CANADA AND THE SANDINISTAS
A Case Study of the Determinants o-f
Canadian Policy Towards Nicaragua, 1979-1984
By
PETER GEORGE PRONGOS
B.A., The University o-f Colorado, 1978
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Political Science}
We accept this thesis as con-forming
to the required standard
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
February 1986
(c?) Peter George Prongos, 1986 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced
degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it
freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive
copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my
department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or
publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written
permission.
r
Department of
The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3
DE-6(3/81) Abstract
This thesis examines Canadian responses to developments surrounding Sandinista rule in Nicaragua. The questions addressed in this thesis are:
1) What was the nature of the Trudeau government's policy toward the Sandinista government of Nicaragua?
2) What were the determinants of this policy?
3) What alternative policies were available to the
Canadian government?
A brief- overview of the evolution of Canadian policy towards Latin America in the 20th century is followed by a discussion of the major elements of Canadian relations with the
Sandinista government, a history of the evolution of that policy, and an examination of the role of Canadian non-governmental actors, i.e. business, labour, churches, aid and solidarity groups, and the press. The next section focuses on the influence of international actors on Canadian policy, particulary the United States. The last part analyzes the determinants of Canadian relations with the Sandinistas and offers a critique of Canada's policy.
This study finds that official interest in Nicaragua gradually increased after the Sandinista victory, following that of the Canadian public. The Clark government mirrored the attitude of the Carter administration, which was suspicious of the new government in Managua. In spite of the enormous devastation wrought in
Nicaragua, the Tories provided no direct bilateral aid. The return of the Liberals under Pierre Trudeau did not signal an immediate change of policy towards Managua, while Reagan's inauguration in 1981 brought to power an administration determined to "roll back" the Sandinista revolution. Canada's initial response was "quiet acquiescence". Although not completely unsympathetic to the Sandinistas, Canada was wary of angering the United States. Canada granted more assistance to
Honduras in spite of its deplorable human rights record and support for the Contra attacks against Nicaragua. Canada decided to back the Contadora peace process as the only alternative to increasing U.S. militarization, but this support was primarily confined to rhetoric. As Canada grew increasingly worried about Washington's actions, llttawa began to be more openly critical. The government eventually made a few moves to implement its own policy toward Nicaragua (some aid, stronger rhetoric), but llttawa did not undertake any major peace or development initiatives, either unilaterally or with other nations. Canada's ambiguous rhetoric was essentially compatible with U.S. policy, the main difference being questions of method. Policy tended to be piecemeal and inconsistent, determined primarily by the hope of winning the good will of the United States, modified slightly by the fear
-iii- of the consequences of an escalating crisis on trade and wor order, and, to a lesser degree, by public opinion in Canada.
The Canadian government is found to have failed to live up either to its principles or its potential to help resolve the crisis that developed around the Sandinista revolution.
-iv- Table of Contents
List of Tables vii
Acknowledgements viii
Introduction 1
Chapter 1. Official Relations 3
a) Background 3
b) Political Relations 13
c) Development Assistance 29
Chapter 2. Domestic Actors 3 7
a) Commercial Relations 37
b) Non-Governmental Organizations 42
Labour 4 2
Churches 47
Aid and Solidarity Groups 50
c) Political Parties 57
The New Democrats 5 7
The Conservatives 60
The Liberals 62
d) The Press 64
Chapter 3. International Actors 72
a) Nicaragua 72
b) The United States 78
c) Other Countries 84
v. Chapter 4. Analysis 88
a) Orientation, Roles, Objectives 93
b) Determinants of Canada's Policies Towards the Sandinistas 96
1) The International System 96
2) Canada's National Attributes 102
c) Decision Making 105
1) The Government 106
2) Non-Governmental Actors 108
Business
Public Opinion 109
d) Critique and Conclusions 113
Notes 129
Bibliography 144
Appendices 152
-vi.- List of Tables
Table I. Canadian Aid to Nicaragua -- 1973-78. 8.
Table II. Canadian-Nicaraguan Trade -- 1975-79. 9.
Table III. Canadian-Central American Trade. 10.
Table IV. Total Canadian Bi-Lateral Aid to Central America — 1980/81-83/84. 31.
Table V. Canadian-Nicaraguan Trade -- 1979/80/84. 35. Acknowledgements
I would like to thank those in the Political Science Department at the University of British Columbia whose advice and criticism were invaluable in the preparation of this thesis: Prof. Don Munton, Prof. Peter Busch, Prof. K.J. Holsti and Prof. Philip Resnick.
I would also like to acknowledge the many people who facilitated my research in Vancouver, Ottawa, and Toronto, wit special thanks for those who consented to be interviewed and t the people at CAPA.
-viii- CANADA and the SANDINISTAS
A Case Study of the Determinants of Canadian Policy
Towards Nicaragua, 1979-1984
Introduction
The victory of the "Frente Sandinista de Liberacion
Nacional" (FSLN) and its supporters over the Somoza dictatorship in July 1979 has had profound repercussions, not only in Nicaragua and Central America, but throughout the hemisphere and beyond. This thesis examines Canadian responses to developments surrounding Sandinista rule in Nicaragua.
Specifically, this examination attempts to shed light on three questions related to Canadian policy towards the
Sandinista revolution:
1) What was the nature of the Trudeau government's policy toward the Sandinista government of Nicaragua?
2) What were the determinants of this policy?
3) What alternative policies were available to the
Canadian government?
Canadian interest in Nicaragua has grown since the end of the 1970s. Economic, humanitarian, and political considerations have combined to raise the salience of Nicaragua for Canadians and for the federal government. This increased interest was accompanied by changes in the relationship between the two countries, and is a subject that has yet to be fully -2- explored. Furthermore, it is hoped that this study, by suggesting explanations for the evolution of a particular aspect of Canada's recent foreign policy, will provide clues about the formulation of Canadian foreign policy in general.
The nature of the issues involved, their relation to Canada's international roles and objectives, the unusual level of public interest, and the involvement of the United States are some of the factors that make a study of this problem important. The continuing significance of many of the subjects discussed, such as the on-going crisis in Central America, the problem of underdevelopment, and the role of the public in foreign relations, make this investigation timely as well.
After a detailed discussion of the evolution of the major elements of Canadian policy towards the Sandinista government, there will be an examination of the role of Canadian non-governmental actors. The third section will focus on the influence of international actors on Canadian policy.. The last part will analyze the determinants of Canadian relations with the Sandinistas and offer a critique of Canada's policy. -3-
Chapter 1 - Official Relations
a) Background
Canadian interest in its hemispheric neighbours south of
the Rio Grande was a relatively recent development. This
section will briefly outline some of the more important events
that marked Canada's increasing involvement with Nicaragua,
keeping in mind that, "it is most difficult in the Central
American context to treat any particular country in isolation".
(1)
It wasn't until the second decade of the twentieth
century that Canadians began to establish links with Nicaragua.
In 1916, Winnipeg businessmen developed an interest in building
a railroad through the country. Negotiations produced a
contract, but then a hold was put on the project. "The reason
appears to have been that a United States company had used
their influence to gain the concession." (2) (Nicaragua was
under U.S. occupation at the time.) Aside from some minor
investment, trade, and banking activities, Canada had almost no
involvement with Nicaragua over the next several decades.
However, a dispute over Nicaragua in 1928 exemplified a
theme that emerged early in the century and which has persisted
to the present: Canada's concern to avoid taking positions vis-a-vis Latin America which would unduly upset the United
States. The Mexican delegation to the Sixth Inter-American
Conference of the Pan American Union considered proposing
Canadian membership in that organization. But President Coolidge had just ordered the re-occupation of Nicaragua by
U.S. Marines. Haiti was also occupied, while Mexico, Panama,
Colombia, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic had all been
recently invaded by the U.S. Ottawa could not support this
intervention and feared that joining the Union would require
Canada to vote with the Latin Americans against the U.S.
re-occupation of Nicaragua, thereby antagonizing Washington.
Canada chose the safe course -- avoiding membership and,
therefore, the need to take a stand.
Canada recognized the regime of the first Somoza soon
after he seized power in 1936, and Nicaragua maintained a
consulate in Montreal in the late 1930s and '40s. A trade
agreement was signed between Ottawa and Managua in 1946, and in
the 1950s Canadian Catholic missionaries, many from Quebec,
became increasingly involved in Nicaragua and other Central
American countries. (3)
Canada's refusal to break diplomatic relations with Cuba
in 1959 was the first of a number of moves which signalled the
beginning of a somewhat more independent Canadian policy for
the region, due partly to a growing Canadian interest in Latin
America. This action was followed, in 1960, by a decision of
the Department of External Affairs (DEA) to establish a Latin
American Division. Canada joined the Pan American Institute of
Geography and History in 1960 and the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America in 1961. A diplomatic mission, opened in September of that year in Costa Rica, was also
accredited to Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, and El Salvador.
When the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was -5- established in 1968, Central America was one area of concentration. CIDA's mandate, "to support the efforts of developing countries in fostering economic growth and social programs", was based on skills at which Canadians were noted: education, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and public administration. (4)
'On 29 May 1968, newly elected Prime Minister, Pierre
Trudeau, acknowledged this change of direction for Canadian foreign policy: "We have to take greater account of the ties which bind us to other nations in this hemisphere - in the
Caribbean, Latin America - and of their economic needs. We have to explore new avenues of increasing our political and economic relations with Latin America where more than four hundred million people will live by the turn of the century and where we have substantial interests." (5) Several months later, Trudeau dispatched five ministers and 30 civil servants on month-long tour of nine Latin American countries. It was the largest official delegation ever sent to the region. These moves were based on the new government's decision to broaden its relations with other countries for purposes of trade and investment, and in order to diminish Canadian vulnerability vis-a-vis the United States.
In 1969, the birth of several Latin-America oriented organizations in Canada signified the continued rise in this area's importance to Canadians. The Canadian Association of
Latin American Studies, formed to foster the spread of information, published "North-South: Canadian Journal of Latin
American Studies". This year also witnessed the formation of -6-
the Ontario Cooperative Programme in Latin American and
Caribbean Studies, whose purpose was to link students of Latin
America within the province. The Canadian Association for
Latin America (and the Caribbean), (CALA), was created by 50
corporations in the same year. This influential group of
business people promoted investment and trade, and developed
strong ties with Canadian government officials.
Ottawa's foreign policy review from 1968 to 1970 produced
a major report: "Foreign Policy for Canadians". While Latin
America rated its own discussion, it was significant that even
at this late date there was no specific mention of Central
America (or Nicaragua) in the report. The following section
reflects key elements of Canada's post-war approach to foreign
relations:
Special note is taken of Latin America, acknowledging that this area is becoming a 'force in the world'. The bases of Canada's interests and relations with Latin America are identified as: economic growth, enhancement of the quality of life, and the promotion of social justice. The objective of the new policy is to develop Canada's distinct position in the Western Hemisphere as a middle power with the aspects of both a developed and a developing country. Closer relations with Latin America were expected to enhance Canadian sovereignty and independence through trade and investment, while 'closer dialogue' about world problems would enhance Canada's capacity to play an independent role in international affairs.'" (6)
Canada's actions reflected this new attitude towards Latin
America, which itself was part of the Third Option, the Trudeau government's plan to decrease Canadian dependence on the U.S. by broadening commercial and political links with Europe, Japan, and
Third World nations. For instance, Canada joined both the Pan
American Health Organization and the Inter-American Institute of -7-
Agricultural Sciences in 1971. Canada assumed "permanent observer" status in the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1972, while maintaining a policy of non-membership. (7) This approach was consistent with Canada's traditional reluctance to become involved in political issues which would force Ottawa to take sides with the
United States against Latin America or vice versa - exactly the kind of problem that Canada would later face over Nicaragua.
In the same year, Canada joined the Inter-American Development
Bank, to which Ottawa had contributed, but without a vote, since
1964. "By that time having established the criteria for its own bilateral aid programmes, the government felt its foreign policy goals would not be lost in increasing aid through a multilateral agency". (8) Canada's initial subscription was US $263.5 million, which grew by 1983 to US $983.6 million. (9) Ottawa responded to the needs of the private sector by joining the IADB, hoping to give
Canadian firms significant advantages in trade and other commercial activities in the developing countries. (10) The next major step was Trudeau's visits to Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela in 1976, (his first as Prime Minister), followed by a major trade tour to Latin
America for Canadian business in early 1979, organized by Industry,
Trade and Commerce. These actions helped to raise Canada's profile while establishing important lines of communication.
In spite of these increasing ties to Latin America, Nicaragua remained virtually ignored, still sharing an ambassador with four other countries. Although Canada began its bilateral aid program to Latin America in 1971, there was no assistance for Nicaragua.
In the six years following the Nicaragua earthquake in 1972, Canada provided $3.54 million in aid to the Somoza regime. (11) -8-
Table I. Canadian Aid to Nicaragua 1973-78 ($ millions)
I 11 c
/. Y7 ,/3 1
Source: LAWG Resource Kit
The Royal Bank had loaned the Somoza regime $42.8 million, but rejected a request for a further $20 million at the time of the popular uprisings in September 1978. (12) (Most of the money which had been loaned to the Nicaraguan state development agency,
INFONAC, went to firms controlled by the Somoza family.)
This brief overview demonstrates the two most important aspects of Canadian policy towards pre-Sandinista Nicaragua.
First, there really was no policy, in the sense of being detailed or well thought-out. While not completely ignored, Nicaragua's profile in Ottawa was so low as to be barely distinguishable from those of dozens of other small Third World countries. Nicaragua was not a stop for the major official Canadian tours. The lack of substantial economic or other ties largely accounted for Canada's lack of interest. The Royal was the only Canadian bank involved with Nicaragua and Noranda owned a gold mine, but neither interest was substantial. As Table II. indicates, trade relations remained minimal. (13) -9-
Table II. Canadian-Nicaraguan Trade 1975-79 ($ millions)
/1?S
EXPORTS ¥-0 v.?
/MPORTS . /3.0 (from Nicaragua) I3.0
Source: Murray, 1981-82
A second reason for this lack of interest was the view that
Nicaragua, like all the nations of Central America, was considered
to be in a superpower's sphere of influence. "A review of
Canadian-Latin American relations, 1866-1968, reveals
that... British and U.S. influences have also determined the extent
of Canada's ties with the region." (14) Both of these countries
had significant economic and political interest in Latin America in
this period. U.S. and British interference in Nicaragua began as a
rivalry over railroads, bank loans, and the potential for an
interocean canal.
By the start of the Trudeau era, an upswing in Canadian
involvement in Latin America was discernable. The reasons had only
a little to do with Canadian trade and business ties. While
commercial ties did grow significantly in absolute terms, as a
percentage of total Canadian exports, Latin America's share
increased only marginally, from 5.0% in 1965 and 5.2% in 1980. As
a percentage, imports from that region actually dropped slightly
over this period, from 6.3% to 5.9%. The same measures for Central
America show substantial drops in trade. (15) -10-
Table III. Canadian-Central American Trade
/465 mo MIS 33 2.3 2. /
2.1 i.r /.2
Source: Murray, 1981-82
However, by the late 1970s another factor began to demand more of Ottawa's attention: the development of significant threats to the stability of the countries of Central America. Canada had both political and economic reasons to be concerned about turmoil in the region. Total Canadian investment topped $300 million, and trade
"grew nearly 200% between 1975 and 1979. In 1980 it shot up by an additional 34%". (16) The Canadian Ambassador's post in San Jose, which had been vacant for almost a year, was filled in 1979 by
Douglas Sirrs. His background was commercial rather than diplomatic, and one report claimed that Sirrs' "thinking runs more towards dollars and cents than human rights". Sirrs himself stressed that "the importance of this area in economic terms" for
Canada was "a very definite opportunity for us to become involved in this part of the world, where there is a need for the technology, skills, and expertise we've developed and which lend themselves to the kind of development required here." Sirrs added that Canada didn't "get too involved" with the politics of the region because Ottawa did not want to "intrude". (17)
The overthrow of the U.S.-backed Nicaraguan dictator Anastacio
Somoza, "the last Marine", underlined the seriousness of the unrest -11- that was growing in Central America. As the casualty toll rose in
Nicaragua's civil war, the primary response of the Conservative government was through CIDA, which provided $434,514 in humanitarian assistance. "A $1.8 million petition from the
International Committee of the Red Cross was met with a $180,000 grant from CIDA..." (18) Meanwhile, External Affairs supported the proposals made by U.S. Secretary of State Vance to the OAS on June
21 for a "peace-keeping force", under U.S. control, to be dispatched to Nicaragua. However, no other OAS member backed the plan, which they perceived to be a thinly disguised form of U.S. intervention to prevent a Sandinista victory. Washington hoped to ensure a continuation of the old "Somocista" system, without the presence of the dictator himself. Ottawa continued to recognize the Somoza regime while issuing statements deploring the violence and bloodshed. "In a June 22nd meeting with Mr. Pastor
Valle-Garay, representing the Nicaraguan Provisional Government,
External Affairs said there was precedent neither for withdrawing recognition from a government like Somoza's nor for recognizing a provisional one like the Nicaraguan government-in-exile." (19)
Moreover, the Clark government did not oppose a $66 million loan from the International Monetary Fund to Somoza as late as
June, 1979, only one month before the dictator fled to Miami. Many
Nicaraguans warned that the money would end up in Somoza's pockets.
(When he fled, Somoza left only $3.5 million in the Treasury and a foreign debt of $1.6 billion.) In July, Flora MacDonald, Secretary of State for External Affairs, said that her "government has viewed with growing concern the growth and persistant violation of human rights by the Nicaraguan authorities" and stated that Canada had -12-
expressed this position at the United Nations and the OAS, but
there was no reference to self-determination for Nicaragua or to
post-war aid. Neither did MacDonald criticize Washington's
political manouvers. Canada withheld recognition of the
provisional Sandinista government until July 24, after Washington
established relations, and a full week after Somoza had escaped to
Miami. (20) -13-
b) Political Relations
The defeat of the short-lived Clark government and the return of Pierre Trudeau did not immediately result in a change of policy towards the Sandinistas. Assistance for reconstruction remained minimal. At the political level,
Ambassador Sirrs, for example, deplored the power of the
"Marxist" Sandinistas and expressed support for "moderate elements". (He also stated that the junta in El Salvador was
"seeking a democratic solution" in that country and represented
"the only viable alternative".) (21) Still, many members of the Liberal government, including the Prime Minister, were inclined to view the Nicaraguan revolution as a product of internal factors such as poverty and oppression, rather than as part of "communist conspiracy" orchestrated by the U.S.S.R. and
Cuba. Canada's attitude coincided with the perspective of most
Latin American governments. For instance, when Mexican
President Lopez Portillo visited Ottawa in May 1980, he and
Prime Minister Trudeau issued a joint communique which noted
"with concern the increasing socio-economic instability" in
Central America, and expressed the hope that these problems would be overcome "through the free expression of the will of the respective peoples and without foreign interference." (22)
Although this statement was ambiguous, it did signify Canada's growing concern over developments in Central America, particularly the increasing interventionism and escalating violence. According to then Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs Allan Gottlieb, 1980 was "the moment of major -14- change...in Canadian foreign policy (when) we identified the
Caribbean region, including Central America, as a key area of interest for Canada." (23)
The inauguration of the Reagan regime in 1981 brought to power a government which was determined to fight a "new cold war" and which, as part of its strategy, decided to "prevent consolidation of a Sandinista regime" by cutting off economic aid and by endorsing a' "covert" CIA plan to destabilize
Nicaragua. (24) Canada did not share the enthusiasm for such an ideological crusade. In an interview published in January,
1981, External Affairs Minister Mark MacGuigan seemed to try to distance his government somewhat from U.S. policy in Central
America. The Minister commented that "[t]he danger is that an
American administration might, as some have in the past, tend to see the North-South relationship on the same East-West lines, and to believe that they had to be hawkish towards countries in the Third World that are not directed by Moscow."
(25) But MacGuigan later indicated that Canada would acquiesce in Washington's plans when, in March, he told Parliament: "I am not aware that we have any serious obligation in that part of the world, in Central America, which is not an area of traditional Canadian interest." (26)
When Reagan visited Ottawa on March 10, MacGuigan saw a convergence of Canadian and U.S. approaches to Central America:
"There was no difference between the positions of our two governments, and indeed, there was no emphasis in American thought and planning on a military solution." (27) This formulation, with the implied hope (or naive belief) that the -15-
United States would not pursue "a military solution" in Central
America, exemplifies the difficult task facing the Trudeau
government. It feared the consequences of Washington's belligerence towards the Sandinistas, but it was wary of
angering the new Reagan administration.
Canada's next major inolvement in the region came in July when, along with the United States, Mexico, and Venezuela, it helped organize the Nassau Group, (a forerunner of the
Caribbean Basin Initiative). The avowed intention was to
increase aid and stability in that region, but skeptics were
suspicious of Washington's motives. In testimony to a
Parliamentary Sub-committee, Conservative MP Douglas Roche
speculated that "the net effect of this joint effort...will have been for Canada to have been used in throwing a cloak of
respectability over the continuation of the U.S. policy of military aid" to the region. (28)
But as the year went on, differences began to emerge
between Canada's view of Nicaragua and that of the Reagan administration. This change was due primarily to the
increasingly militaristic approach taken by the United States, especially the CIA's creation of the anti-Sandinista "Contras", who were attacking Nicaragua from sanctuaries in Honduras and
Costa Rica. This divergence with the U.S. set the tone for the different approaches that subsequently evolved. While Canada was hoping that a positive relationship with the Sandinistas would help to "moderate" their policies, Washington was relying on various types of economic and military coercion. Such tactics went against Canada's traditional preference for -16- diplomatic solutions and compromises. In this vein, MacGuigan told the House on December 2 that, despite some "human rights" concerns, Canada should continue to provide aid to Nicaragua.
Speaking to the External Affairs Committee, MacGuigan cited the alleged closure of a newspaper, disruption of opposition party rallies, and arrests of prominent businessmen as the causes of worry. But the minister said that he feared an aid cut-off might push Nicaragua "in a direction we would not want to see it go."(29)
Parliament was also growing concerned with the way in which the troubles in Central America were multiplying. An all-party delegation of MPs, including Bob Ogle (NDP), Maurice
Dupras (L), and Flora MacDonald (PC), made a fact-finding tour in late January 1982 that included Costa Rica, Nicaragua and El
Salvador. They met with government officials, church leaders, and businessmen, and, though the visit "did not modify their views very much...many of the members were disenchanted...with the briefing on Central America from Canada's ambassador in
Costa Rica, who covers the six countries. They felt Ottawa must be getting a very one-sided view of the changes going on there if the dissertation they received on the Soviet-Cuban
'master plan' for Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala was an example of his reporting". (30)
Canada's uneasiness with Reagan's hawkish approach continued to mount, as outlined in a speech MacGuigan delivered to the University of Toronto Law Faculty in March, 1982:
"I don't believe that when a country chooses a socialist or even a Marxist path it necessarily buys a 'package' which automatically injects it into the -/7-
Soviet orbit. This...is where our views and those of the USA may diverge. The internal systems adopted by the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, whatever these systems may be, do not in themselves pose a security threat to this hemisphere." (31)
This was the clearest presentation yet of how differently the two countries viewed the implications of change in Central
America.
Canada's estrangement from U.S. policies increased when
Allan MacEachen, the Deputy Prime Minister, replaced MacGuigan as Secretary of State for External Affairs in October 1982.
With the appointment of MacEachan, Canadian policy towards the
Sandinista changed "slightly". (32) MacEachen, although wary of Sandinista "Marxism", understood that the war against the
CIA-supported Contras necessitated the proclamation of a "State of Emergency". He was impressed with the improvements that the
Sandinista junta had made in health and education, and especially heartened by the decision to hold national elections in November 1984. MacEachen also approved the idea of sending observers to monitor the voting.
His hand was strengthened by the final report of the
Parliamentary Sub-committee on Canada's Relations with Latin
America and the Caribbean, which had begun its work in May
1981. The creation of the Sub-committee was an indication of the new importance of Latin America to the public, to business, and to the government. The first such group in Canadian history, it was composed of eight Liberals, five Conservatives, and two New Democrats. Their report, issued in November 1982, urged fundamental changes in Canadian policy towards that part of the world. The study recommended, inter alia: * A hemispheric conference on Central America and the
Caribbean to protect the area from superpower intervention;
* Using aid selectively to promote human rights;
* That Central America and the Caribbean be made regions
of concentration in Canada's foreign poicy;
* That international financial institutions should base
their aid projects on developmental rather than ideological
grounds;
* That at least one more Canadian embassy should be
opened in Central America;
* That the underlying structural causes for the region's
problems be given greater consideration in seeking to promote
stability;
* That negotiations between countries, including the
U.S., Cuba, and others, be actively encouraged in order to
resolve conflicts;
* That human rights, defined as "both the right to a
decent material existence, such as access to food, shelter,
employment, and health care, and civil and political rights",
become "one of the essential purposes and guiding lights" of
foreign policy; and
* That Canada join the OAS.
Significantly, the Sub-committee described "the promotion
of stability" as "the central, medium-term objective of
Canadian policy". (33)
Meanwhile, the Trudeau government tried to carry on a balancing act between what it saw as unwarrented interference
by Washington in the sovereign affairs of another country and its fear of antagonizing the Reagan administration. For instance, in December MacEachen publicly opposed U.S. plans to overthrow the Sandinistas, while strongly supporting^
Mexican-Venezuelan initiative for talks between Washington,
Tegucigalpa, and Managua. Speaking for MacEachen, DEA official
Charles LaPointe told the House that Canada "made representations to the Americans to express our concern and consternation vis-a-vis destabilizing interference by foreign powers in Nicaragua's domestic affairs." (34) Several months later Trudeau echoed that position when he said that Canadians
"object to the interference in the internal affairs of other countries by any major power, even if that power is our friend". (35) It was the Prime Minister's strongest statement to date. But rhetoric was as far as Trudeau was prepared to go in opposing the U.S.
During this period, Ottawa was still worried by its perception of the course of domestic evolution in Nicaragua.
When Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel d 'Escoto paid a visit to Ijttawa February 14-16, 1983, MacEachen remarked during one meeting that "many Canadians" are concerned that the Sandinista government was abandoning "noble democratic principles" in favor of "repressive Marxism-Leninism". (36)
As an expression of solidarity and independence vis-a-vis the United States, the formation of the Contadora group in
January was a remarkable event in Latin American history, and one which provided Canada with a chance to press its concerns through a multilateral forum. The Contadora countries, Mexico,
Venezuela, Panama, and Colombia, were hoping to find a -20- diplomatic solution to foreign intervention in Central America while demilitarizing the region. Although Trudeau had sent personal letters of encouragement to the presidents of Mexico and Venezuela when they suggested the creation of the group,
Ottawa, again, took a cautious approach:
In the Commmons, Trudeau stated that Contadora's goal of ending outside interference in Central America is shared by Canada and the U.S. "and certainly we are prepared to assist them in the obtaining of that objective". He did not elaborate. A senior External Affairs official said...Canada would be ready to take part in peace initiatives in El Salvador and Nicaragua but only at the invitation of those countries. Trudeau has come under fire for his statements on U.S. involvement in Central America following a meeting with U.S. President Ronald Reagan last week. U.S. and Canadian officials reported after the meeting that the prime minister specified that any nation has a right to choose its own political system , "but when that society exports trouble, that is a different matter." (37)
In May, four months after its inception, MacEachen announced Canada's full support for the Contadora process. (38)
The growing distance between Canadian and U.S. policies was evident when, in late July, MacEachen referred to a six-point
Nicaraguan peace proposal as, "an encouraging and positive step." (39) But Ottawa said nothing when the U.S. summarily rejected the initiative. Further disagreements surfaced when the Reagan administration increased its efforts to politicize
International Financial Institutions (IFIs): the World Bank
Group, the IMF, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).
Nicaragua was a special target of the United States. The consensus at the IFIs was to oppose moves by Washington to obstruct "hard" loans to Managua. (The U.S. had veto power over "soft" loans, i.e. long-term, low-interest loans). -21-
"Decisions taken by the board of these institutions are generally based on consensus. Canada has always joined that consensus with respect to loans to Nicaragua." (40)
While at the United Nations in October, Trudeau met with
Commandante Ortega while both were at the UN, but nothing apparently came of this encounter.
A minor row erupted in the Commons after an official with
Canada's embassy in Costa Rica revealed on November 14 that
Canada planned to ask the U.S. to evacuate Canadian nationals from Nicaragua in the event of war or invasion. Canadians in
Nicaragua objected strongly to any scheme "to be saved by the government that has put our lives, and those of Nicaraguans, in danger." (41)
As Washington's intervention increased, Ottawa was becoming more concerned and more willing to disagree openly with Reagan's anti-Sandinista crusade. In the House on December
20, MacEachen again emphasized that, "Canada has opposed the militarization of Central America. We have expressed those views to the Government of the United States on a number of occasions." The minister added that he had reached no conclusion regarding halting aid to Honduras because of that country's support for the Contras. (42)
The visit of Colombian Foreign Minister Rodrigo Lloreda in
February 1984 was the occasion for MacEachen to outline the major elements of Canada's changing position. He emphasized the need for economic development in Central America in order to overcome social inequities. The Minister reiterated
Ottawa's support for the Contadora process, indicated that -22-
Canada would seek observer status with its commissions, and restated his oppostition to third party intervention in Central
America. The Secretary then attacked some elements of the recently-released Kissinger Report because "military aid is a major component...Militarization engenders political polarization...weakening those moderate political forces which...are indispensable if national reconciliation in these countries is to be achieved." He admitted that "[t]here is a growing Canadian public interest in Central America. There is every reason for Canadians to be interested and concerned.
Geography alone is a reason. It is the closest area to us of instability and East/West confrontation... We oppose continued military support for anti-Sandinista insurgents..." (My emphasis) (43) This was the Minister's stongest statement to date on the unrest in Central America, and indicative of a growing fear about the potential dangers of Washington's escalation of hostilities.
For his part, Lloreda welcomed increased Canadian interest in Central America, saying that the OAS was effectively paralyzed. Stating that he did not want to see the region become a superpower battleground, Lloreda added, "We want their presence to create, not destroy...Among industrialized nations,
Canada has the best title to exercise a positive influence in
Central America." (44)
Seeking to use that "positive influence", MacEachen announced that he would visit Nicaragua and several other
Central American countries in April, the first Canadian minister to do so. The trip was a response to "mounting -23- concern in Parliament and the media about deteriorating conditions in the region that threaten to turn into widespread conflicts... Central America and the Caribbean are key areas for
Canadian foreign policy.." (45) MacEachen consulted for two days in Washington with U.S. Secretary of State Schultz before heading to Central America. MacEachen refused a public request from Schultz to add El Salvador to his itinerary. He indicated that he hoped to get a first-hand look at the situation and "to test Canadian policy against the reality". (46) During the talks, U.S. officials denied any involvement in the mining of
Nicaraguan ports, which had just come to light. (U.S. official
Langhorn Motley told [now] Ambassador Allan Gotlieb the same story on March 24.) (47)
During his three-day visit to Nicaragua, MacEachen held discussions with deputy foreign ministers Nora Astorga and
Victor Tinoco, Agriculture Minister Jaime Wheelock, the director of the Nicaraguan Reconstruction Agency, and junta member Daniel Ortega. He also met with church officials and leaders of opposition groups. MacEachen stated that his government was considering the opening of a diplomatic mission in Managua, but that budgetary rather than political reasons were holding up the process. Regarding the Nicaraguan elections, the Minister rejected Reagan's condemnations, saying he preferred to wait and see, then "judge them by observing... not blinded by ideological blinders." At the same time he warned Nicaraguan Foreign Minister D 'Escoto that criticism of the United States might alter Canadian attitudes.
But Canadian officials took pains to state that they would "not -24- alter Canadian policy at Washington's behest." (48) Speaking in Tegucigalpa at the end of his trip, MacEachen continued to maintain that Honduran support for the Contras would not affect the $90 million in proposed Canadian aid to that country. He justified this position by declaring, "What would we do then in
Nicaragua about the allegations that they are actively supporting the Salvadoran guerrillas?", then reiterated his view that Canadian economic assistance should not be used to pressure other nations. (49)
Canada reacted negatively to the mining of Nicaraguan ports by agents of the United States. While in Managua,
MacEachen publicly denounced the mining as "an element of tension that doesn't contribute in the least to resolving the situation in Central America." (50) On April 10, International
Trade Minister Gerald Regan told the Commons that Canada's
"concern...has been conveyed to the U.S. government... We support the rule of law, and we believe that the rule of law should apply in relation to this matter". But Regan admitted that, while Canada complained to the U.S. about the violence against Nicaragua in general, the mining itself was not mentioned during MacEachen's talks with Schultz.* (51)
* Trudeau said that Canada would not help with the removal of the mines because of a practice of not sending ships into dangerous areas without a United Nations mandate. (Canadian shipping to Nicaragua was not seriously impeded.) (52) -25-
n the 11th, Trudeau refused to condemn the U.S., claiming that he did not know who was responsible for "this act of terrorism." Still striving to keep a "balanced" approach,
Trudeau went on to say that, "If we can ascertain that the acts are coming specifically from the U.S. administration, we will condemn them, as we have condemned the use of arms in the area by the U.S. and Cuba." * (53) As was typical in his statements on Nicaragua, Trudeau was unable to say anything negative about
U.S. policy without making it clear that he held the U.S.S.R. and/or Cuba equally culpable. Another example occured when the
Prime Minister told the House on May 7 that Central American problems "...are more of a socio-economic nature and should not be turned into a(n)...ideological confrontation between East and West. That meant regretting any military presence, not only from Washington but from Cuba interposing itself for the
Soviet Union." (54)
In a CBC interview upon his return, MacEachen said that
Canada's differences with Washington "have become even clearer on this mining question". This emphatic position was underlined by the Minister's praise of the Sandinistas: "I think that we have to acknowledge that required changes have taken place in Nicaragua... that improvements have taken place."
(55) This statement was the most positive remark that any high
Canadian official had made to date about the Sandinistas.
MacEachen's words and actions indicated that the Minister felt
* On the previous day, the U.S. Senate overwhelmingly condemned the mining after concluding that it was directed by the CIA. -26- himself forced to be more candid about Canadian differenceswith the U.S. over Nicaragua.
The mining, along with the recent U.S. invasion of Grenada, raised fears that the U.S. might increase its "gunboat diplomacy" towards Nicaragua. One of Canada's concerns was its dependence on U.S. sources for information about Nicaragua, and this problem was an important reason for considering the establishment of a Canadian embassy in Managua. When questioned in the House on April 16 by Pauline Jewett about this possibility, MacEachen responded that Canadian personnel in Costa Rica were attempting to keep Ottawa in touch with the situation in Nicaragua. MacEachen admitted that "it would be better if we could establish a full-time embassy in
Managua... However, that decision will have to be taken in the light of budgetary considerations and priorities elsewhere..."
(56) A spokesperson for External Affairs claimed that Canada's new ambassador to Costa Rica, Francis Filleul, "spends at least one week a month (in Nicaragua, and)...the Canadian government is quite informed." (57) Only a few months earlier, however, according to NDP MP Ian Waddell, the Mexican
Ambassador to Nicaragua said that he had not heard from the
Canadian ambassador for a year and a half. (58)
Canada's support for a negotiated settlement in Central
America prompted Canada to send observers to the three
Contadora working groups, while MacEachen denied a report that he was considering the use of Canadian troops to monitor any ceasefire. (59) Canada's increasing willingness to openly challenge the assumptions and militaristic actions of the U.S. -27- towards Nicaragua was also illustrated at a forum held on April
30 at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington. Liberal MP
Maurice Dupras was joined by Ambassador Gotlieb and Claude
Charland, Assistant Deputy Minister (External), in outlining
Canada's disagreements. While these remarks generally constituted one of the clearest public breaks yet with the
Reagan administration, Charland made a point of stating that,
"...I do not see that our objectives with respect to Nicaragua are so widely different." (60)
The three-day visit of Mexican President de la Madrid to
Ottawa in May was seen by some observers as an important gesture acknowledging Canada's opposition to U.S. policy and
Contadora's need for Canadian support. De la Madrid expressed the need for the "collaboration and joint participation of
Canada and Mexico in solving regional problems". He urged "a new dialogue" between North and Central American countries to ensure peace. "Mexico and the Contadora group reject (the idea) that the Central American problem should become a battleground between the two great world powers. Canada has expressed the same opinion. I believe that Canada can be a very important element in working with the Contadora group."
(61) A joint communique expressed concern over "the increasing tension, the regional arms race, destabilizing activities and the foreign military presence in Central America". (62)
Nevertheless, neither man brought up the question of cooperating to pressure the U.S. to withdraw its military presence from Central America, or reports that "the U.S. administration is planning to pressure Canada and Mexico in a -28- bid to get some support for its own approach in Latin America".
(63)
Prime Minister Trudeau left office shortly thereafter. -29-
c) Development Assistance
The Canadian International Development Agency was formed in 1968. Its immediate predecessor was transferred to the
Department of External Affairs in 1960 from the Department of
Trade and Commerce. Its mandate is to operate and administer
Canada's official international development assistance program.
Canada's Latin American aid program commenced in 1970, but
little aid was provided to Managua because of the corrupt and oppressive nature of Somoza's rule. Although it recognized the dictatorship, "Canada did not support the regime". (64) Total bilateral aid disbursements to Nicaragua from 1971 to 1980 were
$3,740,000. (65) (No Export Development Corporation loans or credits were given during this period.)
An exception to this policy occured after a devastating earthquake struck Nicaragua on 23 December 1972. Canada responded to this emergency with a food-aid package worth over
$1 million, plus $2.5 million in "grants and concessionary
loans for trucks, fire engines, other heavy equipment, and prefabricated buildings for use as hospitals..." Subsequently,
$90,000 was provided by CIDA to train 400 apprentice construction workers. (66) Direct Canadian bilateral aid subsequently dropped off, so that by fiscal year 1976/77, for example, it totaled just $570,000. (Fiscal years begin on
April 1.) This figure fell to $400,000 the following year, and no direct aid at all was given in FY 78/79, as the dictatorship
increased its repression in the effort to crush the anti-Somoza rebellion. CIDA did, however, contribute $185,000 during this -30- period under its "International Emergency Relief" program to help the victims of the civil conflict. (67)
Even after diplomatic recognition of the new Sandinista government, reconstruction aid from Canada was slow in coming.
An unofficial group from Nicaragua was told that aid to the war-ravaged country was small because of "budgetary restraints." (68) CIDA's attitude to the new leadership in
Nicaragua seems to have been cautious at first. "The Canadian government to date [Oct. 31, 1979] has not made Nicaragua a country of priority for bilateral aid, and most Canadian assistance initiatives have been taken by non-governmental associations in cooperation with community agencies in
Nicaragua itself". (69)
The first official Canadian assistance to post-war
Nicaragua consisted of $655,000 for a study of food
self-sufficiency and $107,000 channelled through the Red Cross.
(70) In June 1980 CIDA agreed to provide $250,000 in matching funds to Canadian NGiQ's which were raising money to help the
Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign. CIDA had originally balked at the plan due to its perception of "Cuban influence" and a
"radical curriculum". "Following letters of concern and visitations from many... Canadian organizations and individuals, and upon receiving the report of the April visit by a team of
four representatives of the Metropolitan Toronto YMCA", CIDA reversed its policy and agreed to provide the funds. (71)
In this period (FY 1979/80), CIDA provided only $200,000
in direct aid and about the same for relief projects. (72) But with the exception of one fiscal year, (1982/83, when no food -31-
aid was given), Canadian aid to .Nicaragua showed a steady
increase that totaled over $24 million dollars by FY 1983/84.
These figures include direct aid, Mission Administered Funds,
NG|| contributions (including matching CIDA grants), food aid, and funding from the Industrial Cooperation and Institutional
Cooperation programs. * (Appendix 2)
The initial low level of assistance from the Trudeau government towards Managua invited charges that Ottawa was deliberately ignoring Nicaragua's desperate need for aid. In a
report published in July, Ambassador Sirrs denied that Canada was boycotting the Sandinista government. "I think what has happened is no policy, rather than any decision to boycott."
Sirrs added, "Nicaragua has never been designated as an aid-receiving nation and that dates back...to the Somoza era, because of his dreadful human rights record." (73)
A team of Canadian aid experts visited Nicaragua in
November 1980 and again early in 1981 to look into a
three-to-five year aid package focusing on forestry and water problems. The team was impressed with the Nicaraguans with whom they worked, and felt that the Nicaraguan government had
largely eliminated the previously endemic corruption.
Ambassador Sirrs, however, insisted that aid would be contingent upon Nicaragua maintaining a mixed economy, political pluralism, and a policy of non-intervention. He
* These figures do not include multilateral assistance provided through agencies such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the Red Cross. (75) -32- acknowleged that Canada was "a little slow" to respond to events in Nicaragua and that the embassy's resources were at the same level as in 1979. The ambassador added, "There's always a payback (for Canada) in trade. There's a humanitarian element as well. We need an enlightened view of development aid." (74)
These considerations, and the increasing pressure on the government by Canadians, led j|ttawa to reclassify Nicaragua as a "project country" in 1981, "although implementation has been slow due to political pressure within External Affairs". (76)
But it was Honduras which received the highest priority designation as a "core country". This action was decided "not by political whim but by socio-economic levels of development", according to CIDA. (77) "Project country" status opens the way for Canadian assistance on a project-by-project basis, while a
"core" country is entitled to "a concentrated program of development assistance... over a multi-year planning period..."
(78) (Appendix 1)
In February 1982 CIDA announced its intention.almost to triple the amount of Canadian assistance to Central America.
CIDA allocated $106 million for the region over the next five years, in contrast to the $40 million spent in the previous five years, (and only $20 million from 1972 - 1977). The government asserted that its decision was based on "its deep concern for the conditions of poverty and economic dislocation in Central America which lie beneath the current instability and traumatic social change there." (79) The actual value of this increase, however, was very little once inflation and the -33- devaluation of the Canadian dollar were considered. The distribution of this aid package reflected Canadian priorities for Central America. Honduras, the only core country in the region, was alloted the most aid, approximately 40% of the total. This assistance was allocated despite the knowledge that Honduras was serving as a base for armed attacks on
Nicaragua by the ex-soldiers in Somoza's hated National Guard
(including thousands who had been pardoned by the Sandinista government). Democratic Costa Rica would be given 30%, while war-torn Nicaragua would receive only 20%. (80) (Aid to both
Guatemala and El Salvador had been terminated because of large-scale and systematic human rights abuses, as well as wide-spread corruption.)
In June, MacGuigan announced that the Canadian government was providing Nicaragua with $4.5 million in food aid. The
16,000 tons of grain was "a response to Nicaragua's critical food situation," which itself was partly due to the cancellation of a $9.6 million U.S. loan in February. (81)
Subsequently, in FY 1983/84, direct bilateral aid to Nicaragua topped $4 million (compared with a quarter million the previous year), while NGp funds more than doubled to over $3 million.
(82)
On 13 January 1984, the Canada approved a long standing (3 years) Nicaraguan request for a $13.4 million line of credit for agricultural supplies and equipment. This aid package was the largest ever given to Nicaragua, but the funds were tied to the sale of Canadian goods such as fertilizers, farm equipment, and Holstein calves. A $5 million plan for potable water -34- project was still stalled at CIDA. The interest-free loan was repayable in 50 years after a 10-year grace period. (83)
CIDA figures (Appendix 3) can give a false impression of
its aid priorities. Considering government-to-government
(bilateral) aid from FY 80/81 to FY 83/84, (a function of explicit CIDA decisions), every other Central American country except Panama received more direct aid than did Nicaragua.
"Nicaragua ended up with more CIDA dollars only because
Canadian NG0s concentrated projects there which in turn receive matching funds from CIDA. In fact, direct CIDA bilateral aid was less than half the CIDA aid passing through Canadian non-governmantal agencies." (84) (Funding ratios can be as high as 3:1.) While the low level of aid given during the
Somoza era was replaced by an uneven but significant growth, the small amount of direct, bilateral aid for Nicaragua
(compared to other Central American nations), is a revealing indication of Canadian policies. (85)
Table IV. Total Canadian Bi-lateral Aid to Central America
1980/81-83/84 ($ millions)
EL SALVADORCo^ra 'RICAGUATEMALA 'PANAMA
II. £5" 7.
i
Source: Central America Update July/Aug. 1984. -35-
It is significant that the CIDA will consider higher levels of aid to Nicaragua when peace is restored, i.e. if and when the United States ceases its overt hostility to the Sandinista government.
It is necesary to consider the pattern of distribution of
Canadian aid to Nicaragua in the light of the greater levels of corruption and inefficiency in Honduras, which receives the lion's share of assistance. In contrast, "Nicaragua has a good absorbing capacity", an official at External Affairs noted.
"The NGOs are well-organized. Corruption, bribery, and the like have all been wiped out. It's a remarkable thing in the
Latin American context." (86) Echoing this judgement, a CIDA representative described the Sandinista government as an
"honest administration". Asked if CIDA had any problems with the way Nicaragua handled Canadian assistance, she relied,
"None whatsoever." (87) She confirmed that the political situation in Nicaragua was a major factor in determining aid levels. But since the U.S.-backed regime in Honduras received significantly more assistance than Nicaragua, the question of what constitutes an acceptable "political situation" for Canada is unclear. This policy seems to contradict the assertions that the distribution of Canadian development assistance is not based on ideological grounds. Further, CIDA admits that
"...Canada has not developed a single, absolute normative standard against which to judge the human rights behaviour of other countries... The approach has been to try to assimilate human rights considerations into the broader matrix of foreign policy..." (88) It is reasonable to assume that good relations -36- with the United States are a key element of this "matrix", and that this consideration may have played a part in the decision to give so much aid to Honduras. Indeed, it can be argued that
Canada's aid policy reflects U.S. priorities in the region rather than a concern for the long-term development of Central
America, since Nicaragua has demonstrated that it uses its aid more efficiently. While the allotment of any assistance to the
Sandinista government would not please the U.S., the overall pattern of Canadian aid to the two countries was not unacceptable to the Reagan administration. However, Canada
"lined up with a majority of member countries in the
Inter-American Development Bank against moves by the United
States to cut off funds for Nicaragua..." (89) and, as mentioned, has consistently oppossed the politicization of the
International Financial Institutions.
Finally, it should be noted that, along with political and humanitarian motives, commercial considerations were an important factor in Canada's Official Development Assistance
(ODA) strategy. Overall, 80% of Ottawa's aid is "tied" to the purchase of Canadian goods, and CIDA claims that the ODA programme has brought substantial returns to Canada, opened up new markets abroad, and spurred international trade. (90)
Given the relatively small potential for trade with Nicaragua as well as the preferences of the Reagan administation, it is not surprising that Honduras was the recipient of the largest
Canadian aid package in Central America. -37-
Chapter 2 - Domestic Actors
a) Commercial Relations
Although trade with Central America in the 1970s and early
1980s did not increase as a proportion of Canada's total trade, the involvement of Canadian business had been growing significantly in absolute terms. As noted above, Canadian imports and exports with the region grew about 200% between
1975 and 1979, and by an additional 34% in 1980. Canadian investment in Central America topped $300 million by 1981. (1)
By late 1979, the Canadian Association for Latin America and the Caribbean had grown to 215 corporate members, from 50 just a decade earlier, an increase of over 400%. In a submission to the federal government, CALA stated: "We maintain close contact with all nations of the region, and in the major countries have supported the establishment of special bilateral relationships between the business communities of those countries and our own." (2)
Canadian investment and trade with Nicaragua, which had never been very high, suffered a sharp decrease as the civil war entered its last year. At the time of the Sandinista victory, Canada's Royal Bank was Nicaragua's third largest private creditor. "The Royal had lent over $42.8 million to
Nicaragua... and held about 15% to 20% of Nicaragua's debt to private foreign banks. (3) Three months after victory, the
Sandinistas nationalized the Empresa Minera El Setentrion,
Nicaragua's largest gold and silver mine, and a subsidiary of -38-
Noranda. "In 1975 Noranda's profit share was $3.9 million.
However, according to the company, profits received in the
three years preceeding the take-over totaled only $4.7
million." (4) The rate of pay under Somoza "for Noranda's
Nicaraguan workers [was] 56 cents/hour, under working
conditions that [former] Nicaraguan congressman E. Molina
[called] 'subhuman - the worst in the country'." In 1977
Noranda "called in the National Guard to end workers' protests
for better wages and working conditions. The protest leaders
were jailed and beaten." (Wages were tripled after
nationalization.) (5) In 1980, Arturo Cruz explained that the
takeover was part of a policy of giving Nicaragua ownership of
its own natural resources. But he asssured worried
stockholders that "we are not bandits. Our auditors are now
completing an analysis of the value of the Noranda properties
and they will be adequately compensated." (6)
As relations between the U.S. and the Sandinistas
deteriorated, new opportunities opened up in Nicaragua for
Canadians, and both exports and imports increased dramatically.
(7)
Table V. Canadian-Nicaraguan Trade 1979, 1980, 1984
(4f millions)
19 8V
IF.) (to Nicaragua)
£/r\VOF>TS 11.5" HH.O (fro* Nt'caraQvd) Source: Murray, 1981/82; Vancouver Sun (24 May 1985 -39-
The trade balance between the two countries favored
Nicaragua, partly because of Canadian efforts to increase trade with developing countries and partly because of Nicaragua's difficulties in obtaining financing. Canada was anxious to improve trade with Managua, but Nicaraguan ambassador Pastor
Valle-Garay felt that Canadian-Nicaraguan trade "has almost been ignored" by Ottawa. He added, "We felt that Canada would be able to deal with us fairly, that political ideologies would not make very much difference, as long as we are able to pay".
As the quantity of trade increased, so did the variety.
Canadian imports from Nicaragua included shrimp, lobster, coffee, and sesame seeds, as well as bananas and gold alloys.
"Canada is becoming increasingly important to Nicaragua as a supplier of basic consumer goods...such as powdered milk, wheat, pharmaceuticals, paper, transportation equipment and electrical appliances." Iron ore, aircraft parts, malt, aluminum, and chemicals were also exported to Nicaragua. (8)
Since Nicaragua's development plans focus on local industrialization, an important potential market exists for
"Canadian suppliers of motors, pumps, metal working and food processing equipment, agricultural tools and implements and many other capital goods and technologies suitable to small scale industry..." Companies which dealt with Nicaragua included IBM Canada, Canada Packers, R. A. Chisholm,
Johns-Manville Canada, Sherritt Mint, Connaught Laboratories,
Bristol-Meyers Canada Inc., Smith Kline & French Canada,
Westinghouse Canada, Canron Inc., Norcast Inc., and Scintrex -40-
Ltd., and others. To encourage trade, the federal government offered importers and exporters a number of programs and subsidies which totalled over $750,000 for Nicaraguan projects during the period 1980/84 (out of about $2.8 million for all of
Central America. But in 1984, a number of Canadian business representatives who had indicated an interest in exporting to
Nicaragua cited the "difficulty of obtaining insurance from the
Export Development Corporation (EDC) for commercial export credits as a serious obstacle to increased trade...At that time, all of Central America...was 'off cover' for regular EDC export credit insurance..." (9)
The figures cited above indicate how economic relations between Canada and Nicaragua (and all of Central America) increased. Moreover, for reasons of geography, resources, and development needs, there was a greater potential for trade and investment that would have benefited both countries. The- picture for trade between Canada and Nicaragua improved as U.S. hostility closed traditional markets in that country. Still, the diversion of Nicaraguan resources to the Contra war and the threat of a U.S. invasion severely limited the ability of
Nicaragua to buy or sell to Canada. An important distinction between prospects for trade and for investment should be noted here. Although instability hampers both forms of commercial relations, it depresses investment to a greater degree since the risk factor is increased significantly.
Growing trade with Nicaragua and the rest of the region created interests within the Canadian private sector that favored a peaceful resolution of the turmoil there. However, -41- the dominant concern of the business elite in Canada remained good relations with the United States. Nevertheless, corporations which depended on "peace, order, and good government" in the international arena as prerequisites for their commericial activities recognized the danger to trade and investment that accompanied strife and unrest. Given these various concerns, it was to be expected that the "business community" would not speak with a single voice as the militarization of Central America intensified. b) Non-Governmental Organizations
Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have played a significant part in the evolution of Canadian-Nicaraguan relations. But with a few exceptions (such as the Catholic
Church), NGOs had little involvement with Nicaragua before the
1979 Sandinista revolution. Perhaps the most important reason for this lack of interest was the nature of the Somoza dictatorship: most NGOs was felt that very little could be accomplished in conditions of such corruption and oppression.
The growing strength of the struggle against Somoza in the late
1970s not only focused more attention on Nicaragua, but gave
NGOs hope that future conditions might prove favorable for development assistance. The Sandinista victory sparked new enthusiasm among many NGOs, which perceived that the potential
for dramatic social change might present an opportunity for a thorough-going attack on underdevelopment.
This response mushroomed to the point that, by 1984, one observer could report, "Thousands of Canadians are showing their concern...in modest ways, and hundreds are risking their
security, their incomes, and their reputations by going to
(Nicaragua)...to do exhausting work, to witness border raids and refugee camps, to set up peace camps, and to return to
Canada in order to spread this first-hand information..." (10)
Labour
Even before Somoza's ouster, the Canadian Labour Congress
(CLC), representing two million trade unionists, asked the -43- federal government to recognize the Nicaraguan Provisional
Government of Reconstruction, sever relations with the dictatorship, publicly speak out on human rights abuses, and increase humanitarian aid to victims of the civil war. As mentioned, the Clark government's response was limited to general statements deploring the suffering. Immediately following the Sandinista triumph, a delegation from the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which included the CLC's Executive Secretary, visited Nicaragua.
They reported finding Nicaraguans "starving, destitute, and economically ruined." In response, the CLC launched a drive to raise $500,000 in relief for Nicaragua. Shelters, baby food, clothing, and a million doses of vaccine were among contributions collected, while j|ttawa provided the transportation. (11) Unions in Quebec helped by such actions as the donation of hundreds of thousands of dollars towards the
Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign, which commenced in February 1980.
In April, a member of the CLC's International Affairs
Committee stated that "the CLC's support for a small trade union central [CUS] that has been denied official backing in
Nicaragua would not prevent continued strong support". (All
CLC aid had been channeled through CUS.) (12) Soon afterward, however, the CLC began to back away from its support of the
Sandinistas. The Congress' Director for International Affairs,
John Harker, complained that Sandinista Commandante Tomas Borge
"and his closest associates are gathering power unto themselves" at the expense of more moderate interests." There was also^concern about the staus of CUS. Harker rejected calls from a national conference representing 4 2 NGOs that the CLC increase its support for Nicaragua. (13)
Contact with developments in Nicaragua were maintained in spite of this trend in the CLC hierarchy. B.C. trade unionists, for example, toured Nicaragua in February 1981 and met with government officials and union representatives. This trip led to the first "Tools for Peace" campaign in September
1981, when the Nicaraguan grain carrier Monimbo left Vancouver with an extra cargo of 2,000 pounds of fishing gear and nets donated by members of the United Fisherman and Allied Workers
Union. (14) The fishing gear symbolized labour's shift back to strong but not uncritical support for the Sandinistas. Over the next few years, many unions and labour councils deepened their support for the Nicaraguan revolution and demanded that
Canada take concrete action to oppose Washington's hostile policies. Labour groups continued to visit Nicaragua to appraise the situation for themselves. As intervention by the
United States grew, so did labour's concerns. In November
1983, CLC President Dennis McDermott issued his strongest denunciation yet of U.S. intevention in Central America and declared Labour's support of the Contadora process. McDermott said that, "The Canadian Labour Congress is... appalled at the present U.S. policy vis-a-vis Nicaragua, which is undoubtedly designed to turn the clock back on one of the most promising developments towards social and economic justice in Central
American history." (15)
On December 7, James Donaldson of the Ironworkers in
Toronto, along with twenty leaders of most major industrial and -45- public sector unions in Canada made a similar declaration.
Despite pressures from the U.S. and counterrevolutionary forces, the Sandinista government's National Reconstruction Program has made great strides in education, health care, and agrarian reform. Based on the independent reports of many Canadian trade unionists who have visited Nicaragua, we are convinced that it is the working people of Nicaragua who have benefited from the reconstruction program. Through their own unique revolution, the working people of Nicaragua have gained a voice in determining their destiny through free participation in trade unions, in the Council of State, and in other democratic and popularly supported organizations.
The resolution also called on the government to "actively support the Contadora Peace Initiative." Signitories included
Jean-Claude Parrot (postal workers), Jeff Rose (public employess), Pierre Samson (public service), Mike Rygus
(machinists), Cliff Pilkey (OFL), Robert White (UAW), and Dave
Patterson (steelworkers). (16)
The twin policies of providing material assistance and demanding that the Canadian government take stronger actions in defense of Nicaragua were reiterated at the CLC annual convention in Montreal in mid-1984, which also called on Canada to withhold aid to countries (such as Honduras) which serve as bases for U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua. (17)
Continuing solidarity with Nicaragua from labour in Quebec was exemplified by the National Trade Unions (CSN) donation of 45 tons of newsprint to Nicaragua, representing "a growing sense by Quebec unionists of their affinity with the social change occuring in Nicaragua." (18)
Several aspects of labour's posture toward the Sandinista revolution should be noted. The first concerns the depth of pro-Nicaraguan sentiment, which was not confined to the labour -46- hierarchy. Those labour leaders who supported the Sandinistas enjoyed widespread support at the grass-roots level. In many cases, of which the "Tools for Peace" campaign (see below) is the most dramatic, individual trade unionists and their locals played key roles. Those labour leaders who believed that the
Sandinistas were Soviet stooges who had betrayed their revolution and were constructing an authoritarian,
Marxist-Leninist state, were a minority.
The other observation concerns labour's perspective on the internal evolution of Nicaraguan society under Sandinista leadership. Some unionists argued that the Sandinistas are essentially Latin Stalinists who smashed free trade unions, censored the press, and refused to tolerate political pluralism. But the predominant interpretation found little to justify the such a view, and stressed the hope that Nicaragua would be allowed to find its own path to a more humane and democratic society. Labour's attitude was summarized by John
Fryer, president of the National Union of Provincial Government
Employees, after returning from Nicaragua in May 1984:
To understand the Nicaraguan situation fairly one must balance the disquieting things one sees and hears - such as press censorship, the ban on political canvassing and the discouragement of independent trade unionism - against the fact that the U.S.-backed aggression is invariably cited by all sides to be the single major roadblock standing in the way of making progress toward pluralism. (19)
The Canadian labour movement, as a whole, continued to champion the overall thrust of the Sandinista Revolution and the right of Nicaraguans to determine for themselves the type of society in which they would live. -47-
Churches
Canadian churches had long been in the forefront of NGO activity regarding Nicaragua. In November 1978, church representatives accompanied Father Ernesto Cardenal, Nicaraguan poet and priest, during talks with External Affairs officials and members of Parliament. Also in November, a delegation from the Inter-Church Committe on Human Rights in Latin America
(ICCHRLA) participated in the first of a number of visits to
Nicaragua. In June 1979, the Anglican, United, and Catholic churches, among others, urged the government to vote against the $66 million IMF loan to the Somoza regime and to break diplomatic relations. They also requested that Flora
MacDonald, then Conservative External Affairs minister, press the United States and the United Nations to condemn the dictatorship, recognize the provisional government, and terminate all bilateral agreements with Somoza. (20)
After the establishment of the new government in'
Nicaragua, churches took the lead in trying to procure government assistance to the devastated country. John Foster,
United Church official and co-chairman of ICCHRLA, said in
October 1979, that Canada should at least match the $20 million given to Nicaragua by the Netherlands. He stressed that NGOs can do little compared to the federal government and urged
Ottawa to make the political decision to help Nicaragua by making aid available through CIDA. (21) A delegation representing the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Canadian Conference on Development and Peace visited
Nicaragua from November 1-11 1980. They investigated the -48- evolution of Nicaraguan society, government policies, foreign interference, and the role of churches, and their report called on Canada "to increase its aid and trade with the Central
American country and urged continued solidarity with
Nicaragua's people from private organizations and the
Churches." (22)
ICCHRLA outlined the perspective of its member churches to the Parliamentary Sub-committee on Latin America in 1981, declaring that,
"Canadian policy should be geared toward aiding the development of governments that are more equitable and participatory, less militaristic and repressive. We further believe that Canadian policymakers must build links with the popular movements which are coming to self-consciousness and maturity in Latin America, and give up the short-term gains which might derive from the continuation of the policy of business as usual with military dictators and outright alliance with some oligarchies." (23)
In October 1983, ICCHRLA presented MacEachen with a brief
calling on 0:.ttawa to "play a fresh, independent and energetic role in Central America." They asked how Canada could remain silent in the face of open U.S. and Honduran intervention in
Nicaragua. The church leaders said that, "clear, public and sustained opposition is necessary to reverse these aggressive initiatives." (24)
Canadian churches made a special effort to tell the public that, contrary to U.S. claims, freedom of religion was not threatened in Nicaragua. Moreover, a church official who visited Nicaragua for the World Council of Churches said that his group's impression was that most of the clergy and laity in
Nicaragua support the Sandinistas. (25) Church members participated in vigils, conducted educational activities, -49- provided material support, and undertook a variety of other solidarity efforts. One of the most dramatic examples of this committment were the visits made in 1984 by scores of
Canadians, many of whom were associated with churches, to
Nicaragua as "Witnesses for Justice and Peace" in early 1984.
The Witnesses went to Nicaragua to work, to see the Sandinista
Revolution, and to "stand alongside the Nicaraguans." They planned to spend up to a month in a war zone, hoping to deter a
U.S. invasion. (26) Upon returning to Canada, they, used their experience to educate Canadians through slide-shows, talks, and other public events.
Many of the factors which prompted other NGOs to support the Sandinistas, particularly the promise of development with democracy, attracted churches as well. The large number of priests in the Nicaraguan government and the importance of religion in the Sandinista movement added to the churches' interest.
Such church activism is relatively recent in Canada, dating from the late 1960s. Before that time, Canadian churches were generally comfortable with the main thrust of
Canadian foreign policy, and social advocacy was not common.
But new international issues, from Vietnam to apartheid to underdevelopment, began to galvanize church people. The easy relation between church and state in Canada became strained.
Developments in ecclesiastical circles also influenced the churches. The appearance of "liberation theology" in particular, with its "preferential option for the poor", had repercussions beyond its Catholic origins. Overall, it was -50-
"...the more general activism of the church in the Third World and in the World Council of Churches that had a profound impact on the way Canadian churches viewed international development and world politics." (27)
Aid and Solidarity Groups
The Nicaraguan revolution served as a catalyst for the formation of many aid and solidarity groups in Canada. As early as August 1979, for example, Canadian Action for
Nicaragua (CAN) and Medical Aid to Nicaragua (MATN) were formed for the dual purposes of supporting medical projects in
Nicaragua and lobbying the Canadian government to increase all forms of aid. MATN sent the first Canadian medical team to post-war Nicaragua in January 1980, to establish a system of mother-and-child care facilities. (28) A large number of support groups sprang up in Quebec, such as the Montreal
Coordinating Committee for Solidarity with Nicaragua, which opened an office with full-time staff, funded by Quebec unions.
With the Sandinista victory, the Nicaraguan Human Rights
Committee in Vancouver became the Central American Support
Committee (CASC), whose primary goal was to assist with reconstruction efforts. CASC also brought representatives of the FSLN on a speaking tour, did public education, and published the periodical, "Centro America Libre". ||ne of
CASC's first efforts collected $28,000 in donations for the
Literacy Campaign from the B.C. Teacher's Federation. Material aid from Canadian NGp's in 1980 was "well over $1.5 million exclusive of the very sizable contributions of various Canadian -51- labour centrals. In addition to extensive support for (the) literacy (campaign) coming from the churches, Oxfam, provincial teachers' federations, and the YWCA...Canadians are assisting a wide variey of self-help..." projects. (29)
Oxfam-Canada was another organization whose involvement with Nicaragua began to grow in 1979. Oxfam established a clinic in a barrio where none had existed before; began a program to teach women agricultural workers about occupational health and safety; and funded a clothing/sewing cooperative and daycare centres, as well as projects to help small farmers increase production. Oxfam selected Central America as "the region of principal emphasis", and described Nicaragua in particular as "a country whose policies and level of popular organization are very favorable to a development process which benefits the population at large". (30) Oxfam also worked to inform Canadians about Nicaragua and lobbied the government to increase aid and oppose U.S. intervention. Canadian entertainers Bruce Cockburn and Nancy White delivered medical supplies to Nicaragua in February 1983 while on a tour sponsored by Oxfam. Both have been outspoken since their return and have written songs and articles about their experiences.
Only two weeks after its first shipment (see above),
"Tools for Peace" sent a second one worth $70,000, that was organized by several NGOs and co-ordinated by CAN. Donations included medical supplies, office and photographic equipment, clothing, and more fishing gear. A Canadian who was in the
Nicaraguan port of Corinto when the second ship arrived wrote: -52-
Ligia Virgil, of the Augusto Cesar Sandino Foundation, which is responsible for foreign aid to be channeled to popular organizations... said that, at the level of NGOs and the public, Canadians lead all of the citizens of the Americas in their support of Nicaragua. j|n her last visit to Canada, she was impressed by how well-informed about, and interested in Nicaragua, the Canadian public was... Spokesmen for the two largest trade union centrals which will receive some of the supplies, said that these people-to-people donations are important both in the material and in the moral sense..." (31)
"Tools for Peace" became an annual effort which demonstrated the depth of public concern for Nicaragua. CAN collected about $125,000 worth of aid for Nicaragua in December
1982. Most of the aid, which included farm equipment, a new jeep, fishing equipment, musical instruments, medical supplies, tools, sporting goods, toys, and school supplies, was collected in British Columbia, with support coming from a number of trade unions, including the B.C. Government Employees,
Telecommunications Workers, and the Pulp, Paper, and
Woodworkers of Canada. Business donors,, including CP Transport and Barber-Ellis, joined in contributing to the drive, which surpassed its initial goal. (32) The 1983 "Tools for Peace" campaign, now a nation-wide effort, collected over $1 million in cash and material aid, more than three times the amount of non-food aid given by the Canadian government in the previous three years combined. The largest material donation came from the Prairie provinces (over $300,000), while B.C. added over
$100,000 worth. (33) The 1984 total approached $2 million and was channeled to hospitals, schools, daycare centres, and other community service organizations. CAN also conducted a "Music for Nicaragua!" drive, to supply equipment for the flourishing indigenous music scene. Corporate donors in 1984 included CP -53-
Rail and Tilden Rent-A-Car, while the City of Vancouver donated warehouse space.
This "Boat Project" was only one focus in a larger effort of solidarity with the Nicaraguan revolution which went beyond relief aid. Tools for Peace also tried to raise public awareness about Nicaragua, (for example, bringing former CIA analyst David MacMichael on a speaking tour in 1984). The organization also aimed "to persuade the Canadian government to re-examine foreign policy towards Nicaragua. Tools for Peace encourages the government to establish a Canadian embassy in
Nicaragua; to oppose U.S. military intervention in the region; and to support the Contadora proposals for peace in Central
America." (35) Sue Mitchell, project co-ordinator, declared,
"This is ultimately our most important work". (36)
Non-intervention in Central America (NICA) began its work in December 1983 with an open letter printed as a full page ad in the Globe & Mail. The letter called on Prime Minister
Trudeau to take steps to help prevent the escalation of the conflict in Central America. A second ad was published on the eve of MacEachan's trip to the region and the questions it raised were used by the CBC to quiz the Minister prior to his trip. (37) NICA also commissioned a Gallup poll later that year which indicated that Canadians opposed U.S. militarization in Central America by over 2 to 1 (a finding described by a
Gallup representative as "very significant"). (38)
Since July 1979 demonstrations in support of the
Sandinistas and against U.S. intervention have occasionally taken place in Canada. In one of the largest, over 15,000 people marched on Parliament Hill on 30 October 1982. (39) j|n
30 September 1983, civil disobedience aimed at Canadian silence over Washington's policies took place at DEA offices in Ottawa.
Fifteen people were arrested while 50 others supported the protestors. (40) Six hundred people turned up outside of the hotel in Vancouver where Henry Kissinger was speaking at a
$150-a-plate dinner in Vancouver in February 1984. They came to register their opposition to the militaristic and anti-Nicaraguan elements that Nixon's former Secretary of State recommended in the report of the Bipartisan Committee on
Central America.
Throughout this period, as noted above, several thousand
Canadians went to see Nicaragua for themselves. In addition to church tours, a number of work brigades were organized to help with such things as picking coffee, building a carpentery school, and providing medical assistance. Other Canadians paid
$1300-1500 for the chance to pick cotton and show their suport for the Nicaraguan revolution.
Up-to-date information and analysis about developments concerning Nicargua was produced by research groups such as the
Canada-Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives (CAPA) and the Latin American Working Group (LAWG). Although both of these organizations had a wider scope, much of their work since
1979 was specifically related to Nicaragua. They also conducted seminars, lobbied government officials, and carried on related activities in support of the Sandinista revolution.
(One result of the organizing done by NGOs was a conference on 8 December 1984, when approximately 140 people -55- met in Toronto to launch an broad-based Anti-Intervention
Coalition which focused on the threat of direct military
involvement by the United States in Nicaragua [and El
Salvador]). (41)
This brief summary omits far more than it includes of the
history of non-governmental activities in support of Nicaragua.
It is safe to say that the intensity of the Candian public's
interest and involvement in the Sandinista revolution is
unprecedented. No other comparable Third World issue has been
so salient since the Spanish Civil War. (In fact, both issues
involved similar mixes of personal, political, and humanitarian
elements.) Neither the Cuban nor Chinese revolutions, nor the
Biafran war, nor even the U.S. war against Indochina aroused
such extensive and long-term involvement by Canadians. The
hopes aroused by the Sandinistas, the hostility of the Reagan
administration, the relative accessibility of Nicaragua, and
the importance of the events for the future of development and
peace all contributed to catching the attention of Canadians.
Their work resulted in aid projects for Nicaragua whose total value as of February, 1984, was over $80 million. (42) The
enthusiasm of these Canadians was summed up by one aid worker:
"It is small wonder then that so many of Canada's voluntary aid
agencies and institutions were excited about their work in
Nicaragua. This is indeed, in the truest sense of the word, a
developing country. Things happen. Essential needs receive
attention. People are organized for development." (43)
This perspective also characterized the attitude of the -56-
NGOs, as expressed in the final communique of the "First
International Conference of Non-Governmental Organization" that was held in Managua December 6-10, 1983. Representatives of 100 NGOs (including Interpares, CUSO, SUCO, Oxfam,
Development and Peace, and CANSAVE) from 23 nations declared:
We maintain that Nicaragua, despite the limitations caused by the economic and military blockade, is an alternative model for social and economic development and the participation of the people, which benefits the majority and has started to solve the basic problems of underdevelopment. (44)
As for the Sandinistas, they felt that the NGOs had played two very important roles. "The first is to help small community development projects, like in agriculture and the literacy campaign." The second factor has been increased public education in Canada. "The NGOs have played a key role in making the Canadian public aware of what is going on in
Nicaragua by organizing tours, (in four years we have received
1,000 or 1,500 Canadians), or sending medical teams, or establishing...a very successful 'Boat Project'. (45) (As noted, Canadians were more active than any other people in the
Western Hemisphere.)
This last element, the impact of public opinion on government aid for Managua, was crucial, since NGOs obviously could not, by themselves, make the Nicaraguan economy self-sufficient in terms of export crops or attracting foreign revenue or currency. That is why Nicaragua attached great importance to public efforts to pressure Ottawa to grant generous bilateral aid. -57-
c) Political Parties
The New Democrats
The New Democratic Party had supported the Sandinista revolution while Somoza was still in power, and maintained that position afterwards. After the FSLN victory, the NDP continued to press the Canadian government in the Commons to do more for
Nicaragua, while helping with campaigns such as the Literacy
Crusade and "Tools for Peace". Many NDPers visited Nicaragua.
In 1982, for instance, a delegation organized by Dan Heap from his Spadina NDP Riding Association spent two weeks in
Nicaragua. Robert Ogle, MP for Saskatoon East visited
Nicaragua late in 1982 as part of a Socialist International delegation. Upon returning, Ogle said, "There must be some pressure brought to bear against Honduras by Venezuela, Mexico,
Canada, and other countries challenging... their right to support Somocistas on their borders." (44)
The party's pro-Sandinista polices received strong grass-roots support. For example, delegates at the 1983 NDP national convention voted unanimously to send the following telegram to the Nicaraguan government:
The NDP, representing over 100,000 Canadians, extends the warmest greetings to the people and government of Nicaragua on the fourth anniversary of the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship. The NDP is committed to supporting your struggle and keeping Nicaragua democratic and free of U.S. intervention. We wholeheartedly commend the achievements of your people and government since 1979.
In his keynote address, Broadbent added his voice, stating -58- that, "The country and the government deserve our total support." (45)
M.P. Pauline Jewett, External Affairs Critic, was one of the most outspoken advocates of Canadian support for Nicaragua.
She led the NDP delegation to the fourth anniversary celebration in Managua and, upon her return, denounced U.S. policies in Central America while criticizing the Canadian government for failing to exercise its influence to bring peace to the region. "I will urge Prime Minister Trudeau to get in touch with the Contadora group...so that the government lends its support openly and publicly to their efforts to bring peace". Jewett added that, "It is crucially important for
Canada to distance itself from U.S. policy". (46) She also praised the six-point peace plan put forward on (July 19) by
Daniel Ortega...as "reflective and thoughtful". (As noted, the government of Canada also praised this proposal.)
The NDP's concern over the lack of a meaningful Canadian presence in Nicaragua was underlined when word leaked out that
Canada was counting on Washington to guarantee the safety of
Canadians in Nicaragua in the event of a U.S. invasion. Jewett was outraged, saying, "The last thing (the Canadians) need is to be used as a pretext for an American-inspired invasion..."
(47)
Dan Heap laid out the specifics of New Democratic policy on Nicaragua when he called on the Canadian government "to establish our independent presence in Nicaragua by sending our
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Nicaragua to discuss their recent proposals... and by opening an embassy in Managua -59- to provide direct, independent day-to-day information... and by working closely with the Contadora group to block U.S. plans for war and to increase economic aid to Nicaragua". (48) In
1984, Heap led another group of his constituents to Nicaragua and, on January 14, met with President of the Council of State in Managua. Upon his return, Heap made a unique proposal: that the NDP send a representative to Managua if the federal government refused to set up a Canadian embassy there. "It's important to have much better, more direct communication", he said. (49) In April, Jewett reiterated that her party wanted to establish "our own Canada House, courtesy of the NDP, in
Managua." She added that the NDP had a favorable response from
Nicaraguan officials, and that the legation would be staffed by
Canadians with Nicaraguan backgrounds. (50) Such a move would have been the first time a Canadian political party involved itself directly in the diplomatic affairs of a foreign government, but the experiment was not carried out.
The NDP took the lead in denouncing the mining of
Nicaraguan ports by the CIA. Broadbent pressed the Liberal government to condemn the action, calling it "legally indefensible". (51) Other New Democratic M.P.s pressed the issue. Jim Fulton declared the mining "an act of war which is in reality no different from the Soviet invasion of
Afganistan". (52)
Provincial New Democrats also voiced their support for
Nicaragua. The leader of the British Columbia NDP, Robert
Skelly, speaking at a rally organized by the B.C. Nicaragua
Solidarity Committee, declared, "We must change the opinion of -60-
the federal government and its approval of the attitude [of]
the United States..." (Before becoming party leader, Skelly
spent 5 weeks in Nicaragua). (53)
The Conservatives
While Progressive Conservatives have been the most hostile
to the Sandinistas, one can distinguish between the approach of
Tory right-wingers and that of the moderates, including Brian
Mulroney and Joe Clark. Sometimes the remarks of right-wing
Tories came close to caricature, as when John Gamble, during a
Commons debate over the possibilty of sending old fishing boats
to Nicaragua, demanded assurance from MacGuigan that the vessels would not "be used as gunboats for the purpose of
spreading revolution in Central America". (54) External
Affairs critic Sinclair Stevens, who, like Gamble, is on the PC
right-wing, ridiculed any talk of a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua as "Socialist propaganda". (55)
Stevens' views, like those of many of his collegues,
generally mirrored U.S. positions. He asserted in March 1984
that, "We in the Progressive Conservative Party support the efforts of the Contadora Group..." but, like the Reagan
administration, he claimed that "the Sandinistas have betrayed
their own revolution...(and) moved to monopolize political power, to destroy freedom of the press, and to suppress the
independent labour movement...The militarization in Honduras
pales beside the military buildup in Nicaragua. Emulating the -6/-
Cuban model, Nicaragua has built the largest military force in
Central America, far beyond any legitimate defense needs..."
(56) Stevens' ideas were not confined to offering rhetorical support for U.S. policy. When he accompanied Mulroney, then leader of the Opposition, to Washington, Stevens discussed the possibility of Canada establishing a special military unit to accompany the Americans on military missions, such as the invasion of Grenada. (57)
But, as new Conservative party leader, Mulroney, although willing to give the United States the "benefit of the doubt", seemed to perceive the unrest in Central America in a slighly different light than Washington did. He wrote:
I believe that it is important that the political, economic, and social autonomy of all Central American countries be respected as their governments negotiate resolutions to civil and regional disputes. It has always been the Progressive Conservative Party's policy to encourage individual or collective third-party mediation and to discourage third party intervention...we have commended the Contadora group... (58)
The emphasis on negotiation was not, of course, a uniquely
Conservative idea. Canada has always strongly favored dialogue over the use of force in international disputes. Likewise,
Canadians historically have been suspicious of excuses for interventionism. The significance of Mulroney's statement was that much of his party would not accept the argument that this traditional Canadian attitude was appropriate in the case of
U.S. interference in the affairs of Central America. But during the 1984 election campaign, Tory policy statements on
Nicaragua tended to reflect this moderate view. One PC -62- election document conceded that, since "many of the problems in
Central America are socio-economic in origin... Canada must take a more active role through official development assistance..."
The paper admits that Canadian diplomatic representation in
Nicaragua is "somewhat inadequate" and commits the party to "a major foreign policy review" which would include the possibility of an increase in "embassies, consulates and staff" in in the region. (59)
The Liberals
Like the Conservatives but unlike the New Democrats, the governing Liberals never achieved a concensus on the best way to deal with the Sandinistas on the one hand and the U.S. on the other. Although individual Liberal MPs generally echoed government policy, a few were outspoken in their opposition to elements of Canada's position. Liberal MP Warren Allmand, for instance, urged MacEachen to "withdraw all foreign aid to
Honduras until it stops permitting the Contras to use its territory..." He also asked that "the Minister make clear to
Honduras and the United States that Canada opposes... the funding of these Contra troops which constitute a violation of the United Nations Charter". (60)
In early 1984, MP Maurice Dupras, another maverick
Liberal, condemned U.S. actions in Central America and accused the Reagan administration of "a lack of sensitivity to the will of the great majority of the people" in Central America. (61)
In April, Dupras even criticized his own government's timidity -63- over Central America. Speaking at a conference on "Canada, the
United States, and Latin America", the former chairman of the
Commons subcommittee on relations with Latin America and the
Caribbean said that Canada's role should be "to put pressure on the present administration in Washington" to demilitarize
Central America. (62) There were reports that these remarks were encouraged by Secretary of State MacEachen who, by this time, was growing increasingly apprehensive about U.S. policies toward Nicaragua. (63) As events progressed and MacEachen began publicly to distance Ottawa's policies from those of the
U.S., other Liberals were encouraged to speak out. During the
1984 Liberal leadership race, even Mark MacGuigan was reported to have "castigated the United States for its policies in
Central America..." (64)
Not surprisingly, the stands of Canada's three main political parties toward the Sandinistas tended to correspond with their position on the political spectrum. The
Conservatives were the most reserved toward the new government in Managua, while the New Democrats strongly supported
Nicaragua. Liberals were generally ambivalent, with some elements sympathetic and others suspicious. The Liberal leadership paid little attention to the Conservative views regarding government, policy toward Nicaragua, partly because there was not a substantial difference between these parties for most of this period, and partly because the Tories never took the issue very seriously in Parliament. Nicaragua was never a major issue, either in Parliament or with the -64- electorate. Attacks on Trudeau's policy from the NDP were more consistent and probably had a greater effect. Towards the end . of its term, for instance, the Liberal government's attitude toward Nicaragua drew closer to that of the NDP in terms of opening an embassy, increasing aid, and opposing to
Washington's actions. The NDP made more of an issue of
Nicaragua than did the Tories, and they had credible allies among churches, NGOs, and labour. Indeed, only the NDP was sufficiently concerned about Nicaragua to work with non-governmental groups in pressing the government to alter its approach.
Nicaragua, like most other foreign policy issues, played no significant role in the Conservative electoral sweep of
September 1984.
4) The Press
It is beyond the scope of this work to provide a comprehensive account of the media's treatment of either
Nicaragua or Canadian policies towards the Sandinista revolution. This section will offer an impressionistic survey of mainstream opinion as reflected in the two most popular national publications, the Toronto Globe & Mail and Maclean's magazine, both of which generally take a middle-of-the-road approach, editorially and in their news coverage. An unscientific sample of other newspapers and magazines is also included.
There was extremely little news of Nicaragua before 1978, -65- when the final struggle to overthrow Somoza began. Referring
to the attention that developed in 1978 and 1979, one analysis
asserted that, "...the Canadian media have not promoted the
development of a progressive political role for Canada", and
pointed to a Globe & Mail editorial which supported the U.S.
proposal for an OAS "peacekeeping" force under de facto U.S.
control to be sent to Nicaragua. (65) Other Globe editorials
closely paralleled the stand taken by the federal government.
For instance, although it condemned the most flagrant U.S.
intervention, such as the mining of Nicaraguan ports, the Globe
has generally backed Washington's overall aims in Nicaragua.
An editorial published on July 1983, for example, warned
against the "Marxist, authoritarian bent" of the Sandinistas.
The editorial also accepted the Reagan administration's unproved charge that arms were reaching Salvadoran guerrillas via Nicaragua and Cuba. (66) Later, the editors claimed that opposition to the Sandinistas within Nicaragua developed primarily because the Sandinistas "abused" their power, a charge leveled by the U.S. and accepted for a time by the
Canadian government. (67)
Another editorial ridiculed what it termed the "Sandinista cheering section in Canada", (68) and decried "the willful blindness of much of the Canadian Left" which does not care about such atrocities as forcing "the small Jewish community
into exile," (69) (an event which never took place). But the
Globe was genuinely alarmed when Washington organized the mining of Nicaraguan harbours. The paper pointed out that
"Nicaragua has shown no interest in becoming a Soviet -66-
beachhead"; rather, "the U.S. applies military pressure that drives the Sandinistas into the Soviet camp, then cites this
'hemispheric security threat' as justification for their overthrow". (70)
The Globe's attitude is summed up in these statements from an editorial in May 1984:
Nicaragua is already controlled by a Marxist-oriented regime which has been heavy-handed toward Miskito indians, the Catholic Church, and other sectors of Nicaraguan society. But while U.S. hostility toward such trends is justified, that does not make U.S. intervention in Central America a sound policy, either ethically or strategically...(but) The U.S. cannot be indifferent to the security threat that would be posed by Communist subversion throughout the hemisphere and by the mass exodus toward the U.S. of Central Americans fleeing Communist rule."* (71)
News coverage about Nicaragua in the Globe & Mail was more varied. While some of the Globe's columnists agreed with
Washington's portrayal of Nicaragua as a simple Cold War issue, others, such as Richard J. Doyle and Latin American correspondent Oakland Ross, demonstrated a more complex understanding of the forces at work in Nicaragua. By and
large, these writers had a view of the Sandinistas that is more
in accord with Ottawa's position that the troubles of Central
America have more to do with indiginous factors than with
Soviet subversion.
In contrast to the Globe & Mail, other daily newspapers
* The writer seems to have been unaware that the overwhelming majority of Central American refugees were fleeing from U.S. client states [e.g. El Salvador and Guatemala], while Nicaragua actually experienced a net influx of displaced persons. -67- have taken editorial positions less compatible with those of the United States. The Toronto Star regularly slammed
Washington's interference in Nicaragua. When Nicaragua's harbours were being mined, the Star editorialized:
With East-West relations at their lowest point in 20 years, Canadians and everyone else have an enormous stake in not seeing the U.S. government indulge in any international recklessness... Yet Washington is increasingly pursuing just that course, with its... undeclared war against Nicaragua... (72)
The Star also declared that "the Canadian government should publicly lobby" in favor of Contadora. (73) While the
Star accepted as fact the charge that there was significant
"Soviet-backed...military meddling" in Central America (74), it nevertheless declared that, "No regime in the area poses a serious threat to U.S. interests. (75)
A number of other major Canadian newspapers disagreed with
U.S. policy. Nicaragua's 1983 peace proposal, along with idea of establishing a Canadian embassy in Managua, were applauded in a editorial in the Ottawa Citizen. (76) The Montreal
Gazette declared Reagan's policies in Central America "stupid"
(77), while the Vancouver Sun described Washington's involvement as "one of the sorrier chapters of U.S. intervention in Central America". (78)
Wire service stories were a source of a significant amount of coverage. Those from the Associated Press and UPI generally reflected a U.S. bias, while those from Reuters were usually more balanced and had more depth. To cite only one example of this bias: in February 1984, when Daniel Ortega announced the date of Nicaragua's first free election, he added that -68-
"Christianity and Marxism are part of Sandinista democracy".
The Associated Press story began with the statement that,
"Nicaragua's leftist leaders say they will not abandon Marxism regardless of the outcome of the presidential and legislative elections..." (79)
As might be expected of a weekly, Maclean's had the opportunity to provide more in-depth information concerning
Nicaragua. A story in early 1981 which described both the triumphs and the hardships of the revolution stated that the
"sacrifices are not given begrudgingly, but rather with fierce pride." After pointing out the lack of evidence for some of
Washington's accusations, the article concluded that
Nicaraguans "will not give up the independence they won at a cost of an estimated 50,000 lives." (80) A later piece about the strife in Central America detailed both Washington's accusations and the lack of evidence for those charges. It covered the origin of the Contras, the so-called Kissinger
Commission, the Contadora talks, and internal developments in
Nicaragua (such as preparations for national elections). (81)
Maclean's again printed a substantial account of Central
America with special emphasis on Nicaragua in August 1983.
This story contained significant errors, such as describing
Commandante Daniel Ortega as "hard-line," when, in fact, he represents a moderate element in the Sandinista leadership.
More serious was the statement that "elections have been repeatedly postponed". (Actually, the Sandinistas kept their promise to hold eletions within 5 years after the ouster of
Somoza.) The article also stated that, "Despite the -69-
Sandinistas' reputation for Marxist fanaticism", Nicaragua has
"been notably free of internecine violence... in marked contrast to its rightist neighbours..."(82) An accompanying article described Canada's position as "the middle path". The reporter noted, however, that, while Nicaragua was allocated $6.8 million in aid from 1980 to 1983, "$58 million has gone to the rightist regimes in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras over the same period." (83)
In December, Maclean's claimed that there were "2,000
left-wing rebel leaders [sic] from neighboring El Salvador" in
Managua, a number which would represent a sizable percentage of the entire FMLN guerrilla force. (84) Maclean's provided detailed information about the mining of Nicaraguan ports in the Spring of 1984 and pointed out that these developments
"took place against the background of Washington's steady military buildup" in Central America. But the article took at
face value Washington's contention that the U.S. "openly
supports the slow-moving Contadora process". (85) A story in
August 1984 about the approaching Nicaraguan election was headed, "The opposition calls a boycott," and included a quote from an unnamed diplomat who referred to "the abstention of the opposition..." Nowhere was there any indication that only 4 of the 11 political parties were participating in the boycott, or the ties of these non-participants with the CIA-directed contras. (86)
The impact of small-circulation magazines on Canadian opinion must not be overlooked. Publications such as Central
America Update, Canadian Dimension, Our Times, Centro America -70-
Libre, Our Generation, and Canadian Forum served as alternative
sources of information for many Canadians who supported
Nicaraguan independence. These periodicals also provided a means of communication bewteen interested elements of the
Canadian public, providing information, and facilitating the work of NGOs.
While the Canadian print media in general appeared
somewhat skeptical of U.S. intentions toward Nicaragua, they
usually provided little background information. Unproven U.S.
pronouncements were often accepted at face value and went
unchallenged, while the Nicaraguan side of the argument often went unheard. Still, thoughtful pieces did appear and interest
in Nicaragua, as reflected by the number of
letters-to-the-editor, was not insignificant in relation to
other small countries. It should be noted that public interest
in the Sandinistas has been higher than that shown for many
other countries, especially small Third World nations. The
extent to which this interest affected the quantity and quality
of media coverage of Nicaragua is an unanswered but important question.
It is difficult to gauge with any certainty the impact of
the print media in Canada on public opinion about Nicaragua.
One study of the media in general concluded that, relative to
television, newspapers "are used at least equally and perhaps more seriously for news." Significantly, "attentive publics
are more likely influenced by newspapers than by television or
radio." (87) To the extent that it influences public
perception and behaviour, the media has an indirect affect on -71-
decision-makers. Stairs argues that while the press
has very little effect upon the substance of foreign policy per se...it exerts a very significant impact upon the...men who make it...(through) coverage of external events themselves, reports of public debate on specific issues, and editorial opinion. (88)
If these findings are accurate, then it is probably safe
to conclude that the generally negative stance taken by
newspaper editorialists against U.S. intervention in Nicaragua
helped to reinforce the public's pre-existing skepticism about
these actions. However, the reliance on U.S. news sources,
along with the usual deficiencies in reporting foreign news in
Canada, probably resulted in a pro-Washington bias in the news
coverage itself, which would reflect the agenda and definitions preferred by the Reagan regime.
The mass media generally based any opposition to U.S. policy less on support for the Sandinistas than on a sense that
Washington was violating international principles of
self-determination and aggravating the bloodshed in the region.
This tendency may have been the result of ignorance about the realities in Nicaragua, or an inability on the part of North
Americans to understand the values, tradition, and circumstances of a small Spanish-speaking nation. This ambivalence in the print media reflected this unfamiliarity, which in turn probably diluted the media's effects on the general public and on the Canadian government. But its overall effect on the interested public seems to have been to help stir interest in and sympathy for Nicaragua, thereby increasing pressure on Ottawa while contributing to the efforts of various non-governmental organizations. -72-
Chapter 3 - International Actors
Introduction
The actions of several countries played an important part in influencing the nature of Canada's relations with the
Sandinistas. Along with developments in Nicaragua itself, the policy of the United States was the most salient for Ottawa.
It is therefore important to examine Canada's bilateral relationships with these two nations. The attitudes of the
Contadora countries, especially Mexico and Colombia, and to a lesser extent, of Brazil, were not insignificant, and helped to counter that of the U.S.
a) Nicaragua
Even before the ouster of Somoza, the Sandinistas looked to Canada as a promising source of friendship and support, as demonstrated by Father Cardenal's visit. In October 1979, an unofficial delegation from Nicaragua arrived in ||ttawa to talk with Canadian officials about debt relief and long-term development aid. The two-week tour was also designed to inform
Canadians about the situation in Nicaragua. The delegates were disappointed in the response of the Clark government. A spokesperson for the group told reporters that he did not understand why Canada "could assign only $200,000 in aid to
Nicaragua..." (1)
Over the next few years, a number of Nicaraguans made efforts to explain their country's needs to Canadians. In July
1980, A. Cruz discussed some of the specific ways in which
Canada could help Nicaragua. "You should open an embassy here and not rely on an ambassador who has to live in Costa Rica.
We need direct involvement with Canada, especially from your
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and we urgently need your help in certain technical areas where you have achieved world renown." Cruz said his government was particularly interested in working with such industries as paper and forestry companies, railway operations, telecommunications, and agriculture. "We are truly pluralistic here. It is a mixed economy, something like your own, that we seek. We are honest people in the Sandinista government and we will create, if we are allowed, a stable climate for foreign investment. Canada has a crucial role to play in influencing the process of our development, particularly if it can provide technical co-operation and capital. I underscore capital because it is joint ventures that we need most urgently." (2)
Nicaragua also looked to Canada for political support in its stuggle with the United States. In March 1981, a high official in the Ministry of External Affairs in Managua explained that, from a Nicaraguan perspective, "Canada has clout and influence more than any other country in the
Americas". The official was hopeful that Canada and Mexico would cooperate to moderate U.S. hostility. (3) And at a speech delivered to the UN Security Council on March 25, 1982,
Commandante Daniel Ortega made a point of praising Canada
(along with Mexico and Venezuela) for proposing "a global and -74- non-discriminatory programme to permit a joint response in the economic field that would help alleviate the social and political conflicts stemming from economic injustices." Ortega contrasted this attitude towards the "North-South" dialogue with that of Washington, which ignored the initiative. (4)
Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto's 3-day visit to Canada in February 1983, focused on bilateral political issues as well as trade and other economic relations. "We are not here to beg...we are here to seek, through dialogue, mutual understanding so that relations between our two countries deepen and strengthen," he told a press conference. Father
D 'Escoto denied charges that the Nicaraguan path was undemocratic and briefed MacEachen on the profound historical causes of the Sandinista revolution and the reasons behind the hostile attitude of the U.S..." (5) Although he still harboured doubts about the nature of Sandinista domestic policy, MacEachen stressed the need for stronger.
Canadian-Nicaraguan relations, which he characterized as very good.
Nicaraguan non-governmental groups looked to their
Canadian counterparts for assistance in their task of rebuilding. For instance, a representative of the Sandinista's trade union, the CST, toured Canada in early 1982. Her trip was an indication of the importance that Nicaragua placed on support from Canada's labour movement, which had been helpful in the past and which was perceived as a powerful friend in
Canada.
One chance to cement Canadian-Nicaraguan relations was -75- lost when a visit by FSLN Commandante Tomas Borge was postponed indefinitely due to security problems. A diplomatic source reported that Borge was a prime target for those opposed to the
Sandinista government and that his life would *be in danger even in Canada. "'The Canadian invitation dates back to 1980.
Tomas Borge has kept in very close contact with Canadian groups. When he was denied a U.S. visa, the Canadian universities jumped at the chance, said another diplomatic source." (6) Later that year, a delegation of Nicaraguan agricultural officials, led by the deputy minister of agrarian reform, visited Canada to learn about Canadian farming methods.
This trip again "reflected a desire to strengthen ties" with
Canada, according to the Minister. (7)
Ottawa's acceptance of the Sandinistas as a legitimate government was well-received in Nicaragua. The independent newspaper El Nuevo Diario commented that "the Canadian posture towards Nicaragua contrasts with that of its ponderous neighbour to the south..." (8) After Canada approved the aid package of February 1984 the Sandinista weekly, Barricada
Internacional wrote that, "The Canadian government and people have extended a considerable amount of aid to Nicaragua...", citing the "long-term, interest-free loan worth US $13.4 million." (9)
Because the Sandinistas believed that U.S. economic leverage over Canada limited Ottawa's options, the establishment of the line of credit was seen by Managua as a significant gesture. Referring to U.S. economic and political influence over Canadian policy, a counsellor at the Nicaraguan -76- embassy in Ottawa, Jamie Davila said: "We know that for Canada it is very difficult politically, very costly, to have given a line of credit...(and it took) an unusually long time."
Indeed, it took about 2 1/2 years, despite the small size of the loan. So the Junta of National Reconstruction was
"grateful about Canada's step forward", although the delay
"doesn't show us an independent foreign policy". (10)
For Managua, another sign of U.S. influence was the
Canadian promise of greater aid to Honduras even though that country was a base for American-supported Contra attacks against Nicaragua. "We find it hard to understand why a country which is being used by the USA to assasinate
Nicaraguans is being helped by Canada." (11)
Despite this type of problem, Nicaragua appreciated the important differences that existed between the U.S. and Canada.
For instance, Davila noted hopefully that, "Canadians are not leaving the rest of the hemisphere to the United States...the horizon for Canadians is no longer the U.S. border." (12) And at the end of MacEachen's talks in Managua, Commandante Ortega said that, "The government of Canada has a constructive attitude towards Central America which is totally different from the policy of aggression implemented by the United
States." (13) But the Sandinistas needed more help from
Canada. Davila explained that support for peace efforts as well as economic and technical assistance "are the two main areas in which we have expectations from Canada". He pointed out that Nicaragua had invited Canada to join the Contadora efforts to bring peace to the region. "We were very -77- enthusiastic about the statement made by Minister MacEachen in
February (1984) that he would send consultants to the three committees of the Contadora group and that Canada sees ,a-nother solution for Central America than the militant point ,of view that, the United States is taking against Nicaragua." (14)
In April 1984, Nicaragua presented a request for a total of $162 million in Canadian aid over a five year period
(1984-89). The projects included:
1) A Geothermal project ($11 Million);
2) Cooperative development ($8 million); Vs* r
3) A new potable water system ($11.7 million);
4) Maintenance of present water service ($5 million);
5) The second stage of dairy project ($12 million); and
6) Increased agro-export capability and basic grain production ($114.3 million).
"Canada is a very rich country with great knowledge in mining, forestry, in dairy products", Davila added, and
Nicaragua wanted help through a line of credit and technical assistance in these areas. Since 1980, Nicaragua has made efforts to establish good relations with Canadian industries as a source of basic equipment. A Canadian embassy in Managua would be especially welcome, he said. (15)
The record demonstrates that Nicaragua viewed Canada as a potentially important ally in its struggle for development.
Canada possessed the necessary expertise and resources to be of great benefit, and is a wealthy country, especially by Central
American standards. But Sandinista hopes were tempered by an -78-
understanding that Canada was reluctant to antagonize the
United States. The Sandinistas also hoped that Canada (.along with other U.S. allies) would try to discourage the U.S. from
continuing its economic, political, and military atack.s on
Nicaragua. This effort was critical in Nicaraguan relations with Ottawa as "the Mexican position and Canada's position may very well be the largest obstacle to direct intervention in
Central America by the United States." (16) Sandinista foreign
policy has attempted to enlist the support of other nations,
including Canada, in building a diplomatic wall to raise the
costs of Washington's actions. This wall is "made up of a
network of relationships with Western governments, social
democratic parties, and transnational bodies..." According to
one senior Nicaraguan official, "The United States has not
invaded Nicaragua... not because it has not wanted to. It is
because it has not been politically expedient". (17)
Canada's slowly evolving skepticism over the U.S. policy
towards Nicaragua was probably- of some importance in denying
Washington that crucial politcal support, while the (gradual)
increase in Canadian assistance was certainly welcomed by
Nicaragua. But the Sandinistas hoped that Canada would make a more determined effort, both economically and politically, to make possible the rebuilding of their country.
b) The United States
The elements of Canadian-U.S. relations which are directly
or indirectly relevent to Nicaragua are legion and complex. -79-
Th e focus of this section will be the actions and perceptions of both countries which specifically relate to Canada's
Nicaraguan policy. A discussion of the evolution of U.S. policies is not directly relevent to this work: it will be treated as a given. More general factors (e.g. Canada's international orientation and objectives) will be discussed later.
The United States naturally wished to have the support of its closest allies on questions that it deemed vital. Because
Canada did not fully support U.S. policy toward Nicaragua,
Ottawa had to consider Washington's reaction when deciding on its approach to the Sandinistas. Canada had to weigh the possible benefits that might accrue in other bilateral matters if it acquiesced in Washington's actions, as well as the potential harm to Canadian interests if the U.S. was "provoked" by the lack of support. This worry over "linkage" was a form of anticipated reaction, since "poor Canada-United States political relations do often spill over into other areas..."
(18), such as trade, acid rain talks, or questions of sovereignty in the Arctic. Statements by top Canadian officials during this period indicated just how important good relations with the U.S. were to overall Canadian goals. (19)
Hostility could result in a lack of cooperation by the United
States on bilateral issues ("linkage by omission") as well as direct retaliation. The problem was made more acute by .the general increase in tension that had developed in the "special relationship" by the late 1970s and especially in the early
1980s. The events of the first year of the Reagan -80-
administration "demonstrated how the interactions between
Washington and Ottawa were characterized by acute stress in
which...both sides reacted with hysteria, panic, and other
indications that they felt their values were threatened by what
the other side was doing to them". (20)
Although it is hard to get information about how the U.S.
tried to influence Canada over Nicaragua (since both
governments would be discomfitted if its existence was made
public), the lack of "overt pressure" does not preclude subtler
methods. Canadian officials knew that Washington would be more
irritated by open and forceful disagreement than by a quiet,
diplomatic approach. This was the predominant style of the
Canadian government when it first became disenchanted with
Reagan's anti-Sandinista posture, (dating from early 1982 to
late 1983). But increasing U.S. support for the Contras, the mining of Nicaraguan ports, and the invasion of Grenada were
among the actions which impelled Canada to be more vocal over
its differences with Washington. An official at External
Affairs conceded that, as a consequence of the Canadian stand,
Ottawa now enjoyed "more limited access to the U.S. State
Department. 0!ur views have been heard and filed away." But he
stated catagorically that, "There's no overt pressure for us to
toe a particular line. What they tried to do was to pursuade
us through argument that they're right." (21) .;V .
For its part, the United States, through its Information
Service at its Ottawa embassy, maintained that "the U.S. government does not wish to interfere in policy matters of an allied foreign government and would not go beyond this friendly -81- persuasion in most cases (my emphasis). Regarding the amount of influence the U.S. has over Canadian foreign policy, "this is entirely a matter of opinion." (22)
Other reports, however, suggest a different story. Xabier
Gorostiaga, a social scientist now working in Managua, wrote that it was U.S. pressure which caused Canada to give the bulk of its Central American aid to Honduras instead of Nicaragua.
(23) "Canada's aid programme (to Honduras) can be seen as buttressing U.S. aims." (24) Newspaper reports indicated that
Washington was trying to "influence" Canada and Mexico to follow its line in Central America. (25) One public mainifestation of this pressure on Canada was the open letter from Schultz to MacEachen in 1984, asking the latter to add El
Salvador to his Central American itinerary. This move seems to have been calculated to put MacEachen on the spot by forcing him to demonstrate openly his government's position with regard to U.S. actions in the region.
By late 1981, as the Reagan administration began to increase its support the Contras, "the pressure from Washington for its Western allies to toe the line on Central America was intense." A European diplomat was quoted as saying that, "It is a very, very delicate issue right now," with governments trying to "walk a thin line between their committment to social justice and their desire for a working relationship with the
United States." (26) Press reports from Mexico in 1984 told of the increasing success of U.S. presure on that country. An oil deal with Nicaragua was suspended, ostensibly because the
Managua had trouble paying its bills. In fact, Reagan signed a -82- document in mid-May which ordered an increase in pressure on
Mexico to force it to reduce its "economic and diplomatic support for the Nicaraguan government." (27) On the occasion of Mexican President de la Madrid's trip to Ottawa that same month, Canadian officials admitted that Washington was
"planning to pressure Canada and Mexico in a bid to get some support for its own approach to Latin America... the issue of how to deal with the U.S...will likely be discussed before de la Madrid leaves Ottawa". (28) The successful effort to force the French to cancel a small ($16 million) arms sale in 1982 and the unsuccessful bid to get the EEC not to increase
"economic or any political support for Nicaragua" (29) in 1984 suggest that Canada too faced some pressure over its stand on the Sandinistas.
One overt way in which the U.S. attempted to affect
Canadian policy was to present its case to influential
Canadians. This practice, of course, goes on all the time, formally and informally. For instance, in March 1983 , the U. S embassy circulated its version of peace talks with the
Sandinistas to a number of prominent Canadians, including John
Harker of the CLC and Terry Mileski, a CBC journalist. (30)
It is difficult to find reliable information on U.S. pressure aimed at Canada. So far, there is no information about specific threats to Canada from the U.S. on this matter.
But there are precedents in the history of U.S.-Canadian relations which seem analogous to the dispute over Nicaragua.
Canada's response to the Cuban revolution seems to provide the closest parallel. As Jocelyn Ghent wrote, "Canadians were more -83-
flexible and pragmatic in dealing" with the Castro government than was the U.S. (31) Several factors involved in Ottawa's
attitude to Cuba are relevent to the case of Nicaragua:
Canada's dependence on foreign trade made it reluctant to use
economic sanctions; concern that pressure would force Havana
into a closer relationship to the Soviet Union; and the fear
that further U.S. intervention "would stir up a hornet's nest
in Latin America and the UN and not settle the problem in the
long run." (32) These identical concerns have been articulated by the Canadian government regarding U.S. actions toward
Managua.
In the Cuban case, Washington resented what it considered
Canada's lack of cooperation by continuing (non-strategic)
trade, and making a public offer to mediate between the United
States and Cuba. (33) U.S. diplomatic pressure resulted in
"silencing" External Affairs Minister Howard Green's criticisms of Washington's Cuban policy, as well as in forcing a change of emphasis in Canadian statements on the matter of "communist
subversion" in the hemisphere. (34) A possible example of anticipated reaction was Prime Minister Diefenbaker's hope that giving more support to the Kennedy administration's line about
Cuba would cause the U.S. to ease its pressure on Canada to accept nuclear arms, a key issue for Diefenbaker. (35)
Canadian support for the admission of mainland China to the UN was another instance where fear of U.S. retaliatory measures (in this case, regarding the Auto Pact, and lumber and oil exports) caused Ottawa to proceed with caution. (36) More
recently, in the context of Central America and the Reagan regime, MacGuigan, who had condemned "the atrocities perpetrated by the junta [in El Salvador] in suppressing the peasant revolt... apparently responded to direct pressure from
Alexander Haig and gave tacit support" to the military government. (37) It would be surprising if Canada, unlike other nations, had not been subjected to similar pressures over its dealings with Nicaragua, a country which is considered by
U.S. strategic planners to be the "hegemonic core of (its) national security zone". (38) Robert White, former U.S.
Ambassador to El Salvador, went so far as to say that,
"Canadian policy in Central America is...usually dictated by the degree of pressure imposed by Ronald Reagan's White House".
(39)
Ottawa's traditional deference to the United States over
"security" matters in Central America was a factor in determining the narrow limits within which Canada would dissent from U.S. hostility to the Sandinistas. But improved bilateral relations with Washington (seen by Canada as a "sine qua non" for the achievment of Ottawa's overall objectives), along with generally quiet diplomatic pressure from the U.S., seems to have been a key factor in restricting the role that Canada was able to play regarding Nicaragua. As we have seen, Canada has traditionally tended to ignore events south of the Rio Grande if there was a chance of angering Uncle Sam.
c) Other Countries
Excepting the United States, Canada had more contact with -85-
Mexico than any other country regarding Nicaragua. Several factors were responsible for this situation. Both countries share long borders with the U.S. and are affected strongly by
Washington's policies. Both see the turmoil in Central America as rooted primarily in domestic socio-economic structures rather than as an extension of an "evil empire". Moreover,
Mexico is a powerful actor in Central America in its own right.
It was only natural that Canada and Mexico would look to each other for mutual support and cooperation when in profound disagreement with their powerful neighbour. Relations between
Mexico and Canada have generally been quite cordial. For instance, in 1977, Mexico chose Canada as one of the five countries with which it most wanted to expand relations, a development which would have increasing importance throughout the 1980s., and Canada reciprocated the honor.
Just as significantly, the two countries share a similar outlook on many Third World issues. During de la Madrid's visit to Ottawa, for instance, the Mexican president said that he wanted to "show the recognition Mexico gives to Canada and
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau" for his "balanced" position on relations between the developing and developed world. (40)
(This sentiment was also emphasized when when President Lopez
Portillo came to Canada -- see above). Regarding Central
America, de la Madrid and Trudeau "warned that foreign intervention in the region is undermining Mexican-led efforts to find peaceful solutions." (41) The Mexican leader rejected the "domino theory" as applied to Central America and "seemed to be attempting to establish Canada and Mexico as natural -86- allies..." Referring to Canada's support for the Contadora group, de la Madrid offered, "The cooperation of Canada is a positive factor in our efforts." (42) But although Canada had offered to play a peacekeeping role in Central America once a demilitarization agreement was reached, Trudeau did not offer any help to achieve such a breakthrough, and de la Madrid did not make such a request. Nor did the Mexican President ask
Canada to join Contadora.
Canada and Mexico especially feared the escalation of military activity in Central America. At a dinner with
Canada's business and political elite, de la Madrid warned that
"the outbreak of a generalized war is beginning to become a reality" in Central America. (43) Yet, the two leaders did not discuss "any possible moves to jointly pressure Washington to pull its military forces out of the region". They did agree that it would be a mistake to isolate Nicaragua either economically or politically. (44) So, while Mexico remained a more active defender of the Sandinista revolution than Canada, the spectre of U.S. power seemed to temper the words and deeds of both countries.
Another Contadora country, Colombia, also hoped for
Canadian support for the peace effort. In April 1984,
Colombian Foreign Minister Roderigo Lloreda welcomed
MacEachen's statement that Canada was prepared to take a more active part in the quest for peace in Central America. "Canada has a role to play. It is a country that is generally accepted well in Latin America. It has a good image and trust...(Canada) can help other Latin American countries like -87- ours to do a job for which outside help is essential." (.45)
Only the United States, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela appear to have had significant contact with Ottawa regarding
Nicaragua. There is no evidence that Canada has made an effort to line up with other countries which shared its misgivings over U.S. actions toward Nicaragua, although such efforts were recommended in the report of the Parliamentary Sub-committee on
Latin America. In fact, Trudeau and de la Madrid seem to have gone out of their way to avoid joint actions that might upset the Reagan administration. Still, many Latin Americans hoped that Canada would play a larger and more independent role in the hemisphere. In private, a Mexican official complained that, "Sometimes Latin America wishes for more from Canada regarding the United States. When accounts are settled, Canada is always in favor of the United States." (46) -88-
Chapter 4 - Analysis
Introduction
Canadian contacts with Nicaragua before the Sandinista
Revolution were extremely limited. "We ignored the situation... In fact, all of Central America was a bit of a wasteland for Canadian foreign policy." (1) Even with the overthrow of Somoza, the immediate Canadian response, apart from the contribution of the labour movement, some private groups, and several churches, was minimal. The Clark government, whose "limitations were most evident in...foreign affairs", tended to mirror the attitude of the Carter administration, which was cool but not completely hostile to the new Government of National Reconstruction in Managua. (2)
Canada welcomed the three basic Sandinista principles: non-intervention in the affairs of other countries; the committment to a mixed economy; and promises of political pluralism. Nicaragua' need for assistance was enormous.
During the civil war, about 50,000 people had been killed,
40,000 children orphaned, and one-fifth of the population left homeless. Somoza had deliberately bombed the industrial infrastructure before fleeing, and saddled Nicaragua with a foreign debt of US $1.5 billion. "The country was little more than a ruin." (3) But in spite of the enormous devastation wrought in Nicaragua, Clark government provided no direct bilateral aid.
The return of the Liberals under Pierre Trudeau did not -89- signal any immediate change of policy towards Managua. "The
Canadian government, under both the Liberal and Conservative ministries, has been extremely slow in responding to the
Nicaraguan emergency". (4) Reagan's inauguration in January
1981 brought to power an administration determined to "roll back" the Sandinista revolution. Canada's initial response was, in the words of External Affairs Minister Mark MacGuigan,
"quiet acquiescence". (5) Although not completely unsympathetic to the Sandinistas, Canada did not want to put forth a policy that would anger the United States. But
MacGuigan also believed that moves should not be made which would help to drive the Sandinistas into a Soviet orbit. This strategy was manifested by Ottawa's 1981 decision to designate
Nicaragua as a "project country" for development assistance and in the subsequent increases in development assistance to
Managua. Canada, however, maintained its policy of granting higher levels of assistance to Honduras, a country with "no respect for human rights" and which supported the Contra war against Nicaragua. (6) Yet MacGuigan had stated that Canada opposed any country "destabilizing their neighbours or using their territory to inject East-West rivalries into the region...(or failing) to carry out the social and economic reforms urgently needed..." (7) These aid decisions seemed to contradict Canada's noble rhetoric.
Canadian enthusiasm for the Contadora peace process was based on the assessment that it offered the only realistic alternative to increased U.S. militarization. MacEachen, for his part, grew increasingly worried about Washington's plans, -90- especially after the invasion of Grenada, which shook his confidence in the U.S. He began to speak of the need for
Canada to "go after countries that are impeding the process, the outside countries that are supplying arms and military advisors... So it's up to us to put pressure on them to get out so the process can get going." (8) It was clear that MacEachen was referring to the United States. The Minister had never been more openly critical of U.S. policy towards Nicaragua or so candid about differing with the U.S. But realizing that
Canada alone could do little, he stressed, upon his return from
Nicaragua in 1984, that what was required was "a major international effort through the expression of world opinion to put pressure on the countries in there to move out under some orderly conditions..." (9) External Affairs never "worked out the concrete ways to do this." (10)
While the Liberal government eventually made a few moves to implement its own policy toward Nicaragua (some aid, stronger rhetoric), Ottawa did not take any significant unilateral or multilateral initiatives to help Nicaragua rebuild or to restrict intervention in the region. One analyst maintained, "the tragedy is that... Canada could have made a modest, if life-saving difference by playing a constructive mediation role". (11) With the exception of some statements towards the end of MacEachen's tenure at External, Canadian policy was essentially compatible with that of the U.S. For instance, Ottawa accepted the United States' claim to have legitimate security interests in Nicaragua and maintained that
Washington was sincerely concerned with the problems of development, secure borders, demilitarization, and democracy.
According to the DEA, the main difference between the United
States and Canada was the question of how to achieve their mutual goals.
Because of conflicting pressures on Ottawa, Canadian government policy towards Nicaragua was ineffective and contradictory. Its responses tended to be piecemeal, "governed by no apparent strategy other than to retain the United States ' goodwill" (12), moderated by fear of the effects of an escalating crisis on trade and world order and, to a lesser extent, by Canadian public opinion.
A host of international, national, domestic, and individual factors went into the formation of Canada's response to the Sandinista revolution. This chapter will try, in the light of the preceeding discussion, to bring together and summarize the major elements of this policy. Canada's position vis-a-vis the international system of states (i.e orientation and roles) and its political and economic objectives within that system will be considered as they are central to understanding the determinants of the Canadian policy.
Domestic Canadian factors will then be considered, both in terms of the actors involved and the decision-making process in
Ottawa. As the Canadian position evolved, some factors remained constant (such as a general acceptance of the "right" of Washington to maintain hegemony in Central America and concern over linkage in bilateral relations with the U.S.), while others showed marked evolution (including Canada's -92- dissatisfaction with specific U.S. actions, its willingness to disagree openly with the Reagan administration, and the increase in development assistance to Managua). Both changes and continuites will be analyzed and the discussion will conclude with a critique of Canadian policy, including suggestions of possible alternatives. -93-
a) Orientation, Roles, Objectives
Canada's contemporary orientation towards the international system of states grew directly out of the Second
World War. The isolationism of the pre-war era was replaced by a strong sense of Canadian interdependence with the rest of the world, especially in economic and military matters. This internationalism was based on a perception that "only with a strong committment by states to an international organization responsible for collectively securing the peace, could a repetition of the carnage of total war be avoided". (13)
Canada's strong support for the United Nations was a prime example of Ottawa's approach to peace and security in the world. True to Canada's traditional status as a Western country, Ottawa was instrumental in the formation of NATO in
1949, as well as a prominent member of the Commonwealth, and a participant in many other multilateral institutions. Canada viewed such international structures as serving its own national interests while at the same time benefiting the rest of the world. Although some elements of Canada's foreign policy goals shifted during the next four decades, (as a result of changes in the perception of the Soviet threat, or after the
1973 oil embargo, for example) this internationalist, Western orientation remained fundamental.
Since World War Two, Canadian officials have perceived
Canada as a "middle power". As such, Ottawa has taken on a number of roles within the international system, sometimes stressing one or two at the expense of others, sometimes making -94- a previously minor aspect into a major one. Several of these role conceptions are particularly relevent in the context of the Nicaraguan crisis.
Canada has sometimes acted a peacekeeper (e.g. in Cyprus,
Indochina), a "helpful fixer" (the Commonwealth and South
Africa), or bridge builder between nations (China and the
U.S.). Moreover, Ottawa has often been uncomfortable when the tensions increase between the U.S.S.R. and Washington. "Thus, when superpower relations deteriorate, Canada often tries to reverse that slide and restore a sense of proportion and balance." (14)
Canada's security alliance with the United States and
Europe has been a central feature of the post-war years, and although some dissatisfaction with Ottawa was occasionally expressed by its NATO allies, Canada's committment has never wavered. One reason that Canada values this identity as a faithful ally is the hope that its credibility as a key member of the Western bloc would increase its influence, especially in terms of the U.S. Because of Canada's ties to the Alliance, and because its potential influence over Soviet policy is negligible, "[t]he nation to be 'moderated' has most often been the United States..." (15)
Another constant role has been that of friend to developing countries in almost every part of the world.
Although Canada has not been especially generous in relation to other donor countries, it has provided steady aid and has spoken up for the LDCs in many international fora.
These roles were particularly relevent in light of the -95"- deepening crisis in Central America and helped shape Canada's reaction to it. The Trudeau government had the opportunity to try to use Canada's influence and credibility with the nations of the Americas to ease the mounting tensions between Nicaragua and the United States.
Building international institutions and regimes and a committment to functional ism (the notion that a country's responsibilities should be commensurate with its capabilities) were central foreign policy objectives in the first decades following WW II. The decline of idealistic internationalism as the dominant theme of Canadian foreign policy came with the election of Trudeau in 1968 resulted in a foreign policy review. The new Trudeau Doctrine suggested that Canadian efforts in the international arena had often been made at the expense of the national and domestic interests which must now take priority. Fostering domestic economic growth and safeguarding sovereignty and independence headed the list of the six themes that formed the new framework of Canada's foreign policy goals. Working for peace and security through
"peacekeeping, the relaxation of tensions, international law, or improvement of bilateral relations" was another major goal.
The promotion of social justice focused on the problems of racism and developmental assistance to the LDC's. (16) While all four of these objectives influenced Canada's response to the crisis over Nicaragua, economic and security considerations
seemed to be the most salient to policymakers in Ottawa. -96-
b) Determinants of Canada's Policies Toward the
Sandinistas
Given Canada's international orientation, role, and overall objectives, how can the history of Canadian actions towards Nicaragua and the Sandinista revolution be explained?
This section will examine five broad catagories of explanation, seeking to highlight those elements which were most significant in the formation of Canadian policy.
1) The International System
Within the contemporary multipolar international environment, Canada is firmly allied to the West, under the leadership of the United States. But Canada is not an uncritical ally, especially when it perceives that its own interests are threatened, as is sometimes the case when
Washington overreacts to a "crisis". When such problems occur,
Ottawa is necessarily tactful in its approach, a style known as
"quiet diplomacy". It has long been a tenet of Canadian policy that "the degree of conflict and competition in East-West relations can be moderated and ameliorated by sound diplomacy and negotiations". (17) When tensions between the superpowers increase, Canada sometimes attempts to moderate United States actions, but not in such a way as to pose a serious threat to
Canadian-U.S. relations. Ottawa cannot ignore demands for alliance solidarity (i.e. supporting U.S. policies). As the
Reagan administration sought to reestablish Washington's -97- pre-Vietnam influence in the world, it placed renewed emphasis on the loyalty of its allies.
Canada's strong military, cultural, social, and especially, economic relations with Washington leaves it vulnerable to subtle and not-so-subtle pressures to conform to
U.S. policies. "In general, a country that needs something from another is vulnerable to its acts of influence." (18) As part of its strategy for successful bilateral relations with
Washington, Canada also needed to cultivate favor with those elements within the U.S. government (e.g. the White House, the
State Department) which might be expected to defend Canadian interests against demands from various domestic actors in the
United States. This consideration also mitigated against a stronger Canadian stance against Washington's agressive
Nicaraguan policies.
The differences with the United States over Nicaragua were based on conflicting perceptions of how to deal with the
Sandinista revolution. Washington's perception that the
Sandinistas were a threat to U.S. hegemony in Central America clashed with the Canadian view the that, for all its faults, the Sandinista government was legitimate and that the use of force to overthrow it would be counterproductive in the long term. The United States, which insisted on casting Nicaragua as a Soviet/Cuban puppet bent on spreading "communist subversion", gradually came to be seen by the Trudeau government as the main external source of instability in
Central America, but whose cooperation was essential if there was to be any chance of peace in the region. -98-
The strains on the NATO alliance from U.S. policies towards Nicaragua was another consideration for Canada.
Moreove, "any large-scale military intervention by the United
States in Central America would put severe strains on the NATO alliance," according to the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations.
(19) The almost total lack of support by NATO countries for
U.S. policy against Nicaragua, such as their refusal to go along with Washington's trade embargo, give no reason to believe that either NATO governments or their citizens would support an invasion. On the contrary, these governments would probably be under considerable domestic pressure to distance themselves from United States actions. Most of Washington's allies would likely view an invasion as misguided because they tend to view the greater threat to the West as coming from such factors as the division of Europe, the arms race, mass poverty, or economic stagnation - none of which were addressed by the
United States' hostile actions against Nicaragua. "A major clash between the United States and Europe over Central America could soon lead to overwhelming pressures within the United
States for a redefinition of its role in NATO - even to the point of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the European continent", according to one U.S. commentator. (20)
Canada and Europe see danger to world order, not from
Soviet subversion in Central America, but in the chance that the crisis could produce a regional war ("a U.S. invasion of
Nicaragua would quickly provoke a war of guerrillas throughout all of Central America, from Guatemala to Panama...[and] destabilize the countries immediately north and south of the embattled region..." according to an anaylsis in the New York
Times) (21); undermine the political economy of Mexico and other proximate states; discredit the U.S. in Latin and Western public opinion; divert U.S. forces to the region, endangering other areas; "risk superpower confrontation; and deflect concern away from other security problems. (22) Indeed, many analysts believe that a nuclear war is much more likely to be triggered by instability in the underdeveloped world than by a Soviet attack in Europe.
Canada could not afford to ignore the growing turmoil involving Nicaragua for other reasons. As Ambassador Gotlieb observed, "Latin America, Central America, and the Caribbean - these are now [1984] seen by almost all Canadians as areas of special importance to Canada and to our own well-being and security." (23) Canada's attitude toward Central America in particular has undergone a dramatic evolution over the last few decades. As one high-ranking DEA official put it: "It is not now a question of whether we wish to become involved in the region, but how." (24)
Canada's dependence on international trade and commerce also explains part of the anxiety in Ottawa over the more belligerent actions of the U.S. against the Sandinistas.
"Canada is a major trading nation. ||ur prosperity... depends not a little on the future of world trade," (25) (exports generate about 30% of Canada's GNP). (26) While the United
States remains Canada's largest trading partner, the Canadian economy does a significant amount of business with the rest of the world (e.g. about 35% of Canadian exports in 1979). (27) -loo-
As a middle power whose relatively open economy is bound up with world trade, Canada is dependent on continuing peaceful international commerce, while U.S. actions in Central America were increasing the unrest and level of conflict.
Trade is important with respect to the nations south of the Rio Grande. Numerous government officials have expressed the view that, "the Canadian government and Canadians in general have a vested political and security interest in...the furthering of long term stability and development in Latin
America and the Caribbean... because of our real mutual interests in economic development, trade, finance, and investment..." (28) The development of these kinds of mutually beneficial relations was seriously threatened by the continuing unrest and impoverishment that existed in the region.
Peace and stability are needed if world trade is to flourish, but poverty and the absence of economic development are major causes of social unrest in the world today. A glaring example is Central America, where the wide gap between the economic elite and the peasant class creates stresses that provide fertile ground for external forces to interfere. Such political and social stresses, even if they do not lead to armed conflict, inevitably divert economic resources to maintaining a military capability, and money that could go into development goes instead to buy arms. (29) The Trudeau government understood that the escalation of the conflicts in Central America would not be in Canada's economic interests. Peaceful international relations are a prerequisite for expanding trade and commercial relationships.
"Canada has a crucial stake in the development of stable international economic arrangments... Efforts to promote self-sustaining growth in the developing countries will pay dividends in terms of the creation of markets for Canadian raw -101- materials and manufactured goods, as well as the creation of additional sources of supply for...goods not produced in
Canada." (30) Foreign investments were another factor.
Canadian banks had over $22 billion dollars in assets in Latin
America and the Caribbean by 1982, representing over 20% of the world-wide total. But "the instability of Central America makes major project funding unlikely" while the crisis remains unresolved. (31)
In reference to the Sandinistas themselves, while Ottawa did not hesitate to voice its concern that Nicaragua's domestic policies might be turning repressive, there was a growing awareness that the Sandinistas were striving to provide a stable and popular administration, one with which Canada could live and do business. Because the Canadian government's attitude to alternate paths to development was generally tolerant, Ottawa saw no virtue in destabilizing legitimate revolutionary governments and has been willing to assist such nations develop to the point where stability and the growth of trade and investment have a "moderating" effect.
As discussed earlier, Canadian opposition to U.S. policy was made in the context of generally heightened tensions between the two countries. Neither one wanted to add another contentious issue to the relationship, but the significance of
Nicaragua and the international considerations involved made it impossible for Canada to ignore Washington's actions, even though Nicaragua itself was of little direct consequence to
Ottawa. Along with the national and domestic factors already mentioned, these economic and geopolitical considerations were -102- critical to the evolution of Canada's response to the
Sandinistas.
2) Canadian National Attributes
Geography had an obvious relation to the interest shown in
Nicaragua by Canada and Canadians. In addition to sharing a long border with the United States, Canada shares a continent with Central America and the hemisphere with the rest of the
Latin countries. These factors made the turmoil in central
America harder to ignore.
Several elements of Canadian political culture and values, including "a non-military tradition...(and) a fondness for legalistic and diplomatic solutions" incline foreign policy makers to be wary of the use of force to settle international disputes. (32) It is felt that, while conflict cannot be totally eliminated, it can be controlled. Indeed, the value of political action is often seen to lie less in its ends and more in the degree to which it promotes pacific solutions to problems. Influenced to a large degree by experiences of domestic political bargaining, Canadians tend to believe that
"peace, order, and good government", based on legal principles and diplomacy, are the keys to the prevention of political strife. Qualities such as patience, flexibility, tolerance, moderation, and the ability to empathize with others are also part of the Canadian political culture. (This type of political process, however, "may also require...a resigned acceptance of the inconvenience of being weak - a recognition, -103- that is, of the realities of power".) (33)
Internationally, Canada favors the principles of self-determination and non-intervention, and saw in Nicaragua a case where violation of those principles by the United States could lead to an even greater disaster. Canada is heir to the venerable tradition that trade between nations is not only preferrable to war between nations, but to the corollary that such trade may function as a disincentive to adventurism by helping to "moderate" governments while increasing mutual interdependence. Canadian relations with Eastern Europe, China,
Cuba, as well as Nicaragua, exemplify this approach.
The norms and values of one's own culture certainly influence the perspectives of its citizens. Most high-level decision-makers in Ottawa would naturally hold Canada's mixed capitalist economy and its liberal-democratic political system as a model and standard with which to judge the political economy of other nations. Canadian policy-makers would tend to share this perspective with the United States and to be suspicious of emerging systems whose values differed to any significant degree. They would naturally be wary of the avowed
Marxism of the Sandinista leadership, the occasional press censorship, the nationalization of some private businesses, and the fraternal relations with Cuba. j|n the other hand, Ottawa has frequently declared its openess to various political and economic systems in the developing world, and was impressed by such Nicaraguan successes as the literacy campaign, the drop in infant mortality, the great amount of political and religious freedom, and the promise of free elections. It is not -104- surprising, therefore, that there were mixed feelings in Ottawa about the nature of "Sandinismo", which would contribute to the difficulty of assessing events in Nicaragua and to a tendency to "wait and see" before making significant committments.
Finally, the Canadian economy, battered though it may have been at times, gave Ottawa the potential to play an important part in terms for development assistance, influence, and the financing and technological support of any peace process that grew out of the work of Contadora. -105-
c) Decision Making
Introduction
There is little evidence that the Canadian Parliament played more than a very small role in determining the government's Nicaraguan policies. Major decisions were made in the Department of External Affairs and Cabinet under the leadership of the Prime Minister and the SSEA. Such a conclusion is not unxpected, since "the formulation and implementation of Canadian foreign policy is largely the perogative of the executive branch." (34) This pattern seems to have held in the case of Nicaragua, where party solidarity, quiet diplomacy and secrecy, and the lack of fear of suffering at the polls kept things relatively quiet. These factors are traditional in the Canadian system, with the result that
"...non-cabinet members of Parliament (even of the party in power) play a very minor role in policy-making, and parliamentary committees wield little effective legislative power". (35) The Sub-committee reports on Latin America did not seem to have made any significant impact on either the
House or the government, although they might have served to raise the awareness of some MPs and ministers. Confronted by the demands of various "external factors, by pressures from
Canadian business not to upset the Americans, and by demands from church and solidarity groups for greater distancing from
Reagan's policy, the Liberals were trying to find a way of taking a position that would be independent , but not so -106- independent as to offend the Reagan administration more than mildly." (36) But as the White House escalated its hostility toward the Sandinista government, Ottawa was forced to make its disagreements sharper and more openly.
1) The Government
The Department of External Affairs was the main bureaucratic arena in which Nicaraguan policy was worked out.
While international trade and development assistance were also responsibilities of External (the Secretary of State for
External Affairs is the minister designated for CIDA), the geopolitical aspects of the Nicaraguan question were the most salient considerations, so major decisions regarding all aspects of Nicaraguan policy were centered in DEA. "No other ministry has an opposing view, if they have a view at all.
There's no inter-departmental debate - it's left to us." (37)
CIDA itself was unlikely to be a significant source of policy at the Cabinet level because it is without its own minister and because of its limited responsibilities.
Although the Prime Minister has traditionally had a strong hand in foreign policy decisions, this does not seem to have been the case with respect to Nicaragua. Rather, Trudeau's role seems to have been consistent with his approach to foreign policy in general: to delineate broad policy outlines while leaving day-to-day affairs to his ministers. (38) Part of the reason was Trudeau's lack of interest in this particular issue, which he did not consider vital. But the PM set the tone with -107- his perception that "the overwhelming threat to Canada will not come from... foreign ideologies, or even ... nuclear weapons. It will come instead from the two-thirds of the people who are steadily falling further and further behind in the search for a decent standard of living". (39) The primary decision-maker in the Trudeau government with respect to Nicaragua appears to have been MacGuigan and, following him, MacEachen, "with the advice of Cabinet and a strong prime ministerial influence.
Since MacEachen arrived, he has been the decision-maker. As
Deputy Prime Minister, he's been the major source of policy for the region." (40)
If Trudeau paid relatively little attention to Nicaragua, then it is likely that part of the growing rift between the
U.S. and Canada can be traced to the replacement of MacGuigan as SSEA by Allan MacEachen. MacEachen's perceptions and attitudes differed in important ways from those of his predecessor. For instance, "MacGuigan wasn't all that comfortable dealing with Latin Americans. He was much more in the Western European-American circuit." (41) MacEachen on the other hand, had a more "internationalist" outlook and was more skeptical of the Manichean world-view expressed by the Reagan regime. In addition to posessing wide experience in government and a somewhat more sophisticated perspective, MacEachen was concerned with Nicaragua and Central America as an unstable region caught up in an East/West confrontation. Other factors included the Minister's view that there was a clear link between Canadian interests and those of the developing countries, especially "his efforts to link Canada's economic -108- interests with those of an increasingly assertive the Third
World." (42)
The Minister's understanding of the root causes of the unrest in Central America was another element. MacEachen observed, "The fundamental problems of Central America are the result of a long history of political, economic, and social repression. Stability cannot be restored until the forces for change have been accomodated, until social and economic progress can remove the explosive pressures of popular frustration." (43) Other statements demonstrated his disagreement with the military solution that was increasingly being pursued by the U.S. Over time, a number of lower ranking officials at DEA became more concerned about the direction of
United States policies, thus providing a base of support for
MacEachen's increasingly critical attitude.
2) Non-Governmental Actors
Business
Some analysts have argued that representations from the corporate sector get much more of a hearing from government officials than those from "internationally-oriented public interest groups", so that the net affect is a "bias toward business" in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy. "The government does not deal with critical internationally-oriented public interest groups in the same way as it deals with business and industry because it neither attaches the same -109- importance to the issues they raise nor is it seriously concerned to incorporate them into the government-led concensus." (44) Even so, it is argued, non-commercial NGOs are too important to appear to ignore, so the government has developed strategies to co-opt them.
Whatever the validity of that perception as a general rule, important qualifications must be made regarding
Nicaragua. First, Nicaragua and the rest of the region were not insignificant concerns to the government. In fact, the geopolitical ramifications were potentially very serious while, in contrast, there was little business interest in Central
America as a whole, or in Nicaragua in particular. (U.S. investments and trade with Central America were much greater.)
Second, the lack of a strong consensus in the private sector allowed the government wider latitude to consider the demands of other domestic actors. The third consideration was the strength of public support for Nicaragua. The muted voice of business relative to the NGOs gave the latter comparatively stronger influence than one might otherwise predict.
Public Opinion
Public opinion about foreign relations has rarely been important in the formulation of policy. In Canada, foreign affairs have traditionally had low salience with the public, and "foreign policy remains the preserve of the state and its constitutionally embedded competitors, Parliament [sic] and the provinces, rather than of the actors within society itself". -110-
(45) The Prime Minister's attitude toward those citizens who are attentive has usually been one of condescension to those whom he feels are not knowledgable and who are motivated more by passion than reason. The government generally considered public involvement in foreign issues meddlesome and a burden, but as an element which could be useful to support policies which were already favoured, especially in the face of pressure from external actors (the U.S. in particular).
Canadian opinion about Nicaragua was manifested in polls, meetings and demonstrations, the work of NGOs, and communications with the media and the government. As noted above, the reaction of large numbers of Canadians to the
Sandinista Revolution, U.S. intervention, and the government's response was unique in many ways. Two out of three Canadians surveyed in 1984 opposed U.S. attacks on Nicaragua (see above).
An official with the DEA admitted:
Since 1979, there has been a much more sustained interest by the Canadian public. It's surprising because the Canadian public is generally, from our perception, issue conscious for very short periods...Afganistan is a very good example. Central America is different. There has been a sustained, growing, and constant interest in the region, and a very well-organized network of interest groups that are studying the area very carefully. It's a very informed public. So that has been an influence on Canadian foreign policy. (46)
The influence of Canadian public opinion on the government, although not decisive, seems to have been significant. While MacGuigan paid little attention to the
NGOs, MacEachen, who had some sympathy with their goals, was less hostile. Public interest in Nicaragua was stronger during
MacEachen's tenure as Minister, and this growth gave the NGOs -Ill- more influence as they were not representing only their organizatons, but a much larger constituency. This influence was instrumental in getting Nicaragua increased aid by pursuading the government to designate it as a "project country". (47) Another aspect of this influence stems' from the dependence of External Affairs on non-governmental sources for much of its information about Nicaragua, allowing the
Department to get a wider perspective than would be possible if it relied soley on official Canadian or U.S. channels. The DEA received its most reliable information from returning missionaries, academics, development workers, and others who had first-hand knowledge of the situation in Nicaragua. This dependency increased the influence of those Canadians who supplied the information, most of whom favored more political and economic support for Nicaragua.
But it would be a mistake to credit public opinion, even as manifested by various NGOs, with having a lot of political clout in Ottawa. The most common demands articulated by the churches, solidarity groups, and labour were the establishment of a Canadian embassy in Managua, a strong public condemnation of the policies of the Reagan administration (especially their support for the Contras), and a refocusing of official development assistance from Honduras to Nicaragua. When Ottawa did begin to express some dissatisfaction with U.S. policies, most of the statements tended to be mild and/or ambiguous.
Bilateral loans to Nicaragua were increased, but only after several years, while total aid was still much less than that provided to Honduras. The embassy in Nicaragua never -112- materialized. Public pressure did support those government officials who, because of the considerations mentioned above, were trying to alter Candian policy. Public opinion was useful because it allowed the government, in the face of strong disapproval from the United States, to justify its decision to continue and even expand bilateral aid to Nicaragua.
The overall feeling among many NGOs was frustration in dealing with the government, and "most perceived their influence to be fairly small." (48) Still, although Ambassador
Gotlieb may have been exaggerating the level of governmental responsiveness for domestic reasons, there was probably some truth to his remark that:
Statistics have been cited about the extent of our trade and investment and the size of our aid program. The statistics are impressive, in Canadian terms. The statistics are not as important, however, as the existence of a growing concensus among Canadians about the crucial importance of the region to Canada and to Canadian interests. (49) -113-
d) Critique and Conclusions
When the elements discussed above are considered in the light of the substance of Canadian policy towards the
Sandinistas, it appears that these decisions were ultimately determined less by domestic considerations and more by external actors (e.g. Nicaragua, the United States) and external situations (e.g. geopolitical considerations, commercial relations).
The international environment is a pervasive, day-to-day influence on Canadian foreign policy, which tends to be reactive in nature. It therefore constrains the ability of interest groups to influence the broader, major issues on which external factors must be responded to. In general, the decision costs of foreign policy choice are greatly determined at this level, setting the context within which interest group activity must take place...(50)
Various policy options towards Nicaragua were considered in the context of these elements, each of which tended restrict the number of alternatives open to Canada. In discussing the formation of Canadian foreign policy, John Holmes sums up a view which could also be applied in the case of Nicaragua:
Canadian policies in recent years have been determinted more by what has happened in Washington or Houston, Brussels or Tegucigalpa, than by what has been decided or sought in Ottawa... Canadian policies would not have been very different if there had been another Liberal leader or a longer Conservative government... The range of Canadian foreign policies is considerably... 1imited by basic geopolitical, economic and cultural factors... and the room for radical change is circumscribed. (51)
The Trudeau government was much more concerned about the potential escalation of the conflict in Central America, and -Im• possible damage to Canadian interests from angering the Reagan administration, than by any foreseeable domestic consequences.
Although Trudeau had always tried to avoid upsetting the United
States unnecessarily, growing bilateral differences in a number of areas, along with the renewed emphasis on economic nationalism manifested by the Liberals in the 1980 election campaign, raised the levels of tension between Ottawa and
Washington to the point where MacGuigan warned that "normal relations between the two countries may no longer be possible".
(52) In the light of these pressing concerns, Trudeau seemed to go out of his way to avoid picking a fight with Washington over what began as a relatively minor problem in the United
States' "backyard". (The tougher statements were left to
MacEachen.) The increasing seriousness of the Reagan administration's actions against Nicaragua was the primary cause of Ottawa's gradual move away from supporting the U.S.
Domestic Canadian opinion, although it anticipated the subsequent drift of official policy, was a secondary, reinforcing factor in that evolution. Within this overall context, public opinion seemed to have had more of an impact on
Canadian aid policy than on strictly political actions.
As Cranford Pratt observed, "The relationship of development to stability in the Caribbean and Central America, particularly the relationship between external intervention, internal political change, and fundamental economic rights, is unaddressed by the Canadian government, no doubt for fear of raising yet another conflict with Washington..." (53) The
Canadian decision to focus its efforts on development -115- assistance, for instance, was due in large measure to the understanding that it was not likely to overly antagonize the
Reagan administration. The small amount of aid provided to
Nicaragua, not to mention its unusually long delay following the downfall of Somoza, exemplified Ottawa's hesitant approach.
The result has been a policy full of inconsistencies, which, in turn, have rendered Canadian actions relatively ineffective. Canadian "quiet diplomacy" had no effect on the
Reagan administration. Their reaction was: "This is the way our policy is. Take it or leave it." (54) Canadian support for various peace plans and its attempts to promote dialogue between the various actors in the region have been likewise fruitless. Canada must take some of the blame for this failure, since its support for Contadora was little more than rhetorical. No matter how sincerely meant, Canadian actions lacked significant, concrete efforts and the follow-through necessary to make a process like Contadora succeed. The
6-point Nicaraguan peace plan of 1983, for example, was endorsed in principle by Ottawa and promptly forgotten when
Washington ignored it. These failures are especialy significant in light of the contributions that Canada could have made with a more coherent and determined policy (see below).
One reason for Ottawa's ad hoc approach has been the lack of knowledge of Nicaragua among Canadian officials who, until the early 1980s, hadn't "had to develop distinct Canadian policies towards ... individual Central American republics... Nicaragua is an enigma to Canadian policy-makers." -116-
(55) The shortage of knowledgable staff at External Affairs, while contributing to the absence of an overall stategy, was itself a symptom of Canada's refusal to become seriously involved in working toward a peaceful solution in Central
America. This refusal indicated to the U.S. that Ottawa was not prepared to make a serious issue over Washington's efforts to destroy the Sandinista revolution if it would further damage
Canadian-U.S. relations.
Despite this ad hoc approach, however, a number of consistent themes can be discerned in the history of Canada's approach to the Sandinistas.
The first, and most obvious, is Canada's concern about the reaction of the United States. This fear may not have been based on any specific threat: "threats are extremely rare among
Canadian and American actions", and "spillover" from one issue area to another is unusual. (56) Still, no nation in Canada's vulnerable position could afford not to consider the attitude of so powerful a neighbour. The Sandinista revolution
"impinges on (Canada's) overall relations with the U.S., and that's been a very constraining factor in our whole approach to
Central America." (57) The fear of provoking the United States and the concurrent hope for a "special relationship" run throughout this chapter (and many others) of the history of
Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, in the MacGuigan period it can be fairly said that Canada was following a policy of
"nondecision" in regard to both Nicaragua and U.S. policy towards that country. Later, Ottawa made no significant decisions about Nicaragua without considering possible U.S. -117- responses, as "[t]he fear of retaliation lurks below the surface of Ottawa's political discourse." (58)
Fear of the turmoil that might result from United States heavy-handedness towards Nicaragua was the other major recurring theme. Foremost among these fears was the real possibility that the war against Nicaragua could destabilize the region, especially "Mexico and Venezuela, two countries in very close proximity to the area of conflict". (59) The war against Vietnam, which escalated to a war against all three countries of Indochina, was a recent reminder of how hostilities, once begun, could be difficult to contain. This possibility, and the consequences it might engender (see above) was the single most powerful factor in encouraging opposition to the U.S.
Canadian support for some elements of Washington's
Nicaraguan policy, based as it was on common perceptions and traditions, was consistant through this period. Specifically, there was agreement that Nicaragua was in the legitimate security sphere of the United States, that both countries preferred to see change take place in a "non-revolutionary way"
(60), and that a bourgois regime was preferable to a "Marxist" one. For most of this period, Canada accepted U.S. charges that the Sandinistas were actively trying to promote revolutionary struggle throughout Central America, especially in El Salvador. Although Canada's assessment of Nicaragua's internal political development varied slightly during this period, suspicions that the FSLN was trying to construct an authoritarian Marxist-Leninist state remained a concern from -119- the day that the Sandinistas seized power. "The interpretation of Central American history since 1979 which sees 'Nicaragua as platform for revolution' with the Sandinistas having 'betrayed' their ideals, has gained many adherents among Canadian officials." (61)
Canada's differences with Washington stemmed from several factors: its "middle power" status, some differences in political culture, disagreement about the nature and causes of the Sandinista revolution and, most of all, fear of the consequences of Washington's militaristic approach. Canadian officials had a more tolerant, more "European" view of change in the Third World, and did not see an "evil empire" behind every disturbance. Canada saw the problems of poverty, disease, political repression, and social justice as the real dangers to Central America. Ottawa was concerned that
Washingtons's hostility to the Sandinistas would drive them into the Soviet bloc, much as was the case with Cuba twenty years previously. As in the case of Cuba, Canada rejected "the
U.S. assumption that internal change in the countries of the
Caribbean Basin threatens US security." (62) With the possbile exception of a short period during MacGuigan's tenure at
External, Canada maintained that Nicaragua was not a Soviet or
Cuban client state and that Soviet expansionism was not an important factor. (Although as late as May 1984, Trudeau remarked that both the U.S. and the Soviets were "trying to turn the misery of the region into a contest between communist and democratic ideals".) (63) Because Ottawa did not believe that Nicaragua was a Soviet puppet or a serious threat to the -In• security of Central America, it viewed U.S. actions and the risks that were involved as a grave miscalculation. Canada's primary response was the use of "quiet diplomacy" to try to moderate Washington's,anti-Sandinista crusade.
These elements were the most consistent themes in Canadian policy towards Nicaragua. But there were inconsistencies and contradictions between Ottawa's rhetoric and practice, and between some actions and others. Development assistance is a case in point. The Canadian government spoke of "human solidarity", and "the powerful humanitarian motive" upon which it based its efforts to help those "trapped in world poverty to experience a more decent life..." (64). But Ottawa tied 80% of
its aid to the purchase of Canadian goods (one of the highest rates in the world), with the result that Managua was not able to "shop around" for the lowest prices or highest quality.
Tied aid also favours "imported technologies... and makes it extremely difficult to employ aid for direct poverty-alleviating projects, particularly in rural areas..."
(65)
Another problem lay with Canada's contention that "aid is not designed as a tool to reward or punish foreign governments" and is "not determined by political whim but by socio-economic
levels of development". (66) These principles were applied differently in the cases of Nicaragua and Honduras. Canada used Nicaragua's need for development assistance as a lever to push for a reversal of Managua's alleged "authoritarianism" and
"subversion" of neighbouring countries (e.g. MacEachen's remarks during his trip to Central America, comments from CIDA -120-
oficials and Amb. Sirrs, above) Honduras, however, which had a much worse human rights record, was granted more Canadian
assistance than any other country in the region. This largesse
was granted even though "Canada does not approve of the supply
of armaments by any country to opposing factions in Central
America" (67) and Honduras was the primary supply and staging
base for Contra attacks on Nicaraguans. When questioned about
this practice, External Affairs responded that Canada has
reiterated its "serious concern about the escalation of the
conflict" to the United States, Honduras, and Cuba (sic!). The
DEA maintained the dubious proposition that the aid will give
Canada more leverage with the Honduran government in order to
promote a "peaceful solution". (68) In any case, this "benefit
of the doubt" was not extended to the Sandinistas.
This particular contradiction is greater since Nicaragua
is admittedly able to use the aid it receives more efficiently
than Honduras. A report from ICHRLA in 1984 notes "the
excellent track record of the Nicaraguan government in
delivering aid to the grass roots population..." and adds that
the need for assistance is "reinforced by the crippling
attacks" through both the "dirty war" and the economic boycott
promoted by the United States. (69) The designation of
Honduras as a "core country" for aid, while granting Nicaragua
only "project country" status does not fit with Canada's
professed intention of maximizing the impact of its aid
programs to benefit the world's poor. Not only does the record
demonstrate that the funds would be used more effectively in
Nicaragua itself, but the conditions that are found there, such — lav• as agrarian reform, mass mobilization, and the veritable absence of corruption, might serve as inspirations for successful development in other poor countries - if the
Sandinistas were allowed to experiment with social reform in peace. *
This contradiction was analyzed by Edgar Dosman:
Since Honduras is the only designated core country for Canadian aid in Central America, a meaningful signal for showing displeasure toward that country for its part in the covert war against Nicaragua would be either to curtail further aid or to scale it back to the Nicaraguan level. Although pressed to be consistent in its action in curtailing aid to Cuba in retaliation for that country's "adventurism" and intervention in African affairs, the Trudeau government consistently refused to recognize the parallel in the militarization of Honduras and its use as a base for the anti-Sandinista "contras..." (71)
The other major inconsistency was the disparity between the Canada's traditional preference for a multilateral approach to peacefully resoving conflicts when a superpower, particularly the United States,
* One observer holds that U.S. hostility to the Sandinistas stems from the fact that "...the priorities of the new government 'meant that Nicaragua's poor majority would have access to, and be the primary beneficiaries of, public programs,' the fact that infant mortality fell so dramatically that Nicaragua won an award from the World Health Organization for the best health achievement in a Third World nation, health standards and literacy sharply improved, a successful agrarian reform was carried out, GDP expanded by 5% in 1983 in contrast to other countries in the region, production and consumption of corn, beans, and rice rose dramatically and Nicaragua came closer to self-sufficiency than any other Central American nation and made the most impressive gains of any Latin American nation in the Quality of Life Index of the Overseas Development Council, based on literacy, infant mortality, and life expectancy... 'Nicaragua should, in many ways, stand as an example for Central America, not its outcast. The grim social statistics from Honduras... stand in sharp contrast to the recent achievements in Nicaragua. (70) -122-
is involved, and its failure to work seriously with such organizations as the United Nations, the European Economic
Community, and especially Contadora in order to try to bring
peace to Central America. (Canada had made such efforts with
respect to the Korean War, China, Cuba, the Vietnam War, arms
control talks, and in other contexts.) (72) But although
Canadian support for the Contadora effort was sincere, it was
little more than words. There is no evidence that the Canadian
government made any serious effort to help mobilize the
resources and influence of this or other international
organizations and their member states in an effort bring
pressure to bear for an end to hostilities, or to moderate
those elements of U.S. policy to Nicaragua which Canada
opposed. Canada has more influence as part of a larger team,
and countries like Mexico and Venezuela might have been helpful
allies. By helping to strengthen world opinion in favor of a
negotiated settlement with Nicaragua and by encouraging
continued international support for the Sandinistas, Canada
might have helped to force Washington to rethink the costs and
risks of its policy of overthrowing the government of
Nicaragua. The opportunity was there. "In a time of American
military and economic decline, the United States is
sufficiently weakend that it is now forced to listen to its
allies, since it can no longer impose on them its preferred
solutions to world problems...America cannot afford not to get
on well with its continental partner." (73)
Canada's failure to use its influence is all the more
significant because -123-
Among the disparate group of "middle powers", from both the North and South, with enough clout and credibilty to lead in defining new collective management, and in radically improving existing multilateral systems, Canada re-emerges, insistently and naturally, because of both its traditions and its interests. (74)
Had the Canadian government so desired, there was room to act unilaterally. Ottawa could have been more explicit about its serious disagreements with the United States actions, particularly the backing for the Contras and the mining or
Nicaraguan harbours. By clearly opposing Reagan's actions,
Canada, as one of Washington's closest allies, would have denied the U.S. important political support while undercutting the "legitimacy" of its policies. But Canada tended to avoid direct condemnations about these acts of war, and, as noted, when vague statement were made denouncing "outside interference", the Soviet Union and Cuba were usually added to the U.S. for "balance". The establishment of a Canadian embassy in Managua would have underlined Canada's differences with Washington, demonstrated its support for Nicaraguan sovereignty and independence, while providing Canada with a valuable source of information. Such a move was needed because of the unique, revolutionary situation in Nicaragua, as well as the anti-Sandinista disinfomation campaign orchestrated by the
White House.
The transfer of aid funds to Nicaragua from Honduras was another possible option, and one whose effect would be both concrete and symbolic. Offerring such support to the
Nicaraguan economy would reduce some of the damage caused by the U.S.-backed Contras. By providing grants (instead of loans), preferential trade agreements, technical expertise, and other forms of assistance (e.g. credit insurance for Canadian companies through the Export Development Corporation), Canada could have backed its rhetoric about self-determination with significant deeds. As it was, the modest increase in Canadian aid to Nicaragua also served Ottawa as an excuse for not doing more and as a sop to public opinion.
More use could have been made of NGOs for this work. CIDA found that "NGOs... represent one of the most practical and effective forms of human cooperation in the world. They have the potential to be instruments of change, to provide leadership and build bridges of practical action between North and South." (75) Actions such as the multilateral and unilateral ones listed above would certainly have helped
Nicaragua to survive. By setting such an example, Canada might have encouraged other countries to increase their:own aid programs to Nicaragua and to be more openly critical of U.S. policy. At the very least, Canada would have been providing vital help to a small country in its struggle for national independence and development.
As it was, Ottawa's efforts were inadequate at best. An
External Affairs official conceded that Canadian attempts to moderate Washington's military approach with "quiet diplomacy" had failed. "We don't have much influence", he admitted. (76)
Of course, Ottawa's influence on Washington has always been limited and it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions as to what impact a stronger position might have had on the U.S., if any. But "Canada is better placed than any other country to -125- act as a moderate mediating influence between the'U.S. ,and
Latin America" precisely because of its ties to the U.S., its international reputation, its wealth, and other factprs. (77)
Canada's opposition to an outright U.S. invasion was a not insignificant element in deterring such a move. Yet, Canada's own contribution to peacefully resolving the crisis over
Nicaragua was minimal. No sustained or determined effort was made to find a multilateral solution. Aid was slow in arriving and cannot be deemed generous. Trudeau did not launch a "peace initiative" for Central America, not only because he didn't consider the crisis serious enough, but because he seemed to subscribe to the traditional Canadian notion that, in international relations, power could "be affected only marginally by the application of legal rules or by institutional processes." (78)
One can only speculate about what might have been accomplished had Canada allocated more resources either to assist Nicaragua unilaterally or to pursue a multilateral approach with those Latin and European nations which share
Canada's concerns. The implementation of strategies such as those suggested above, because they would have clearly run counter to U.S. policy, would constitute strong evidence of an independent foreign policy. The failure to play a vital and independent role in Central America, however, "casts doubt upon
Canada's identity as a(n independent) member-nation of the continent of the Americas..." (79)
Considering all the limitations on Canada's options, it would be unrealistic to think that Ottawa could have pursued -126- radically different policies. Indeed, given the factors discussed in this study, it is not surprising that Canada reacted as it did. However, had some of the conditions been changed, a markedly altered policy might have been possible.
For example, had the Prime Minister (or perhaps the Minister for External Affairs), been willing to risk Washington's anger, he might have adopted one or more of the policies mentioned above. A stronger and more organized public effort in support of the Sandinistas might have resulted in a more forthright stand by the Canadian government. While some elements of
Canada's relations with Nicaragua (e.g tied aid, suspicion of
"Marxist" tendencies) would have existed even without
Washington's hostility to the government in Managua, Canada's traditional concern for developing countries, along with the growing support of the Canadian public, suggests that Ottawa might have been significantly more generous and supportive of the Sandinista experiment in social development. To say that
Canada pursued a more enlightened policy toward Nicaragua than the United States did is to say little. A more reasonable, and damning, comparison is with the actions of other middle powers, such as Mexico, the Netherlands, and Sweden, which offered substantially more political and economic support to the
Sandinistas. Canadian policy, in the last analysis, opted for profits over principle, trade over international law, and narrow self-interest over the lives of Nicaraguans.
Examining Nicaragua as a foreign policy question can illuminate the decision-making processes in other cases, but -127- some unique aspects of this issue (e.g. the lack of any str.on.-g input from business interests; the depth of public opinion; the unusually high levels of tension with the U.S..; and the seeming absence of major differences among various ministries) require caution before generalizing to other foreign policy outputs.
More complete answers about the determinants of Canada's
Nicaraguan policy (and its relation to various decision-making models) will certainly be possible as more documents, papers, and memoires become available. In addition, research will be needed on questions such as:
1) To what extent did anticipated reaction, direct and
indirect pressures, "spillover", and other aspects of
Canadian-U.S. relations affect Ottawa's Nicaraguan policy?
2) What actions did Canada undertake in its "quiet diplomacy" with Washington in order to try to moderate the
latter's policy towards the Sandinista revolution?
3) Did Canada pursue any as yet undisclosed attempts to rally international and/or multilateral support for its opposition to U.S. intervention against Nicaragua?
4) What efforts did the Sandinistas make to try to win
Canadian support?
5) What recommendations did CIDA make about aid to
Nicaragua, and how much influence did it have a) within the
Department of External Affairs? b) in Cabinet?
6) Did the media influence the views of either the public or the decision makers in Ottawa? In what ways?
7) Who was responsible for making decisions (or nondecisions) for a given policy? The development of a more -128- complete understanding of the objectives and perceptions of the policy-makers themselves would probably yield the greatest insight into the evolution of Canada's policy towards the
Sandinista revolution. -129-
Notes
Chapter 1
1) David Bickford, (DEA), personal interview, 7 May 1984.
2) J.CM. Ogilsby, Gringos from the Far North (Toronto: MacMillan, 1976) 101.
3) Ogilsby 326.
4) CIDA, 1983-84 Annual Report (Hull, 1984) 4.
5) Canada-Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives (henceforth CAPA), Brief on Canada and Central America (Toronto, 1984) 20.
6) CAPA, Canada-Central America Relations (Toronto, 1984) 20.
7) CAPA, Canada 11.
8) CAPA, Canada 10-11.
9) CIDA, Canada and the Multilateral Development Banks (Hull: MSS, 1984) 11.
10) "Canadian Aid to Latin America", LAWG Letter May-August 1981: 35.
11) Latin America Working Group (henceforth LAWG), Resource Kit 37.
12) Tim Draimin, "Canada and Central America", LARU Studies, V (1982) : 84 .
13) D.R. Murray, "The Bilateral Road: Canada and Latin America in the 1980s", International Journal, 37 (Winter 1981-82): 119-120 .
14) Ogilsby 287.
15) Murray 117.
16) Draimin, Canada 83.
17) San Jose News [Costa Rica], 23 May 1980.
18) Nicaragua Update (henceforth Update, (25 June 1979) 9.
19) Update 8.
20) CAPA, Canada 10.
21) San Jose News. -130-
22) CAPA, Canada 9.
23) Allan Gotlieb, "Canada, The United States and Latin America: Independence and Accomodation"; Washington, 30 April 1984 .
24) Peter Rosset and John Vandermeer, eds., The Nicaragua Reader (New York: Grove Press, 1983), 25.
25) CAPA, Canada 7.
26) Hansard, 2 March 1981, 7767.
27) CAPA, Canada 7.
28) CAPA, Canada 6.
29) Canadian Press, 2 December 1981.
30) John Walker, "Foreign policy formulation - a parliamentary breakthrough", International Perspectives, May/June 1982: 11.
31) Mark MacGuigan, "Central America and Canadian Foreign Policy"; University of Toronto, 31 March 1982.
32) Bickford (interview).
33) Sub-Committee on Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, Final Report, (Hull: MSS, 1982) passim.
34) "Canada and Central America", Central America Update (henceforth, CAU) December 1982: 9.
35) "International Canada", April/May, 1983: 3.
36) Roger Annis, "Should Canada aid Nicaragua's enemies?", Socialist Voice 7 March 1983.
37) "Trudeau backs Latin Peace Efforts", Vancouver Sun (henceforth, Sun) 4 May 1983.
38) CAPA, Canada 2.
39) Department of External Affairs, "Central America - Peace Initiatives", 29 July 1983.
40) CIDA, letter to the author, 22 May 1985.
41) Thomas Walkom, "Lift Canadians' safety out of U.S. hands: NDP", Globe and Mail (henceforth, GM) 1 December 1983.
42) CAPA Memo 27 March 1984: 38. -131-
43) Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Notes for a Toast Offered by the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen on the Occasion of the Visit of the Foreign Minister of Colombia, H.E. Lloreda Caicedo", 20 February 1984.
44) James Rusk, "Canada plans Central American role, GM, 21 February 1984.
45) GM 31 March 1984.
46) "Canada spurns appeal by U.S. on El Salvador", Toronto Star (henceforth TS, 3 April 1984.
47) "U.S. flatly denied role in planting mines Ottawa says", TS, 17 April 1984.
48) "Canada spurns appeal by U.S. on El Salvador", TS, 3 April 1984 .
49) "We won't use aid as blackmail--MacEachen", TS, 14 April 1984.
50) "MacEachen Trip Profiles Ottawa's Opposition to U.S.", CAU (May 1984.) 46 .
51) "Mining of Nicaraguan ports adds tension, MacEachen says", TS, 11 April 1984.
52) "Will not help Nicaraguans remove mines, PM says", GM, 10 April 1984.
53) Joel Ruimy, "Mining of Nicaragua's harbors is an 'act of terrorism', PM says", TS, 12 April 1984.
54) On Central America (NDP information package - henceforth OCA), March 1984.
55) "MacEachen", CAU, 46.
56) OCA.
57) "NDP plans legation in Nicaragua", GM, 21 April 1984.
58) OCA.
59) Bruce Ward, "'No chance' our troops will go to Salvador: MacEachen", TS 18 April 1984.
60) Claude Charland, "A Canadian View of Latin America and the Caribbean", Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, 30 April 1984.
61) Sun 26 April 1984: 1.
62) Glenn Somerville, "Richer nations called on to help Central America", TS, 9 May 84. -132-
63) "Danger of war real, Mexican president says", Winnipeg Free Press, 8 May 1984.
64) Francine Milo, (CIDA), personal interview, 8 May 1984.
65) LAWG 37.
66) CIDA, Country Profile: Nicaragua, (Hull: n.p., 1982) 4.
67) CIDA, Annual Report: 1978-1979 (Hull: MSS, 1979) 43.
68) "Nicaraguans ask for more money in Canadian aid", The Gazette (Montreal - henceforth MG) 1 November 1979.
69) John W. Foster & Joey Edwardh,. "Canadian Aid to Nicaragua", (Brief: 1979) 2.
70) CIDA, Country Profile 4.
71) "Canadian Delegation Lauds Literacy Campaign", CAU (June 1980) 119.
72) CAPA, "Summary of Canadian Aid to Central America", CAPA Memo, June 1984.
73) TS, 27 July 1980.
74) CIDA, Annual Report, 1979-1980 (Hull: MSS, 1980) 41, 56.
75) Eric Mills, "Positive Nicaragua role urged for Canada", GM, 5 March 1981.
76) CAPA, "Canadian Aid to Central America", Aid Memo, September 1983.
77) DEA, Response to the Inter Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America (ICCHRLA) Brief of October, 1983: Canadian Policy on Central America (Ottawa: 1984) 5.
78) CIDA, Annual Report, 1981-1982 (Hull: MSS, 1983) 6.
79) CIDA, News Release, 12 February 1982.
80) "Turner Takes Charge", CAU (July/August 1984) 2.
81) CIDA, Country Profile, 4.
82) CAPA, CAPA Memo.
83) CIDA, News Release, 13 January 1984.
84) "Turner", CAU , 2.
85) CAPA, CAPA Memo. -133-
86) Bickford (interview).
87) Milo (interview).
88) CIDA, Elements of Canada's Official Development Assistance Strategy 1984 (Hull: MSS, 1984) 35.
89) "Canada opposes U.S. in development bank", TS, 6 August 1983 . '.:
90) CIDA, Elements, 14.
Chapter 2
1) Draimin, Canada 83.
2) CAPA, Canada 12.
3) "The people on the offensive", Canadian Dimension (henceforth CD), Jan./Feb. 1979: 25-6.
4) "News Briefs" CAU, June 1981: 50.
5) CD 25-6
6) TS, 27 July 1980
7) Murray 119, 120; "Clark stands by Nicaragua despite back-bench criticism", Vancouver Sun (henceforth Sun), 24 May 1985: A14.
8) Gail Lem, "Nicaraguan strife boosts trade", GM 16 July 1984
9) Bob Thomson, Canadian Trade Relations with Nicaragua after the U.S. Embargo, (CAPA, May 1985) 3.
10) Lucia Kowaluk, "Peace Action and Central America", Qur Generation 16.2 (1984): 15.
11) "Unions contribute to Nicaraguan relief fund", Canada Weekly 24 j|ctober 1979 .
12) "Renew committment to Nicaraguan aid, ||ttawa, CLC urged", GM 8 April 1980: 9.
13) "CLC toning down its efforts to send aid to Nicaragua", GM 12 May 1980.
14) "UFAWU sends nets and gear to Nicaragua", The Fisherman 25 September 1981: 1.
15) Canadian Labour Congress, "CLC Statement on USA -134-
Ihtervention in Nicaragua", (press release), 22 November 19.83.
16) "Canadian Trade Union Leader's Statement on Canada and Nicaragua", Centro America Libre 1 Jan-Feb 1984: 3.
17) "Oppose U.S. view in Latin America, CLC tells Ottawa", GM 1 June 1984.
18) Canadian Action for Nicaragua Newsletter, June 1984: 7.
19) John Fryer, letter, GM, 15 May 1984.
20) "Canadian Churches: Open Letter on Nicaragua", 14 June 1979 .
21) John Foster, "Canadian Aid to Nicaragua, (brief), 31 October 1979.
22) Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, (press release) n.d.
23) ICCHRLA, "Submission to the Sub-Committee (of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence) on Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean", 9 July 1981: 7 .
24) ICCHRLA, "Canadian Policy on Central America", 11 October 1983: 11.
25) "Embassy, more aid sought for Sandinistas by church", GM, 10 August 1983.
26) Russell Kelly, "Canadians monitoring battle in Nicaragua in push for peace", Ottawa Citizen (henceforth ]_[C) , 10 May 1984 .
27) Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt, eds., Church and State: The Christian Churches and Canadian Foreign Policy, Toronto, 2 8 September 198 2 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982) 3.
28) "Medical Aid to Nicaragua", CAU March 1980: 105.
29) "Aid Notes", CAU June 1980: 119.
30) Lawrence Cumming, "National Secretary's Report", Inside Oxfam: 1983 Annual Report n.d.: 4.
31) Cathy Gander, letter, 18 February 1982.-
32) "Nicaragua aid tops B.C. goal", West Ender 2 December 1982.
33) "Ship to take aid to Nicaragua", Sun 5 December 1983: C8. -135-
34) Robert Sarti, "War zone asks B.C. for tools of peace", Sun 22 September 1984 .
35) "Tools for Peace" (pamphlet) 1984.
36) Gordon Clark, The Ubyssey 29 January 1985: 5.
37) GM 27 December 1983, 30 March 1984: 11, N.I.C.A. (letter) 19 June 1984.
38) Paul Knox, "Majority oppose greater U.S. role in Latin America", GM 11 October 1984: 9.
39) "Solidarity Coast to Coast", CAU December 1982: 4.
40) "Civil Disobedience at External", CAU October 1983.
41) Diane Granfield, "Anti-Intervention Coalition Created", CAN-NEWS January 1985: 10-11.
42) Robert Thompson, "Canadian NG|| Aid to Nicaragua" May 1984.
43) Lawrence Cumming, "Nicaragua: Waiting for Ottawa", Star 7 April 1984.
44) "Report on the First International Non-Govermental Agencies Conference in Nicaragua, December 1983", press statement, 15 December 1983.
45) Jamie Davila, personal interview, 8 May 1984.
46) Michael MacDowell, "Canadian mediation role urged", GM 14 December 1982.
47) "Broadbent: 'Nicaragua deserves our support'", Socialist Voice August 1983 .
48) "Canada urged to take role in Latin America", MG 22 July 1983 .
49) Thomas Walkom, "Lift Canadians' safety out of U.S. hands: NDP", GM 1 December 1983.
50) OCA.
51) Michael McDowell, "NDP should post observer in Nicaragua, MP argues", GM 2 0 January 1984.
52) "NDP plans legation in Nicaragua", GM 21 April 1984.
53) "Angry Senate decries U.S. acts in Nicaragua", GM 11 April 1984 .
54) 0CA. -136-
55) "Independent policy on Nicaragua urged", Sun 28 May 19,8,4.
56) Steve Lee, Nicaragua Package (NDP) 2 December 1981.
57) Walkom, "Lift".
58) CAPA, Memo 4 May 1984.
59) CAU "Turner".
60) CAPA, Memo October 1984: 21.
61) CAPA, Memo October 1984.
62) CAPA, Memo 27 March 1984: 38.
63) "Canada urged to push for Latin peace talks", GM 11 January 1984.
64) William Johnson, "U.S. Latin policy 'bloody shambles,' Canadian MP says", GM 1 May 1984: 1.
65) Tim Draimin and John Foster, "Canada, Contadora and Central America: Negotiations or Intervention", CAPA Memo October 1984.
66) "Liberal contenders outline policies on Canada's mission in the world", GM 28 May 1984.
67) Update 8.
68) "Nicaragua's proposal", editorial,GM 22 July 1983: A6.
69) "Calling all democrats", editorial, GM 28 March 1984: A6.
- 70) "First, these questions", editorial, GM 15 February 1983: A6 .
71) "The revolution's drift", editorial, 31 May 1984 : A6.
72) "Undermining freedom of the seas", editorial, GM 10 April 1984: A6.
73) "The Reagan formula", editorial, GM 11 May 1984: A6.
74) "Reagan's frightening war dance", editorial, TS 26 April 1984 .
75) "Curbing Latin American strife", editorial, TS 27 April 1984 .
76) "Some progress in Nicaragua", editorial, TS 23 February 1984 .
77) "Blinkered on Central America", editorial, TS 14 April -137-
1984 .
78) "The Nicaragua mess", editorial, QC 25 July 1983.
79) "U.S. policies boomerang", editorial, MG 13 April 1984.
80) "Wings of the hawk", editorial, Sun 27 June 1984.
81) "Marxism to remain despite vote result", Sun 22 February 1984 .
82) John Piper and Jacqueline Toupin, "The Sandinistas ride the wave of a shaky victory", Macleans's 30 March 1981: 10-12.
83) Thomas Hopkins, "Central America at the abyss" Macleans 29 March 1982: 28-34.
84) Val Ross, "The cast of a dangerous drama", Maclean's 8 August 1983: 20.
85) Susan Riley, "Canada's uneasy stand on a tricky issue", Maclean's 8 August 1983 : 22.
86) David North, "Managua moves to limit the dangers", Maclean's 5 December 1983 : 42.
87) Michael Posner, "The darkening war clouds", Maclean's 7 May 1984: 27.
88) Ann Finlayson, "The opposition calls a boycottt", Maclean's 6 August 1984 .
89) Don Munton, "Public opinion and the media in Canada from Cold War to detente to new Cold War", International Journal Vol. XXXIX No. 1 (Winter 1983-84): 200.
90) David Dewitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: Wiley & Sons, 1983) 180. -138-
Chapter 3
1) "Nicaraguans ask for more money in Canadian aid", MG 1 November 1979: 48.
2) TS 27 July 1980.
3) Eric Mills, GM.
4) Rosset and Vandermeer, Reader 8-9.
5) "Seeking cooperation, Nicaragua telIs 0ttawa", Canadian Tribune 28 February 1983.
6) Michael McDowell, "Nicaraguan postpones trip to Canada", GM 26 April 1983.
7) "Nicaraguans learn about Canadian farming methods", Lennoxville Record 18 August 1983.
8) "Prestamo de Canada sin intereses", El Nuevo Diario 16 January 1984.
9) "Canadian minister visits", Barricada Internacional 9 April 1984.
10) Jamie Davila, personal interview, May 1984.
11) Western Producer [Saskatoon] 2 February 1984.
12) Davila.
13) "Daniel destaca actitud constructiva de Canada", Barricada 11 April 1984.
14) Davila.
15) Davila.
16) "U.S. Neighbours Oppose Intervention", CAU December 1980: 22 .
17) Robert Matthews, "The Limits of Friendship: Nicaragua and the West", NACLA Report on the Americas May/June 1985: 30.
18) C.A. Cannizzo, "Canada between the Superpowers: The Search for Stability", in Brian Tomlin and Maureen Molot, eds., Canada Among Nations: 1984 (Toronto: Lorimer, 1985) 41.
19) Stephen Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge (Toronto: Lorimer, 1982) 284-5.
20) Clarkson 271.
21) Bickford (interview). -139-
22) United States Information Service, letter to the author, 23 May 1984.
23) Richard Fagen and Olga Pellicer, eds., The Future of Central America (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1983) 65.
24) Tim Draimin, Honduras Memo June 1983.
25) "Danger of war real, Mexican president says", Winnipeg Free Press (henceforth WFP) 8 May 1984.
26) Matthews 28.
27) "Revolutionaries fear Mexican crackdown", TS Summer 1984.
28) "Danger", WFP.
29) Matthews 30, 32.
30) William Harbin, History of U.S. policy on talking to the Nicaraguans (U.S. embassy, Ottawa) 28 March 1984.
31) Jocelyn M. Ghent, "Canadian-American Relations and the Nuclear Weapons Controversy, 1958-1963", diss., U of Illinois, 1976, 160.
32) Ghent 160.
33) Ghent 154.
34) Don Munton, ed., Groups and Governments in Canadian Foreign Policy (Ottawa: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982) 29.
35) Clarkson 283.
36) Edgar Dosman, Latin America and the Caribbean: A Strategic Framework - A Canadian Perspective (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1984) 13.
37) "Ex-envoy assails Ottawa over El Salvador policy" GM 19 March 1984.
38) "Play role in OAS, Canada urged", GM 26 April 1984.
39) Glenn Somerville, "Richer nations called on to help Central America", TS 9 May 1984.
40) "Mexican president says Canada has key peace role", TS 26 April 1984.
41) "Danger" WFP. 42) "End meddling in Central American wars, Trudeau", TS 8 May 1984 .
43) "Colombia welcomes Canadian role in Central America", GM 23 February 1984.
44) Oakland Ross, "Memory keeps Mexicans wary", GM 3 May 1984.
Chapter 4
1) David Bickford (interview).
2) Jeffery Simpson, Discipline of Power (Toronto: Personal Library, 1980) 57.
3) Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (New York: Norton, 1984) 239.
4) John W. Foster, Canadian Aid to Nicaragua: Review and Prospects, (Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America [henceforth ICCHRLA], 4 April 1980) 2.
5) GM 5 February 1981.
6) Tim Draimin, interview, "Sunday Morning", CBC radio, CBO, Toronto, 18 December 1983.
7) Mark MacGuigan, speech, "Central America and Canadian Foreign Policy", University of Toronto, 31 May 1982.
8) Bickford (interview).
9) "MacEachen's Trip Profiles Ottawa's Opposition to U.S.", CAU May 1984: 46.
10) Bickford (interview).
11) Christine Link and Cecilio Morales, Jr., "Canada's role needs enlarging", GM 3 September 1984.
12) Edgar Dosman, "Hemispheric Relation in the 1980s: A perspective from Canada", Journal of Canadian Studies 4 (Winter 1984-85) 47. 13) Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1980) 5.
14) Cannizzo 38.
15) Peyton Lyon and Brian Tomlin, eds., Canada as an International Actor (Toronto:Macmillan, 1979) 20.
16) Information Canada, Foreign Policy for Canadians (Hull: MSS, 1970) 4-5. 17). Cannizzo 38.
18) K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1983) 151 .
19) NYT 11 June 1985.
20) Andrew Pierre, ed. Third World Instability: Central America as a European-American Issue (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985) 46.
21) NYT 2 April 1985.
22) Dosman, Latin 74-5.
23) Gotlieb.
24) Claude Charland, "A Canadian View of Latin America and the Caribbean", Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, 30 April 1984.
25) Parliamentary Task Force on North-South Relations, Report to the House of Commons (Hull: MSS, 1980) 17.
26) A. Roy Megarry, "Canada should boost foreign aid", GM 21 June 1984: 7.
27) North-South 65.
28) Dupras.
29) Megarry.
30) CIDA, PDA 9.
31) Michael Kaufman, "The Internationalization of Canadian Bank Capital (With a Look at Bank Activity in the Caribbean and Central America", Journal of Canadian Studies 4 (1984-85): 69,75.
32) Tucker 3.
33) Denis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy", Canadian Journal of Political Science 4 (December 1982): 679.
34) Michael Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite? (Toronto: York U, 1984) 14.
35) Howard Stanislawski, "Domestic Interest Groups and Canadian and American Policy: The Case of the Arab Boycott", in Robert Matthews, Arthur Rubinoff, and Janice Stein, eds., International Conflict and Conflict Management (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1984) 138. -142-
36) David Morrison,- '! Introduction: The Mulroney Government and the Third'World", Journal of Canadian Studies 4 ( 1984-85 )-':' 11.
37) Bickford (interview).
38 ) Tucker 14.
39) Bruce Thoradson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: a study in decision-making (Toronto: Oxford UP, 1972) 70.
40) Bickford (interview).
41) Bickford (interview).
42) Tucker 37.
43) Allan MacEachen, "Notes for a Speech", UNA seminar, Ottawa, 3 June 1983.
44) Cranford Pratt, "Canadian foreign policy: bias to business", International Perspectives Nov/Dec 1982: 6.
45) John Kirton and Blair Dimock, "Domestic access to government in the Canadian foreign policy process 1968-1982", International Journal 1 (Winter 1983-84): 69.
46) Bickford (interview).
47) Draimin, Overview 84.
48) Quoted in Don Munton, Groups 22.
49) Gotlieb.
50) Blair Dimock, in Munton, Groups 24.
51) John Holmes, "Most safely in the middle", International Journal 2 (Spring 1984) 372.
52) "MacGuigan rakes U.S. 'interference', TS 19 October 1980.
53) David Cox, "Trudeau's Foreign Poicy Speeches", International Perspectives Nov/Dec 1982: 8.
54) Bickford (interview).
55) Murray 128
56) K.J. Holsti, "The United States and Canada", Conflict in World Politics, ed. Steven Spiegel and Kenneth Waltz (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1971) 385.
57) Bickford (interview).
58) Quoted in Clarkson 324. -143-
59) Mark MacGuigan, "Notes for an Address", Law Faculty, U of Toronto, 31 March 1982.
60) Gotlieb.
61) Edgar Dosman, "Hemispheric Relations in the 1980s: A Perspective from Canada", Journal of Canadian Studies 19.4 (Winter 1984-85): 55-6.
62) Dosman, Latin 73.
63) "Canada critical of U.S. policies". Latin America Weekly Report 25 May 1984.
64) CIDA, 1981-82 4; 1982-83 5.
65) G'.K. Helleiner, "Canada, the Developing Countries and the International Economy: What Next?", Journal of Canadian Studies 19.4 (Winter 1984-85): 18-19.
66) DEA, Response 4.
67) Emile Martel (DEA), letter to the author, 26 July 1984.
68) DEA, Response 4.
69) ICCHRLA Canadian Policy and Central America: Renewing the Dialogue (Toronto: 12 June 1984) 19.
70) Noam Chomsky, Turning the Tide (Boston: South End Press, 1986) 82-3.
71) Dosman, "Hemispheric" 55.
72) Stairs 677n.
73) Clarkson 316-7.
74) North-South Institute, Review '83 - Outlook '84 (Ottawa, 1984) 3.
75) CIDA, Partners in Tomorrow (Hull: MSS, 1984) 12.
76) Bickford (interview).
77) Dupras (speech).
7 9) Stairs 675.
79) CAPA, Brief on Canada and Central America (Toronto: 2 9 March 1984) 1. -144-
Bibliography
Books
Chomsky, Noam. Turning the Tide. Boston: South End Press, 1986.
Clarkson, Stephen. Canada and the Reagan Challenge: Crisis in the Canadian-American Relationship. Toronto: Lorimer, 1982.
Dewitt, David and John Kirton. Canada as a Principal Power. Toronto: Wiley & Sons, 1983.
Dosman, Edgar. Latin America and the Caribbean: A Strategic Framework - A Canadian Perspective. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1984.
Fagen, Richard, and Olga Pellicer, eds. The Future of Central America. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1983.
Hawes, Michael. Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite?. Toronto: York U, 1984.
Holsti, K.J. International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1983.
LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions. New York: Norton, 1984 .
Lyon, Peyton, and Brian Tomlin, eds. Canada as an International Actor. Toronto:Macmillan, 1979.
Matthews, Robert, and Cranford Pratt, eds. Church and State: The Christian Churches and Canadian Foreign Policy. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982.
Matthews, Robert, Arthur Rubinoff, and Janice Stein, eds. International Conflict and Conflict Management. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1984.
Munton, Don, ed. Groups and Governments in Canadian Foreign Policy. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982 .
Ogilsby, J.CM. Gringos from the Far North. Toronto: MacMillan, 1976.
Pierre, Andrew, ed. Third World Instability: Central America as a European-American Issue. New York: !Council on Foreign Relations, 1985.
Rosset, Peter, and John Vandermeer, eds. The Nicaragua Reader New York: Grove Press, 1983. Simpson, Jeffery. Discipline of Power. Toronto: Personal Library, 1980.
Thoradson, Bruce. Trudeau and Foreign Policy: a study in decision-making. Toronto: Oxford UP, 1972.
Tomlin, Brian, and Maureen Molot, eds. Canada Among Nations. Toronto: Lorimer, 1985.
Tucker, Michael. Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes. Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1980.
Journals
Dosman, Edgar. "Hemispheric Relations in the 1980s: A Perspective from Canada". Journal of Canadian Studies 19.4 (Winter 1984-85): 42-60.
Draimin, Tim. "Canada and Central America". LARU Studies. V (1982) : 81-93 .
Helleiner, G.K. "Canada, the Developing Countries and the International Economy: What Next?". Journal of Canadian Studies 19.4 (Winter 1984-85): 16-27.
Holmes, John. "Most safely in the middle". International Journal 2 (Spring 1984): 366-88.
Holsti, K.J. "The United States and Canada". Conflict in World Politics, ed. Steven Spiegel and Kenneth Waltz. (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1971): 375-96.
Kaufman, Michael. "The Internationalization of Canadian Bank Capital (With a Look at Bank Activity in the Caribbean and Central America". Journal of Canadian Studies 4 (1984-85): 61-81.
Kirton, John and Blair Dimock. "Domestic access to government in the Canadian foreign policy process 1968-1982". International Journal 1 (Winter 1983-84): 69-98.
Kowaluk, Lucia. "Peace Action and Central America". Our Generation 16.2 (1984): 15-25.
Matthews, Robert. "The churches and foreign policy". International Perspectives. (Jan./Feb. 1983): 18-21.
"The Limits of Friendship: Nicaragua and the West". NACLA Report on the Americas. (May/June 1985): 22-32.
Morrison, David. "Introduction: The Mulroney Government and the Third World". Journal of Canadian Studies 4 (1984-85): 3-15. -146-
Munton, Don. "Public opinion and the media in Canada from Cold War to detente to new Cold War". International Journal 3 9.1 (Winter 1983-84): 171-213.
Murray, D.R. "The Bilateral Road: Canada and Latin America in the 1980s". International Journal. 37 (Winter 1981-82): 109-131.
Pratt, Cranford. "Canadian foreign" policy: bias to business". International Perspectives. (Nov/Dec 1982): 3-6.
Stairs, Denis. "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy". Canadian Journal of Political Science 4 (December 1982): 667-690.
Walker, John R. "Foreign policy formulation -- a parliamentary breakthrough". International Perspectives. (May/June 1982): 10-14.
Government Publications
Canada. Canadian International Development Agency. Annual Report: 1978-1979. Hull: MSS, 1979.
Annual Report: 1979-1980. Hull: MSS, 1980.
Annual Report: 1981-1982. Hull: MSS, 1983.
Annual Report: 1983-84. Hull: MSS, 1984.
Canada and the Multilateral Development Banks. Hull: MSS 1984 .
Country Profile: Nicaragua. Hull: n.p., 1982.
Diane Beauchamp. Letter to the author. 2 2 May 1985.
Elements of Canada's Official Development Assistance Strategy 1984. Hull: MSS, 1984.
News Release. "Canada to Increase Aid to Central America". 12 February 1982.
. News Release. "Canadian Aid to Nicaragua". 13 January 1984.
, Partners in Tomorrow Hull: MSS, 1984.
Department of External Affairs. "Central America - Peace Initiatives". 29 July 1983.
Martel, Emile. Letter to the author. 26 July 1984. Response to the Inter Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America (ICCHRLA) Brief of October, 1983: Canadian Policy on Central America. Ottawa: 1984.
Hansard. Hull: 2 March 1981.
House. Parliamentary Task Force on North-South Relations. Report to the House of Commons. Hull: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1980.
Sub-Committee on Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. Final Report. Hull: MSS, 1982.
Information Canada, Foreign Policy for Canadians. Hull: MSS, 1970.
Reports, Briefs
Canada-Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives. Brief on Canada and Central America. Toronto: 29 March 1984.
Canada-Central America Relations. 1984.
"Canadian Aid to Central America". Aid Memo. September 1983 .
Draimin, Tim, and John Foster. "Canada, Contadora and Central America: Negotiations or Intervention". Memo October 1984 .
Gorostiaga, Xabier. Central America and the Caribbean: Towards a New Regional Initiative. May 1985.
Leonard, Julie. Canadian Links to the Militarization of the Caribbean and Central America. May 1985.
. Memo. 27 March 1984: 38.
"Summary of Canadian Aid to Central America". CAPA Memo. June 1984.
Thomson, Robert. Canadian Aid & Trade Relations with Nicaragua. 6 November 1984.
Canadian Trade Relations with Nicaragua after the U.S. Embargo. May 1985.
Cumming, Lawrence. "National Secretary's Report", Inside Oxfam: 1983 Annual Report n.d.: 3-4.
Draimin, Tim. Honduras Memo June 1983.
Foster, John W., & Joey Edwardh. "Canadian Aid to Nicaragua". Toronto: 31 October 1979. -148-
Foster, John W. Canadian Aid to Nicaragua: Review and Prospects. Toronto: ICCHRLA, 4 April 1980.
Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America. Canadian Policy and Central America: Renewing the Dialogue. Toronto: 12 June 1984.
"Canadian Policy on Central America". 11 October 1983.
"Submission to the Sub-Committee (of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence) on Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean". Toronto: 9 July 1981.
New Democratic Party. Nicaragua Package. 2 December 1981.
On Central America March 1984.
North-South Insitute. Review '83 - '84. Ottawa: 1984.
Speeches
Charland, Claude. "A Canadian View of Latin America and the Caribbean". Washington, 30 April 1984.
Dupras, Maurice. "Canada's Political and Security Interests in Latin America and the Caribbean". Washington, 30 April 1984.
Gotlieb, Allan. "Canada, The United States and Latin America: Independence and Accomodation". Washington, 30 April 1984.
MacEachen, Allan. "Notes for a Speech",. UNA seminar, Ottawa, 3 June 1983. . "Notes for a Toast Offered by the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen on the Occasion of the Visit of the Foreign Minister of Colombia, H.E. Lloreda Caicedo". Ottawa: 20 February 1984. MacGuigan, Mark. "Central America and Canadian Foreign Policy". University of Toronto, 31 May 1982.
"Notes for an Address". Law Faculty, U of Toronto, 31 March 1982.
Articles
Canadian Dimension. "The People on the Offensive". Jan./Feb. 1979: 25-6.
Central America Update. "Aid Notes". June 1980: 119. -149-
"Canada and Central America". December 1982: 9.
"Canadian Delegation Lauds Literacy Campaign". June 1980: 119.
"Civil Disobedience at External". October 1983.
- . "MacEachen Trip Profiles Ottawa's Opposition to U.S.".
May 1984: 46.
"Medical Aid to Nicaragua". March 1980: 105.
"Solidarity Coast to Coast". December 1982: 4.
"Turner Takes Charge". July/August 1984: 2.
"U.S. Neighbours Oppose Intervention". December 1980: 22. Finlayson, Ann. "The opposition calls a boycottt". Maclean's. 6 August 1984: n.p.
Hopkins, Thomas. "Central America at the abyss". Macleans. 29 March 1982: 28-34.
North, David. "Managua moves to limit the dangers". Maclean's. 5 December 1983 : 42.
Piper, John, and Jacqueline Toupin. "The Sandinistas ride the wave of a shaky victory". Macleans's. 30 March 1981: 10-12.
Posner, Michael. "The darkening war clouds", Maclean's. 7 May 1984: 26-27.
Riley, Susan. "Canada's uneasy stand on a tricky issue". Maclean's. 8 August 1983 : 22.
Ross, Val"The cast of a dangerous drama". Maclean's. 8 August 1983: 20-1.
Periodicals
Canada Weekly.
Canadian Tribune .
Centro America Libre! [Vancouver].
The Fisherman [Vancouver].
Latin America Weekly Report [London].
Socialist Voice. -150-
Newspapers
Barricada [Managua].
Barricada Internacional [Managua].
El Nuevo Diario [Managua].
The Gazette [Montreal].
Globe and Mail [Toronto].
Lennoxville Record [Quebec].
New York Times•
Ottawa Citizen.
San Jose News [Costa Rica].
Toronto Star.
The Ubyssey [University of B.C.].
Vancouver Sun.
West Ender [Vancouver].
Western Producer [Saskatoon].
Winnipeg Free Press.
Miscellaneous
Bickford, David. Personal interview. 7 May 1984.
Canadian Action for Nicaragua. Newsletter. Toronto.
Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace. Press release. n.d.
Canadian Labour Congress. "CLC Statement on USA Intervention in Nicaragua". Press release. 22 November 1983.
Davila, Jamie. Personal interview. 8 May 1984.
Draimin, Tim. Interview. Sunday Morning. CBC radio. CBO, Toronto. 18 December 1983.
Gander, Cathy. Letter to Oxfam, CUSO. 18 February 1982.
Ghent, Jocelyn M. "Canadian-American Relations and the Nuclear Weapons Controversy, 1958-1963". Diss. U of Illinois, 1976. -151-
Harbin, William. History of U.S. policy on talking to the Nicaraguans. Ottawa: U.S. embassy, 28 March 1984.
Latin American Working Group. "Canadian Aid to Latin America". LAWG Letter. Toronto.
Milo, Francine [CIDA]. Personal interview. 8 May 1984.
Nicaragua Update. n.p.: 25 June 1979. "Report on the First International Non-Govermental Agencies Conference in Nicaragua, December 1983". Press statement. 15 December 1983. Tools for Peace. Help us fill a ship for Nicaragua 1. Vancouver: 19 84.
United States Information Service. Letter to the author. 23 May 1984. Appendi x I
Country Eligibility - Bilateral Development Assistance
Factors bearing on a country's eligibility status:
- in terms of a particular developing country, factors include its level of need, its commitment to development, the human rights situation, absorptive capacity, etc.
- in terms of Canadian interests, the factors include political considerations - such as Canada's bilateral relations, the role of the developing country in the regional and world community, the status of the developing country as a member of the Commonwealth or la francophonie, involvement of Canadian business, institutions, NGOs or religious groups in the country - as well as commercial considerations.
- special crisis factors might include periods of reconstruction, political upheavals, natural disasters, etc.
Canadian policy includes a concentration of assistance on the poorest countries -- 80 percent of bilateral aid is provided to low-income developing countries.
Canada undertakes bilateral activities within the following eligibility structure (partial listing):
Catagory I - Core ("program country")
A long-term substantive commitment to development is envisaged, and is represented by relatively large budgetary allocations, long-term, extensive, on-going analysis and planning, and significant administrative resources. Canadian interests are primarily developmental, with geopolitical and commercial interests as essential considerations. Multi-year commitments and the use' of all transfer mechanisms are permissable for countries in this catagory.
Catagory II - Non-core ("project country")
This catagory is composed of countries where a significant Canadian presence is required for developmental, political, and commericial reasons, but where - because these countries are relatively less important for the 0'DA programme, are in a state of political uncertainty, or because the administrative resource constraints - a full-fledged long-term ODA programme is not appropriate or feasible at present.
Source: CIDA - Elements of Canada's Official Development Assistance Strategy (1984). -153-
Appendix II
CIDA has divided the aid into the following catagories:
Bilateral - direct government to government aid, either grants or loans usually tied to directly to the purchase of Canadian goods and services.
MAF - Mission Administered Funds handled by the Canadian embassies for small, grassroots projects.
Industrial Cooperation - projects which assist a country in developing its business sector through financing Canadian initiatives in feasibility studies for large capital projects or joint business ventures, or support to test new technology.
Institutional Cooperation - cooperative projects between a Canadian institution (hospital, university, etc.) and the local counterpart.
Food Aid - the value of in kind donations of Canadian food products, usually grain.
NGO - this represent's CIDA's contibution to a Canadian non-governmental agency's projects. The initiative for thses projects is that of the NGO, not CIDA, (which explains why the largest recipient of these funds in Central America has been Nicaragua). SUMMARY OF CANADIAN AID TO CENTRAL AMERICA
BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, MAF,
SPECIAL 'PROGRAMS AND FOOD AID
DISBURSEMENTS IN $000
80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 TOTAL
HONDURAS
Bilateral 3,626.0 3,048.3 3,306.0 1,666. 9 11,647.2
*MAF 50.0 200.0 275.0 350. 0 875.0
*NC0 900.0 1,400.0 2025.1 2,443. 2 6,768.3
*Indust. Co-op. 68.0 4 5.0 52.1 128. 0 293.1
*Inst. Co-op. - - 55.0 11. 2 66.2
Food Aid — — - — -
TOTAL 4,644.0 4,693.3 5,713.2 4,599. 3 19,649.8
NICARAGUA
Bilateral 4.8 1.3 233.7 3,970.0 4,209.8
MAF 199.6 164.6 350.0 350. 0 1,064.2
NCO 1,500.0 1,820.0 1,450.0 3,102. 4 7,872.4
Indust. Coop. 365.0 165.0 91.2 142. 8 764.0
Inst. Coop. 87.0 640.C 911.7 1,047.. 0 2,685.7
Food Aid — 4,500.0 — 3,000.. 0 7 ,500. 0
TOTAL 2,156.4 7,290.9 3,036.6 11,612,. 2 24,096.1
* MAF: Mission Administered Fund NGO: Non-Governmental Organization Industrial Cooperation Institutional Cooperation
May 1984 /C*?A
l -/ST-
80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 TOTAL
EL SALVADOR
Bilateral 2,809.9 6,377.9 435.5 347.4 9,970.7
MAT 20.0 50.0 275.0 350.0 695.0
NGO 157.0 229.0 279.7 598.7 1,264.4
Indust. Coop 10.0 - - - 10.0
Inst. Coop - - — 4.5 4.5
TOTAL 2,996.9 6,656.9 990.2 1,300.6 11,944.6
GUATEMALA
Bilateral 1,264.5 850.2 2,187.1 511.3 4,813.1
MAF 60.0 313.0 350.0 350.0 1,073.0
NGO 525.0 396.0 300.0 700.5 1,921.5
Indust. Coop 123.0 154.0 234.3 105.9 617.2
Inst. Coop. — - 73.0 55.9 128.9
TOTAL 1,972.5 1,713.2 3,144.4 1,723.6 8,553.7
COSTA RICA
Bilateral 33.7 4.6 2,878.1 6,000.1 8,916.5
MAF 101.0 341.0 350.0 350.0 1,142.0
NGO 60.0 260.0 81.0 211.0 612.0
Indust. Coop. 109.0 254.0 279.5 180.6 823. 1
Inst. Coop. — - 106.0 286.1 392.1
TOTAL 303.7 859.6 3,694.6 7,027.8 11,855.7
* MAF: Mission Administered Fund NGO: Non-Governmental Organization Industrial Cooperation Institutional Cooperation
May '.(984 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 TOTAL
PANAMA
MAF 40.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 490.0
NGO 88.0 210.0 155.0 205.9 658.9
Indusc Coop. 270.0 46.0 20.0 11.7 347.7
Inst. Coop. - 281.0 72.9 353.9
TOTAL 398.0 406.0 606.0 440.5 1850.5
Multilateral assistance to refugees of Central America.
The Multilateral Branch of CIDA made the following contributions for Central American refugees:
1981/82: $ 500,000 to the UNHCR* for refugees of C .A. 1982/83: $2,000,000 to the UNHCR for refugees of C.A . $ 250,000 to the UNHCR for refugees in Honduras 1983/84: $3,000,000 to the UNHCR for refugees of C A.
Multilateral assistance for displaced persons in ElSalvador .
The Multilateral Branch of CIDA made the following contribution to the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) in support of its efforts to help displaced persons in El Salvador.
1981/82:' $550,000 1983/84: $975,000
* UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees
May 1984
/