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Spinoza's Rejection of Teleology SPINOZA’S REJECTION OF TELEOLOGY * EDWARD ANDREW GREETIS 1. INTRODUCTION Bennett, that Spinoza is consistent in his rejection of teleology. My argument will consist of two eleology is a highly contested topic in main parts. First, I argue that Lin misinterprets Spinoza scholarship. Spinoza’s discussion Spinoza by showing that his argument against of teleology, which comes in Appendix 1 Bennett is mistaken. Second, I aim to show that T Bennett is incorrect in claiming that Spinoza is of the ETHICS, appears to be a brutal assault on the concept. At one point, he even states that caught in an inconsistency; I argue that Spinoza “all final causes are nothing but human not only rejects all teleology but consistently does inventions.” 1 Nevertheless, many commentators, so, i.e., I argue for a nonteleological reading of such as Martin Lin, argue that Spinoza is conatus. committed to and employs teleological explanations of human action—the discussion 2. WHY SPINOZA REJECTS TELEOLOGY: BENNETT’S in Appendix 1 is merely an assault on divine ARGUMENT teleology, i.e., the notion that God had objectives in mind when creating the universe. On the other One of Spinoza’s objections against final hand, Jonathan Bennett argues that Appendix 1 causation in Appendix 1 is that it “completely is an argument against all final causation; overturns nature,” that is, “that which is prior in moreover, the metaphysics and philosophy of nature it makes posterior.” To borrow Bennett’s mind in the ETHICS show that Spinoza is analogy, teleology explains causes in terms of committed to a rejection of all teleological “pulls” (something subsequent in time explaining explanations. Bennett concedes, however, that something prior) instead of “pushes,” i.e., this exposes an inconsistency in the ETHICS: efficient cause determinism where, if A efficiently Spinoza argues against, and is committed to, a causes B, then B follows from A. Spinoza is rejection of all teleological explanations, but his arguing here that teleology is incompatible with concept of conatus, or endeavoring, which is the the efficient cause determinism, which he basis of his moral philosophy and psychology, is prescribes. used to explain human action teleologically. Some teleological explanations, however, Contrary to Bennett’s arguments, Lin seem to be tenable in a world of only efficient holds that not only is Spinoza not committed to causes. Consider the following: an idea a rejection of teleological explanations of human representing a future goal, or (i) causes an action action, his account of mental content actually (a). This is an efficiently caused event, which commits him to such explanations. In what can be explained teleologically. Although follows, I argue, contra Lin, that Spinoza is Spinoza would find this event untenable because committed to a rejection of teleology, and contra his system does not allow thought and extension—two, of the infinitely many, distinct * I am currently affiliated with San Diego State University where I work on Spinoza, philosophy of science, and attributes of substance, or God—to interact, we epistemology. My current projects involve Spinoza’s theory can modify the explanation to work. Spinoza’s of causation, especially his views on teleology. parallelism doctrine holds that the order and 1 I use G. H. R. Parkinson’s translation of the ETHICS, connection of ideas is the same as the order and unless otherwise noted. REVISTA Conatus - FILOSOFIA DE SPINOZA - VOLUME 4 - NÚMERO 8 - DEZEMBRO 2010 25 GREETIS, EDWARD ANDREW. SPINOZA’S REJECTION OF TELEOLOGY. P. 25-35. connection of things (E2P7).2 Thus, for every mode parallel. Thus, the causal powers of ideas cannot of thought, there is a parallel mode of extension— depend on the representational content of there is only one substance for Spinoza, so thought ideas—which represent the future goals or external and extension are merely ways of considering the objects involved in the teleological explanations in same substance. So (i) could not cause (a), but (i) question—because representational content is an could cause the idea parallel to (a), and, since the extrinsic property of ideas. Bennett clarifies the order and connection is the same for ideas and concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic properties of matter, (a) would be caused by the physical parallel ideas by comparing them to a page with ink on of (i). Spinoza’s parallelism therefore does not rule it. The page represents a map of Sussex. out this kind of teleological explanation. However, what the page and the person Bennett, nevertheless, contends that examining the page are intrinsically like conjures Spinoza also rejects this kind of teleological the thought “this is a map of Sussex,” not what explanation. Spinoza’s formulation of “appetite” the map indirectly represents5—if the intrinsic and much of Part 3 of the ETHICS is explicable properties did not change, the thought “this is a only if he is attempting to avoid letting anything map of Sussex” would be the same even if Sussex subsequent to x explain x (Bennett, 1984: 217). never existed (Bennett, 1984: 219). Lin further For example, Spinoza’s formulations of appetite elucidates why representational content is an and desire are nonteleological, and Bennett extrinsic property of ideas by likening extrinsic claims, and I agree, that it is an attempt to replace properties with causal histories.6 He asks us to the standard Scholastic teleological conceptions imagine a thing and its perfect duplicate; they of, among other things, will, appetite, and desire. both have a scratch on them (what they share is Spinoza writes in E4Def7: “by the end for the intrinsic to them), but the original was scratched sake of which we do something I understand by an external object last July, so they each have appetite,” and in E3P2S: “the decrees of the mind different causal histories, which is extrinsic to are simply appetites themselves.” And desire is them. In short, intrinsic properties are those simply “appetite together with a consciousness properties a thing has regardless of its relations of the appetite” (E3P9S). Appetite and desire to other things, while extrinsic properties are are further identified with the actual essence of relational properties—properties a thing has a thing (E3P7 and E3P9S). Moreover, some of solely in virtue of its relation to other things.7 Spinoza’s tenets require a rejection of the kind 5 of teleological explanation in question. Bennett uses “indirect representation” to indicate that 3 it is the content of the idea that represents objects external In the ‘short physical treatise ’ in Part 2 to us. The reason he adds “indirect” is because trivially, of the ETHICS, it is evident that the causal powers ideas represent body states due to Spinoza’s parallelism. of bodies rely only on size, shape, motion and This “representation,” however, simply means that the rest, etc., or intrinsic properties.4 Likewise, the idea is parallel to a body state. The idea parallel to a body causal powers of ideas rely only on intrinsic state will include properties other than representations of external objects (including, among other things, properties—recall that thought and extension are passions; the mind’s ideas retain a certain ratio of motion 2 By “order and connection,” Spinoza means that every and rest identical to the body’s ratio, which explains why cause and effect is numerically identical in both thought the mind is a composite, individual idea of the body; and and extension (Spinoza adheres to a rationalist causal each individual idea will be a parallel of an affection of the theory so causation is logical deduction: if A causes B, then body, meaning that the motion and rest, position, etc., of a B follows logically from A). That is, if body A causes B, body must have an idea parallel to it). These are the intrinsic then the idea parallel to A causes the idea parallel to B. properties of an idea. Although ideas represent, or parallel, 3 This treatise is found between E2P13 and P14. bodies, ideas also contain representations of external objects 4 Bennett translates Spinoza’s term “formaliter” as and intrinsic properties. I will use the term “represent” as “intrinsic” and claims that it is the inherent features of a synonymous with the content of an idea. thing. As we will see shortly, he compares intrinsic with 6 Bennett compares representative features with causal extrinsic, or representative features of an idea, i.e., the history as well, but I will provide Lin’s elucidation. content or meaning of an idea. I will explain “intrinsic” 7 It may be objected that on this account of “intrinsic,” and “representative” shortly. Here, his point is that motion and rest, direction, etc., are not intrinsic. representative features are not causally relevant in However, we can see why motion and rest, direction, etc., Spinoza’s discussion in the short physical treatise. are intrinsic properties by imagining an x,(TO BE CONTINUED) 26 REVISTA Conatus - FILOSOFIA DE SPINOZA - VOLUME 4 - NÚMERO 8 - DEZEMBRO 2010 GREETIS, EDWARD ANDREW. SPINOZA’S REJECTION OF TELEOLOGY. P. 25-35. Lin summarizes Bennett’s argument as that passions themselves are widely individuated follows: by citing E4P33, where Spinoza claims that there 1. The causal powers of bodies depend on intrinsic are “as many species of each emotion as there properties such as size, shape, and motion. are species of objects by which we are affected.” In other words, Lin claims, passions are 2. There is a parallelism between bodies and their individuated by their external causes. Spinoza properties and relations on the one hand and seems to provide further support for this claim ideas and their properties on the other. (E2P7) in E3P56Dem. In the demonstration, he argues that we are only acted on—passively affected— 3.
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