MIAMI SHOWBAND MASSACRE
INFILTRATION OF ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT
(INFORMATION FOUND IN DE-CLASSIFIED BRITISH GOVERNMENT PAPERS AT THE BRITISH NATIONAL ARCHIVES, KEW, LONDON)
Despite strenuous and repeated denials after the Miami Showband murders, the British authorities at a senior level knew, from at least August 1973, that the UDR was heavily infiltrated by loyalist paramilitaries1.
A 20-page document “Subversion in the UDR” of that date records: a. That between 5% and 15% of UDR members have paramilitary links with “widespread” joint membership of the UDA b. Some soldiers are “undoubtedly” living “double lives” c. That the UDR is the single “best” source of loyalist weapons and the “only significant source” of modern weapons d. That the primary loyalty of many of its members was to “Ulster” rather than the British government e. There is a self-confessed dearth of British and RUC intelligence on UDR-loyalist links f. That in many areas UDR commanders consider dual membership normal.
In the immediate aftermath of the Miami killings, however, in a telegram to the British ambassador in Dublin, an NIO official angrily refuted any claim of UDR involvement in the attack, saying this was “entirely without foundation” and had been “rightly repudiated”.
The same official suggested surplus military uniforms were easily procured and this “should be pointed out to the Irish” to explain why some of the Miami attackers wore UDR uniforms. (In fact, a serving member of the UDR, Thomas Raymond Crozier, was already in custody and was charged with the murders the day after the official rebuked Dublin)
Five days later, in a letter to an official at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, an NIO civil servant said he had informed the Irish ambassador to London that a man charged with the murders [Crozier] was a serving member of the UDR. The NIO official said this was unfortunate but there was always the risk of a “bad hat” in any large organisation.
On 24th August, in a replica of the Miami Showband attack, and less than a month after the Miami attack, two young men returning home from the All-Ireland Football Semi-Final in Croke Park were stopped at an apparent, but bogus, UDR checkpoint and murdered at Altnamaken, Co. Armagh.
Rather than focus on concerns about loyalist subversion of the UDR, the then Northern Secretary, Merlyn Rees, in a memo to the British Prime Minister, complained that the SDLP was concentrating “on the two incidents of unofficial Vehicle Checkpoints (VCPs) with possible UDR involvement in order to attack the reliability of the UDR and the RUC Reserve”.2
A month after the Miami attack, on 10 September 1975, the then British prime minister, Harold Wilson, met the leader of the opposition, Margaret Thatcher. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees and Airey Neave also attended the meeting. MIAMI/UDR COLLUSION/PAGE 2
In a report of that meeting, a Downing Street official writes “Mrs. Thatcher was informed that they were very worried by the current sectarian murders and that, unfortunately, there were elements in the RUC who were very close to the UVF”.
The report goes on to report that “The Army’s judgment was that the UDR was heavily infiltrated ‘by extremist Protestants’ and in a crisis situation they could not be relied upon to be loyal”.3
The British side were also aware of a sympathy notice for UVF men Harris Boyle and Wesley Somerville placed in the UVF magazine, “Combat” on behalf of UDR members. A British official, however, informed the Irish side at a meeting that they had already investigated this and that there was no reason to believe it was genuinely from UDR members.
A margin note, however, contradicts this by revealing the Combat notice is being treated seriously: ”We must look into this”.4
The SDLP at the time was repeatedly raising concerns about sectarian bias in the UDR and that Catholics had as much to fear from genuine checkpoints mounted by the regiment as bogus ones.5
CONCLUSION
It is crystal clear from these communications that London was fully aware of wholesale loyalist infiltration of the UDR but was continuing to deny any concern to Dublin and the SDLP.
In the briefing given to Margaret Thatcher, six weeks after the Miami murders, British prime minister, Harold Wilson, says unambiguously that the UDR was a force out of control and there were also serious concerns about the RUC Reserve.
It is obvious that, both before and after the Miami and Altnamacken attacks, the Irish government, at both ministerial and diplomatic levels, was also repeatedly raising its concerns, but the pleas fell on deaf ears.
As time passed, rather than stand the regiment down, or even carry out a review of subversion, the UDR’s role grew, even to the point of developing an intelligence role and deploying it into sensitive areas such as South Armagh.
NOTE: The above is a very limited number of excerpts from dozens of documents retrieved at the National Archives in London showing the detailed knowledge London had about UDR subversion and loyalist links in membership and arms procurement. 1 “Subversion in the UDR” (Aug 1973) – Scan of original document available on PFC website, www.patfinucanecentre.org under “Collusion” heading 2 PREM16/520 3 PREM16/520 4 FCO87/423 5 PREM16/520