SCL Forum: Internet www.scl.org

The DigiNotar Case: Internet Security is No Abstract Matter

n 2 September used for the authentication of the government certificates 2011, towards transactions and web sites. were at issue. Is it true that midnight, a bar This technically complex issue we could go quietly back to Oappeared at boils to down this: for each web sleep after Donner’s nocturnal the top of television screens site a certificate is required statement? The operational in the with the that proves the identity of management of DigiNotar was announcement of an extra the web site operator. These transferred, in other words: the news broadcast at 1 am. Had so-called SSL certificates are government was going to take disaster struck the world? tested via the browser (the charge. Secondly, a process Had the government fallen? little padlock that is either open was started for a transition to Viewers were in for or locked). In addition to this other PKI certificate suppliers a somewhat surreal type of certificate, there are in the shortest term possible. scene. Piet Hein other types, such as Public Key The process opted for was one Donner, the Minister Infrastructure (PKI) certificates. of gradual transition so as to of the Interior, sitting These PKI-certificates are safeguard continuity. Thus, it all by himself at an used in the communication was arranged with ordinary little table, with citizens (tax assessment, that the browser would not read out a statement implementation of employee yet be updated to refuse to the effect that insurance schemes and DigiD, DigiNotar certificates (meaning the Internet was no the national identification system that possibly compromised longer safe. But we for transactions between citizens transactions between could rest assured and (local) government), but government and citizens were and go quietly back also by civil-law notaries and allowed to continue). to sleep; adequate bailiffs (eg for entries in the land The telco-regulator measures had been register). When the certificates OPTA swung into action Nico van Eijk relates a taken. The country get compromised, so called too. By virtue of the Dutch was saved! ‘man-in-the-middle’ attacks Telecommunications Act story that illustrates the (MITM) can take place (see (Telecommunicatiewet) OPTA DigiNotar the graphic in the download is charged with supervising dangers associated with The statement panel opposite). As early as ‘qualified certificates’ (also marked the July, DigiNotar knew that the called ‘digital signatures’). digital certificates and beginning of the system had been hacked, but The PKI certificates at issue DigiNotar affair. (For it was not before late August belong to these regulated suggests improvements to a more detailed that Govcert.nl, which includes certificates. Providers are to account of the combating cybercrime among its register with OPTA and have the relevant regime DigiNotar-case and activities, received a report from a legal obligation to comply the underlying policy/ a German sister organization with all kinds of regulations. legal issues, see: A.M. Arnbak that something was probably OPTA may decide to withdraw & N.A.N.M. van Eijk, Certificate wrong: an Iranian Internet user the registration. This happened Authority Collapse: Regulating wanted to surf to .com in the DigiNotar case. Its Systemic Vulnerabilities in the and received a message about a registration was terminated with HTTPS Value Chain, paper possibly fraudulent certificate. effect on 14 September, and presented at the TPRC- This got things moving. An DigiNotar was held to withdraw conference 2012, http://ssrn. independent report confirmed the qualified certificates that com/abstract=2031409.) It had the break-in and soon it had been issued within 14 been rumoured that something became clear that not only the days. Both DigiNotar and the was wrong with the ‘certificates’ Internet certificates but also civil-law notaries and bailiffs

VOL. 23 ISSUE 6 FEBRUARY/MARCH 2013 COMPUTERS & LAW MAGAZINE OF SCL 1 SCL Forum: Internet www.scl.org

contested the OPTA decision and Microsoft on delaying the The unauthorised issuing of SSL-certificates creates the before the judge in interim processing of the compromised possibility of ‘man-in-the-middle’ attacks (MITM). The Open Web injunction proceedings, but to no certificates? Application Security Project (OWASP)-web site (://www. avail. Meanwhile, DigiNotar had owasp.org/index.php/Man-in-the-middle_attack) describes and already been declared bankrupt. What action should be illustrates these attacks as follows: The man-in-the middle attack Even today, some DigiNotar taken? intercepts a communication between two systems. For example, certificates are still in use. The DigiNotar affair has brought in an http transaction the target is the TCP connection between home the fact that Internet client and server. Using different techniques, the attacker splits What do we learn from the security is no abstract matter the original TCP connection into 2 new connections, one between DigiNotar affair? and that violations may have the client and the attacker and the other between the attacker and The affair was triggered by dire consequences. It is a the server, as shown in the figure. Once the TCP connection is corrupt SSL certificates, the lesson that is not confined to intercepted, the attacker acts as a proxy, being able to read, insert type most frequently occurring in the Netherlands. Certificates and modify the data in the intercepted communication. everyday Internet use. Yet, these should offer certainty as to are the very certificates that web site access and executing are hardly restricted by a legal transactions. The situation framework. They are not among becomes even more critical due the qualified certificates that are to increasing dependence on subject to electronic signature the Internet and the lack of any regulations. It remains doubtful if alternatives. there was (or could have been) A sound analysis and sufficient awareness of this fact further studies are absolutely when the European Directive necessary; getting back to on electronic signatures was the old order is no longer an finalised in 1999 (Directive option. Is the system of digital 99/93/EC, OJ L 13/12 of 19 signatures, which was brought January 2000). That Directive is about at a time when the be subject to specific conditions. between the Dutch government the basis for the provisions of Internet was not as ubiquitous, Such conditions would apply to and Microsoft – should be the Telecommunications Act. sufficient? Is poor compliance the issuing parties (introducing embedded in legal context, The measures actually the actual problem and, if more specific quality of service- not least to enable adequate taken, such as the operational so, can tighter supervision criteria), possibly in combination action and prevent abuse. In the take-over of DigiNotar and the provide a solution, or should with an obligation for market DigiNotar-case it became clear migration to secure certificates, the whole system go by the parties – such as web sites and that even the safeguards based raise a number of questions. board and be replaced by services using SSL – to use on regulated certificates did Did the government act in a (say) licensing? The proposed secure certificates from qualified not work: alternatives might be public-law or a private-law Regulation on ‘electronic suppliers. In short, the legal necessary. Finally, with respect capacity when DigiNotar was identification and trust service framework that is still focused to the measures taken, the taken over? The former seems for electronic transactions in on some classic parties in the interests should be assessed to be the most obvious option, the internal market’ (European value chain between information more transparently, and it which makes the lack of a legal Commission, COM(2012) providers and customers should be clear how transitional basis all the more interesting. 238/2), which is supposed should reflect this value chain measures relate to the risks Secondly, there have been some to replace the directive on in its entirety better – with due (and possible liabilities). ● legally interesting complications electronic signatures, will not observance of such activities as with respect to the migration. solve the systemic failures of issuing certificates and the role Nico van Eijk is Professor How were the interests between the DigiNotar-case. It mainly of browsers. of Information Law, in guaranteeing continuity on brings SLL-certificates under the Authorisations and particular of media and the one hand and the risks same framework as the already enforcement measures also telecommunications law, associated with possibly regulated qualified certificates, call for critical analysis. The at the Dutch Institute for compromised certificates on the but does not deal with most DigiNotar affair lacked a Information Law (Instituut other hand assessed (a question of the known vulnerabilities as legal foundation with regard voor Informatierecht, IViR, of that could also be asked with such. to essential steps. The take- the University of Amsterdam: respect to the postponement I believe we should address over of operational processes www.ivir.nl/staff/vaneijk.html). granted by OPTA)? And what the issue rather from the and negotiating with market is the significance of the perspective of risks and look at parties with respect to public- discussions between Donner ‘critical’ certificates that should law interests – as took place

2 COMPUTERS & LAW MAGAZINE OF SCL VOL. 23 ISSUE 6 FEBRUARY/MARCH 2013