The Journal of International Security Affairs No. 29, Spring/Summer 2015

HOTSPOTS & FLASHPOINTS Featuring articles by Michael Rubin and Paul Rosenzweig

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The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Inc., incorporated in the District of Columbia, is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. The Journal of International Security Affairs No. 29, Spring/Summer 2015

Editor’s Note Ilan Berman 3

Hotspots and Flashpoints

Yemen on the Brink Oren Adaki 5 Yemen could be the Middle East’s next failed state. Here’s why you should care. An Islamic State in the Sinai Jantzen W. Garnett 15 The ISIS threat to Israel and Egypt is closer than you think. Why the Western Sahara Matters Michael Rubin 21 In North Africa, a hub for regional security... or a source of global instability. Israel in the Eye of the Storm Tom Wilson 30 The view from Jerusalem is worrying indeed. Anti-Semitism: Islamism’s Indelible Marker M. Zuhdi Jasser 37 Why Jew-hatred goes hand in hand with Islamic radicalism. China’s Great Maritime Gamble Phillip Orchard 43 How Beijing is rewriting the rules of the road in the East and South China Seas. The War for Ukraine Herman Pirchner, Jr. 51 The year-and-a-half-old conflict between Moscow and Kyiv isn’t close to being over. Deterring Russia: Has NATO Succeeded? Leo Michel 61 Grading the Atlantic Alliance’s response to a rapacious Russia. The Changing Face of Cyber Conflict Paul Rosenzweig 67 Brace yourself. It’s going to be a bumpy ride in cyberspace. Finding the Islamic State’s Weak Spot Celina B. Realuyo 73 To defeat the new terrorist threat, we need to follow the money. Perspective

The Danger of Incorrect Assumptions 79 An Interview with The Honorable Douglas J. Feith Dispatches HELSINKI: Finland’s Balancing Act Charly Salonius-Pasternak 83 BEIJING: China’s Changing Foreign Policy Priorities Da Wei & Sun Chenghao 86 MADRID: Needed: A New Counterterrorism Alliance in North Africa José María Gil Garre 88 Book Reviews

Russia’s Manufactured Reality Jason Czerwiec 91 Peter Pomerantsev pulls back the curtain on Russia’s larger-than-life media. The High Cost of Doing Business in Russia Samuel Bendett 93 What Bill Browder learned about the cutthroat capitalism of the new Russia. The Indispensable Factor in Intelligence Malcolm Forbes 95 There’s simply no substitute for human tradecraft, says Stephen Gray. America’s Path to Power Todd Johnson 97 A trio of national security experts explain how the U.S. became a superpower—and what it will take to stay one. Editor’s Note

Today, the United States faces a world in chaos. From the Middle East to the Asia- Pacific, a dizzying array of crises now challenges regional stability—and, by extension, America’s strategic interests abroad. In this edition of The Journal, we take a tour of some of today’s most prominent geopolitical hotspots and flashpoints.

We start our examination in the southern Persian Gulf, as Oren Adaki of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies explains why Yemen could well be the region’s next failed state—and why this would constitute a dangerous development for the United States and its allies. From there, Jantzen Garnett of the Institute for the Study of War provides a probing look at the Islamic State’s newest franchise, situated in Israel’s geopolitical backyard of the Sinai. The American Enterprise Institute’s Michael Rubin then looks at the past and present of the most prominent “frozen conflict” in the greater Middle East: the Western Sahara. Tom Wilson of the Henry Jackson Society follows up with a detailed overview of Israel’s changing threat environment—and of the changes taking place in Israeli policymaking as a result. We round out our examination of the region with M. Zuhdi Jasser of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, who makes a com- pelling case that anti-Semitism makes up a core element of Islamist political thought and practice.

From there, we branch out to Asia—and beyond. First, Stratfor’s Phillip Orchard out- lines the brewing crisis in the South and East China Seas, where China’s “reclamation” activities are increasingly challenging the regional legal order and strategic status quo. Herman Pirchner of the American Foreign Policy Council offers up a comprehensive, and compelling, description of the current struggle taking place for the soul of Ukraine. The National Defense University’s Leo Michel takes a different tack on much the same subject with his description of what the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is doing to deter Russian behavior in Ukraine, and beyond. Paul Rosenzweig of Red Branch Consulting then takes us behind the scenes of the changes taking place in cyberspace, the next great arena of conflict between the United States and its adversaries. We wrap up with Celina Realuyo of the National Defense University, who argues for a serious strategy to tackle the finances that help sustain and empower the Islamic State terrorist group.

Our coverage does not stop there, however. This issue’s “Perspective” interviewee is former Under Secretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith, who weighs in on the Syrian civil war, the unfolding nuclear deal with Iran, and a multitude of other issues. This time out, our “Dispatches” come from Finland, China and Spain. And our book reviews cover a quartet of important new contributions dealing with Russia, espionage and American foreign policy.

In short, like the current state of the world, this issue of The Journal offers a great deal of food for thought. We hope that you find its pages interesting—and illuminating.

Ilan Berman Editor

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© 2015 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION Yemen on the Brink

Oren Adaki

n March 25th, Saudi Arabia and a coalition of eight other Arab states began military operations in Yemen as part of Operation Decisive Storm. The stated Ogoal of the campaign, which relied heavily on coalition air strikes, was to restore Yemen’s internationally recognized government to power. The Yemeni government, led by President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, had been undermined by Shi’ite Houthi rebels advancing from the country’s northern provinces, who seized the Yemeni capital in late September, forcing Hadi to flee Sana’a. Hadi then called on the international community for help from his new refuge in the strategic port city of Aden. When the Houthis subsequently advanced on the city in late March, Hadi escaped the country on a plane marked “Saudi Medevac,” and Saudi Arabia began its military campaign.

The initial phase of the operation lasted about a month, and targeted Houthi positions throughout the country, including military bases and installations. The air strikes succeeded in neutralizing much of the rebels’ military edge, taking out Houthi- controlled air bases and ballistic missile sites that could have been used to strike deep into Saudi territory. While this stage of the operation appeared to be geared toward containing the Houthi crisis within Yemen’s borders, the Saudi-led coalition announced on April 21st that Decisive Storm had come to an end, inaugurating a second phase— entitled Operation Restoring Hope—focused on finding a political solution to the ongo- ing crisis. Yet the military efforts of the Arab coalition appear to have had only limited suc- cess in stemming the rebel advance in the country. The Houthis have continued to press their offensive in southern Yemen. In early April, they battled Popular Commit-

Oren Adaki is a research analyst with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) focusing on Yemen and the broader Gulf region. His work has previously appeared in Foreign Policy, Al-Arabiya, The National Interest, The Long War Journal and War on the Rocks. Oren Adaki

tees (local armed resistance groups allied lowers are therefore sometimes referred with President Hadi) for control of the to as “Twelver Shi’ites.” Meanwhile, the port of Aden, eventually seizing parts of Zaidis broke with the Twelvers over the the city, including the presidential palace. appropriate candidate for the fifthimam . Air strikes have likewise not been capa- They are therefore called “Fiver Shi’ites,” ble of dislodging the rebels from their or Zaidis for their preferred contender positions in and surrounding the capital at that time, Mohammad’s great-great or other vital locations in the country. grandson, Zaid bin Ali. A five-day cease-fire went into effect In sharp contrast to other regional on May 12th, allowing for humanitarian arenas, Sunni-Shi’ite tensions have never aid to reach civilians besieged by war in been a serious concern in Yemen. That the region’s most impoverished nation. fact may in part be due to the Zaidis’ Hours later, violations to the cease-fire doctrinal similarities to Sunni Islam. were already being reported on both That is, Zaidi jurisprudence is more simi- sides. The Houthis reportedly advanced lar to Sunni legal tradition than to that of in several locations and the Saudi-led the Twelver Shi’ites in Iran. The Zaidis coalition responded by carrying out lim- actually rely on the legal tradition of Abu ited air strikes against rebel positions. Hanifa, a founder of one of Sunni Islam’s Houthi fighters also allegedly fired rock- four juridical schools. The Zaidis also ets into population centers in southern do not consider their leaders infallible, a Saudi Arabia and directed sniper fire at long-held belief in most Shi’ite communi- Saudi border posts. ties. There is also no precedent in Yemen So the situation remains. When hos- of mosques segregated along sectarian tilities began in late March, the spokes- lines. While most mosques are affili- man for the Saudi-led coalition told ated with one group or another, Yemen’s reporters that the operation achieved its Zaidis and Sunnis have prayed together goals “within the first 15 minutes.”1 But for centuries in a manner unimagined in several months, two operations, and a places like Iraq or Syria.2 cease-fire later, it seems that the combat- It is also important to remember ants in Yemen’s prolonged crisis are head- that the Zaidis are not just a periph- ing toward a stalemate desired by none. eral minority group suddenly vying for power. Indeed, the Zaidis ruled Yemen for Who are the Houthis? over a thousand years under an Imamate The Houthis, formally known as overthrown in 1962 by Adbullah al-Sal- Ansar Allah, are part of Yemen’s Zaidi lal’s republican revolution. The rulers of Muslim community, which are composed the Zaidi Imamate in Yemen governed by of more than a third of the Yemeni popu- religious fiat—they claimed lineage from lation. Zaidi Islam is a branch of Shiism the Prophet Mohammad and imposed that emerged in the ninth century from their reading of Islamic law as the law a dispute regarding leadership succes- of the land. Following Yemen’s game- sion of the Muslim community following changing 1962 revolution, the Zaidis and the Prophet Mohammad. The origins of their northern strongholds were margin- Shi’ite doctrine are defined primarily by alized by the new central government in the belief that religious leadership follow- Sana’a and their ideology came under ing Mohammad should run through the attack by the spread of Saudi-sponsored line of Ali bin Abi Talib, Mohammad’s Wahhabism, a strand of Sunni doctrine son-in-law. Mainstream Shi’ite ideology that is more directly antagonistic toward reveres twelve imams—or religious lead- Shi’ism than traditions embraced by ers—following Mohammad, and its fol- Yemen’s Sunnis.

6 The Journal of International Security Affairs Yemen on the Brink

In the early 1990s, Zaidi community who still leads the group today. Under leaders began to organize under what Abdel Malek’s direction, the Houthi was then coined Al Shabaab al-Mu’min, movement fought an additional five The Believing Youth, a revivalist move- wars with the Yemeni military between ment promoting the Zaidi religious creed 2005 and 2010, even drawing in regional in the face of the growing entrenchment superpower Saudi Arabia in 2009 follow- of Saudi Wahhabism in Yemen. At the ing a Houthi incursion into Saudi terri- time, the group was led by Hussein tory which killed a Saudi border guard. Badreddin al-Houthi and mainly dissem- The Yemeni government brokered a inated Zaidi propaganda, such as video cease-fire agreement with the Houthis in and cassette recordings. early 2010, concluding six years of war The United States’ inauguration with the northern Zaidis which had left of the war on terror following the 9/11 more than 100,000 Yemenis internally attacks and the subsequent invasion of displaced, scores dead, and rendered Iraq in 2003 galvanized the nascent Zaidi government authority in the north vir- movement.3 The group began staging tually nonexistent. But just a year later, anti-American rallies in Yemen, possibly the Houthis were once again voicing their in the mold of revolutionary Shi’ite Iran, opposition to the central Yemeni govern- with particular vitriol directed toward ment, this time as part of the Arab Spring then-president Ali Abdullah Saleh for his protests which engulfed the Yemeni capi- close ties with Washington. It was in this tal. The protests called for the ouster of context that the current anti-American longtime Yemeni strongman Ali Abdul- Houthi slogan first emerged: “Death to lah Saleh, who had ruled the country for America, Death to Israel, Damnation over three decades. Saleh’s corruption Upon the Jews, and Victory to Islam.” during his presidency was staggering, and the subject of widespread outrage on The road to rebellion the Yemeni street; a subsequent United As the Zaidi movement transitioned Nations report released in 2015 claimed from revivalism to radicalism, the Yemeni that Saleh had amassed up to $60 bil- government felt increasingly threatened lion, equivalent to Yemen’s annual gross and led a concerted effort to arrest the domestic product (GDP).5 Ironically a group’s leader, Hussein Badreddin al- Zaidi himself, Saleh led the Yemeni gov- Houthi, even going so far as to place a ernment’s military campaigns to squash $55,000 bounty on his head.4 In turn, this the Houthi rebellions in the north, bolster- perceived attack against the Zaidi move- ing Houthi grievances against the gov- ment spurred al-Houthi to launch the ernment in general and Saleh specifically. first of what would become a series of six The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) wars against the government, known as laid the groundwork for the transition the Saada wars. After the Yemeni mili- of power from Saleh to his deputy Abd tary killed al-Houthi along with two hun- Rabbo Mansour Hadi in 2011, and Saleh dred of his loyalists in Saada province in eventually stepped down in early 2012. 2004, the Zaidi movement was renamed Notably, the GCC plan enshrined Saleh’s after him, giving birth to the Houthi immunity from prosecution for all his movement as we know it today. past actions as president and guaranteed Hussein’s father, Badreddin al- him the right to return to the country. As Houthi, took the helm of the Houthi part of the GCC initiative, a transitional movement after his son’s death, and was dialogue process called the National Dia- eventually replaced by another son, Hus- logue Conference (NDC) was launched in sein’s brother, Abdel Malek al-Houthi, early 2013 in an effort to propose reforms

The Journal of International Security Affairs 7 Oren Adaki that could repair the broken Yemeni Houthi rebels responded by deploying political system. their militias and seizing control in mid- Though the Houthis were not September. In a sign of their newfound involved in the GCC agreement, their power, the rebels raided the downtown participation in the National Dialogue residences of prominent military and Conference was a watershed moment in political officials and took over govern- their movement’s history. A Houthi rep- ment offices and military bases in and resentative was included in the NDC’s around the Yemeni capital. The United nine-member presidency and a Houthi Nations soon intervened and brokered a delegation attended the nearly year-long cease-fire agreement known as the Peace conference. This political representa- and National Partnership Agreement, tion marked a sharp departure for the which called for increased representa- Yemeni government’s treatment of the tion for marginalized sectors of Yemeni Houthis; the government had spent mas- society, including the Houthis, and a rein- sive resources fighting the rebels for six statement of fuel subsidies. The Houthis, years. The Houthis ultimately rejected however, refused to sign the annex to the the NDC’s recommendation to divide agreement, which stipulated the with- Yemen into six federal regions, fearful drawal of all armed militias from the of ramifications for their northern power capital. Instead, they consolidated their bases. Yet the NDC served to legitimize power in the capital and continued their the Houthi movement. By the time the military offensive throughout the coun- NDC came to a close in January 2014, the try, gradually extending control south- Houthis had transformed from a north- ward into Yemen’s Sunni heartland. In a ern rebel group to a full-fledged political matter of weeks, the Houthis had seized opposition movement. the significant port city of Hodeidah on Despite their growing political the Red Sea coast as well as Ibb province, legitimacy, just weeks following the a mere 100 miles from the Gulf of Aden. conclusion of the National Dialogue By the beginning of 2015, the Conference the Houthis began con- Houthis achieved stunning military suc- solidating their presence in Yemen’s cesses in the country, emboldening them northern Amran province and staged to reject attempts to draft a new constitu- an attack against Sunni tribal forces in tion, as laid out in the Peace and National that area. Their efforts culminated in Partnership Agreement. Ultimately, the July, when they successfully seized the rebels stormed the presidential palace entire province and fatally attacked the in Sana’a, held President Hadi and other Yemeni general leading an army bri- government ministers under house gade sent to repel their offensive. arrest, and forced Hadi and his cabinet to Later that same month, the Yemeni resign under duress. government lifted subsidies on fuel in an Hadi eventually fled the capital to effort to secure an International Mon- his hometown of Aden in February, where etary Fund (IMF) loan, causing gasoline he rescinded his resignation and appealed prices in the country to soar. The Houthis to the international community to come capitalized on the popular outcry in to the aid of his embattled government. the country, and by August hundreds When Houthi rebels appeared to be clos- of Houthi protestors were on Sana’a’s ing in on Aden in March, Hadi slipped streets calling for the resignation of the out of the country with apparent help “corrupt” Yemeni government. from Riyadh, and Saudi Arabia promptly When government forces clashed announced the commencement of Opera- with protestors in the capital, Sana’a, the tion Decisive Storm the following day.

8 The Journal of International Security Affairs Yemen on the Brink

Unlikely allies at home cated that Saleh and the Houthis reached The Houthis’ successful offensive an understanding late last year to work was undoubtedly due in part to a wide- together toward creating a mutually spread sentiment in Yemen that Hadi’s beneficial situation—spoiling the tran- government was indeed corrupt and inef- sition process that removed Saleh from fective, as they had claimed. However, power and elevating the significance of there can be no question that their stag- the Houthi rebels.7 gering military successes were in part Another player was present as well. due to the help of Yemen’s former presi- From very early on, there were signs of dent, Ali Abdullah Saleh. the Yemeni military’s collusion in the It may surprise outside observers Houthi rebel offensive. Reports suggested of Yemen that Saleh, a man who waged that the rebels faced minimal resistance six brutal wars against the Houthis in their takeover of the Yemeni capital during his presidency, would ally him- in late September, and they were soon self with the group. Saleh once famously spotted patrolling the streets of Sana’a described his political maneuvers during in Yemeni military uniforms. Moreover, his 33-year-long tenure as “dancing on the one of the rebels’ first orders of business heads of snakes,”6 as he was known for was to storm the residence of Ali Mohsen shifting his alliances in Yemen’s complex al-Ahmar, an elite army commander who tribal landscape to secure his tight grip turned on Saleh during the 2011 pro- on power. Thus, it came as no surprise to tests by calling for his resignation. The Yemenis that Saleh joined forces with his Houthis swiftly gained control of much Houthi arch-rivals in order to resurface of the Yemeni military’s heavy weap- as a key player in Yemeni politics a mere onry—including tanks, rocket-propelled three years after stepping down. grenades, and air force fighter jets—pro- Despite relinquishing power, Saleh viding the rebels with a significant mili- still commanded the loyalty of key units tary edge over their opponents. in the Yemeni military. Saleh had spent While the full extent of Saleh’s over three decades elevating his associ- backing for the Houthi rebels remains ates to top military positions, strengthen- murky, he has been singled out interna- ing his patronage network and ensuring tionally for his role in Yemen’s current his control over the military even after his crisis. Both the United Nations and the departure from politics. Notably, Saleh’s United States sanctioned Saleh in early son Ahmed was commander of Yemen’s November 2014 for “undermining the powerful Republican Guard and Special political transition of Yemen.”8 The U.S. Forces, and his nephew Yahya headed claimed that Saleh had become “one of Yemen’s Central Security Forces. Due to the primary supporters” of the Houthi disproportionate dominance of the Saleh rebellion soon after he stepped down family and their associates over the mili- from the presidency in 2012.9 tary, President Hadi moved to restruc- ture Yemen’s security forces in late 2012 A helping hand from Iran and early 2013, absorbing the forces loyal There are also growing indications to Saleh into five new military branches. that the Houthis have been receiving sup- Although Hadi’s restructuring of port from an aspiring regional hegemon: the military sought to reduce Saleh’s namely, Iran. Indeed, the history of Ira- lingering influence in Yemen, the former nian support for the Houthi movement Yemeni president soon found a new is long, dating back at least to the Sa’ada comeback strategy in the emerging wars between 2004 and 2010. During that Houthi rebel movement. Reports indi- time, bilateral relations between Yemen

The Journal of International Security Affairs 9 Oren Adaki

and Iran began to strain, with Yemeni these weekly flights from Iran were being officials routinely accusing the Islamic used to shuttle destabilizing “supplies,” Republic of backing the Shi’ite rebels.10 and the spokesperson for the Saudi-led Since 2009, there have been a military coalition went so far as to claim number of reports highlighting Iran’s that a majority of these flights was ferry- military support for the Houthis. In Octo- ing arms and ammunition.16 ber 2009, Yemen seized an arms-laden There are now several indications Iranian ship manned by Iranian weap- that the Iranians have not only supplied ons experts sent to replace other Iranian the Houthis, but trained them as well. nationals fighting alongside the Yemeni Yemeni officials claim that Houthis have rebels. A joint U.S.-Yemeni military oper- been traveling to Lebanon and Iran for ation seized yet another ship off the coast training for some time now, indicating of Yemen in January 2013, the Jihan 1, that 100 Houthi fighters trained in Iran containing a cache of weapons. The cache in 2014 alone.17 Though virtually impos- included significant weaponry, such as sible to confirm, a senior Iranian offi- Katyusha rockets, heat-seeking surface- cial admitted in December 2014 that the to-air missiles, Iranian-made night-vision IRGC’s Qods Force had stationed a “few goggles, and advanced artillery systems. hundred” military personnel to directly Despite Iranian denials, markings on the train Houthi combatants in Yemen, in weapons indicated they had come from addition to about a dozen Iranian mili- Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards tary advisers already on the ground.18 Corps (IRGC) facilities. U.S. officials sub- A news report in late March suggested sequently confirmed that the weapons that members of the IRGC were training were intended for the Houthi rebels.11 Houthis in the use of Yemen’s air force.19 After the Houthis took the port Iran has also provided vital finan- of Hodeidah in October 2014, reports cial support to the Houthi movement. In indicated that they received a weapons 2012, U.S. officials noted that along with shipment at a port in the area from an weapons, Iran was regularly sending unspecified allied “Islamic country,”12 several million dollars in cash to Yemen suspected by most to be Iran. Most to back the Shi’ite rebels.20 In Decem- recently, in March, an Iranian ship is ber 2014, a Yemeni official warned that reported to have unloaded more than 180 “sacks of cash” from Tehran had been tons of weapons and military equipment arriving at Sana’a International Airport, at the Houthi-controlled Saleef port in some of which were channeled via Iran’s western Yemen.13 Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah.21 Iran has also not limited its illicit Beyond military and financial arms shipments to the Houthis to mari- support, Iran and its proxies have also time transfers. Recent evidence has sug- been a great source of guidance for the gested that Iran is utilizing Pouya Air, Houthis. In late 2009, reports emerged of an airline previously designated by the a secret meeting along the Yemeni-Saudi U.S. for its weapons shipments to Syria, border between Houthi rebels, the IRGC, in order to send arms to the Houthis by and Hezbollah.22 The latter also assisted air.14 Moreover, Tehran signed an air the Houthis in establishing Al Masira, transport agreement with the Houthis in a Houthi radio and television station March, ensuring fourteen flights a week that provides the Houthis with a reliable between Sana’a and Tehran, not to men- means of disseminating their propa- tion a continuous arms transfer route ganda in Yemen and beyond.23 from Iran to the Shi’ite rebels.15 Secretary Recent reports highlight the grow- of State John Kerry stated in April that ing relationship between Hezbollah and

10 The Journal of International Security Affairs Yemen on the Brink the Yemeni rebels.24 In May, a Hezbol- of the al-Anad airbase in southern Lahij lah commander close to the terrorist province. The base previously served as group’s leadership spoke of Hezbollah’s a key site for joint Yemeni-U.S. counter- advisory role vis-à-vis the Houthis, alleg- terrorism operations, including as a base edly teaching the rebels the art of gue- for drone strikes, and AQAP has targeted rilla warfare and operational timing.25 the base in the past in retaliation for U.S. Harping on long-standing Shi’ite narra- drone strikes against its operatives. tives of oppression, the Hezbollah com- Perhaps even more troubling than mander commented, “We are wherever the apparent ouster of President Hadi is the oppressed need us… Hizbollah is the the evident reinvigoration of AQAP in school where every freedom-seeking man recent months. From the outset of the wants to learn.” When Houthi spiritual rebellion, AQAP framed the conflict in leader Abdel Malek al-Shami died as a starkly sectarian terms and champi- result of injuries sustained from a Sunni oned itself as the vanguard of Yemen’s terrorist bombing of a mosque in March, Sunni Muslims in the face of a Shi’ite he reportedly was buried in Lebanon at rebel onslaught.28 This narrative was a cemetery in the Hezbollah stronghold bolstered by the fact that until the begin- of southern Beirut alongside Hezbollah ning of Operation Decisive Storm, AQAP terrorist mastermind Imad Mughniyeh.26 was one of the only forces on the ground launching attacks against the rebels. Con- The road ahead sequently, a growing number of reports The ongoing Houthi crisis poses indicate that more Sunni tribesmen have serious challenges to U.S. counterter- joined forces with the terrorist group in rorism efforts in Yemen, a country that battles against the Houthis—a boon for serves as a base for operations for al- AQAP recruitment in the country.29 Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Houthi rebellion has also cre- Senior American intelligence officials ated a dangerous power vacuum in the have called AQAP “the most dangerous country, which AQAP has been more than of al-Qaeda’s” affiliates, particularly due happy to exploit. AQAP routinely capital- to the group’s repeated attempts to strike izes on moments of crisis in Yemen, as it Western targets outside of Yemen’s bor- did in 2011 when massive Arab Spring ders.27 After all, AQAP claimed credit protests filled the streets of Sana’a. While for the terrorist attack on the offices of more troops were recalled to the capital to French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo squash the protests, AQAP mobilized in in January 2015 and has attempted to the south and started seizing territory— carry out several brazen attacks in the eventually announcing the establishment U.S. These include the 2009 Christmas of an emirate in the Yemeni province of Day plot to bomb a Detroit-bound pas- Abyan in 2011. senger airplane, two attempts to down It appears that the current Houthi cargo planes with explosives disguised rebellion has similarly breathed new as printer cartridges in October 2010, as life into al-Qaeda’s Yemeni affiliate. well as a May 2012 attempt to bomb a AQAP has managed to wage a three- U.S.-bound airliner. front war—staging attacks against the The sidelining of President Hadi, Houthi rebels, the Yemeni military, as a staunch U.S. counterterrorism part- well as targeting U.S. and other West- ner, surely does not bode well for future ern interests in the country. In light of efforts to combat AQAP in the country. this increased operational capability, it This became especially clear in late should not have come as a major sur- March, when Houthi forces took control prise when the terrorist group seized

The Journal of International Security Affairs 11 Oren Adaki control of the coastal city of al-Mukalla the Shi’ite rebels in Yemen could also in early April, subsequently raiding the exacerbate the already simmering sec- local branch of the Central Bank and tarian tensions in Saudi Arabia, most other key government offices. AQAP prominently in the Kingdom’s Eastern fighters also staged a prison break in Province, where Shi’ites make up about the city, freeing over 300 inmates includ- a third of the population. In fact, reports ing AQAP leader Khalid Batarfi. in April suggested that Saudi security AQAP’s strengthened hand is just services were severely cracking down one concern for U.S. counterterrorism on Shi’ites in the Eastern Province in an officials focused on Yemen. A major fear attempt to prevent them from protesting is the prospect that Yemen could go the against Operation Decisive Storm.31 way of Syria, continuing to spiral out The Houthi rebellion inched closer of control and attracting jihadi opera- toward becoming a crisis of international tives of all stripes, especially given the proportions when the Houthis began increasingly sectarian nature of the repositioning missiles, artillery, and crisis. In this scenario, Yemen could small armed boats on the strategic island become a haven not just for al-Qaeda of Perim in the Bab al-Mandaab strait affiliates, but for a host of other extrem- in early April. Perim sits at the narrow- ist organizations as well—groups that est point of the strait and commands the could destabilize the country for years fourth-busiest oil and fueling shipping to come and foster even more anti-Amer- bottleneck in the world, connecting the ican activity. This is already becoming Gulf of Aden to the Mediterranean by a reality, as evidenced by the emergence way of the Red Sea. of an Islamic State cell in Yemen in The Bab el-Mandeb strait not only March that has already claimed a series serves as a conduit for the international of brutal attacks in the country. oil trade, but also for nearly all trade by The resurgence of Ali Abdullah sea flowing south from Europe to Asian Saleh in Yemen is another discourag- markets. Any interference in shipping ing development, threatening to spoil traffic through the Strait could therefore the country’s delicate political transition severely affect international commerce which began in 2011 and potentially writ large, effectively rendering the Suez destabilizing Yemen for the foreseeable Canal obsolete and forcing shipping to future. Moreover, it throws a wrench in reroute to longer and costlier journeys. It President Obama’s description of Yemen is also worth noting that Israel depends as a model of peaceful political transi- upon shipping in and out of the Bab el- tion in the Arab world,30 and could ulti- Mandeb strait for its maritime commerce mately engender even more divisions in a between Asia and Eilat. When Israel country which celebrated the removal of went to war in 1967, in part its casus Saleh’s authoritarian rule. belli was Nasser’s decision to block off Beyond the danger to Yemen’s sta- another important Red Sea chokepoint, bility, the current Houthi rebellion also the Straits of Tiran. Keenly aware of the threatens to spill over Yemen’s borders, strait’s strategic importance, coalition with serious consequences for the region forces swiftly eliminated the Houthi pres- and the broader international commu- ence on Perim through a combination of nity. The Houthis have already killed a air strikes, naval bombings, and a Saudi number of Saudi soldiers in cross-border special forces landing. mortar attacks, even hitting major popu- Iran’s involvement in the Houthi lation centers in Najran and Jizan. The crisis further threatens to upend the geo- Saudi-led military campaign against political balance in the region, with the

12 The Journal of International Security Affairs Yemen on the Brink

Islamic Republic advancing on several 27, 2014, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1759/ fronts throughout the Middle East. Ira- opinion/3540/Yemen-is-more-nuanced-than- %E2%80%98Sunni%E2%80%99-amp;%C2%A nian officials were quick to gloat over 0%E2%80%98Shi’a%E2%80%99.htm. this possible development. Days after 3. Adam Taylor, “Who Are The Houthis, The the Houthis seized the Yemeni capital Group That Just Toppled Yemen’s Government?” in September, Ali Riza Zakani, a promi- Washington Post, January 22, 2015, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/ nent member of the Iranian parliament, wp/2015/01/22/who-are-the-houthis-the-group- exclaimed, “Three Arab capitals have that-just-toppled-yemens-government/. already fallen into Iran’s hands,”32 sug- 4. “Yemeni Forces Kill Rebel Cleric,” BBC, Septem- gesting that after Damascus, Beirut, and ber 10, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_ east/3643600.stm. Baghdad, Sana’a would be next. Iran’s 5. “Yemen Ex-President Amassed Up to $60 Bil- growing role in the region is undeniable, lion, Colluded With Rebels: U.N. Experts,” and the dangerous prospect of an Ira- Reuters, February 25, 2015, http://www.reuters. nian forward operating base in Yemen com/article/2015/02/25/us-yemen-security-saleh- un-idUSKBN0LT1C520150225. is deeply concerning to American allies 6. Salman Aldosary, “Opinion: Saleh Continues throughout the Middle East. to Dance on the Heads of Snakes,” Asharq Al- Awsat (London), April 3, 2015, http://www. aawsat.net/2015/04/article55342747/opinion- Continued relevance saleh-continues-to-dance-on-the-heads-of- Only time will tell what will become snakes. of Yemen’s current Houthi crisis. How- 7. Mustapha Ajbaili, “Eyeing Return, Yemen’s ever, no matter the outcome of the cur- Ousted Saleh Aids Houthis,” Al-Arabiya, Octo- ber 23, 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/ rent Saudi-led military operation, what is perspective/analysis/2014/10/23/Eyeing-return- becoming increasingly apparent is that it Yemen-s-ousted-Saleh-helps-Houthis-.html. will not be the final nail in the coffin of 8. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Press Release: the Houthi movement. The Houthis have Treasury Sanctions Political Spoilers Threaten- ing the Peace, Security and Stability of Yemen,” proven that they are a force to be reck- November 10, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/ oned with, and that efforts to marginal- press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2693.aspx. ize them completely are doomed to fail. 9. “U.N. Sanctions Yemen’s Ex-President Saleh, As such, they will continue to play Two Rebel Leaders,” Reuters, November 7, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/07/us- an important role in Yemen’s political yemen-un-sanctions-idUSKBN0IR2EA20141107. future. The country’s future stability and 10. Haytham Mouzahem, “Iran’s Angle in Yemen,” survival may just depend on the extent Al-Monitor, May 14, 2013, http://www.al-mon- to which a political accommodation can itor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/iran-angle- yemen-relations.html#. unite Yemen’s disparate political move- 11. Phil Stewart, “Large Arms Shipment Inter- ments, including the Houthis, to create cepted off Yemen, Iran Eyed as Source,” Reuters, a strong, central government capable of January 28, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/ tackling the country’s myriad problems. article/2013/01/29/us-yemen-weapons-iran-idUS- BRE90S01B20130129. 12. Arafat Madabish, “Yemeni Houthis Receiving Heavy Weapon Shipments Via Red Sea Ports: Sources,” Asharq Al-Awsat (London), Decem- ber 7, 2014, http://www.aawsat.net/2014/12/ article55339265/yemeni-houthis-receiving- heavy-weapon-shipments-via-red-sea-ports- sources. 1. Mishal al-Otaibi, “Operation Achieves Goals 13. “Iranian Ship Unloads 185 Tons of Weapons for Quickly: Al-Asiri,” Saudi Gazette, March Houthis at Saleef Port,” Al-Arabiya, March 20, 26, 2015, http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/ 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle- index.cfm?method=home.regcon&conten east/2015/03/20/Iranian-ship-unloads-185-tons-of- tid=20150327238415. weapons-for-Houthis-at-Saleef-port.html. קירטה תא תופשוח תונומתה“ ,Roni Daniel Abubakr al-Shamahi, “Yemen Is More Nuanced 14. .2 .Mako, March 31, 2015, http://mobile ”,ינריאה Than ‘Sunni’ & ‘Shi’a,’” Yemen Times, February

The Journal of International Security Affairs 13 Oren Adaki

mako.co.il/news-world/arab-q1_2015/Article- 2015, http://yalibnan.com/2015/04/14/yemens- 2e8f4352aa07c41004.htm. houthi-spiritual-chief-buried-by-hezbollah-in- 15. “Houthis Sign Economic Agreements With lebanon-report/. Iran,” Aden Street, March 12, 2015, http://www. 27. Greg Miller and Craig Whitlock, “Yemen adenstreet.com/news725.html. Crisis Disrupts U.S. Counterterrorism Opera- 16. John Kerry, “Interview With Judy Woodruff of tions, Officials Say,” Washington Post, Janu- PBS NewsHour,” U.S. Department of State Web- ary 23, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost. site, April 8, 2015, http://www.state.gov/secre- com/world/national-security/us-counterter- tary/remarks/2015/04/240486.htm; “Brig. Gen. rorism-operations-with-yemen-suspended- Ahmed Asiri says, In His Fourth Daily Briefing, officials-say/2015/01/23/03bf8826-a337-11e4- That Houthi Militia Managed to Work in the Pre- 903f-9f2faf7cd9fe_story.html. vious Period to Transfer Yemen to a Huge Inven- 28. Oren Adaki, “AQAP Calls Sunnis to Arms,” The tory of Ammunition and Weapons,” Saudi Press Long War Journal, September 24, 2014, http:// Agency, March 29, 2015, http://www.spa.gov.sa/ www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/in_ english/details.php?id=1343771. the_midst_of_a.php. 17. Yara Bayoumi and Mohammed Ghobari, “Ira- 29. Maggie Michael, “How Shi’ite Rebels in Yemen nian Support Seen Crucial for Yemen’s Houthis,” Are Helping Sunni Al-Qaeda Militants,” Asso- Reuters, December 15, 2014, http://www.reuters. ciated Press, January 5, 2015, http://www. com/article/2014/12/15/us-yemen-houthis-iran- csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0105/ insight-idUSKBN0JT17A20141215. How-Shi’ite-rebels-in-Yemen-are-helping-Sunni- 18. Ibid. Al-Qaeda-militants-video. Jeff Mason, “U.S. Tells G8 Syria’s Assad .30 يلتاقم دحأ بردي يناريإ رايط..ويديفلاب“ .19 ,Al-Arabiya, March 27, 2015, http:// Must Go, Cites Yemen As Model,” Reuters ”,يثوحلا www.alarabiya.net/ar/saudi-today/2015/03 May 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/arti- /27/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8 cle/2012/05/19/us-syria-usa-whitehouse-idUS- 1%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88- BRE84I0BC20120519. %D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8% 31. “‘They’re Afraid We’ll Protest Yemen Opera- A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9 tion,’ Say Saudi Shi’ites,” France 24, April %8A-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8- 6, 2015. http://observers.france24.com/ %D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9 content/20150406-crackdown-saudi-Shi’ites- %82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%8A- yemen-awamiyah. %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8% 32. “Sanaa Is the Fourth Arab Capital to Join AB%D9%8A-.html. the Iranian Revolution,” Middle East Moni- 20. Eric Shmitt and Robert F. Worth, “With Arms tor, September 27, 2014, https://www. for Yemen Rebels, Iran Seeks Wider Mideast middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle- Role,” New York Times, March 15, 2012, http:// east/14389-sanaa-is-the-fourth-arab-capital-to- www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/world/middlee- join-the-iranian-revolution. ast/aiding-yemen-rebels-iran-seeks-wider-mid- east-role.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1. 21. Yara Bayoumi and Mohammed Ghobari, “Ira- nian Support Seen Crucial for Yemen’s Houthis,” Reuters, December 15, 2014, http://www.reuters. com/article/2014/12/15/us-yemen-houthis-iran- insight-idUSKBN0JT17A20141215. 22. “Yemen’s Houthis Hold Secret Meeting With Iran,” Al-Arabiya, December 13, 2009, http:// www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/12/13/94076. html. 23. Amal Mudallali, “The Iranian Sphere of Influ- ence Expands Into Yemen,” Foreign Policy, Octo- ber 8, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/08/ the-iranian-sphere-of-influence-expands-into- yemen/. 24. Erika Solomon, “Lebanon’s Hizbollah and Yemen’s Houthis Open Up on Links,” Finan- cial Times, May 8, 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/ cms/s/0/e1e6f750-f49b-11e4-9a58-00144feab7de. html?siteedition=uk#axzz3ZYQvwEt0. 25. Ibid. 26. “Yemen’s Houthi Spiritual Chief Buried by Hez- bollah in Lebanon, Report,” Ya Libnan, April 14,

14 The Journal of International Security Affairs An Islamic State in the Sinai

Jantzen W. Garnett

espite major efforts by Egyptian security forces, ongoing— and intensifying—levels of violence now predominate across Dthe northern Sinai Peninsula. A recent attack targeting the Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO) base in North Sinai has drawn renewed international attention to the threat posed by militant groups operating in the area.

Chief among these is Wilayat Sinai, or Sinai Province, an Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) affiliate that was previously known as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM). The June attack on the MFO base was claimed by Wilayat Sinai and confirmed by the U.S. government in a formal press release.1 And while the exact details of the attack are still unknown, the group’s targeting of international peacekeepers represents a clear escalation of the already-fraught security environment in the Sinai—and a potential change in the dynamics of the conflict there. Indeed, since joining ISIS, Wilayat Sinai has increasingly adopted tactics, tech- niques, and procedures employed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. So far, however, it has by and large refrained from targeting civilians or international forces. As such, the tar- geting of the MFO base indicates a major shift in the group’s modus operandi, and a potential portent of things to come.

Ideological (d)evolution Wilayat Sinai originally pledged baya (a religious oath of allegiance) to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in November 2014, and subsequently reaffirmed its fealty in a video that was released in May 2015.2 Following its original November 2014 pledge,

Jantzen W. Garnett is a researcher at the Institute for the Study of War in Wash- ington, DC, concentrating on militant groups active in the Levant. This article was written prior to the July 1st North Sinai terrorist attacks. Follow him on Twitter at @ JantzenGarnett. Jantzen W. Garnett

ABM was formally incorporated into in North Sinai followed. And, having the ISIS structure—rebranding itself gradually reconstituted itself after an Wilayat Sinai and in the process becom- operational pause, ABM launched its ing one of ISIS’ first external affiliates. first complex attack (combining the tac- The merger raised new questions tics of an SVBIED followed by a heavily and concerns about the capabilities of armed assault) against the Karam al- the already-deadly terrorist organiza- Qawades military post in North Sinai on tion. While a simple name change does October 24, 2014. At least 28 soldiers died not in and of itself indicate increased in the attack. lethality, recent operations carried out ABM’s pledge of baya to al-Baghdadi by Wilayat Sinai suggest that the group followed that attack, and took the form of has received expertise and possibly an audio statement released on Novem- resources from ISIS. It is useful, then, ber 10, 2014. A few days later, the group to trace the group’s recent evolution as claimed responsibility for the Karam a way of understanding where it came al-Qawades attack—the first claimed in from—and where it is heading. the name of Wilayat Sinai.3 Thereafter, Even prior to pledging allegiance the militant group increased operations to ISIS, Wilayat Sinai (then ABM) was throughout North Sinai, culminating already widely considered to be the most in synchronized and well-coordinated dangerous Salafi-jihadist group operat- attacks carried out across the region in ing in Egypt. It had a history of attacks, January 2015, which went well beyond including a string of stand-alone vehi- any previous terrorist acts carried out cle-borne improvised explosive device by the group in both sophistication and (VBIED) and suicide-VBIED operations scope. They included, among other inci- in the latter half of 2013 and January dents, a triple-SVBIED attack inside the 2014. The group, however, suffered a security corridor of North Sinai’s provin- number of setbacks in the early months cial capital, al-Arish, as well as concur- of 2014; at least nine key operatives were rent assaults on a number of security killed in clashes with Egyptian forces, positions across the region. including a co-founder of the group and The exact death toll is still three veterans of the Syrian jihad. Eight unknown, due to a moratorium imposed other members were arrested in March on the Health Ministry by the govern- 2014, six of whom were subsequently ment shortly after the attacks occurred. executed by Egyptian authorities this Wilayat Sinai itself claimed the attack past May. left “hundreds” dead. Some residents of The lethality and frequency of al-Arish estimated the death toll to be the group’s attacks dropped signifi- nearly 100.4 Most media reports, mean- cantly after March 2014. Nevertheless, while, put the number at no less than it did manage to carry out a few terror- 30 dead with dozens of others wounded. ist attacks, most notably one near al- The lack of transparency, and unwilling- Farafra in Egypt’s Western Desert. In ness to release official figures, suggests July 2014, elements of the group con- that the attacks may have been more dev- ducted an armed assault against a mili- astating than the government would like tary post there, killing 22 soldiers. The to acknowledge. following month, ABM released a video that concluded with photos from the Growing lethality attack and a caption warning of a forth- Prior to the January synchronized coming one. A number of deadly roadside attacks, there had been little or no evi- IED attacks targeting military convoys dence that Wilayat Sinai had obtained

16 The Journal of International Security Affairs An Islamic State in the Sinai technical assistance or advanced weap- he encouraged the “mujahideen broth- onry from ISIS. The sort of complex ers” of the Islamic State in Iraq and al- attack carried out by the group at that Sham to stand firm and have patience time, however, indicated improved for God’s assistance.5 Then, in July 2014, logistical support, an increase in funds, during an Eid al-Fitr sermon at the end technical assistance in constructing of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, explosives, and additional recruits. It al-Masry called on God to “grant vic- represented the largest, most sophisti- tory to our brothers in the Islamic State cated attack conducted by the group to and open Baghdad and all the country to date—and is the clearest indication that them as well as the hearts of the people.”6 Wilayat Sinai has received support from Subsequently, in August 2014, the ISIS, perhaps significantly so. It was group adopted a campaign of behead- against this backdrop that Wilayat Sinai ings and executions carried out in much launched a mortar and rocket attack the same manner as that of ISIS, filming against the international peacekeepers’ and disseminating the videos on jihadi base in North Sinai. forums and Twitter. The first video sur- At the time, the group claimed it had faced in August 2014 and showed the attacked the base’s airstrip as a response beheading of four civilians accused of for the arrest of a woman by Egyptian cooperating with Israel’s Mossad spy security forces in the nearby town of service.7 The manner in which they were Sheikh Zuweid. But other reasons were killed mimicked the high profile behead- likely behind the attack. For instance, the ings of American and British hostages MFO consists of troop contributions from that have been carried out by ISIS. A 12 countries, eight of which have partici- second video published by the terrorist pated to one extent or another in the anti- group surfaced in early October, show- ISIS coalition now operating in Iraq and ing the beheading of three civilians and Syria. Wilayat Sinai’s decision to target the execution of another. All of the vic- the MFO base, therefore, might be a form tims had been accused of cooperating of retribution carried out on the periph- with Israeli or Egyptian security forces.8 ery of the hostilities taking place in the In early 2015, the Sinai witnessed Levant. It was also a demonstration of a significant increase in the number of sorts. With it, the Wilayat Sinai signaled summary executions and beheadings. its willingness to target the peacekeepers Eight bodies were found beheaded and and reaffirmed that it is capable of con- strewn along North Sinai roadways with ducting such an attack—and likely will dozens of others found shot in appar- pursue similar actions in the future. ent execution-style killings. Many local Here, too, the influence of ISIS can residents blamed Wilayat Sinai for the be felt. As its ideology has changed, beheadings, which proved accurate; Wilayat Sinai has incrementally adopted on February 9th, the group released a many of ISIS’ operational methods. The gruesome video of the eight beheadings, pace at which they began implementing which were carried out in broad daylight ISIS’ methods increased steadily after along the side of the al-Arish-Rafah high- pledging allegiance, but even prior to way. 9 Although the majority of the exe- its formal rebranding the group began cution-style killings since have not been adopting some of ISIS’ tactics. ABM’s publicly claimed, they too are presumed first public indication of affinity with to be the work of Wilayat Sinai militants. ISIS was in a January 23, 2014, audio These tactics are designed to intimi- message by the group’s religious leader, date the local population so as to discour- Sheikh Abu Usama al-Masry, in which age would-be informants from working

The Journal of International Security Affairs 17 Jantzen W. Garnett with the security forces. Another tactic mujahideen checkpoints in North Sinai.11 utilized by the terrorist group, albeit to In January, photos of militants stopping a lesser extent, is home demolitions.10 In vehicles, confiscating marijuana, and a video released in October, armed mili- then burning it along the side of the road tants are shown searching a house late were published by Wilayat Sinai’s media at night for a man accused of cooperat- office. These sorts of events double as, or ing with the Egyptian security forces. perhaps are purely, public relations stunts Not finding him at home, they remove his designed to enhance the group’s image. wife and two small children and demol- And since joining ISIS, their media pro- ish the house with explosives. As the file has grown dramatically. militants are shown clearing the house, an excerpt from a speech by ISIS spokes- Resilient militancy man Abu Muhammed al-Adnani is For all of its counterterrorism efforts heard, in which he advises “remove their to date, it is likely that the Egyptian families from their homes and thereafter government has unwittingly assisted blow up their homes.” This tactic, along Wilayat Sinai’s recruitment efforts. with beheadings and executions, bears a Within days of the October attack strong resemblance to the intimidation against the Karam al-Qawadis military campaign undertaken by ISIS in Mosul post, the Sisi government responded by prior to its seizure of the city and the dec- implementing a plan to establish a 500- laration of the “caliphate.” meter (0.3-mile) wide, 13.5-kilometer (8.4- Other signs of a deeper association mile) long “buffer zone” along the Sinai’s also persist. Wilayat Sinai has taken border with the Gaza Strip. The plan efforts to at least appear to distribute called for the eviction of 1,156 families money to locals in need, as evidenced and the demolition of 802 homes. Subse- by a photo set published by their media quently, in January 2015, the Egyptian office. The photos allegedly depict muja- military began implementing phase two hideen distributing funds to residents of the project, which doubled the initial whose homes were destroyed by the mili- 500-meter wide zone to a full kilometer tary during security operations targeting and required the evacuation of an addi- the militants. The alleged funds were dis- tional 2,044 families and demolition of tributed in clearly marked Air Mail enve- another 1,220 homes.12 A third phase, lopes with “Islamic State, Wilayat Sinai” expanding it an additional kilometer, written prominently across the front. The was announced in April. The buffer zone distribution of “Islamic State” aid money is intended to stop the flow of weapons is, like the fear tactics of executions and and fighters coming from the Gaza Strip beheadings, a hallmark of ISIS social out- through hundreds of tunnels under the reach efforts in their Iraqi and Syrian ter- border. In all likelihood, however, the ritories. In additional efforts, armed and forced evictions, loss of homes, jobs, and masked militants were photographed major sources of income (i.e., the smug- handing out treats to the children of local gling of licit and illicit goods into Gaza) Sinai residents and photos of militants for the local population has given Wilayat distributing food aid to the local popula- Sinai more fodder for recruitment. tion were also circulated online. So far, it is unclear how many new Furthermore, Wilayat Sinai has— recruits the group has garnered as a on occasion—enforced, at least to a result. But there is mounting evidence limited extent, its own interpretation of that the displacement caused by Egyp- sharia (Islamic law) by confiscating and tian security measures has the potential burning marijuana during traffic stops at to be a boon for the organization; to wit, a

18 The Journal of International Security Affairs An Islamic State in the Sinai recent photo report published in late May www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/world/middle- depicts some three dozen camouflage- east/in-egypt-jihadists-release-video-of-an-octo- ber-attack.html. clad militants marching and training 4. Zaki Menna, Amira El-Fekki, and Mahmoud in what is alleged to be a new group of Mostafa, “‘State of Sinai’ Claim Hundreds of recruits for the group.13 Killings in Sinai Attacks,” Daily News Egypt, Nor are there signs that Wilayat January 31, 2015, http://www.dailynewsegypt. com/2015/01/31/state-sinai-claim-hundreds-kill- Sinai has been significantly impeded ings-sinai-attacks/. by the stepped-up security operations 5. Borzou Daragahi, “Sinai Jihadi Group Emerges the Egyptian authorities have employed at Forefront of Egypt Violence,” Financial to target it. Indeed, there are indicators Times, January 31, 2014, http://www.ft.com/ intl/cms/s/0/b5ad40d0-8a7b-11e3-9c29- that Wilayat Sinai’s operations will 00144feab7de.html#axzz3daq3tvqx. increase in frequency, lethality, sophis- 6. “New Video Message from Jama’at Ansar Bayt tication, and complexity as the target al-Maqdis’ Abu Usamah al-Masri: ‘Sermon of Id set grows to encompass international From the Sinai,’” Jihadology, July 31, 2014. http:// jihadology.net/2014/07/31/new-video-message- peacekeepers and potentially other from-jamaat-an%E1%B9%A3ar-bayt-al-maqdis- foreign interests. The group appears abu-usamah-al-ma%E1%B9%A3ri-sermon-of- to have received technical assistance, id-from-the-sinai/. training, and possibly even limited 7. Michael Georgy, “Sinai Militant Group Says it Beheaded Four Egyptians,” Reuters, funds from ISIS, and is seizing muni- August 28, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/ tions and likely gaining recruits—all article/2014/08/28/us-egypt-beheadings-idUSK- of which have added to its capabilities. BN0GS0VM20140828. These new capabilities can be 8. Gianluca Mezzofiore, “Egypt’s Ansar Bayt al- Maqdis Beheads Three ‘Spies for the Jews,’” expected to increase the frequency of International Business Times, October 6, 2014, large, complex attacks carried out by http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/egypts-ansar-bayt-al- Wilayat Sinai, similar in nature to the maqdis-beheads-three-spies-jews-1468672. January triple-SVBIED attack in al- 9. “Egypt Islamic State Affiliate Posts Behead- ing Video,” Agence France-Presse, February, Arish. With their recent battlefield suc- 10, 2015, http://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt- cesses, Sinai militants are certain to be islamic-state-affiliate-posts-beheading-video/. emboldened to aim for larger targets. 10. “Sinai Militants Rise Again,” Al-Monitor, Octo- Their growing boldness—and the acqui- ber 8, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/ originals/2014/10/ansar-bayt-al-maqdis-impose- sition of heavy weapons—means that presence-sinai-egypt.html#. the already-volatile situation in the Sinai 11. Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Islamic State’s Model,” is likely to expand still further. Washington Post, January 28, 2015, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/ wp/2015/01/28/the-islamic-states-model/. 12. Mahmoud Mostafa, “Rafah Evacuation Contin- ues, Amid Efforts to Destroy All Gaza Tunnels,” Daily News Egypt, January 7, 2015, http://www. dailynewsegypt.com/2015/01/07/second-phase- buffer-zone-evacuation-starts-thursday-north- sinai-governor/. 1. Embassy of the United States in Cairo, Egypt, 13. Mohamed Taraq, “ABM Claims a New Batch “Press Release: U.S. Embassy Condemns Terror of Terrorists Join the Organization,” Al-Watan, Attacks,” June 11, 2015, http://egypt.usembassy. June 1, 2015, http://elwatannews.com/news/ gov/pr061115.html. details/741859. 2. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Militant Group in Egypt Vows Loyalty to ISIS,” New York Times, November 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes. com/2014/11/11/world/middleeast/egyptian-mili- tant-group-pledges-loyalty-to-isis.html. 3. Kareem Fahim and Thomas Merna, “In Egypt, Jihadists Release Video of an October Attack,” New York Times, November 15, 2014, http://

The Journal of International Security Affairs 19

Why the Western Sahara Matters

Michael Rubin

ith the Middle East in chaos, it is understandable that few in Washington have time for the Western Sahara. After all, Syria has become the world’s Wlargest generator of refugees. Iraq continues to teeter on the brink of chaos, and both Yemen and Libya are mired in civil war. Iran is resurgent. Afghanistan’s sta- bility likely will not last long beyond the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The Islamic State has re-introduced a twisted, reactionary version of the Caliphate, replete with plunder, rape, and slavery, and Boko Haram, which has now taken over vast swathes of northern Nigeria and moved into Cameroon as well, isn’t far behind in its brutality. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, meanwhile, operates across the Sahel from Algeria to Sudan.

So why is the fate of the Western Sahara important? It is home to barely 500,000 people—equivalent to the city of Fresno, California—spread over a 100,000-square-mile patch of desert, an area the size of Colorado. It boasts only one town with over 100,000 people, and just five over 10,000 people. In other words, if the Western Sahara were ever to become independent, then it would be the least densely populated country on earth. Increasingly, however, Morocco and the Western Sahara are the only oases of security and stability across a region teetering on the brink of failure. If there are two lessons of the post-9/11 era, the first is that governed spaces trump ungoverned spaces, and the second is that reform-minded regimes make better allies than autocra- cies which flirt with terrorism. Given the choice between a strengthened partnership with Morocco and empowering the Polisario Front, an authoritarian group which has declared itself the head of a self-styled Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the choice should be clear. Not only does Moroccan control over the Western Sahara

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School. His most recent book, Dancing with the Devil (Encounter, 2015), is a history of a half-century of U.S. diplomacy with rogue regimes and terrorist groups. Michael Rubin

best deny that territory to the terrorists, formal boundaries and more on an abil- Islamists, and criminal gangs which ity to tax and conscript, and so informal increasingly plague North Africa and borders shifted constantly, both within the Maghreb, but it also provides the dynasties and between them. Generally best hope for the Sahrawi to flourish speaking, however, the Idrisid dynasty both culturally and economically. (788-974 AD) that was centered in Fez The United States has, for more did not extend its control to what is now than two decades, stayed on the fence the Western Sahara, but the contempo- with regard to the Western Sahara, raneous Midrarid dynasty (823-977 AD), and continues to pay heed to the United based in the eastern central Moroccan Nations-promoted idea that the status town of Sijilmasa, dominated the trade of the Western Sahara should be deter- routes through the Western Sahara to mined by referendum. Algerian and what is today Mauritania. Thereafter, Polisario filibustering, however, has the Almoravid dynasty (1062–1147 AD), undercut any census to determine eli- based in Marrakech, ruled over both gibility, condemning the remaining Morocco and the Western Sahara as Sahrawi refugees stuck in Polisario-run a cohesive whole. Then the Almohad refugee camps in Algeria to a festering Caliphate (1121–1269) and their succes- limbo which now threatens to metath- sors largely let the Western Sahara slide esize into an engine for terror and insta- away. The Marinids (1217-1465) arose bility. Embracing Sahrawi autonomy from the Banu Marin, however, a nomadic under Moroccan rule not only recog- tribe arose from the northern fringe of nizes the status quo, but represents the the Western Sahara, and proceeded to only responsible policy, from both a rule all of Morocco. By the second half of humanitarian and security perspective. the sixteenth century, the Sadid Sharifs (1510-1659) had pushed Moroccan rule A history of possession deep into the Sahara to include what is At the core of questions about now northern Mali. Finally, the Alaouite Morocco’s claims to the Western Sahara Dynasty, which began in 1631 and contin- is a dispute about their legitimacy: Is the ues to rule Morocco today in the person Moroccan claim to sovereignty righting of King Mohammed VI, has consistently historical wrongs, or is a naked land claimed Moroccan sovereignty over the grab meant to expand Moroccan terri- Western Sahara, although its ability to tory in order to enable the kingdom to assert control fluctuated with time. loot the Western Sahara’s resources, as Thus, regardless of whether so many proponents of Sahrawi indepen- Morocco formerly ruled the Sahara at dence suggest? any given time or whether some desert Those suggestions, however, are a tribes were in rebellion, five Moroccan red herring.1 True, the territory has phos- royal dynasties trace their roots to the phates, but they are just a pittance com- region. Sahrawi nationalism, on the other pared to the 50 billion metric tons—85 hand, is largely an artificial, Cold War percent of the world’s total—found in construct. Historically, it would be far Morocco itself.2 more accurate to recognize Sahrawis as Moreover, there is much historical part of the diversity which has always fact to back Morocco’s claim. A succes- marked the Moroccan national identity. sion of dynasties governed the present- Indeed, many Sahrawis have married day kingdom from the early decades of into various Moroccan groups over the the Islamic conquest.3 As with all enti- centuries, so that Moroccan and Sahrawi ties at the time, control rested less on identities are far from distinct.

22 The Journal of International Security Affairs Why the Western Sahara Matters

In the late nineteenth century, Euro- Sahara 25 years later, there was little pean colonialism threw a wrench into Morocco could do. Moroccan control of the territory. Spain For Morocco, the situation grew was a relative latecomer to the scram- more tenuous in the first decades of the ble for Africa. Against the backdrop twentieth century. The French army had of the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference in conquered Algeria in 1830 and, begin- which European powers met to resolve ning in 1848, the French administered formally their sometimes competing Algeria as an integral part of France. It colonial claims, Spanish forces seized was in this context—to protect Algeria’s the barren and resource-poor Western flank and to prevent any other power Sahara (which was initially divided into from taking advantage of Morocco’s the southern Río de Oro and northern geostrategic importance with coasts on Saguia el-Hamra). Gaining European rec- both the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic ognition of its conquest was one thing, Ocean—that the French began increas- but pacifying the locals proved to be ingly to interfere in Moroccan affairs, quite another. For the first half-century of eventually claiming Morocco as part of Spanish occupation, local tribes resisted their sphere of influence. Other imperial any Spanish administration. After 1934, powers were not going to leave such a the Spanish grip was stronger, but quiet status unchallenged. On March 31, 1905, and acquiescence do not always correlate. Kaiser Wilhelm II landed in Tangiers to Why didn’t Morocco step up to meet with Moroccan Sultan Abdelaziz assert its claims when Spain invaded and proceeded to endorse Morocco’s sov- the Sahara in 1884? Ultimately, the ereignty. France saw this as both provoc- answer was because it had little diplo- ative and detrimental to Paris’ interests. matic leverage and its military was too The war of words between the French weak to repel the Spanish army. True, and Germans escalated into the summer, Morocco had managed to maintain with French and German forces mobiliz- its independence for centuries, even ing for war. as European powers gobbled up huge Ultimately, the Algeciras Confer- swathes of Africa further away and less ence led to a truce, but it did not last. On accessible than Morocco. But, by the July 1, 1911, against the backdrop of an late nineteenth century, the kingdom too uprising against Sultan Abdelhafid, who was in the crosshairs of European geo- had taken over from Abdelaziz two years political competition. earlier, the Germans sent a gunboat to Spain declared war on Morocco in the Moroccan port of Agadir—theo- 1859 over a dispute about the borders of retically to protect German commercial Ceuta, to this day a seven-square-mile interests and rescue German merchants. enclave on the North African coast sur- The French responded by sending troops rounded by Morocco and the Mediter- to Fez, and the British dispatched war- ranean. The Portuguese had captured ships off the Moroccan coast, fearing Ceuta in 1415, and transferred it to Spain the Germans’ ultimate goal was to estab- in 1668; the territory has always been lish a base that could threaten Gibraltar. an irritant to Moroccans, much the way Again the powers negotiated a solution, many Spaniards resent the British pres- but the French were willing to take no ence at Gibraltar. The Spanish-Moroccan more chances: with the 1912 Treaty of War lasted just over six months and Fez, they and the Spanish established a ended in a decisive defeat of the Moroc- formal protectorate over Morocco, with can army and the occupation of Tetuán. the Spanish controlling along the north- When the Spanish seized the Western ern coast minus Tangiers as well as the

The Journal of International Security Affairs 23 Michael Rubin

Spanish-occupied areas of the Sahara, independence and too many journal- while the French ruled supreme every- ists that the Court’s 1975 finding shot where else. down Morocco’s claims to the Western The United States quietly sup- Sahara. The BBC, for example, wrote ported Moroccan independence begin- in a 2014 profile of the Western Sahara ning in the 1940s, and gave more overt that “In October 1975 the International diplomatic support in the 1950s.4 But it Court of Justice rejected territorial claims was overbearing French manipulation by Morocco and Mauritania… [and] of the monarchy—exiling Mohammad recognised the Saharawis’ right to self- V to Madagascar and replacing him on determination,” while Foreign Policy In the throne with his uncle Mohammed Focus, a magazine for leftist academics Ben Aarafa—that ultimately did French and activists in the United States, stated, control in. Facing riots and active oppo- “Morocco has occupied Western Sahara sition, the French ultimately allowed since 1975 in violation of…a decision by Mohammad V to return and, in 1956, the International Court of Justice.”5 granted Morocco formal independence. Such a reading willfully misrepre- The Spanish forfeited their protectorate sents both the International Court’s find- along the northern coast, but continued ing and its context. First, the court issued to hold the Western Sahara. The follow- an advisory opinion rather than a legally ing year, Morocco formally laid claim to binding decision. At issue before the the territory, the repossession of which Court were two questions. The first ques- became the Kingdom’s dominant foreign tion was: “Was Western Sahara (Rio de policy goal. In 1963, Morocco success- Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of fully pushed the United Nations to for- colonization by Spain a territory belong- mally designate the Western Sahara to ing to no one (terra nullius)?,” while the be non-self-governing territory and, in second was, “What were the legal ties 1965, the Moroccans spearheaded a non- between this territory and the Kingdom binding but symbolically important UN of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?”6 General Assembly resolution demanding The court disputed Morocco’s claim Spain give up its colony. that the Western Sahara was terra nul- Momentum certainly seemed to be lius when the Spanish armies colonized on the Kingdom’s side. The age of impe- it, but found overwhelmingly that there rialism was ending. Between Morocco’s were legal ties between the Western independence and 1975, when the Span- Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco ish ultimately decided to evacuate the consistent with Morocco’s claims and Western Sahara, three dozen African that several Sahrawi tribes held alle- countries gained independence, includ- giance to the Moroccan Sultan. Why the ing Equatorial Guinea which the Spanish seeming inconsistency? The historical had given up in 1968. evidence which Morocco had submit- ted was overwhelming and not easy to Snubbed by the ICJ dispute, but 1975 was the height of the But Moroccan efforts at diplomacy Cold War. The Sahara question was were not enough to overcome Cold War entangled in the Cold War as Morocco reality. In 1974, the Moroccan govern- was a staunch ally of the West, while ment had sought an International Court the Polisario Front and its Algerian of Justice ruling confirming Morocco’s and Cuban backers were Soviet clients. claims to the Western Sahara. What they The Non-Aligned Movement distrusted got fell short. It has become conventional Morocco’s links to the West and largely wisdom among proponents of Sahrawi sided with the Polisario.

24 The Journal of International Security Affairs Why the Western Sahara Matters

Nor should the finding that the West- leader of the country after leading the ern Sahara was not terra nullius at the 1965 coup, transformed Algeria into an time of the Spanish invasion imply that authoritarian, socialist, Soviet-oriented the Western Sahara was a distinct entity. state. Morocco was no democracy and The judges’ interpretation centered on was also often abusive of human rights, the question of whether there were tribes but its orientation was decidedly West- and chiefs who were theoretically capa- ern. The two states were always staunch ble of autonomy; not whether those tribes political and cultural rivals. Morocco and chiefs actually were independent.7 was a conservative, traditional monarchy In short, the deck was stacked. Man- while Algeria was a reactionary republic. fred Lachs, the president of the court for The Cold War only exacerbated the con- the proceedings, was Polish. There was flict, as did the “Sand War,” a 1963 skir- also a Soviet judge, Platon Dmitrievich mish sparked by Morocco’s attempt to Morozov. Louis Ignacio-Pinto was Beni- reclaim territory around Tindouf which nese. At the time, Benin was perhaps the French colonial authorities had trans- staunchest Marxist state in Africa. Nor ferred from Morocco to Algeria when could Morocco expect a fair hearing from France was suzerain over both. Nagendra Singh, the Indian judge. India When Spain withdrew from the ter- had been the leader of the Non-Aligned ritory and Mauritania ceded its claims Movement, which was suspicious of in the Western Sahara to Morocco, Alge- the West to start. By the 1970s, it had ria sought to undercut its neighbor and largely shed any pretense to neutrality rival. Its chief tool was the Frente Popu- and moved firmly into the Soviet camp lar de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y in foreign policy, even signing a Treaty of Río de Oro, better known as the Polisa- Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with rio Front. Founded in 1973, the Polisa- the Soviet Union in 1971. rio had launched occasional guerilla The Moroccan government was dis- actions against Spanish garrisons and, satisfied with the Court’s split decision. Just more frequently, Sahrawi residents who weeks after the Court’s decision, 350,000 did not accept the Polisario as their rep- Moroccans marched unarmed into the resentatives. The Polisario’s campaign Western Sahara waving Moroccan flags took a new direction after the Spanish and carrying copies of the Qur’an in what withdrawal. On February 27, 1976, it became known as the “Green March.” declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Spanish forces watched the incursion, Republic and proceeded to resist what it but did not fire on the crowds. In effect, argued was Moroccan occupation of the the non-violent action marked the end of Western Sahara. any Spanish pretense of control. This was The subsequent guerrilla conflict confirmed barely a week later when, on killed 7,000 Moroccan soldiers and 4,000 November 14, 1975, the governments of Polisario guerrillas, not to mention per- Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania agreed haps 3,000 Sahrawi civilians. Fighting to the Madrid Accords which effectively displaced tens of thousands of others. divided the Western Sahara between Ultimately, it was the Moroccan army’s Morocco and Mauritania.8 construction of a huge, 1,500-mile-long sand and stone berm and trench system Cold War proxies with minefields and forward operating Not everyone was willing to accept bases along the Western Sahara’s fron- a peaceful, diplomatic resolution. Houari tier with Algeria and Mauritania which Boumediene, commander of Algeria’s confirmed Moroccan control over the ter- revolutionary council and indisputable ritory and precipitously diminished the

The Journal of International Security Affairs 25 Michael Rubin

Polisario insurgency on the Moroccan not only the Polisario, but also the group’s side of the berm. Algerian backers. Preparations broke The Polisario launched one final down over a simple question: Who gets unsuccessful offensive in 1989 against to vote? While the Polisario Front claims the Moroccan-held town of Guelta Zem- more than 100,000 Sahwari refugees live mour, but the collapse of the Soviet Union in refugee camps in Tindouf, and some and the ensuing financial crisis amongst journalists and short-term visitors parrot Cuba and its other clients took their toll: that figure, diplomats with long experi- While some African countries and more ence in the camps and in the region, as radical regimes continued to lend diplo- well as former refugees, estimate that no matic support, the Polisario found their more than 40,000 reside in the camps. more substantive international backing Only half of these are actual refugees whittling away. The Polisario’s leader- from the portion of the Western Sahara ship recognized that, lacking popular that Morocco controls; the remainder has support and now largely blunted militar- roots in Algeria, Mauritania, or Mali and ily, they would never achieve their aims so have no standing in the referendum. by force. Enter the United Nations: On In theory, the UN should be able to solve April 29, 1991, the UN Security Coun- the problem, but Algeria refused to allow cil unanimously adopted resolution 690, free access to independent observers which created a United Nations Mission to conduct a true census. As a result of for the Referendum in Western Sahara these disputes, an indeterminate number (MINURSO) with a mission to arrange of refugees have remained in the Tindouf a referendum among the Sahrawi about camps for the almost quarter century self-determination. On September 6, since MINURSO’s establishment. 1991, a cease-fire took hold. While many countries might shy Morocco consolidated control over away from hosting any refugee popula- the Western Sahara, initially with a brutal tion into perpetuity, cynicism and cor- hand, but its behavior was nothing com- ruption twists Algeria’s position. Today, pared to the ruthlessness employed by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic the Polisario. The Polisario held Sahrawi exists on paper only, thanks to Algerian refugees as virtual hostages in camps in largesse, which sees the Polisario as a the western Algerian province of Tindouf. useful wedge against rival Morocco and It separated children from their families, so bankrolls its diplomatic missions. and sent them to Cuba for re-education, Money also matters. In 2007, the and it often executed those who opposed European Union’s Anti-Fraud Office the Polisario’s dominance or questioned detailed with precision the diversion of its tactics or positions. After the cease-fire, humanitarian aid destined for Sahrawi the Polisario illegally kept more than 400 refugees confined to the Tindouf camps. Moroccan prisoners-of-war for an addi- The diversions began with the conniv- tional 14 years. These were subjected to ance of the Algerian military in the Medi- regular torture, and the Polisario repeat- terranean port of Oran and continued as edly forced its Moroccan prisoners to the convoys made their nearly 1,000-mile donate blood for wounded Polisario fight- trek to the camps. The basis for much of ers. The Polisario summarily executed the fraud was the Polisario (and Alge- many Moroccan POWs years after the rian) inflation of the number of refugees. cease-fire mandated their release. In effect, the European Union was feed- While MINURSO continues to moni- ing ghosts.9 Too many Algerian military tor the cease-fire, it failed in its mission to officers and politicians have a vested sponsor a referendum. The problem was interest in keeping the conflict alive.

26 The Journal of International Security Affairs Why the Western Sahara Matters

Overcoming stalemate and Mauritania, where merchants sell Active war is not going to erupt aid supplies delivered to Tindouf. again between Algeria and Morocco, and Siphoned aid is only the tip of the the Polisario lacks the capacity to renew iceberg. Polisario smugglers also trans- its fight inside Morocco. The problem is port African migrants northward toward not the Sahrawi insurgency, but rather Europe, and jihadis and weaponry broader regional collapse. southward from Libya, through Algeria, Fueled by loose weapons from and across the Sahel. Counterterrorism Libya, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb analysts say that AQIM now recruits in (AQIM) and other terrorist groups have Polisario camps.12 destabilized wide swathes of the Sahel. It would be in the security interest Tunisia might be the shining star of the not only of the United States but also Arab Spring, but it too is facing a terror- every country in North Africa and the ist challenge. On March 18, 2015, terror- Sahel to hamper these smuggling net- ists loyal to the Islamic State attacked the works. The Tindouf camps are not the Bardo Museum in the country’s capital, only source of such smuggling, but they killing 22. A month and a half later, the are a catalyst. The simple fact is that the jihadi Ifriqiyah Media called on those camps need not exist. Many residents loyal to the Islamic State to transform of the Tindouf camps seek to return to the summer months into a “Summer of Morocco, which welcomes them with open Hell” in Tunisia.10 Nor is Tunisia alone in arms. Whereas from the 1970s through facing a looming terrorist threat. On May the 1990s, Morocco treated the Western 9, 2015, for example, the Islamic State Sahara as a poor backwater, Moham- released an audio tape purporting to be med VI of Morocco has spearheaded eco- from the Ansar al-Khilafah Battalion in nomic development in the region.13 As a Algeria, pledging allegiance to self-styled result, living standards in the Western Islamic State Caliph Abu Bakr al- Sahara are now higher than in the rest Baghdadi, and four days later, Adnan of Morocco. Rather than simply exploit Abu Walid al-Sahrawi from El Mour- the region’s minimal mineral wealth or abitoune, a jihadist group which oper- its more robust fisheries, the government ates in the Sahel and Sahara, likewise focuses on sustainable development, tour- pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.11 ism, businesses, and education. Many After Syria and Iraq, nowhere does the returnees, meanwhile, suggest that thou- Islamic State control more territory than sands more would follow if the Polisario in Libya. Across North Africa and the allowed them to leave. Sahel, from the Red Sea to the Atlantic, More importantly, the Moroccan only Morocco is truly stable. government no longer simply seeks to While 45 countries might recog- annex the territory. In 2006, the Moroc- nize the fiction of the Sahrawi Arab can Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Democratic Republic—largely as a pre- Affairs (CORCAS) proposed an autonomy condition to receive Algerian aid or dis- plan for the territory, somewhat modeled counted gas—Polisario authority does on the autonomy of Spanish regions and not extend beyond its presence in the the Canary Islands under Spanish sov- Tindouf refugee camps. Tindouf itself ereignty. In 2007, Nicholas Burns, then- is a miserable place: It has no natural Undersecretary of State for Policy, called resources and no agricultural potential. the Moroccan plan “a serious and cred- Residents live not only off aid, but also ible proposal,” and a bipartisan group smuggling. Polisario smuggling is evi- of 173 congressmen—including nearly dent in markets around Algeria, Mali, every member of the leadership—sent

The Journal of International Security Affairs 27 Michael Rubin a letter to President George W. Bush fact of the past. Rather than persist in a expressing support for the Moroccan process that effectively holds Sahrawis proposal.14 Algeria, always statist, con- in Tindouf hostage to the Polisario, the tinues to oppose such autonomy for fear United States and United Nations should that it might set a precedent for Algerian demand that Algeria allow Sahrawi refu- Berbers to demand similar freedoms. But gees to travel with their families freely, while Algeria has stonewalled, Morocco by bus, to Morocco. No longer should the has moved forward with its plans. Former Polisario be allowed to keep family mem- Polisario members and refugees occupy bers hostage to encourage the return of the highest positions and set policy. On the few camp residents who can get seats November 6, 2014, the 39th anniversary on UN-sponsored flights. Not always do of the Green March, Mohammed VI American security interests and humani- announced “advanced regionalization,” tarian factors so neatly coincide. In this effectively complete autonomy under case, however they do. Moroccan sovereignty.15 As crises erupt across the globe, Diplomats naturally seek compro- from the Senkaku Islands to Ukraine mise, but win-win situations only work and across the Middle East, it can be when both sides sincerely seek a settle- tempting for the White House and State ment. Had the referendum enshrined in Department to put policy toward tradi- the MINURSO mission been viable, it tionally peripheral regions like the West- would have long ago occurred. Boiler- ern Sahara on autopilot. It would also be plate language for direct negotiations a mistake, as the status quo in the Sahel between Morocco and the Polisario are is no longer tenable. meaningless if not counterproductive when one party filibusters a permanent, realistic solution. With AQIM wreaking havoc in the region, and the Islamic State looking at North Africa and the Sahel as a new front, the United States and its European and African allies should no 1. Kristen Chick, “In Remote Western Sahara, longer sit idle and let the problem fester. Prized Phosphate Drives Controversial Invest- ments,” Christian Science Monitor, January 24, Washington should embrace stability 2013. and security, not take them for granted. 2. “Phosphate: Morocco’s White Gold,” Bloomberg It is time to side unequivocally with Business, November 4, 2010. Rabat. Morocco has been a staunch friend 3. Clifford Edmund Bosworth, The New Islamic Dynasties (New York: Columbia University to the United States for centuries, ever Press, 1996), 25-54. since becoming the first country to rec- 4. Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy ognize American independence in 1777. (New York: Norton, 2007), 511-512. It is time to repay the favor. The United 5. “Western Sahara Profile,” BBC News, Janu- ary 7, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world- States should overtly recognize Moroc- africa-14115273; Stephen Zunes, “Morocco and can sovereignty over the Western Sahara Western Sahara,” Foreign Policy in Focus, so long as Morocco fully implements its December 1, 1998. regionalization policy and utilizes the 6. International Court of Justice, “Advisory Opin- ion of 16 October 1975,” http://www.icj-cij.org/ commodity and fishing resources of the docket/files/61/6197.pdf. region as well as potential offshore gas 7. Clemens Feinäugle, “Western Sahara (Advisory primarily for the development of the Opinion),” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public region, as required by international law. International Law, March 2007. 8. “Declaration of Principles on Western Sahara by The ineffectual MINURSO experiment Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania,” November 14, should be ended as an expensive arti- 1975.

28 The Journal of International Security Affairs Why the Western Sahara Matters

9. “Bruxelles accuse Alger de détournements d’aide humanitaire” (“Brussels Accuses Algiers of Embezzling Humanitarian Aid”), Le Monde Afrique, January 23, 2015. 10. “Ifriqiyah Media Calls Lone Wolves to Male ‘Summer of Hell’ in Tunisia, Kill Foreigners, Security Forces, and Spies,” SITE Intelligence Group, May 8, 2015. 11. “IS Releases Pledge to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi from ‘Skikda Battalion’ in Algeria,” SITE Intel- ligence Group, May 9, 2015. 12. Alison Lake, “Unlikely Bedfellows: Are Some Saharan Marxists Joining Al-Qaeda Operations in North Africa?” Foreign Policy, January 3, 2011. 13. “New Development Model for the Southern Prov- inces,” Economic, Social, and Environmental Council, Kingdom of Morocco, October 2013. 14. Alexis Arieff, “Western Sahara,” Congressional Research Service, October 8, 2014. 15. “HM the King delivers speech to the Nation on 39th anniversary of Green March,” Agence Marocaine de Presse, November 6, 2014.

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33298 JINSA SureFire_JrnlIntlSecurityAffairs.indd 1 1/27/15 10:40 AM The Journal of International Security Affairs 29 Client: Pratt & Whitney Military Engines Ad Title: Surefi re Publication: JINSA Journal of Int’l Security Affairs - January Trim: 5.5” x 4.25” • Bleed: NA • Live: Israel in the Eye of the Storm

Tom Wilson

n a region convulsed by the turmoil of civil wars, revolutions, and insurgencies, Israel stands out as an island of relative stability, one that has successfully weathered the Imultiple storms of the Islamist winter that abruptly followed the so-called “Arab Spring.” Yet in the summer of 2014, the calm in Israel was shattered by rockets, terrorists emerging from tunnels, and amphibious attacks along the country’s shoreline. The abrupt intrusion of terrorism back into Israeli domestic life—with all of the country’s major cities within reach of missiles fired by the Hamas terrorist group—was reminiscent of the second intifada, when suicide bombers from Hamas and other extremist factions entered Israel’s busy city centers and transformed them into war zones, paralyzing daily life.

During the height of the summer 2014 Gaza War, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu commented that Israel could not afford to give up control of the West Bank and risk the creation of “another 20 Gazas” there.1 That remark resonated particularly strongly with many Israelis, not least because it came just months after a failed Ameri- can-led effort to push for a peace agreement with the Palestinians—one that would have obliged Israel pull out of the vast majority of the West Bank. And whereas Netanyahu’s statement about the potential horrors of Palestinian terrorism appears to have been received approvingly by many in Israel, Secretary of State John Kerry’s peace-making efforts enjoyed far less popularity. Indeed, many sections of Israeli society came to resent the Obama administration’s focus on promoting a peace agreement, as did some in Israel’s political establishment. That they did speaks volumes about just how much Washington’s diplomats, like their counterparts in Europe, have fundamentally failed to appreciate the changes that

Tom Wilson is a Middle East analyst and a Resident Associate Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society in London. Israel in the Eye of the Storm have taken place in Israel’s calculus of with the nation-states whose territory risk over the preceding decade. Further- they now operate from. more, they have failed to view Israel’s The spread of this regional turmoil predicament in its full regional context. has had a mixed impact on the Israeli- Rather, ever since Barack Obama Palestinian situation. To some extent, took office, his administration has the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Yemen pressed unrelentingly for reconciliation have made the mostly-cold confronta- between the Israelis and Palestinians. tion between Israel and the Palestin- It has done so, moreover, as if the par- ians appear far less pressing and far ties in question were still operating in less relevant. Whereas once the words the relative stability of the Middle East “Middle East conflict” were shorthand of the 1990s. Thus, Kerry’s approach is for referring to the dispute between reminiscent of the Clinton administra- Israel and its Arab neighbours, now tion’s hammering out of the Oslo Accords this expression is more likely to refer to with Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, the struggle between Sunni and Shi’a and its subsequent full-court press for a extremists, backed by the Gulf States final agreement at Camp David between and Iran, respectively. Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestin- It is particularly significant that ian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. many of these militant groups are now But while it is true that the current Pal- operating from territories that Israeli estinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, is security forces have previously with- a somewhat more preferable negotiating drawn from (the Sinai, Southern Lebanon, partner to Arafat, the similarities end and Gaza) or are directly adjacent to stra- there; the political landscape for a peace tegically important territories that Israel agreement today is more inhospitable has previously considered giving up (e.g., than ever before. the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley). This is so for two reasons. The This naturally has had a considerable first relates to the changing regional cir- impact on Israel’s current willingness cumstances now confronting Israel. The to make territorial concessions in return second is tied to the fundamental trans- for peace agreements or international formation that has taken place in Pales- good will. From a strategic point of view, tinian society and politics. such moves have ultimately amounted to creating power vacuums that have even- Region on fire tually been filled by militants, so effec- Half-a-decade into the “Arab tively moving a range of security threats Spring,” Israel faces numerous Islamist ever closer to Israel’s civilian population militant groups on its borders, from Hez- centers and core national infrastructure. bollah in southern Lebanon and Jabhat Take Hezbollah, Iran’s most signifi- al-Nusra in Syria to Hamas in Gaza and cant terrorist proxy. The Shi’ite militia al-Qaeda and Islamic State-aligned fac- represents one of the most formidable tions in the Sinai. The emergence of each fighting forces in the Middle East, and of these groups has transformed Israel’s is one of the greatest security challenges security outlook and diminished hopes facing the Jewish state. Hezbollah and for securing a durable peace. Rather than the Israeli military engaged in a deadly an environment ripe for a modus vivendi clash in 2006, one in which Israel’s mili- with essentially pragmatic neighboring tary failed to strike a truly decisive blow states, Israel now faces jihadist non-state against the Shi’a militants. Since then, actors, most of which are locked in power Hezbollah is understood to have dramati- struggles with other militants as well as cally increased its military capabilities,

The Journal of International Security Affairs 31 Tom Wil son and even with Israel’s Iron Dome and governed territory. Today, groups loyal to David’s Sling air defense systems opera- both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State con- tional, it is likely that Hezbollah could tinue to operate in the Sinai Peninsula. still inflict considerable damage in the And while Israel has now constructed event of a future conflict, since most of a security barrier along its Egyptian Israel’s territory is now well within Hez- border, and jihadists there are currently bollah’s reach. occupied with battling Egypt’s military, The other major threat to Israel’s the lawless nature of the peninsula rep- north has been the unfolding crisis in resents a major security concern, among Syria. Stray projectiles from the fight- other things because of the way in which ing have impacted the Israeli-controlled the Sinai has served as the primary parts of the Golan on numerous occa- channel through which weapons and sions, but it is the advance of Islamist weapons-related matériel have reached groups close to the Syrian border that the Gaza Strip. has caused the most alarm in Israel. The one border from which Israel For the moment, militants have been too currently faces the least significant threat absorbed with the fighting in Syria to is the Jordanian one. Like other monar- direct their attention toward Israel. Nev- chies in the region, the Hashemite King- ertheless, the threat from chemical weap- dom has so far survived the ripple effects ons and other capabilities falling into the of the “Arab Spring” uprisings—but this hands of such groups must be taken seri- may not remain the case indefinitely. ously. Given that less than a decade ago, The growing popularity of Salafism in the Israeli government had contemplated Jordan2 may well come to undermine a withdrawal from the Golan Heights—a stability in Jordan, creating a scenario territory that borders the Galilee, one of that would almost certainly jeopardize Israel’s most vital fresh water sources— Israel’s security. Although it has been the these developments have done nothing case that some Jordanian Salafists have to win public support for the notion of been drawn away from that country to making further territorial concessions join the fighting in Syria, it is also true for peace. To the contrary, they have that Jordan’s proximity to both Iraq and demonstrated that while Israel might Syria places it in a particularly fragile hand territory into the possession of one situation. Furthermore, the significant regime, there is no guarantee that that influx of refugees into Jordan from those territory will remain secure, or that the conflicts may well have brought other regime in question will survive long after extremists into the country. The result- the signing of any such peace treaty. ing concerns about Jordan’s long-term That, in part, has been the Israeli future have contributed to Israel’s insis- experience in the Sinai as well. True, tence that the Jordan Valley must remain Egypt’s short-lived Muslim Brotherhood its most eastern border, or at the very government never officially revoked the least that the Israeli military must be peace treaty between the two countries, allowed to maintain a presence there. as many feared would happen after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in 2011. Yet The Islamization of in Egypt—as in Lebanon and Syria— Palestinian politics the threat to Israel has not come from Ever since the establishment of the state itself, but rather from the weak- Hamas (The Islamic Resistance Move- ness of those states and the prevalence ment) in 1987 at the outset of the first of terrorist non-state actors moving into intifada, Islamist jihadist groups have the resulting ungoverned and under-

32 The Journal of International Security Affairs Israel in the Eye of the Storm played an increasingly prominent part in them and Hamas, which has found itself Palestinian political life in general, and in in the position of needing to eliminate particular as part of the Palestinian clash more extreme Islamist elements to main- with Israel. Hamas had, of course, grown tain its hold on power. At the same time, out of the Muslim Brotherhood, which Fatah has been locked in a long-running was operating in the area even during the struggle to prevent a takeover by Hamas days of the British Mandate in Palestine.3 Islamists in the West Bank, where it The group’s founder, Sheikh Ahmed holds sway. Yassin, had led the Muslim Brotherhood The heavy involvement of Islamists in Gaza since 1968, but Islamists had in the terror attacks of the second always played a minor role in Palestin- intifada was certainly an indication ian terrorist activities compared to the that radical Islam was playing an secular and Marxist guerrilla groups as increasingly decisive role in the Israeli- represented by the PLO. Palestinian conflict. Nevertheless, few at The past two decades, however, that time predicted that Hamas would have seen a veritable explosion of win a decisive victory when elections Islamist politics in the Palestinian Ter- were held for the Palestinian national ritories. Drawing from the lessons of assembly in 2006. The group’s subse- Hamas, Palestinian militants began to quent seizure of power in Gaza by force adopt the tactic of suicide bombing as a in 2007, and the ousting of Fatah there, preferred method of attack. As they did, further cemented the process of radical- other Islamist groups (such as the smaller ization sweeping Palestinian society. Palestinian Islamic Jihad) became Indications of what was happening increasingly prominent across the West should already have been apparent from Bank and Gaza Strip. And, beginning the results of two surveys conducted in in the mid-2000s, Salafist- and al-Qaeda- the mid-2000s. A 2004 survey by the aligned groups began to proliferate in Jordanian Center for Strategic Studies Gaza. Among them were small groups, found support for al-Qaeda to be notice- such as Jaish al-Islam (Army of Islam), ably higher among Palestinians than in Jaish al-Umma (Army of the Nation), and neighboring Arab countries, with 70 per- Fatah al-Islam (Islamic Conquest), all of cent describing al-Qaeda as a resistance whom began to make their presence felt movement as opposed to a terrorist in the Gaza Strip.4 organization.6 Similarly, a 2005 survey The Islamist politics of the Gaza by the Norwegian group Fafo found 65 Strip have been far from harmonious. percent of Palestinians questioned sup- These factions were always fiercely criti- ported al-Qaeda attacks against the cal of Hamas’s failure to fully implement West, and in Gaza that figure rose to Islamic law, in particular following the 79 percent.7 European observers living group’s takeover of the Strip in 2007, and in Palestinian society at the time noted have opposed the temporary cease-fires this trend of popular extremism, with Hamas has agreed to with Israel from one European diplomat stating that time to time. But while these groups Palestinian society was undergoing “an certainly attracted some disaffected accelerated process of broad Islamiza- Hamas operatives,5 they did not appear tion and radicalization.”8 to represent an immediate challenge to While the Palestinian Authority Hamas rule—at least for a time. More had itself noted the presence of Salafist recently, however, some of these factions evangelist preachers operating in the have sworn loyalty to the Islamic State, West Bank,9 Palestinian sympathies for and clashes have broken out between violent extremism had still tended to be

The Journal of International Security Affairs 33 Tom Wil son expressed as support for nationalistic versity in Hebron, while the Islamic bloc Islamist groups such as Hamas and the won outright at Birzeit University.11 Islamic Jihad. Indeed, by many estima- What Israel is now watching for tions Hamas would have a strong chance are signs of whether or not sympathies of winning West Bank elections were for the Islamic State and its ideology are they to be held again today. Although cer- increasing among Palestinians. Unlike in tain West Bank cities such as Ramallah, Gaza, the security presence of the Israeli Bethlehem and Jericho have remained military throughout the West Bank will quite firmly under the control of Mah- go some way to ensuring that IS militants moud Abbas’s Palestinian Authority, are unable to establish fully operational there are other localities where Fatah has cells in the West Bank. Nevertheless, been severely weakened. there have been early indications of pock- Abbas’s approval rating had clearly ets of support for IS among West Bank plummeted by the time of the summer Palestinians. Israel’s intelligence services 2014 war in Gaza. An indication of where have already warned of a process of the sympathies of West Bank Pales- militants defecting from existing terror tinians lay came shortly before major groups, primarily Hamas and Islamic hostilities erupted. At the time, Israel’s Jihad, and swearing allegiance to IS. security forces had undertaken a mili- This process may have been under- tary operation to rescue three Israeli way for some time now. At the time of teenagers kidnapped by a Hamas cell Hamas’ kidnapping of the three Israeli based in Hebron in the southern West teenagers in June 2014, a previously Bank. During that eleven-day operation, unknown group claiming to be aligned Israeli forces arrested some 350 mili- with IS attempted to take responsibility tants, including almost all of Hamas’s for that action. And during the Gaza war leadership in the West Bank. But while that followed, the Islamic State’s media this operation received the backing of wing, al-Battar, released a series of the Palestinian Authority and the coop- images depicting the Dome of the Rock eration of its security forces, widespread and threatening Israel’s Jews that the anger erupted into several nights of anti- Islamic State was coming for them, and Fatah rioting in Ramallah. in August images appeared online show- The Gaza conflict in the summer of ing an individual displaying the group’s 2014 appeared to give Hamas a signifi- flag on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. cant boost with the Palestinian public, In Gaza, the process of extremists with many believing that the organiza- shifting their allegiances to the Islamic tion was doing far more than Fatah to State is far more advanced than in the lead “resistance” against Israel. Polling West Bank. This is partly because in shortly after the war revealed that sup- recent years violent Salafist groups have port for Hamas had doubled among already been able to establish a foothold West Bank Palestinians, rising from 23 in Gaza, with some groups such as Suyuf percent in March to 46 percent in Sep- al-Haq (Swords of Righteousness) launch- tember.10 There are other indications to ing IS-styled attacks against institutions suggest that the pro-Hamas feelings that and individuals accused of spreading arose during last summer’s war have not Western influence. It had also become dissipated. Student elections across West increasingly apparent that the military Bank universities in the spring of 2015 wing of The Popular Resistance Commit- witnessed a surge of support for Hamas tees (Al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades), and the Islamist bloc, with the two being the third-largest military group in Gaza, tied at the Palestinian Polytechnic Uni- was displaying signs of radicalization,

34 The Journal of International Security Affairs Israel in the Eye of the Storm placing it further to the extreme than region. In the early 2000s, at the height either Hamas or Islamic Jihad. It is out of the second intifada and prior to the of this milieu that support for the Islamic second Gulf War, this may indeed have State appears to have arisen. been true. Today, it is not. Yet American Early indications of the growing and European leaders continue to push support for IS in Gaza began to emerge for drastic changes in the current status in the fall of 2014. At that time, a group quo, even at a time when much of the calling itself “ISIS-Gaza Province” began rest of the region is already in a state of to establish an online presence, with a extreme and unpredictable flux. video appearing on YouTube showing a They are bound to be disappointed. group of armed militants claiming to be Israel will naturally be reluctant to make the Islamic State in Gaza, complete with any significant concessions while the IS flag. Indeed, by late 2014 ISIS flags had surrounding region remains so unpre- become an increasingly common sight in dictable. It knows that the security and Gaza, with eyewitnesses reporting their stability it enjoys has been hard fought appearance everywhere from football and remains fragile. Under the present stadiums to car windshields to wedding circumstances, a dramatic change in the invitations. On November 3rd, the Shura existing status quo could begin a chain council of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in the of events that would plunge Israel into Sinai, as well as the group’s leader, Abu one of the deepest security crises of its Khattab, formally pledged loyalty to the history, making it once again one of the Islamic State. This was a telling indica- region’s major flashpoints. tion that not only individuals but also It is a reality that Israeli policymak- entire Salafist factions are defecting to ers—and the Israeli public at large— IS—a trend that Israel will need to grap- understand well, even if officials in the ple with in the not-so-distant future. West do not.

Mind the gap As the surrounding Middle East increasingly descends into turmoil, Israel for the most part has managed to main- tain relative calm and stability over the territory under its control. This stabil- 1. “Netanyahu: Gaza Conflict Proves Israel Can’t Relinquish Control of West Bank,” Times of ity is not a naturally occurring state of Israel, July 11, 2014, http://www.timesofisrael. affairs, but rather the result of the exten- com/netanyahu-gaza-conflict-proves-israel-cant- sive efforts of Israel’s security forces to relinquish-control-of-west-bank/. keep a multitude of surrounding threats 2. See, for example, David Schenker, “Salafi Jihad- ists on the Rise in Jordan,” Washington Institute at bay. Almost all of these threats stem for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch no. 2248, May in one way or another from violent 5, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ Islamism, which refuses to be appeased policy-analysis/view/salafi-jihadists-on-the-rise- by any number of Israeli concessions. in-jordan. 3. Jonathan Schanzer, Hamas vs. Fatah: The International policymakers, how- Struggle for Palestine (New York: Palgrave ever, do not appear to have adjusted to Macmillan, 2010), 24. this new reality. The failing has been 4. Jonathan Schanzer and Mark Dubowitz, Pales- particularly noticeable in the policies of tinian Pulse: What Policymakers Can Learn from Palestinian Social Media (Washington, the Obama administration, whose repre- DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, sentatives still seem to regard the Israeli- 2010), http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/ Palestinian dispute as one of the most uploads/documents/Palestinian_Pulse.pdf. pressing and problematic concerns in the 5. Yoram Cohen and Matthew Levitt, with Becca

The Journal of International Security Affairs 35 Tom Wil son

Wasser, “Deterred but Determined: Salafi-Jihadi Groups in the Palestinian Arena,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus no. 99, January 2010, http://www.washingtoninsti- tute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFo- cus%2099.pdf. 6. “Revisiting the Arab Street: Research from Within,” Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, February 2005, http://www.mafhoum. com/press7/revisit-exec.pdf. 7. Gro Hasselknippe, “Palestinian Opinions on Peace and Conflict, Internal Affairs and Parlia- ment Elections 2006,” Fafo Paper 2006:09, 2006, http://almashriq.hiof.no/general/300/320/327/ fafo/reports/797.pdf 8. As cited in Cohen and Levitt, “Deterred but Determined.” 9. Ibid. 10. “We’re Back; Hamas in the West Bank,” The Economist, September 3, 2014, http://www.econ- omist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/09/hamas- west-bank. 11. Adnan Abu Amer, “Hamas Sweeps Student Council Elections in the West Bank,” Al- Monitor, April 28, 2015, http://www.al-monitor. com/pulse/originals/2015/04/hamas-victory-stu- dent-elections-west-bank.html#.

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36 The Journal of International Security Affairs Anti-Semitism: Islamism’s Indelible Marker M. Zuhdi Jasser

oday, the United States and its allies are focused on the concept of “countering vio- lent extremism” as a means of combatting the scourge of radical Islam. Yet violent Textremism is but one manifestation of the Islamist ideology that threatens Western democracies and citizenry under its sway. Anti-Semitism is also a defining symptom of Islamism—and arguably a much more important one. For one can espouse radical Islamism and its totalitarian, supremacist goals of world domination without choosing violent means to do so. But it is far harder to endorse Islamist ideology without supporting anti-Semitism.

Thus, anti-Semitism is not just another “radical” symptom. In fact, if we can develop the understanding and national conviction to confront the anti-Semitism of global Islamist movements directly, we will hold the key to unraveling the very fabric and platform through which Islamist leaders spread their ideas. The linkage is simple. Supremacists from within a particular faith community will create and exploit hatred toward another in order to rally their own followers against a common foe. Islamists utilize anti-Semitic imagery, profiling and demoniza- tion of Jews as a tool for their own ascension to power in Muslim majority communi- ties and nations (or in Arabic, the ummah). Islamists often exploit both the Muslim ummah and the Jewish minority in order to create groupthink against the “other.” The Islamist demonization of Jews is a key feature of their worldview, because underneath that hatred lies a more global supremacism that threatens all minorities, both within and outside the faith.

M. Zuhdi Jasser is the President of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, based in Phoenix, Arizona. A former U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander, he is author of A Battle for the Soul of Islam: An American Muslim Patriot’s Fight to Save His Faith. He is also the Vice-Chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. The opinions expressed herein are purely his own. M. Zuhdi Jasser

Today, Europe and the West are Protocols of the Elders of Zion, even as being directly impacted by the events state media regularly denied the Holo- that have transpired over the last half- caust while at the same time irrationally decade of the Arab Awakening. With labeling Zionism as a “new Nazism.” the tumult in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabian government media and Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, the ascent academia are also rife with anti-Semitic of Islamist movements has for the most imagery and the demonization of Jews, part not brought a real spring but while the country’s public schools teach rather the empowerment of new auto- that Jews “obey the devil” and are those crats who wield Islamist thought as a whom “God has cursed and with whom supremacist weapon. He is so angry that He will never again The challenge before the world be satisfied.”2 The list goes on. could not be clearer. The vacuum left The hate thereby created fueled by the region’s long-serving dictators a mass exodus of Jews. Since 1948, at is a widening front in the battle for the Israel’s founding, there have been over soul of Islam: Will Muslim majority 1 million Jews expelled from Arab lands societies and Muslim leaders around with only a few remaining.3 That exodus the world heed the call for the rights has carried over to the Christian commu- of the individual? Will they defend nity, where it is believed over two million the rights of the minority over the col- Christians have fled the Middle Eastern lective, the tribe, and the clerical oli- Arab community in the last 20 years.4 garchs? Or will they ultimately just Yet anti-Semitism is hardly the pur- trade one autocracy for another? Here, view of secular tyrants alone. Rather, it the importance of the role played by serves as a primary nexus between pan- anti-Semitism cannot be overstated. Arabism and pan-Islamism.

Follow the numbers Hating Jews… and Israel According to Pew research surveys, The intellectual origins and under- “anti-Jewish sentiment” is endemic in the pinnings of Islamist anti-Semitism are Muslim world. “In Lebanon, for example, diverse. But while our Islamic tradi- all Muslims and 99 percent of Christians tion certainly possesses, as the scholar say they have a very unfavorable view of Martin Kramer has described, “some Jews. Similarly, 99 percent of Jordanians sources on which Islamic anti-Semitism have a very unfavorable view of Jews. now feeds,” it is not the only reason for Large majorities of Moroccans, Indone- it.5 In fact, if Islamist anti-Semitism is sians, Pakistanis and six in ten Turks wholly confronted by modern Muslim also view Jews unfavorably,” a 2005 poll reformers, there is hope that it can be by the research center noted.1 marginalized and ultimately defeated, That outcome is hardly surpris- ending a force which can ultimately hold ing. For generations, Arab dictators like sway over a quarter of the world’s popu- Hosni Mubarak, Zine El Abidine Ben lation.6 The current reality, however, is Ali, Saddam Hussein, Bashar Assad or that the imams (clerics), ulema (scholars), King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, have har- or activists with the courage to publicly nessed and incubated anti-Semitism as take on the anti-Semitism of Islamist a political tool, using their vast media leaders are sadly few in number. And machines to expand the reach and reso- when they arise, they have neither the nance of this corrosive idea. Thus, Egypt platforms, attention, nor the backing that under Mubarak lionized the virulently Islamist-linked movements enjoy around anti-Semitic and czarist Russian forgery, the world.

38 The Journal of International Security Affairs Anti-Semitism: Islamism’s Indelible Marker

Integral, and related, is the exploi- has since authored more than 120 books, tation of Israel. As the scholar Martin influenced a number of highly trafficked Kramer has noted, Islamist websites, and most notably hosts a weekly program on Al-Jazeera Arabic Islamists see Israel as a symptom titled “Shariah and Life” that is viewed of a larger conspiracy against them, by an estimated 60 million people glob- either western or Jewish or a sinis- ally. Yet his sermons and public state- ter combination of the two. Many ments are a treasure trove of conspiracy Islamists today do not look at Israel or its policies as their irritant. They look theories and anti-Semitic diatribes. beyond, either to America, symbol Qaradawi’s significance to Islamist today of the power of the West or to anti-Semitism cannot be overstated. the Jews, dispersed throughout the Despite being prohibited from travel West where they exercise a malig- to France, the United Kingdom and nant influence. These are deemed to 7 the United States, Qaradawi, who lives be the real forces driving history. in Qatar, has long been President of the European Council for Fatwa and Kramer highlights in 1994 that Research (ECFR). ECFR is notoriously Rashid al-Ghannushi, who now happens known for being a Muslim Brotherhood to be the leader of Tunisia’s ruling Islamist legal arm in the West, giving hundreds Al-Nahda party, alleged “a Jewish-Ameri- of anti-Western separatist fatwas (legal can plan encompassing the entire region, opinions) targeted at western Muslims, which would cleanse it of all resistance and weaving conspiracy theories of and open it to Jewish hegemony from Jewish global domination.11 Marrakesh to Kazakhstan.”8 Likewise, In 2011, Qaradawi returned to Egypt when the Organization for Islamic Coop- after more than a 30-year absence to lead eration (previously the Organization of a crowd of more than 200,000, leading the Islamic Conference) met in Malay- scholars like Barry Rubin to remark that sia a dozen years ago, Prime Minister Egypt has gotten “its Khomeini.”12 Yet, Mahathir Mohamad told the crowd, “The surprisingly, the case against Qaradawi’s Europeans killed 6 million Jews out of 12 hate-filled anti-Semitic speech is not million, but today the Jews rule the world so clear for many. Shadi Hamid of the by proxy. They get others to fight and die Brookings Institution, who attended for them.”9 Both statements met not with Qaradawi’s return to Tahrir Square, widespread condemnation, but broad stated at the time that acceptance. Kramer thus concludes, Qaradawi is very much in the main- If these themes seem distress- stream of Egyptian society, he’s ingly familiar it is quite likely in the religious mainstream, he’s because they are borrowings from not offering something that’s par- the canon of Western religious ticularly distinctive or radical in the and racial anti-Semitism. The context of Egypt… He’s an Islamist anti-Semitism we see today in the and he’s part of the Brotherhood Islamic world owes a crucial debt school of thought, but his appeal 10 to the anti-Semitism of the West. goes beyond the Islamist spectrum, and in that sense he’s not just an Islamist figure, he’s an Egyptian The power of the pulpit 13 Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi is argu- figure with a national profile. ably the most influential Sunni cleric in the world. He escaped from Gamal Abdel The threat that Qaradawi and his Nasser’s Egypt to Qatar in 1961,where he Islamist sympathizers pose is manifold.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 39 M. Zuhdi Jasser

While the arguments against his politi- deal. According to former CIA direc- cal Islamist ideas may be nuanced, to tor R. James Woolsey, the Kingdom of ignore his anti-Semitism (as so many Saudi Arabia has spent nearly $90 billion around the world do) is to imperil world spreading its ideology around the globe Jewry and the security of all minorities since the 1970s. He describes the Saudi and our liberal democracies. One of the sponsoring of the dissemination of the most revealing tests is to note the silence extremist Wahhabi strain of Islam as of many western Muslim leaders con- “the soil in which Al-Qaeda and its sister fronted with the anti-Semitism of the terror organizations are flourishing.”15 likes of Qaradawi or Malaysia’s former According to scholars such as Gilles Prime Minister Mahathir. Kepel, Wahhabism gained considerable influence in the Islamic world following Understanding the a tripling in the price of oil in the mid- linkage 1970s. The Saudi government thereafter One cannot help but connect the began to spend tens of billions of dollars dots from Qaradawi’s anti-Semitism throughout the Islamic world to promote to an inevitable neo-theocratic fascism Wahhabism, a particularly virulent and that is now ascending in the Middle militant version of supremacist Islamism. East under the rise of Islamism. Even- All too often, this hate-filled ide- tually, the world will have to come to ology has led to violence and terror. terms with how clerics with toxic posi- For example, the deadly 2008 Mumbai tions on Jews and Americans swim in attacks in India, which killed 164 and the same pool with those who have simi- wounded 308 over the Thanksgiv- larly hateful positions against the Shi’a ing weekend, including the Nariman community (described as deviants), the Jewish Community Center known as Ahmadiyya (described as apostates), or the Mumbai Chabad House, were found the Baha’i (described as infidels) and so to have been launched by members of Lashkar e-Taiba, a group that adheres to many other vulnerable religious minori- 16 ties who will undoubtedly suffer, and Saudi Arabia’s austere Wahhabi creed. are suffering, at the hands of Islamists Other examples of Islamist-inspired anti- when they are in power. Semitism leading to terror against Jews The Simon Wiesenthal Center are, sadly, too numerous to list here. recently listed the Muslim Brother- The U.S. Commission on Interna- hood and the Iranian regime as the tional Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has worst offenders of anti-Semitic rheto- long been at the forefront of monitoring ric across the planet.14 We ignore the the hatred disseminated in educational telltale signs of hate against Jews and textbooks that originate in the Kingdom what that portends for other minorities of Saudi Arabia. What it has found is at the peril of all genuine democracies. horrifying. For example, a ninth grade One need look no further than Iran to textbook published by the Saudi Min- see that an Islamist revolution, while istry of Education states that “the Jews using the democratic engine of elec- and Christians are enemies of the believ- toral politics, will never herald real ers and they cannot approve of Muslims.” democracy until minorities have equal An eighth-grade text similarly states, rights and anti-Semitism is defeated “The apes are the people of the Sabbath, the Jews; and the swine are infidels of the within the Islamic consciousness. 17 Here, what the Muslim world communion of Jesus and Christians.” says—and learns—matters a great As former USCIRF commissioner Nina Shea notes,

40 The Journal of International Security Affairs Anti-Semitism: Islamism’s Indelible Marker

The kingdom is not just any country 1. “Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Pub- with problematic textbooks. As the lics,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 14, 2005, controlling authority of the two holi- http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/248.pdf. est shrines of Islam, Saudi Arabia 2. Nina Shea and Jeanne Hoffman, “Teach Your is able to disseminate its religious Children Well: Classic Anti-Semitic Literature in Arab Schools,” Weekly Standard, August materials among the millions making 14, 2006, http://www.hudson.org/research/4569- the hajj to Mecca each year. Such teach-your-children-well-classic-anti-semitic-lit- teachings can, in this context, make erature-in-arab-schools-. a great impression. In addition, Saudi 3. Ya’akov Meron, “Why Jews Fled the Arab Coun- textbooks are also posted on the tries,” Middle East Quarterly 2, no. 3, September Saudi Education Ministry’s website 1995, http://www.meforum.org/263/why-jews- and are shipped and distributed by a fled-the-arab-countries. vast Sunni infrastructure established 4. Ibid. with Saudi oil wealth to Muslim com- 5. Martin Kramer, “The Salience of Islamic Anti- munities throughout the world. In his Semitism,“ Institute of Jewish Affairs Report no. 2, October 1995, http://www.martinkramer.org/ book, The Looming Tower, Lawrence sandbox/reader/archives/the-salience-of-islamic- Wright asserts that while Saudis con- antisemitism/. stitute only 1 percent of the world’s 6. Ibid. Muslims, they pay “90 percent of 7. Ibidem. the expenses of the entire faith, over- 8. Martin Kramer, “The Jihad Against the Jews,” riding other traditions of Islam.”18 Commentary, October 1994, 38-42, http://www. martinkramer.org/sandbox/reader/archives/the- jihad-against-the-jews/. Shea adds that despite four years 9. Carl Schrag, “Malaysia’s Casual Anti-Semitism,” of pressure from the U.S., and despite Slate.com, October 20, 2003, http://www.slate. pledges from Riyadh that it had cleaned com/articles/news_and_politics/international_ up its textbooks, the reality is that they papers/2003/10/malaysias_casual_antisemi- tism.html. have not. To their credit, American pub- 10. Kramer, “The Salience of Islamic Anti-Semitism.” lishing leaders have recently banded 11. Ian Johnson, “Islamic Justice Finds a Foot- together to shed light on this important hold in Heart of Europe,” Wall Street Journal, issue, stating that “hate speech is the pre- August 4, 2005, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB112311814949504607. cursor to genocide, first you get to hate, 12. Barry Rubin, “Egypt Gets Its Khomeini,” Jerusa- 19 and then you kill.” lem Post, February 20, 2011, http://rubinreports. blogspot.com/2011/02/egypt-gets-its-khomeini- qaradawi.html. Canary in the coal mine 13. Sarah Lynch, “Egypt Revolution Unfinished, A better understanding of the link Qaradawi Tells Tahrir Masses,” Christian Sci- between anti-Semitism and Islamist ence Monitor, February 18, 2011, http://www. movements and its supporters is just a csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0218/ Egypt-revolution-unfinished-Qaradawi-tells- first step. The next is to implement long- Tahrir-masses. lasting solutions. These solutions will 14. “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Tops Anti-Semitic not only provide Europe and the West Rhetoric List,” JTA, December 28, 2012, http:// with a bulwark against the infiltration www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world- news/egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-tops-anti- of anti-Semitic ideas from Islamist move- semitic-rhetoric-list-1.490639. ments in the Middle East, North Africa 15. “Fueling Terror,” Institute for the Analysis of and Southeast Asia, but will also serve to Global Security, n.d., http://www.iags.org/fuel- better secure us against the threat of mil- ingterror.html. 16. Mark Mazzetti and Salman Masood, “Pakistani itant Islamism. For where anti-Semitism Role is Suspected in Revealing U.S. Spy’s Name,” thrives, so too does the eventual threat New York Times, December 17, 2010, http://www. against other faith minorities and the nytimes.com/2010/12/18/world/asia/18pstan. very foundations of democracy. html?_r=0. 17. Robert L. Bernstein and Harold Evans, “Saudi Textbooks Incite Hate, Say Leaders of Ameri- can Publishing,” The Daily Beast, October

The Journal of International Security Affairs 41 M. Zuhdi Jasser

17, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/arti- cles/2012/10/17/saudi-textbooks-incite-hate-say- leaders-in-american-publishing.html. 18. Nina Shea and Bonnie Alldredge, “Saudi Text- books: Still Teaching Hatred,” National Review Online, June 29, 2010, http://www.hudson.org/ research/7125-saudi-textbooks-still-teaching- hatred. 19. Robert L. Bernstein et al., “Saudi Textbooks Incite Hate, Say Leaders in American Publish- ing,” The Daily Beast, October 17, 2012, http:// www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/17/ saudi-textbooks-incite-hate-say-leaders-in-amer- ican-publishing.html.

HuntingtonIngalls.com

HII_ad RW.indd 1 10/22/2014 1:38:28 PM 42 The Journal of International Security Affairs China’s Great Maritime Gamble

Phillip Orchard

wo years ago, at high tide, Subi Reef in the South China Sea’s Spratly Archipelago was little more than a coral crescent meekly sheltering an iri- Tdescent lagoon—a diver’s paradise, if you could get there, but a weak foundation on which to stake one’s voracious territorial claims. Today, China has dumped enough sand on the tiny atoll to give it more than two square kilometers of reclaimed land, sufficient for a four-story building, a radar station, an estimated 200 PLA troops and soon, judging by recent satellite photos, a lengthy runway.1

Located nearly 600 nautical miles from China, but claimed also by the far more proximate Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan, the reef is one of seven in the Spratly Islands that China is building up out of the sea.2 Nearby, for example, Fiery Cross Reef has a growing port facility, coastal artillery, a 200-person garrison and a 3.3-kilometer runway capable of handling most Chinese military aircraft, plus a parallel taxi that sug- gests that the new island will be suitable for high-tempo military operations.3 Further to the east, China is believed to be transforming the previously submerged Mischief Reef—which, at just 129 nautical miles from the Philippines, falls well within that coun- try’s UN-designated exclusive economic zone—into a forward naval station already capable of hosting a PLA-Navy frigate.4 Through its intentionally ambiguous “9-dash line” policy, China claims nearly 90 percent of the 1.4 million square miles in the South China Sea, the potentially oil-rich, seafood-packed body of water through which nearly $5 trillion in trade flows each year. Its claims encompass nearly all of the Spratlys, including islets occupied and

Phillip Orchard works as a writer and analyst at Stratfor, with a particular focus on East and Southeast Asia. He recently completed his master’s work in security, law and diplomacy at the Lyndon B. Johnson School at the University of Texas at Austin. His studies there focused on energy and national security, Chinese foreign policy, intelligence and institutional pathologies. Phillip Orchard built on by Vietnam, the Philippines, As a result, Beijing has long pur- Malaysia and even Taiwan, as well as sued a strategy of securing its buffer the Vietnam-claimed Paracel archipel- zones and asserting control of its claims ago, near which last summer CNOOC in the Yellow, East China and South stationed an oil rig, sparking intense China seas, even ones encompass- anti-Chinese protests in Vietnam. ing seemingly little more than half- The new islands are the physical submerged rocks. And it has assumed embodiment of China’s decisive pursuit the role of a revisionist power seeking of its historical ambitions and a con- to shape a new order, particularly by certed effort to change the status quo in replacing the United States as the pre- the South China Sea and chip away at the dominant power in the Western Pacific. maritime dominance of the United States. The new islands will support Chi- So far, China is succeeding, and without na’s strategic imperatives by bolstering much of a fight. Considering the lack of its surveillance and anti-area/access- U.S. appetite for conflict with China (the denial capabilities, giving it the ability Pentagon’s recently renewed interest in to harass or even blockade rival hold- the South China Sea notwithstanding5), ings, and—by changing the facts on the the frenzied pace of China’s military ground ahead of the 2016 decision in the modernization, and the maritime weak- case filed by the Philippines with a UN nesses of other South China Sea claim- tribunal two years ago—preemptively ants, China’s near-term strategic goals in weakening the influence of international the region are becoming a fait accompli. law over what Beijing believes to be its Yet this more aggressive posture in the core strategic imperatives. The island- sea will increase the risk of conflict over building also enhances China’s preferred the long term, even if China itself has tactic of using non-military assets, such little reason to provide the spark. as fishing fleets, oil rigs and commercial shipping vessels, to solidify its authority China’s calculus over its maritime claims. The reefs and The strategy being pursued by atolls have few of the resources needed China in the East and South China Seas to sustain a large military presence, and is grounded in the country’s historic geo- they would be difficult to defend in the graphic vulnerabilities, and perceived outbreak of an actual conflict with a security challenges now facing the PRC. power like the United States. Nonethe- Throughout its history, China’s less, they will also allow China to pro- weak maritime capabilities left the ject the level of military force needed for nation with little power beyond its own low-intensity standoffs with its weaker coastline and vulnerable to intrusions neighbors. by potentially hostile forces that could Ultimately, they strengthen China’s also impede China’s access to vital trade de facto control over what is truly a criti- routes across the open oceans. Today, cal region for the country. China’s export- Chinese leaders remain concerned that dominated economy relies heavily on the country’s maritime access could be the waters, through which also passes severed at choke points along the “First more than 75 percent of China’s crude oil Island Chain” by another Pacific power, imports. The sea is an abundant source particularly the United States, which of seafood as well, and technological Beijing sees as pursuing a policy of con- advances have made recoverable vast tainment against it while simultaneously swathes of deep-sea oil and gas (though emboldening Southeast Asian states to estimates about the region’s hydrocarbon destabilize the region. potential vary widely, in part because

44 The Journal of International Security Affairs China’s Great Maritime Gamble seismic testing has been hindered by the same week, the Philippine military said region’s unsettled disputes). China had warned away Philippine sur- In one sense, China is replicating veillance planes from airspace over the activities previously undertaken by Spratlys at least six times in the previous Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and three months. The latter incidents have even Taiwan during earlier historical raised concerns that Beijing may be mull- periods—when China was focused too ing establishing an Air Defense Identifi- inwardly to project power far beyond cation Zone over the archipelago (the its shores. Until recently, China was the Chinese Foreign Ministry denies this) only claimant country (besides Brunei) similar to the one it declared abruptly without an airstrip in the Spratlys. And over waters contested with Japan in 2013. Vietnam is reportedly conducting simi- Most notably, the Pentagon released foot- lar reclamation work on two islets it age on May 22 of the PLA Navy issuing occupies. Beijing also asserts that the a warning from Fiery Cross Reef to an construction is primarily for scientific approaching U.S. surveillance plane.6 and humanitarian purposes, though At the moment, however, Beijing it recently admitted its military inten- appears to have little interest in trigger- tions as well. ing a conflict with any of its neighbors, But the scale and speed of China’s much less the United States or its major push into the South China Sea is set- treaty allies. After all, in order to secure ting off alarm bells around the region. its strategic imperatives and restore its Whereas Vietnam has reclaimed an esti- regional leadership role, China needs mated 60 acres of land since 2009, accord- to keep regional states from unifying ing to U.S. officials, China has reclaimed against it. Why, then, is Beijing being so as much as 2,000 acres—including on antagonistic? reefs that were previously likely fully submerged at high tide. China’s secrecy Staring down a divided on the matter is further heightening Southeast Asia regional concerns, as it has denied inter- China thinks it can change the polit- national access to the atolls and, for a ical reality of the region without spark- long time, refused to comment on what ing a major conflict by aggressively, yet activities were taking place there. And, of incrementally, asserting its claims and course, the fact that most of the Spratly building up its naval and coast guard atolls occupied by China are nearly 1,000 presence in the region, while simultane- nautical miles from the Chinese main- ously strengthening its economic ties land further belies its intentions. with regional states. Eventually, Beijing Of late, China has become more believes, Southeast Asian states will overtly protective of its claims. This come to find accommodating China’s April, for example, the Chinese coast authority over the South China Sea pref- guard used water cannons to run off a erable to banding together in opposition group of Philippine fishermen at Scarbor- to it. The PRC similarly thinks that its ough Shoal, a reef north of the Spratlys, overwhelming economic and military roughly 140 miles from the Philippines, strength will compel weaker regional where Chinese and Philippine forces states to settle their disputes with it in engaged in a lengthy standoff in 2012. bilateral settings, leaving the interna- Then, in early May, China reportedly tional community out of the loop. prevented a broken-down Vietnamese So far, this strategy has been suc- fishing boat from docking at the China- cessful. To date, China’s push into the occupied Gaven Reef in the Spratlys. The

The Journal of International Security Affairs 45 Phillip Orchard

South China Sea has been incremen- posture unless Chinese provocations tal enough to avoid sparking a major move further south. Malaysia, which conflict or compelling Southeast Asian occupies three reefs in the Spratlys, states to unify against it—or to put aside shares many of the more immediate con- their suspicions of the United States in a cerns of Vietnam and the Philippines, lasting fashion. No individual reclaimed and it has been pursuing a number of island is important enough to any of defense cooperation deals around the these countries to risk starting a con- region. In early May, it conducted joint frontation with Beijing, particularly since exercises with the U.S. Navy, and it all the other countries control their own recently endorsed the U.S. recommenda- reefs and could presumably counter Chi- tion that ASEAN form a joint peacekeep- na’s moves with their own military build- ing force—possibly with U.S. backing. ups. More problematic, Southeast Asian However, among the claimants, Malay- states are inherently divided, with differ- sia has the best (or at least the most cau- ing levels of interest in opposing China, tious) relationship with China and has varying degrees of reliance on Chinese generally proved wary of making any trade and investment, and disparate stra- moves that could harm these ties. The tegic calculations regarding the potential current government also does not want threat posed by China. to risk upsetting the country’s delicate The lack of unity was on display at Malay-Chinese ethnic balance. the recently concluded ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur, where the consensus- The front lines: The oriented 10-member bloc proved capable Philippines and Vietnam of issuing only a milquetoast statement The Philippines and Vietnam have of disapproval of China’s ongoing land the most to lose from Chinese assertive- reclamation activities—albeit the stron- ness, and possibly the most incentives gest one to date issued by the bloc. The to force the issue before China’s military island-building is seen by most ASEAN modernization and economic growth members as a violation of the 2002 make it even more dominant. At this ASEAN-China Declaration on the Con- point, however, neither country can afford duct of Parties in the South China Sea. to become too confrontational. With Yet, the statement did not even mention Vietnam, the main constraints are politi- China by name, though it provoked a cal, economic and strategic. Politically, denunciation from Beijing nonetheless. decision-making in Vietnam prioritizes Among the bloc’s members, only consensus, and the senior leadership in Vietnam and the Philippines appear to Hanoi is split on China. The CNOOC oil have any appetite for confrontation with rig standoff in 2014, in combination with China. Brunei does not claim any of the China’s land reclamation activities, has disputed islands, and it is too small to unified the prevailing strategic outlook forge an independent course on the somewhat, as evidenced by its recent matter anyway. Indonesia reportedly outreach to Washington. Still, high-level backed the push for a stronger statement splits will hinder decisive Vietnamese at the ASEAN summit, and the country action absent an unprecedented Chinese has been eager to play a more active role provocation. Vietnam’s long-term strat- in maritime matters. Nonetheless, Indo- egy of balancing outside powers against nesia’s claims overlap with the “nine- each other—along with pressure from dash line” only narrowly, around the Russia, still Vietnam’s foremost security Natuna Islands, and it has little reason patron—will ultimately limit its ties with to adopt a significantly more aggressive the United States.

46 The Journal of International Security Affairs China’s Great Maritime Gamble

Moreover, Vietnam’s overwhelm- ment, albeit considerably less so than ing reliance on Chinese investment and other Southeast Asian states. In 2013, it trade means that powerful stakeholders received the second-lowest total of Chi- in Hanoi will be wary of taking decisive nese investment among ASEAN mem- action against China. Low-priced raw bers, and China was only its third-largest materials and machinery from China trading partner. But this nevertheless are critical to Vietnamese exports. Viet- gives China ample room to strengthen nam is diversifying its economy, as ties whenever needed to defuse a conflict, evidenced by its recent lucrative trade particularly in light of the Philippines’ deal with South Korea, and the country persistent economic isolation. Manila, would reap a windfall from the Trans- which eagerly joined the China-led Asian Pacific Partnership. But Vietnam cannot Infrastructure Investment Bank, is yet afford to isolate itself from Chinese unlikely to turn down Chinese offers of markets and suppliers. trade and investment that require modest With the Philippines, the main security concessions. constraints are economic and military weakness, as well as deep internal frac- The beginnings of a tures. The archipelagic nation forms the backlash eastern wall of the South China Sea and Nevertheless, Southeast Asia is serves as a gateway to the Pacific, so more unified on the issue of the South China cannot afford to see the country China Sea than its actions and state- become openly hostile to Chinese inter- ments may suggest. ASEAN itself may ests. But the country’s maritime capabili- never serve as a vehicle for countering ties have long been neglected in favor of Chinese assertiveness, but China’s con- combating its myriad domestic insurgen- tinued provocations in the region are cies (recent spending increases and the spurring member states to strengthen May 4th announcement of a new naval military ties both with each other and base to be built 100 miles from the Sprat- with outside powers, namely the United lys notwithstanding). Moreover, Manila States, Japan, and even India. In fact, as has remained ambivalent about strength- the details of China’s island-construction ening relations with the U.S. military efforts have come into focus over the past too much ever since the Philippine par- several months, the pace of balancing liament voted to expel the United States activity appears to have accelerated. from the Subic Bay Naval Base in 1991, Since the start of this year, a number despite signing the Enhanced Defense of bilateral security ventures have been Cooperation Agreement with the United announced among various Southeast States in 2014 (which nonetheless stops Asian states in the region—primarily short of allowing a permanent U.S. mili- 7 involving Vietnam and the Philippines, tary presence). Beijing thus has less to but encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia fear than it may seem. At the same time, and Singapore as well. Moreover, and considering the Philippines’ military perhaps paradoxically, by antagonizing weakness, China would have no need in Vietnam and the Philippines the most, the event of a conflict to employ the levels China is compelling the two states that of force that would compel the United could threaten it the most by strengthen- States to intervene on behalf of its treaty ing military ties with the United States to partner, thereby limiting the likelihood of actually do so, within the aforementioned a major escalation. limits. Vietnam—which sees itself locked Furthermore, the Philippines relies in a thousand-year rivalry with China and heavily on Chinese trade and invest-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 47 Phillip Orchard is the only one of the littoral states to also drills with the Vietnamese coast guard share a border with the Asian giant—is and the Philippine navy. The push into also modernizing its naval capabilities Southeast Asia comes at a time when via its enduring relationship with Russia. Japan is slowly shedding its self-imposed Washington and Manila are still imple- post-WWII military constraints and seek- menting their 2014 defense agreement, ing to develop independent capabilities and the U.S. Navy is likely to end up with sufficient to balance China’s rise, even greater access to Subic Bay. In April, the in areas outside of Japanese territorial United States held its largest exercises claims. Its recently launched helicopter with the Philippines in 15 years. With destroyer and new fleet of V-22 Ospreys, Vietnam, Washington partially lifted its for example, may be ideal for amphibious 40-year ban on lethal arms sales to the combat operations. For its part, India is country in October 2014, and the Com- wary of China’s push to develop a blue- munist Party of Vietnam general secre- water navy and its increasing activity tary, Nguyen Phu Trong, is expected to in the Indian Ocean basin. As a result, make a historic visit to Washington later India has sought to gain leverage against this year. China by eagerly strengthening defense China is also compelling these and energy ties with Vietnam and Indo- countries to invest more heavily in their nesia and voicing its concerns over free- own maritime capabilities, to varying dom of navigation in the waters. degrees, creating a more militarized— Overall, a more crowded, more and thus more explosive—South China heavily armed South China Sea is likely Sea. According to recently released to result. For example, the greater avail- data from the Stockholm International ability of cheap, but sophisticated diesel Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), defense submarines means the South China Sea spending across ASEAN has increased is expected to be home to more than 100 by more than 44 percent on average since electric diesel subs by 2025, according to 2010, including even among poorer states the Singaporean military.9 And particu- with long-neglected militaries.8 Viet- larly in Hanoi and Manila, U.S. backing nam’s buildup has been particularly pro- could increase the tolerance for risk in nounced, with overall defense spending a way that makes small confrontations increasing by nearly 60 percent between more likely. 2010 and 2014. Here, its enduring defense relationship with Russia has proved Implications for the especially valuable; in recent years, the United States Russians sold Vietnam no fewer than six For the United States, the emerging kilo-class submarines and four Gepard- environment in the South China Sea will class frigates. pose new challenges. The land reclama- Chinese assertiveness is also draw- tion activities themselves do not pose a ing into the region outside powers such serious threat to the current military bal- as Japan and India. Japan’s economy ance. The new islands could host Chinese would be crippled by a cutoff of oil and long-range radars and missile technolo- gas flows through the South China Sea, gies and, by supporting helicopter opera- and Tokyo is concerned about China’s tions, could boost Chinese long-range ability to hinder shipping traffic and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, thus overflight privileges in the contested helping counter one of the few remaining waters. As a result, Tokyo has begun to areas of overwhelming U.S. superiority. turn its gaze southward. In the first two Overall, however, the islands will weeks of May, for example, Japan held

48 The Journal of International Security Affairs China’s Great Maritime Gamble give China relatively few advantages gaining de facto, uncontested control that its breakneck military moderniza- of the region and reassure U.S. allies in tion drive and burgeoning domestic the region. Chinese political imperatives arms industry would not already. In fact, will compel the PLA to respond, even if if China continues to compel regional largely for show. Such moves are likely states toward more robust partnerships to harden the positions of both coun- with the United States, then its South tries. The United States and China may China Sea provocations would seem to be be destined for a more confrontational counterproductive, particularly consider- relationship, considering mutual suspi- ing Beijing’s longer-term strategic aim of cions about each other’s intentions and replacing the United States as the pre- overlapping imperatives. But the United dominant power in the East and South States and China still have myriad areas China seas. The United States may soon of mutual interest that call for bilat- find itself with more capable allies who eral cooperation, such as North Korea, are more willing to provide logistical sup- and there still reason to believe that the port, access to bases, intelligence sharing two countries can avoid falling into the and so forth. Moreover, the boosted mari- “Thucydides Trap.”10 time capabilities of these countries will Overall, the abilities of China, the reduce the burden that the United States United States and Southeast Asian coun- currently shoulders overwhelmingly tries to prevent minor incidents from in fighting piracy and other non-state escalating will soon be put to tests of threats in regional waters. increasing complexity. With the Philip- Nonetheless, the increased likeli- pines, small-scale conflicts triggered hood of more-frequent small-scale con- by run-ins between Philippine activists frontations will threaten to draw the or fishermen and Chinese forces in the United States into an escalated conflict— Spratlys appear inevitable. In such a situ- one that goes against broader U.S. stra- ation, Manila may see an opportunity to tegic interests, but which Washington gauge the strength of its newly minted deems necessary to preserve its already- U.S. security guarantees. With Vietnam, weakened credibility in the region. This another attempt by China to drill for oil will force the United States to prepare for in Vietnamese waters is possible—one more complicated worst-case scenarios, that again sparks anti-Chinese riots like likely requiring a diversion of attention those that followed the 2014 oil rig stand- and assets from elsewhere. Considering off, and which pressure Hanoi to put its the pace of China’s naval modernization, new submarines to work. the United States could easily find itself These sorts of incidents—and in a costly arms race against an opponent worse—have happened repeatedly over with more political will to fund it—and the past decade, and have yet to escalate one whose anti-access/area-denial strat- into a major confrontation. And all of the egy requires far less resources than does Southeast Asian claimants would prefer the U.S. Navy’s global commitments. to play China off against the United Moreover, any measures to impose States rather than attempting to go costs on China’s activities are likely to toe-to-toe with their powerful northern further strain U.S.-China relations, as neighbor. But the historical status quo, in would strengthened cooperation with which Southeast Asian states preferred regional states. The United States is the path of least resistance to peace by likely to continue deploying U.S. mili- leaving each other’s overlapping claims tary aircraft and ships to waters near the largely unresolved is no longer viable. reclaimed islands to prevent China from Going forward, with more Chinese forces

The Journal of International Security Affairs 49 Phillip Orchard in the South China Sea, with claimants increasingly militarizing and aligning with outside powers, and, ultimately, with the resource demands of each party growing, regional leaders will be forced to navigate far more turbulent waters.

1. “China’s First Runway in Spratlys Under Con- struction,” IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, April 16, 2015, http://www.janes.com/article/50714/china- s-first-runway-in-spratlys-under-construction. 2. The author recommends CSIS’s Asia Mari- time Transparency Initiative as an invaluable resource on the reclaimed islands: http://amti. csis.org/island-tracker/. 3. Andrew Erickson, “Runway to the Danger Zone? Lengthening Chinese Airstrips May Pave Way for South China Sea ADIZ,” April 24, 2015. http:// www.andrewerickson.com/2015/04/runway-to- the-danger-zone-lengthening-chinese-airstrips- may-pave-way-for-south-china-sea-adiz-2 4. Jaime Laude, “China Transforms Reef into Naval Station.” The Philippine Star, July 27, 2013. http://www.philstar.com/head- lines/2013/07/27/1018091/china-transforms-reef- naval-station. 5. Adam Entous, Gordon Lubold and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Military Proposes Challenge to China Sea Claims,” Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2015. 6. Brad Lendon, “U.S. Threatens Peace in South China Sea, China Says.” CNN, May 22, 2015. 7. Carl Thayer. “Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.” The Diplomat, May 2, 2014. http://thediplomat. com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines- enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/. 8. Zachary Abuza, “Analyzing Southeast Asia’s Military Expenditures,” cogitASIA, May 7, 2015. http://cogitasia.com/analyzing-southeast-asias- military-expenditures/. 9. Xue Jianyue, “Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia Could Extend Maritime Patrols in the South China Sea.” Today Online, May 11, 2015. http:// www.todayonline.com/singapore/spore-msia- indonesia-could-extend-joint-patrols-south-chi- na-sea. 10. Graham Allison, “Avoiding Thucydides’s Trap,” Financial Times, August 22, 2012.

50 The Journal of International Security Affairs The War for Ukraine

Herman Pirchner, Jr.

kraine is at war. Since the spring of 2014, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has waged a concerted campaign of aggression against its smaller western neighbor. Mos- Ucow’s “hybrid warfare” in support of separatist enclaves in Ukraine’s Donbass region has included the insertion of military forces to augment pro-Russian insurgents, large-scale deliveries of military matériel to these fighters, and the widespread use of propaganda. The Kremlin’s efforts have met with political and economic pressure from the West, in the form of multilateral sanctions imposed by the Obama administration and the European Union. However, the strongly negative effects of this pressure on the Russian economy have not caused the Kremlin to change course in any meaningful way.

Why does Russia covet Ukraine? And why has Moscow persisted in its offensive there, despite the mounting political and economic costs? The answers to those ques- tions can be found in the bloody shared history of the two countries. So, too, can a sense of what the next steps in this crisis might be.

A bloody history Without the proper historical context, it is impossible to understand the current struggle between Russia (and its supporters in Ukraine) and Ukraine itself. Much of the current conflict is rooted in Moscow’s long-standing imperialist ideology, which denies the very existence of an independent Ukrainian state. President Putin himself admitted as much when he stated that Russians “always saw the Russians and Ukrainians as single people. I still think this way now.”1

Herman Pirchner, Jr., is President of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. Herman Pirchner, Jr.

History, however, tells us otherwise. which removed the village’s food supply The beginnings of the Ukrainian nation and then let no one in or out—simply can be traced to the arrival of Slavic allowing the residents to die slow deaths tribes in the territory of present day from starvation. central and eastern Ukraine in the 6th That policy was followed by the century. By the 11th century, the state of widespread imprisonment and assas- Kievan Rus’ (which was founded in 862) sination of Ukrainian opposition forces. was geographically the largest state in Outright murders, show trials, and sen- Europe. The 13th century, however, saw tences to hard labor in “Gulag” camps much of it destroyed by Mongol raiders. further crushed the resistance of Ukrai- Over the following 100 years, in the nian nationalists and anti-communists. wake of the Mongol retreat, the Poland- An estimated 80 percent of Ukraine’s cul- Lithuanian commonwealth annexed tural elite were killed or sent to the camps most of the territory of Ukraine. By the during the decade of the 1930s alone.2 mid-17th century, an increasingly power- With resistance thereby minimized, ful Russia gained sovereignty over much Moscow turned its attention to cultural of the land, with the remainder staying repression, most significantly the sup- under Polish rule until the second and pression of the Ukrainian language. As third partitions of Poland (1793 and 1795) late as 1933, 88 percent of all students in ended Poland’s status as an independent Soviet Ukraine were receiving instruction country. From that time until its 1991 in Ukrainian.3 By 1938, however, the study independence, most of today’s Ukraine of Russian had become mandatory in all was ruled by Czarist Russia and subse- schools. The effects of this policy were far- quently its successor, the USSR. reaching; by 1988, Ukrainian remained Russia’s dominion came at a high the language of instruction for only 48 price. During the 124 years of Tsar- percent of students. Nevertheless wide- ist rule (1793 to 1917), repeated efforts spread opposition remained; shortly before were made to suppress all vestiges of Ukraine’s independence in 1989, an esti- Ukrainian culture. Publishing in the mated 65 percent of Ukraine’s citizens still Ukrainian language, teaching in the spoke Ukrainian as their first language.4 Ukrainian language, and survival of independent churches not under control Promises not kept of the Russian Orthodox Church were Ukraine’s 1991 independence came all severely curtailed. about as the result of a vote in which Between 1917 and 1920, there was a every Ukrainian oblast (the equivalent brief period of declared Ukrainian inde- of a U.S. state) opted in favor of a break pendence from Moscow. By the early with Moscow. Yet soon thereafter, a 1920s, however, the Soviets gained con- chorus of prominent voices in Moscow— trol and began their consolidation of including the famed anti-communist his- power. This effort took three major forms. torian Alexandr Solzhenitsyn and Dmitri The first was the horror of the man- Rogozin, currently Russia’s Deputy made famine known as the “Holodomor.” Prime Minister—began calling for the Today, a large museum in Kyiv docu- reabsorption of Ukraine and other former ments the estimated 2,000,000 Ukrai- Soviet territories. nians that were intentionally starved to One of the main obstacles to neo- death by the communists in the early imperialist Russian ambitions was the 1930s. This tragedy unfolded in brutal fact that independent Ukraine was a fashion; Ukrainian-speaking villages nuclear state. That status, however, was were surrounded by Bolshevik forces, removed by diplomatic means. In the

52 The Journal of International Security Affairs The War for Ukraine

1994 Budapest Memorandum, Russia, Disorder followed. In the years the United Kingdom, Ukraine and the since, the well-documented graft and United States all agreed to “guarantee” theft of assets perpetrated by Yanu- the territorial integrity of Ukraine if it kovych and his inner circle practically agreed to give up its nuclear arsenal.5 bankrupted the country. Less well doc- Thereafter, Kyiv did so. umented during the same period was Yet, formal guarantees notwith- the Yanukovych regime’s denigration standing, Moscow soon began taking of the Ukrainian military and security steps to make its expansionist aspira- services, as well as its promotion of tions a reality. In 2001, the Russian Duma those with questionable loyalty to the enacted a law outlining the procedure Ukrainian state. The Yanukovych years for the expansion of the territory of the also saw creeping Russian influence in Russian Federation.6 (That law, whose the form of activities launched through compatibility with international law was Russia’s five Ukrainian-based consular later endorsed by the Council of Europe’s operations in the country—institutions Venice Commission, would become the that worked in parallel with the Russian template for the annexation of Ukraine’s intelligence services. Their ample budget Crimean Peninsula some thirteen years was used to employ and/or organize Rus- later, in the spring of 2014). Thereafter, sian nationalists, mafia figures, and the in 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei marginally ideological unemployed as a Ivanov advanced a strategic doctrine collective asset to be used at the proper that authorized the use of Russian force moment. That moment came in the Fall to protect Russian citizens living beyond of 2013. the borders of Russia.7 Subsequently, in 2004, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail The Maidan, and after Fradkov’s government made it easier In the Fall of 2013, Ukraine faced a for Russians living in other countries transformative choice. Preceding months (including those in Ukraine) to obtain had seen the Yanukovych government, Russian citizenship.8 The same year, by then in dire need of an economic bail- Russia launched a movement to form out, begin serious consultations with the a single economic space with Belarus, European Union over the possibility of Kazakhstan and Ukraine.9 an Association Agreement that would Moscow’s meddling was soon felt in decisively hitch Ukraine’s economy to Ukraine. In the country’s 2004 presiden- the Euro-Atlantic sphere. For Russia, tial election, Russia strongly promoted this represented an alarming develop- the candidacy of pro-Kremlin politician ment, and Moscow employed tremendous Viktor Yanukovych, who used massive economic leverage and political clout to amounts of fraud to “win” the poll. The sway the Yanukovych government back Ukrainian public’s reaction to the elec- into its orbit. toral fraud ushered in the popular unrest The ploy worked, but at a high cost. In known as the “Orange Revolution.” The November of 2013, Yanukovych reversed subsequent revote brought pro-Western course, opting for a deeper partnership advocate Viktor Yushchenko to power in with Russia in lieu of increased commerce January of 2005. But the next half-decade with Europe. But Yanukovych’s retreat of poor government and graft took their from his pledges to build Ukraine’s eco- toll, and five years later Yanukovych nomic relationship with Europe led to again won the Ukrainian presidency— protests in Ukraine’s Maidan Square, an this time in elections that were generally open area in the center of Kyiv. The esca- regarded as fair. lating protests, which grew to encompass

The Journal of International Security Affairs 53 Herman Pirchner, Jr. other Ukrainian cities as well, led to the formed from Ukrainian reservists and toppling of the Yanukovych government volunteers. After initially losing territory, in early 2014. these forces began a successful counter- The subsequent turmoil, however, offensive in mid-July 2014 and looked provided a new opening for Moscow. poised to regain full control of Luhansk The power vacuum that followed Yanu- and Donetsk. That is, until the Russian kovych’s ouster in Kyiv gave the Kremlin government decided to raise the stakes fresh opportunities to expand its influ- in late August 2014, sending Russian sol- ence, and it seized the moment, stage- diers with advanced equipment into the managing the infiltration of masked, fray. Predictably, the poorly trained and armed, and unidentified Russian forces equipped Ukrainian forces took heavy into Ukraine. Through bullying tactics, casualties and lost much of the territory they took control of Crimea and staged they had previously regained. a fraudulent March 2014 political refer- This tug-of-war eventually led to endum that led to that territory’s subse- the first Minsk Agreement, a provisional quent annexation by Russia. cease-fire that was signed on Septem- This proved to be just the begin- ber 5, 2014. But this deal did not hold, ning. By the Spring of 2014, Rus- and Russian-led troops took additional sia’s attention had already turned to territory, prompting another agree- other parts of Ukraine. Moves toward ment, colloquially known as Minsk II, independence by pro-Russian forces to be signed on February 11, 2015. As appeared in the provinces of Odessa of this writing, that agreement as well and Dnipropetrovsk, but were success- is being routinely violated, with ongo- fully subdued by the fledgling govern- ing casualties on both sides and inter- ment of Petro Poroshenko in Kyiv. In national observers not being permitted the Eastern provinces of Donetsk and promised access to Russian-controlled Luhansk, however, those efforts proved areas. Further, an estimated 50,000 Rus- more resilient—and more dangerous. sian troops are currently massed on its There, demonstrators, backed border with Ukraine, and an additional by Russian interests, began to appear 50,000 are located in Crimea.10 Based on demanding union with Russia. Soon, a maps and statistics provided by the there were armed men taking over cities Ukrainian government, it is possible and villages. In April of 2014, separatist to estimate that roughly a third of the forces in the Donetsk region attempted combined territories of Donetsk and to solidify their political status through Luhansk Oblasts are today under Rus- the creation of an independent Donetsk sian control. This, however, only consti- People’s Republic. Later the same month, tutes approximately three percent of the pro-Russian forces in Luhansk did the territory of Ukraine – far less than the same. And weeks later, the two upstart mainstream media, and Russian propa- enclaves signed an agreement forming a ganda, would have us believe. confederation. All of these moves were backed by Moscow, which lionized the Moscow’s risky game separatists on state media and which, Most of the fighters that make up later, would dispatch both arms and the pro-Russian forces were born on the manpower in the guise of “humanitarian territory of present day Ukraine. These convoys” to reinforce the rebels. fighters, trained, supplied and directed by By now, however, the new Ukrai- Moscow, can be divided into three basic nian government was determined to categories (although no one knows defini- fight. So were several grassroots militias tively how many fall into each). The first

54 The Journal of International Security Affairs The War for Ukraine contingent is made up of those who really mothers, who have begun to trade infor- wish to be a part of the Russian Federa- mation and demonstrate against govern- tion, and are fighting for that cause. The ment lies.15 second is composed of mafia types who This state of affairs is not new. A have been promised riches when property similar movement emerged during the is confiscated from conquered Ukrainian time of the USSR’s invasion of Afghani- territory. Finally, there are those who are stan. Over time, it had a significant effect engaged in the fighting simply because on Soviet policy, and contributed to the they need the money that is being paid to Kremlin’s decision in 1989 to cut its losses separatist forces by Russia. and withdraw from that country. This However, as noted above, there are suggests that the continued flow of body a significant number of Russian troops bags back to Russia, or any increase in (recently estimated at 12,00011) and Russian casualties, will create political irregulars fighting in Ukraine—all of problems for Russian President Vladimir them under Moscow’s direct command. Putin. In the electronic age, it has become These Russians direct the military cam- harder to lie to your own people. paign and have provided all those fight- Opposition is also showing its ing against Ukraine with weapons far face among the elite that form Putin’s more advanced than anything possessed power base. Former Prime Minister and by the Ukrainian side.12 Russian-based FSB chief Yevgeny Primakov recently fighters can also be divided into three remarked that it was time to cut a deal categories, each again of unknown size. over Ukraine, because Russia could not The first contingent is made up of Rus- afford to become isolated in the world.16 sian nationalists drawn from various It is unlikely that Primakov, a savvy branches of the Russian armed forces, long-time operator in the cutthroat power including officers directing combat politics of the Kremlin, would have made activities. The second encompasses “vol- such a public remark while enjoying sig- unteers” from the Russian army, who are nificant support within the security ser- heavily encouraged by Moscow to take vices that are the true masters of Russia. part in the hostilities. The final group is Opposition is also beginning to composed of Chechens, some of whom build from the country’s oligarchs and were released from Russian jails and are local elites. Massive government projects, paid to fight.13 such as a dam system to stop the annual For Russia, the current state of floods in the Russian Far East, have affairs is far less favorable than it been postponed or cancelled as a result appears at first glance. The Kremlin of the costs associated with Russia’s war is being forced to lie to its own people effort in Ukraine. The economic fortunes about the presence of Russian soldiers in of Russia’s wealthy have also declined Ukraine, and their deaths there. Numer- noticeably. In just one example, well-off ous news stories about the surreptitious Russians are now finding it difficult to burials of soldiers killed in the fighting unload expensive real estate at even a in Ukraine14 underscore the fact that the quarter of its previous value, because deaths of Russian soldiers on the Ukrai- everyone else with enough money to buy nian battlefield have become an inconve- premium properties is also trying to get nient truth, and one Russian authorities their cash and families out of the coun- are taking great pains to cover up. Never- try. These stakeholders have little faith theless, the number of Russian casualties in Russia’s future—especially its short- has been great enough that there are now term future, as the country’s economy the beginnings of a movement of military is not expected to recover anytime soon.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 55 Herman Pirchner, Jr.

Getting Crimea was great, goes the line, Yet, as recent polling documents, these but is Eastern Ukraine worth the cost? extremists represent a smaller percent of Nevertheless, Putin and his inner the population in Ukraine than in many circle believe they can up the ante and Western European countries. In the 2014 expand their holdings and influence at presidential election, Ukraine’s two right- the expense of Ukraine and other coun- wing parties, the Radical Party and Svo- tries. Their confidence rests on the fact boda, received 8 percent and 1.16 percent that they are masters of propaganda in of the vote respectively.19 In France’s 2012 the West (which they expect to divide by presidential election, by contrast, Marine muddying various policy debates with Le Pen secured 17.9 percent for her ultra bad information) and within Russia itself. conservative party.20 Domestically, they are convinced that the Though the Russian public has Russian public will believe what it is told, not been told of their soldiers dying in and that therefore Russians will support the war, Ukraine’s population is acutely Putin no matter the cost. Prevalent, too, aware of the thousands of casualties is the belief that Putin has an iron will— they have suffered to date—and are pre- one that will ultimately cause the materi- pared to suffer more in order to regain alistic, divided West to surrender. their territory. Russia is viewed as the aggressor in a way that will preclude Ukraine’s struggle normal Russian-Ukrainian relations for The picture on the Ukrainian side is a long time. equally complex. Years of misrule under Ukrainians are motivated not only Yanukovych left Ukraine’s army in hor- by the natural desire to defend them- rible condition, with an unreliable officer selves against an invasion, but also by corps and questionable loyalties among memories of the past and a vision for the its commanding officers. This state of future. Many of those running Ukraine affairs has changed substantially over the today are the relatives of the 2,000,000 past year, as many of the officers of the starved to death by Moscow in the Yanukovych era have been progressively “Holodomor” of the 1930s, or of the count- dismissed by the new government in Kyiv. less others sent to the Gulag. They know The army is not alone, however. their churches were repressed during Independently led and financed militias both the Tsarist and Soviet periods. It (many guess up to 30 fighting on the is not lost on the Ukrainian leadership Ukrainian side) have played a large role that these barbaric acts were carried out in the fighting to date. Funded by oli- by Stalin’s KGB or its successor organi- garchs, public fundraisers, and by indi- zations—governmental entities that not vidual soldiers (who have to buy their only dominate the government of Putin’s own equipment when joining a militia), Russia but are increasingly trying to these highly motivated—if ill-trained restore the image of Stalin. Moreover, (volunteers go through a week of training Ukrainians are presently learning how before seeing combat)17—soldiers have Crimea and occupied Donetsk and been effective and should be increasingly Luhansk are being run, and they don’t so as they are fully integrated into the want the same to happen to them.21 Ukrainian Army.18 Recent economic history also counts. Nevertheless, problems abound. For Ukrainians know that a quarter-century example, some militia units and their ago, Ukrainians and Poles were roughly civilian supporters have been tied to far comparable in terms of economic status right ideologies, fueling Russian pro- and standard of living. Yet today, the paganda of fascist politics in Ukraine. per capita income of Poles is three times

56 The Journal of International Security Affairs The War for Ukraine higher than that of Ukrainians. This and from its new partners. However, as of other examples of prosperity among the this writing, the Obama administra- Western-oriented countries of Eastern tion has yet to send defensive weapons Europe have bred a desire for European to Ukraine in spite of the authorization freedoms and economic advantages passed, by large bipartisan votes, in among ordinary Ukrainians. These are both Houses of Congress. advantages they know they will not The situation on the ground, mean- obtain if they become an expanded Rus- while, continues to deteriorate. Since sian state. the signing of the most recent Minsk The leadership in Kyiv understands accords, attacks by the separatists, in as well that economic and legal reforms violation of the original Minsk agree- are necessary if Ukraine is to be a pros- ment, have increased the net area under perous and independent state. It is not Russia-backed rebel control by roughly yet clear if these efforts will be success- 500 square kilometers. Here, the timing ful, but great progress has already been is telling; separatists took Debaltseve made in at least one area: energy diversi- three days after Minsk II was signed.26 fication. Two years ago, Ukraine received Moreover, OSCE peacekeepers have 95 percent of its natural gas from Russia, not been given the agreed-upon access and was continually subjected to Mos- to areas controlled by Russia-backed cow’s economic blackmail. Today, per- separatists—including 90 percent of the haps as little as 40 percent of Ukrainian artillery withdrawal zone, informed esti- gas comes from Russia.22 mates say.27 Additional gains are being made Western intelligence likewise has in the training of Ukrainian troops sent reported that heavy artillery and tanks to the front. In the past, militia troops have been moved into Ukraine territory were sent to the front lines with little or by Russia, including T-72B3 and T-90 no training. Ukraine’s defense minister tanks, Dozor armored vehicles, Pantsir- estimated that only about 6,000 out of S1 air defense systems, and Grad-K 130,000 troops were prepared for combat rocket systems, and Buk missile sys- when the war began a year ago.23 This is tems.28 According to a study conducted no longer the case; a growing number of by Dr. Phillip Karber of the Potomac military troops now engaged in combat Foundation, roughly 890 Russian heavy against Russian and pro-Russian forces weapons were introduced into the Donbas are battle tested, and have received some between October and December.29 measure of training from foreign special- Defense Secretary Ash Carter has ists. In April, 300 U.S. troops joined those summarized the current state of play as of other countries who train Ukrainian follows: “What’s clear is that sanctions forces in basic military tactics.24 Modern are working on the Russian economy… military equipment also remains in short what is not apparent is how that effect supply, though the situation is margin- on his economy is deterring Putin from ally less dire than it was. At the begin- following the course that was evidenced ning of the war, 99 percent of equipment in Crimea last year.” That, according to being used had been manufactured over the U.S. defense chief, represents a teach- a decade ago, and only one in 100 soldiers able moment. “There are other things we had a bullet-proof vest.25 need to be doing in recognition of the fact There are also now the beginnings that...Putin does not seem to be reversing of a Lithuanian, Polish, Ukrainian mili- course,” he told reporters in early June.30 tary alliance and a modest amount of So far, however, American action has not arms have begun to flow to Ukraine matched this rhetoric.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 57 Herman Pirchner, Jr.

What comes next? by Moscow today, in which the economic The conflict still is far from over. instability associated with continued Russia possesses the military capability unrest in Ukraine leads to one of two to take still greater swathes of Ukrai- outcomes desired by the Kremlin: either nian territory. The cities of Kharkiv, a counterrevolution that brings to power Mariupol, and Odessa are among the a more pliable, Russia-friendly govern- most-mentioned potential targets of Rus- ment in Kyiv, or a political settlement sian aggression. If the Kremlin chooses by which Ukraine adopts a “federalist” to advance militarily, however, it will solution granting greater autonomy to most certainly face a range of adverse the country’s east—and thereby codify- conditions, from greater sanctions and ing Moscow’s sway there. isolation from the international com- munity to an insurgency in the Ukrai- American options nian territories occupied by Russia and Amid all of this uncertainty, how is its proxies to a steady flow of Russian the U.S. to respond? In addition to finan- soldiers who have been killed in action. cial assistance, the arming of Ukraine All of the above would threaten Vladi- is imperative. We should do so because mir Putin’s rule at home, and dictate an of the commitments we gave under the increasingly repressive rule in both the Budapest Memorandum. If we do not occupied territories he now controls and honor that commitment, it will incentiv- within Russia itself. ize transnational movements and other A second potential scenario is the nations who wish to move against Amer- invasion of Latvia, a NATO member ican interests. Additionally, if the fight nation too small to put up much resis- against Russian aggression is not made tance to Russian troops. In this case, by Ukrainians in Ukraine, Americans Russian nationalists would have carried and other NATO members may be the the day in Moscow—no doubt arguing ones having to fight a Russian invasion that the Atlantic Alliance would never of Latvia or another NATO member in respond to the provocation and, when the not-too-distant future. it in fact didn’t, that Western security But what type of help should we guarantees could no longer be believed. give? Former NATO Commander and That would lead to still further Russian Democratic Presidential candidate Gen. expansionism, to which Europe would Wesley Clark has proffered a list of mili- need to accommodate itself. tary equipment that the West should Other futures, of course, are pos- send, ranging from anti-armor weapons sible as well. Russia’s current course to night vision goggles.31 This seems like could well take its political toll, with a good start. After all, as Clark himself Putin falling from power. Should that has pointed out, arming Ukraine may happen, a new Russian leadership be destabilizing—but not to do so has might be willing to make a political already proved to be destabilizing, and settlement. However, the opposite result will likely continue to be so. is also possible: a new Russian ruler His comments hint at a larger truth. who governs even more recklessly. Of Russia, which has long sought to sub- course, Putin could maintain his current jugate Ukraine, sees the country’s cur- hold on power, drawing out the occupa- rent military weakness—and the lack of tion of parts of Donetsk and Luhansk attention being paid by the West—as an and using that base to destabilize other opportunity. And because it does, more parts of Ukraine. In fact, this seems to aggression is possible. Whatever the par- be the dominant strategy being pursued ticulars, the United States and its allies

58 The Journal of International Security Affairs The War for Ukraine need to begin reversing that percep- ton, DC: Atlantic Council, May 2015), https:// tion. After more than a year-and-a-half dl.dropboxusercontent.com/content_link/doh- V0PQ1tbtoYmpshZMLI8IQmgBsfQQvpu8CjJ- of instability stemming from Moscow’s jYoA8UJs1Ofyi9Soa3E9Zc2U40. actions, there’s no time to lose. 14. “Russian Reporters ‘Attacked at Secret Soldier Burials,’” BBC, August 27, 2014, http://www.bbc. com/news/world-europe-28949582. 15. “The Russian Mothers Waiting for News of Their Missing Soldier Sons,” Newsweek, September 2, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/2014/09/12/ russian-mothers-waiting-news-their-missing- sons-267909.html. 16. Yevgeniy Primakov, “Russia’s Course Cannot 1. Russian President Vladimir Putin, public speech be One of Self-Isolation,” Russia Beyond the in Moscow, Russia, March 19, 2015, https://www. Headlines, January 15, 2015, http://rbth.com/ youtube.com/watch?v=SSsAT1v0vOc. politics/2015/01/15/russias_course_cannot_be_ 2. Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 2nd one_of_self-isolation_42889.html. ed. (Spokane: University of Washington Press, 17. “Ukraine’s Volunteer Soldiers Face Unexpected 1995). Foe,” New York Times, September 2, 2014, http:// 3. Ibid., 564. www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-volunteer-sol- 4. Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 diers-face-unexpected-foe-1409675515. goda, vol. 7, ch. 1 (n.p., 1989), 10. 18. “Russia Objects to American Military Train- 5. “Budapest Memorandums on Security Assur- ers, but Ukraine’s Army Has Long Way to ances, 1994,” Council on Foreign Relations, Go,” The Economist, April 24, 2015, http:// December 5, 1994, http://www.cfr.org/nonpro- www.economist.com/news/europe/21649772- liferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/buda- russia-protests-american-military-trainers- pest-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/ ukraines-army-has-long-way-go-training-wheels p32484. 19. “Extraordinary Parliamentary Election 2014,” 6. See Herman Pirchner, Jr., Reviving Greater Central Election Commission, n.d., http://www. Russia: The Future of Russia’s Borders with cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2014/wp300e?PT001F01=910. Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and 20. “French Republic Election for President 2012,” Ukraine (Lanham, MD: University Press of Election Guide, n.d. http://www.electionguide. America, 2005), 51. org/elections/id/2232/. 7. Marcel de Haas, “Russia’s Military Doctrine 21. “Rebels in Ukraine Dream of Reviving Soviet Development (2000-10),” in Stephen J. Blank, ed., Heyday,” New York Times, October 4, 2014, Russian Military Politics and Russia’s 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/world/ Defense Doctrine (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies europe/rebels-in-eastern-ukraine-dream-of- Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2011), reviving-soviet-heyday.html. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ 22. Vladimir Socor, “Ukraine Rapidly Dismantling pdffiles/pub1050.pdf. Gazprom’s Supply Monopoly,” Jamestown Foun- 8. Pirchner, Reviving Greater Russia, 43. dation, Eurasia Daily Monitor 12, iss. 65, April 9. “Agreement on the Establishment of the Common 8, 2015, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/ Economic Zone,” World Bank, http://wits.world- edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43764 bank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/Common_Eco- &cHash=e90a656097ebe64aecc7fbd591ae34df#. nomic_Zone.pdf. VWytvPlVhBc. 10. Jeremy Bender, “Former NATO Commander: 23. Andrew Kramer, “Battle Tested, Ukraine A New Russian Offensive in Eastern Ukraine Troops Now Get U.S. Basic Training,” New is ‘Imminent,’” Business Insider, April 7, 2015, York Times, May 9, 2015, http://www.nytimes. http://www.businessinsider.com/new-russian- com/2015/05/10/world/europe/ukraine-troops- offensive-in-ukraine-is-imminent-2015-4. receive-us-basic-training-after-battle.html. 11. Sabrine Siebold and Caroline Copley, “Some 24. “Russia Objects to American Military Trainers, 12,000 Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Support- but Ukraine’s Army has Long Way to Go.” ing Rebels: US Commander,” Reuters, March 3, 25. “Army in Need: Volunteers Try to Get Supplies to 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/03/ Ukraine’s Forces,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib- us-ukraine-russia-soldiers-idUSKBN0L- erty, June 16, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/ Z2FV20150303. ukraine-army-equipment-donations/25413169. 12. Presentation by Phillip Karber before the Center html. for Strategic and International Studies Russian 26. Maksymilian Czuperski, et al., Hiding in Plain Military Forum, March 10, 2015, https://www. Sight. youtube.com/watch?v=8WA1rP5WGfY. 27. Phillip Karber, Presentation at “Beyond Minsk 13. Maksymilian Czuperski, et al., Hiding in Plain II—Prospects for a New Russian Offensive,” Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine (Washing-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 59 Herman Pirchner, Jr.

Potomac Foundation, Vienna, VA, May 12, 2015, http://www.thepotomacfoundation.org/russias- hybrid-war-in-ukraine-prospects-for-escalation/. 28. Maksymilian Czuperski, et al., Hiding in Plain Sight. 29. Karber, Presentation at “Beyond Minsk II.” 30. “Carter: New Steps Needed to Counter Russian Aggression in Ukraine,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, June 6, 2015, http://www.rferl. org/content/russia-ukraine-carter-new-steps- needed/27056471.html. 31. Wesley Clark, “Ukraine Must Be Armed Right Now,” Newsweek, April 3, 2015, http://www. newsweek.com/wesley-clark-ukraine-must-be- armed-right-now-319348.

GE Aviation

imagination at work

60 The Journal of International Security Affairs Deterring Russia: Has NATO Succeeded?

Leo Michel

t the much-publicized Wales Summit last September, the leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) attempted to send two resolute messages Ato Moscow. The first—which, in truth, was also intended to reassure Russia’s worried neighbors—was that the Alliance remains “strong, ready, robust, and respon- sive” and able to fulfill its Article 5 treaty commitment of collective defense in the face of any aggression. To underscore the point, the twenty-eight leaders agreed to a number of near- and long-term measures to strengthen NATO’s military posture and capabilities.

The second message focused on reversing Russia’s “escalating and illegal military intervention” in Ukraine. To this end, NATO “demanded” that Moscow take “concrete action” to comply with its international obligations, “end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea,” and stop its support of pro-Russian separatists who had proclaimed “peoples’ republics” in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine. As the Summit’s concluding com- muniqué noted, NATO “stands with Ukraine” in the face of Russian aggression. Still, this was a necessarily ambiguous formulation, since Ukraine is not an Ally—despite the promise of NATO leaders at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO.”1

Plan of action Overall, NATO’s near-term measures, known as the “Readiness Action Plan,” have had the desired effect of assuring Allies most directly concerned by Russia—thanks, in large part, to their visibility, scope, and multinational character. For example, NATO has increased (from four to sixteen) the number of fighter aircraft dedicated to the air-

Leo Michel is Distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. The opinions above represent the personal views of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Leo Michel policing mission over Estonia, Latvia, A few Allies have taken additional and Lithuania. It has started regular steps on a national basis that comple- Airborne Warning and Control System ment NATO’s moves. Over the past year, reconnaissance flights over Poland and company-size U.S. units (approximately Romania. And it has stepped up regular 160 soldiers each) with armored vehicles maritime patrols in the Baltic Sea, Black have been rotating through the Baltic Sea, and Mediterranean. NATO’s Mul- States, Poland, and Romania, where they tinational Corps Northeast headquar- train with local forces. This “persistent ters in Szczecin, Poland, meanwhile, is presence,” which is expected to continue receiving more capabilities and upgrad- at least through 2016, draws upon the ing its readiness to serve as a hub for two U.S. Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) regional cooperation. permanently stationed in Europe, as well In parallel with these activities, as rotations of troops from a third U.S.- NATO has conducted several impor- based BCT that is earmarked for Europe. tant land, air, and maritime exercises. In addition, the Obama Administration The ALLIED SHIELD training series in recently decided to pre-position a “Euro- June involved some 15,000 military per- pean Activity Set” in the Baltic States, sonnel from nineteen alliance members Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania.2 This and three partner nations. The series set of equipment would consist of over a includes another test of NATO’s interim thousand vehicles—including some 250 Very High Readiness Joint Task Force Abrams main battle tanks, plus hun- (VJTF), a “spearhead force” of around dreds of Bradley fighting vehicles and 5,000 troops (with air, maritime, and mobile Howitzer artillery—to be used by special forces “enablers”) able to begin the rotating U.S. personnel or, if neces- moving within two to three days at sary, by a full U.S.-based BCT that could the first warnings of a potential threat. be airlifted to Europe in a crisis. Other NATO Force Integration Units com- Allies, too, have stepped up their game. posed of small multinational teams are France, for example, recently deployed being set up in the Baltic States, Poland, 15 main battle tanks and 300 soldiers to Romania, and Bulgaria to assist those Poland for a six-week exercise. countries with their Host Nation Sup- However, when it comes to the long- port activities, including the logistical term measures pledged at Wales, the networks and infrastructure required to picture is mixed. NATO has struggled receive the VJTF deployments. for more than a decade to find ways to NATO’s higher profile in the region reverse the trend of declining defense has been welcomed by Partner countries budgets, to use available funds more Finland and Sweden, and for good reason. effectively, and to find a more equitable In recent months, both nations have had sharing of costs and responsibilities. to scramble air and coastal defense forces The topic is one of vital significance to to respond to provocative Russian mili- the Alliance. As then-Defense Secretary tary flights and naval activities (includ- Robert Gates warned the Allies in a June ing, most probably, submarines) near or 2011 speech: “(If) current trends in the within their national airspace and terri- decline of European defense capabilities torial waters. Not surprisingly, both Hel- are not halted and reversed, future U.S. sinki and Stockholm are now seized with political leaders—those for whom the the potential for Russian hostility—and Cold War was not the formative experi- as a result are stepping up their militar- ence that it was for me—may not con- ies’ participation in NATO exercises in sider the return on America’s investment the region. in NATO worth the cost.”3

62 The Journal of International Security Affairs Deterring Russia: Has NATO Succeeded?

The language agreed at Wales— some time to evaluate if, in practice, notably, that Allied nations will “aim this initiative will generate more results to move toward the 2 percent (of GDP) than NATO’s “Smart Defense” and “Con- guideline (for defense expenditures) nected Forces Initiative” approaches. within a decade”—is, of course, far from Nevertheless, NATO’s Allied Command a guarantee. And NATO’s less-than- Transformation can point to promis- brilliant record in generating quick capa- ing activities since Wales to improve bilities improvements through increased Allied and Partner interoperability; these multinational cooperation can leave one a involve, for example, the more efficient bit skeptical. But there are signs, at least, management of air-to-ground precision that the proverbial NATO aircraft carrier guided munitions, better integration has begun to change course. of new off-the-shelf technologies into Currently, only four Allies—the military systems, and innovative ways United States, United Kingdom, Esto- to deliver professional military educa- nia, and Greece—meet the 2 percent tion and training to NATO and Partner guideline.4 Over the past year, France forces. And at long last, the first of five and Germany have announced modest Global Hawk remotely piloted aircraft for defense budget increases. So, too, have the NATO-owned and -operated Alliance Poland (which will come close to the 2 Ground Surveillance system rolled off percent mark), Norway, the Netherlands, the production line in June. Spain, Lithuania, and Latvia. (Sweden Regarding Ukraine, practical assis- also has announced an increase, and its tance from the Alliance seems modest fellow Partner Finland is expected to do relative to the situation on the ground. so in the near future.) Of course, some of NATO has sent advisors to Kyiv to work these countries are starting from very with government officials in areas such low spending levels and, in the case of as military organizational reform, defense France and Spain, security concerns education, cyber defense, command, con- along NATO’s southern flank—not con- trol, and communications, logistics, and cerns about Russia—are the primary military career transition. NATO is also motivation for the increases. working to establish additional “trust True, the United Kingdom’s recently funds” to finance such support. announced 1.5 percent cut in defense More substantive—albeit still spending for 2015 is a disappointment— restrained—assistance to Ukraine has even if, as defense ministry officials come through bilateral channels. So far, have claimed, it does not bring Britain the United States has committed close below 2 percent this year nor impact to $200 million in security-related aid, manpower numbers or current opera- including body armor, night and ther- tions. Still, Britain’s longer-term trend in mal vision devices, heavy engineering defense spending might not be clear until equipment, radios, patrol boats, rations, the new Conservative government com- tents, medical supplies, counter-mortar pletes its Strategic Defense and Security radars, and other related items.5 In addi- Review in late 2015 or early 2016. And tion, the first shipments of 230 Humvees Italy and Belgium also have announced promised to Ukraine have been delivered. cuts in their already low military spend- And some 300 U.S. troops based in Italy ing since Wales. deployed to western Ukraine in mid-April On the capabilities front, the Wales to begin a six-month mission of training summit endorsed a new “framework Ukrainian National Guard forces. Some nations concept” intended to facilitate 75 British soldiers have provided similar multinational cooperation. It will take training since March.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 63 Leo Michel

To date, however, the Allies have not the many other surprises that Russia’s acted on Ukrainian entreaties to provide leader has delivered of late, it is hard to lethal weapons. NATO as an organiza- argue that NATO’s actions, underscored tion does not provide weapons to anyone, by declarations by U.S. President Barack leaving such important decisions to Obama and other Allied heads of state national authorities. And despite mount- and government, have not been prudent ing calls in the U.S. Congress to do just and useful.11 At a minimum, the Alliance that, President Obama has not moved has given Moscow more reasons not to beyond his statement last February that test its will when it comes to defending offering lethal arms was only one of the one of its members. options under consideration “if, in fact, Sadly, the same cannot be said for diplomacy fails.”6 Ukraine. Since Wales, Russia has contin- ued and, in some areas, increased its mili- Ends and means tary, economic, and propaganda support So has NATO successfully deterred for the separatists in eastern Ukraine. Russia? The answer is not so straight- Ukrainian officials and some outside forward. analysts believe this is a prelude to an On the one hand, Moscow’s mus- offensive aimed at establishing a land cle-flexing of late has been reminiscent bridge between Russia and the illegally of Cold War days. For example, Russia annexed peninsula of Crimea.12 recently conducted large military exer- At this juncture, the best available cises in the Baltic and Arctic regions, deterrent against Russia is the combina- and asserted its “right” to deploy nuclear tion of European Union and American weapons “anywhere on Russian territory, sanctions. President Obama sketched out including on the Crimea Peninsula.”7 Last the effects of these sanctions during the March, the Russian ambassador to Den- June 2015 meeting in Germany of the G-7, mark warned that “Danish warships will the West’s leading industrialized democ- be targets for Russian nuclear missiles” racies. According to the President: if the Danes contribute ship-borne radars to NATO’s missile defense system.8 The Russian economy has been Meanwhile, Russia’s propaganda seriously weakened. The ruble and foreign investment are down; infla- machine is churning away to convince its tion is up. The Russian central bank citizens that NATO is hell-bent on regime has lost more than $150 billion in change within the Russian Federation. In reserves. Russian banks and firms a clear sign of the times, back in May, are virtually locked out of the inter- Rossiya 1, a leading television channel, national markets. Russian energy broadcast a documentary alleging that companies are struggling to import the Red Army and its Warsaw Pact allies the services and technologies they need for complex energy projects. invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 to “pre- Russian defense firms have been cut vent NATO from overthrowing the legiti- off from key technologies. Russia mate government in Prague.”9 is in deep recession. So Russia’s On the other hand, Russia so far has actions in Ukraine are hurting Russia not crossed NATO’s “red line” that would and hurting the Russian people.13 lead an Ally to invoke Article 5.10 Maybe, as some argue, Russian President Vladi- True, Europe’s support for the sanc- mir Putin is not that big a risk-taker, tions regime showed signs of waver- in which case NATO’s strengthened ing over this past spring; in March, for military posture and capabilities were example, Italian Foreign Minister Paolo not necessary to deter him. But given Gentiloni publicly favored a relaxation

64 The Journal of International Security Affairs Deterring Russia: Has NATO Succeeded? of sanctions against the Kremlin.14 And the Allies fail to follow through on their one can expect, of course, that Russian commitments to defend their interests President Vladimir Putin will continue and values outside Europe, Russian lead- his lobbying in various capitals on the ers might rationally conclude that at least Continent for a lifting of sanctions.15 some of those Allies would be willing However, the G-7 seems to be holding the to shrug off their responsibilities within line, declaring: “We recall that the dura- Europe, as well. tion of sanctions should be clearly linked “Our Alliance remains an essential to Russia’s complete implementation of source of stability in this unpredictable the Minsk agreements and respect for world,” the Wales declaration reminded Ukraine’s sovereignty. They can be rolled us. Left unsaid—but just as true—is that back when Russia meets these commit- the gap between acknowledging that fact ments. However, we also stand ready and mobilizing our national and collec- to take further restrictive measures in tive resources and political will to project order to increase cost on Russia should “stability” is still alarmingly wide. its actions so require.”16 Given the foregoing, it appears possible—indeed, likely—that Ukraine will take its place among the misnamed “frozen conflicts” that have descended upon Georgia and Moldova over the past two decades. Such a state of affairs 1. “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” nato.int, April would significantly increase the latent 3, 2008, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/offi- cial_texts_8443.htm. instability on Europe’s periphery. 2. Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Poised to Put Heavy Weaponry in East Europe,” New York Times, June 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes. Interconnected parts com/2015/06/14/world/europe/us-poised-to-put- NATO, meanwhile, faces yet another heavy-weaponry-in-east-europe.html?_r=0. challenge: balancing competing priori- 3. Robert Gates, “The Future of NATO,” speech to ties. The understandable focus at Wales the Security and Defense Agenda in Brussels, on reaffirming the deterrence and collec- June 20, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/ speech.aspx?speechid=1581. tive defense aspects of the Alliance risks 4. “Financial and Economic Data Relating to overshadowing its other “core tasks”— NATO Defence,” North Atlantic Treaty Organi- crisis management and cooperative secu- zation Communiqué, February 24, 2014, http:// rity. Yet the continuing, complex, and www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/ pdf_topics/20140224_140224-PR2014-028-De- violent conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, fence-exp.pdf. Note that the latest NATO figures Iraq, and parts of northern Africa (espe- are based on 2013 budgets. cially Libya and the Sahel) will pose an 5. Defense Security Cooperation Agency news array of dangers for, and demands upon, release, March 25, 2015, http://www.dsca.mil/ news-media/news-archive/first-us-armored- the Transatlantic Alliance for years, pos- hmmwvs-arrive-ukraine-greeted-president-po- sibly decades, to come. And simmering roshenko. tensions elsewhere—arising from the 6. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Israel-Palestinian impasse and unsolved “Remarks by President Obama and Chancellor Merkel in Joint Press Conference,” February 9, Iranian nuclear dossier, to cite only two 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- examples—could reach a boiling point office/2015/02/09/remarks-president-obama-and- with little advance warning. chancellor-merkel-joint-press-conference. But responding to those real and 7. Zachary Keck, “Russia Threatens to Deploy Nuclear Weapons in Crimea,” The National potential dangers is not unrelated to Interest, June 1, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/ the problem of deterring Russia from blog/the-buzz/russia-threatens-deploy-nuclear- potentially dangerous behavior. For if weapons-crimea-13013.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 65 Leo Michel

8. “Russia Threatens to Aim Nuclear Missiles ruary 2015. See “US Intelligence Chief Says He at Denmark Ships if it Joins NATO Shield,” Backs Arming Ukraine,” VOA News, Febru- Reuters, March 22, 2015, http://www.reuters. ary 26, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/ com/article/2015/03/22/us-denmark-russia- united-states-intelligence-chief-backs-arming- idUSKBN0MI0ML20150322. ukraine/2660637.html. 9. Martin Plichta, “Quand Moscou réécrit l’histoire 13. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, du ‘printemps de Prague,’” Le Monde (Paris), “Remarks by President Obama in Press Confer- June 5, 2015, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/arti- ence after G7 Summit,” June 8, 2015, https://www. cle/2015/06/04/quand-moscou-reecrit-l-histoire- whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/08/ du-printemps-de-prague_4646982_3214.html. remarks-president-obama-press-conference- 10. NATO’s Article 5 states, in part: “The Parties after-g7-summit. agree that an armed attack against one or more 14. Conor Gaffey, “Italian Foreign Minister Calls of them in Europe or North America shall be for End to Russia Sanctions,” Newsweek, considered an attack against them all.” To date, March 31, 2015, http://europe.newsweek.com/ NATO has invoked Article 5 only once—in italian-foreign-minister-calls-end-russian-sanc- response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the tions-318257. United States. 15. See, for example, Don Melvin, “Putin: Sanctions 11. See, for example, White House, Office of Have Cost Italy Dearly,” CNN, June 10, 2015, the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President http://www.click2houston.com/news/putin-sanc- Obama to the People of Estonia,” September 3, tions-have-cost-italy-dearly/33501856. 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- 16. The G-7 includes the United States, Canada, office/2014/09/03/remarks-president-obama-peo- France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United ple-estonia. Kingdom. The June 2015 G-7 statement is avail- 12. U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clap- able at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- per also raised this possibility in testimony to office/2015/06/08/g-7-leaders-declaration. the Senate Armed Services Committee in Feb-

66 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Changing Face of Cyber Conflict

Paul Rosenzweig

uch of what the U.S. military is doing to prepare for conflict in cyberspace is misguided. We are, in effect, preparing to fight the last war against the last Menemy. We conceive of the conflict as involving a contest between peer nation- states—the U.S. and China, for example. What we are systematically missing is some- thing we can characterize as the democratization of conflict in cyberspace. We are seeing a sea-change in the capability of non-state actors, ad hoc groups and even individuals, allowing them to compete on an almost level playing field with nation-states, and to do significant damage to our national security interests. If we do not re-conceptualize how we think about cyber security, policy, and conflict, we are in danger of missing the boat.

Snowden, and after Consider the following question: what or who has been the most significant cause of damage (through cyber means) to the national security in recent years? By any abso- lute measure, one suspects that the most likely answer is: Edward Snowden, a single individual who, through his own activities, or perhaps with a small cadre of a few fellow travelers, caused immense damage to American national security interests. Think of what has happened since 2013 by virtue of Snowden’s activities. We have have suffered major diplomatic difficulties. There is a significant amount of anger at the United States among our allies and friends in Europe at what they perceive to be American spying against their own national security interests. They knew that we did it, but now that it is out in the open, they can no longer deny it, and they are annoyed.

Paul Rosenzweig is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company, and a Senior Advisor to The Chertoff Group. He formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security. Paul Rosenzweig

Even worse, the disclosures have closing it.1 That demonstrates the damage given China and Russia the opportunity to national security interests that a single to create a perception of false equiva- individual, or a small group of actors, can lence, if you will, between the nature of do. They are not affiliated with any nation- what they are doing, which is widespread state, except perhaps after the fact. They rampant economic espionage, and what have no sovereign interest that we can the United States has been engaged in, address or talk to. They are, in essence, which by and large has been more tra- a combination of political activism, ideol- ditional national security intelligence ogy, criminality, and an adherence to some activities. Edward Snowden’s actions form of an anarcho-libertarianism—com- have also disclosed intelligence sources bined with what appears to be a great and methods, to the detriment of the deal of narcissism. United States. As result, we have already Thus, when we look at cyber con- seen terrorist groups and other govern- flict and threats to national security, we ments change their communication activ- should not focus exclusively on other ities, so that we are no longer as readily national opponents. Rather, our cyber able to intercept their communications strategy needs to account for the “democ- and understand their plans. China, for ratization” of conflict, because the tools example, was alerted to a particularly and weapons of attack are now widely significant penetration of one of their available throughout the globe and the cyber systems as a result of the Snowden use of force (since information is a tool of leaks—a penetration that, presumably, force) is no longer the exclusive province has since been terminated. That amounts of nation-states. to major damage to the national security interests of the United States. Wiki-War And then, of course, there is the In this light, I would argue that we domestic political uproar. Last year, an are in the midst of what Thomas Kuhn amendment to completely defund por- would call a paradigm shift.2 It is a shift tions of the NSA’s intelligence activity that is empowering individuals to act with programs failed by only 12 votes in the force in ways that were beyond our con- House of Representatives just before the ception a few short years ago. To see one August recess; the vote was 217 to 205. example of that paradigm shift in prac- Just a few weeks ago, Congress passed— tice, it is useful to reflect on what we might and the President signed into law—the call the “WikiLeaks War” from 2010. USA Freedom Act, significantly curtail- With the disclosure of classified ing the intelligence collection activities of information from American sources like the NSA. When, in the course of Ameri- Chelsea Manning, information clear- can history, has a vote to essentially close inghouse WikiLeaks appeared to be down a portion of our national security launching an assault on state authority apparatus come that close to success, (and more particularly, on that of the much less succeeded? United States, although other govern- The foregoing highlights the scope of ments were also identified). Confronted the damage that Snowden has done, and with WikiLeaks’ anti-sovereign slant, the done as essentially an independent actor. institutions of traditional commerce soon Indeed, in a rather unguarded moment, responded. There is no evidence to sug- Snowden admitted that he actually took gest that any of the governments affected the job at Booz Allen Hamilton for the ordered any actions, but the combination purpose of collecting classified informa- of governmental displeasure and clear tion with an eye toward eventually dis- public disdain for Wikileaks founder

68 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Changing Face of Cyber Conflict

Julian Assange soon led a number of cyberspace, waged almost exclusively major Western corporations (Master- between non-state actors. Card, PayPal, and Amazon, to name The failure of Anonymous to effec- three) to withhold their services from the tively target corporate websites and organization. Amazon reclaimed rented its relative vulnerability to counterat- server space that WikiLeaks had used tack are, likely, only temporary circum- and the two financial institutions stopped stances. Anonymous (and its opponents) processing donations made to the group. will learn from this battle and approach What followed might well be the next one with a greater degree of described as the first cyber battle skill and a better perspective on how to between non-state actors. Supporters of achieve their ends. Indeed, many of their WikiLeaks, loosely organized in a group more recent attacks—such as the effort under the name “Anonymous” (naturally), to shut down the Vatican website—show began a series of distributed denial-of- a great deal of additional sophistication service (DDoS) attacks on the websites of and effectiveness. those major corporations they thought had Moreover, Anonymous has dem- taken an anti-WikiLeaks stand, in order onstrated that, even with its limited to flood and prevent legitimate access to capacity, it can do significant damage to them. The website of the Swedish pros- individuals and companies. When Aaron ecuting authority (which was seeking Mr. Barr, the corporate head of a security Assange’s extradition to Sweden to face firm, HB Gary, announced that his firm criminal charges) was also hacked. Some was investigating the identity of Anony- of the coordination for the DDoS attacks mous participants, the group retaliated. was done through social media, such as Its members hacked the HB Gary net- Facebook or Twitter. Meanwhile, other work (itself a significantly embarrassing supporters created hundreds of mirror development for a cybersecurity com- sites, replicating WikiLeaks content, so pany) and took possession of internal that it effectively could not be shut down. emails that, in turn, suggested that HB The hackers even adopted a military- Gary was engaged in some questionable style nomenclature, dubbing their efforts business practices. As a result, Barr was “Operation Payback.” forced to resign his post—exactly the When Anonymous attacked, the type of individual consequence that is other side fought back. The major sure to deter an effective counterinsur- sites used defensive cyber protocols to gent response. oppose Anonymous. Most attacks were More to the point, Anonymous has relatively unsuccessful. The announced made quite clear that it intends to con- attack on Amazon, for example, was tinue to prosecute the cyberwar against, abandoned shortly after it began because among others, the United States. “It’s a the assault was ineffective. Perhaps even guerrilla cyberwar—that’s what I call more tellingly, someone (no group has, to it,” according to Barrett Brown, a self- my knowledge, publicly claimed credit) described senior strategist and “propa- began an offensive cyber operation gandist” for Anonymous. “It’s sort of against Anonymous itself. Anonymous an unconventional asymmetrical act of ran its operations through a website, warfare that we’re involved in, and we AnonOps.net, and that website was sub- didn’t necessarily start it. I mean, this ject to DDoS counterattacks that took it fire has been burning.”3 Or, consider the offline for a number of hours. In short, a manifesto posted by Anonymous, declar- conflict readily recognizable as a battle ing cyberspace independence from world between competing forces took place in governments: “I declare the global social

The Journal of International Security Affairs 69 Paul Rosenzweig space we are building together to be nat- understanding of the new nature of cyber urally independent of the tyrannies and conflict, and for demonstrating that injustices you seek to impose on us. You military means are not the only ones of have no moral right to rule us nor do you addressing cyber intrusions.5 Recall that possess any real methods of enforcement the hack, conducted by a group identified we have true reason to fear.”4 In February as the “Guardians of Peace,” exfiltrated 2012, Anonymous went still further, for- terabytes of data from Sony. Some of that mally declaring “war” against the United data involved unreleased films; other data States and calling on its citizens to rise included embarrassing internal emails and revolt. and proprietary information. Beyond Indeed, in many ways, Anonymous the damage resulting from the release conducts itself in the same manner that of confidential information, the hackers an opposing military organization might. also demanded that Sony withhold from Also in February 2012, for example, release The Interview, a movie depicting it was disclosed that Anonymous had the assassination of North Korean leader hacked into a telephone conversation Kim Jong-Un. After delaying the release between the FBI and Scotland Yard, the for several days, Sony eventually made subject of which was the development the movie available through several alter- of a legal case against the group. That nate outlets. The FBI (relying in part on sort of tactic—intercepting the enemy’s information provided by the NSA) attrib- communications—is exactly the type of uted the intrusion to North Korean gov- tactic an insurgency might use. And by ernment agents. Estimates of damage to disclosing the capability, Anonymous Sony’s financial interests range upward has successfully sown uncertainty about of $100 million (though, of course, Sony how much else it might be intercepting. isn’t saying).6 In advancing their agenda, the Here we have a group probably members of Anonymous look some- affiliated with a minor state actor, North what like the anarchists who led move- Korea, using cyber means to degrade ments in the late 19th and early 20th the economic interests of the citizens of centuries, albeit anarchists with a vastly another nation, the U.S. (Some experts, greater network and far more ability to incidentally, doubt the attribution to advance their nihilistic agenda through North Korea, but for now let us provision- individual action. And, like the anar- ally accept it.) How shall we characterize chists of old, they have their own internal this action? It had no kinetic effects, nor disputes. In 2011 another group called did it significantly affect the American “Black Hat” effectively declared war on economy. No matter how we view it, Sony Anonymous because it disagreed with is not really considered part of the “criti- the Anonymous agenda. But even more, cal infrastructure” of the United States Anonymous and its imitators look like (although, oddly enough, in law it is char- the non-state insurgencies we have faced acterized as such). And, so, this was not in Iraq and Afghanistan—small groups an “armed attack” triggering the laws of non-state actors using asymmetric of armed conflict. Nor was it even an means of warfare to destabilize and dis- act of espionage. But calling this a state- rupt existing political authority. sponsored criminal act seems to trivial- ize its geopolitical context. The Sony hack In the end, the Sony intrusion seems The late 2014 attack on Sony Pic- to reflect a new category of conflict—a tures Entertainment provides an instruc- quasi-instrumental action by a nation- tive case for testing the limits of our state (or its non-state actor surrogates)

70 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Changing Face of Cyber Conflict that has significant non-kinetic effects take down the electric grid in the United on a target nation. Responses will not States currently. But that will not remain follow traditional military patterns. The the case for very long. We have five years, United States, for example, has publicly ten years at the outside, before the capa- announced financial sanctions against bilities of non-state actors become almost North Korea, and may very well have equivalent to those of nation-states. We taken other, quiet actions in response. have a window of opportunity to get our strategy right now, and we need to take it. Cyber Third, attribution is the hardest counterinsurgency part of the game. Knowing who the other What are the implications of this side is and what their motivations are paradigm shift for cyber military strat- represents the most difficult challenge. egy? They are profound. From Russia Identifying actors and their motivations and China, we can expect some form of is not something we can fix technologi- rationality in action. We can understand cally—although we can improve our their motivations. For example, we know “situational awareness.” why the Chinese are stealing intellectual Instead of technical fixes, we need property: to jump-start their economy. to develop cyber counterinsurgency law We likewise can make some judgments and policy that uses all of the techniques about what would annoy them and what in our arsenal to fight this kind of new would not. opponent. It will require not big disrup- In the end they are rational actors, tive military activity, but methods such just as the Russians were during the as integrating military and civilian activ- decades of the Cold War. But in the cyber ities, collecting intelligence, building host domain, the motivations of the actors are nation security, and so on. It is an effort as diverse as the number of people who are in which all the elements of national there. There are indeed many actors, with power will come into play. many different motivations. Yet we can characterize them as irrational chaotic Organizing to face the actors, unified by a disrespect for author- new threat ity, for hierarchy, for structure, a dislike Cyberspace is the most distributed, of it and an effort to work outside of it. In dynamic domain that we know of. There this structure, they look much more like are more than two-and-a-half billion insurgents that national military. people and more than a trillion things That means we need a new strategy connected to the network across the for cyber counterinsurgency.7 Three fac- globe. It changes on an hourly or daily tors that should our guide cyber strat- basis. The advanced, persistent threats egy—elements that should form the basic that are intruding on the Pentagon’s .mil assumptions of a new COIN program in computers today did not exist six months cyberspace. The first is that asymmetric or a year ago. They are newly built for conflict is here to stay. Non-state actors that purpose. The last thing we need is a with near equal power to governmental centralized, top-down hierarchy to face a actors are going to be the rule, not the diverse, multifaceted, morphing opponent exception, going forward. They can serve in a battle space that changes every day. as proxies for nation-states, but they are Yet that is exactly what we are doing. not nation-states themselves. The “big military” complex does a lot of Second, current non-state actor things well, but one of the things it does capabilities are limited. They cannot not is to turn quickly. Thus we are in the

The Journal of International Security Affairs 71 Paul Rosenzweig process of building, at the United States have a monopoly on the use of signifi- Cyber Command, a new “big cyber” to cant force to one in which the destructive go with our “Big Army.” It is currently potential of cyberspace is being increas- a sub-unified command that reports ingly democratized. Unless we adapt and to United States Strategic Command respond, we are setting ourselves up for (STRATCOM), and there are already catastrophic failure. proposals to turn it into an independent command of its own. Doing so would lock us into the old Pentagon structure of a hierarchy with lots of rules, formal reporting, acquisition requirements, and staff judge advocates who will enforce rules across the length and breadth of 1. Mollie Reilly, “Edward Snowden Says He the organization. Sought Booz Allen Hamilton Job To Gather NSA Surveillance Evidence,” Huffington Post, In this conflict space, however, a June 24, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost. model based on “Big Army” is the wrong com/2013/06/24/edward-snowden-booz-allen- one. Instead, we need a cyber force that hamilton_n_3491203.html. is far more akin to those used in special 2. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3d ed. (University of Chicago Press, operations: something that is lean, quick 1996). to react, flexible, with a flat administra- 3. Michael Isikoff, “Hacker Group Vows ‘Cyber- tive structure and elite skills. War’ on U.S. Government, Business,” MSNBC. Just look at the cyber aspects of com, March 8, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn. com/id/41972190/ns/technology_and_science- some of the current conflicts we face. The security. Obama administration is currently in the 4. The manifesto was posted as a YouTube video: midst of rethinking its strategy against “Anonymous to the Governments of the World,” the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. But April 25, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=gbqC8BnvVHQ. what will ISIS’s cyber response be? What 5. For a useful timeline of events related to the Sony might be that of the Syrian regime? The hack, see Trend Micro, “The Hack of Sony Pic- Syrian Electronic Army has already put tures: What We Know and What You Need to the United States on notice that it will Know,” December 8, 2014, http://www.trendmi- cro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/ counterattack if U.S. troops enter Syria, the-hack-of-sony-pictures-what-you-need-to- while ISIS has threatened to disrupt the know. American economy. 6. Estimates vary on the actual losses, ranging Can they do so? We simply do not from a low of $15 million, to a high of over $100 million. Compare Ceclia Kang, “Sony Pictures know. Nor do we know their likely tar- Hack Cost the Movie Studio at Least $15 Million,” gets. We need to—just as we need tar- Washington Post, Feb. 4, 2015, http://www.wash- geted weapons that can find the ISIS or ingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2015/02/04/ Syrian Electronic Army command-and- sony-pictures-hack-cost-the-movie-studio-at- least-15-million/ with Lisa Richwine, “Sony’s control servers and take them out with- Hacking Scandal Could Cost the Company $100 out taking offline the entire Syrian and Million,” Reuters, Dec. 9, 2014, http://www.busi- Iraqi electric grids. None of these tools nessinsider.com/sonys-hacking-scandal-could- and capabilities will come about as a cost-the-company-100-million-2014-12. 7. I first wrote about this in Paul Rosenzweig, result of a new unified command. “Lessons of WikiLeaks: The U.S. Needs a We are facing a brave new world. Counterinsurgency Strategy for Cyberspace,” Anonymous and their ilk are a harbinger Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder no. 2560, of things to come. Power and force are May 31, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/ reports/2011/05/lessons-of-wikileaks-the-us- being democratized, and we are not ready needs-a-counterinsurgency-strategy-for-cyber- for it. We are in the midst of a paradigm space. shift from a period when nation states

72 The Journal of International Security Affairs Finding the Islamic State’s Weak Spot

Celina B. Realuyo

ince the end of the Cold War, we live in an increasingly interconnected and thriv- ing world. For the most part, what has come to be known as globalization has Spositively transformed our lives, facilitating the free flow of goods, services, capital, ideas and technology. At the same time however, these drivers of globalization have also empowered illicit networks of terrorists, criminals and their facilitators that threaten the security and prosperity of the global community. These illicit actors, like al-Qaeda and Mexican cartels, actively capitalize on weak governance, socioeconomic vulnerabilities and corruption to conduct terrorism and crime throughout the world.

Over the past year, the dramatic rise of ISIL (the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) has emerged as the most compelling illustration of the convergence of terrorism and crime destabilizing the Middle East. Illicit networks require critical enablers, in particular illicit activities and financing, to carry out their violent agendas. ISIL derives its ideological, economic, and military strength from these enablers, and financing is the most critical of these enablers. Therefore, in order to degrade and defeat ISIL, the U.S. and its allies must enhance their efforts to attack ISIL’s funding streams.

Mapping the network At their core, illicit networks threaten the four key missions of government: (1) to guarantee the nation’s security and sovereignty, (2) to promote economic prosper- ity, (3) to safeguard society and the rule of law and (4) to ensure that the government represents the political will of the people. Through their illegal activities, terrorists, criminals and their facilitators exploit the global marketplace to promote their own

Celina B. Realuyo is Professor of Practice at the William J. Perry Center for Hemi- spheric Defense Studies, National Defense University. This article is adapted from her testimony before the House Financial Services Committee on May 21, 2015. Celina B. Realuyo interests—and do so at the expense of port to move matériel, personnel, the national security of the United States services and funding from supply to and its allies. demand points of their enterprises. Herein lies a crucial difference. While rogue nation-states and terrorist • Weapons. Illicit networks use force or groups tend to be motivated by ideology, the threat of force to dominate their transnational criminal organizations operating areas; access to weapons, (TCOs) are driven primarily by greed. the ability to deploy them, and a lack The transnational trafficking of drugs, of concern for collateral damage are arms, people, and counterfeit goods and what make illicit networks so violent the money laundering that accompanies and lethal. these illicit activities compromises the safety of consumers, robs inventors of • Technology and communications. their intellectual property, denies gov- Illicit networks diligently adopt new ernments significant tax revenues, and technology and communications undermines our economies. methods to avoid detection by secu- These illicit networks require sev- rity forces, and monitor and adapt to eral critical enablers in order to sustain changes in their areas of operation. their activities and realize their political or revenue objectives: • Corruption. Illicit networks prefer operating in ungoverned or weakly • Leadership. Illicit networks need governed spaces, where state con- leadership that directs and manages trol and oversight are lacking or can resources to achieve their mission of be compromised. While they may political objectives or maximizing not necessarily aspire to topple and profits. Their leadership can be orga- replace governments, they seek out nized in hierarchies or, more likely, officials vulnerable to corruption as loose networks of affiliates that who can facilitate illicit activities in diversify the “key man risk” associ- certain geographic areas. ated with relying on a sole leader for command and control. • Financing. Illicit networks consider revenue as both a key objective in • Personnel. Illicit networks must case of crime and an essential enabler recruit and maintain personnel to for terrorism. Financing serves as the support all aspects of their activities. lifeblood for these networks and their illicit endeavors; they derive power • Illicit activities. Illicit networks can from their wealth and use it to corrupt engage in a broad spectrum of illegal and co-opt rivals, facilitators, and/or revenue-generating activities includ- government and security officials.1 ing trafficking in narcotics, arms, humans, exotic wildlife, and contra- Combating the network band, as well as money laundering, That last element, financing, is per- cybercrime, extortion, and kidnap- haps the most vital enabler of illicit net- ping for ransom. works, as all the other critical enablers require funding. Consequently, finan- • Logistics and supply chains. Illicit cial intelligence and investigative tools networks rely on global supply are essential to better understanding, chains, commercial transportation, detecting, disrupting and dismantling resources and other logistical sup- terrorism, crime and corruption. Track-

74 The Journal of International Security Affairs Finding the Islamic State’s Weak Spot ing how terrorists and criminals raise, The convergence of move, store and use money has been terrorism and crime instrumental in degrading and defeat- Terrorism, crime and corrup- ing groups such as al-Qaeda “core,” Sri tion have existed since the beginning Lanka’s Tamil Tigers (LTTE) and the of human civilization, and tradition- FARC in Colombia. ally were addressed as local security Money serves as the oxygen for issues. Now they have gone “global.” In any activity, licit or illicit. In a globalized an age of globalization, the magnitude world, we have grown to appreciate how and velocity of terrorism and crime, “following the money trail” can enhance driven by interconnected economies and our efforts to counter illicit networks. advances in communications and tech- Since the tragic attacks of September nology, have resulted in unprecedented 11, 2001, the U.S. and other governments profits and record levels of violence. In have incorporated the financial instru- many cases, terrorist groups, interna- ment of national power in their efforts to tional drug cartels, mafias, and gangs combat terrorism and crime. They have are better armed, funded, and trained done this through intelligence and law than the government security forces enforcement operations, like the Iraq and charged with confronting them. Afghan threat finance cells, to pursue In recent years, terrorist groups have terrorist financiers and money launder- become increasingly reliant on criminal ers; public designations, sanctions and activities in order to sustain themselves asset freezes and seizure; and domestic as state sponsorships and donor support and international capacity-building in have evaporated. Insurgent movements, the counter-threat finance discipline in like the FARC in Colombia and Peru’s the public and private sectors. Shining Path, are examples of this evo- In the main, these measures have lution in Latin America, as these terror- proven effective. Enhanced anti-money ists have become increasingly involved laundering and counterterrorism finance in the cocaine and other illicit trade. measures have significantly damaged Meanwhile, some criminal organizations illicit networks. Over the past decade, have adopted ideological agendas and al-Qaeda operatives and affiliates from act more like terrorists, using violence Iraq to Afghanistan have complained against innocents. This is the case with about increased difficulty in funding the Haqqani Network in Afghanistan terrorist operations and supporting their and Pakistan, which was once consid- networks. Similarly, transnational crimi- ered a criminal mafia controlling supply nal organizations in the Western Hemi- routes. In 2012, it was designated as a sphere, like the various cartels operating Foreign Terrorist Organization by the in Mexico, realized that greater over- U.S. due to several high-profile insurgent sight of international banking and off- attacks on U.S. and other foreign person- shore accounts after September 11th nel in Afghanistan, including the assault complicated their ability to launder prof- on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul in 2011.2 its through the formal banking sector. We are now witnessing a disturb- Following the money trail and the sur- ing trend: the dangerous convergence of veillance of facilitators, like the bank- terrorism and crime that is becoming a ers and lawyers moving and sheltering formidable threat to sovereignty. Con- money for terrorist and criminal groups, vergence is defined as “the process of produced critical financial intelligence coming together and having one inter- that has led to the weakening of key est, purpose, or goal.” In the case of ter- illicit actors. rorists, that purpose is a political end

The Journal of International Security Affairs 75 Celina B. Realuyo

state and in the case of criminals, it is truckers and middlemen. By selling well maximizing profits. What terrorists and below market price, traders are incentiv- criminals have in common and how they ized to take on the risk of such black- converge is in the threat they pose to market deals. The oil-starved Assad national security and sovereignty. Such regime, Turkey, and Iraqi Kurds—all is the case with the Haqqani Network apparent enemies of ISIL—are rumored in Afghanistan, the FARC in Colombia, to be among its customers.5 al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Hezbol- Additional funding comes from lah’s global networks and now ISIL, all of extortion networks, kidnap for ransom, which have leveraged illicit activities to criminal activities like stolen antiquities realize their terrorist agendas.3 and human trafficking, and some dona- tions from external individuals.6 Ransom All eyes on ISIL payments provided ISIL upward of $20 ISIL has dominated the news since million in 2014, including large sums last summer with the brutal behead- for kidnapped European journalists ings of Western hostages, remarkable and other captives, according to the U.S. military offensives in Iraq and Syria, Treasury.7 ISIL is also believed to extort the persecution of religious minorities businesses in Mosul, netting upward of and a compelling foreign fighter recruit- $8 million a month.8 Christians who have ment campaign. As a result, the group not fled the city face an additional tax has been designated a foreign terror- levied on religious minorities. Protection ist organization by the U.S. and United rackets bring in revenue while building Nations. But ISIL also represents a for- the allegiance of some tribesmen. Exploi- midable example of the convergence of tation of natural resources and traffick- illicit networks, combining the ideologi- ing in antiquities also contribute to the cal aspirations of a terrorist group and ISIL’s coffers.9 the profit-seeking objectives of a criminal This diversified portfolio makes organization. ISIL a challenging adversary. Accord- In addition to the world headlines ingly, the financial front has once again reporting their vicious acts of violence become an indispensable aspect of against non-believers, ISIL is widely combating terrorist groups like ISIL by characterized as being the “richest” ter- attacking their financing abilities. rorist group in the world. To conduct its ambitious military operations, recruit Pushing back and support its fighters and maintain The dramatic rise of ISIL, and control of its “caliphate,” ISIL requires its ability to conduct terrorist atroci- significant financing and is engaged in ties, occupy territory in Iraq and Syria, a broad spectrum of criminal activities. attract ideological support, recruit for- The group’s principal source of eign fighters, and harness economic finances is derived from its control and resources has refocused counterterror- sale of oil, estimated at bringing in $1 ism efforts worldwide. In September of million a day, according to recent U.S. 2014, the United Nations Security Coun- Treasury Department assessments.4 The cil unanimously adopted Resolution 2178, group is estimated to produce forty-four underscoring the need to prevent the thousand barrels a day from Syrian wells “recruiting, organizing, transporting or and four thousand barrels a day from equipping of individuals who travel for Iraqi ones, although the Coalition air the purpose of the perpetration, planning campaign is impacting these production of, or participation in terrorist acts, asso- levels. The group then sells the crude to ciated with the Islamic State in Iraq and

76 The Journal of International Security Affairs Finding the Islamic State’s Weak Spot the Levant (ISIL), Al-Nusra Front (ANL) and a treasure trove of mobile phones, and other affiliates or splinter groups of computers and documents were col- Al-Qaida.”10 lected at the safe house. This operation The United States, for its part, has illustrates the growing importance of built a global coalition of some 60 nations targeting ISIL’s financial infrastructure with the aim of degrading and ultimately and the value of financial intelligence in defeating ISIL. The White House has set better understanding and undermining forward a comprehensive strategy fea- ISIL. Due to the diversified sources of turing the following nine lines of effort its income, the campaign against ISIL’s to counter ISIL, ranging from denying financing will require perseverance and the group safe haven to expanded intelli- a multi-pronged approach across agen- gence collection.11 But it is the disruption cies and jurisdictions. of ISIL’s finances that arguably repre- sents the most critical initiative being The way forward undertaken. Over the past decade, the U.S. and The U.S. strategy to counterISIL other governments have increased their financing is focused on disrupting the efforts to detect the financing of terror- group’s revenue streams, restricting ism and crime, impose economic sanc- ISIL’s access to the international finan- tions, and raise awareness of how the cial system, and targeting its leaders, international financial system can be facilitators and supporters with sanc- abused to fund the infrastructure, mem- tions. The U.S. is also collaborating with bers, and operations of these illicit actors. international partners on this issue; in To effectively counter ISIL, the financial March 2015, for example, the U.S., Italy instrument of national power must be and Saudi Arabia formally established leveraged to the fullest extent possible at the Counter-ISIL Finance Group.12 the national, regional and international Likewise, the coalition has been con- levels. The goal is simple: to starve the ducting a military air campaign against group of financing. Going after the funds the group since August 2014. “Opera- that are its lifeblood is a critical compo- tion Inherent Resolve,” now underway, nent of the overall mission to defeat the conducts targeted airstrikes of Iraq and terrorist group. Syria, at least some of which have been Here, the track record is decidedly directed at ISIL-linked oil infrastructure mixed. The international coalition against and supply networks in Syria and Iraq. ISIL has not proven very effective to According to U.S. Central Command, 152 date. Since August 2014, the U.S.-led mis- oil infrastructure targets have been dam- sion, “Operation Inherent Resolve,” has aged or destroyed as of May 8, 2015.13 conducted over 3,400 air strikes over Iraq Mobile refineries have been specifically and Syria at a reported cost of over $2.5 targeted to reduce the availability of billion.14 Yet in May 2015, ISIL made sig- refined oil products, and their success- nificant military gains by seizing control ful destruction has impacted—but not of Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province destroyed—ISIL’s illegal oil sales. in Iraq, and the ancient city of Palmyra On May 16, 2015, U.S. Special in Syria. According to the Syrian Obser- Forces operators conducted a daring raid vatory for Human Rights, an activist in Syria against Abu Sayyaf, a senior monitoring group, ISIL is now in control leader considered the Chief Financial of 50 percent of Syria. As ISIL advances Officer of ISIL. Although the high-value militarily, it enriches itself by plunder- target was killed rather than captured, ing their newly conquered territories and his wife was detained for interrogation, extorting their new subjects.15 It is feared

The Journal of International Security Affairs 77 Celina B. Realuyo that Palmyra, an historic city founded Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, over 2,000 years ago and designated as and Trade, February 4, 2014, http://docs.house. gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20140204/101702/ a UNESCO World Heritage Site, will be HHRG-113-FA18-Wstate-RealuyoC-20140204. destroyed by ISIL or be pillaged to sell pdf. looted antiquities on the black market, as 4. David S. Cohen, “Attacking ISIL’s Financial it has previously done with the 9th cen- Foundation,” Remarks at the Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace, Washington, DC, tury Assyrian palace in Nimrud, Iraq. October 23, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/ To better attack ISIL on the financial press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2672.aspx. front, the coalition should establish a spe- 5. Financial Action Task Force, Financing of the cialized counter-ISIL threat finance cell Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, February 2015, http://www. to collect, analyze, and exploit financial fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/financing- intelligence to better understand ISIL’s of-terrorist-organisation-isil.html. networks, operations, and vulnerabilities. 6. Charles Lister, “Cutting off ISIS’ Cash Flow,” It should also develop specific target sets The Brookings Institution, October 24, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/ to disrupt and destroy the financial infra- posts/2014/10/24-lister-cutting-off-isis-jabhat-al- structure of ISIL. By attacking its fund- nusra-cash-flow. ing sources, the coalition can deprive 7. Cohen, “Attacking ISIL’s Financial Foundation.” ISIL of its most critical enabler. 8. Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “The Islamic State,” Council on Foreign Relations Going forward, the United States Backgrounder, May 18, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/ and its allies will need to halt the politi- iraq/islamic-state/p14811. cal, ideological, and military advance of 9. Micah Zenko, “Preventing Cultural Destruction ISIL, and actually reclaim control of ter- by ISIS,” CFR.org, March 6, 2015, http://blogs. cfr.org/zenko/2015/03/06/guest-post-preventing- ritories occupied by the group in both cultural-destruction-by-isis/. Iraq and Syria. This daunting mission 10. United Nations, “Security Council Unanimously will require a comprehensive and proac- Adopts Resolution Condemning Violent Extrem- tive strategy—and one that, above all, ism, Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel, Sup- port for Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” September targets the group’s financial lifeblood. 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ sc11580.doc.htm. 11. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: The Administration’s Strat- egy to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Updated FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Request,” November 7, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- 1. For more, see Celina B. Realuyo, “The Future Evo- office/2014/11/07/fact-sheet-administration-s- lution of Transnational Criminal Organizations strategy-counter-islamic-state-iraq-and-leva. and the Threat to U.S. National Security,” in Paul 12. Carla E. Humud, Robert Pirog and Liana T. Bartone and Mitchell Armbruster, eds., The Rosen, Islamic State Financing and U.S. Policy Shifting Human Environment: How Trends in Approaches, Congressional Research Service, Human Geography Will Shape Future Military April 10, 2015, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ Operations (National Defense University Press, terror/R43980.pdf. May 2015), http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/2015/05/06/ 13. U.S. Department of Defense, “Operation Inherent dtp-107-shifting-human-environment-how- Resolve,” n.d., http://www.defense.gov/home/fea- trends-in-human-geography-will-shape-future- tures/2014/0814_iraq/. military-operations/. 14. Alexander Mallin, “Inside the Nerve Center 2. Karen DeYoung, “Haqqani Network to be of the US-Led Campaign Against ISIS,” ABC Designated a Terrorist Group,” Washington News.com, June 7, 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/ Post, September 7, 2012, http://www.wash- International/inside-nerve-center-us-led-cam- ingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ paign-isis/story?id=31595463. haqqani-network-to-be-designated-a-terrorist- 15. Pamela Engel, “The ISIS Economy Just Got a group-obama-officials-say/2012/09/07/e6576ac0- Huge Boost,” Business Insider, June 1, 2015, http:// f8f6-11e1-a073-78d05495927c_story.html. www.businessinsider.com/the-isis-economy-just- 3. Celina B. Realuyo, testimony before the House of got-a-huge-boost-2015-6#ixzz3cif10nR3. Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs

78 The Journal of International Security Affairs Perspective

The Danger of Incorrect Assumptions An Interview with The Honorable Douglas J. Feith

he Honorable Douglas J. Feith is one of America’s best known national security practitioners. A lawyer by training, he began his career in the office of Sen- Tator Henry “Scoop” Jackson in the mid-1970s, going on to serve on the staff of the National Security Council and at the Pentagon during the Reagan administra- tion. He left government service in the late 1980s to go into private law practice, but rejoined the government in July of 2001 to serve as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the administration of President George W. Bush—a position he held until August of 2005. Thereafter, he taught at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and was associated with Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and Stanford’s Hoover Institution. He currently serves as a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, where he directs the Institute’s Center for National Security Strategies.

On May 26, 2015, Secretary Feith spoke with Journal editor Ilan Berman regarding the threat posed by the Islamic State, the Obama administration’s efforts to hammer out a nuclear deal with Iran, and the tragic course of the Syrian civil war. What follows is an edited transcript of his remarks.

Over the past year, the terrorist group known as the Islamic State has erupted onto the international scene. Its battlefield successes in Iraq and Syria, and its radical, absolutist worldview, have resonated in many corners of the Muslim World, to the point that it has now surpassed al-Qaeda in terms of both prominence and reach. How grave is the threat it poses to American national security?

It’s a serious threat. I view it as part of the broader Islamist attack on the United States and on the West in general. The Islamic State is a particularly worrisome part of that picture because it’s shown an interest in moving beyond simply being an ideological movement and terrorist group. It now controls substantial territory, population, and Perspective economic resources, and functions in the real world, claiming to be the universal caliph- ate. That’s part of the reason it’s excited so many people across the Muslim World, and is doing so well in recruitment.

If the Islamic State succeeds in taking either Baghdad or Damascus, two venerated Arab capitals that each served as the capitals of caliphates, it would enormously excite a lot of young people throughout the Muslim world and increase its strength and capa- bilities greatly. For this reason, the Islamic State is very much worth worrying about. The group has the economic resources, the political will and hostility, and an increasing capability to assert its revolution and do great harm to its enemies. And the Islamic State considers the United States an enemy.

This brings us to Iraq. The recent advances made there by the Islamic State have made clear that the Iraq policy pursued by the Obama administration to date is woe- fully deficient. Yet new approaches—either military or diplomatic—are in short supply. What can Washington in fact do to help secure the Iraqi state?

The Obama administration has blamed Iraq for failing to confront the Islamic State successfully. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter recently said that Iraqi forces performed so poorly in the field because they lacked the will to fight. There may be something to that analysis, but the U.S. administration bears some responsibility too for the Iraqi government’s failure.

The Obama administration helped create this problem through its passivity, and now justifies further passivity by saying that it doesn’t have any good options. In Iraq, Syria and elsewhere, if we had been more farsighted and active early on, we might have been able to improve the situation through relatively minor actions. Now, in order to improve matters, we need to take major actions. U.S. officials who weren’t inclined to take minor steps can’t now be expected to take major actions. So these problems are metastasizing.

If we stick with the premises of the Obama national security doctrine, there’s almost nothing that can be done. The only way the United States can begin to remedy the situa- tion in the Middle East, and elsewhere, is to adopt a comprehensively different approach to national security affairs. A complete overhaul is required.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has emerged as one of the most prominent players in today’s fight against the Islamic State. What are Iran’s priorities in the campaign it is currently waging in Iraq? And is cooperation with Tehran on this issue in fact possible?

In the Middle East today, we have a number of large strategic concerns. One of them is something we have already discussed: the Islamic State. But Iranian revolutionary activity is also a major challenge for the United States. Iran is deeply hostile to the United States for ideological reasons. It thinks of itself as a revolutionary government, and wants to dominate its region and exert influence beyond it.

Iran is a strategic problem, and not—as the Obama administration seems to think—a strategic partner and a strategic opportunity. We should oppose Iran at the same time that we are opposing the Islamic State. The fact that we have some interests that overlap with Iranian interests doesn’t make Iran a sensible partner for us.

80 The Journal of International Security Affairs Perspective

The Obama administration has made the conclusion of some sort of agreement over Iran’s nuclear program a centerpiece of its second-term foreign policy agenda. By all indications, the United States—together with the other P5+1 powers—is now closing in on that goal. But how durable an agreement is this deal likely to be? And what are its implications for America’s other priorities and equities in the Middle East?

Something durable is not what’s intended. What the Obama administration intends is for this deal to somehow handle the political problems posed by Iranian nuclear ambi- tions. Its perspective is short term. Its approach will be as ineffective in constraining the Iranians as arms control agreements of this type have been in limiting actions and capabilities of non-democratic regimes over the last century. I don’t know if it would be possible to coerce this Iranian regime to stop developing nuclear weapons, but I don’t believe it’s possible to get Iran to do so by means of a deal that relies on the Iranian regime’s voluntary cooperation.

Iran has defied a large part of the world in developing and pursuing its nuclear pro- gram. This agreement absolves their efforts of sin. It suggests that Iran has successfully stared down the international community. Many medium-sized powers will conclude that the era when nuclear weapons were in the hands of only a small number of large powers is over. That will convince countries like Egypt, Turkey, and the Gulf States that they need nuclear capabilities of their own. The proliferation effect will extend beyond the Middle East. In a few years, we may see an explosion, so to speak, in the number of nuclear powers.

We have lived for 70 years since the end of World War II without any wars involv- ing nuclear detonations. Non-proliferation policy has been an astonishing success. The pending deal with Iran undermines that success and, by making proliferation far more likely, will make nuclear war far more likely. It is grimly ironic that a U.S. president who championed “global zero”—the notion that the world can rid itself of nuclear weapons— is determined to make a deal with Iran that will have the effect of destroying the world’s non-proliferation architecture. That will be the deal’s effect even if Iran complies with its promises and even if it behaves moderately after acquiring nuclear weapons. And I don’t believe that either of those “ifs” is realistic.

Syria’s brutal civil war is now nearly four-and-a-half years old, but contrary to the expectations of most Western observers, the regime of Bashar al-Assad still remains ensconced in Damascus. How stable is Assad’s rule, really? And what—if anything— should the United States do to shape the contours of that conflict?

What got us into this situation in the first place is that the Obama administration did not want to see Syria as an element of the Iran problem. Here, too, Administration think- ing is driven by the idea that Iran is a strategic partner and a strategic opportunity for the United States. So the White House wasn’t inclined to see the Syrian civil war, where Assad was fighting brutally to preserve his dictatorship and doing so with heavy assistance from Iran, as Iran-related. U.S. officials looked at the war as a free-standing problem with no broader strategic context. They assumed that Assad wouldn’t be able to remain in power.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 81 Perspective

Early on in the anti-Assad revolt, a small amount of encouragement and military sup- port from the United States to the rebels opposing Assad might have led to consoli- dation of the rebel forces. It might have closed off the option for other states to arm extremist Islamist groups entering the fray. And it might have encouraged Syrians on the political fence to join the rebels before the civil war became large scale. That might have given rise to a non-extremist rebel coalition that could have swept away Assad early on. I don’t know if that would have happened, but it was never tried. Instead, President Obama chose laissez-faire. In the absence of American engagement, support for Islamist extremist groups came in from around the region. That altered the nature of the revolt against Assad.

Now we’re at a point where Assad’s victory would be damaging for the United States, and a great strategic victory for Iran, but Assad’s defeat could be a major success for the Islamic State. Our options are worse than they appeared to be a few years ago. The U.S. government has maneuvered itself into a corner. Almost nothing that happens there will be good for the Syrian people, or for American interests.

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Finland’s Balancing Act Charly Salonius-Pasternak

HELSINKI—Today, the chorus of voices concerned about the increased instability of the Baltic Sea region can be heard clearly in Finland. According to recent polling, the percentage of Finns concerned about Russia has increased from 42 percent to 75 percent during the past year, largely as a function of Moscow’s aggressive foreign policy toward Ukraine. Yet on the whole, Finnish officials—and Finnish society at large—are not as alarmed about Russia’s actions as their neighbors.

For a country that is geographically located next to two of Russia’s strategically impor- tant areas (St. Petersburg and adjacent energy export facilities, and the Koala Penin- sula/Murmansk), which shares a 1,300-kilometer border with the revanchist state, and which fought Russia twice during World War II, Finland’s official attitude may seem strange. However, it reflects a quiet confidence that the country is today well positioned to withstand potential Russian threats.

Like many other countries, over the past two decades Finland has hoped that Russia would continue on its own path toward some kind of liberal democracy. Even in early 2014, when Russia launched its “hybrid war” against Ukraine, many in the political establishment in Helsinki still hoped that backsliding would turn out to be temporary, or at least that its impacts on Russian foreign policy and its neighbors would be limited. By summer 2014, however, Finnish politicians were forced to acknowledge that Russia’s aggressive foreign policy and military behavior had become the new normal.

This new normal, entailing the illegal annexation of Crimea and continuing war in parts of Eastern Ukraine, has also forced Finland to break new ground in its foreign

Charly Salonius-Pasternak is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute for International Affairs. Dispatches policy, especially vis-à-vis Russia. In stark contrast to its neutrality during the Cold War, Finland now finds itself an active player in an unfolding regional power struggle.

To appreciate Finnish views regarding Russia, it is necessary to understand that for most Finns, there is no problem holding two seemingly contradictory thoughts in one’s head. First, that Russia is and will remain a neighbor with whom it is worthwhile to trade, deepen cultural, athletic, societal, tourist-travel ties. Second, that Russia is the only potential existential threat to Finland and the Finnish people.

Economically Russia is one of Finland’s top three trading partners (along with Sweden and Germany). Interaction in the tourism and service industries is particularly robust, with millions of Russian tourists visiting annually. Moreover, Finland imports all of its natural gas and over 90 percent of its oil and coal from Russia, meaning that around half of the country’s energy use is dependent on Russia. Nevertheless, domestic reserves and the availability of foreign suppliers help limit Russia’s energy leverage over the Finnish polity.

Militarily, meanwhile, Russia’s improved strategic capabilities—and its growing will- ingness to consider military means as an element of its foreign policy—have jump- started Finnish efforts to fix specific weaknesses in an otherwise historically robust defense. With strong political backing and popular support, the Finnish Defense Forces continue to concentrate on training and equipping a large reservist-based military, recently downsized to a wartime strength of 230,000 soldiers. This “old- fashioned” conscript to reserve model enables Finland to better address the modern Russian approach to warfare; for example, hundreds of top cyber professionals can simply be ordered to report to duty in the event of a crisis. Meanwhile, an air force using American F/A-18 jets with state of the art weapons, including the Joint Air-to- Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), and a small but very modern navy combine to form a not-insignificant deterrent.

The fundamental reason for the lack of alarmism in Finland, however, is trust in the concept of comprehensive societal security. Finland has continued to invest in security of supply, with the private and public sectors cooperating extensively to ensure that everything from drugs to food to energy continues to be available even during extended crises. More profoundly, Finland’s universal literacy, economic equality, freedom of the press, multi-party democracy and trust in the rule of law provide a generally inhospi- table environment for anyone seeking to foment violent uprisings or cause fear. This “deep security” ultimately makes Finland quite resilient against—although not immune to—Russian threats.

This general confidence does not mean that Finnish officials or the population at large do not take the increasing aggressiveness and unpredictability of Russia seriously. Finns have first-hand experience of how life changes when revolutions and war envelop Russia. In recent polls, nearly half of the Finns think the military situation in general is more threatening (46 percent in 2014, as compared to 21 percent in 2013), and 63 per- cent think Russia’s recent actions have negatively impacted Finnish security. Perhaps most ominously, the percentage of citizens who think Finland is likely to be threatened militarily during the next decade has increased from 7 percent to 21 percent in one year.

84 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

The axiom that “if you want peace, prepare for war” is one that is now taken very seriously, precisely because of Russia’s potential to threaten Finland. As always, the ultimate decision regarding war will not be made in Helsinki. Yet today’s Finns—like their forbears—believe their country is worth defending. But, like previous generations, they hope that that day will never come.

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The Journal of International Security Affairs 85 Dispatches

China’s Changing Foreign Policy Priorities Da Wei and Sun Chenghao

BEIJING—For almost two decades, the question of whether China should focus primar- ily on its immediate neighborhood or on the world’s major powers (particularly the U.S.) has been a hotly debated topic among the country’s foreign policy elite. In the 1990s, the answer seemed clear; the China-U.S. relationship was viewed as a “priority among pri- orities.” During the first decade of this century, the two directions became more equal when President Hu Jintao made regional diplomacy a “priority” of his government, while ties with major powers simultaneously became “key.” Now, neighborhood diplo- macy has gained more prominence still in the strategy of Chinese President Xi Jinping.

One signal of this shift emerged during the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s November 2014 Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs. At that event, President Xi stressed that China “should promote neighborhood diplomacy, turn… neighborhood areas into a community of common destiny, continue to follow the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness in conducting neighborhood diplomacy.” By contrast, when he elaborated on the issue of how to deal with “major countries,” Xi merely said that “we should manage well relations with other major countries, build a sound and stable framework of major-country relations.” The emphasis on the former over the latter was clear.

This has proved to be more than mere rhetoric. Over the past several years, Beijing has worked extensively to deepen its economic links with neighboring countries. Thus, China proposed the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” (collectively known as “the Belt and Road Initiative”) during President Xi’s Fall 2013 visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia. More recently, China has proposed the creation of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to build basic infrastructure in the region. In these efforts, and others, China’s goal is the promotion of economic prosperity and greater integration in the region.

This reorientation has a security dimension as well. At the Fourth Summit of the Con- ference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), which took place in Shanghai in May of 2014, President Xi proposed a new security concept for China, and called for the establishment of a new framework for regional security coop- eration. In addition, the possible expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to include countries such as India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and even Turkey will provide another cooperative mechanism for building the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and conducting regional diplomacy.

Like it or not, the adjustment of China’s foreign policy priorities is natural. For most of the world’s countries, their immediate neighborhood represents a natural priority.

Da Wei is Director of the Institute of American Studies at the China Institutes of Con- temporary International Relations.

Sun Chenghao is Research Fellow at the Institute.

86 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

This is most certainly the case in Asia, home to the most robust and promising econo- mies in the world, where 1/3 of the world’s population lives, and where four countries (Russia, India, Pakistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) currently pos- sess nuclear weapons. The Obama administration has already engaged in a “pivot” of its strategic priorities to Asia-Pacific. Why, then, should we be surprised when China emphasizes the importance of its neighborhood?

China’s shift in foreign policy priorities is not necessarily bad news for the United States. After all, China’s leadership has been very clear in its view that the U.S. will remain the leading power in the world for the foreseeable future. Beijing believes that America can play a role helping China achieve its “Chinese Dream” of modernization, if the bilateral relationship remains constructive. It can also hinder or even undermine China’s rise, should relations deteriorate. For these reasons, the U.S. remains a critical country for China. It is also why China has proposed to build a “new model of major country rela- tionship” with America. As President Xi has outlined, such a relationship would mean no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation in a number of spheres. The goal is to achieve a long-term framework with the United States within which both countries can coexist peacefully via constructive cooperation and healthy competition.

There are other benefits as well. Given the fact that the U.S. is rebalancing its foreign policy resources to Asia-Pacific, China’s shift may decrease the risk of strategic col- lision between the two countries. The “Belt and Road” will go westward and south- ward from China, toward Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and beyond. This approach means that China and the U.S., which is now focusing on East Asia and the West Pacific, may face fewer divergences and disputes. Indeed, the “Belt and Road Ini- tiative” could actually create opportunities for China and the United States to cooperate economically, since both Washington and Beijing have a shared interest in the stability and development of Afghanistan, Pakistan, South Asia and Central Asia.

Thus, while it may not seem like it at first blush, China’s shift of foreign policy priorities away from America and toward its neighborhood may actually be good news for the bilateral relationship in the long run.

The Journal of InCongratulationsternational Security A ffairs 87 to the recipients of the 2014 Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award and the Grateful Nation Award Dispatches

Needed: A New Counterterrorism Alliance in North Africa José María Gil Garre

MADRID—Relations between Spain, France and Morocco are increasingly central to the security and development of the Maghreb. Global terrorism is evolving, and throughout North Africa its various manifestations—most recently in the form of the Islamic State and its various franchises in Libya and the Sahara—have added to the complexity of the regional environment, and to the potential dangers it holds for Europe and the United States.

This evolution requires a more comprehensive, networked and effective response than exists to date. Here, a new security axis encompassing Paris, Madrid and Rabat could serve an important—and beneficial—purpose.

Recall that each of the three countries, by virtue of their geographic position (Spain), role in the Muslim world (Morocco) and involvement in African security (France) has emerged as a notable target for extremist forces. This shared status creates a common interest for reliable intelligence, and military and legal cooperation that could help ame- liorate the threat. In turn, such an integrated system of intelligence collection and analy- sis and strategic coordination could rebound to the security of the larger European community, and of the United States.

To be sure, practical hurdles to this type of coordination remain. Among the most sig- nificant is the question of the Western Sahara, the current, uncertain territorial status of which has allowed threats to proliferate. That is an unfortunate state of affairs, given that a workable solution was put forth some time ago by Morocco, in the form of a pro- posal for “advanced regionalization” and autonomy under Moroccan rule. But, without a firm international consensus on the status of the region, local threats have evolved— and exploited the territory’s uncertain status. Most notable among these is the Polisario Front, a rebel group created, promoted and financed by Algeria, which has used the Western Sahara as a conduit for criminal activities, as well as for its long-running fight against the Moroccan state.

This represents a dangerous state of affairs. As recent experience has clearly shown, situations of this sort—regardless of their nature—present an attractive target and an arena in which jihadist groups can proliferate. The clearest examples of this phenom- enon can be seen in the nearby cases of Libya and Mali, but the rule also pertains to the more high-profile conflict now raging in Syria.

Despite this and other problems, however, broader regional cooperation is feasible—and necessary. Effective internation military action requires information-sharing, prompt

Professor Gil serves as the director of counterterrorism studies at the Instituto de Seguridad Global in Madrid, Spain (www.institutodeseguridadglobal.com).

88 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches intelligence analysis, and a “fusion” of these functions among involved parties. The same is true in the case of counterterrorism. And with regional threats from North Africa increasingly migrating to threaten the Eurozone, the frontline states of Morocco, Spain and France are uniquely positioned to serve as a buffer.

Institutionalizing a more durable counterterrorism partnership among the three requires moving beyond existing bilateral cooperation treaties on security and legal matters into a more consolidated, and effective, framework. Doing so faces many practical chal- lenges (not least the unique bilateral politics between Morocco and its two one-time colonial powers, France and Spain). But this shared history is precisely what makes a tripartite counterterrorism partnership so feasible—and so potentially effective. Put simply, all three know each other well, and—putting other political issues aside—have a shared interest in deeper and more effective coordination against the Islamist threat.

Recent events in Libya, and the growing salience of the Islamic State beyond the Middle East, necessitates this type of thinking. North African security stands at a vital cross- roads, and it is clear that, in the face of the metastasizing threat of global terrorism, there is considerable strength in numbers.

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HII_ad RW.indd 1 10/22/2014 1:38:28 PM The Journal of International Security Affairs 89

Book Reviews

Russia’s Manufactured Reality Jason Czerwiec

Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing is True Everything is Possible, he takes us inside and Everything is Possible: The Surreal a “new” Russia that is both plagued by Heart of the New Russia (New York: doubt and sure of its destiny. This anxi- Public Affairs, 2014), 256 pp. $25.99. ety and destiny have come to be encap- sulated, through a symbiosis of state and media, in the person of Russian In October of 1939, Winston President Vladimir Putin. Pomerantsev’s Churchill gave a speech that contained book speaks to the reader about the post- what, in the latter half of the twentieth Soviet psyche. It provides glimpses of the century, would become the prevailing mechanisms of power that the Kremlin description of Russian society. Russia, exercises through a carefully constructed Churchill said, “is a riddle wrapped in a media monopoly and through a totalizing mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps vertical integration of coercive control. there is a key.” That key was Russian The stories he tells are brief forays into national interest, and while at the time the heart of that machine. Churchill was speaking in purely geo- Beyond these raw insights, there is political terms, his rule has been taken not much in the way of strategic think- to heart in the years since by scores of ing in this book. We never do get a clear Western analysts hoping to peel back the handle on what makes Russia tick. Per- layers of the Russian enigma. haps the author believes this feat is unat- Peter Pomerantsev turns this con- tainable. But what Nothing is True and cept on its head. In Nothing is True and Everything is Possible lacks in strategy

Jason Czerwiec is Junior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. Book Reviews and prescriptions, it makes up for in its that we can grasp the exigency of what is human approach and insider perspective. wrong within Russia. In Nothing is True From these elements, we can begin to and Everything is Possible, the personal piece together a larger picture, one that is becomes the political. as grotesque as it is wildly entertaining. In his work at London’s Legatum The book is organized into three the- Institute, Mr. Pomerantsev focuses more matic parts. Reality Show Russia starts specifically on the role of propaganda the reader off at the beginning of Pomer- in Russia’s global strategy, arguing that antsev’s career, moves through Siberia, the regime in Russia uses its assets of Kaliningrad and back to Moscow as it energy, corruption and propaganda to introduces gangsters, development con- asymmetrically confront the West and sultants and the “political technologists” its perceived values. It is this very state responsible for molding media reality, of constant confrontation, he contends, along the way. Cracks in the Kremlin which has come to define Russia. And in Matrix provides a morbid introduction order to combat it, the West will have to into the Russian criminal justice system learn its methods of confrontation—and and the practice of “reiding,” which has understand just how far we need to adapt become endemic in post-Soviet Russia. our own institutions to deal with them. “Reiding” is a form of corporate takeover, That means first grasping what Russia whereby the head of a company is arrested is, and what it is not. and, while imprisoned, relieved of his or The Russia in Nothing is True her business assets. It is a practice that and Everything is Possible is one that has been applied across Russian society, possesses all the glitz and glamour of from the very top (in the form of ousted a Western democracy without, any of Yukos tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky) the substance. By masking chaos in a down to local furniture stores. Forms of cloak of materialism, the government of Delirium, the final chapter, could be the Vladimir Putin is able to obscure objec- beginnings of another book in and of tive truth, and both subvert and pervert itself. Here Pomerantsev hones in on the Western values, even as it professes to debilitating denial which accompanies espouse them. working within the “Kremlin matrix.” He As the images churned out of the reflects on his parents’ decision to leave Russian propaganda machine become Russia and ends up emigrating back to more Western in their aesthetic and more London himself. He ends the book with anti-Western in their message, it useful to a glimpse of the Russian system’s impact look back at the origins of Putin’s propa- on the financial poles of the world. ganda strategy. The setting of this book, Each chapter is formed by the con- the first decade of the 21st century, is a solidation of biopic vignettes strung good place to start. As Mr. Pomerantsev together against the backdrop of the describes it, Putin is waging a war with author’s experience as a reality televi- the West that is far subtler than prior sion producer looking to get to the heart strains. By using every tool at his dis- of Russian new post-Cold War society. posal, tools which Pomerantsev shows The evidence is largely anecdotal, encap- us in his description of life in post-Soviet sulated in stories of gangsters-turned- Russia, Putin is slowly bringing Russia’s movie moguls, of the kept mistresses of national interests into line with those of rich and unaccountable oligarchs, and his inner circle—and molding Russia’s of gullible Russians seduced by surreal future in his own image. personal improvement cults and extreme ideologies. But it is through this approach

92 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews

The High Cost of Doing Business in Russia Samuel Bendett

William Browder, Red Notice: A True First, he finds himself barred from enter- Story of High Finance, Murder, and ing Russia after carrying out successful One Man’s Fight for Justice (Simon campaigns publicizing corrupt Russian & Schuster, 2015), 416pp. $28.00. oligarchs and the crooked way in which they did business. Then, one of his law- yers, a gentle man by the name of Sergei An ambitious young American Magnitsky, uncovers massive tax fraud businessman seeks to make his fortune to the tune of $230 million, for which on the newly open financial markets of Browder’s company is ultimately blamed. the Russian Federation following the As he decides to take this case public in Soviet collapse. He doesn’t know much the Russian and then international press, about the country he wants to invest in, Russian authorities make Magnitsky the but—guided by his tenacious personal- scapegoat, arresting and torturing him ity and top-notch experience in some of before finally becoming complicit in his the best financial institutions around the murder in November 2009. world—he decides to go all in. Along the Red Notice is broadly divided into way, he acquires a talented and dedicated two parts. The first reads like a step- staff of Russian nationals who help guide by-step instruction manual of how an him through the bureaucratic uncertain- American businessman with no expe- ties and byzantine rules and processes rience in post-Communist Russia can that helped privatize the majority of Rus- make a fortune, provided he happens to sian economy in the early 1990s. be in the right place at the right time. Bill Browder, who grew up in a Browder’s tenacity, commitment and family of devout American communists, work ethic helped him to surmount prides himself of choosing a capitalist numerous obstacles (including lack of path in a country that just shed its com- information, the lack of a Western-style munist past. So starts Red Notice, which financial system, the lack of financial reads as part biography, part political experts, and so on). His gamble paid off. thriller, and part case study of what He bet big, and won—becoming one of happens when American optimism and the very first major foreign investors in respect for the rule of law meets the Rus- the new Russia. sian version of the “free market.” But, over time, Browder became Mr. Browder’s insistence that the a crusader. He saw firsthand how Rus- country he knows very little about start sia’s massive, uncontrolled privatization acting according to the principles that he resulted in the enrichment of a small best understands, rather than the shady, cadre of Russian officials, who became rough and tumble ways of Russia’s new what is commonly known today as oli- capitalism, predictably ends in a tragedy. garchs. He decided to fight back against

Samuel Bendett is an Assistant Research Fellow at the National Defense University, Department of Defense. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect those of NDU or DoD.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 93 Book Reviews the crooked business that typified the Ultimately, Red Notice is nothing if age, and—using the tool of media expo- not a cautionary tale. Browder engaged sure unfamiliar to most Russians at in the very type of “cowboy capitalism” that time—took these companies to that many Russians grew to resent in the task, making his investors rich in the 1990s and downright despise today. It process. He proceeded despite growing was therefore inevitable that his quest for warnings that his meddling could have wealth would ruffle some feathers among consequences, not quite believing that Russia’s powerful—and ruthless—lead- he would suffer the consequences. In the ership. It is thus required reading for end, it was Sergei Magnitsky—and not anyone aspiring to become an invest- Bill Browder—that ended up paying the ment capitalist in societies in transition, ultimate price. or those that operate at the intersection of Of course, Browder cannot be business, nationalism and politics. blamed for Magnitsky’s death. It was the But his book is also much more. It crooked Russian state that proverbially is the story of a crusade against just one ate one of its best children. But Browder incident of egregious injustice, and an feels personally responsible for Sergei’s effort to bring to heel the larger, unac- ordeal, and the second half of Red Notice countable authoritarian system that made is devoted to chronicling the campaign to it possible. That is a tale worth telling. first free Magnitsky and then, following his death, to punish the Russian govern- ment. One cannot help but be impressed with Browder’s dedication to ensure that Magnitsky doesn’t become yet another unfortunate Russian statistic. He utilizes his vast network of American and Euro- pean investors, influencers, well-wishers and politicians to push through a piece of legislation in the U.S. Congress that comes to be known as the “Magnitsky Act”: a measure imposing sanctions on a select number of Russian officials con- nected to Sergei’s death. That the act was passed is in and of itself a major accomplishment, as Browder acknowledges. What remains to be seen is whether or not it had its desired effect on the crooked Russian politicians that it sought to punish. Red Notice is silent on that score, and—while the Magnitsky Act is indeed a significant achievement—the reader is left wonder- ing if this story has truly drawn to a close. Indeed, today, in light of Russia’s policy toward Ukraine, the question of whether such measures can truly impact the Russian state’s ability to impose its will on those who dare challenge it is as relevant as ever.

94 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews

The Indispensable Factor in Intelligence Malcolm Forbes

Stephen Grey, The New Spymasters: intrigue and manipulations at the hands Inside the Modern World of Espionage of less glamorous and less principled from the Cold War to Global Terror agents. A sharply focused chapter on (St. Martin’s Press, 2015). 384 pp. $27.99. Kim Philby and the rest of the so-called “Cambridge Five” charts the means and scope of their betrayal; a subsequent At the beginning of Stephen Grey’s chapter deals with British intelligence impressive book, one of the author’s operations in Northern Ireland and their many anonymous sources, an “old- successful infiltration of the IRA. time CIA spymaster,” tells him that the To counterbalance the somewhat agency was unable to prevent the 9/11 lopsided bias towards matters British, attacks because they didn’t have a spy Grey routinely branches off to regale us in place within al-Qaeda’s inner circle. with KGB and CIA recruitment methods “If only,” he says, “we‘d had a man on the and instances of one-upmanship, and to rock beside Osama bin Laden, learning spin the tale of how officers in the East his thoughts, learning his plans.” German foreign intelligence service While Grey’s book is, as its title sug- infiltrated the West German govern- gests, a chronological history of modern ment and helped destroy the career of espionage, it is at the same time a rigor- Chancellor Willy Brandt. But despite the ous analysis of what Graham Greene many game-changing coups and elabo- called “the human factor”—that “man on rate countermoves of the Cold War, Grey the rock” tasked with gathering human explains, for all parties concerned human intelligence. Grey sets out to explore how intelligence became an increasingly frus- twenty-first-century spying differs from trating business—“a resource-hungry, that of the twentieth, and whether, in this time-consuming, and usually fruitless digital age of far-reaching intercepts and pursuit at constant risk of backfiring.” surveillance, there is still a role for the This became all too apparent after spy on the ground. the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disin- Grey, a British journalist and author tegration of the Soviet Union. Grey cites best known for his shattering revela- former CIA Director James Woolsey’s tions of the CIA’s extraordinary rendition famous warning of nascent post-Cold program in his 2006 book Ghost Plane, War dangers: “We have slain a large opens with a section that takes us back dragon, but we now live in a jungle filled to the Cold War and covers the origins with a bewildering variety of poisonous of the modern secret service. But the snakes. And in many ways, the dragon derring-do of swashbuckling, adventure- was easier to keep track of.” Making seeking soldier-spies gives way to the sense of this new jungle with its new later, murkier realm of cloak-and-dagger threats required new spies, and a new

Malcolm Forbes is a freelance writer from Edinburgh, Scotland. He has written for many publications including the Economist, the Financial Times, the Daily Beast, the National, the Weekly Standard and the Columbia Journalism Review.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 95 Book Reviews game plan. One new strategy adopted nage are interspersed with accounts of by both the CIA and Britain’s SIS was triumphs and failures, a close scrutiny to fight fire with fire: if the emerging of thorny issues (the “standard dilemma” enemies were diffuse, non-state organiza- for an agent inside a terror group: how tions like crime syndicates and terrorist far to go?) and a fascinating look at the cells then there was no alternative but many different reasons why men and to recruit members—criminals—from women sign up for an erratic life of such groups. secrecy, treachery and high stakes. In his Grey uses this rationale to explain final, illuminating section, Grey gives a how a gangster became a useful infor- detailed prognosis and evaluation of what mant for the British, and how a Moroccan form spying will take in this twenty-first- spy who underwent training in Afghani- century world of globalized threats and stan aided the French. Along the way, he border-transcending interests. points out one of the dangers of attempt- Throughout, The New Spymasters ing to get into the enemy’s mind: “If you stays true to its remit, prioritizing and draw close to that dividing line between analyzing the human factor involved in friend and foe and begin to think like intelligence gathering. Ultimately, Grey your opponent, you risk slipping over.” argues, for all the advances of and reli- For the book’s penultimate sec- ance upon technology, the man on the tion, Grey draws on his reporting on the rock is as relevant as ever. Human intel- war in Afghanistan in 2008 to catalog ligence is not the dying art it has been the various fruitful attempts made by reckoned by some to be. For as long as spies to penetrate and combat al-Qaeda. the age-old motivations that fuel them Here, he saves the best for last: describ- endure, there will continue to be both a ing the myths and facts behind the hunt need and a role for the secret agent. for Osama bin Laden—what the com- mander of that operation, Admiral Wil- liam McRaven, described as “one of the great intelligence operations in the his- tory of intelligence organizations.” As in-depth a survey as The New Spymasters is, it is by no means com- prehensive. But Grey acknowledges this at the outset, admitting that the work is based solely on his dealings with secu- rity services in the western hemisphere and across the Middle East and South Asia. More jarring is Grey’s lack of faith in his reader, which leads him to unnec- essary and pedantic explanations of the concepts and principles of spycraft. Yet these are minor flaws in what is on the whole an informative and engag- ing tour through a century of spying. Grey’s many short case-studies, such as that of the Pakistani suicide bomber who developed second thoughts, unfold like the tense, scene-setting opening chapter of a thriller. The nuts and bolts of espio-

96 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews

America’s Path to Power Todd Johnson

Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev between foreign policy, defense strategy, and Mackubin T. Owens, U.S. Foreign and commercial interests.” Designed to Policy and Defense Strategy: The Evolu- serve as a supplemental textbook for tion of an Incidental Superpower (George- international affairs students, this read- town University Press), 262 pp. $29.95. able, accessible tome makes a cogent argument that the emergence of the United States as a superpower following In today’s world, it is sometimes World War II wasn’t necessarily planned difficult to imagine a time when Amer- or anticipated. ica hasn’t had a preeminent place on The term “superpower” first the world stage. Since 1945, the United emerged in the early 1940s, when it was States has grown from a regional power coined by geo-strategist Nicholas Spyk- into a hegemonic, global superpower man. From that time on, it has been that currently boasts the largest econ- used to describe nations that have both omy in the world and arguably pos- global reach and global commitments. To sesses one of the most capable militaries be sure, many books have been written the world has ever seen. But this trans- since then about America as a super- formation didn’t happen overnight, and power, and its resulting predominant role it didn’t occur without mistakes being in global events (and the responsibilities made along the way. and authorities that accompany it). But Along these lines, some in the inter- U.S. Foreign Policy and Defense Strat- national affairs community believe that egy differs from most writings on the the rise of the United States has been the subject, because its authors illustrate how result of a nation responding to radical the creation of a stable national security changes in the international system that establishment, enduring national inter- occurred in the wake of World War II. It ests and a vast network of international is this thesis, of the U.S. as an “inciden- powers have led the United States to tal superpower,” that forms the central occupy the position of prominence that it argument of U.S. Foreign Policy and enjoys today. Defense Strategy. The chapters follow a systematic Published by Georgetown Press and approach, with the authors covering written by a trio of prominent national the “American Way” of organizing for security affairs experts (Derek Reveron, defense, of conducting civil-military rela- Nikolas Gvosdev and Mackubin Owens), tions, of warfare, of peace and of finance. the book “explains how the United States One of the more interesting chapters is became a superpower, examines the for- the one on civil-military relations in the mation of the national security establish- United States and how they have changed ment, and explores the inter-relationship over time. As a serving military officer,

Todd Johnson is a policy analysis instructor at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and an active duty Army officer. The views expressed here are his own.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 97 Book Reviews the book’s analysis of the topic struck me Anonymous) or a nation-state (China)— as being both insightful and balanced. It now have far-reaching effects on foreign is doubly significant because it tackles and defense policy. By not fully exploring some of the most pressing contemporary the issue, the authors missed an oppor- policy issues relating to the subject. To tunity to demonstrate the very real link- wit, with the advent of combatant com- age that has emerged between the cyber manders and the vast resources attached domain and U.S. commercial interests. to their commands, some have come to This deficiency aside, U.S. Foreign believe that U.S. foreign policy has been Policy and Defense Strategy is even- quietly militarized. The authors address handed in its analysis and rigorous in its this issue by acknowledging that the methodology. It also provides and impor- traditional paradigm of civil-military tant glimpse into how America attained relations “is in flux” and may need to be its current place in the world, and just renegotiated by those in power. what it will entail if we hope to keep it. If there is one criticism of the book, That makes it a valuable resource for stu- it is that it doesn’t devote enough space in dents of international affairs and Ameri- its conclusion to the topic of cyber secu- can history, as well as for those who are rity and the threat of cyberterrorism. involved in the shaping of U.S. security These issues have grown exponentially policy today, both today and tomorrow. in the last decade, and—whether in the guise of an individual (Eric Snowden), a group (world-wide hacking network

LEARNING TO SPEAK NETWORK STATUS QUO

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