Rethinking Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Defence of Australia

Richard Tanter

Rethinking Extended Nuclear Deterrence public in Australia." in the Defence of Australia 1. Introduction Richard Tanter President Obama’s announcement of a "US intelligence also helped us to assess the longterm United States commitment to the risk of Soviet nuclear strikes on Australia in the abolition of nuclear weapons has been event of global nuclear war. We were able to accompanied by a revival of thinking about that identify the locations in Australia that were most difficult of deterrence concepts, extended targeted by Moscow and assess likelynuclear deterrence, in the United States itself, casualties. We judged, for example, that the in a number of allied countries which are SS-11 ICBM site at Svobodny in Siberia was recipients of American assurances of protection capable of inflicting one million instant deaths through extended nuclear deterrence, and in and 750,000 radiation deaths on Sydney. And other countries to which the United States you would not have wanted to live in Alice appears to be considering offering such Springs, Woomera or Exmouth -- or even assurances. There are a number of reasons for Adelaide." this surge in attention, amongst the most important of which are shifts in the character Paul Dibb, America has always kept us in the of nuclear threats to the United States and its loop1 allies in the post-Cold War world, both in number and perceived ability to be deterred; Synopsis resurgent doubts about American intent and capacity to honour such promises; increased This article examines the foundations and weight placed on the value of certainty of rationale for Australian reliance on USextended nuclear deterrence to obviate a drive assurances of extended nuclear deterrence for indigenous nuclear weapons capacity; and (END). The Australian model of END is marked not implausibly, a perceived need by interested by its lack of public presence, a lack of parties to recover legitimacy for a U.S. nuclear certainty about its standing and character in mission structure threatened by the promotion American eyes, its lack of a direct nuclear of nuclear abolition. These pressures are all threat, and its resurgence at a time when salient to American re-assertion of the nuclear abolition possibilities are beingreliability and necessity of its nuclear umbrella embraced by the leader of the deterrence in East Asia, the Pacific, and Europe, and provider. Australian policy amounts to a claim suggestions of its possible extension into the that the nuclear guarantee is necessary 'just in Middle East. case' - though without any plausible specifics. The fundamental questions remain: what Yet the pressures are not all one way. On the threats, what probabilities, what alternatives? one hand, newly elected governments in These have never been seriously discussed in Germany and Japan have questioned elements

1 7 | 50 | 3 APJ | JF of extended deterrence policy and forcetime when nuclear abolition possibilities are posture. On the other hand, the recently being embraced by the leader of the deterrence elected Australian Labor government has provider. The only time when there appeared to paralleled the abolitionist turn in its nuclear be a serious attempt to develop a rationale for ally by initiating the International Commission extended nuclear deterrence, late in the Cold on Nuclear Non-proliferation andWar, linking the price of the guarantee in Disarmament, co-chaired with Japan, while at hosting intelligence bases to benefits from the same time issuing a Defence White Paper global nuclear stability, was flawed at the time, with a much more explicit and elaborate and needs scrutiny even more closely now. rationale for reliance on American assurances of extended nuclear deterrence than ever 3. Models of extended nuclear deterrence before. Before looking at the main variants of the Extended nuclear deterrence is one part of species, a key question, for which there is Australia’s official defence policy. Australian surprisingly no authoritative answer, is exactly policy-makers have for decades asserted that how many countries, and which countries, are Australia confidently relies on United States’ recipients of American extended nuclear 2 promises of nuclear protection in the face of deterrence. Various estimates have been nuclear threat. Australia, so the official story produced in recent years. In 2007, a group of goes, from some unspecified time in the 1950s senior American security officials set the figure 3 following the signing of the ANZUS Treaty in at 31: “the 26 nations of NATO, Australia, 4 1951, has rested secure beneath the American Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Israel.” Other nuclear umbrella. This essay reviews the estimates differ. For example, a 2006 Defense available information on the understanding Threat Reduction Agency Study appears to 5 both parties have of this arrangement, and sets exclude Australia. out the model of extended nuclear deterrence In December 2008, a Defense Department in this Australian case as distinct from those advisory committee on nuclear policy for the with other US allies. On the basis of publicly incoming administration chaired by James available information, much less is certain Schlesinger stated that about these arrangements than appears to be the case on the surface. The paper concludes by setting out a research agenda necessary for The United States has extended its greater clarity on key issues, and by nuclear protective umbrella to 30- challenging the a series of elements in the plus friends and allies as an rationales provided by successive Australian expression of commitment and governments for the role of US nuclear common purpose as well as a weapons in Australian defence policy. It disincentive for proliferation.6 stresses the need for an urgent review of claims that there are plausible security threats to which only nuclear weapons can provide What is intriguing is not just the variations in protection. numbers, but how unsure even seasoned observers of the American nuclear order are Extended nuclear deterrence in Australian about just who is included in any of the defence policy is marked by its lack of public estimates. Hans Kristensen, one of the closest presence, a lack of certainty about its standing civil society observers of the American nuclear and character in American eyes, its lack of a order, for example, takes the Schlesinger-Perry direct nuclear threat, and its resurgence at a report estimate of “30 plus” recipients, as

2 7 | 50 | 3 APJ | JF being made up of 25 NATO countries (not of the allied recipient country in including Britain and France); Japan, Taiwan the provision of the deterrent; and and Korea; and Australia and New Zealand.7 To simply state the obvious, the inclusion of New • the involvement of the allied Zealand would be a great surprise to both the recipient country with other allied United States and New Zealand governments nuclear weapons states besides the following the “suspension” of the United States’ nuclear guarantor. obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS treaty following New Zealand’s banning of The NATO model nuclear ship visits in 1986.8 The significance of the fact that the number of recipients is unclear Core NATO countries have the longest and will be dealt with further below. most intimate connection with American extended nuclear deterrence through the It is clear that actual United States and allied combination of deployment of US nuclear country practices of extended nuclear weapons in western European member deterrence vary considerably by region. There 9 countries and the practice of “nuclear sharing” are roughly four regionally-based models of in Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands American extended nuclear deterrence: and Turkey: the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) provision of dual-capable aircraft to • the NATO model; use locally deployed United States nuclear weapons under bilateral agreements with the • the East Asian model; U.S. Apart from the nuclear sharing mode of provision, there are two notable features of the • the Australian model; and NATO model. The first is the explicit articulation of political solidarity through • the as yet unclear incipient “maximum Allied participation” in nuclear Middle Eastern model. deployment options.10 The other is the breadth of its threat spectrum: its announced purpose remains to deter not only Russian (and The organization of the nuclear umbrella in potentially, Iran) nuclear attack or coercion of each model varies in a number of ways, NATO states, but also biological and chemicals including: weapon attacks, terrorism and, as in the Cold War, Russian conventional attack.11 • the range of threats against which nuclear protection is Needless to say, there are internal NATO offered; tensions, but in contrary directions: the more recent NATO entrants have called for inclusion • the location and type of forces in nuclear sharing, and the new centre-right involved in substantiating the coalition government in Germany has threat; announced its aim of removing all nuclear weapons from Germany. Germany and others • the physical location of the have also raised concerns about the example nominal antagonist nuclear that the nuclear sharing model sets for other weapons state in relation to the possible providers of extended nuclear allied recipient country; deterrence.12

• the level and type of engagement The possible Middle Eastern model

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While Turkey provides a western-most nuclear- and missile testing, a nuclear attack on Japan sharing foundation for the NATO model, a new would be dealt with by all forces available to model appears to be under consideration by the the United States – i.e. including nuclear United States in the Middle East, though the weapons. Such weapons are no longer deployed matter is far from clear. The Obamain Japan, Korea or Taiwan, but are deployed administration appears to be considering the elsewhere in Guam and bases on United States offer of an assurance of extended deterrence – territory. The key points for the present nuclear and conventional – to Iran’s Middle purpose are the renewal of assurance following Eastern neighbours, including Iraq, the Gulf indication of unease in the recipient country; states, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.13 In the case of the now explicit role of dissuasion from Saudi Arabia and Egypt at least, a primary indigenous nuclear weapons development; and purpose would be to dissuade those countries the “off-shore” deployment – in contrast to from moving towards indigenous nuclear NATO nuclear-sharing. weapons development. There has been little clarification of just how the putative assurance The Australian model, I will argue, is very of extended nuclear deterrence would be different from each of the other three, and is realised – whether the United States would probably best described as the “Just in Case” introduce more nuclear weapons to the region model. as in Turkey under NATO14; or by off-shore 4. Australia and United States extended naval deployment, whether distant or nearby; nuclear deterrence: “Just in case” or through direct deployment on United States bases in the region. Needless to say, the Understanding how the Australian model of position of Israel in such a possibility is extended nuclear deterrence differs from ambiguous – whether the assurance would others takes a little exploration. Nobody extend to Israel or whether Israel’s large appears to doubt that Australia is a recipient of nuclear arsenal would constitute an element of United States nuclear protection as a result of the deterrence force or be intended to be the ANZUS treaty of 1952. One of the most constrained by it. Moreover, it is not clear influential of Australian defence policy-makers precisely what threat the guarantee would over the past quarter century, Paul Dibb, apply to, beyond the obvious application to speaking to an Australian parliamentary possible Iranian nuclear weapons. Would it also seminar in 1997, summarised the situation this apply to actual or threatened of biological and way: chemical weapons? These matters aside, the most important aspect of the Middle Eastern model is simply the fact of its contemplation – The final point I would make is that the first American extension of such nuclear ANZUS has both a deterrent role, guarantee in half a century, into arguably the including an extended nuclear most volatile region in the world. deterrent role, and it has tangible – if you like, real to measure – The East Asian model military and intelligence benefits that are a force multiplier for the The history of American nuclear deterrence in ADF [Australian Defence Force] in East Asia, is long and complex, but remains, a a changing strategic balance. generation after the end of the Cold War, Although I do not think that basically unchanged,15 In its contemporary multilateralism is the answer, let form, the United States has reassured Japan me make it clear in my final words that, in the context of North Korean nuclear that certainly we need to work on

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multilateralism, but in that process Australian policy on the place of the United let us not go to some cloud-cuckoo- States assurance of extended nuclear land that pretends that the defence deterrence in Australia’s defence policy. In of Australia and the alliance with fact, this is necessary precisely because public the United States can be statements about that policy are remarkably replaced.16 few and notable for their brevity and lack of detail.

Dibb’s remarks introduce several key elements The 1994 Defence White Paper, issued by the of the Australian situation: Keating Labor government, offered what appears to be the first formal policy announcement of a key element of defence • the conviction that the ANZUS policy that is presumed to have been in place treaty – or more likely, the for many years. For that reason, and because it accompanying wider alliance was to be another thirteen years before regime – carries with it an anything of greater length was officially said on assurance of extended nuclear deterrence; the subject, it is worth quoting in toto:

• the claim that there is no doubt The government does not accept that Australia is in fact a recipient nuclear deterrence as a permanent of American nuclear protection, condition. It is an interim measure without necessity of qualification until a total ban on nuclear or specification of limits; weapons, accompanied by • the assertion that the alliance substantial verification provisions, regime which locates Australia can be achieved. In this interim within the United States global period, although it is hard to nuclear order also brings envisage the circumstances in indispensable benefits for which Australia could be Australia’s otherwise self-reliant threatened by nuclear weapons, defence policy – especially in we cannot rule out that possibility. intelligence and access to military We will continue to rely on the hardware; extended deterrence of the US nuclear capability to deter any • the view that the entire alliance nuclear threat or attack on package, especially including Australia. Consequently, we will extended nuclear deterrence, is of continue to support the such necessity and value to maintenance by the United States Australian national interests that of a nuclear capability adequate to any alternative is for practical ensure it can deter nuclear threats purposes, inconceivable. against allies like Australia.17

4.1 Documenting Australian nuclear deterrence Four elements in that first statement are of policy ongoing importance:

It is worth taking a little time to set out at length and in detail what is known about • reliance on deterrence is

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necessary for the foreseeable the role of US nuclear weapons in the defence future; of Australia:

• a nuclear deterrent for Australia is necessary for circumstances Australia relies on the extended which apparently cannot be deterrence provided by US nuclear named, perceived, or even, one forces to deter the remote might say, able to be conceived; possibility of any nuclear attack on Australia.19 • the only stated contingencies for which extended nuclear deterrence is considered necessary are a A 2006 Defence Department history of the threatened or actual nuclear attack alliance noted two further elements as “a on Australia; degree of limited protection” against a new threat of “a rogue nuclear missile strike”: • these requirements lead the namely, “growing cooperation with the United Australian government to support States in missile defence, and the possible the wider American global nuclear development by Australia of significant missile deterrence structure. defence capabilities”. However, it concluded,

Three years later, the 1997 statement of “only the extended umbrella of US Australia's Strategic Policy, the first produced nuclear forces that can provide us under the Howard Liberal-National Party with a comprehensive deterrent government, added one more element: an protection against anything more assurance that while the American substantial in terms of nuclear undertakings in the ANZUS treaty “do not 20 missile strike.” amount to a guarantee” of all American commitments, Significantly, the most recent Australian official statement on extended nuclear deterrence is [i]n one specific respect the also the detailed and developed in the six alliance does provide a clearer decades of the ANZUS alliance. In the 2009 expectation of US support - that is, Defence White Paper all of the previously defence against nuclear attack.18 mentioned elements of the Australian policy of reliance on the United States assurance of This is a curious public assertion, because as nuclear protection are present, and are we shall see, there is no known publicexpounded at greater length and with more statement by the United States government coherence:21 that provides support for that apparently confident statement. However, such is the strength of the assumption in the Australian • the United States will continue to public realm, of the palpable character of rely on its “nuclear deterrence United States commitment, the authors found capability to underpin US strategic no need to provide further support. power, deter attack or coercion by other nuclear powers, and sustain In a single sentence, the 2000 Defence White allied confidence in US security Paper set out the official statement of policy on commitments by way of extended

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deterrence”; • joint defence facilities, especially at the Pine Gap intelligence • “stable nuclear deterrence” will facility, “contribute to the continue and extended nuclear intelligence collection capabilities deterrence “will continue to be of both countries, support viable”; monitoring of compliance with arms control and disarmament • “rogue states of concern” with agreements, and underpin global long-range ballistic missiles will be strategic stability by providing “the challenge”; ballistic missile early warning information to the United States”. • for the first time, specific nuclear threats – “though remote” – are named: The only substantial historical comments on the development of the extended deterrence • “Iran and North Korea, and assurance from one involved in it came from possibly others in the future, will former Australian Minister for Defence Kim continue to pursue long-range Beazley. Beazley is however, laconic, if not ballistic missile programs that cryptic, on the key issue: could pose a direct, though remote, risk to our own security.” In the 1980s ANZUS was • the alliance is “indispensable to incorporated within an evolving our security” insofar as it means Australian national strategy of self- “that the associated capability, reliance. Two decades of struggle intelligence and technological to get the United States to clarify partnership, at the core of the its extended deterrence guarantee alliance, is available to support our to Australia was replaced with the strategic capability advantage in cheerful Australian assumption our immediate neighbourhood and that no enemy of Australia's could beyond.” not guarantee the United States would not aid its Antipodean ally, • the alliance also “means that, for and that would do.22 so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter Beazley offers nothing further on the subject, nuclear attack on Australia.” and nothing is known publicly about those “two decades of struggle”. The only thing that is • for the first time, an official made clear is the context of at least the latter document articulates a commonly part of those developments - the understanding held position that alliance that hosting the joint facilities were the “protection provides a stable and Australian contribution to the United States reliable sense of assurance and has capacity to maintain global nuclear order, and over the years removed the need that “we accepted that the joint facilities were for Australia to consider more probably targets, but we accepted the risk of significant and expensive defence that for what we saw as the benefits of global options.” stability.”23

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4.2 United States policy on assurance of Hugh White. In testimony to a parliamentary nuclear protection to Australia committee in 2004, White explained the origins of the statement “of principle” in the 2000 The fact that a significant aspect of Australian White Paper quoted above. That statement, defence policy that was widely assumed in White said, Australia and elsewhere to be in place was not officially confirmed by the Australian government for a number of decades after its was based on explicit discussions apparent inception is curious enough. But the with U.S. officials. The position of issue of just what Australian policy and practice the United States is that they actually is and has been over the past six would threaten nuclear retaliation decades becomes more complex and against a country that attacked problematic in the face of a second fact. Australia with nuclear missiles.25

If the rationale for the Australian perspective on policy had become clearer by the sixth In reply to a subsequent question from this decade of the alliance, the same could not be author, White confirmed that the “discussions” said for the United States side of the equation. were in fact “a purely oral [though not casual] In fact almost nothing can be said on that exchange of views between officials”, and score. Despite any number of reiterations of initiated by him for the purpose of confirming American support for the alliance withthe to that point assumed American nuclear Australia as a whole, there is no known publicly 26 assurance. available United States official statement specifically providing an assurance of American It would appear that there has been an nuclear protection for Australia in the face of understanding between officials to the effect nuclear threat or nuclear attack.24 that there exists an American assurance of extended nuclear deterrence for Australia It is possible that this finding will be falsified by subsequent historical research, but on the face under at least one condition – nuclear attack on of it, there is no public American formal Australia – but that little or nothing is in confirmation of the Australian official public writing, or was available in writing for the understanding. There are then two possibilities: principal author of a recent white 27 either that there is no American commitment paper. There may well be secret agreements and that Australian officials have deluded from an earlier period of which White was themselves, their government masters, and the unaware, or was unable to reveal. public for many years; or that there are American assurances and commitments, but It also implies that there is – or was at that time they have never been made public. – no specific ANZUS alliance bureaucratic or military organisational structure to manage the The first possibility is not only absurd, but is nuclear deterrence aspects of the also contradicted by Beazley’s cryptic remark relationship.28 about “two decades of struggle to get to get the United States to clarify its extended deterrence 4.3 The consequent research agenda guarantee”. It is further contradicted by two pieces of evidence from one of thoseA number of questions flow from the historical responsible for much of what was said in at aspects of this situation, some of considerable least two of the Defence statements quoted policy and political – and military – importance already, former Deputy Secretary of Defence, for the present.

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• If there is no public formal •chemical and biological attacks statement of US commitment to on Australia nuclear protection of Australia, is there a confidential or private government-to-government formal •Former Australian intelligence statement of such a commitment? official Rod Lyon, in the most • If there is such a private formal sustained recent discussion of statement, what is it? extended nuclear deterrence in Australian defence policy albeit( , • If there is, when and how was it two pages in length) censures incorporated into Australian White and other Australian officials defence planning? for contributing to a public understanding that the • If there is, what is the nature of “appropriate application of nuclear the assurance? What precisely deterrence” is limited “to deterring does the United States undertake the possible use of an adversary’s to do? What are the explicit or nuclear weapons.”29 Lyon’s understood limits? criticism implies that other “applications” not only exist, but • Against what threats is the are in fact salient to contemporary assurance held to be applicable? Australia, and possibly understood Under what conditions does to be a matter of policy by those whatever assurance accorded Lyon considers more Australia actually become knowledgeable than White. actionable? • If there is neither a private nor • Is the only circumstance that the public formal statement, on what US is committed to nuclear-armed precise basis do official assertions protection of Australia “the remote of nuclear protection rest? possibility” of nuclear attack, or are there other contingencies in • What was the process by which which either the United States or Australian and shared Australia- Australian government would American bureaucratic expect a nuclear defence of “understandings” arose? Australia? Based on US commitments to other allies, these • When and how did the policy of might include: reliance on the American assurance of nuclear protection commence?30 •threat of nuclear attack on Australia • At what particular conjuncture of the development of regional and •nuclear attacks on Australian global and national politics, and forces deployed abroad nuclear regime?

•large-scale conventional attack • How was it initiated? Was it in on Australian territory the context of the formation of

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ANZUS alliance, itself tied to the commitments in the face of threats signing of the San Francisco peace to Australia; treaty with Japan, in which ANZUS was the U.S. assurance to Australia • the range of threats to which the that it would resist any resurgent deterrence guarantee is aggressive Japan? In which case, understood to apply; were nuclear threats to Japan promised? • the linkage between the nuclear guarantee, the Australian • The question of who initiated contribution to the United States what is also relevant to the polar maintenance of a global nuclear tensions of abandonment and order by hosting the joint facilities, entrapment inherent in any and the viability of that global alliance structure. Australia, like nuclear order; and Japan, is an anxious ally, with a record of responding to fears of • the role of the American nuclear abandonment by alliance over- guarantee dampening pressures performance.31 for either an indigenous nuclear deterrent or compensatory These questions go to the heart of the expanded conventional defence extension of United States’ nuclear hegemony spending. into Australian politics. Beyond clarifying the murky historical realities, they also contain a series of challenges to Australian political 5.1 U.S. nuclear calculus about Australia identity as a democracy in charge of its own In the course of one of the few detailed fate, especially at a time when the Australian government has announced its commitment to Australian discussions of missile defence a renewed global disarmament project on an options for Australia, Stefan Frühling historic scale. addressed the beneficial consequences of an autonomous missile defence capacity as a 5. “Just in case”: Extended nuclearsupplement to extended nuclear deterrence and Australia today deterrence.32 Such a capacity would lower the burden of decision and execution placed on the If the slim historical materials leave some United States in the event of a nuclear attack doubt about almost every aspect of the United on Australia. The alliance, Frühling maintains, States assurance of extended nuclear“is an element of general deterrence”, and a deterrence for Australia except the fact that missile defence capacity would “lend credibility those involved in its production believe in its to any threat that the United States makes solidity, then the contemporary debate is not explicitly or implicitly in a particular situation”. rich either. Though not in detail, four issues fundamental to the Australian extended nuclear With some understatement, Frühling, who deterrence situation have been addressed: argues for diversification and modernization of the American nuclear arsenal, then goes on to • the fundamental question of address the issue at the heart of any thinking credibility in the United States’ about extended nuclear deterrence involving likely calculation of interests and missile threats or attacks:

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Finding an appropriate retaliatory arguable, but the point is clear: there is such a response to an attack on Australia category, and the presumption that Australia with conventional or WMD would not be one such case in any given warheads will be highly demanding nuclear threat scenario is cannot be decided by and politically difficult for both the simply pointing to either the general level United States President and the assurances in the ANZUS treaty or the Australian government…There is “protection” offered by hosting of indispensable thus a danger that the United United States intelligence facilities. Davis States might be perceived as “self- continues: deterred” by the high yield and low versatility of its current stockpile. The aversion of the Australian In more difficult cases involving public towards nuclear weapons non-vital interests, however, we makes the problem even graver.33 will need to reduce our standards and rely on a wide range of influence factors, some of them This is a particular, missile defence-inflected distinctly squishy and political.34 version of a common question in every country that is a recipient of a nuclear guarantee – the ultimate fear of abandonment – about which 5.2 Threat spectrum and response there is little that can sensibly be said one way or the other, beyond avowals of loyalty and The question of just what source and spectrum abstract-inductive modelling. It is important, of threats the United States nuclear deterrence however to note that there is a parallel to the guarantee does apply to is the first matter that ally’s fear of abandonment – namely the fear on needs public clarification. Speaking of the the deterrence provider’s side of entrapment in 1980s, when public nuclear debate in Australia the affairs of an ally that may not amount to a was at its height, Lyon focuses on the range of truly vital national interest. The calculus of how threats to which extended nuclear deterrence vital is the U.S. interest in any given scenario is was seen to apply in Australia – in his eyes, impossible to predict, but it is certainly within overly narrowly, both in the security policy the realm of the possible to envisage reversals community and even more so, in the public at of expected commitments. large:

Paul Davis examined the question how the The relatively low level of security United States should threat that Australia faced directly meant that nuclear weapons were deter invasion or coercion of weak usually seen as offsetting other and medium-strong states when nuclear weapons, that the the security of the threatened credibility of the U.S. extended states is important but is not a nuclear deterrence guarantee was "vital" national interest of the never severely tested within powers that might be protectors. Australia, and that the nuclear debate was often dominated by relatively marginal themes.35 not of vital interest to the United States including “Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic states, Taiwan, or a unified Korea.” Any such list is That historical disposition, Lyon concludes

11 7 | 50 | 3 APJ | JF disapprovingly, has now solidified to scepticism For most of its history, the Australian reliance about extended nuclear deterrence: on the American nuclear guarantee has been implicit rather than explicit, never confirmed in public by the notional provider, and never On the whole, Australians have justified by more than vague nods in the moved away from a belief that direction of specific threats which are either nuclear deterrence is a central implausible or of such low probability as to pillar of the global order, and are question the justification for invoking the more likely to question the utility threat of nuclear attack in response. of the doctrine of deterrence across a larger spectrum of The questions posed by George Percovich38 for 36 security threats. United States commitments to extended nuclear deterrence apply in particular to the Australian case: In a 2007 review of US nuclear posture, Linton Brooks suggested that “nuclear weapons must deter not only nuclear attack on the United • what are the actual threats to States but also conventional attack on our Australia against which extended allies, particularly NATO, Japan, South Korea, nuclear deterrence is invoked? and Australia.”37 However, as Ambassador Brooks has confirmed, there is no publicly • what are the probabilities available U.S. confirmation of assurance of attached to such threats? nuclear protection against nuclear threats to Australia, let alone conventional attack, it is • where threats are deemed to be difficult to know precisely what official U.S actionable with nuclear response, policy is at this point. what alternative responses or means of addressing the issue exist The present guarantee, whatever it actually is, or could be generated? long antedates the naming in the 2009 White Paper of the “remote” possibility of missile attack from Iran and North Korea. The long- Despite the ideological power of the Gramscian running fundamental assumption has been that structures of nuclear hegemony that Hayes 39 Australia faces nuclear threat – whether of outlines , Percovich’s apparently simple direct attack, or intimidation to change policy – questions in fact dissipate much of the miasma that can only be assuaged by extended nuclear that surrounds discussions of nuclear deterrence. Yet beyond undocumented appeal deterrence, extended and otherwise. To date, to “common sense” understandings of a Korean at least in the Australian case, there has been or Iranian missile threat, there is very little no significant response by proponents of examination of either actual threats, or what retention of extended nuclear deterrence in might constitute sufficient probability of threat Australian security policy. The most important to Australian vital interests – essentially its discussion of threats to Australia that might survival – to warrant even consideration of warrant resort to extended nuclear deterrence nuclear deterrence. Amongst the “30 plus” for Australia is Arthur Burns’ subtle, and now recipients of American extended nuclear fascinatingly anachronistic 1970 analysis of the deterrence today, the Australian case of possibilities of nuclear intimidation by the then extended nuclear deterrence is unique in predominant “state of nuclear concern”, having no identifiable specific nuclearChina.40 Since then, by and large it has not antagonist. been thought necessary to provide an extended

12 7 | 50 | 3 APJ | JF justification.41 calculation of costs and benefits of the alliance in relation to Given the imminence of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty review in 2010, one more Standing Up Right Here, Malcolm Templeton’s question might be added: what is the standing, superb diplomatic history of the crisis makes in relation to any given putative nuclear threat, clear the process by which the United States of the positive security guarantees made to came to the position that the New Zealand ban Non Nuclear Weapons States by the Nuclear on port visits (in New Zealand alone) had to be Weapons State signatories to the nuclear Non- treated as a threat to its global alliance Proliferation Treaty?42 These are usually structure built around extended deterrence. As ignored, or derided as being non-binding, yet Beazley summarised the situation they remain the subject of considerable pressure from many non-nuclear weapons states in the NPT review process. Basically, the Americans were not worried about the New Zealanders. These guarantees, which certainly require They were worried about us and careful scrutiny, receive little attention in the they were particularly worried Australian security community, even as a about the Japanese, because the matter that may require strengthening and Americans regarded themselves as extension in the NT Review process. Given the doing serious business with us and flimsiness of the structure around the with the Japanese. At the time they Australian model of extended nuclear were also bracing the Europeans deterrence, this is somewhat surprising. on cruise missiles and, in any case, Certainly, in the context of Percovich’s agenda there was that world view that of revisiting foundation questions about all America was making a sea change cases of extended nuclear deterrence, the NPT shift to a different view of positive security guarantees warrant serious deterrence. …The mere cut-off of attention. military relationships with New Zealand was enough to send a 5.3 Extended deterrence, maintenance of the signal into our two systems that global nuclear order, and the joint facilities this would be an unwise course to follow.44 However, at the heart of the Australian commitment to extended nuclear deterrence for at least the last quarter century is the belief Beazley and his officials sided with the United that the only serious nuclear threat to Australia States, in the knowledge that in doing so “we derived from a breakdown of the United States- accepted that the joint facilities were probably orchestrated “system of stable deterrence”. targets, but we accepted the risk of that for This period roughly began prior to the 1983-85 what we saw as the benefits of global stability.” crisis in ANZUS when the Lange Labour As Dibb, publicly silent at the time on the government in New Zealand declared visits by matter, put it more than two decades nuclear-armed ships illegal. The United States afterwards: declared that such actions were incompatible with its obligations under ANZUS, and that as a result, New Zealand’s membership of ANZUS We judged, for example, that the was indefinitely suspended.43 Certainly at the SS-11 ICBM site at Svobodny in time of that crisis if not before, Dibb and other Siberia was capable of inflicting Australian defence officials went through a one million instant deaths and

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750,000 radiation deaths on Facility has improved greatly as a result of the Sydney. And you would not have efforts of Beazley, Dibb, White and others, wanted to live in Alice Springs, there is little evidence of subsequent Australian Woomera or Exmouth -- or even influence over American nuclear decision- Adelaide.45 making.

Today, the argument is still more in need of The essential element of the argumentclose scrutiny, beyond the possibilities of this sketched above by Beazley and Dibb was paper. However, three requirements can be publicly expressed by Desmond Ball: that the noted before the 1980s trade-off is confirmed. benefits to Australia’s interests from the signals intelligence contribution of the Pine Gap joint Firstly, if the government believes that the facility to providing a key element in the bargain Beazley and Dibb outlined still obtains verification of U.S.-Soviet arms control treaties there is still nevertheless a requirement in a outweighed the undoubted costs anddemocracy that such a basic threat to a good disadvantages of Pine Gap (and until its closure portion of the population on the basis of an in 1999, Nurrungar).46What threatened abstract calculation be publicly stated and Australia, they argued, was a breakdown in the debated. global nuclear order, and even if it meant that the joint facilities and near-by regionsSecond, the argument needs to be re-examined (including Adelaide) were certain nuclear given the vast changes that have taken place targets as a consequence, this was a price since the 1980s in all elements of the American worth paying for the quid pro quo, thecommand, control, communication and protection of American extended nuclear intelligence (C4I) system, and in the functions deterrence. of the Pine Gap joint facility in particular. A virtual revolution in production and Historically there were three problems with dissemination of signals intelligence from this bargain. Firstly, the existence of a policy to space-based and other platforms, with profound willingly anticipate the deaths of very large consequences for Pine Gap’s role. The numbers of Australian citizens was asserted by networking of U.S. space-based intelligence the peace movement at the time, and known to collection platforms and processing and be true by the government of the day which analysis facilities has diminished stovepiping of officially denied it. Secondly, there was at the the major global signals intelligence facilities, time, argument that the system of “stable with tasks formerly performed only at Pine Gap nuclear deterrence” – especially the command, may now shared by other major facilities such control, and intelligence systems including the as Menwith Hill in the U.K. Conversely, joint facilities – would not work as expected, analytical product ultimately derived from Pine especially in relation to the antagonist’s Gap and the rest of the U.S. space-based systems, and that “stable nuclear deterrence” signals intelligence network is now was anything but that.47 Thirdly, once disseminated very widely in the U.S. military committed by hosting the joint facilities, system, including to relatively low levels of Australian leverage over nuclear issues was in command in combat theatres. The part that the fact diminished rather than increased as joint facility now plays in United States global claimed in the tediously reiterated “a seat at non-nuclear operations, including in Iraq and the table” and “punching above our weight” Afghanistan, adds a new element to the metaphors asserted. Certainly while Australian political calculation that must be carried out by participation in operations at the Pine Gap Joint both government and citizens.48

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Third, the central claim to an irreplaceable and would have to increase very indispensable arms control contribution by the substantially.55 Again, Percovich’s questions are joint facility needs to be revisited, in the primary: what threat? what probability? what knowledge of both new technical developments, function of armed force? Absent serious open and the changed global nuclear order. discussion of these questions in the particular contemporary Australian security context, 5.4 Extended nuclear deterrence relieves reflex assertions of a requirement, with obvious pressure for an alternative – nuclear orpolitical disincentives, for greatly expanded conventional conventional armament are untenable and serve mainly to deflect attention from the task The final argument for extended nuclear of re-assessing the role of extended nuclear deterrence that emerged a little earlier, deterrence in Australian defence. according to Beazley, was that it “avoided a discussion in Australia of an independent 6. Out of denial: two preliminary nuclear deterrent.”49 In contrast to Japan as a requirements for democratic will- nuclear abstainer, Australia has had a formation and sustainable security substantive history of attempted nuclear armament, either by acquisition from allies or 50 There are two fundamental considerations for through indigenous development. The any discussions of extended nuclear deterrence residues of these attempts still linger in Royal – one moral and political, the other a question Australian Air Force (RAAF) force structure of efficacy. The first is that the use of nuclear and institutional memory51, and in Indonesian weapons in any extant form inevitably leads to security community memory.52 Accordingly the the deaths – whether immediately or over long resolution of these issues has multiple potential periods of time - of large numbers of people, consequences for Australian strategic policy, and that consequently the use of nuclear especially concerning the claimed linkage. weapons is always incipiently if not It may have been true that such discussion immediately genocidal. Whoever advocates a practically disappeared, as Beazley maintained, deterrent role for such weapons immediately but to attribute this primarily to the embracing either faces a moral calculus of a high level of of extended nuclear deterrence cannot be certainty of avoidance of an even worse future substantiated.53 More important were the lack for others to justify the deaths of large numbers of direct nuclear threats, the change in the of innocents, or lives in denial and bad faith – Southeast Asian environment, and mostusually the latter. It may be that some such important of all, the direct coercion exercised justification can be imagined. What is striking by the United States in the late 1960s during is how rarely such considerations appear in the the Gorton Liberal government to cease and casual invocation of the merits of extended 56 desist from what US Secretary of State Dean nuclear deterrence most commonly seen. Rusk called Australia’s “picayune” objections to abandoning its nuclear weapons ambitions and The second consideration is the presumption signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty.54 that nuclear deterrence is strategically effective – that it works. Obviously this is a well A related argument, heard in Beazley’s day and worn path, but in a recent review of the main raised today, is that if the extended nuclear arguments and historical studies usually deterrence function is done away with, then adduced to support the efficacy of nuclear both for strategic reasons and for reasons of deterrence in the Cold War period Ward Wilson assuaging public anxiety, defence spending has argued that

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the problem in all these cases is eyes, its lack of a direct nuclear threat, and its that proof - the essential ingredient resurgence at a time when nuclear abolition of prudent judgment - is entirely possibilities are being embraced by the leader missing. If there were a concrete of the deterrence provider. The rationale foundation of fact on which to base developed for the guarantee during the only our assessment of the usefulness of period when there appeared to be a serious nuclear deterrence, it might justify attempt to do so, linking the price of the our reliance on these threats. As it guarantee in hosting intelligence bases to is, almost all of the conventional benefits from global nuclear stability were wisdom about nuclear deterrence flawed at the time, and need scrutiny even is so speculative and so much of it more closely now. As it stands, it amounts to a runs counter to cases from history claim that the nuclear guarantee is necessary that any conclusions are doubtful “just in case” – though without any plausible 57 at best. specifics.

The fundamental questions remain as Percovich Wilson presents his review as “the beginning of has outlined them: what threats, what a process of intellectual exploration, not firm probabilities, what alternatives? These have and final conclusions”, yet as with the necessity never been seriously discussed in public in for moral and political assessment of the Australia. What is necessary is that they be highest and robust order to justify conceiving addressed in such a way that minimally, a of the possibility of mass killing of innocents, pathway to a non-nuclear alliance – or coalition the great bulk of contemporary reference to the – is visible, without at the same time provoking need for incorporation of extended nuclear a resurgence of support for either an deterrence into national defence policies of American allies passes over the question of the indigenous Australian nuclear weapons strategic efficacy of nuclear deterrence in capacity, or unjustified greatly expanded silence. Taken together, these two forms of defence spending. At root, Australians need to denial – moral and strategic – are instances of ask themselves whether their country needs to what Robert Lifton termed the psychicbe, or should be, defended by nuclear weapons. numbing necessary for the functioning of the 58 nuclear establishment. They are however inimical to both democratic policy formation Richard Tanter is Senior Research Associate at and sustainable security. In itself this double Nautilus Institute for Security and denial is not an argument against extended Sustainability and Director of the Nautilus nuclear deterrence as a security policy, but it is Institute at the Royal Melbourne Institute of a warning that there is much about such Technology. A Japan Focus associate, he has policies that requires more close and more written widely on Japanese, Indonesian and public scrutiny. global security policy, including 'With Eyes 7. Conclusion: a pathway beyondWide Shut: Japan, Heisei Militarization and the Australia’s “Just in Case” model ofBush Doctrine' in Melvin Gurtov and Peter Van extended nuclear deterrence Ness (eds.), Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific, (New York: In contrast to the extended deterrence models Routledge, 2005). His most recent book, co- in other regions, Australia’s is marked by its edited with Gerry Van Klinken and Desmond lack of public presence, a lack of certainty Ball, is Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military about its standing and character in American and Violence in East Timor in 1999 [second

16 7 | 50 | 3 APJ | JF edition]. Contact countriese-mail: in NATO, including the United States, [email protected]. provider of the assurance of extended nuclear deterrence, and the two European NATO This paper was first presented to the Nautilus nuclear weapons states, France and the United Institute RMIT research workshop on Australia- Kingdom, neither of which are recipients of US Japan Civil Society Cooperation for Nuclear END assurances. Disarmament, supported by the Australia-Japan Foundation and RMIT University Foundation. I 4 Kathleen C. Bailey et al, White Paper On The am grateful to Peter Hayes, Mark Selden, Necessity of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent, 30 Patrick Morgan, Ken Berry, Tessa Morris- July 2007, p. 6. Suzuki, Jimbo Ken, Richard Leaver, and 5 Arabella Imhoff for their comments on earlier Jeffrey Larsen, Nuclear Baseline: Post-Cold drafts. This article was prepared for publication War US Nuclear Policy, appendix to Lewis at The Asia-Pacific Journal and for APSNet. Dunn, Gregory Giles, Jeffrey Larsen, and Thomas Skypek, Foreign Perspectives on U.S See the other articles in the series: Nuclear Policy and Posture: Insights, Issues and Implications, Defense Threat Reduction 1. Peter Hayes and Michael Hamel-Green, The Agency, 12 December 2006. Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: 6 Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force Northeast Asia on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission, 2. Peter Hayes, Extended Nuclear Deterrence, December 2008. Global Abolition, and Korea 7 “The Minot Investigations: From Fixing 3. Richard Tanter, Arabella Imhoff and David Problems to Nuclear Advocacy”, FAS Strategic Von Hippel, Nuclear Power, Risk Management Security Blog, 14 January 2009. Link. and Democratic Accountability in Indonesia: 8 Volcanic, regulatory and financial risk in the See footnote 42 below. Muria peninsula nuclear power proposal 9 Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in Recommended citation: Richard Tanter,European host states, Claudine Lamond and "Rethinking Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Paul Ingram, BASIC Getting to Zero Papers, the Defence of Australia," The Asia-Pacific No. 1, 23 January 2009; and Hans M. Journal, 50-3-09, December 14, 2009. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005. For Notes a savage but tendentious critique of perceived German “nuclear conscientious objection” 1 America has always kept us in the loop, Paul regarding nuclear sharing, see Rühle, op.cit. Dibb, The Australian, 10 September 2005. 10 NATO’s Nuclear Policy: A View from NATO 2 Many analysts refer to the provider of HQ, Guy B. Roberts, Deputy Assistant assurances of extended deterrence (whether Secretary General for WMD Policy, NATO HQ, nuclear or conventional) as the “defender”, the April 2006. Link. Roberts lists required antagonist state as the “challenger”, and the participatory elements in this model as recipient of the assurance as the “protégé”. including “not obstructing” preparation and planning; actively advocating planning for 3 Note that there are, as of 2009, 28 member operations, “providing permission for basing,

17 7 | 50 | 3 APJ | JF overflight, logistic support or missionthe Future of Extended Deterrence, Institute planning”, and “active participation infor Foreign Policy Analysis, March 2009; Peter operations”. Rühle, op.cit. expands on one Hayes, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence, Global version of the obligations derived from this Abolition, and Korea”, The Asia-Pacific Journal: structure again tendentiously but in a way that Japan Focus, and Nautilus Institute, November needs a strong counter-argument. 2009; Peter Hayes and Michael Hamel-Green, The path not taken, the way still open: 11 See the remarks by Lukasz Kulesa in Are the Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, the Asia- Requirements for Extended DeterrencePacific Journal: Japan Focus, and Nautilus Changing? Panel discussion at the 2009 Institute, November 2009. Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference: The Nuclear Order—Build or 16 Paul Dibb, former Deputy Secretary of Break, 6 April 2009.Link . Defence, presentation to Seminar on the ANZUS alliance, Joint Standing Committee on 12 Greece withdrew from such bilateral nuclear Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament cooperation with the United States in 2001, of Australia, 11 August 1997. Note that links to and Canada in 1984. For the 2009 German shift this and many other Australian references in see “Analysis of the Coalition Agreement: How Merkel's New Government Intends to Govern”, this paper are available at the documentation Björn Hengst, Roland Nelles and Severin site Extended nuclear deterrence – Australia, Weiland, Spiegel International Online, 26 Nautilus Institute [updated regularly].

October 2009; and Martin Butcher, “It's Official 17 - German Coalition Wants US Nukes Out”, The Defending Australia: Defence White Paper NATO Monitor, 25 October 2009. Link. 1994, Department of Defence, 1994.

18 13 Egypt has recently moved to signing Australia's Strategic Policy, Department of contracts for its first commercial nuclear power Defence, 1997. station. Notably, Egypt has not ratified the 19 IAEA Additional Protocol. “Egypt set to join N- White Paper: Defence 2000 - Our Future club with help from Australia”, The World Defence Force, Department of Defence, 2000, Today, ABC Radio, 19 June 2009. Link. p. 36.

20 14 William G. Eldridge,The Credibility of Founded In History, Forging Ahead, America’s Extended Nuclear Deterrent: the Department of Defence, 8 September 2006, p.7 Case of the Republic of Turkey, Air University, 21 AU/AFF/NNN/2009-XX, April 2009. Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2020. Defence White Paper 15 Amongst many other studies, see, on the 2009, Department of Defence, 2009. history, Peter Hayes, "American Nuclear 22 Hegemony in the Pacific,"Journal of Peace Kim Beazley, “Whither the San Francisco Research, Vol. 25, No. 4, December 1988; Peter alliance system?” Australian Journal of Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky, and Walden Bello, International Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. American Lake, Nuclear Peril in the Pacific, 325-338, July 2003, p. 329. Penguin, 1987; Peter Hayes,Pacific 23 Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Kim Beazley, presentation to Seminar on the Korea, Lexington Books, 1990. OnANZUS alliance, Joint Standing Committee on contemporary issues see, James L. Schof, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & of Australia, 11 August 1997.

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24 It is inherently difficult to prove a negative, 30 It is possible, and even likely, that in the but the negative results of my own searches of 1950s and possibly through the early 1960s publicly available or open sources have been there was a parallel development of a confirmed by both former Deputy Secretary of comparable understanding with British Defence Hugh White and United Statesauthorities – something approaching a British Ambassador Linton Brooks. (Personalassurance of extended nuclear deterrence – at communications, 23 February 2009, and 6 April least until the cancellation of the Blue Streak 2009 respectively.) I am grateful to both, missile project, and the symbolic collapse of though of course, neither is responsible for my British military capacity “east of Suez”. Given interpretations. See also John P. Caves, Jr. and the close coordination (if not cooption) of the M. Creighton Hottinger, briefing on "Project on Australian military with British nuclear U.S. Declaratory Policy toward WMD Threats: authorities in the Monte Bello Island and Phase 1 Findings", National DefenseMaralinga nuclear test programmes, it is likely University, Center for the Study of Weapons of that such understandings were at least mooted Mass Destruction, Washington DC, 9 April 2008 in that context. version. 31 Tanter, “Anxious Nation: Japanese 25 Hugh White, Testimony before the Australian Perspectives on National Strategy", Part 1 of Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee of Richard Tanter and Honda Masaru,"Does Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade on the issue Japan Have a National Strategy?" The Asia- of U.S. – Australian defence relations, 26 Pacific Journal 4 May 2006. March 2004. White concluded on the import of the American promise: “That will make people 32 Frühling, op.cit. The other important detailed think pretty seriously. I think that will work in discussion is Richard Macmillan, AEGIS TMD: the majority of cases.” Implications for Australia, Australian Defence College Monograph Series, No. 1., 2003. 26 Pers. comm., 23 February 2009. 33 Frühling, op.cit., pp.32-33. See also Raoul E. 27 There may well be secret agreements from an Heinrichs, “Australia’s Nuclear Dilemma: earlier period of which White was unaware, or Dependence, Deterrence or Denial?”, Security was unable to reveal as a matter of law. The Challenges, Volume 4, Number 1, 2008, pp. ongoing revelations about the secret55-67. agreements between Japanese and American for four decades about conditions under which 34 Paul K Davis, “A Provocative Premise: Special US nuclear weapons continued to be brought Challenges in Extending Deterrence in the New into Japan contrary to that country’sEra”, Appendix G.1 in Post-Cold War Conflict parliamentary resolution concerning the three Deterrence, Naval Studies Board, Commission Non-Nuclear Principles is reminder enough on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and here. Applications, National Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 28 Lyon, op.cit. p.43, notes that ANZUS has no 1997, p. 133. I am grateful to Allan Behm for Nuclear Planning Committee. referring me to Davis, although he would distinctly not agree with my interpretation. 29 Rod Lyon, “Australia”, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and 35 Lyon, op.cit., p. 438. Security in 21st Century Asia, (Stanford U.P., 2008), p. 437. 36 Ibid, p. 448.

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37 “The final aspect of our deterrent theory was the 1995 NPT Review and Extension that nuclear weapons must deter notConference, the five NWS again provided only nuclear attack on the United States but unilateral security assurances, unconditional also conventional attack on our allies,only in the case of China. These were then particularly NATO, Japan, South Korea, and noted in a further UNSC resolution 985 Australia.”, Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, (adopted April 11, 1995). Both the 1995 and “America’s Nuclear Posture”, Michael May 2000 Review Conferences affirmed the role of (ed.) Rebuilding the NPT Consensus, Center for the NPT with regard to security assurances, International Security and Cooperationbut didn't manage to get much further.”, (CISAC), Stanford University, October 16-17, Rebecca Johnson,The Nuclear Non- 2007, p. 69. Proliferation Treaty: 2008 NPT PrepCom: Decisions taken, Security Assurances debated, 38 George Perkovich, Extended deterrence on Acronym Institute, May 6, 2008. Link. the way to a nuclear-free world, Research Paper, International Commission on Nuclear. 43 Michael Pugh’s account in The ANZUS Crisis, Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009; Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence, Cambridge and his comments in thePanel on Are the U.P., 1989, is now supplemented by the Requirements for Extended Deterrenceexcellent study by Malcolm Templeton, Changing? Panel discussion at the 2009 Standing Upright Here: New Zealand in the Carnegie International NonproliferationNuclear Age 1945-1990, Victoria U.P., 2007. Conference: The Nuclear Order—Build or 44 Break, 6 April 2009. Kim Beazley, presentation to Seminar on the ANZUS alliance, Joint Standing Committee on 39 Hayes, “American nuclear hegemony”, op.cit. Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of Australia, 11 August 1997. 40 A.L.Burns, “Australia and the Nuclear Balance”, in H.G.Gelber (ed.)Problems of 45 “America has always kept us in the loop”, Australian Defence, (Oxford University Press, Paul Dibb, The Australian, 10 September 2005. 1970), pp. 144-165. The anachronistic quality 46 especially inheres in the treatment of China, The most explicit and developed statements and the parallels with discussions ofby Ball and Dibb are: Testimony of Professor contemporary “states of nuclear concern”. Desmond Ball to the Joint Standing Committee On Treaties, Reference: Pine Gap, Official 41 For a partial exception, see Frühling, op.cit. Committee Hansard, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Parliament of the 42 “In view of their cold war nuclear doctrines, Commonwealth of Australia, 9 August 1999, pp the major NWS refused to have binding 1-16; and Testimony of Professor Paul Dibb to security guarantees put into the treaty text, but the Joint Standing Committee On Treaties, carried through the UN Security Council a Reference: Pine Gap, Official Committee resolution promising immediate assistance to Hansard, 9 August 1999, pp 17-28. A any NPT party that was threatened or attacked comprehensive bibliography of materials with nuclear weapons. This positive security relating to Pine Gap is at Joint Australian-US assurance became UNSCR 255 (1968).intelligence facility - Pine Gap, Nautilus Following this, in 1978 and then 1982, the Institute [updated regularly]. NWS gave unilateral negative security assurances to NNWS, with exemptions or 47 See, for example, the argument concerning conditions (for some) relating to states in C3I in Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky and Walden nuclear alliances. In the month leading up to Bello, American Lake, Nuclear Peril in the

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Pacific, Viking/Penguin, 1987, pp. 189-238. ‘Nuclear Option’", 40th Anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, National 48 For a sketch of an argument about the role of Security Archive, 1 July 2008, and in particular, the Joint Defence Facility - Pine Gap in the Document 16a: Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, see U.S. Embassy Canberra cable 4842 to Richard Tanter, Pine Gap and the coalition Department of State, 6 April 1968, Secret wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Nautilus Nodis. Institute. Link. 55 Daniel Flitton, “Disarmament: words don't 49 Kim Beazley, presentation to Seminar on the match actions”, The Age, 4 September 2009. ANZUS alliance, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament 56 Michael Rühle’s robust advocacy of German of Australia, 11 August 1997. “nuclear sharing” a foundation of contemporary extended nuclear deterrence is a partial 50 See, for example, “Surprise Down Under: The exception. See Michael Rühle, Good and Bad Secret History of Australia's Nuclear Nuclear Weapons: Berlin’s Part in Shaping Ambitions”, Nonproliferation Review, 5 (Fall Nuclear Reality, Körber Foundation for 1997), pp 1-20. See also:Australia nuclear International Affairs, Körber Policy Paper No. proliferation history, Re-framing Australia- 3, April 2009. Indonesia security relations, Nautilus Institute

(updated). 57 Ward Wilson, “The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence”, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, 51 “Exploring The Nuclear Option”, Pathfinder: No. 3, November 2008, p. 435. “Three practical Air Power Development Centre, issue 29, arguments put the efficacy of nuclear August 2005. deterrence into doubt: 1) the characteristic 52 Tom Morton, “Australia and the nuclear attack threatened in most nuclear deterrence renaissance”, Background Briefing, Radio scenarios - city attack – is not militarily National, ABC, 3 September 2006. effective or likely to be decisive; 2) the psychology of terror that is supposed to work in 53 Though it should be noted that there has nuclear deterrence’s favor actually creates the been a small flurry of interest by figures on the circumstances for unremitting resistance; and edge of the contemporary Australian security 3) even though the field is mostly conjectural, community. See, for example, Richard Tanter, what little unambiguous evidence does exist “The Re-emergence of an Australian nuclear contradicts the claim that nuclear deterrence weapons option?”, Austral Policy Forum works.” ibid, p.421. 07-20A, 29 October 2007; Martine Letts, “A reply to Richard Tanter, Austral Policy Forum 58 Robert J. Lifton, The Broken Connection. 07-20B, 12 November 2007; andAustralian Simon and Schuster, 1979. See also Joel Kovel, nuclear proliferation – contemporary, Nautilus Against the State of Nuclear Terror, Free Institute [regularly updated]. Association Books, 1984.

54 See “Australia's Prime Minister Wanted