Utilising the Concept of Human-As-A-Security-Sensor for Detecting Semantic Social Engineering Attacks
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Utilising the concept of Human-as-a-Security-Sensor for detecting semantic social engineering attacks Ryan John Heartfield A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Greenwich for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY June 2017 Declaration \I certify that the work contained in this thesis, or any part of it, has not been accepted in substance for any previous degree awarded to me, and is not concurrently being submitted for any degree other than that of Doctor of Philosophy being studied at the University of Greenwich. I also declare that this work is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise identified by references and that the contents are not the outcome of any form of research misconduct." SUPERVISOR: ................................................ ............................... RYAN HEARTFIELD SUPERVISOR: ................................................ ............................... DR. GEORGE LOUKAS SUPERVISOR: ................................................ ............................... DR. DIANE GAN i Abstract Social engineering is used as an umbrella term for a broad spectrum of computer exploitations that employ a variety of attack vectors and strate- gies to psychologically manipulate a user. Semantic attacks are the spe- cific type of social engineering attacks that bypass technical defences by actively manipulating object characteristics, such as platform or system applications, to deceive rather than directly attack the user. Semantic social engineering attacks are a pervasive threat to computer and com- munication systems. By employing deception rather than by exploiting technical vulnerabilities, spear-phishing, obfuscated URLs, drive-by down- loads, spoofed websites, scareware and other attacks are able to circum- vent traditional technical security controls and target the user directly. In this thesis, we begin by defining the terminology of a semantic attack, introducing a historic time-line of attack incidents over the last 17 years to illustrate what is an existential relationship with the user-computer inter- face and it's ever expanding landscape. We then highlight the scale of the semantic attack threat by identifying different individual attacks and dis- cussing recent statistics. Recognising the complexity in understanding the many facets that may form an attack, as well as the depth and breadth of the threat landscape, we construct a taxonomy of semantic attacks which encapsulates attack characteristics into a fixed, parametrised classification criteria that span all stages of a semantic attack. We then supplement the taxonomy of attacks with a survey of applicable defences and con- trast the threat landscape and the associated mitigation techniques in a single comparative matrix; identifying the areas where further research ii can be particularly beneficial. Armed with this knowledge, we then ex- plore the feasibility of predicting user susceptibility to deception-based attacks through attributes that can be measured, ethically, preferably in real-time and in an automated manner. We conduct two experiments, the first on 4333 users recruited on the Internet, allowing us to identify useful high-level features through association rule mining, and the sec- ond on a smaller group of 315 users, allowing us to study these features in more detail. In both experiments, participants were presented with attack and non-attack exhibits and were tested in terms of their ability to distinguish between the two. Using the data collected, we determine predictors of users' susceptibility to different deception vectors. With these, we have produced and evaluated a generalised model for training a dynamic system for proactive user security. Using the model as a base- line, we propose a technical framework that aims to utilise the concept of Human-as-a-Security-Sensor as a dynamic defence mechanism against se- mantic attacks. To test the viability of our framework and to demonstrate the concept of the Human-as-a-Security-Sensor in an empirical context, we employ the framework to develop a prototype Human-as-a-Security- Sensor platform called Cogni-Sense; evaluating its utility in a real-world experiment. Lastly, we conclude with a review of the problem space, summarising our novel contributions towards a dynamic, user-driven de- fence against semantic attacks and identify open problems in our work to discuss future plans and motivation for continuing the development of Human-as-a-Security-Sensor. iii Acknowledgements In all the theses that I have read, all agree that embarking on a PhD is a journey. None were wrong, and like all journeys, there are good times and not so good times. Along the way one experiences many emotions, inspiration, excitement, elation, as well as self-doubt, anxiety and despair where it feels as one is trying to fix an unfixable problem. For me, the journey has been all these things, but the single most important thing I have learned throughout this journey is that without the incredible and unwavering support of my supervisor, colleagues, friends and family, this PhD simply would not have been possible. I am eternally grateful to my supervisor Dr. George Loukas. George is a remarkable human, possessing incredible insight which has helped me to illuminate ways forward when there seemed to be only dead-ends. He is a supervisor any PhD student would wish for - enthusiastic, motivating, providing support in times of need, as well as possessing a great sense of humour! If it was not for George seeing potential in me I would never have undertaken a PhD, and over the past four years his mentorship has guided me to develop a success as a computer science researcher that I never before thought possible. George, thank you for helping me unlock my potential. I give heartfelt thanks Dr. Diane Gan for her continued support and guid- ance as my second supervisor and as my lecturer and mentor through my academic journey from undergraduate to PhD. Your continued enthusiasm and motivation has been both infectious and inspiring. iv I would also like to thank my work colleagues Andy, Sean, Stuart and Zed for their continued support and input and enthusiasm when sharing ideas related to my research, it has helped me to think outside-the-box and improved the quality of this project. A big thank-you also goes to Riley, who helped me turn my unfriendly install process for Cogni-Sense into an automated, user-friendly script! To my beautiful Carla, you have always believed in me, even when I have lost belief in myself. You will never know how much your love and support has driven me to make this PhD possible. v Dedication For my Carla. vi List of Author Publications Manuscripts published • 1. R. Heartfield and G. Loukas. On the feasibility of automated semantic attacks in the cloud. Computer and Information Sciences III. Springer London, 2013, pages 343-351. • 2. R. Heartfield and G. Loukas. A Taxonomy of Attacks and a Survey of De- fence Mechanisms for Semantic Social Engineering Attacks. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 48(3), 2016. • 3. R. Heartfield and G. Loukas. Evaluating the reliability of users as human sensors of social media security threats. Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics And Assessment (CyberSA), 2016 International Conference On. 14 June 2016. IEEE. • 4. R. Heartfield and G. Loukas. Predicting the performance of users as human sensors of security threats in social media. International Journal On Cyber Situational Awareness (IJCSA). 1(1). 2016 • 5. R. Heartfield and G. Loukas, and D. Gan, D. You are probably not the weakest link: Towards practical prediction of susceptibility to semantic social engineering attacks. IEEE Access, 4, 2016, 6910-6928. • 6. R. Heartfield and D. Gan. Social Engineering in the Internet of Everything. Cutter Business Technology Journal. 26(7). 2016, Pages 20-29 vii • 7. R. Heartfield and G. Loukas and D. Gan. An eye for deception: A case study in utilising the Human-As-A-Security-Sensor paradigm to detect zero-day semantic social engineering attacks. Software Engineering Research, Manage- ment and Applications (SERA 2017), 15th ACIS International Conference on. 7 June 2017. IEEE. • 8. S. S. Rahman, R. Heartfield, W. Oliff, G. Loukas, A. Filippoupolitis. Assess- ing the cyber-trustworthiness of human-as-a-sensor reports from mobile devices. Software Engineering Research, Management and Applications (SERA 2017), 15th ACIS International Conference on. 7 June 2017. IEEE. viii Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Outline . .2 1.2 Characterising the threat of semantic attacks . .3 1.2.1 A brief historic overview of social engineering in computer systems3 1.2.2 The extreme diversity of semantic attacks . .7 1.3 The scale of the threat today: recent semantic attack statistics . 10 1.4 Research Aim . 15 2 A taxonomy of attacks and survey of defence mechanisms 17 2.1 Taxonomy of Semantic Attacks . 19 2.1.1 Control Stage 1: Orchestration . 23 2.1.2 Control Stage 2: Exploitation . 27 2.1.3 Control Stage 3: Execution . 32 2.1.4 Taxonomy Examples . 34 2.2 Survey of Semantic Attack Defence Mechanisms . 43 2.2.1 Organisational . 43 2.2.1.1 Policy and Process Control . 43 2.2.1.2 Awareness Training . 45 2.2.2 Technical . 48 2.2.2.1 Sandboxing Mechanisms . 48 2.2.2.2 Authorisation, Authentication and Accounting (AAA) 51 2.2.2.3 Monitoring . 52 2.2.2.4 Integrity checking . 53 ix 2.2.2.5 Machine Learning . 55 2.3 Attack Vs. Defence Matrix . 59 2.4 Discussion: Grand Challenges in Semantic Attack Research . 64 2.4.1 An authoritative semantic attack dataset . 64 2.4.2 Predicting susceptibility to semantic attacks in real-time . 65 2.4.3 Patching the user . 66 2.5 Conclusion . 67 3 Predicting Susceptibility to Semantic Social Engineering Attacks 69 3.1 Predicting Susceptibility . 71 3.1.1 Related Work . 71 3.2 Indicators of susceptibility . 75 3.2.1 Auditable Indicators . 75 3.2.2 Self-Efficacy Indicators . 76 3.3 Methodology .