Doklam Standoff: an Analysis of India’S Security and Economic Perspectives

International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology Vol. 29, No. 3, (2020), pp. 15287 - 15292

Doklam Standoff: An Analysis of India’s Security and Economic Perspectives

Sanchuma Goyary PhD Research Scholar, Department of Political Science North Eastern Hill University, Shillong, Meghalaya, India

Abstract The standoff between India and China in Doklam area of Sikkim put New Delhi and Beijing relationship at an embarrassing low with both sides indulging in rhetoric, warnings and threats. The unresolved border crises continue to be a negative factor in bilateral relationship between two countries. India sees it as a security threats whereas Chinese sees it as an infringement of its sovereignty. The political debate about this impasse has put both the nations on high alert in terms of military and economic perspectives. It is imperative for the both nations to indulge in meaning dialogue from further escalation of the border crises between the two economic giants of Asia. Hence, the main purpose of this article is to analysis the security and economic perspectives between the two countries.

Keywords: Standoff, Doklam, Security Threats, Infringement, Security and economic perspectives, Meaningful Dialogue.

Introduction: The heated border standoff in the remote Doklam area between India and China could have escalated into a major conflicthad the standoff not handled with maturity by the two neighbouring countries.The crisis between the two countries first came into spotlight around the time Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was visiting theUnited States in late June of 2017. The military standoff at the tri-junctionwhere the borders of China, Bhutan and India meet was triggeredby the construction of a motor able road by the PLA from Doka La in the Doklam area.The Indian government claimed that the road,when completed, will connect Lhasa to the Chumbi valley in the disputed tri-junctionarea.1 Indian military planners and securityexperts are of the opinion that this move by the PLA poses a serious threat to India’s national security.2 In recent years, almost all neighbours of China have accused Beijing of coercive tactics to settle border disputes. The standoff was seen as part of the same tactic to change the status quo in the area by India. The Chinese claimed that the Indian troops have infringed into its sovereignty as the face-off was taking place in Chinese territory. To support their basis of claim, the Chinese pointed out the to the 1890 convention China and Britain which China regard as the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim. Article 1 of the 1890 convention, signed in Calcutta (Kolkata), states: “The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating

1See, Simply Put: Where Things Stand on the Dolam Plateau, The Indian Express, July 24th, 2017, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-china-standoff-sikkim-doka-la-simply-put-where-things-stand- on-the-dolam-plateau-4763892/ (Accessed on July 24, 2017) 2See, Border Manoeuvres, Frontline, Issue-15, Volume-34, Issue Date: 04-08-2017, available at http://www.frontline.in/cover-story/border-manoeuvres/article9774377.ece?homepage=true (Accessed on July 22, 2017)

International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology Vol. 29, No. 3, (2020), pp. 15287 - 15292 the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its effluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi, on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the abovementioned waterparting to the point where it meets Nepal territory”.3 The location of standoff which took place between India and China is a controversial contested area. The Indian side claimed that the face-off is taking place in a tri-junction of China, Bhutan and India.The Indian stated that the boundary along the tri-junction has not been finalized, contrary to the Chinese claim. The Indian side also pointed out that as Bhutan was not the part of the finalization of boundary talks it cannot be taken as the final decision because any finalization of boundary will have to involve Bhutan.

Objective: The paper attempts to analyse the security and economic perspectives, its impact on the relationship between India and China amidst the Doklam stand-off and its aftermath.

Research Methodology: The present study isdescriptive and analytical in nature. Sources of this study are obtained from secondary sources. The secondary sources include published journals, articles, magazines, government reports and internet.

Analysis and Discussion: Security Perspective What worries India is that of security measures, China has time and again encroached into Indian territories especially in the North-East India. Similarly, theChambai valley is among the few areas where nuclear-armed neighbours share a 3,500 kilometer border, much of which is contested.4It is well known that China has developed an excellent road and rail network in the direction of the Chumbi valley. The QinghaiTibetrailway has already reached Shigatse, not far from the border with Nepal.From there, the Chinese plan to extend the railway toYadong, which is inside the Chumbi valley.Yadong is the base for reaching Nathu La which connects Tibet with Sikkim. TheChinese have developed an excellent road network between Tibet’s capital, Lhasa, and Yadong, a distance of around 500 kilometers. Departing from Lhasa, the Kamba La pass, at a height of 16,000 feet (4,800metres), is the first major landmark that is crossed enroute Yadong. Further ahead lies the Tibet,Bhutanjunction before the road descends steeply towards Yadong, located at a height of around 9,000 feet (2,700 m).5

3See, Anglo-Chinese Conventions of 1890 and 1893, available at http://indpaedia.com/ind/index.php/Anglo- Chinese_Conventions_of_1890_and_1893#REGULATIONS_REGARDING_TRADE.2C_COMMUNICATIO N_AND_PASTURAGE.2C_TO_BE_APPENDED_TO_THE_CONVENTION_BETWEEN_GREAT_BRITAI N_AND_CHINA_OF_MARCH_17.2C_1890.2C_RELATING_TO_SIKKIM_AND_TIBET (Accessed on July 22, 2017) 4See, Dispatch from Doklam: Indians Dig in for Long Haul in Standoff with China, South China Morning Post, 24th July, 2017, available at http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2103881/dispatch-doklam- indians-dig-long-haul-standoff-china (Accessed on July 24, 2017) 5Border Manoeuvres. No.2.

International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology Vol. 29, No. 3, (2020), pp. 15287 - 15292

China blamed India for the standoff, insisting that Indian troops had trespassed into Chinese sovereign territory. To illustrate its assertion, the Chinese Foreign Ministry cited letters written by Jawaharlal Nehru to the Chinese Prime Minister ZhouEnlai. In a media briefing on July 3rd, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson cited two letters written by Nehru in 1959 where he“had explicitly recognised many times that the (1890) Convention has defined the boundary between Xi Zang (Tibet) of China andSikkim”.In a letter written on September 26th, 1959, Nehru said that the “rectification of errors in Chinese maps regarding theboundary of Bhutan with Tibet is therefore a matter which has to be discussed along with the boundary of India with the Tibet regionof China in the same sector”.6 Chinese aggression can be well understood because India is taking a stern position on building an economic corridor through Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). India also chose to boycott One Belt One Road initiative taken by China. India’s mainobjection to OBOR is related to the ambitious ChinaPakistanEconomic Corridor (CPEC), an important component of the Belt Roadinitiative. China plans to invest more than $40 billion in CPEC and has developed the Gwadar port in Pakistan, which will serve as animportant export hub.7 India’s Act East Policy to garner the geo-political space in Asia and its closeness and bonding ties with the United States, Japan and Russia has not gone down well with Beijing.Economically, Southeast Asia is an important source of raw materials for China as well as export market. Southeast Asia is also a source of oil and gas supplies for China. More importantly, it is through Southeast Asian Malacca Straits that China’s primary energy supply routes from the Middle East and Africa pass.So, China sees the ‘Act East Policy’ of India as US design to circumscribe China’s influence in the region.8 India’s displeasure with Beijing can be understood as China was responsible for blocking its membership of the prestigious Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG). The outgoing Obama administration had assured India that it would facilitate its entry into the NSG, taking China for granted. The intensity of the crisis was visible when the China’s state-run tabloid Global Times accused external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj of lying in the Indian parliament about the whole issue of crisis.Swaraj told Rajya Sabha that to end the standoff crisis and to cease it from further escalation both the nation should withdraw their troops. The defense ministry spokesperson of China Col. Wu Qian on July 24th 2017, reiterated China’s demand that Indian troops should be pulled back from the Doklam area before talks can begin. The Malabar naval exercise amid concern raised by China between India, Japan and USA on July 10th, 2017 aimed at achieving deeper military ties between three nations also provoked China. USA president Donald Trump declared that the tie between India and USA is strong like never before. Chinese actions at Doklam are aim at putting a spotlight on the Indian presence there as they are compelling Bhutan to loosen the tight bonds that historically held New Delhi and Thimpu together. China has boosted about its military strength and used psychological mind

6Anglo-Chinese Conventions of 1890 and 1893. No.3. 7Border Manoeuvres. No.2. 8See, China’s Perception of India’s ‘Look East Policy’ and Its Implications, available at https://idsa.in/system/files/monograph26.pdf (Accessed on November 16, 2017)

International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology Vol. 29, No. 3, (2020), pp. 15287 - 15292 games to carry out its own agenda in Asia.9 China’s military expenditure stands relatively small in comparison to United States but many security observersargue that actual figure could be more. China announced this year that it will increase 7 percent of its budget in military expenditure. It means that the total spending will account for about 1.3 percent of the country’s projected GDP in 2017.The military expenditure of China is estimated at around $200 billion in 2015 whereas India’s military expenditure was around $50 billion in the same year.10India’s defense was hiked to 6 percent in 2017 that seems low priority area for the government which is 1.62 percent of the GDP despite the recommendation of a key defense ministry panel that the spending should be 2.5 percent of GDP.11 India’s military expenditure is relatively very small in comparison to Chinese huge budget. Meanwhile, the BRICS meet was held on September 2017. The summit took place in Xiamen which is located in east China’s Fujian Province. The summit was held under the theme “BRICS: Stronger Partnership for a Brighter Future”. It also featured five key priorities such as deepening cooperation, strengthening global governance, carrying out people to people exchanges, making institutional improvements and building broader partnership. India tried to keep the temperate down with limited public statements about the border standoff. The summit was attended by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi who called for a strong partnership among BRICS nations to spur economic growth.

Economic Perspective The standoff has brought sharp focus on its impact particularly on China’s economic ties with India. There is no doubt that Chinese direct investment has steadily increased in India. From being the 37th largest foreign investor in 2011 to 17th largest foreign investor in 2017, it has really scaled up its business with India.It appears to pecking high but actually the size of the total Chinese investment in India and the annual flows are very little. Between April 2000 and March 2017, India received cumulative foreign investments of over $332 billion. Of this, however, China’s share is only $1.63 billion. In 2010-11 China invested only about $2 million in India. That year India had received total direct foreign investment of over $14 billion. The following years the Chinese investments rose to $495 million in 2014-15 and $461 million in 2015-16. Chinese annual outward FDI is estimated $100 billion a year, of this, India share a tiny half billion dollar. The Chinese investment also dropped significantly in India during 2016-17 to $227 million.On the trade front also, the scenario is similar. India’s imports from China in 2016-17 were estimated at $61 billion, whereas India’s exports to China that year were only $10 billion.China’s total annual exports are estimated at over $2.2 trillion. Thus, export of $61 billion to India account for a small share in China’s total

9See, Sikkim Standoff: India Must Counter Aggressive China, The Indian Express, July 24th 2017, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/doklam-standoff-india-must-counter-aggressive-china-bhutan-sikkim- trijunction/ (Accessed on July 24, 2017) 10See, China to increases Military Spending by 7% in 2017, BBC News, March 4th, 2017, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-39165080 (Accessed on July 22, 2017) 11See, Defense Budget up by 6 per cent to Rs 2.74 lakh crore in 2017-18 from Rs 2.58 lakh crore last year, The Economic Times, February 2nd, 2017, available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/defence- budget-up-by-6-per-cent-to-rs-2-74-lakh-crore-in-2017-18-from-rs-2-58-lakh-crore-last- year/articleshow/56909480.cms (Accessed on July 22, 2017)

International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology Vol. 29, No. 3, (2020), pp. 15287 - 15292 exports.12In short, India is a booming economy for sure and it holds the promise of a big market for China, but that promise is yet to be fulfilled.

Conclusion: The Doklam standoff came to an end on August 28th, 2017 after seventy days of intense tensions during which the troops of India and China held their positions in what India describes as “no war, no peace” mode. The troops of the two countries stood merely 150 metres from one another.13India issued a brief statement on August 28th, 2017 that it had reached an understanding with Beijing following diplomatic communications and agreed to an “expeditious disengagement” along the border, pulling troops.The move came days before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi travelled to China to attend the BRICS summit which was held from September 3rd to 5th, 2017. During the height of standoff, the psychological war and rhetoric between the two countries was visible with the official Chinese media and think tanks warning India that conflict can lead to war if not handled properly. In New Delhi the rhetoric was similarly tough. For instance, Defense Minister Arun Jaitley replied that “India of 2017 is different from India of 1962.”Likewise, General Bipin Rawat, India’s chief of army staff said that theIndian Army is fully ready for a two and a half front warand that India is prepared for security threats posed China and Pakistan.14India was able to isolate China and garner international support in this crisis by highlighting the bullying tactics used by China towards its small neighbouring country like Bhutan. The USA, the UK and Japan openly threw their weight behind India.15For India, the Doklam standoff is a reminder that China will continue to meddle along the borders especially where Indian position is not so strong. Army Chief General Bipin Rawat has already said that the Indian forces should remain prepared to deal with an “increase” in Doklam-like incidents.India has shown that it cannot be bullied and pressurised by China. Despite China’s hyperbole to please its domestic audience, India showed that it can stand against the face of adversary. However,both the neighbouring countries showed their maturity in dealing with the issue by indulging themselves in peaceful and meaningful dialogues and settling down the border dispute. The credit should be given to both the neighbouring countries for maintaining peace and tranquility and resolving the issue by not even firing a single shot of bullet.It’s not clear who blink first in this intense border standoff. The Chinese newspaper, Global Times was quick to report on August 30th, 2017 that the Indian troops withdrew their troops and by doing so, India had admitted that China has sovereignty and the actual control over the

12See, Sikkim Standoff: China’s Economic Stakes in India are No Worry for China, Business Standard, July 14th 2017, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/sikkim-standoff-china-s- economic-stakes-in-india-is-no-worry-for-beijing-117071300210_1.html (Accessed on July 14, 2017) 13See, 70 Days of Doklam Standoff: What it Signifies for India, China and Neighbourhood, India Today, August 28th, 2017, available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/doklam-standoff-india-china-border-dispute-indian- army-pla/1/1035815.html (Accessed on November 15, 2017) 14See, Learn From ‘Historical Lessons’, China Warns India as Army Chief Bipin Rawat Says ‘Ready For War’, The Indian Express, June 29th, 2017, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/china-india-army-chief- bipin-rawat-war-border-sikkim-donglong-4727944/ (Accessed on June 30, 2017) 15See, Doklam Standoff: Did China not Expect an Aggressive and Bellicose Response From India, India Today, September 1st, 2017, available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/doklam-chinese-media-india-aggressive- narendra-modi-xi-jinping/1/1038817.html (Accessed on November 15, 2017)

International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology Vol. 29, No. 3, (2020), pp. 15287 - 15292

Doklam area. The newspaper also reported that China has made it clear that its border troops will continue with their patrols in the area.Still, the damage done over the course of the crises at Doklam particularly to bilateral agreements and understandings will have important spillover effects over the years.The silver lining is that despite China’s insistence that India withdraw before diplomacy could take effect, the “disengagement” itself was the result of hard-fought negotiation. The mutually agreed sequential was no doubt a positive reduction in the temperature at Doklam, but it remain unclear what concessions either side may be willing to offer to reach a more comprehensive agreement to put an end to the stand-off once and for all.16

References: [1]. 70 Days of Doklam Standoff: What it Signifies for India, China and Neighbourhood, India Today, August 28th, 2017, available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/doklam-standoff-india-china-border-dispute-indian-army- pla/1/1035815.html [2]. Anglo-Chinese Conventions of 1890 and 1893, available at http://indpaedia.com/ind/index.php/Anglo- Chinese_Conventions_of_1890_and_1893#REGULATIONS_REGARDING_TRADE.2C_COMMUNICATION_AND _PASTURAGE.2C_TO_BE_APPENDED_TO_THE_CONVENTION_BETWEEN_GREAT_BRITAIN_AND_CHINA _OF_MARCH_17.2C_1890.2C_RELATING_TO_SIKKIM_AND_TIBET [3]. Border Manoeuvres, Frontline, Issue-15, Volume-34, Issue Date: 04-08-2017, available at http://www.frontline.in/cover- story/border-manoeuvres/article9774377.ece?homepage=true [4]. Border Manoeuvres, Frontline, Issue-15, Volume-34, Issue Date: 04-08-2017, available athttp://www.frontline.in/cover- story/border-manoeuvres/article9774377.ece?homepage=true [5]. China to increases Military Spending by 7% in 2017, BBC News, March 4th, 2017, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-39165080 [6]. China’s Perception of India’s ‘Look East Policy’ and Its Implications, available at https://idsa.in/system/files/monograph26.pdf [7]. Defense Budget up by 6 per cent to Rs 2.74 lakh crore in 2017-18 from Rs 2.58 lakh crore last year, The Economic Times, February 2nd, 2017, available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/defence-budget-up-by-6-percent-to-rs-2-74-lakh-crore-in-2017-18-from-rs-2-58-lakh-crore-last-year/articleshow/56909480.cms [8]. Dispatch from Doklam: Indians Dig in for Long Haul in Standoff with China, South China Morning Post, 24th July, 2017, available at http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2103881/dispatch-doklam-indians-dig-long-haul- standoff-china. [9]. Doklam Standoff: Did China not Expect an Aggressive and Bellicose Response From India, India Today, September 1st, 2017, available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/doklam-chinese-media-india-aggressive-narendra-modi-xi- jinping/1/1038817.html [10]. Learn From ‘Historical Lessons’, China Warns India as Army Chief Bipin Rawat Says ‘Ready For War’, The Indian Express, June 29th, 2017, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/china-india-army-chief-bipin-rawat-war- border-sikkim-donglong-4727944/ [11]. Sikkim Standoff: China’s Economic Stakes in India are No Worry for China, Business Standard, July 14th 2017, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/sikkim-standoff-china-s-economic-stakes-in- india-is-no-worry-for-beijing-117071300210_1.html [12]. Sikkim Standoff: India Must Counter Aggressive China, The Indian Express, July 24th 2017, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/doklam-standoff-india-must-counter-aggressive-china-bhutan-sikkim- trijunction/ [13]. Simply Put: Where Things Stand on the Dolam Plateau, The Indian Express, July 24th, 2017, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-china-standoff-sikkim-doka-la-simply-put-where-things-stand-on-the- dolam-plateau-4763892/ [14]. The Doklam Standoff Between India and China Is Far From Over, The Diplomat, October 22nd, 2017, available at https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-doklam-standoff-between-india-and-china-is-far-from-over/

16See, The Doklam Standoff Between India and China Is Far From Over, The Diplomat, October 22nd, 2017, available at https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-doklam-standoff-between-india-and-china-is-far-from-over/ (Accessed on November 14, 2017)