(CUWS) Outreach Journal #1187

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies

(CUWS) Outreach Journal CUWS Outreach Journal 1185 16 October 2015

Feature Item: “North Korea: Development of Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Continues”. Authored by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.; published by 38 North.org, 14 October 2015. http://38north.org/2015/10/jbermudez101415/ Commercial satellite imagery indicates that North Korea is continuing the development of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) at the Sinpo South Shipyard, including planning for a test of the vertical launch tube intended to fire the weapon. These developments may account for a CNN report on October 9—the eve of the 70th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK)— that US officials believed the DPRK might conduct an SLBM test soon.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons 1. Y-12 Uranium Project Could Cost up to $76.7M 2. US Air Force Orders New Tail Kits for B61 Nuclear Gravity Bombs - Boeing 3. W80-4: Sandia California Works On Nuclear Weapon Life Extension Program

U.S. Counter-WMD 1. Russia Calls on US to Abandon Plans to Place Missile Defense in Romania

U.S. Arms Control 1. NATO’s "Joint Nuclear Missions" Violate Non-Proliferation Regime — Diplomat 2. US 'Prompt Global Strike' Most Serious Obstacle in Reducing Nukes - Moscow 3. Russia Urges US to Abandon ‘Megaphone Diplomacy’ in Disarmament Issues

Asia/Pacific 1. North Korea Shows Off ‘Long Range’ Nukes, but Experts Divided over Authenticity of Claim 2. Kim Jong-un Mentions “People” 90 Times, “Nuclear” Not Once 3. DPRK Not yet Able to Fit Nuke Warhead atop Ballistic Missile: Seoul 4. Air Force Now Able to Launch Long-Range, Precision Strikes 5. China Expanding Regional Nuclear Forces 6. N. Korea Preparing to Test Launch Tube Used in SLBM: 38 North 7. S. Korea, U.S. Capable of Countering N. Korea's SLBMs: U.S. Navy Chief

Europe/Russia 1. Trident: MPs Could Vote on Nuclear Weapons Before Christmas 2. Almost Half of Russians Don't Believe in External Threat — Opinion Poll

India/Pakistan 1. India's Indigenous Nuclear Submarine Arihant to Undergo Missile Firing Tests 2. U.S., Pakistan Discuss Nuclear Weapons Program

Commentary 1. Dodge: Russian Bear Growls at U.S. Nukes 2. The Nuclear Verification Technology that Could Change the Game 3. America's Russian Nuke Obsession 4. Don’t Fear the Dirty Bomb

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The Washington Times – Washington, D.C. Y-12 Uranium Project Could Cost up to $76.7M By Associated Press (AP) Tuesday, October 13, 2015 OAK RIDGE, Tenn. (AP) - Federal overseers have given preliminary approval for a new uranium purification facility at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Oak Ridge, with a price range between $58.6 million and $76.7 million. The Knoxville News Sentinel reports that, according to newly released information by staff of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the "electrorefining" project is scheduled to come online in the summer of 2021. The project is supposed to replace a similar capability in the plant's 70-year- old 9212 uranium complex, which the government wants to vacate as soon as possible.

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The electrorefining technology will be used to purify uranium metal, which is an essential part of the enriched uranium operations at the nuclear weapons plant. The work will be done in a building inside Y-12's high-security Protected Area. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/13/y-12-uranium-project-could-cost-up-to- 767m/ Return to Top

Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency US Air Force Orders New Tail Kits for B61 Nuclear Gravity Bombs - Boeing The Boeing Defense, Space and Security Missile and Unmanned Airborne Systems (BDS) unit in St. Louis, Missouri, has won an $11.8 million modification to a previous contract to manufacture tail kit assemblies for B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs, the company said in a release. 14 October 2015 WASHINGTON (Sputnik) — The B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb is believed to feature improved strike capability, including increased accuracy and combined strategic and tactical capabilities. "[BDS] will provide additional test assets, materials and hardware to enable the demonstration of the reliability of the B61-12 tail kit assembly," Boeing stated in the release on Tuesday. The B61 is a variable yield device, blurring the lines between so-called tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. The power of the weapon can be adjusted for use as a small-scale battlefield nuclear bomb, or set to detonate at over 300 megatons. The Boeing Defense, Space and Security Missile and Unmanned Airborne Systems is a $31 billion business that has approximately 53,000 employees worldwide, according to the company’s website. Work on the modified contract will be performed at Boeing's St. Louis, Missouri facility, and is expected to be completed by July 31, 2017, according to the statement. http://sputniknews.com/military/20151014/1028488552/B61-Nuclear-Gravity-Bomb.html Return to Top

Los Alamos Daily Post – Los Alamos, NM W80-4: Sandia California Works On Nuclear Weapon Life Extension Program Submitted by Carol A. Clark October 15, 2015 ALBUQUERQUE — Sandia National Laboratories is doing what it hasn’t done in decades: extending the life of a nuclear warhead at the same time the U.S. Air Force develops a replacement cruise missile that will carry the weapon. The goal of the W80-4 Life Extension Program (LEP) is refurbishing the W80 warhead with replacement components for aging technology and components that have limited lifespans. Sandia’s California site is responsible for development of non-nuclear components and subsystems and for

Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama systems integration. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is responsible for the refurbishment of the nuclear explosive package and joint development of detonators with safety features. “The LEP will update the interface between the warhead and the missile to meet current Air Force standards and requirements, assuring nuclear safety and security,” said Paul Spence, who joined the program in February as manager of the W80-4 Systems Integration department. The W80-4 LEP builds on programs that began more than a decade ago. The W80-4 LEP is moving from the concept phase, which includes system architecture development, mechanical layout and preliminary component design, to the feasibility study phase, which includes more detailed design work, maturing component technologies and fabricating prototype hardware. The feasibility study phase, officially known as Phase 6.2, was approved July 23 by the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). A life extension program refurbishes aging components that are reaching the end of their service life. Scientists and engineers make decisions to reuse, remanufacture or redesign weapons components. A reused component is requalified to go back into a weapon without change. A component that’s determined to be past its original life is remanufactured to the original specifications. However, if some components can’t be remade to those specifications because the parts aren’t available anymore, Sandia redesigns them using modern parts. In August 2014, the NWC, which coordinates stockpile activities for the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear Security Administration, chose the W80-4 as the warhead for the Long Range Stand Off missile, the Air Force’s successor to the current Air Launched Cruise Missile. “Developing both at the same time requires a lot of cooperation and coordination between Sandia and the Air Force,” Spence said. The last time a missile and warhead were developed and fielded concurrently was in the late 1980s with the W87 and W88 and the ballistic missiles on which they are carried. Based on the president’s budget request, the W80-4 LEP budget would increase in fiscal year 2016. The systems integration element of the program expects staffing to increase next year and again the following year, which Spence said requires accelerated hiring in multiple fields from engineering to computer modeling and simulation. “We will develop the next generation of weapon scientists and engineers and give them hands-on experience in a system development and integration program,” he said. Teams, shared resources necessary to succeed After nuclear testing ended in 1992, the U.S. began extending the life of existing warheads rather than developing new ones for the stockpile. Because many of those on the W80-4 team have been at Sandia for less than a decade, they are working with more experienced staff on the warhead program. The program also is taking advantage of experience gained in other ongoing life extension programs at Sandia. The W80-4 LEP requires Sandia to coordinate development work with the B61-12 LEP, the W88 ALT (Alteration) 370 and the Mark 21 Fuze Replacement programs. The four programs will share the labs’ resources, everything from microchip fabrication at the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications complex to computational simulations to large-scale testing at Sandia’s major environmental test facilities. Originally, the W80-4 program was to begin producing weapons for the stockpile in 2027, but this year that milestone was moved up to 2025. “The schedule has been compressed and we have less time to do the development work we need to do, so that’s also going to be a challenge we will meet,” Spence said. Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies

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The W80-4 LEP is likely to become the largest weapons system development and integration effort at the California site in two decades. The W80 was originally developed by Los Alamos and Sandia, with the first units fielded in 1982. “It’s exciting to have the program in the Livermore Valley. It’s important … to collaborate closely with Lawrence Livermore and production agencies like the National Security Campus in Kansas City,” Spence said. “Sandia will also work with Pantex, Savannah River [Site] and others. There will be lots of interactions to build on and grow.” http://www.ladailypost.com/content/w80-4-sandia-california-works-nuclear-weapon-life- extension-program Return to Top

Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency Russia Calls on US to Abandon Plans to Place Missile Defense in Romania Moscow calls for abandoning of plans to place US missile defense systems in Romania, the director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department of Non-proliferation, Disarmament, and Arms Control said, as quoted by the ministerial website Monday. 12 October 2015 MOSCOW (Sputnik) — According to Mikhail Ulyanov, placing the systems in Romania would be a flagrant violation by the United States of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty. According to the official, target missiles and attack drones, which could be used for launching cruise missiles of intermediate range, could be placed on Navy ships, but not on land. "We are calling on the United States and Romania to understand their full responsibility for the development of these events, and abandon these plans while it’s not too late," Ulyanov said, as quoted by the ministerial website. Romanian Defense Minister Mircea Dusa said in May that the elements of the NATO missile shield in Europe would be deployed at a military base in Deveselu, Romania, by the end of 2015. Romania, a NATO member since 2004, is among several Eastern European nations seeking greater US presence in missile technology and expanded military exercises. The United States and Russia signed the INF Treaty in 1987 to eliminate the threat of nuclear missiles capable of striking targets on the European continent. Russia has repeatedly expressed concerns over NATO's military buildup along its western borders, warning that the alliance's expansion undermines regional and global security. http://sputniknews.com/politics/20151012/1028418726/us-should-abandon-missile-defense- romania.html Return to Top

Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia NATO’s "Joint Nuclear Missions" Violate Non-Proliferation Regime — Diplomat The Russian diplomat noted that the United States was going to modernize its nuclear warheads deployed in Europe soon October 12, 2015 MOSCOW, October 12. /TASS/. NATO’s "joint nuclear missions" contradict the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT), a Russian diplomat said on Monday. "Despite an agreement reached on Iran’s nuclear programme, serious challenges remain in the nuclear non-proliferation sphere," Mikhail Ulyanov, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry department for non-proliferation and arms control, said at the general political discussion held in the first committee of the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly. "Apart from the Korean peninsula’s nuclear problem, special attention should be paid to the ongoing practice of NATO member states to carry out ‘joint nuclear missions’ in violation of clauses I and II of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). In all signs, both nuclear and non-nuclear NATO countries are building up cooperation in this sphere," Ulyanov, who is leading the Russian delegation to the UN General Assembly session, went on to say. The Russian diplomat noted that the United States was going to modernize its nuclear warheads deployed in Europe soon while the European countries in the territories of which the warheads have been deployed were planning to renovate the fleet of aviation means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the near future. "It means that NATO’s violation of its non-proliferation commitments is going to be infinite," Ulyanov added. "Despite official U.S. statements that the removal of the so-called Iran’s nuclear threat will eliminate all imperative motives behind the deployment of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe, the European Missile Defense project is being implemented at the previous pace," Ulyanov said adding that a thesis on preservation of some "nuclear threats", which made it impossible to turn away from the previously adopted anti-missile plans, had been brought into play. "It should be noted that an adaptive approach to the creation of the missile defense system, if it can really be called this way, consists in adapting the arguments in favour of the project rather than its parameters," the Russian diplomat stressed. Moscow certain time is ripe for arms control UN GA declaration Russia is for the adoption of a special declaration of the UN General Assembly session on arms control and disarmament, the director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s non-proliferation and arms control department, Mikhail Ulyanov, said in the course of the general political debate at the first committee of the 70th UN General Assembly session in New York. The text of his statement was published on the Russian Foreign Ministry’s website. "We believe that at a time when the entire complex of arms control and disarmament agreements may be in jeopardy it is necessary to pay special attention to the task of strengthening global strategic stability as a cornerstone of international security and major prerequisite for arms reductions," Ulyanov said. "We are certain that time is ripe for adopting a special declaration of the UN General Assembly session on that score. Russia has proposed a corresponding draft document."

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The Russian delegation is going to hold intensive consultations with all parties concerned on that score on the sidelines of the current session of the first committee, he added. http://tass.ru/en/politics/828128 Return to Top

Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency US 'Prompt Global Strike' Most Serious Obstacle in Reducing Nukes - Moscow The conviction of the United States to fulfill its conception of the “Prompt Global Strike” to use ordinary high-precision long-distance arms to solve its strategic goals is an obstacle in reducing nuclear weapons arsenals, the director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department of Non- proliferation, Disarmament, and Arms Control said Monday. 12 October 2015 UNITED NATIONS (Sputnik) – The US Prompt Global Strike system allows Washington to carry out high-precision non-nuclear attacks using hypersonic weapons from US territory at targets throughout the world within about an hour after launch. In late 2014, a hypersonic weapon the United States was testing exploded several seconds after being launched. “It is the policy of the United States that is the most serious obstacle in the further reduction in nuclear arms. This is because of their persistent implementation of their line objectively rocking global strategic stability through the unilateral creation of a global system of anti-missile defense that gradually complements the conception of a Prompt Global Strike, which hampers the beginning of negotiations on the prohibition of placing weapons in space and lack of any type of progress in ratifying the LTBT [Limited Test Ban Treaty],” Mikhail Ulyanov said at a non-proliferation conference in New York. Moscow warned the United States that it could levy a nuclear response if threatened by US conventional forces, such as the Prompt Global Strike program. In September 2014, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that Russia was likely to develop its own prompt global strike capability, but would adhere to a defensive doctrine in the development of strategic weaponry. http://sputniknews.com/us/20151012/1028398801/us-prompt-global-strike-nukes.html Return to Top

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia Russia Urges US to Abandon ‘Megaphone Diplomacy’ in Disarmament Issues The diplomat rejected Washington’s accusations that Russia is allegedly violating the INF treaty October 13, 2015 UNITED NATIONS, October 13. /TASS/. Moscow urges the US to abandon its "megaphone diplomacy" and start solving all the issues linked to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

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The Japan Times – Tokyo, Japan North Korea Shows Off ‘Long Range’ Nukes, but Experts Divided over Authenticity of Claim Agence France-Presse (AFP)-JIJI Sunday, October 11, 2015 SEOUL – North Korea on Saturday showed off what it said were long-range ballistic missiles carrying miniaturized nuclear warheads, its latest claim to the sophisticated technology, but analysts remain divided over whether Pyongyang had mastered the process. Rows of the intercontinental ballistic missiles known as KN-08, which some think could fly far enough to reach the continental U.S., were paraded through the capital as part of a massive military parade marking the 70th anniversary of the ruling Workers Party. A defense analyst in Seoul said the new missile appeared to have been modified to allow it to be fitted with a miniature nuclear warhead — a claim echoed by North Korea’s state TV — but others experts said it was impossible to tell. North Korea has long claimed it has technology capable of launching nuclear bombs at its distant enemies, but experts are skeptical whether the impoverished country has acquired the sophisticated technology needed to produce such weapons. “With the vengeful desire to turn the citadel of our enemies into a sea of fire, our powerful tactical rockets loaded with diversified and miniaturized nuclear warheads are on the move,” the commentator said, as rows of missiles were shown on screen. Leader Kim Jong Un on Saturday told crowds assembled for the parade that the country’s armed forces “are capable of fighting any kind of war provoked by the U.S. and we are ready to protect our people and the blue sky of our motherland.” Lee Il-woo, a defense analyst at Korea Defense Network, said the new version of the KN-08 — which has an estimated range of up to 12,000 kilometers (7,500 miles) — had a more rounded end than the version unveiled in 2012. “This means North Korea might have successfully developed technology to minimize nuclear warheads and fit them on top of missiles,” he said. But another analyst, Chae Yeon-seok at the Korea Aerospace Research Institute, cautioned that the missiles might be mock-ups. “You never know what is inside by just looking at them. It has never been verified that North Korea has developed any nuclear-tipped ICBMs,” he said, using the shorthand for intercontinental ballistic missile. Seoul’s Yonhap news agency, quoting military sources, also said it remains unclear whether the warheads on display might be ordinary explosives or nuclear devices. “Its cone has a different shape now. We need further analysis to determine whether it is filled with ordinary high explosives or a nuclear warhead,” the military official said. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/11/asia-pacific/north-korea-shows-off-long-range- nukes-experts-divided-authenticity-claim/#.Vh62z1OFNDx Return to Top Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama

The Hankyoreh – Seoul, South Korea Kim Jong-un Mentions “People” 90 Times, “Nuclear” Not Once North Korean leader apparently seeking to usher in his own era under the slogan of “people first” By Kim Ji-hoon, staff reporter October 12, 2015 North Korean leader Kim Jong-un sounded a “people first” message in his speech at a military parade to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the foundation of the Korean Workers‘ Party, using the Korean term for “the people” ninety times in his remarks. In contrast, he avoided any mention of the word for “nuclear,” in what appeared to be a gesture of concern for improving Pyongyang’s foreign relations. The speech was read overall as a sign of Kim’s commitment to ushering an era of his own with “people first” as a governing philosophy. The South Korean Ministry of Unification issued a “General Assessment of the North Korean Workers’ Party Seventieth Anniversary Military Parade” on Oct. 11, noting that Kim had “emphasized the Workers’ Party ‘people first philosophy’ and dedicated the majority of his remarks to emphasizing his love for the people.” The report also said Kim had “emphasized valuing the people, the military, and the young.” The speech began with an expression of “deepest thanks to the people” and ended with an appeal for “all of us to serve selflessly for the great people of this country.” “His implication was that if [grandfather] Kim Il-sung’s era was ‘party first’ and [father] Kim Jong- il’s era was ‘military first,’ then he plans to adopt ‘people first’ as a governing philosophy for the Kim Jong-un era,” said University of North Korean Studies professor Yang Moo-jin. “He’s signaling that he is going to make improving the people‘s lives the country’s supreme goal,” Yang added. Kim also avoided using the word for “nuclear” anywhere in his remarks, despite the occasion being a military parade. Notably, he substituted the term “developing the economy and national defense together” for a previous message calling for “developing nuclear capabilities and the economy together” -- a change that could be motivated by hopes of improving ties with Beijing. The absence of any particular mention of inter-Korean relations in Kim’s speech was taken as a sign that he hopes to carry forward the momentum from a agreement reached with Seoul on August 25. By omitting any specific mention of the South, Kim was picking up where he left off with remarks about the agreement during an extended meeting of the Workers’ Party central military commission on Aug. 28, analysts said. “We need to turn a disaster into a blessing by valuing this agreement and cultivating it to bear rich fruit,” Kim said at the time. Kim denounced Washington in relatively mild terms during the speech, saying North Korea “can face any war of any kind that the American empire desires.” “A spokesperson for North Korea’s Foreign Ministry made a formal proposal on Oct. 7 to sign a peace agreement with the US, so we may end up seeing Pyongyang working next to improve relations with Washington if things improve with Beijing and Seoul,” said Kim Keun-sik, a professor of political science and international relations at Kyungnam University.

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No notable changes were observed in the senior-level representation in the parade’s VIP section. Kim’s younger sister Yo-jong was briefly seen behind the section, suggesting that she is a major player in the regime despite her relatively low status as deputy director of the Worker’s Party propaganda and agitation department. General political bureau director Kim Yong-chol also appeared in the VIP section, showing that he is still in good standing after previous rumors that he was disciplined in connection with an Aug. 4 landmine explosion in the Demilitarized Zone. Experts were divided on the estimated cost of the parade preparations. Cho Bong-hyun, a senior researcher at the IBK Economic Research Institute, estimated the cost at “one to two trillion won (US$87 million-1.74 billion), or about one-third of North Korea’s yearly budget.” In contrast, Kim Keun-sik said the “net costs of the parade after subtracting missile development and construction expenses would have been on the order of a few tens of billions of won.” http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/712410.html Return to Top

Xinhua News – Beijing, China DPRK Not yet Able to Fit Nuke Warhead atop Ballistic Missile: Seoul (Xinhua) October 12, 2015 SEOUL, Oct. 12 (Xinhua) -- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has yet to reach a technology to fit nuclear warheads atop ballistic missiles, South Korea's Defense Ministry said Monday. Deputy defense ministry spokesman Col. Na Seung-yong told a press briefing that the DPRK is estimated to have reached a considerable level in technology of miniaturizing nuclear warheads. Na, however, noted that it would be right to say that Pyongyang hasn't reached the level capable of mounting nuclear warheads on top of ballistic missiles. During its massed military parade in Pyongyang Saturday to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of ruling Workers' Party of Korea, the DPRK disclosed what it claimed were tactical rockets with a rounded tip "loaded with diversified and miniaturized nuclear warheads." The deputy spokesman said it was not a conclusion as South Korea and the United States are currently analyzing whether those rockets, called KN-08s, are capable of carrying atomic bombs. The DPRK also showcased 300-mm multiple rocket launchers during the parade mobilizing the largest number of military officers and party officials as well as DPRK people. Na said that the launchers were estimated to have a range of 140 km that cannot reach the Gyeryongdae military complex in the country's South Chungcheong Province, but he added the range could be extended in the future as seen in most of other weapons. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-10/12/c_134705107.htm Return to Top

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The Washington Free Beacon – Washington, D.C. China Expanding Regional Nuclear Forces New cruise, ballistic missiles increase danger of war, report says By Bill Gertz October 14, 2015 China is developing a nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile as part of a military buildup of both its regional and long-range nuclear forces, according to a forthcoming congressional commission report. The latest publicly available draft of the annual report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission presents a dire picture of advancing Chinese military capabilities and declining relations with the United States. “U.S.-China security relations continued to deteriorate in 2015,” the report concludes. “China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and its unremitting cyber espionage against the United States were the key drivers of growing distrust.” The military buildup of high-tech weapons “makes clear that China seeks the capability to limit the U.S. military’s freedom of movement in the Western Pacific,” the report says. On the regional nuclear buildup, the report says “China appears to be pursuing a theater nuclear capability in addition to the strategic nuclear capability it has maintained since it became a nuclear state in the 1960s.” The growth in regional nuclear forces poses new dangers for a future conflict in the increasingly volatile Asia Pacific region, a zone where China added to destabilization through disputed maritime claims while seeking to drive U.S. forces out of the region. “In a conflict, China’s maturing theater nuclear capability could provide it with the means to flexibly employ nuclear weapons to deescalate or otherwise shape the direction of conflict,” the report said. Additionally, the commission report warns that the U.S. government’s passive approach to “massive” Chinese cyber attacks is likely to encourage further damaging cyber strikes on both government and private computer networks. “The United States has relied on a passive defense, and the U.S. government has failed to create an overall strategy to counter the increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks on some of its most valuable technology,” the report said. Among its recommendations, the report calls for Congress to pass laws allowing U.S. companies to conduct counter cyber attacks to punish Chinese and other cyber foes by stealing back or destroying stolen data or using cyber attacks to damage hackers and their gear. U.S. law currently prohibits such counterattacks. China’s high-technology military buildup also includes an array of space weaponry that indicates Beijing is preparing for space warfare against U.S. satellites in a future conflict, according to the report. A copy of the draft report was obtained by the Washington Free Beacon from the commission staff. The final report could change from the draft and will be released formally next month, a spokesman said. Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The report said that in the three years since coming to power, Chinese supreme leaders Xi Jinping made significant progress in consolidating power, including a purge in the military ostensibly aimed at countering corruption that also is part of police power consolidation. China’s space weaponry includes two types of anti-satellite missiles for attacking low-earth and high-earth orbit, small orbiting attack satellites, electronic jammers, lasers, and cyber weapons capable of taking control of satellites. “As China’s developmental counterspace capabilities become operational, China will be able to hold at risk U.S. national security satellites in every orbital regime,” the report states. The annual report for the first time provides a detailed assessment of China’s large-scale nuclear and missile buildup that while remaining small in number is growing increasingly lethal and difficult to counter. Still regarded as a minimal nuclear deterrent of some 250 warheads that would be used only after China is attacked by nuclear arms, the Chinese are developing new cruise and ballistic missiles to target U.S. forces in Asia and other regional states, as well as the continental United States. The commission report also raises new questions about China’s so-called “no-first-use” doctrine of not being the first to use nuclear arms in a conflict. The report says Beijing appears to be reconsidering the doctrine and adopting a “launch-on-warning” system used by the United States and other nuclear powers. That doctrine calls for launching nuclear missiles and bombers before first being attacked. China’s recent military parade marking the 70th anniversary of end of World War II included several new missiles, including the DF-26 intermediate-range missile that can be armed with both nuclear and conventional warheads. “The parade highlighted the pace and sophistication of China’s missile modernization, and signaled to the world China’s seriousness about enhancing both its nuclear and conventional missile capabilities and its ability to hold adversary forces at greater distance and greater risk,” the report says. Regarding the new cruise missile, the report states that China’s military is likely developing a nuclear-armed, air-launched cruise missile called the CJ-20 that will be outfitted on H-6 bombers, each of which can carry six of the missiles. The long-range CJ-20 is a variant of the current DH-10 land-attack cruise missiles that is also nuclear-capable and “enhances the lethality of China’s air-launched cruise missile arsenal,” the report says. The missile sharply increases the range of its missile forces to include the U.S. island of Guam, a major military hub. “A nuclear-capable CJ-20 would indicate China is developing new, air-delivered theater nuclear strike capabilities, in addition to its formidable ballistic missile theater nuclear forces and the strategic nuclear strike capability it has maintained since it became a nuclear state,” the report said. The missile also could be deployed on Chinese ships and submarines allowing it to target U.S. military facilities in Guam, Hawaii, and Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean. China’s anti-ship cruise missile forces also have “advanced significantly,” the report said. “Because there are doubts regarding whether U.S. Navy shipboard systems could reliably and adequately defend against intense salvos of China’s advanced Russian-made and indigenous [anti-

(CUWS) Outreach Journal ship cruise missiles], China’s advancing ASCM technologies are reason for concern,” the report states. A chart in the report lists a total of 12 different cruise missiles, including the CJ-20, with ranges of between 62 miles and 932 miles. “China is developing cruise missiles that are increasingly difficult for the U.S. military to detect and defend against,” the report said. China’s ballistic missile forces also are growing more lethal with the addition of multiple warheads and precision guided warheads. Beijing has 13 different ballistic missiles, both silo-based and road-mobile, with ranges of between 186 miles and 6,959 miles. On China’s maritime disputes in the South China Sea, the report outlines new details of the military buildup on some of the 2,900 acres of islands created by Chinese dredging. “China is building, expanding, and upgrading military and civilian infrastructure on the islands,” the report said. The construction included up to three airstrips, helipads, port facilities, radars, and satellite communication equipment, and antiaircraft and naval guns.” The report said the island-building is part of a military plan the Pentagon calls “anti-access/area- denial” aimed at preventing U.S. forces, a presence of peace and stability for some 60 years, from operating. Chinese military forces on the islands could be used to prevent a U.S. defense of Taiwan, as required under the 1972 Taiwan Relations Act. On Taiwan, the report warned that growing anti-mainland sentiment on the island could lead to the election of a pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party president in January. The military buildup is also taking place on islands in the East China Sea, where China is disputing Japan for control of the Senkaku islands. One new exotic weapon mentioned in the report is the Aviation Industry Corp. of China’s high- altitude hypersonic unmanned aerial vehicle for regional strategic reconnaissance operations. Press reports indicate the drone will travel at up to three times the speed of sound at 95,000 feet. On cyber, a section to be deleted from the final report said: “Evidence of Chinese cyber espionage against U.S. military and civilian government entities illustrates a focused, well resourced, and state-sponsored effort by China to secure an advantage in an evolving strategic competition with the United States. China has the resources and the demonstrated capability to extract sensitive data from U.S. agencies and steal defense technology and other secrets.” A Pentagon report from January 2015 stated that the U.S. defense industry is vulnerable to Chinese cyber attacks noting “significant vulnerabilities on nearly every [Defense Department] acquisition program that underwent cyber security [operational test and evaluation] in [fiscal year] 2014.” http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-expanding-regional-nuclear-forces/ Return to Top

Yonhap News Agency – Seoul, South Korea S. Korea, U.S. Capable of Countering N. Korea's SLBMs: U.S. Navy Chief October 16, 2015 SEOUL, Oct. 16 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the U.S. are capable of detecting and countering North Korea's sea-based ballistic missiles, the U.S. navy chief said Friday, stressing that if the North launches any provocations they will be met with a "proportional" response.

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North Korea is believed to be preparing for another test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile in the near future following its claim of a successful SLBM test in May, according to recent U.S. news reports. Such tests could indicate significant headway in the communist country's nuclear weapons capabilities, particularly sea-based ones that are harder to detect and counter. "I think that's destabilizing capability, but we do have capabilities as well to detect and counter such threats," the Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson told a group of reporters in Seoul. "So in this scenario we would want to enhance our cooperation with South Korea to make sure our posture is well to counter such threats." Richardson is in Seoul as part of a four-nation trip, the first overseas outing since he took office a month earlier. Seoul is the second leg of the trip, following Japan. He will fly to Bahrain on Saturday and then move to Italy before returning home. North Korea's expected SLBM test could be "unpredictable and destabilizing," and the U.S. is ready to respond to the action, the admiral said, declining yet to discuss the timing and other related information of the test. He also stressed if North Korea launches any kinds of provocations "the response would be proportional." The admiral suggested that joint naval exercises between South Korea and Japan would greatly help the trilateral military cooperation also involving the U.S. in deterring North Korean threats. "If we are trying to provide a situation that deters North Korea from provocative types of behaviors, that type of trilateral cooperation provides more responsive options and better deterrence posture." he said. "There are advantages to that type of cooperation," he added, calling for more military collaboration between the two Asian countries entangled in history-related diplomatic tensions. Richardson also indirectly called for South Korea's participation in U.S. patrolling activities in the tension-ridden South China Sea. "The U.S. and South Korea are global nations, we have global interests ... we should act in support of the rules that govern global trade, global prosperity and global maritime traffic," the admiral noted, adding that no one should be surprised that global nations with global trade would be interested in preserving and supporting the international law that allows them as much access as possible. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2015/10/16/14/0301000000AEN2015101600780031 5F.html Return to Top

Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The Telegraph – London, U.K. Trident: MPs Could Vote on Nuclear Weapons Before Christmas Ministers want to settle the question replacing Trident within weeks to stop the SNP turning next year's Holyrood elections into a referendum on the nuclear deterrent By Tim Ross, Senior Political Correspondent 10 October 2015 The future of Britain’s nuclear weapons is set to be decided within weeks as ministers plan to call an early Commons vote on Trident. The government wants the question to be settled “by Christmas” to stop Nicola Sturgeon and Jeremy Corbyn turning next year’s Scottish parliament elections into a referendum on Britain’s nuclear deterrent, senior sources said. Senior figures fear that a divisive debate over national defence would weaken Britain's image abroad at a time of increased threat to national security. A vote in the Commons in December would also expose the deep split on the issue within Labour. The party’s new leader, Mr Corbyn, is certain to oppose replacing the nuclear-armed submarines but many of his shadow Cabinet members and MPs want to maintain the missile system. The vote had been expected by the end of 2016, which would allow enough time for the first of the new submarines to be built before the existing fleet is taken out of service in the late 2020s. However, the critical decision on whether to proceed with replacing Trident now looks likely to be brought forward. The UK's deterrent consists of four Vanguard-class submarines, each capable of carrying up to 16 Trident II D-5 ballistic nuclear missiles. At least one submarine is constantly on patrol, while one undergoes maintenance and the other two carry out manoeuvers. The missiles are capable of hitting a target up to 7,500 miles away. However, the Trident missile system, which was launched in the 1990s as a replacement for the predecessor, Polaris, is due to end its service from 2028. It takes about a decade to build and prepare a new submarine for service. The full, like-for-like replacement of Britain’s nuclear deterrent would cost more than £25 billion and by some estimates up to £100 billion. The parliamentary vote on whether to approve the replacement of all four submarines had been expected to take place in June 2016. But ministers fear that this will make the future of Trident a defining issue at the Edinburgh parliament elections in May. The Scottish National Party leader, Ms Sturgeon, would be likely to campaign against replacing the submarines. Alex Salmond, Ms Sturgeon’s predecessor as Scottish First Minister, has warned that going ahead with a replacement for Trident could trigger a new referendum on independence for Scotland, because so many Scots opposed nuclear weapons. Three separate senior government sources said a vote could take place before Christmas this year, or in January 2016, on the principle of whether to go ahead with a “like for like” replacement. “We want to get this decision soon to stop the SNP turning the Scottish elections into a referendum on Trident,” one government source said. Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies

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Senior Tories are also keen to resolve the question over Trident to prevent damage being done to Britain’s image as a country with a strong commitment to defence.This is seen as especially important at a time when Russian President Vladimir Putin has been aggressive in his recent rhetoric about nuclear strikes and increasingly provocative in launching military interventions in Syria and Ukraine. Last week, Nato allies proposed to re-start nuclear weapons exercises for the first time since the end of the Cold War in order to ensure that Western military commanders are ready for any scenario. “It takes at least 10 years to build and trial a new submarine so we need to get on with the first one fairly soon,” another senior government figure said. “We are not going to lose a vote on Trident. But the Scottish elections in May are a complicating factor. We need to stop Sturgeon spending the whole campaign talking about Trident.” Last week, David Cameron told the Conservative conference in Manchester that his government wanted to go ahead and order a replacement nuclear missile system as an essential part of Britain’s defences. Mr Corbyn’s Labour party may choose to allow his MPs a “free vote” to avoid a damaging rebellion against the leader’s anti-nuclear stance. The crucial vote would be on the headline, or “main-gate” decision on whether to proceed. A vote in favour would authorise ministers to negotiate the best deal for replacing the submarines from military manufacturers. The submarines would then be ordered and built individually, and in stages, to ensure that the overall bill is kept as low as possible. Before the vote can take place, however, the government must conclude the Strategic Defence and Security Review, which examines the threats facing Britain and defence planning and funding for the years ahead. Trident will be part of this review, which is expected soon after the Chancellor delivers his Autumn Statement on November 25. A vote on Trident could then take place at some point before December 17, when the Commons breaks for Christmas. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11924500/Trident-MPs-could-vote-on- nuclear-weapons-before-Christmas.html Return to Top

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia Almost Half of Russians Don't Believe in External Threat — Opinion Poll The share of people who believe that an external threat exists has grown by 14% since 1990 October 16, 2015 MOSCOW, October 16. /TASS-DEFENSE/. About a third of Russians consider Russia’s army as the world’s most combat-ready, according to the results of a poll published by the all-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) on Friday.

Mehr News Agency – Tehran, Iran Iran Test-Fires New Long-Range Ballistic Missile Sunday, 11 October 2015 TEHRAN, Oct. 11 (MNA) – Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan says the country has successfully test-fired a new long-range ballistic missile, dubbed “Emad ”. “The Emad missile, which was designed and made domestically by our scientists in Iran, is the first long- range missile of the Islamic Republic of Iran that can be controlled and directed until the last moment of hitting its targets,” Dehghan told reporters on Sunday. He underlined that the missile is capable of striking targets with great precision. “We do not need permission from anyone to boost our military and missile capabilities. We will decisively follow our defense program objectives and expand our missile capabilities. Emad missile is a result of our persistence,” he said. General Dehghan marked this event as a great technological advancement in Iran’s military capabilities. http://en.mehrnews.com/news/110895/Iran-test-fires-new-long-range-ballistic-missile Return to Top

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FARS News Agency – Tehran, Iran Monday, October 12, 2015 Deputy Commander Says IRGC Will Chase US Troops Even to Gulf of Mexico In Case of Attack TEHRAN (FNA) - Lieutenant Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Navy General Alireza Tangsiri warned the enemies against any aggressive move, and said the IRGC forces will chase the US troops even to the Gulf of Mexico if they ever make a mistake and take a hostile move against Iran. "I declare now that if the enemy wants to spark a war against Iran, we will chase them even to the Gulf of Mexico and we will (certainly) do it," Tangsiri told FNA on Monday. He downplayed enemies' war rhetoric against Iran, and said, "They have tested us once and if necessary, there are people who will blow up themselves with ammunitions to destroy the US warships." Tangsiri referred to the IRGC's detention of four US military men and two Kuwaitis in the Persian Gulf almost 13 years ago sailing on two boats equipped with different state-of-the-art weapons who intended to cross Arvand river in Southern Iran, and said, "The footage and their equipment (seized by Iran) still exist but we didn’t publicize it for security reasons." He said when the American forces found out that the IRGC forces were approaching them, they surrendered without any resistance, adding that they were under detention for four days. Tangsiri also referred to the IRGC's hi-tech weapons and equipment, and said they include vessels, missiles, rocket-launchers and some more new weapons. He underlined the necessity for arming the entire Iranian coasts with the state-of-the-art weapons, and said, "We have dug tunnels all the along the Southern parts of the country and there are so many of these tunnels that the enemy cannot imagine." Tangsiri pointed to the home-made torpedo vessel, 'Zolfaqar', unveiled in an exhibition in Tehran on October 3, and said that Zolfaqar is a submersible vessel. There is also a semi-submersible vessel which is equipped with torpedos and radar systems. He also underscored Iran's missile power, and said the IRGC vessels are equipped with the home- made high-precision air-based cruise missiles, Nasr and Zafar, that can be fired from small vessels. "The missiles that we have now can hit the targets with a higher precision than their foreign counterparts, including even the Israeli missiles and the (anti-ship cruise) Penguin missiles," Tangsiri said. In relevant remarks earlier this month, Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh said all US military bases in the Middle-East are within the range of the IRGC's missiles, but the country still sees no restriction for boosting its missile capabilities. "Some of the threats by the US are aimed at appeasing the Zionists, while others are for the purpose of domestic consumption (in the US), but what is important is that they are aware of and acknowledge our capabilities and deterrence power; we do not feel any need to increase the range of our missiles and (our perceived enemy) targets are fully within the range of our missiles," Brigadier General Hajizadeh said, addressing a group of professors of Iran's Science and Technology University in Tehran. Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama He pointed to the allegations made about imposing restrictions on Iran's missile technology, and said, "We do not see any restriction for our missiles and the IRGC's preparedness and missile drills are conducted without a halt and according to our annual time-table, but only some of them are publicized through the media." Brigadier General Hajizadeh pointed to Iran's self-sufficiency in the missile technology, and said, "Today, all surface-to-surface missiles are fully built in Iran (from idea to finished product), different communications and wireless systems are (also) made inside the country and we do not need to buy radar systems from abroad." In relevant remarks in late September, IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi stressed that the US is aware of its imminent loss and casualties in case it sparks a new war in the Persian Gulf and it, thus, obeys Iran's orders in the regional waters. "The US knows that the damages of any war and firing bullets in the Persian Gulf cannot be compared with its benefits at all," Fadavi told reporters on the sidelines of the annual nationwide parades at the mausoleum of the Founder of the Islamic Republic, the Late Imam Khomeini, South of Tehran. "The US is obedient and passive in the Persian Gulf and we impose our sovereignty right in the Persian Gulf very powerfully," he added. Also in May, Fadavi announced that the US forces and warships in the Persian Gulf complied with the orders of the Iranian naval forces deployed in the region. "We observe confrontations and, as a matter of fact, debates between Iran and the foreign vessels in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz on a daily basis and they always comply," Fadavi told reporters in Tehran. Noting that the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and Iran's territorial waters were at present the most secure geographical waters in the world, he said, "At present different types of foreign military vessels and 40 US warships and logistic ships are present in these regions but certainly, security is established there due to the measures adopted by our forces." His comments came after a senior Islamic Revolution Guards Corps commander also announced in May that the IRGC Navy drones and boats were constantly recording movements of the US warships deployed in the Persian Gulf. "The presence of the US aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf is meant to intimidate such fake regimes as the al-Saud since our forces don’t feel any fear at all and are constantly taking footage of the warships when they are on their 15-meter boats and by means of drones," Commander of IRGC Navy's Salman 26 Missile Brigade General Abdolreza Vajdian said. He said that different massive drills that the Iranian Armed Forces stage are monitored by the Americans and they are aware of the Islamic Republic of Iran's power. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940720000933 Return to Top

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The Independent – London, U.K. Iran Tests New Precision Missile in Possible Violation of Nuclear Deal Test-firing of new guided missile comes despite curbs imposed on weapons development following deal on Tehran's nuclear programme By Alexander Sehmer Monday, 12 October 2015 Iran has successfully test-fired a new long-range guided missile, according to state media, apparently in defiance of a UN ban. The Iranian-built Emad (Pillar) surface-to-surface missile has improved precision targeting, according to Iran's defence minister Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan. "The Emad missile is able to strike targets with a high level of precision and completely destroy them," he said in a televised news conference. "This greatly increases Iran's strategic deterrence capability." In July, Iran and six world powers reached a widely heralded deal on Iran's nuclear programme that included curbs on Iranian missile development. A UN resolution passed in the wake of the deal also prohibits Iran from developing ballistic missiles that could deliver a nuclear weapon. Iranian officials are opposed to that ban and experts have warned the Vienna agreement is vague on certain details. "To follow our defence programmes, we don't ask permission from anyone," Mr Dehqan said. Iranian state media covered the launch: The new missile will be in range of Israel, which has made it clear it believes the nuclear deal will be ineffective at preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons and has threatened to carry out a pre-emptive strike on Iran's nuclear sites. Iran maintains its nuclear activity is peaceful. Anthony Cordesman, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, wrote in January that the Emad missile would have a range of 1,700 km (1,060 miles), 500 meters (1,650 feet) accuracy and a 750 kg (1,650 pound) payload. It is a variant of the liquid-fuelled Shahab-3 missile, which has been in service since 2003 and has a similar range but is accurate only to within 2,000 meters. "The Emad represents a major leap in terms of accuracy," Israeli missile expert Uzi Rubin said. "It has an advanced guidance and control system in its nose cone."

FARS News Agency – Tehran, Iran Tuesday, October 13, 2015 FM Spokeswoman: N. Agreement Not to Affect Iran's Defensive Capabilities TEHRAN (FNA) - Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Marziyeh Afkham rejected reports alleging that Tehran has violated its nuclear agreement with the world powers by its recent missile tests, and underscored that the country's defense program cannot be affected by the deal. "Iran's missile test is no violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at all and there is no reference in the JCPOA to Iran's defensive power, including missiles, and relating Iran's missile test to the JCPOA is fully incorrect and an attempt to create doubt," Afkham told FNA on Tuesday. Stressing that Iran's defensive capabilities are fully independent from the contents of the JCPOA, she reminded that the UN Security Council resolution 2231 merely points to those missiles which have been designed for carrying nuclear warheads, and said basically Iran's ballistic missiles have not been designed to this end and the UNSC resolution doesn’t include them. "As underlined in the Islamic Republic of Iran's statement after the approval of resolution 2231, Iran will continue taking the necessary measures to strengthen its defensive capabilities to safeguard its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity against any aggression and fight against the threat of terrorism in the region," Afkham said. Iran on Sunday successfully test-fired a new long-range precision-guided ballistic missile, named Emad, that can be controlled until the moment of impact. "This missile (Emad) which has been fully designed and made by Iranian Defense Ministry's scientists and experts is the country' first long-range missile with navigation and strike controlling capability; it is capable of hitting and destroying the targets with high-precision," Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan told reporters after the successful test of Emad missile. The Iranian Defense Minister reiterated that the manufacture and successful testing of Emad missile is a technological and operational jump in a strategic field, and said, "We don’t ask for anyone's permission for boosting our defense and missile power; we resolutely continue our defense programs, especially in the missile field, and Emad missile is a conspicuous example." The Iranian Defense Minister reiterated that the mass production and delivery of Emad missile to the country's Armed Forces will considerably increase their power and tactical capabilities. The Iranian Armed Forces have recently test-fired different types of newly-developed missiles and torpedoes and tested a large number of home-made weapons, tools and equipment, including submarines, military ships, artillery, choppers, aircrafts, UAVs and air defense and electronic systems, during massive military drills.

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Defense analysts and military observers say that Iran's wargames and its advancements in weapons production have proved as a deterrent factor. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940721000994 Return to Top

Mehr News Agency – Tehran, Iran Parliament Passes JCPOA Bill Tuesday, 13 October 2015 TEHRAN, Oct. 13 (MNA) – Iranian lawmakers on Tue. approved the bill on JCPOA dubbed ‘Iranian Government's Reciprocal and Proportional Action ’. Iran's Parliament in Tuesday’s open session approved a single-article bill on JCPOA dubbed ‘Iranian Government's Reciprocal and Proportional Action.’ The bill indicates that the government within the framework of Parliament’s National Security resolutions can voluntarily implement the JCPOA on the condition that it complies with provisions and tasks set by the Parliament in the implementation process. Paragraph 1 of the single-article bill prohibits the development or/and use of nuclear weapons according to Ayat. Khameni’s Fatwa: “According to the Leader of the Islamic Revolution’s Fatwa, no government in Iran is allowed to develop or/and use nuclear weapons, and the government is required to actively pursue the policy of global nuclear disarmament. It is also obliged to actively participate in all international, legal and diplomatic efforts for saving humanity from the threat of nuclear weapons and their proliferation by establishing zones free of weapons of mass destruction, particularly by forming a regional coalition to free the Middles East from nuclear weapons especially in regard to the nuclear disarmament of the Zionist regime”. Article 2 stresses that mutual cooperation in the implementation of JCPOA must be respected. With an emphasis on sanctions removal, Article 3 underscores the need for deterrence in the adoption of new sanctions against the Islamic Republic. According to Article 4, projects in the field of nuclear development must be implemented in line with the commercialization and industrialization of Iran's nuclear activities in a 15-year period. Article 5 points to redesigning of Arak Heavy Water Reactor. According to the Article, the other side must meet its obligations to redesign Arak Reactor concurrent with the fulfilment of commitments by Iranian side. Article 6 of the bill prohibits the inspection of the Islamic Republic's military sites, unless it is conducted under supervision of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC.) Article 7 focuses on the need for strengthening the country’s defensive power. According to the Article, the Armed Forces must be strengthened in terms of offensive and defensive missile in Air Force, Army and Navy. Article 8 indicates lifting of sanctions on the first day of the implementation of the accord. It underlines that the government should take measures to inhibit adoption of any new sanctions against Iran. Article 9 states that the assets released resulting from the implementation of JCPOA must be allocated to the resistance economy and prosperity of national production. Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Note 1 of the single-article bill focuses on the need for Iran’s Foreign Ministry to present a report every six months on the implementation of JCPOA to the National Security Council. The single-article bill was approved with 161 votes in favor, 59 against and 13 abstentions out of the 250 present lawmakers in Tuesday’s open session of the Parliament. http://en.mehrnews.com/news/110953/Parliament-passes-JCPOA-bill Return to Top

Press TV – Tehran, Iran IRGC to Use New Generation of Long-Range Missiles: Cmdr. Wednesday, October 14, 2015 A senior commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) has announced plans for an overhaul in the elite force’s missile program, saying a new generation of long-range missiles are to replace the current stockpile. “As of next year, a new and advanced generation of long-range liquid and solid fuel missiles will replace the current products,” said Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the IRGC’s Aerospace Division, on Wednesday. Hajizadeh said missiles in different ranges are ready to be fired at the enemy upon the order of the commander-in-chief of the Iranian Armed Forces, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. “The missiles in various ranges are mounted on the launchers in all bases and ready to be launched,” he said, warning that missiles will be used if “enemies make a mistake.” The comments by the Iranian general was carried by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) in a report which also aired an exclusive footage of a deep underground tunnel packed with missiles and launcher units at an unknown location in Iran. Hajizadeh said the underground tunnel is just a sample of Iran’s “numerous missile bases,” which he said are scattered across the country at the depths of hundreds of meters. “Those who pin their hopes on options on the table, should only have a look at the options of the Islamic [Republic's] forces under the table,” he said. The release of the footage came against the backdrop of claims in the West that a recent nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group of countries - Russia, China, France, the UK, the US plus Germany - will dramatically restrict Iran’s missile capability. Some lawmakers in the Iranian parliament had asked the IRGC and other military units to respond to the claims. The Islamic Republic has repeatedly said that its military might poses no threat to other countries, reiterating that its defense doctrine is merely based on deterrence. http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2015/10/14/433403/Iran-IRGC-missiles-Hajizadeh- Return to Top

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Tasnim News Agency – Tehran, Iran Iran’s Guardian Council Oks JCPOA Legislation October 14, 2015 TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Iran’s Guardian Council (GC) on Wednesday approved a bill passed by the parliament for the country’s “proportional measures” on the implementation of a nuclear agreement recently finalized by Tehran and world powers. Nejatollah Ebrahimian, the council’s spokesman, told Tasnim that the GC in two sessions on Wednesday morning and afternoon discussed the bill and decided that it was not against Islamic tenets and the Constitution. The parliament on Tuesday voted to pass the details of the motion to implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the agreement reached between Iran and the Group 5+1 (Russia, China, the US, Britain, France, and Germany) on July 14. The bill allows the administration to voluntarily implement its July 14 nuclear agreement with the world powers under certain conditions. The motion secured 161 yes votes, 59 no votes, and 13 abstentions. A total of 250 lawmakers were present at the legislature at the time of the voting. The outlines of the motion had been approved in the parliament on Monday. http://www.tasnimnews.com/english/Home/Single/889101 Return to Top

FARS News Agency – Tehran, Iran 14 October 2015 IRGC Reveals Underground Missile Facilities, Launchers Across Iran TEHRAN (FNA) - The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force revealed on Wednesday that Iran is dotted with an unknown number of underground missile facilities and launchers. The first time-ever declaration came with footage and images of one of such centers that has been dug some 500 meters deep under a mountain, where you can see a depot of long-range Qadr and Shahab ballistic missiles. http://english.farsnews.com/imgrep.aspx?nn=13940722000965 Return to Top

Mehr News Agency – Tehran, Iran JCPOA to Be Ratified on Monday: Salehi Thursday, 15 October 2015 TEHRAN, Oct. 15 (MNA) – Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) said that an Iranian delegation will be leaving for Vienna today and JCPOA will most probably be ratified on Monday . Ali Akbar Salehi expressed his gratitude to the Guardian Council and the Iranian Parliament MPs for approving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and said that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is strongly supported now . Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies

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He added that an Iranian delegation headed by Deputy FM Seyyed Abbas Araghchi and including AEOI spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi, will be heading to Vienna today and JCPOA will most probably be ratified on Monday. Following the approval, the EU will announce all the sanctions against Iran to be lifted, he said and added “The president of the United States will also officially announce lifting of some sanctions while some other will be suspended”. “The exact date of JCPOA’s implementation depends on the commitments of Iran and the steps it takes regarding Natanz and Fordo which will possibly take two months”. Some of the commitments include the changes in the number of centrifuge machines in the Natanz facility, as well as other measures in Fordo and Arak’s heavy water reactors. He also added that Iran is negotiating with some countries to cooperate in the area of “nuclear safety” and Japan has announced its readiness, adding that nuclear safety is indeed the most significant aspect of the industry. http://en.mehrnews.com/news/111061/JCPOA-to-be-ratified-on-Monday-Salehi Return to Top

FARS News Agency – Tehran, Iran Thursday October 15, 2015 IAEA Confirms Completion of Iran's Clarification Steps TEHRAN (FNA) - The International Atomic Energy Agency announced that Tehran has completed all steps that it needed to take under the roadmap of cooperation that the two sides signed in Vienna in July to resolve Tehran's past and present outstanding issues. "In the period to 15 October 2015, activities set out in the 'Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program' were completed," a statement by the IAEA said on Thursday. "By 15 December 2015, the Director General will provide, for action by the Board of Governors, the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues, as set out in the annex of the 2011 Director General’s report," it added. IAEA Chief Yukiya Amano and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi signed a roadmap of cooperation in Vienna on July 14. After the roadmap was signed, Salehi announced that the new agreement would fully settle all unresolved issues pertaining to Tehran's nuclear activities in the past. "All past issues will be resolved completely after Iran and the Agency adopt some measures," Salehi told reporters after signing an agreement called the Iran-IAEA Cooperation 'Roadmap'. "I hope that a new chapter in the relations and cooperation between Iran and the IAEA will start after the settlement of the past issues," Salehi added. Salehi made the remarks in Vienna just a short time after diplomats acknowledged a sum-up agreement had been made between world powers and Iran.

Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency Iran Nuclear Deal Moves to Implementation Stage - Kerry US Secretary of State John Kerry said that the restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program under the agreement will never die out. 15 October 15, 2015 WASHINGTON (Sputnik) — The implementation phase of the Iran nuclear agreement is beginning following the approval of the deal by the country’s parliament, US Secretary of State John Kerry said on Thursday. “Now, we are moving to the implementation stage, and it is essential that we will maintain our vigilance, our unity of approach and our common purpose,” Kerry stated in a speech at Indiana University. On Tuesday, the Iranian parliament approved the nuclear agreement that Tehran signed in mid-July with the P5+1 group of countries consisting of the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom plus Germany. The nuclear agreement aims to keep Iran’s nuclear program peaceful in exchange for sanctions relief. “Now, as a result, Iran has every reason to live up to its obligations, just as it has, by the way, throughout the negotiating process,” Kerry said. “Because we actually struck an interim agreement to begin with that tested their bona fides, and required them to rollback their program, and they’ve already done that over a two-year period.” Kerry reassured the US public that the restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program under the agreement will never die out. “So, make no mistake, the most fundamental provisions of this agreement, including the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections and protocols, have no expiration date whatsoever,” Kerry explained. “They are forever. That means that Iran will be prevented and prohibited from pursuing a nuclear weapon forever.” The IAEA is expected to provide a final assessment of Tehran’s compliance with the agreement by December 15. http://sputniknews.com/politics/20151015/1028589762/iran-nuclear-deal-implementation- kerry.html Return to Top

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The Economic Times – Mumbai, India India's Indigenous Nuclear Submarine Arihant to Undergo Missile Firing Tests By Press Trust of India (PTI) 11 October 2015 NEW DELHI: India's first indegenously developed nuclear submarine Arihant, which has "successfully" completed the sea trials held so far, will undergo its maiden missile firing test this month, top defence sources said. The aim is to handover the submarine to the Indian Navy during the International Fleet Review scheduled in February next year in Vishakapatnam, they said. "The tests held so far has been successful. We will, this month, fire Nirbhay missile from the submarine which will be followed by firing of another type of missile," the sources said. While Nirbhay is a 1000-km-long range subsonic cruise missile, the next missile would be India's first Subamrine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), which has a range of about 700 kms. These would be followed by another few rounds of tests. India plans to build at least two more Arihant-class submarines. India had started building Arihant in the 1990s under its highly secretive ATV (Advanced Technology Vessel) programme. Though Arihant was initially supposed to be a fast-attack submarine, the project was realingned to make it a ballistic missile submarine following the nuclear test conducted by India in 1998. After its launch in 2009, Arihant went through extensive tests including harbour acceptance trials with the on-board reactor going critical in 2013. It left the harbour for its sea trials in December 2014. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-indigenous-nuclear-submarine- arihant-to-undergo-missile-firing-tests/articleshow/49311148.cms Return to Top

The Wall Street Journal – New York, NY U.S., Pakistan Discuss Nuclear Weapons Program Talks come ahead of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington next week By Felicia Schwartz October 16, 2015 WASHINGTON—The U.S. and Pakistan are discussing ways to limit Pakistan’s growing nuclear weapons program, people familiar with the discussions said, in talks that are under way as the country’s prime minister plans a visit to Washington next week. However, the exploratory talks aren’t considered likely to progress very far, officials said, because Pakistan is seen as unwilling to accept limitations on its nuclear program.

Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama U.S. officials have long had concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program, which is considered to be among the world’s most dangerous because of historical political instability and an acute rivalry with neighboring India. Both countries are estimated to have more than 100 nuclear weapons in arsenals developed outside of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif will visit Washington next week. The U.S. entered into a civilian nuclear deal with India in 2005. U.S. officials now hope to see whether Islamabad might accept some curbs on its arsenal in exchange for U.S. steps to open the way for greater nuclear cooperation and, eventually, finding a way for Pakistan to seek membership in the 48-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, or NSG, which controls the exports and transfer of nuclear materials, experts familiar with the talks said. A senior U.S. official said the idea was still in a nascent stage. “The idea is to try to change the dynamic, see if helping them on NSG would be a carrot for them to act in this other area,” a senior U.S. official said. A Pakistani official said “a lot of homework needs to be done” before talks can advance. A chief U.S. concern is to cap the number of Pakistani nuclear weapons and limit the capability of Pakistani delivery systems so that they can strike no farther than India. The fact that the talks are taking place represents recognition by the U.S. that the Pakistani nuclear weapons are safe, according to Pakistanis. Acknowledging that the talks are taking place, Islamabad said last week that it needed an effective nuclear capability to prevent attack from its traditional foe India. “Pakistan’s nuclear policy is shaped by evolving security dynamics of South Asia, growing conventional asymmetry, provocative doctrines and aggressive posturing by India, which obliges us to take all necessary measures to maintain a full spectrum deterrence capability in order to safeguard our national security, maintain strategic stability and deter any kind of aggression from India,” said a statement from Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. White House press secretary Josh Earnest said Thursday that the U.S. and Pakistan regularly discuss nuclear security issues, but cautioned against expectations of a new agreement. “The United States and Pakistan are regularly engaged in a dialogue about the importance of nuclear security,” he said on Thursday. “And I would anticipate that that dialogue would include conversations between the leaders of our two countries.” It remains unclear what types of guarantees the Pakistanis might provide in exchange for U.S. support in entering the NSG, the official said. Current and former U.S. officials said it was also unclear whether the idea would be acceptable to Pakistani citizens, given nationalistic sentiment surrounding the country’s nuclear program and their growing fears of encirclement by India and other countries. The discussions, first reported last week in a Washington Post op-ed written by David Ignatius, are being led by Peter Lavoy, an expert on Pakistan’s nuclear program who is on the staff of the White House National Security Council. “When it comes to things nuclear, the prospects for getting Pakistan to do something are pretty slim because you can’t expect them to do something unless we’re willing to treat them identically with India,” said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.

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A report released in August by the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace and the Stimson Center found that Pakistan is rapidly expanding its nuclear capabilities out of fears of neighboring rival India’s capabilities. The report found that Pakistan is far outpacing India in developing nuclear warheads. The U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement allows India to purchase civil nuclear technology, but without limiting India’s nuclear program. Pakistan is considered unlikely to accept limits on its program knowing that India has secured a deal without limits, experts said. Pakistan insists that it is not in a nuclear arms race with India, but just wants a deterrent. It believes that as a deterrent to India, its nuclear program has been highly effective and has averted the possibility of war. However, the Pakistani program needs to be treated differently, given the potential dangers it poses, according to analysts. “In order to address the significant nuclear security risk that Pakistan’s arsenal poses, there would be a number of steps that I believe Pakistan needs to take in order to make even the consideration of accommodation at the Nuclear Suppliers Group worthwhile,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, which monitors proliferation issues. Adam Entous and Saeed Shah contributed to this article. http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-pakistan-discuss-nuclear-weapons-program-1444973113 Return to Top

The Boston Herald – Boston, MA OPINION/Op-Ed Dodge: Russian Bear Growls at U.S. Nukes But its own Euro-stockpile is far bigger than NATO’s By Michaela Dodge Monday, October 12, 2015 Moscow and its apologists are in high dudgeon over the deployment of “new” U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. But calling these weapons new is like calling your 1970 Chevelle SS new when what you’ve done is replace the spark plugs and brakes. The only difference is it’s infinitely easier to change a car’s brakes than to reliably update thousands of components in a nuclear bomb. What Vladimir Putin’s blustering about is the B61 bomb. It entered the U.S. arsenal in the 1970s and is the oldest weapon in our nuclear stockpile. Originally designed for a 10-year lifespan, the United States in 2012 started a Life Extension Program to update aged components in the weapon and enable it to be in service for 20 to 30 more years. The United States is not refurbishing these weapons for the fun of it. Without updates, the B61’s reliability would be severely degraded — to the point that its ability to perform would be questionable. And these weapons are absolutely critical for transatlantic security. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization confirmed that in its 2010 Strategic Concept. And

Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama the alliance’s 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review notes that “Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence.” The Europeans are pitching in to keep that component viable. They are contributing funds to update the infrastructure that supports U.S. nuclear weapon deployments on their respective territories. This includes the modernization of security perimeters around vaults where weapons are stored. Only a fool would complain about improving the security of the most powerful weapons mankind possesses. The Russian bear growls about U.S. and allied activity, even though Moscow deploys anywhere from 2,000 to 4,000 short-range nuclear weapons close to NATO’s borders. Oh, and Russia is moving full speed ahead in developing and testing new types of nuclear weapons, even as it aggressively maintains its large nuclear weapon production complex. Against Russia’s thousands, the United States has about 200 tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Reports differ on whether Washington is upping that number by 20 or swapping them in for old weapons that are being taken off-line awaiting upgrade. It really doesn’t matter. Even if the U.S. deployed five times more weapons to Europe than it currently has, Russia would still enjoy at least a 2:1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons. Security obligations of the two countries are completely asymmetrical. The United States guarantees Europe’s security. Russia threatens it. Today, there is no area on NATO borders where the alliance has military superiority over Russia. And Russia’s military and nuclear weapon superiority is exactly the kind of “strategic balance in Europe” that Moscow wants to maintain. But not offending Russia’s feelings must not be a basis for U.S. nuclear weapons policy in Europe — or anywhere else — because Russia’s goals are incompatible with U.S. foreign policy interests. Russian accusations that the U.S. is increasing tensions in Europe are even more ridiculous when one considers a string of Russia’s actions aimed at destabilizing European security. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia. In 2014, it invaded Ukraine. Russia is also blatantly violating a bevy of arms control treaties and international obligations, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Vienna Protocol. You get the idea. To be fair, flawed U.S. policies have enabled and encouraged Russia’s bad actions. President Obama’s “reset” policy fed into Russia’s worst aggressive tendencies and made the United States look like a patsy. As a result, Russia has successfully limited U.S. options and undermined U.S. interests throughout the region and beyond. Moscow’s extensive efforts to undermine U.S. nuclear presence in Europe are but a continuation of its time-honored technique of denial and deception. Washington must not fall for it this time. Michaela Dodge is a senior policy analyst for defense and strategic policy in the Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy at The Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. https://www.bostonherald.com/news_opinion/opinion/op_ed/2015/10/dodge_russian_bear_gro wls_at_us_nukes Return to Top

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists – Chicago, IL OPINION/Voices of Tomorrow The Nuclear Verification Technology that Could Change the Game By Kelly Wadsworth 13 October 2015 The historic agreement between Iran and six world powers to curb the former’s nuclear development, concluded over the summer and expected to be adopted this month, relies heavily on verification. The foreign powers are keen to make sure that Tehran doesn’t acquire enough plutonium or uranium to build a nuclear weapon, and Tehran wants to demonstrate good behavior in order to get sanctions relief. That raises questions about the imperfect verification methods used by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the organization charged with the task under the Iranian nuclear deal, and the International Monitoring System (IMS), a global network that detects nuclear explosions worldwide. Are they reliable enough? Some would argue no. There may be, though, a new option for verification on the not-too-distant horizon. Antineutrino detection is an existing technology that, if political and diplomatic hurdles are overcome, could be put in place before the 10-year ban on Iranian enrichment R&D is lifted. And fully developed over the long-term, it holds great promise for monitoring similar deals in the future, and for reinforcing nuclear non-proliferation worldwide. Difficult to evade, antineutrino detection technology could allow the international community to reliably monitor a country’s nuclear activities in real-time, potentially without setting foot in the country. Similar in cost and technological scale to the space- borne reconnaissance methods governments use for detection today, antineutrino detection could not only help identify undeclared nuclear reactors, but could monitor nuclear facilities and detonations throughout the Middle East and beyond. More research and development could make this technology a viable nonproliferation verification option. The problem with verification today. Current far-field verification methods have been evaded in the past. Even with technology and policy improvements since the Iraq war, in the absence of immediate onsite inspections, the IAEA cannot reliably detect facilities outside its jurisdiction that may be producing weapon-grade uranium or plutonium. To monitor for suspicious activity outside its jurisdiction, the IAEA relies on environmental sampling and US electro-optical and radar satellites, such as the one that discovered Iran’s secret nuclear facility in 2009. Environmental samples are likely to be highly diluted if collected far from the expected site, and reactors can be hidden from satellite reconnaissance via underground facilities and cooling mechanisms to divert their thermal signature. In short, the current IAEA far-field verification system isn’t foolproof. The IMS, developed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty‘s Provisional Technical Secretariat, uses seismic, hydro-acoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide monitoring technologies to detect nuclear explosions around the globe. Not only are these methods inaccurate in pinpointing the exact detonation location due to signal interference, but there is also evidence that countries can decouple and disguise their nuclear test yields to make them difficult for the IMS technologies to detect. For example, a determined proliferator could decouple (or muffle) a nuclear explosion in a large underground cavity, which might appear to a seismic monitor as an earthquake or mining explosion. Radionuclide monitoring is highly susceptible to weather, and releases could even be captured to obscure detection. Antineutrino detectors do not have any of these problems. Because

Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama it is impossible to hide or fake the antineutrino signal that a reactor sends out, as long as the detector itself has not been interfered with, it cannot be evaded. The pioneering technology of antineutrino detection could change the game, providing real-time, accurate, remote monitoring of nuclear endeavors, giving international agencies unprecedented access to knowledge about a particular state’s nuclear activity. And the technology’s effects could go further, for example, by motivating Tehran to be a responsible player in the nonproliferation sphere, and perhaps one day helping to develop a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone and with it greater regional stability. How it works. Antineutrinos are emitted during all fission nuclear processes. Since they are not electrically charged, they pass right through nearly all forms of matter in a straight line. They cannot be blocked or shielded. In fact, an antineutrino could pass through a piece of lead more than a light-year thick (6 trillion miles) before showing any sign of interaction. The concept of using antineutrinos to detect nuclear activities is not new; antineutrinos from a reactor were first detected in 1956. However, technology has only recently caught up to the science, and we now have the ability to build antineutrino detectors at various sizes and costs that could potentially aid in nonproliferation efforts. Antineutrino detectors are categorized into three different monitoring classes: Near-field (hundreds of meters), mid-field (tens of kilometers), and far-field (hundreds of kilometers). The first category is the most fully developed, and could even be deployed today for verification purposes with a host country’s permission. Near-field antineutrino detection could supplement current IAEA safeguard methods and provide an independently-verified, real-time picture of what’s happening to the nuclear material in a reactor core. The detectors—metal boxes about the size of refrigerators—could catch frequent reactor shutdowns, alerting the IAEA to dubious behavior, and tell inspectors exactly what’s in the fuel mix, showing whether a facility is trying to over-enrich plutonium. Unfortunately, near-field detectors have struggled to gain acceptance in the safeguards community. (Some experts attribute this to a fear that the technology is so good, states won’t allow it on their soil.) Incorporation of such a technology into the IAEA inspections regime would likely be interpreted as an act of “western aggression” against Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states. It is unlikely that Iran, or any other NAM state, would allow monitoring measures beyond what they have already agreed to without being offered sufficient additional incentives. Still, it is possible that Iran could be persuaded to adopt the technology. The opportunity to host a large-scale project with major economic, scientific, and geopolitical impact could serve as an enticement. Mid-field antineutrino detectors, meanwhile, have been proven able to monitor the presence or absence of 10 megawatt reactors from up to 10 kilometers away, and with further research and development, could be useful for detecting covert activities outside of the IAEA’s agreed-upon jurisdiction. A country might be amenable to allowing the technology on its soil because of the prestige inherent in hosting a world-class antineutrino observatory, a center that might employ hundreds of scientists with a commensurate physical and economic footprint. Certainly, if Iran were to host one, it would ease international proliferation fears while indemnifying Tehran for any loss in international status caused by curtailing its nuclear program, and could motivate the government to become a responsible player in the nonproliferation sphere. Though it is farther away, the greatest potential for nuclear verification lies with far-field antineutrino detectors. A far-field observatory could monitor the presence or absence of reactors from up to hundreds of kilometers away, and thus, like the methods employed by the CTBTO, would not have to be based in-country. A decade ago, a team led by John Learned, a University of Hawaii physics professor and pioneer in the antineutrino detection field, developed a plan for a far-field, deep-ocean, 9,000-ton antineutrino observatory that could be used for deterrence monitoring. A

(CUWS) Outreach Journal far-field detector is estimated to cost in the range of $500 million to $1 billion—which is comparable to the price of the flagship technology, space-borne reconnaissance, currently used by non-proliferation monitors. With sufficient funding, a far-field, deep-ocean observatory could be built now, and could provide nuclear verification from outside a country’s borders that would be very difficult to evade. Far-field detectors would be the ideal means of verifying compliance with nuclear agreements, as they don’t require the monitored state’s approval; however, their development lacks funding. On the other hand, a mid-field observatory placed within Iran’s borders would promise a consistent and reliable method of verification. Getting Iran on Board. Near- and mid-field detectors face the disadvantage of having to be installed within the borders of the state being monitored, thereby requiring its approval. This poses a problem when a country like Iran holds a historically hostile attitude toward the United States and international control regimes. Antineutrino observatories, though, could eventually transform 21st century counter-proliferation efforts as dramatically as radar transformed modern warfare in the early 20th century. A single one could have incredible implications for the future of covert proliferation as well as nuclear weapons test monitoring. While a far-field detector is still a ways away, can Iran be convinced to host a mid-field antineutrino detector? Iranian leadership may well entertain the idea of a world-class antineutrino observatory within the country’s borders, as it would significantly repair the international isolation caused by its non-compliance, bringing with it increased economic activity and international prestige. The presence of an observatory could bring the Iranian nuclear program into full transparency and compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which it is already a signatory. The prospect of highly effective verification would decrease liability for countries interested in investing in Tehran’s growing power industry. And, a major scientific center may give Iran the opportunity to reverse some of the brain drain that has plagued it in recent years. In short, one of the main things Iran wants from the nuclear deal is to repair the self-inflicted damage caused by well-documented non-compliance with internationally imposed nuclear safeguards, and hosting an antineutrino observatory would help it get there. It would attract scientists from around the world, while reassuring the agreement’s other signatories that Tehran cannot develop a “breakout capability,” or ability to quickly build nuclear weapons. Let’s get started. A mid-field antineutrino observatory holds the answer to the Iran deal’s verification woes. It has the potential to provide real-time, non-disguisable monitoring of Iran and allow Tehran to continue to develop its nuclear power sector, while offering peace-of-mind for the international verification community. And eventually—in perhaps 10 to 20 years—a far-field antineutrino observatory could hold the key to establishing a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone, providing the ability to monitor nearly all nuclear reactors and detonations in the Middle East. There should be no debate over further investment in the research. Kelly Wadsworth is a PhD student in international security studies at the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. She is also a Non-Resident Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Her areas of interest include missile proliferation and nuclear security. http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-verification-technology-could-change-game8798 Return to Top

Real Clear Defence – Chicago, IL OPINION/Article America's Russian Nuke Obsession Thinking Beyond Moscow in the New Nuclear Age By Michael Auslin October 14, 2015 When the Chinese Communist Party held a huge military parade on Tiananmen Square on September 3, it did more than mark the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Japan. By parading some of China’s most advanced ballistic missiles, it also put America and the world on notice that it has steadily become a major nuclear power. China was jostling for position in a crowded field in what some are calling a “new nuclear age.” Yet even as America’s two-decade vacation from nukes is ending, the country’s nuclear thinking remains obsessed with an old enemy, Russia. In order to navigate the unwelcome return of nuclear weapons to international politics, U.S. nuclear strategy and planning needs to change, as well, and new questions need to be asked about our strategic environment. For a country focused on terrorism and counterinsurgency for nearly 15 years, talk of nuclear conflict seems a throwback to the days of Fail Safe and On the Beach. Yet the disconnect works at two levels. In Washington, D.C., nuclear weapons have been out of fashion since the end of the Cold War and the standing down of the iconic Strategic Air Command, in 1992. Until Vladimir Putin decided to annex Crimea and invade eastern Ukraine, Russia was dismissed by administrations of both parties as a geopolitical has-been, and its nuclear force fit only for further negotiated reductions. Moreover, President Obama’s 2009 Prague call for “global zero” further fueled the belief that nuclear weapons were a horror whose time had come and gone. The fact that the world’s nuclear powers, and some would-be powers, were recommitting to their nuclear arsenals was largely ignored by U.S. policymakers and analysts more focused on immediate threats. America’s fearsome nuclear arsenal sat quietly in its silos, submarines, and bombers while politicians turned to debates over counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. The nuclear enterprise, as it is called, became a military backwater, and morale and standards suffered, with cheating scandals and the public firing of both the nation’s number two nuclear commander and the Air Force general in charge of the country’s ICBM’s. Yet even as the military struggled to restore confidence in the nuclear mission, America’s nuclear war fighters continued their mission 24/7, deep underground in silos, in the ocean depths, or in cramped and aging bombers decades older than their pilots. Nuclear strategy has seemed as static as the weapons themselves, maintaining a default focus on Russia, seemingly to the detriment of thinking about a more complicated nuclear environment. The esoteric world of nuclear thinkers, satirized decades ago in Dr. Strangelove, may seem a relic from another era, but it is poised for a big comeback, thanks to the nuclear threats slowly gathering on the horizon. The problem America and its nuclear wizards face, though, is that our thinking is not keeping up with the changes occurring around us. It is true that nuclear policy studies have never completely stopped. Some corners of government, like the Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment, have continued to explore a future of nuclear proliferation and war fighting (full disclosure: I have participated in a number of those war games/studies). But this year’s annual Deterrence Symposium, held by U.S. Strategic Command

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(STRATCOM), revealed a preoccupation with Russia that harked back to the Cold War, driven no doubt by public comments from senior officials, such as the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that Moscow poses an existential threat to the United States. From the perspective of the men and women who operate America’s nuclear forces, Russia is indeed their primary adversary and target. After all, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, it still has 4,500 nuclear warheads, of which 1,780 are deployed on 311 land-based missiles, between eight and ten ballistic missile submarines (SSBN’s), and around 60 strategic bombers. Russia is modernizing or developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles and adding 40 missiles to its land-based force, commissioning up to ten new Borei-class SSBNs with three already launched, and upgrading its bombers. None of this takes into account, moreover, Russia’s 2,000 non-strategic nuclear warheads that can be used in tactical situations, not to mention its violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The composition of Russia’s nuclear forces is just part of why STRATCOM remains focused on Moscow. Over the past year, Putin has revived the art of nuclear coercion, threatening the Baltics with nuclear attack and pledging to use nuclear weapons to defend the annexation of Crimea. This type of nuclear saber rattling has not been heard since the Cold War, at least outside of North Korea, whose extreme rhetoric belies its actual capabilities. Putin’s increasingly charismatic style of leadership introduces an entirely new element into nuclear strategy, whereby one man may have direct control over thousands of nuclear warheads. Western strategists cannot try to understand Russia under Putin by dusting off Cold War playbooks. Hard questions about changes in Russian nuclear doctrine need to be asked, and the challenge of nuclear coercion needs to be integrated into diplomatic and strategic thinking. Is Putin moving to consider tactical nuclear operations during conflict? Is he dropping the long-standing vow against making a first strike? How will a worsening economic picture affect overall military strategy? Indeed, NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group has recently just started tackling these questions, but their discussion must spread out into the broader policy community, such as those who deal with Russian politics and even sociological issues. If it remains the purview of cloistered bureaucrats or nuclear planners, it is unlikely to provide the type of encompassing perspective needed to think clearly about what the threat is and how to deal with it. For all its apparent dangers, though, Russia remains but one nuclear power. It is a far more complex nuclear environment that U.S. nuclear planners and strategists now must also prepare for, and fit into America’s larger national security discussions. Above all, it requires different thinking than during the Cold War, when a largely stable, primarily dyadic nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was successfully managed for over four decades. The new nuclear era will be multipolar, inherently unstable, and driven by a combination of resentment, ideology, and power politics among multiple players. Our assumptions about deterrence and rationality may be as outdated as our B-52’s still flying nuclear missions. Not all nuclear threats involve the United States, of course. While both India and Pakistan continue to test new missile systems, their threat is directed at each other. The possibility of a nuclear exchange between Islamabad and New Delhi remains worryingly high, and some nuclear analysts believe that South Asia is the most likely place on earth for a nuclear exchange. For Washington, however, diplomacy may be the only role it can play in the event of a nuclear crisis on the subcontinent.

Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Other growing or emerging nuclear powers, however, pose a more direct challenge to the United States and its interests or to its allies. They present a more complicated strategic picture in coming years, one requiring a new renewed commitment to intelligence gathering, analysis, diplomacy, and planning. It is also where the most innovative and hardest questions need to be asked, given how little we have thought about these nuclear players. Next to Russia, China may pose the most worrisome threat among current nuclear powers. In September’s parade, Beijing showcased weapons it has already deployed, including the DF-5B ICBM, which is China’s first missile to carry multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), meaning multiple warheads that can be programmed to hit different targets. Achieving MIRV capability creates a far more difficult anti-ballistic missile picture for the United States and allies like Japan. In addition, China unveiled its new DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile, which can target all of Japan and range out to U.S. air and naval bases in Guam. Still in the development stage is the DF-41 ICBM, which is also MIRVed and has a range of 12-14,000 kilometers, thereby being able to hit the entire continental United States. The DF-41 is a road- mobile missile, meaning that it is more survivable and harder, if not impossible, to target in a U.S. counterstrike. Further developing a survivable force, China also has at least 3 Jin-class SSBN’s, and may have up to eight boats by 2020, with new JL-2 missiles. Sheer numbers are one part of the story, though. Beyond China’s growing arsenal, U.S. strategists need to pay far more attention how Chinese nuclear policy might change in coming years. Despite some good work in English on Chinese nuclear strategy and posture, we know far less about Chinese nuclear thinking than we do about Russian. This lacuna is made worse by the lack of Sino- U.S. discussions on nuclear weapons matters, and that the Chinese so far refuse to talk to us about arms reduction or limitation. Most importantly, Chinese nuclear doctrine may well be changing as China’s foreign policy and security strategy evolves. Knowledgeable analysts argue that Chinese leadership circles maintain a belief dating back to the beginning of their nuclear program in the 1960s that the “sole purpose of [Chinese] nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear aggression and prevent coercion” against China. This helps explain, in such analysts’ views, both the relatively small size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal as well as the continuing avowal of the “no first use” doctrine. Chinese leaders, in this view, have never viewed their nuclear arsenal as weapons to be used for achieving military objectives. Yet a position first adopted by Mao Zedong and faithfully carried through by his successors may not fit China’s changing security environment. A China that now has a global presence must consider how most effectively and efficiently to protect its interests that are far removed from the homeland. Beijing has so far avoided nuclear coercion or saber-rattling of the kind favored by Vladimir Putin. But with a plethora of worsening tensions with smaller nations over territorial disputes, could China resort to such tactics out of frustration and a sense of being overwhelmed? Just as importantly, now that China has expanded its territory to include manmade islands in the South China Sea, will Beijing’s nuclear doctrine change from its focus on the homeland to extending a nuclear umbrella to vulnerable Chinese territory offshore? What if Chinese forces are attacked at foreign bases, such as in Pakistan; would the employment of nuclear weapons be seen as a legitimate response to the inability to strike back at an enemy who might not be operating near Chinese waters? Similarly, Chinese leaders may perceive that their military modernization efforts are resulting in a conventional arms race in Asia, with other nations building aircraft carriers (like Japan), deploying more submarines, and fielding anti-ship missiles, that threatens their conventional forces. If Beijing is not assured of maintaining regional conventional dominance, could it at some point begin to rely on nuclear weapons as elements of a warfighting strategy and not merely for retaliatory purposes? Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies

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Similarly, U.S. nuclear strategists need to think about the potential implications of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s plan to put the nation’s armed services under one unified joint command. Could that type of reorganization result in the 2nd Artillery Corps, China’s nuclear force, being considered as part of more traditional military operations? Non-military pressures could also result in changes to China’s nuclear doctrine. For example, should China’s economic slowdown prove to be more severe than initially anticipated, thereby causing budgetary pressure on the PLA, could Beijing shift its military doctrine in part to rely more on nuclear weapons as a cost-saving measure, just as the United States did during the 1950s? Given the depth and number of contentious issues between the United States and China, combined with America’s treaty commitments to nations with their own disputes with Beijing, will nuclear weapons be seen as a uniquely effective means of intimidating Washington, not to mention other powers, or preventing a conventional war from breaking out in the first place? Other threats are even less understood. Compared to what we know about China, North Korea remains a black box, and no one has even really begun to think about the operational implications of a nuclear-armed Iran. One might assume that Pyongyang sees its nuclear weapons not unlike the Chinese supposedly do, as a means of assured retaliation for any attack on its territory. But given our almost unbroken track record of being caught by surprise by North Korea, it would be foolhardy to assume we understand anything of Pyongyang’s nuclear doctrine or operational policies, especially as they relate to the question of the survival of the Kim family regime. As for Iran, the world has never dealt with the specter of a theological regime bolstered by nuclear weapons. Not merely questions of what kind of understandable doctrine Iran might adopt, but the issue of command and control raises nightmarish possibilities. And none of this discussion, it should be noted, even attempts to fit the question of non-state actors such as terrorist groups getting their hands on nuclear weapons, whether through proxy relationships with nuclear powers or through A.Q. Khan-style illicit nuclear activities. This new nuclear future requires an all-hands-on-deck approach to rebuild our intellectual infrastructure. Some of what is needed is to revive Cold War-era activities, but geared to a more complex environment, focused on multiple nation-state actors. Game theorists will be needed to run endless new scenarios with several players, while historians and cultural specialists will need to undertake the kind of research that can provide nuance and depth about a broad cast of nuclear states. From a more narrow military perspective, understanding how nuclear weapons fit into hybrid and limited war will have to inform operational planning and doctrine in the West. Even more importantly, the theory of extended deterrence will likely require a complete overhaul, as will assumptions about alliances. U.S. policymakers will have to ask searing questions that they have avoided for a quarter-century. How do we respond to nuclear blackmail? What risks are we willing to incur by ignoring direct nuclear threats designed to forestall U.S. military activities abroad? Are we really willing to trade Seoul for Pyongyang, or Los Angeles for Tokyo? The Congress will have a major role in ensuring that such public discussions occur within the full context of U.S. foreign policy debates. The questions themselves seem like the return of creatures from a black lagoon of the global past, but not preparing for them may assure a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions. Nourishing a new strategic culture is the only way to ensure the consistent and steady analysis of political, security, economic, social, and cultural facets of statecraft and warfighting in this new nuclear age. Asking the questions above, and many others, cannot be done during times of crisis or

War on the Rocks.com OPINION/Article Don’t Fear the Dirty Bomb By Al Mauroni October 16, 2015 At the recent Democratic presidential debate, the candidates were asked to identify the biggest threat the U.S. national security. Hillary Clinton, the candidate on stage with the most federal government experience, stated that she most worried over “nuclear material that can fall into the wrong hands.” She continued, “I know the terrorists are constantly seeking it, and that’s why we have to stay vigilant, but also united around the world to prevent that.” Clinton’s answer came on the heels of an Associated Press report about a criminal organization in Moldova that tried to sell nuclear material to an Islamic State group. Predictably, the story received a lot of media attention. The general public is afraid of radiation. It’s an irrational fear, driven by the imagination of what high levels of uncontrolled radiation might do to our bodies or to our children, and spurred by high- profile accidents in the nuclear energy business. However, no one died from radiation poisoning or acute diseases as a result of the radioactive releases at Three Mile Island or Fukushima. Even at Chernobyl, less than 30 people died within a few months from radiation sickness. Another 130 suffered high doses of radiation poisoning, most of whom recovered over a number of years. Cancer rates for those near nuclear accidents are in line with those of the general population. But we’re terrified of invisible radiation waves, despite being bombarded every day from a variety of natural and man-made sources of radiation. The panic over low-risk radiation exposure is bad enough. Nuclear terrorism raises the specter of fear several notches, with the idea that some terrorist group might obtain fissile material from somewhere in the world and bring it to a United States city — someday. We don’t have any specifics as to who is pursuing the material, where loose piles of material exist, or which cities are vulnerable, but other than that, it could happen, right? This is not a partisan issue — both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have warned of nuclear terrorism, the latter saying in 2010 that “The single biggest threat to U.S. security … would be the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon.” I disagree, considering there is more than one nation that could launch some seriously large-yield nuclear weapons at the United States today, and that the aspects of probability and consequence has to be included in any risk assessment. But I digress. What I want to focus on is the deliberate manipulation of this public fear of radiation by people who know better, but do so to advance their organizations’ agendas. These people do not differentiate

(CUWS) Outreach Journal between radioactive and fissile material. They want to put warnings about “dirty bombs” — otherwise known as radiological dispersal devices — and nuclear weapons in the same op-ed, giving readers the impression that immediate steps are necessary today to stop numerous terrorist groups from exploding a nuclear bomb in New York City or Los Angeles like something out of 24. Former Sen. Sam Nunn and Andrew Bieniawski are leaders within the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a non-profit organization that wants to reduce the risk of use or proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Just two months ago, they warned in a Washington Post op-ed that the United States was vulnerable to a “disaster posed by dangerous radiological materials,” that these materials could wreak havoc and cause billions of dollars of damage unless the U.S. government took immediate steps to secure dangerous radioactive material or replace commercially used isotopes with alternative technologies. “It is nothing short of a miracle that we have not yet seen a dirty bomb terrorist attack,” they say. And yet it isn’t. Yes, radioactive cesium, cobalt, iridium, americium, thorium, barium, tritium, and many other isotopes are widely used in commercial practices and could be appropriated by a determined thief who wasn’t too worried about getting severe radiation poisoning. Yes, there are hundreds of cases of lost or stolen radioactive material every year, though overwhelmingly not highly enriched uranium or plutonium. And yet there has never been a detonated dirty bomb in history. Ever. Joe Cirincione is a little blunter than Nunn or Bieniawski, saying that it’s “just a matter of time before ISIS — or some other terrorist group — gets some radioactive material.” These terrorists will “go nuclear, hoping to deter our attacks,” and “short of a nuclear explosive bomb, a dirty bomb may serve the same function.” But this logic does not hold together. The U.S. government has been fighting Islamist terrorist groups for decades, and — if one is to be optimistic — we’ve been pretty good in decimating al Qaeda, probably the most determined terrorist group to seek unconventional weapons. So all of a sudden, now terrorists are going to go nuclear in an effort to push the United States back? Iraq had decades to develop a nuclear program — dedicated resources, personnel, infrastructure — and never built a bomb, but somehow we’re supposed to be afraid that the self- proclaimed Islamic State is going to go nuclear, simply because it has a territory to defend and we’re supporting the Iraqi government in efforts to retake that land? Cirincione knows there is a difference between nuclear weapons and dirty bombs, and he readily admits that a dirty bomb will not kill many (if any) people. But he warns that “a few grams” of cesium or americium in a dirty bomb could “contaminate tens of square blocks, making them uninhabitable for weeks.” That’s ridiculous. Let’s get past the impossible physics in which a heavy metal powder in the form of a few grams gets dispersed miles from the point of a ground explosion. We have atmospheric dispersion models and guidance to figure these things out. What Cirincione means (but doesn’t say) is that public officials, panicking because of the perception of radioactive dispersal in their city, will order the evacuation of people from the contaminated area to include a healthy buffer area further out, not because of the actual public health risk of a few millicuries of radiation exposure every day, but because they don’t want to be fired as a result of not being reactive enough. There was no rational basis for the U.S. government to order all Americans living within 50 miles of Japan’s crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant to evacuate, other than fear. All that order did was spur the public’s panic and make Japan’s job of dealing with its millions of citizens in the same area more difficult. For a serious examination of the threat of nuclear terrorism, I recommend reading Michael Levi or Brian Jenkins, both of whom do a much better job on this serious issue. So why does Andrew Bienawski tell the news media that “the threat is real” despite the utter lack of any past terrorist use of dirty bombs and despite the fact that no state has ever lost control of a

Issue No.1187, 16 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama nuclear weapon to a sub-state group. Why do arms control experts want to tell us about terrorist capabilities and intentions regarding nuclear and radiological material? To be clear, there are some media sources who find experts to offer different conclusions. VICE reached out to a Chatham House professor and a Stratfor analyst who pointed out that the groups such as the Islamic State already had access to commercial radioactive sources, rather than needing to go to criminal organizations. Richard Brown of King’s College London points out the high cost of obtaining radioactive material and assesses that the return on investment for terrorist groups would be poor. The reason that Cirincione and his fellow arms control analysts want to beat the drum about the risk of nuclear terrorism is that it feeds the public fear of nuclear weapons. We have lived with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons for decades, and despite dramatic drops in the number of operational nuclear weapons since 1991, the disarmament community would like to see the number go to zero. As long as nuclear weapons exist in government arsenals, they reason, there’s the possibility that a terrorist organization could get one. Similarly, environmental groups who oppose the building of nuclear reactors will exaggerate the effects of radiation. Some science reporters will exaggerate the nuclear threat just because it sells articles. Scaring the public about nuclear terrorism — even if it’s just in the form of a dirty bomb — benefits their agendas. I am delighted to see that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is working overseas with other nations’ law enforcement agencies to interdict smuggling of radioactive material. I am convinced that our Intelligence Community has an appropriate level of insight into this situation. I am supportive of the Department of Energy’s efforts to secure and lock down fissile material across the globe. But as long as we have public officials proclaiming that they cannot sleep at night because of the threat of nuclear terrorism, we cannot have a serious and reasoned approach to this issue. The fact remains that the overwhelming threat from terrorist groups will stem from their use of high- yield explosives, automatic rifles, and kidnappings that lead to executions, despite countless analysts who insist that terrorists are on the verge of having doomsday devices, nuclear or otherwise. I don’t trust an arms control expert to tell me how terrorists are going to employ unconventional weapons. And I don’t trust a terrorist expert to tell me how a few grams of cesium in a car bomb will ”close down New York for months,” as Bob Baer recently suggested on CNN with Wolf Blitzer. Our policymakers need to tone down the rhetoric about the threat of terrorists using radiological and nuclear material, because the threat isn’t as probable as some make it out to be, and we really do have a good amount of government resources against this challenge. Let’s talk about this issue in the larger context of terrorist intentions and capabilities, rather than through this gut reaction to the primal fear of radiation. When we do, I suspect that our policymaking will be a lot more rational and in balance with the actual threats against the United States. Al Mauroni is the Director of the U.S. Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense. http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/dont-fear-the-dirty-bomb/ Return to Top

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ABOUT THE USAF CUWS The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation . The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation - counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.