Eyewitness Accounts and Political Claims: Transnational Responses to the 2009 Postelection Protests in Iran
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Access Provided by Columbia University at 10/17/11 3:27PM GMT Eyewitness Accounts and Political Claims: Transnational Responses to the 2009 Postelection Protests in Iran Janet A. Alexanian ollowing the June 2009 Iranian presidential election, images of mass protests through- out Iran flooded Western news media. Unlike the prevailing images that have repre- sented Iran in the mainstream press over the past three decades, images of the 2009 demonstrations showed political dissension within the country; these images disrupted the familiar ones of masses of chador- clad women and angry men chanting “Death to America.” Black was replaced with a sea of green, and scenes of violence and police brutality were fore- grounded. The use of social media became central to the emerging narrative about the po- tential for revolution or social change. The growing ability of Iranians to videotape, photograph, and circulate images and events to a global audience through social media was made even more powerful by the near complete dependence of Western news agencies on such sources for information. In turn, Iranians in the United States have used these images—most important, the shooting of Neda Agha- Soltan—as a rallying point to gather support for Iranian protesters and agitate for po- litical change in Iran. During this time of increased geopolitical tension, Iran offers a critical site to examine the escalating battles between governments attempting to control media im- ages and individuals attempting to disrupt that control. This article examines how such battles of call into question the relationship between mass media and national identity and what this Studies presages for the future of political action in the digital age. and In an examination of the differential uses of social media by protesters within Iran and Africa Asia, Iranians outside Iran, the contradictory nature of digital media—as both evidentiary (be- South cause of its unmediated truth value) and indeterminate (because it is open to transformation East Comparative Middle and uncontrollable circulation)—becomes evident. This article analyzes the representation the of social media as a form of “eyewitness account” and its related claims to truth. I examine 2011 2, No. -1264334 how variously situated actors negotiate, navigate, and use these specific properties for politi - 31, x cal purposes. While protesters in Iran have mobilized transnational social media to organize Vol. Press politically in a context of strict government control of public places and media, Iranians in the 10.1215/1089201University doi Duke diaspora have used social media to disrupt hegemonic narratives about Iran and articulate by 2011 © Iranian identities. Unless otherwise noted, translations from Persian to English are mine. 425 The 2009 Postelection Protests Iranian state media initially ignored news of the 426 The 2009 election was a media affair well before demonstrations, focusing instead on the huge the outbreak of the protests. For the first time in voter turnout and what it deemed “healthy de- Iranian history, televised debates between can- mocracy” in Iran. Ahmadinejad’s state address, didates were broadcast, and social media sites which was televised on 13 June 2009, applauded served as platforms for campaigning. Foreign the fact that 84 percent of eligible voters par- reporters were covering Iran’s first televised and ticipated, describing this turnout as a “major highly mediated elections for weeks before the blow to the oppressive world system and the protests, and Iranian state media celebrated the psychological war launched by the enemy.”5 state’s transparent and participatory democratic He blamed “Western- led media hype” for the of political process. civil unrest, stating: “This is a great victory at Comparative On 12 June 2009, Iran’s Interior Minis- a time and condition when the entire material, Asia, Studies try announced that President Mahmoud Ah- political, and propaganda facilities outside Iran the and madinejad was reelected with two- thirds of the were totally mobilized against the people and South Africa vote. In response, masses of people converged the heaviest pressure and psychological warfare East (without a legal permit to do so) on Tehran’s organized against the people of Iran.”6 Middle main squares to protest the result, accusing the The theme of Western media provoking government of rigging the election.1 The pro- the demonstrations was reiterated by Khame- tests spread to other large cities throughout nei, who warned Iranians of the “behind- the- Iran. Although dismissed by both Ahmadinejad scenes moves by the enemy meant to spark riots and Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei (Iran’s su- in the streets” and called on opposition leaders preme leader), the demonstrations continued to promote “unity and brotherhood.”7 Unity was and, on some days, escalated into riots and the theme of both Ahmadinejad’s and Khame- police clashes. Images and signs of opposition nei’s speeches and sermons as they cast an au- candidates were visible, especially the green col- thentic, democratic, and social justice–oriented ors most demonstrators wore to signify support Iran against oppressive and imperialist Western of Mir Hossein Mousavi, who used the color as countries that sought its downfall. This familiar the signature emblem for his presidential cam- theme was also emphasized in state news stories paign.2 Mousavi participated in and spoke at and Iranian state satellite television about the many of the rallies and, along with other oppo- protests in support of Ahmadinejad—protests sition candidates, formally demanded a recount that were described as “anti- West” and “unity” of the votes.3 rallies.8 The increasing number of beaten and International media already had a signifi- killed pro- Mousavi protesters was attributed to cant presence in Iran during the run- up to the “unidentified gunmen” and hooligans; any re- election and immediately began covering the sponsibility on the part of the basij (described story in up- to- the- minute news reports, blogs, as “hard- line volunteer paramilitaries” on most and broadcasts.4 Television reporters interviewed news programs) was denied. In the Press TV Iranians “on the ground” and emphasized the news story “Several Killed at Pro- Mousavi Rally,” massive size and peaceful nature of the protests. for instance, victims were described as “attack- 1. Maidan- e Azadi (Freedom Square) was the main 4. In a statement by Iran’s Foreign Ministry, the large 7. “Leader Tells Mousavi to Pursue Protest Calmly, site for these protests in Tehran. It was also a main presence of international reporters in Iran was “a through Legal Channels,” Tehran Times, 16 June 2009, site of demonstrations during the Iranian revolution sign of the total transparency in the trends of the www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code= (1979–80). elections and the effective performance of the sys- 196811. tem of religious democracy.” Quoted in “Iran: Foreign 2. Mousavi, the reformist candidate and the run- 8. “In Tehran, Anti- West Protests Erupt Too,” Press TV, Media Supporting ‘Hooligans,’” CNN.com, 17 June ner- up in the election, had served as Iran’s prime 15 June 2009, www.presstv.ir/; “Ahmadinejad Sup- 2009, www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/17 minister (1981–89) during most of the Iran- Iraq war porters Hold Unity Rally,” Press TV, 16 June 2009, www /iran.journalists. (1980–88). .presstv.ir/. 5. “President Joins Sea of Celebrations: Election a 3. In the months following the June election, the Blow to World Oppressors,” Keyhan International, 15 opposition movement was often called the Green June 2009, www.kayhanintl.com/. Movement, and green became a symbol used in pro- tests both in Iran and around the world to signify 6. Ibid. support for the demonstrators and their demands. ers”: “After the demonstrations were over, the This move did not, however, end global cover- attackers reportedly were trying to loot weapons age of the violence within Iran. Rather, it high- 427 and vandalize public properties when they were lighted the role of cell phone camera footage, shot by unidentified gunmen.”9 Following the digital cameras, and social media in circulating growing violence in Iran, Western news cover- images from Iran to the world. age increasingly focused on the basij, reporting Most news stations and papers began to shootings and arrests, as well as international re- rely heavily on “social media” from Iran to “get actions to this violence. In an official statement the story.” For example, CNN constantly re- about the situation, President Barack Obama ferred in television broadcasts to its “iReport” Iran said that “people’s voices should be heard and section where it posted “amateur” video from in Claims: not suppressed,” and many expatriate Iranians Iran. In a news broadcast on CNN Interna- Alexanian A. interviewed in the mainstream media described tional, analyst Errol Barnett reported: Protests Political the protests as attempts to overthrow the Is- We are also getting iReports from people on the Janet 10 and lamic Republic. Reza Pahlavi, the son of the ground, and what we’re hearing from iReport- last shah (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, deposed in ers in Iran is, number one, they don’t want to 1979), said in an interview: “The younger gen- be identified by name—they’re afraid of what Postelection Accounts eration has had it. They are risking their lives in government forces might do, so they’re giving 2009 the streets of Iran to demonstrate to the regime us pseudonyms to use for them.