attended the Written by former astronaut Tom Jones, a veteran launches and had a prayer service on the beach at of four space-shuttle flightsand holder of a PhD in Cape Canaveral for the crew, their families, and planetary sciences, this exceptional book captures friends. His descriptions from space reflect his both the technological and human aspects of a pro strong beliefs: “Never have I felt so insignificant, fession so many aspire to yet so very few attain. part of a scene so obviously set by God” (p. 316). The memoir relates a chronological journey of His third mission involved dispatching and re astronaut life, from the decision to apply to the Na trieving an ultraviolet spectrometer satellite and an tionalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA), aborted extravehicular activity (EVA), or space walk, through the five days of interviews and testing, se when the shuttle’s pressure door jammed, the lat lection and initial training, to assignment of the ter described as the biggest disappointment of his first mission. It also offers detailed descriptions of astronaut career. His fourth mission (and the book’s all flights. Jones avoids using a redundant, cookie- finale)included docking with the ISS and his long- cutter approach to recounting each of his four mis awaited and intensely trained-for EVA, which he sions. Instead, he describes precisely the eight-minute, terms “sky walking.” These missions, STS 80 and 98, 40-second launch sequence on one flight; the mi flew in November 1996 and February 2001, respec nutely scripted schedule of daily life in orbit on an tively. The thrill of sky walking on STS 98 compen other; the 45-minute plunge through the heat of sated for the lost opportunity on STS 80. 3,000 degrees of reentry, which he took for granted Jones’s ability to relate the absolute wonder and until Columbia incinerated in 2003; and the ballet- thrill of spaceflightis captured in his description of like series of maneuvers involved in successfully sky walking around the ISS during his third and docking with the International Space Station (ISS) final EVA: on his last mission. Pivoting around my grip on Destiny’s forward hand The author skillfully describes both the techno rail, I drank in the panorama unfolding around me. logical aspects of each shuttle mission in layman’s Directly in front of me, twenty feet away, the tail of terms (a feat in itself for most PhDs) while simulta Atlantis split the Earth’s horizon. Straight up, the glit neously providing plenty of information about the tering solar panels of the Space Station spread like

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 122 11/8/07 12:35:49 PM BOOK REVIEWS 123

golden wings across the black nothingness of space. Black’s premise is that one must have a focus of To either side of the now-empty payload bay, the royal time as well as place to say whether or not a given blue of the ocean and its swirling white clouds rolled war is a “total war.” Many factors must come to past. Behind me, the bulk of the Station plowed for gether to culminate in an experience that would ward like a vast, unwavering star cruiser, slicing inarguably become a total war (summarized on p. through the heavens toward a horizon a thousand 1). He evaluates a block of history, from 1860 to miles distant (p. 316). 1945, which provides a wide sampling of conflicts This memoir reveals many additional fascinating that in many ways reflects some or most of the ele points: the ineptness of NASA management at ments he describes on page 1. times, the poor planning and management of the Through the firsttwo chapters, the author walks ISS, the incredible difficulty of working with the the reader through examples of total war in a micro Russians, the one-in-76 chance of a catastrophic cosm. This introduction is important to understand failure that astronauts face each time they fly, and why Black states that there is more to the totality of the fact that Republican administrations supported war than simply what the beholder perceives. Each NASA more strongly than Democratic ones. case study, covering conflicts worldwide from 1860 Although the book provides many other exceed to prior to World War I, sets the stage for the follow ingly interesting stories and superb descriptions of ing chapters. the challenges and thrills of a shuttle astronaut, it The Age of Total War’s discussions of World Wars I does suffer from a few minor flaws. The ending and II positively shine. First, in describing World seems a bit abrupt and fails to give readers enough War I, Black gives the reader examples of the player insight into the future of manned spaceflight after states’ commitments to the war in terms of treasure, the shuttle program concludes. Also, the descrip blood, territory, national pride, mobilization, and industrial capability. He discusses the Versailles tions of scientific experiments occasionally bordered settlement at length, including the carving up of on the tedious. But Jones’s exceptional writing skills, Germany and Austria; the creation of new states; logical organization, and thoroughness make these the number of dead and wounded; and reparations blemishes very minor and easily overlooked. due from Germany. “[The Versailles settlement] Sky Walking is an outstanding memoir that any was a settlement without compromise. Insofar as one even remotely interested in manned space total war was a matter of outcomes, this was total flightwill finddifficult to put down. I highly recom war” (p. 100). mend it, especially to the next generation of Black then turns to World War II. Drawing from astronauts who will flythe crew exploration vehicle, several fellow historians’ work and setting the stage the successor to the space shuttle, which will take by using Versailles, he argues that World War II was men and women to the moon, Mars, and beyond. a kaleidoscopic conflict of totality, depending on Col Phil Bossert, USAF how one views segments of the conflict. For example, University of Houston the British and Americans preserved the “civilized inhibitions of their societies” in their fighting on the Western Front (p. 144), suggesting a more lim ited conflict; this contrasts with the level of brutality experienced on the Eastern Front between the Ger The Age of Total War, 1860–1945 by Jeremy Black. mans and the Soviet Union, which suggests that Praeger Security International, Greenwood Pub both parties waged a total war (pp. 146 and 147). lishing Group (http://www.praeger.com/psi), Black sums up this work by saying that “the under 88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881, standing of war in terms of campaigning—the op 2006, 216 pages, $44.95 (hardcover). erational approach to war—is far too narrow. In stead, it is more appropriate to understand war as The term total war frequently conjures up mental a cultural process that focuses on the imposition of pictures of intense suffering and death, mass de will. . . . People are beaten when they understand that struction, widespread conflict, and perhaps a na they have lost” (pp. 169–70). tional commitment to prosecuting war bordering The extent to which a state commits itself to im on fanaticism. Jeremy Black, in The Age of Total War, pose its will on another ultimately defines the totality 1860–1945, does a magnificent job of illustrating of a conflict. One could argue that today’s global the complex ties to each image and demonstrating war on terrorism is a limited conflictfrom the US/ why, even within these stark illustrations, wars may coalition perspective—but a total war from almost or may not be “total.” any one of the opposing parties’ views, based on

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 123 11/8/07 12:35:49 PM 124 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL WINTER 2007

their level of commitment and desire to impose R-7 ICBM—evidently both sides wanted to use the their will. I heartily recommend The Age of Total War lucky number). In September 1955, faced with in for planners at all levels, who would do well to re telligence reports of the Russians’ progress on their flect on the application of its lessons to adaptive ICBM, the DOD gave Atlas the highest national de plans for future operations. velopment priority. The project became one of the largest and most complex production, testing, and Maj Paul Niesen, USAF construction programs ever undertaken. Benefit Scott AFB, Illinois ing from the hard-driving management of Brig Gen Bernard A. Schriever, who managed the project for the Air Force, Atlas became the first ICBM in the Atlas: The Ultimate Weapon by Chuck Walker with US arsenal. It underwent its firsttest-fire on 11 June Joel Powell. Apogee Books / Collectors Guide 1955, and a later-generation rocket became opera Publishing (http://www.apogeespacebooks.com), tional in 1959. 1440 Graham’s Lane, Unit no. 2, Burlington, Although replaced as a ballistic missile in 1965, Ontario L7S 1W3, Canada, 2005, 304 pages, the Atlas has enjoyed a significantcareer as a space $29.95 (softcover). launcher thereafter, with more than 440 launches to its credit. It served as the launch vehicle for the In Atlas: The Ultimate Weapon, Chuck Walker tells orbital Mercury flights, sending John Glenn, Wally the story of the development of the Atlas interconti Schirra, Scott Carpenter, and Gordon Cooper into nental ballistic missile (ICBM) from an insider’s orbit in 1962–63. With the use of Agena and Cen perspective. The work captures well the importance taur upper stages, the Atlas also became the medium- of the Atlas rocket as both a ballistic missile and lift workhorse for American human, planetary, and space-launch vehicle. One of three major launch geosynchronous-orbit space missions. After a reen systems developed in the 1950s by the Department gineering effort in the last decade of the twentieth of Defense (DOD) that found both military and century, Atlas V continues to operate as one of the commercial uses, Atlas began with the US Army Air critical expendable launch vehicles flown by the Corps’ request for proposal in October 1945. By 10 United States. January 1946, Consolidated-Vultee’s (Convair) engi As should be obvious, this important story is wor neers, under the leadership of Belgian-born Karel thy of serious historical attention. Unfortunately, At­ Bossart, had submitted their proposal for a 6,000 las: The Ultimate Weapon gives it only a partial telling. nautical-mile ballistic missile. New technologies Essentially a memoir of an engineer who worked on proposed for the missile included extremely the program, the book relates certain aspects of the low structural weight through the use of steel Atlas story involving Chuck Walker quite well but monocoque, single-wall construction tanks kept gives short shrift to the larger context for the weap rigid by internal tank pressure; a state-of-the-art ons system’s development and employment. It is al rocket motor with unique gimbals to help control most exclusively an account of the Convair experi attitude; a detachable payload or warhead section; and ence, based on personal recollection and interviews nearly single-stage-to-orbit performance through with colleagues. This is especially disappointing be the “stage-and-a-half” approach of jettisoning the cause of the broadness of the Atlas history. The study booster engines rather than a full stage during the should examine not only the technical issues that ascent. On 19 April 1946, Convair received a con Convair wrestled with (which it does relatively well) tract in the amount of $1,893,000 for fabricating but also many other aspects of the rocket’s history. and testing 10 missiles to verify Bossart’s innova For instance, it should cover the political story of tive concepts. But the Atlas program was stillborn; Atlas’s origins and development by exploring the in DOD cutbacks forced termination of the contract terservice rivalries between the Air Force and Army in July 1947. concerning ballistic-missile development (such as With renewed international tensions in 1951, the challenging of Atlas’s inflatable structure con the DOD gave Convair a new contract to design a cept by the Army’s Wernher von Braun) and the in ballistic missile incorporating the basic features al terorganizational rivalries between the Atlas project ready validated. In 1953 Convair presented a plan and the competing Titan effort. Also critical is dis to the Air Force for a full-fledgeddevelopment pro cussion of the management of the Atlas program— gram, and in January 1955 it received the go-ahead the first to use the systems-management concept to develop what was called at the time MX-774. At and configuration control, with Simon Ramo (of Convair the project was known as Model 7 (in Rus what would eventually become TRW, Inc.) oversee sia, Korolev was then working on the competing ing systems integration.

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 124 11/8/07 12:35:50 PM BOOK REVIEWS 125

A number of good books address the history of pertaining to the Tet offensive from North Viet ballistic-missile development and operations, David namese, US military, and media sources. Reading K. Stumpf’s Titan II: A History of a Cold War Missile these documents provides background usually lack Program (University of Arkansas Press, 2000) repre ing in lesser works. senting the gold standard for recording one ICBM The final part includes a list of resources. Much program’s history. Although Atlas: The Ultimate more than a simple bibliography, it offers a cata Weapon provides some useful technical details about logue of books, papers, and media divided into spe the missile’s development, it does not measure up cific categories relating to the Tet offensive. Addi to Stumpf’s outstanding work on the Titan. The tionally and most usefully, Willbanks includes a history of the Atlas program remains to be told. short commentary about each source. These com Dr. Roger D. Launius mentaries will help guide readers in expanding National Air and Space Museum their study of the events. Smithsonian Institution Rather than just a simple rendition of the offen Washington, DC sive, this book is truly a reference work that can be read in whole or in part, depending on one’s needs. The narrative itself, although short, is excellent. The author segments the discussion in order to provide specificity without sacrificing overall clarity. The Tet Offensive: A Concise History by James H. His coverage of the tactical, strategic, and percep Willbanks. Columbia University Press (http:// tual issues of the Tet offensive gives readers a com www.columbia.edu/cu/cup), 61 West 62d Street, plete portrait. New York, New York 10023, 2006, 272 pages, Unlike some writers, who leave Khe Sanh out of $29.50 (hardcover). the Tet offensive as if it were a completely separate In every American war, one battle defines the operation, Willbanks includes a discussion of the conflict in our national memory. Yorktown, Gettys siege there, recognizing it as a significant element burg, Normandy, and Inchon are seared into our of Tet. Regarding the question about whether Khe minds as representative of the courage of our fight Sanh was meant as a diversionary attack or a main ing men and their commitment to victory in the element of Tet, the author presents both sides of American Revolution, Civil War, World War II, and the argument, allowing readers to draw their own Korean War, respectively. Regarding the Vietnam conclusions. War, one need only mention the Tet offensive to evoke Interestingly, the author’s strict adherence to memories of courage but not of victory. Tet has be objectivity may frustrate some readers since one en come the symbol of the futility, if not the outright fail counters such a stance so rarely. This is especially ure, of our war in Vietnam. The Tet Offensive: A Concise evident in the discussion about the role of the media History is the latest attempt to examine what happened in interpreting the events and meaning of Tet. It is and how it came to be interpreted as a defeat. common to blame the media for misrepresenting This book is thorough, well written, and uniquely the offensive and turning American public opinion constructed. Of its six parts, the narrative comprises against the war. However, one can make a strong the firsttwo (“Historical Overview” and “Issues and argument that the media did not shape public Interpretations”) but less than half of the entire opinion but was shaped by it. The author takes no work. These two parts provide a solid foundation of specificposition on this matter, citing evidence that facts critical to understanding how Tet was a US tac could support either position. Once again readers tical victory and strategic defeat—but one encoun must weigh the facts and decide for themselves. ters much more here. The Tet Offensive: A Concise History would appeal Readers will findthemselves regularly returning to either casual military-history buffs or serious stu to part 3, an almost daily chronology of events dents of the Vietnam War. The former will gain in through 1967 and 1968, and will thank the author sight into a very important part of our military and for including it because such a reference helps political history, while the latter will findthemselves keep events in the proper order. Part 4, “The Tet reevaluating previously held beliefs. Any book ca Offensive, A to Z,” an exhaustive glossary that com pable of doing that is well worth the investment of plements the chronology, includes military terms, one’s time and money. personal names, and locations that even the most erudite student of the Vietnam War will finduseful. CSM James H. Clifford, USA, Retired Part 5 is a compendium of 10 important documents McDonough, Georgia

2007-4 Book Reviews.indd 125 11/8/07 12:35:50 PM ir and Space Power Journal, the US Air Force’s Web site http://www.af.mil/subscribe, selecting any Aprofessional journal, is published in English, of the Air and Space Power Journal language editions, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, French, and Chinese. entering your name and e-mail address, and then Each version is independent and has an editor—a clicking on the “submit” button. You will immedi­ native speaker of the particular language and an ately receive an e-mail asking you to reply in order to confirmyour subscription. You won’t receive your expert in the region of coverage—who selects its subscription unless you reply to that message. Elec­ content. We’re always looking for good, thought- tronic subscription is free. provoking articles up to 5,000 words in length, written in any of our published languages. All sub­ missions will be edited in accordance with the Is Your Organization standards set forth in the Air University Style and Author Guide (available online at http://aupress Receiving Its Proper Number .maxwell.af.mil/Resources/style/austyle_guide of ASPJ Copies? .pdf). For details, please see our guidelines for sub­ The following criteria guide the free distribu­ mitting articles at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af tion of Air and Space Power Journal to military and .mil/airchronicles/howto1.html. You can contact government organizations. These criteria are only us by e-mail at [email protected]; regular mail planning factors—not absolute limits. If your or­ at Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, ganization has different needs, please contact Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6004; phone at DSN us at [email protected]. 493-5322 (commercial [334] 953-5322); or fax at DSN 493-5811. • One copy for each general on active duty with the US Air Force or Air Reserve Forces. • One copy for every five active duty US Air Force of­ Subscribing to ASPJ: ficers in grades second lieutenant through colonel. Both Printed and Electronic • One copy for each US Air Force or Air Reserve Forces Subscriptions Are Available office of public affairs. • Three copies for each Air Reserve Forces unit down Printed copy to squadron level. • The Journal is available free to all USAF organiza­ • Three copies for each air attaché or advisory-group tions as described below in the section “Is Your Or­ function. ganization Receiving Its Proper Number of ASPJ • One copy for each US Air Force or US government Copies?” Other US government and foreign military library. organizations may also receive the Journal for free by • Other US military, US government, or foreign mili­ contacting the editor at [email protected]. tary organizations wishing to receive the Journal should • Nonmilitary and nongovernmental organizations contact us at [email protected]. may receive the Journal by contacting the Superinten­ dent of Documents by any of the following methods: If your organization is not receiving the desired writing to New Orders, Superintendent of Docu­ number of copies, please contact us. ments, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954; calling (202) 512-1800 (voice), (866) 512-1800 (toll­ free outside the DC area), or (202) 512-2104 (fax); Cumulative Article Index or visiting http://bookstore.gpo.gov/collections/ military_ journals.jsp on the Internet. The Journal’s A cumulative index of ASPJ articles, listed alpha­ officialdesignation is AFRP 10-1, Air and Space Power betically by the author’s last name, is available at Journal, stock number 708-007-00000-5. The cost is http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ $32.00 ($44.80 for international mail). Major credit aspjindex.html. cards are accepted. The Editor Free electronic copy • You can receive the Journal electronically by logging on to the “Subscription Center” at the Air Force Link

126

Mission Debrief.indd 126 10/29/07 10:01:42 AM OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Maj Gen (sel) Robert R. Allardice (USAFA; Maj Kyle “Brad” Head (USAFA; MBA, Liberty Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr. (BA, Saint Joseph’s MS, University of Southern California) is the University) is a senior personnel officer as­ University; JD, Villanova University) is Deputy commander of the Coalition Air Force Transition signed to the Directorate of Airman Develop­ Judge Advocate General of the Air Force. He is Team, Baghdad, Iraq. He is responsible to the ment and Sustainment, Deputy Chief of Staff the author of numerous articles on legal and Multi-National Security Transition Command- for Manpower and Personnel, Headquarters national security affairs and has deployed in Iraq for standing up the Iraqi Air Force. A US Air Force, Washington, DC. He was a mem­ support of several operations in the Middle command pilot with more than 4,700 hours in ber of the advanced echelon team that stood East and Africa. General Dunlap is a graduate the C-141, C-5, and C-17, he commanded the up the Iraqi Air Force Training School at Taji, of the Armed Forces Staff College and a distin­ strategic humanitarian airdrop in 2001, which Iraq. He then served on the staff of the Coali­ guished graduate of the National War College. began on the first night of combat operations tion Air Force Transition Team as the senior in Afghanistan. In the opening days of Opera­ coalition airpower advisor to the Iraqi Train­ tion Iraqi Freedom, he commanded and led ing and Doctrine Command. Major Head is a the airdrop of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air seizing vital territory in northern Iraq. General Command and Staff College. Allardice is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College; he also attended Harvard University as a Senior Executive Fellow.

Lt Col Bruce K. Johnson (BS, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee) serves as Air Force Re­ Maj Jason M. Brown (BA, Texas A&M Univer­ serve chief of strategic communication plans, sity; MMS [Master of Military Studies], Marine Pentagon, Washington, DC. Previous staff as­ Corps University) is currently a student at the signments include Air Force Reserve chief of US Marine Corps School of Advanced War- strategic assessment and future concepts as fighting in Quantico, Virginia. Earlier in his well as chief of combat forces, Pentagon, career as a squadron- and wing-level intelli­ Washington, DC. A master navigator with Lt Col Alexus G. Grynkewich (USAFA; MA, gence officer, he supported dynamic-targeting more than 3,000 hours in both the F-111F University of Georgia; MA, Naval Postgraduate operations while deployed during Operations and C-130H aircraft, he served in a variety of School) is executive officer, Air Combat Com­ Northern Watch and Enduring Freedom. He operational capacities: radar strike officer, mand Directorate of Requirements, Langley deployed twice as the senior intelligence duty weapon and tactics officer, operational plan­ AFB, Virginia. He previously served as director officer in the Combat Operations Division of ner, information warfare/tactical deception of operations, 59th Test and Evaluation Squad­ the combined air operations center at Al Udeid officer, current operations officer, chief navi­ ron, F-22A operational test pilot, and chief of Air Base, Qatar. During these deployments, he gator, assistant operations officer, combined F-22 Standardization and Evaluation, Nellis coordinated dynamic targeting as well as intel­ air operation center’s senior offensive duty AFB, Nevada; F-16 pilot, 18th Fighter Squad­ ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance op­ officer, and deployed mission commander. ron, Eielson AFB, Alaska; flight commander, erations over Iraq and Afghanistan. Before at­ While serving in these capacities, he took part 421st Fighter Squadron, Hill AFB, Utah; and tending Marine Corps University, he served as in a wide range of global operations, including weapons officer, 8th Fighter Squadron, Kunsan the director of operations, 32nd Air Intelli­ Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Coronet Oak, Air Base, Korea. Colonel Grynkewich is a dis­ gence Squadron, , Germany. Nomad Vigil, Shining Hope, and Iraqi Free­ tinguished graduate of Squadron Officer School Major Brown is a distinguished graduate of dom. Colonel Johnson completed Squadron and intermediate developmental education at Squadron Officer School, the US Air Force Officer School and Air Command and Staff the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Weapons School, and the US Marine Corps College by correspondence and is currently California. Command and Staff College. enrolled in Air War College by correspondence.

127

Bios - 2007-4.indd 127 10/29/07 8:59:58 AM Subscription to the Air and Space Power Journal for People Not Affiliated with the Military or Government

Copy this page, fill it out, and mail it along OR with a check or credit card number to Fax your orders: (202) 512-2104 Superintendent of Documents P.O. Box 371954 Phone your orders: Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954 DC Metro area toll-free outside DC area (202) 512-1800 (866) 512-1800 Make all checks payable to Order online: Superintendent of Documents http://bookstore.gpo.gov/collections/military_ journals.jsp

Order Processing Code: *5679 ❑ Yes, please send me ____ subscription(s) of the Air and Space Power Journal (AURE) for $32.00 each ($44.80 foreign).

The total cost of my order is $______. Price includes regular shipping and handling and is subject to change. International customers please add 25%.

______Company or personal name (Please type or print) ______Additional address/attention line Charge your order. ______Street address It’s easy! ______City, State, Zip Code ______Daytime phone including area code ______Purchase order number (optional)

For privacy protection, check the box below: ❑ Do not make my name available to other mailers

Check method of payment: ❑ Check payable to Superintendent of Documents ❑ GPO Deposit Account ❑ VISA ❑ MasterCard ❑ Discover ❑ American Express

(expiration date) Thank you for your order! ______Authorizing signature 11/95

Important: Please include this completed order form with your remittance.

subscription.indd 128 10/29/07 10:04:52 AM EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University (professor emeritus) Col Steven D. Carey, USAF, Retired Dr. J. Douglas Beason, Colonel, USAF, Retired, Los Alamos National Laboratory Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, National Defense University Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, Naval War College Lt Col Dave Mets, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus)

Left to right: Mr. Guocheng Jiang, editor of Air and Space Power Journal-Chinese; Maj Gen Wanfu Zhong, deputy commandant, Chinese People’ s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Command College; Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, commander, USAF Air University; Dr. David Lai, USAF Air War College; and Mr. Luyang Yuan, editorial assistant of Air and Space Power Journal-Chinese, during the PLAAF Command College delegation’ s visit to Maxwell AFB, Alabama (20 June 2007).

Inside cover.indd 3 11/27/2007 12:48:36 PM