Slovakia’s Politics in a Nutshell AA presentationpresentation withwith annotations.annotations. TheThe fivefive keykey topicstopics areare listedlisted below:below: Conflict Power Parties Elections Coalitions Conflict>US OneOne ofof thethe mostmost essentialessential (though most difficult to To provide context, (though most difficult to To provide context, define)define) toolstools forfor understandingunderstanding I I willwill trytry wherewhere any country is an assessment possible to any country is an assessment possible to ofof thethe corecore conflicts,conflicts, thethe thingsthings comparecompare findingsfindings that leaders and voters fight for Slovakia to that leaders and voters fight for Slovakia to about.about. InIn thethe UnitedUnited StatesStates thosethose forfor thethe this is often portrayed as a United States. this is often portrayed as a United States. one-dimensionalone-dimensional conflictconflict betweenbetween “liberals”“liberals” and and “conservatives.”“conservatives.” This This isis flawedflawed atat bestbest because…because… Liberal Conservative Many key studies (Shafer and Many key studies (Shafer and Claggett’s The Two Majorities, 1995, Conflict>US>1980‐present Claggett’s The Two Majorities, 1995, among others) show that political among others) show that political competition in the United States competition in the United States actually functions on two relatively actually functions on two relatively independent dimension, one of which Cultural Right independent dimension, one of which relates to government involvement in relates to government involvement in the economy and the other of which the economy and the other of which relates to government involvement in relates to government involvement in questions of culture and lifestyle. questions of culture and lifestyle. These are largely independent and These are largely independent and knowing somebody’s economic position knowing somebody’s economic position does not help much in identifying that does not help much in identifying that person’s cultural position (though person’s cultural position (though Layman and Carsey 2000 and others Layman and Carsey 2000 and others suggest that two axes are becoming suggest that two axes are becoming aligned). aligned). Economic Economic Left Right

Cultural Left Slovakia is also a country with two Slovakia is also a country with two major axes. As in the United States, Conflict>Slovakia>1990 major axes. As in the United States, one is economic (though the location of one is economic (though the location of this dimension in absolute terms is this dimension in absolute terms is different—the average Slovak is far different—the average Slovak is far more willing than the average Independence more willing than the average American to accept government American to accept government intervention in the economy. The intervention in the economy. The other axis is more difficult but can be other axis is more difficult but can be understood as related to national understood as related to national culture, a question that is extremely culture, a question that is extremely important in a small country with important in a small country with significant national minorities in a significant national minorities in a region that has over the last century region that has over the last century experienced significant periods of experienced significant periods of inter-ethnic conflict. inter-ethnic conflict. Communism Anti‐ State Communism Control Free Markets

The specific expression of these The specific expression of these conflicts, however, differs from year to conflicts, however, differs from year to year. In the first years after the fall of year. In the first years after the fall of communism, the economic axis was communism, the economic axis was closely tied to anti-communist closely tied to anti-communist sentiments (and therefore in part to sentiments (and therefore in part to pro-religious sentiments of those who pro-religious sentiments of those who disliked communism for the limits it disliked communism for the limits it placed on the Roman Catholic Church. placed on the Roman Catholic Church. Czechoslovakia Conflict>Slovakia>1990‐1994 Independence Even in the first years, however, there was in Slovakia the Even in the first years, however, there was in Slovakia the strong presence of a second axis that saw the political strong presence of a second axis that saw the political changes as related to expression of ethnic identity and changes as related to expression of ethnic identity and focused on changes to the internal structure of focused on changes to the internal structure of Czechoslovakia. Some called for Slovakia’s independence, Czechoslovakia. Some called for Slovakia’s independence, some (few) called for a unitary system with Czechs and many some (few) called for a unitary system with Czechs and many called for some relationship in between. One of the strongest called for some relationship in between. One of the strongest (if not the most easily defined) voices was Vladimir Meciar, (if not the most easily defined) voices was Vladimir Meciar, Prime Minister of Slovakia who in 1991 created his own Prime Minister of Slovakia who in 1991 created his own party and advocated for “confederation” with the Czechs), a party and advocated for “confederation” with the Czechs), a call for more rights and status for Slovaks without actual call for more rights and status for Slovaks without actual independence. Communism independence. Anti‐ State Communism Control Free Markets

Czechoslovakia Conflict>Slovakia>1994‐1998 Nation‐Building / Firm‐Hand Rule

Meciar’s success in the 1992 elections (a near Meciar’s success in the 1992 elections (a near majority of parliamentary seats) and the majority of parliamentary seats) and the subsequent negotiation of full independence (which subsequent negotiation of full independence (which even Meciar himself may not have fully intended) even Meciar himself may not have fully intended) raised the salience of the national issue, especially raised the salience of the national issue, especially as independence raised questions about the viability as independence raised questions about the viability of Slovakia as an independent state (even for some of Slovakia as an independent state (even for some of its supporters) and also its treatment of ethnic of its supporters) and also its treatment of ethnic minorities (especially Hungarians). minorities (especially Hungarians). Communism Anti‐ State Communism Control Free Markets Over time, furthermore, Meciar demonstrated an Over time, furthermore, Meciar demonstrated an increasingly heavy hand and a proclivity to increasingly heavy hand and a proclivity to marginalizing anyone who questioned his leadership, marginalizing anyone who questioned his leadership, using state power to do so. Nationalism thus using state power to do so. Nationalism thus became linked to Meciar’s authoriarian methods became linked to Meciar’s authoriarian methods (methods he justified as necessary to defend the new (methods he justified as necessary to defend the new country from its external and internal enemies. country from its external and internal enemies. Linking these two axes, however, gave opponents a Linking these two axes, however, gave opponents a chance to appeal for more democracy (they could chance to appeal for more democracy (they could not appeal for less nation-building) and the not appeal for less nation-building) and the appearance of over-reaching cost Meciar his appearance of over-reaching cost Meciar his majority in the 1998 elections majority in the 1998 elections Integration/Democracy Conflict>Slovakia>1998‐2006 Nation‐Building / Firm‐Hand Rule

Meciar remained the main foe during the first Meciar remained the main foe during the first Dzurinda government that followed (a government Dzurinda government that followed (a government composed of an ungainly coalition of Christian composed of an ungainly coalition of Christian Democrats, former Communists, Hungarians and Democrats, former Communists, Hungarians and others) and the questions of nation and democracy others) and the questions of nation and democracy remained prominent, especially as Slovakia faced remained prominent, especially as Slovakia faced the renewed but uncertain prospects for entry into the renewed but uncertain prospects for entry into NATO and the EU. NATO and the EU.

Welfare Market State Reforms

The failure of Meciar to return to government in The failure of Meciar to return to government in 2002 and the successful negotiation of NATO and 2002 and the successful negotiation of NATO and EU entry in the years that followed diminished the EU entry in the years that followed diminished the role of the nation- and democracy-related issues, role of the nation- and democracy-related issues, and the rapid pro-market reforms of the 2002 and the rapid pro-market reforms of the 2002 Dzurinda government combined with the emergence Dzurinda government combined with the emergence of Robert Fico as the most prominent opposition of Robert Fico as the most prominent opposition leader shifted the main axis of competition back to leader shifted the main axis of competition back to economic questions, which dominated the 2006 economic questions, which dominated the 2006 parliamentary election. parliamentary election. Integration/Democracy Conflict>Slovakia>2006‐present Nation‐Defending Fico’s victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections Fico’s victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections allowed some economic changes and divisions continue allowed some economic changes and divisions continue between Fico’s “left” and the “right” that governed between Fico’s “left” and the “right” that governed from 2002-2006, but Fico’s choice of coalition from 2002-2006, but Fico’s choice of coalition partners from among nationally-oriented Slovaks and partners from among nationally-oriented Slovaks and his increasingly prominent use of soft national themes his increasingly prominent use of soft national themes (pride, history) and stronger rhetoric toward (pride, history) and stronger rhetoric toward Hungarians (who themselves used stronger rhetoric Hungarians (who themselves used stronger rhetoric during this period) helped turn the axis back slightly during this period) helped turn the axis back slightly and actually suggested an emerging unity of national and actually suggested an emerging unity of national and economic questions (there are few pro-market and economic questions (there are few pro-market Slovak nationalists and few anti-market defenders of Slovak nationalists and few anti-market defenders of minority groups Welfare minority groups Market State Reforms

Integration Conflict>Slovakia>3rd axis, 2002‐2006 Nation‐Defending A third axis which has emerged from time to time A third axis which has emerged from time to time (and has been more prominent in Poland and (and has been more prominent in Poland and Hungary) is the conflict between a social Hungary) is the conflict between a social conservativism associated with Roman Catholic conservativism associated with Roman Catholic believers and a more classical liberal approach. This believers and a more classical liberal approach. This conflict asserted itself within Slovakia’s governming conflict asserted itself within Slovakia’s governming coalition between 2002 and 2006. It has receded coalition between 2002 and 2006. It has receded slightly with the strength of the economic and national slightly with the strength of the economic and national issues but it remains a potential threat to “right” Traditional issues but it remains a potential threat to “right” coalitions and also to Slovakia’s current coalition coalitions and also to Slovakia’s current coalition should Fico lose his grip on the internal Smer (where Morals should Fico lose his grip on the internal Smer (where these conflicts have the potential to emerge as well. Welfare these conflicts have the potentialMarket to emerge as well. State Reforms

Personal Freedom Integration Having defined the axes of competition, we need to Having defined the axes of competition, we need to define the realms in which ideas (and those who hold define the realms in which ideas (and those who hold them) compete for power and look for the locus of them) compete for power and look for the locus of Power>US political power. In the United States it would be political power. In the United States it would be possible to identify quite a few potential sources of possible to identify quite a few potential sources of political power (and possible to argue about where the political power (and possible to argue about where the power really lies, something that is well beyond the power really lies, something that is well beyond the scope of this presentation). It is useful to think about scope of this presentation). It is useful to think about this as a way of understanding the difference between this as a way of understanding the difference between the United States and Slovakia. the United States and Slovakia.

PresidentCongress Courts

Regions Media Firms Cities Civil Society Unions Slovakia’s basic list of Slovakia’s basic list of power centers is largely power centers is largely the same with two the same with two Power>Slovakia exceptions: government exceptions: government is separated from the is separated from the presidency and presidency and dependent directly on dependent directly on parlament, and the parlament, and the European Union plays a European Union plays a strong independent European Union strong independent role. But this is only a role. But this is only a roster. We need to roster. We need to assess their importance. assess their importance. Government President Courts Parliament Regions Media Firms Cities Civil Society Unions The role of the European Union is extremely The role of the European Union is extremely complex, strongest in economic-related complex, strongest in economic-related regulation. Haughton and Rybar argue that the Power>Slovakia regulation. Haughton and Rybar argue that the EU enters indirectly into domestic political EU enters indirectly into domestic political competition and provides “tools” for domestic competition and provides “tools” for domestic competition rather than imperatives. competition rather than imperatives.

The presidency has a few The presidency has a few powers of delay and powers of delay and European Union appointment but the office has appointment but the office has The highest courts have at times remained largely subservient, The highest courts have at times remained largely subservient, handed down decisions especially with pro-Smer handed down decisions especially with pro-Smer intervening in political affairs president Ivan Gasparovic and a intervening in political affairs president Ivan Gasparovic and a but courts seem more Smer-led government. but courts seem more Smer-led government. dependent than independent Government dependent than independent Political power in Slovakia continues to lie in the Political power in Slovakia continues to lie in the enmeshed complex of government and parliament. Presidentenmeshed complex of government and parliament. Courts Large firms and foreign Large firms and foreign investors play a relatively investors play a relatively Parliament significant role and appear to significant role and appear to Broadcast and print journalists play a significant role and have some power to discourage Broadcast and print journalists play a significant role and have some power to discourage Fico has criticized print journalists for what he sees as their major changes affecting their Fico has criticized print journalists for what he sees as their major changes affecting their knee-jerk opposition to him. status/business conditions. Regionsknee-jerk opposition to him.Media status/businessFirms conditions. Cities Civil Society Unions Regions and cities are largely Non-profits and other organizations The role of unions has risen and Regions and cities are largely Non-profits and other organizations The role of unions has risen and dependent on central government have in the past proven their ability fallen. While sometimes prominent, dependent on central government have in the past proven their ability fallen. While sometimes prominent, revenues and exert relatively little to organize when situations under however, they are not a driving force revenues and exert relatively little to organize when situations under however, they are not a driving force independent role. Large cities Meciar became dire but they are not in political debate (and the power independent role. Large cities Meciar became dire but they are not in political debate (and the power Bratislava and Kosice have a bit more in general a major force in political seems often to move in the opposite Bratislava and Kosice have a bit more in general a major force in political seems often to move in the opposite pull, but not much. life. direction. pull, but not much. life. direction. Power>Slovakia

Political power in Slovakia continues to lie in the Political power in Slovakia continues to lie in the enmeshed complex of government and parliament. enmeshed complex of government and parliament. Activity here, however, depends on the interaction Activity here, however, depends on the interaction among Slovakia’s major political parties. These are among Slovakia’s major political parties. These are the focus of the next sections of this paper. the focus of the next sections of this paper. Parliament Government SMK Most HZDS SDKU KDH SaS SNS Smer As this chart suggests, Slovakia has a complicated political As this chart suggests, Slovakia has a complicated political party system which has changed considerably over time. The party system which has changed considerably over time. The system appeared quite stable between about 2005 and about system appeared quite stable between about 2005 and about Parties 2009 but since then new parties have emerged within the 2009 but since then new parties have emerged within the current opposition. current opposition. Yet simultaneous with the institutional complexity, there is an underlying stability. Yet simultaneous with the institutional complexity, there is an underlying stability. It is possible to group almost all parties into one of four basic positions on the axes It is possible to group almost all parties into one of four basic positions on the axes discussed above. This helps to simplify the situation and shows a relatively clear discussed above. This helps to simplify the situation and shows a relatively clear Parties pattern on the next slide. pattern on the next slide.

Slovak National

Welfare “Left” “Right” Market State Reforms

Hungarian National

Integration Grouping parties into these four categories suggests a fairly high stability of underlying Grouping parties into these four categories suggests a fairly high stability of underlying preference, with extremely high stability among Hungarian National and “Right” blocs and an preference, with extremely high stability among Hungarian National and “Right” blocs and an almost perfectly linearly tradeoff between “Left” and Slovak National with “Left” gaining the almost perfectly linearly tradeoff between “Left” and Slovak National with “Left” gaining the upper hand. The tradeoff is not necessarily in the nature of opinions but in the kind of party upper hand. The tradeoff is not necessarily in the nature of opinions but in the kind of party that voters opt for. Of course that is obscured by labels. There is, in general, a strong Slovak Parties that voters opt for. Of course that is obscured by labels. There is, in general, a strong Slovak national-left bloc of voters that has migrated from primarily national parties to primarily left national-left bloc of voters that has migrated from primarily national parties to primarily left ones (i.e. Smer). ones (i.e. Smer). Parties

SinceSince changeable changeable (and (and changing)changing) party party institutions institutions shapeshape the the overall overall expression expression ofof political political preference preference in in Slovakia,Slovakia, I Iwill will describe describe each each majormajor party party individually individually in in termsterms of of four four main main categoriescategories listed listed below. below.

WhereWhere did did the the party party come come from from?? Has Has it it remained remained stable? stable? History HowHow has has it it performed performed and and changed changed over over time? time?

WhatWhat does does the the party party stand stand for? for? Where Where does does it it fall, fall, in in Issues generalgeneral terms, terms, on on the the axes axes th thatat define define Slovakia’s Slovakia’s politics politics

WhoWho runs runs the the party? party? What What is is the the balance balance between between leaders leaders Leaders andand party party members? members? Between Between leader leader and and other other elites? elites?

WhatWhat kinds kinds of of people people vote vote fo forr the the party? party? What What are are their their Voters demographicdemographic characteristics? characteristics? Parties>Deceased and Minor AA number number of of once once prominent prominent political political players players in in Slovakia Slovakia have have disappeared disappeared from from the the political political scene scene or or become become politicallypolitically irrelevant. irrelevant. OnOn the the “Right” “Right” this this includes includes —the—the Democratic Democratic Union Union (DU) (DU) merged merged into into SDKU SDKU —the—the Democratic Democratic Party Party (DS) (DS) merged merged into into SDKU SDKU but but recently recently independently independently revived revived —the—the Alliance Alliance of of the the Free Free Citizen Citizen (ANO) (ANO) collapsed collapsed —— the the Free Free Forum Forum still still alive alive but but with with support support reduced reduced to to about about 1%-2% 1%-2% and and now now part part of of the the coalition coalition “Liga” “Liga” OnOn the the “Left” “Left” th thisis includes includes —the—the Party Party of of the the Democratic Democratic Left Left (SDL)—collapsed (SDL)—collapsed before before the the 2002 2002 el electionsections and and merged merged with with Smer Smer but but recentlyrecently revived revived independently independently —the—the Association Association of of Workers Workers of of Slovakia Slovakia (ZRS)--collapsed (ZRS)--collapsed before before the the 1998 1998 elections elections —the—the Party Party of of Civic Civic Understandin Understandingg (SOP)--collapsed (SOP)--collapsed before before the the 2002 2002 elections elections and and merged merged with with Smer Smer —the—the Communist Communist Party Party of of Slovakia Slovakia (KSS)--s (KSS)--stilltill alive alive but but with with support support around around 2% 2% InIn the the “Slovak “Slovak Nation National”al” bloc bloc this this includes includes —the—the Movement Movement for for Democracy Democracy (HZD)—collap (HZD)—collapsedsed and and recently recently merged merged into into Smer. Smer. TheThe subsequent subsequent pages pages will will focus focus on on the the eight eight parties parties with with significant significant support. support. History Smer

FicoFico created created Smer Smer in in 1999-2000 1999-2000 when when he he departeddeparted from from the the Party Party of of the the Democratic Democratic LeftLeft (SDL) (SDL) (which (which transformed transformed itself itself from from thethe Communist Communist Party Party of of Slovakia Slovakia in in 1989- 1989- 1990).1990). Capitalizing Capitalizing on on dissatisfaction dissatisfaction with with SDLSDL and and other other parties, parties, Smer Smer rose rose to to 20% 20% inin the the polls polls almost almost overnight overnight and and hovered hovered 50 aroundaround 15%-20% 15%-20% during during its its early early years. years. In In 50 parliamentaryparliamentary opposition opposition between between 2002 2002 andand 2006, 2006, the the party party ag againain capitalized capitalized on on 45 dissatisfactiondissatisfaction with with other other opposition opposition parties parties 40 andand on on dissatisfaction dissatisfaction with with the the economic economic 40 reforms of the Dzurinda government to reforms of the Dzurinda government to 35 reachreach levels levels around around 30%. 30%. Since Since entering entering 30 government,government, the the party party has has defied defied 30 expectationsexpectations of of decline decline and and has has risen risen Polls furtherfurther to to levels levels of of popularity popularity never never before before 25 sustainedsustained in in Slovakia, Slovakia, hovering hovering around around 20 40%.40%. The The party party has has gained gained to to a a limited limited 20 agreeagree to to its its ability ability to to dominate dominate the the “left” “left” sideside of of the the political political space space and and to to engineer engineer 15 thethe absorption absorption of of almost almost all all smaller smaller “left” “left” 10 partiesparties except except for for Communists Communists and and the the 10 Greens. Greens. Seats 5 0 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Issues Smer Nationalism

Communism Anti‐Communism State Control Free Market

AA recent recent survey survey of of academic academic experts experts on on SlovakiaSlovakia (and (and other other countries) countries) asked asked respondentsrespondents to to locate locate political political parties parties on on manymany of of the the most most important important questions questions in in politicalpolitical debate. debate. The The circle circle above above locates locates thethe experts’ experts’ opinions opinions about about Smer Smer : : significantlysignificantly to to the the left left on on economic economic questions;questions; slightly slightly to to the the national national side side on on identityidentity questions. questions. A A survey survey taken taken 4 4 Integration yearsyears earlier earlier showed showed Smer Smer closer closer to to the the centercenter on on economic economic questions questions (though (though still still ) and at or slightly toto the the left left of of center center) and at or slightly belowbelow the the mean mean on on identity identity questions. questions. Leaders Smer

First Leadership v. Membership v.

Second 

Tier SmerSmer is is an an extremely extremely centralize centralizedd party party even even by by Slovakia’s Slovakia’s standards.standards. The The party party leadership leadership plays plays an an extremely extremely strong strong role role vis-à-visvis-à-vis the the membership, membership, which which plays plays a a largely largely supportive supportive role role andand has has little little direct direct control control over over party party poli policycy or or leadership leadership (and (and whilewhile large large in in absolute absolute numbers— numbers—aboutabout 16,000 16,000 by by recent recent count, count,  is quite small compared to the party’s level of support. HZDS is quite small compared to the party’s level of support. HZDS had more than twice as many withwith smaller smaller levels levels of of support support had more than twice as many Fico clearly plays a dominant members.)members.) Within Within the the leadership leadership Fico clearly plays a dominant role.role. Other Other party party leaders leaders play play roles roles in in particular particular realms, realms, but but it it is is ers (even as a group) able to hardhard to to imagine imagine other other party party lead leaders (even as a group) able to makingmaking a a significant significant move move of of which which Fico Fico disapproved. disapproved. SmerSmer is is remarkable remarkable for for the the “average “average-ness”-ness” of of its its support. support. The The graph graph belowbelow (based (based on on numbers numbers from from 2008) 2008) shows shows the the relationship relationship of of party party votersvoters (in (in orange) orange) to to the the average average citi citizenzen of of Slovakia Slovakia (the (the black black bar). bar). Voters InIn 2008 2008 Smer Smer was was indistinguishabl indistinguishablee from from the the average average in in every every Smer category.category. By By late late 2 2009009 other other surveys surveys indicate indicate the the party party had had become become slightlyslightly more more rural rural and and poor poor than than average, average, though though not not by by much. much. Male Hi‐Ed Young Urban Rich Slovak

Female Low‐Ed Old Rural Poor Other PopularityPopularity of of SNS SNS has has varied varied between between 5% 5% and and 15%15% over over the the past past 20 20 ye years,ars, averaging averaging around around 8%.8%. The The party’s party’s popularity popularity suffered suffered somewhat somewhat Historyduringduring its its time time in in government government with with Meciar’s Meciar’s SNS HZDSHZDS (1994-1998) (1994-1998) but but recovered recovered until until the the departuredeparture of of Slota Slota led led to to a a split split in in the the party. party. In In thethe 2002 2002 elections, elections, SNS SNS and and Slota’s Slota’s rival, rival, “The “The Real”Real” Slovak Slovak National National Party Party (PSNS) (PSNS) split split evenly, evenly, eacheach falling falling short short of of the the electoral electoral threshold threshold with with aboutabout 3.5%. 3.5%. The The loss loss compelled compelled party party leaders leaders to to workwork for for unification unification and and the the party party subsequently subsequently succeededsucceeded in in regaining regaining its its previous previous levels levels of of 50 popularitypopularity and and (largely (largely because because of of the the waning waning of of 50 Meciar’sMeciar’s HZDS—see HZDS—see below) below) actually actually increased increased its its popularitypopularity to to near-record near-record levels, levels, but but it it has has 45 subsequently fallen again. 40 subsequently fallen again. 40 35 30 30 25 20 Polls 20 15 10 10 Seats 5 0 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 PopularityPopularity of of SNS SNS has has varied varied between between 5% 5% and and 15%15% over over the the past past 20 20 ye years,ars, averaging averaging around around 8%.8%. The The party’s party’s popularity popularity suffered suffered somewhat somewhat History duringduring its its time time in in government government with with Meciar’s Meciar’s SNS HZDSHZDS (1994-1998) (1994-1998) but but recovered recovered until until the the departuredeparture of of Slota Slota led led to to a a split split in in the the party. party. In In the 2002 elections, SNS and Slota’s rival, “The The loss in 2002 the 2002 elections, SNS and Slota’s rival, “The The loss in 2002 Real” Slovak National Party (PSNS) split evenly, compelled party Real” Slovak National Party (PSNS) split evenly, compelled party each falling short of the electoral threshold with leaders to work for each falling short of the electoral threshold with leaders to work for about 3.5%. unification and the about 3.5%. unification and the party subsequently party subsequently succeeded in regaining succeeded in regaining its previous levels of 50 its previous levels of50 popularity and (largely popularity and (largely because of the waning45 because of the waning of Meciar’s HZDS—see DÚ PSNS of Meciar’s HZDS—see 40 below) actually 40 below) actually increased its increased its popularity to near- 35 popularity to near- record levels, but it 30 record levels, but it30 has subsequently fallen has subsequently fallen again to near the 5% again to near the 5%25 threshold. 20 Polls threshold. 20 15 10 10 Seats 5 0 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Issues SNS Nationalism

Communism Anti‐Communism State Control Free Market

ExpertExpert surveys surveys locate locate SNS SNS slightly slightly to to the the leftleft on on economic economic questions questions (but (but without without a a clearclear profile) profile) and and strongly strongly to to the the Slovak Slovak Integration NationalistNationalist pole pole of of competition, competition, as as might might rty leader has often bebe expected. expected. The The pa party leader has often spokenspoken in in strong—even strong—even rude rude and and confrontational—waysconfrontational—ways regarding regarding other other ethnicethnic groups. groups. Leaders SNS

Leadership v. Membership First v.

Second 

Tier

SNSSNS is is highly highly centralized, centralized, both both with with regard regard to to the the dominantdominant relationship relationship of of the the party party leadership leadership and and itsits relatively relatively small, small, weak weak party party base base and and dominant dominant  statuatorystatuatory role role of of the the party party leader, leader, Jan Jan Slota Slota vis- vis- à-vis party prominents Anna Belousovova and à-vis party prominents Anna Belousovova andnd RafaelRafael Rafaj. Rafaj. It It would would appear, appear, however, however, that that 2 2nd tiertier leaders leaders such such as as Belousovova Belousovova and and Rafaj Rafaj may may be be ableable to to wield wield practical practical power power during during Slota’s Slota’s not not infrequentinfrequent periods periods of of absence absence and and infirmity. infirmity. SNS’sSNS’s electorate electorate is is the the most most male male and and Slovak Slovak of of any any party. party. The The party’sparty’s voters voters are are slightly slightly younger younger th thanan average, average, with with average average levels levels ofof education. education. The The 2008 2008 numbers numbers show show them them to to be be slightly slightly above above Votersaverageaverage in in income, income, but but 2010 2010 numbers numbers suggest suggest that that they they are are more more SNS blue-collarblue-collar than than average. average. The The prot prototypicalotypical voter voter of of SNS SNS is is a a young, young, working-classworking-class male male living living in in a a medium-sized medium-sized city. city. Male Hi‐Ed Young Urban Rich Slovak

Female Low‐Ed Old Rural Poor Other HZDS began as an offshoot of the anticommunist VPN HZDS began as an offshoot of the anticommunist VPN (Public Against Violence) Begun in part to protest (Public Against Violence) Begun in part to protest Meciar’s removal from the prime ministership by the Meciar’s removal from the prime ministership by the parliamentary presidium, HZDS quickly surpassed VPN History parliamentary presidium, HZDS quickly surpassed VPN and scored a significant electoral victories in 1992. HZDS and scored a significant electoral victories in 1992. DÚ HZD LÚ

50 Seats 50 40 AZEN40 30 Polls 30

Meciar again to be removed as prime 20 InIn 1994 1994 splintering splintering within within HZDS HZDS caused caused Meciar again to be removed as prime 20 won a significant plurality in the 1994 ministerminister by by parliament, parliament, but but the the party party won a significant plurality in the 1994 the party again gained the more votes electionelection and and formed formed a a government. government. In In 1998 1998 the party again gained the more votes previous years and too few to form a thanthan any any other other party party far far fewer fewer than than in in previous years and too few to form a 10 governmentgovernment with with the the Slovak Slovak National National Party. Party. Between Between 1998 1998 and and 2008 2008 the the party party 10 sawsaw a a marked marked erosion erosion of of its its support, support, through through party party splintering, splintering, shifts shifts to to other other partiesparties and and attrition attrition and and by by early early 2010 2010 the the party party had had fallen fallen very very close close to to the the electoral threshold. 0 electoral threshold. 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Issues HZDS Nationalism

Communism Anti‐Communism State Control Free Market

WhileWhile during during the the mid-1990’s mid-1990’s HZDS HZDS took took aa distinct distinct pro-na pro-nationaltional and and anti- anti- integrationintegration position position (albeit (albeit softer softer than than thatthat of of SNS), SNS), by by the the mid-2000’s mid-2000’s the the party’sparty’s search search for for rehabilitation rehabilitation had had causedcaused it it to to abando abandonn nearly nearly all all of of its its distinctivedistinctive party party positions positions and and adopt adopt a a Integration positionposition slightly slightly to to the the left left of of center center on on economiceconomic issues issues (though (though its its voters voters were were amongamong the the most most supportive supportive of of redistribution)redistribution) and and slightly slightly toward toward the the nationalnational pole. pole. Leaders HZDS

Leadership v. Membership First v.

Second 

Tier

HZDSHZDS has has always always been been firmly firmly in in control control ofof Meciar Meciar and and any any second-tier second-tier leader leader whowho emerged emerged to to challenge challenge him him has has been been oustedousted or or has has chosen chosen to to leave. leave. With With the the  departure of Milan Urbani, there is no departurend of Milan Urbani, there is no ndin command. The party once clearclear 2 2 in command. The party once party organization hadhad a a strong, strong, if if docile docile party organization ? butbut over over time time it it has has weakened weakened in in its its organizationalorganizational capacity capacity as as well. well. HZDSHZDS has has maintained maintained an an extremel extremelyy consistent consistent demographic demographic pattern pattern forfor some some time: time: low-education, low-education, olde older,r, rural, rural, poorer poorer voters voters (these (these thingsthings tend tend to to go go together together in in Slov Slovakiaakia as as elsewhere) elsewhere) have have been been its its Votersmainstaymainstay and and this this looks looks likely likely to to continue continue until until the the party’s party’s demise, demise, HZDS somethingsomething that that may may happen happen in in the the 2010 2010 election, election, and and if if not, not, then then almostalmost certainly certainly in in 2014. 2014. Male Hi‐Ed Young Urban Rich Slovak

Female Low‐Ed Old Rural Poor Other History SDKÚ TheThe Slovak Slovak Democratic Democratic and and Christian Christian UnionUnion (SDKU) (SDKU) emerged emerged out out of of the the Slovak Slovak DemocraticDemocratic Coalition Coalition (SDK) (SDK) a a party party that that itselfitself emerged emerged from from the the coalition coalition of of five five pro-democracypro-democracy parties parties against against Meciar’s Meciar’s HZDSHZDS in in 1998 1998 (and (and forced forced into into a a single single partyparty structure structure by by a a restrictive restrictive electoral electoral 50 law).law). When When the the Christian Christian Democratic Democratic 50 MovementMovement (KDH) (KDH) withdrew withdrew from from SDK SDK in in 2000,2000, the the coalition coalition chair chair and and then then prime prime 45 ministerminister Mikulas Mikulas Dzurinda Dzurinda formed formed SDKU SDKU 40 asas a a distinct distinct party. party. Dzurinda Dzurinda continued continued 40 asas prime prime minister minister after after the the 2002 2002 electionelection with with a a coalition coalition more more univocally univocally 35 supportivesupportive of of economic economic reform. reform. After After the the 30 20062006 election election the the party party went went into into 30 oppositionopposition and and has has faced faced both both significant significant internalinternal dissent dissent and and corresponding corresponding 25 attempts at centralization by the party 20 attempts at centralization by the party 20 leader.leader. SDKU’s SDKU’s support support has has consistently consistently hoveredhovered around around the the 8%-15% 8%-15% mark, mark, 15 thoughthough the the party party has has consistently consistently 10 outperformedoutperformed its its polling polling numbers numbers in in 10 actualactual elections. elections. It It has has sustained sustained support support aroundaround the the 12%-15% 12%-15% level level in in despite despite 5 majormajor internal internal discord discord resulting resulting in in the the 0 expulsionexpulsion of of a a significant significant share share of of party party 0 leadersleaders and and members members who who formed formed the the smallsmall parties parties Free Free Forum Forum (SF) (SF) and and Civic Civic CandidatesCandidates (OK) (OK) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Issues SDKÚ Nationalism

Communism Anti‐Communism State Control Free Market

SDKUSDKU has has consistently consistently offered offered one one of of the the clearestclearest ideological ideological profiles profiles in in Slovakia’s Slovakia’s politicalpolitical party party system, system, with with resolute resolute supportsupport for for market market mechanisms, mechanisms, lower lower taxes,taxes, and and reforms reforms that that shift shift costs costs to to serviceservice users. users. The The party party has has also also supportedsupported international international integration integration and and Integration withinwithin the the context context of of Slovakia’s Slovakia’s politics politics hashas been been relatively relatively open open to to calls calls for for minorityminority rights, rights, though though it it has has at at times times alsoalso tried tried to to employ employ national national issues. issues. Leaders SDKÚ

Leadership v. Membership First v.

Second

SDKU presents an interesting hybrid model of party internal

Tier SDKU presents an interesting hybrid model of party internal organization,organization, at at least least by by Slovakia’s Slovakia’s standards, standards, at at least least at at present. present.  The party’s longtime chair Mikulas Dzurinda has, because of The party’s longtime chair Mikulas Dzurinda has, because of  scandal, stepped aside from the candidate list. Furthermore, scandal, stepped aside from the candidate list. Furthermore, althoughalthough SDKU SDKU never never boasted boasted a a la largerge membership membership and and was was created created fromfrom within within parliament, parliament, it it nevertheless nevertheless differed differed from from other other parties parties inin selecting selecting party party of of the the party party electoral electoral lists lists through through an an internal internal primary.primary. In In the the recent recent primary, primary, members members voted voted to to support support a Radicova for the first position formerformer presidential presidential candidate candidate Ivet Iveta Radicova for the first position inda ally Ivan Miklos. For the onon the the ballot ballot rather rather than than Dzur Dzurinda ally Ivan Miklos. For the moment,moment, then, then, the the party party elements elements are are in in relative relative balance, balance, though though therethere is is no no reason reason to to expect expect the the balance balance to to endure. endure. SDKUSDKU has has a a demographic demographic profile profile opposite opposite toto that that of of HZDS: HZDS: more more educated, educated, urban, urban, andand wealthy wealthy and and slightly slightly younger younger than than Voters average.average. It It has has maintained maintained this this SDKÚ demographicdemographic position position consistently consistently over over timetime Male Hi‐Ed Young Urban Rich Slovak

Female Low‐Ed Old Rural Poor Other TheThe Christian Christian Democratic Democratic Movement Movement (KDH) (KDH) emergedemerged shortly shortly after after the the fall fall of of Communism,Communism, strongly strongly influenced influenced by by Catholic Catholic History dissidentdissident circles. circles. The The party party played played a a strong strong KDH rolerole in in the the early early post-communist post-communist governmentsgovernments and and again again during during a a brief brief periodperiod in in 1994 1994 after after the the ouster ouster of of Meciar Meciar (and(and before before his his subsequent subsequent return). return). The The partyparty sharply sharply opposed opposed HZDS’s HZDS’s abuses abuses of of politicalpolitical power power and and helped helped shape shape a a broad broad oppositionopposition coalition, coalition, first first under under the the name name of of thethe “Blue” “Blue” coalition coalition and and then then as as the the Slovak Slovak 50 DemocraticDemocratic Coalition, Coalition, into into which which the the party party 50 mergedmerged in in 1998. 1998. After After the the election, election, SKDH however,however, the the party party sought sought some some of of its its former autonomy and eventually left SDK to 40 former autonomy and eventually left SDK to KDS40 re-establishre-establish itself itself as as an an independent independent party. party. ItIt continued continued in in government, government, however, however, but but leftleft the the coalition coalition in in 2006 2006 (because (because of of 30 disagreementsdisagreements with with other other coalition coalition partners) partners) 30 promptingprompting slightly slightly premature premature elections. elections. 20 Polls 20 10 Seats 10 0 0

For over 15 years, KDH has had a low but stable level of support between 7% and 15% (though actual continuity is For over 15 years, KDH has had a low but stable level of support between 7% and 15% (though actual continuity is harderharder to to determine determine1990 1991 because because1992 of of1993 the the ab 1994 absencesence1995 of of polling polling1996 while while1997 the the1998 party party1999 partic partic2000 ipatedipated2001 in in SDK).2002 SDK). Party2003 Party 2004 supporters supporters2005 tend 2006 tend 2007 2008 2009 toto be be those those with with strong strong religious religiou sbeliefs, beliefs, a a stable stable if if slowly slowly decl decliningining demographic demographic group. group. Issues KDH Nationalism

Communism Anti‐Communism State Control Free Market SinceSince 1998 1998 KDH KDH has has participated participated in in two two governing coalitions with strongly market- governing coalitions with strongly market- KDH supported EU accession but has oriented parties and as part of its own KDH supported EU accession but has oriented parties and as part of its own subsequently been cautious and even anti-Communism, the party has tended to subsequently been cautious and even anti-Communism, the party has tended to critical of the EU to the extent that it support market mechanisms as well. Expert critical of the EU to the extent that it support market mechanisms as well. Expert favors “European” and “liberal” values surveys therefore list it to the right of favors “European” and “liberal” values surveys therefore list it to the right of over “Christian” ones. More than most center on economic questions (though not as over “Christian” ones. More than most center on economic questions (though not as other parties, KDH competes on a third far as SDKU). The party’s relationship with other parties, KDH competes on a third far as SDKU). The party’s relationship with axis, not pictured here, involving the national questions is less clear, as it has been axis, not pictured here, involving the national questions is less clear, as it has been conflict between religious and secular less likely than SNS or HZDS to attack conflict between religious and secular less likely than SNS or HZDS to attack Integration values and the party has talked more Slovakia’s Hungarians on ethnic grounds values and the party has talked more Slovakia’s Hungarians on ethnic grounds than other parties about such themes as (and has indeed served in coalition with than other parties about such themes as (and has indeed served in coalition with homosexuality, abortion, and law and them) but has also not shied away from homosexuality, abortion, and law and them) but has also not shied away from order. nationalnational themes themes and and expressions expressions of of order. MKP/SMK as well as discontentdiscontent with with the the MKP/SMK as well as withwith the the European European Union. Union. Leaders KDH

Leadership v. Membership First v.

Second

Tier KDHKDH is is the the party party in in Slovakia Slovakia with with the the strongest strongest and and most most influential influential organizationalorganizational base, base, at at least least as as relate relatedd to to the the party party elite. elite. While While the the party party hashas seen seen the the departure departure of of some some frustr frustratedated would-be would-be leaders leaders (most (most recently recently in 2009, when some leaders departed to form KDS with but failed to take in 2009, when some leaders departed to form KDS with but failed to take KDHKDH voters) voters) but but it it is is unique unique among among Sl Slovakia’sovakia’s parties parties for for the the regular regular and and is the only major party in Slovakia orderlyorderly change change in in party party leadership. leadership. It It is the only major party in Slovakia The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) emerged shortly after the fall of Communism, strongly influenced by Catholicd yet dissident continue circles. to The remain party played involved. a strong role wherewhere past past leaders leaders hand hand over over power power an and yet continue to remain involved. in the early post‐communist governments and again duringIn a2000, brief period Pavol in 1994 Hrusovsky after the ouster replaced of Meciar (andretiring before hislong-time subsequent return). party The leader party sharply Jan opposed HZDS’s abuses of political power and helped shapeIn a 2000,broad opposition Pavol coalition, Hrusovsky first under replaced the name re oftiring the “Blue” long-time coalition and partythen as the leader Slovak DemocraticJan riety of other leaders continued to Coalition, into which the party merged in 1998. After theCarnogursky, election,Carnogursky, however, butthe but party Carnogursky Carnogursky sought some of andits and former a a va autonomyvariety andof eventuallyother leaders left SDK tocontinued re‐establish itself to 2010 Jan Figel replaced Hrusovsky as an independent party. It continued in government, however,playplay a buta prominent prominent left the coalition role, role, in 2006 and and (because in in 2010of disagreements Jan Figel with other replaced coalition Hrusovsky partners) prompting slightly pre‐term elections. In 2000, Pavol Hrusovsky replaced retiringproducing long‐time a party small leader uptick Jan Carnogursky, in support. but Carnogursky Other and KDH a variety leaders of other including leaders continue Daniel to play a prominent role, and like MKP/SMK, KDH is less focused aroundproducing a single leader a small and more uptick dependent in support. on its membership Other base KDH than most leaders other partiesincluding in Slovakia. Daniel LiLipsicpsic alsoalso exert exert influence influence over over p partyarty decisions. decisions AA KDH KDH voter voter is is more more likely likely than than average average to to be be female, female, older,older, and and poorer, poorer, with with a a low low level level of of education. education. 2009 2009 surveyssurveys suggest suggest that that the the educat educationion level level is is not not as as low low as as Voters thatthat of of HZDS, HZDS, however however an andd that that the the KDH KDH voters voters are are KDH moremore likely likely to to be be white white co collarllar than than those those of of HZDS. HZDS. Male Hi‐Ed Young Urban Rich Slovak

Female Low‐Ed Old Rural Poor Other History SaS

50 50

SaSSaS emerged emerged in in Spring Spring 2009 2009 as as an an initiative initiative of of a a 40 formerformer adviser adviser within within the the Dzurinda Dzurinda government’s government’s 40 economiceconomic ministry, ministry, Richard Richard Sulik. Sulik. The The party party remainedremained relatively relatively obscure obscure until until it it demonstrated demonstrated a a 30 certaincertain level level of of success success (in (in part part because because of of the the 30 effectiveeffective use use of of electronic electronic social social networks), networks), nearly nearly crossingcrossing the the 5% 5% threshold threshold in in the the low-turnout low-turnout 20 EuropeanEuropean parliament parliament elections. elections. Since Since then, then, the the 20 partyparty has has become become a a primar primaryy rival rival of of SDKU SDKU with with mostmost polls polls showing showing enough enough supports supports to to exceed exceed 10 parliament’sparliament’s 5% 5% minimum minimum threshold. threshold. 10

0 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Issues SaS Nationalism

Communism Anti‐Communism State Control Free Market

SaSSaS positions positions are are still still rather rather new new but but the the partyparty is is strongly strongly free free market, market, favoring favoring thethe flat flat tax tax and and continued continued (even (even accelerated)accelerated) market-oriented market-oriented reforms. reforms. It It Integration alsoalso appears appears willing willing to to work work with with HungarianHungarian parties parties and and even even considered considered anan electoral electoral coalition coalition with with Bugar’s Bugar’s Most- Most- to avoid dealing with Hid.Hid. It It has has tended tended to avoid dealing with nationalitynationality and and identity identity questions. questions. Leaders SaS First

v. Leadership v. Membership

Second

Tier  SaSSaS internal internal organization organization is is difficult difficult to to judge. judge. ItIt appears appears to to be be larg largelyely the the brainchild brainchild of of founderfounder Richard Richard Sulik. Sulik. It It has has attracted attracted  talentedtalented second second tier tier members members but but their their influenceinfluence on on the the party’s party’s overall overall direction direction is is unclear.unclear. The The party party has has also also made made significant significant useuse of of electronic electronic social social networks networks but but it it remainsremains to to be be seen seen whether whether electronic electronic relationshipsrelationships are are used used primarily primarily for for party party marketingmarketing or or actually actually have have influence influence on on party party direction.direction. Voters SaS Male Hi‐Ed Young Urban Rich Slovak

NoNo formal formal data data can can be be presented presented he herere but but recent recent surveys surveys show show that that a a largelarge share share of of SaS SaS voters voters come come bo bothth from from Smer Smer and and SDKU SDKU and and from from youngyoung voters voters and and outside outside the the electorate, electorate, while while a a small small share share come come from from KDH,KDH, SF SF and and SNS SNS and and none none at at all all from from the the Hungar Hungarianian Parties Parties and and HZDS. HZDS. Like SDKU but even more extreme in that way, SaS is a party with an Like SDKU but even more extreme in that way, SaS is a party with an overrepresentation of well-educated, young, urban and relatively wealthy overrepresentation of well-educated, young, urban and relatively wealthy supporters. supporters.

Female Low‐Ed Old Rural Poor Other MKP-SMKMKP-SMK is is almost almost exclusively exclusively identified identified withwith the the Hungarian Hungarian ethnic ethnic population population in in Slovakia:Slovakia: few few party party voters voters are are not not HistoryHungarianHungarian and and until until recently recently nearly nearly all all MKP HungarianHungarian voters voters supported supported this this party. party. ThisThis meant meant that that the the party party had had an an extraordinaryextraordinary stable stable ba basese of of support. support. In In recentrecent years years party party support support has has begun begun to to declinedecline and and the the creation creation of of Most-Hid Most-Hid by by formerformer MKP MKP chair chair Bela Bela Bugar Bugar led led to to a a significantsignificant exodus exodus of of voters. voters. The The HungarianHungarian electorate electorate remains remains stable stable but but 50 notnot the the allocation allocation of of its its votes votes between between 50 thesethese two two parties. parties.

40 40 Most 30 30 20 Polls 20 10 Seats 10

0 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Issues MKP Nationalism

Communism Anti‐Communism State Control Free Market

MKP/SMKMKP/SMK is, is, ideologically, ideologically, the the mirror mirror imageimage of of SNS SNS according according to to expert expert surveys:surveys: in in favor favor of of integration integration and and minorityminority rights rights and and (given (given its its participationparticipation in in eight eight years years of of coalition coalition withwith “Right” “Right” parties, parties, slightly slightly inclined inclined towardtoward market market mechanisms. mechanisms. It It is is worth worth noting,noting, however, however, that that the the party’s party’s overwhelmingoverwhelming support support of of integration integration is is in in Integration by a denationalized largelarge part part driven driven not not by a denationalized cosmopolitanismcosmopolitanism but but by by a a strong strong emphasisemphasis on on creating creating a a counterweight counterweight thatthat helps helps preserve preserve rights rights for for the the HungarianHungarian ethnic ethnic group group within within Slovakia. Slovakia. Leaders MKP

First Leadership v. Membership v.

Second

Tier

Like KDH, MKP-SMK has maintained a relatively strong organization Like KDH, MKP-SMK has maintained a relatively strong organization vis-à-visvis-à-vis the the party party elite—one elite—one that that could could influence, influence, if if not not command, command,  partyparty decisions. decisions. Party Party leadership leadership wa was salso also more more collegial collegial than than in in many many otherother parties, parties, with with a a large large number number of of influential influential elites. elites. In In 2007 2007 A A mbers removed longtime chair Bela narrownarrow vote vote among among these these leading leading me members removed longtime chair Bela Bugar.Bugar. Bugar Bugar stayed stayed for for a a time time within within the the party party but but eventually eventually left left to to gnificant leader within the party formform Most-Hid. Most-Hid. Csaky Csaky is is the the most most si significant leader within the party traint from at least some other hierarchyhierarchy but but appears appears to to face face cons constraint from at least some other leaders.leaders. InIn past past years years the the story story of of MKP-SMK’s MKP-SMK’s demographic demographic support support was was easy easy to to tell: tell: withwith a a few few exceptions, exceptions, Hungararians Hungarariansandand only only Hungaria Hungariansns supported supported the the party.party. Recent Recent surveys surveys show show that that this this is is true true but but that that there there are are differences differences Voters betweenbetween MKP-SMK MKP-SMK and and Most-Hid Most-Hid within within the the Hungarian Hungarian population. population. MKP- MKPMKP- SMKSMK voters voters are are more more likely likely to to have have low low education education levels levels and and live live in in rural rural areas,areas, have have less less income. income. They They are are also also sl slightlyightly older. older. Interestingly, Interestingly, whereas whereas a a smallsmall but but significant significant group group of of Most-Hid Most-Hid voters voters are are non-Hungarian, non-Hungarian, SMK SMK Male Hiappearsappears‐Ed to to have have lost lost Young what what fe feww non-Hungarian non-Hungarian Urban voters voters it it had. had. Rich Slovak

Female Low‐Ed Old Rural Poor Hungar. TheThe party party is is too too new new to to havehave a a very very strong strong electoralelectoral track track record. record. It It History hashas gone gone from from nothing nothing Most toto a a position position slightly slightly aboveabove that that of of MKP-SMK MKP-SMK butbut its its ability ability to to endure endure atat this this level level is is open open to to question.question.

50 50

40 MKP/SMK is almost exclusively identified with the 40 Hungarian ethnic population in Slovakia: few non‐ 30 Hungarians vote for the party, and few party voters are 30 not Hungarian. This means that the party has an 20 extraordinary stable base of support, though for reasons 20 that are nit entirely clear this has declined slightly (by 1% 10 or 2% in the last two years). Seats 10 0 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Positions Most Nationalism

Communism Anti‐Communism State Control Free Market

TheThe positions positions of of Most-Hid Most-Hid resemble resemble for for thethe most most part part those those of of MKP-SMK, MKP-SMK, thoughthough Most-Hid Most-Hid has has rejected rejected some some of of thethe stronger stronger national national appeals appeals of of MKP MKP and and hashas deliberately deliberately sought sought out out Slovaks Slovaks and and usedused a a half-Slovak half-Slovak party party name name (meaning (meaning Integration BridgeBridge in in both both languages). languages). Nevertheless Nevertheless thethe primary primary appeal appeal of of MKP MKP is is to to HungariansHungarians and and the the party party strongly strongly defendsdefends the the right right to to Hungarian Hungarian cultural cultural reproduction.reproduction. Leaders Most First

v. Leadership v. Membership

Second

Tier  AsAs with with SaS, SaS, Most-Hid’s Most-Hid’s internal internal organizationorganization is is difficult difficult to to judge. judge. It It is is thethe project project of of Bela Bela Bugar, Bugar, former former chair chair ofof MKP-SMK MKP-SMK and and attracted attracted some some other other  prominent members of MKP-SMK as prominent members of MKP-SMK as wellwell as as a a few few ethnic ethnic Slovaks. Slovaks. The The party party isis too too new new to to determine determine the the internal internal dynamicsdynamics but but Bugar Bugar looks looks set set to to exert exert a a commandingcommanding role, role, having having left left behind behind manymany of of the the constraining constraining influence influence in in MKP-SMK.MKP-SMK. Voters Most Male Hi‐Ed Young Urban Rich Slovak

NoNo formal formal data data can can be be presented presented he herere but but recent recent surveys surveys show show that that a a nearlynearly all all Most-Hid Most-Hid voters voters come come both both from from MKP-SMK, MKP-SMK, but but that that a a few few comecome from from voters voters previosly previosly outside outside the the electorate, electorate, while while a a small small share share comecome from from SDKU SDKU and and Smer. Smer. Compared Compared to to voters voters in in Slovakia Slovakia as as a a whole, whole, Most-Hid voters are older, more rural, poorer and more Hungarian, but Most-Hid voters are older, more rural, poorer and more Hungarian, but compared to MKP-SMK voters, Most-Hid voters are more educated, compared to MKP-SMK voters, Most-Hid voters are more educated, younger, less rural, less poor and less likely to be Hungarians. younger, less rural, less poor and less likely to be Hungarians.

Female Low‐Ed Old Rural Poor Hungar. Elections

developments over the last 8 years: Long-termLong-term polls polls show show several several important important developments over the last 8 years: •The•The rise rise of of Smer Smer to to a a dominant dominant position, position, even even more more dominant dominant since since the the 2006 2006 election election and and now now hoveringhovering around around 40% 40% with SDKU usually holding the position of the •The•The cluster cluster of of other other parties parties between between 5% 5% and and 15%, 15%, with SDKU usually holding the position of the secondsecond party party and and others others fighting fighting for for the the remaining remaining positions. positions. parties either well above or well below the 5% •The•The “viability “viability gap” gap” that that emerged emerged in in 2006 2006 with with parties either well above or well below the 5% e disappearance may be temporary if both new threshold.threshold. This This gap gap disappeared disappeared in in 2009 2009 but but th the disappearance may be temporary if both new SaS) manage to stay above. No other parties partiesparties that that rose rose through through that that gap gap (Most-Hid (Most-Hid and and SaS) manage to stay above. No other parties A few parties (SNS and HZDS and MKP-SMK) could fall below. appearappear poised poised to to rise rise above. above. A few parties (SNS and HZDS and MKP-SMK) could fall below. TheThe next next slide slide offers offers a a closer closer look look at at the the last last year. year. Elections

ThisThis graph graph shows shows recent recent trends trends in in more more detail, detail, particularly particularly the the extraordinarily extraordinarily high, high, if if slightly slightly decliningdeclining performance performance of of Smer Smer (in (in orange) orange) arou aroundnd 40% 40% and and the the second second place place (albeit (albeit with with fluctuations)fluctuations) position position of of SDKU SDKU (in (in blue) blue) around around 15%. 15%. Because Because so somanymany parties parties cluster cluster around around 10% 10% thethe next next slide slide looks looks at at these these in in greater greater deta detailil without without the the compressing compressing effects effects of of Smer. Smer. ThisThis graph graph shows shows the the shifts shifts in in greater greater deta detail.il. The The following following points points are are noteworthy: noteworthy: •SDKU•SDKU (in (in dark dark blue) blue) has has risen risen has has high high as as 16% 16% but but has has falle fallenn recently, recently, largely largely in in parall parallelel to to the the rise rise of of SaS SaS (in (in aqua),aqua), but but SDKU SDKU has has not not fallen fallen as as far far as as SaS SaS has has risen risen suggesting suggesting that that SaS SaS g getsets some some voters voters from from other other sources. sources. •KDHElections•KDH (in (in bright bright blue) blue) has has remained remained stable stable around around 10% 10% as as is is that that party’s party’s habit. habit. •MKP-SMK•MKP-SMK (in (in bright bright green) green) has has fallen fallen si signficantly,gnficantly, especially especially with with the the rise rise of of Most-Hid Most-Hid (in (in mustard) mustard) but but Most-Hid Most-Hid hashas risen risen faster faster suggesting suggesting (as (as with with SaS) SaS) that that it it is is recruiting recruiting at at least least some some vo votersters from from elsewhere. elsewhere. Both Both parties parties are are currentlycurrently right right at at the the threshold threshold of of vi viability.ability. Chances Chances are are that that one one will will get get in. in. Chances Chances of of both both getting getting in in are are smallersmaller but but by by no no means means impossible). impossible). •HZDS•HZDS (in (in brown) brown) and and SNS SNS (in (in dark dark green) green) have have both both fallen fallen this this year year to to near near the the 5% 5% threshold. threshold. HZDS HZDS fell fell near near thethe threshold threshold once once in in mid mid 2009 2009 but but recovered recovered only only to to fall fall again. again. SNS, SNS, starting starting from from a a higher higher point, point, has has fallen fallen steadilysteadily over over the the past past year year (past (past two two years years in in fact) fact) •More•More established established small small parties parties remained remained small: small: ANO ANO has has di died.ed. HZD HZD fell fell too too low low to to sust sustainain itself itself and and merged merged with with Smer,Smer, SF SF despite despite a a surge surge in in early early 2009 2009 has has fallen fallen low low again, again, and and KSS KSS has has stayed stayed around around 2% 2% without without showing showing muchmuch sign sign of of change. change. By the numbers using specific poll data. HZDS has continued its slow process By the numbers using specific poll data. HZDS has continued its slow process of two steps down, one step up, of two steps down, one step up, recovering from lows in early 2008, recovering from lows in early 2008, falling to new lows and then falling to new lows and then Elections recovering again in Fall 2009. recovering again in Fall 2009. Addition of Polis polls accelerate the Smer, in a class by itself has saw Addition of Polis polls accelerate the Smer, in a class by itself has saw current descent but these are significant rise (to yet another peak) in current descent but these are significant rise (to yet another peak) in countered by unreasonably high early 2009 but has fallen back below countered by unreasonably high early 2009 but has fallen back below numbers measured by Median. MK 2008 levels according to almost every numbers measured by Median. MK 2008 levels according to almost every and FOCUS both show the same poll (still higher than in 2006) and FOCUS both show the same poll (still higher than in 2006) trend. trend.

SNS Shows a process of almost linear SNS Shows a process of almost linear decline in the smoothed average, decline in the smoothed average, accelerated by the inclusion of Polis accelerated by the inclusion of Polis polls in which SNS scores low but polls in which SNS scores low but these are countered by unreliably high these are countered by unreliably high Median polls for SNS and the trend is Median polls for SNS and the trend is traceable in both FOCUS and MVK traceable in both FOCUS and MVK polls polls Elections KDH has always hovered around 10%. KDH has always hovered around 10%. SaS has risen from nowhere, first It rose slightly over the last year with SaS has risen from nowhere, first It rose slightly over the last year with appearing on polls in spring of 2009 the coming of Figel but that effect appearing on polls in spring of 2009 the coming of Figel but that effect and in every poll except Median may have worn off (and some voters and in every poll except Median may have worn off (and some voters (which is unusually low) rising steadily may have left for SaS. (which is unusually low) rising steadily may have left for SaS. each month. each month.

SDKU has fluctuated in the past year, SDKU has fluctuated in the past year, rising from a trough in summer rising from a trough in summer 2008 to a peak in summer 2009 2008 to a peak in summer 2009 and then falling again, probably and then falling again, probably related to the rise in SaS. All the related to the rise in SaS. All the polling firms are quite consistent on polling firms are quite consistent on this one. this one. Most-Hid’s rise is so rapid that it Most-Hid’s rise is so rapid that it looks to have pulled voters from looks to have pulled voters from non-MKP sources (disaffected MKP Elections non-MKP sources (disaffected MKP voters who withdrew earlier and voters who withdrew earlier and perhaps some Slovaks. It now perhaps some Slovaks. It now shows no upward trend (and really MKP shows a steady decline shows no upward trend (and really MKP shows a steady decline never did, starting all of them accelerating with the emergence of never did, starting all of them accelerating with the emergence of around the current level except Most-Hid, but not isometric to it, around the current level except Most-Hid, but not isometric to it, Median, where the slow rise suggesting that MKP lost potential Median, where the slow rise suggesting that MKP lost potential suggests greater name recognition. voters beforehand. suggests greater name recognition. voters beforehand. This chart shows levels of predictivity of polls at various points over time. This chart shows levels of predictivity of polls at various points over time. Predictivity is greater for elections to Slovakia’s parliament than for Predictivity is greater for elections to Slovakia’s parliament than for Europarliament elections (very low turnout obscures the relationship) but for all Europarliament elections (very low turnout obscures the relationship) but for all Elections of them predictiveness appears to begin increasing about 6 months before the of them predictiveness appears to begin increasing about 6 months before the elections. We are slightly beyond that point right now. This means that all elections. We are slightly beyond that point right now. This means that all predictions based on data above should be taken with considerable caution. predictions based on data above should be taken with considerable caution. Later polls should get 1 to 2 percentage points better in predictiveness for the Later polls should get 1 to 2 percentage points better in predictiveness for the average party. average party. This chart shows levels of predictiveness of polls for various parties and elections. This chart shows levels of predictiveness of polls for various parties and elections. When the white circle is above the colored circle, the polls have overpredicted. When the white circle is above the colored circle, the polls have overpredicted. This has happened for Smer and SNS in 3 of 4 elections (but not the most recent This has happened for Smer and SNS in 3 of 4 elections (but not the most recent Elections parliamentary election, suggestion caution about thinking that current results are parliamentary election, suggestion caution about thinking that current results are overprediction). When the colored circle is above the white one the polls have overprediction). When the colored circle is above the white one the polls have underpredicted. This has happened all four times for SMK-MKP (though its underpredicted. This has happened all four times for SMK-MKP (though its circumstances are now quite different with the emergence of Most-Hid and bets circumstances are now quite different with the emergence of Most-Hid and bets are off) and for SDKU (though with decreasing levels of error over time). For are off) and for SDKU (though with decreasing levels of error over time). For KDH and HZDS the results have been fairly close to the actual results and KDH and HZDS the results have been fairly close to the actual results and unpredictable in their direction. For Most-Hid and SaS we have no track record unpredictable in their direction. For Most-Hid and SaS we have no track record to judge from. to judge from. It is therefore hard to guess for which party current polls will be accurate and for It is therefore hard to guess for which party current polls will be accurate and for which they will not. which they will not. There are two key elements in assessing the likelihood of the next There are two key elements in assessing the likelihood of the next coalition: coalition: •Math: does a given combination have a sufficient number of seats •Math: does a given combination have a sufficient number of seats Coalitions •Chemistry: can a given combination get along. •Chemistry: can a given combination get along. With 8 parties potentially reaching parliament, there are 256 With 8 parties potentially reaching parliament, there are 256 possible coalitions. Most of these, however, can be eliminated or possible coalitions. Most of these, however, can be eliminated or discounted as improbable on the basis of chemistry or math discounted as improbable on the basis of chemistry or math

HZDS KDH

SNS SDKU

Smer SaS

SMK Most The graph below—a compilation of the The graph below—a compilation of the individual party locations from the individual party locations from the graphs above—offers one way to assess graphs above—offers one way to assess Coalitions chemistry: based on party position. This chemistry: based on party position. This suggests a continuation of the current suggests a continuation of the current coalition or a shift to the 2002-2006 coalition or a shift to the 2002-2006 coalition with SaS substituting for then coalition with SaS substituting for then ANO. Nationalism ANO. Of course this is not the only form of Of course this is not the only form of chemistry: personal chemistry among chemistry: personal chemistry among SNS leaders is key and that is harder to leaders is key and that is harder to judge. I will try to make some of those judge. I will try to make some of those judgments below. judgments below. HZDS Smer Welfare State Market Reforms KDH

SDKÚ

SaS

MK Most

Integration Coalitions>Hard to imagine

HZDS KDH

SNS SDKU

Smer SaS

SMK Most

There are a few combinations that can be eliminated because they would There are a few combinations that can be eliminated because they would violate one or another party’s reason for existence: violate one or another party’s reason for existence: •The Slovak National Party and either Hungarian party. In a sense they •The Slovak National Party and either Hungarian party. In a sense they need each other but unless aliens cause all humanity to unite against a need each other but unless aliens cause all humanity to unite against a common foe, these two are matter and antimatter. common foe, these two are matter and antimatter. •SaS and Smer. SaS has made rejection of things-communist part of its •SaS and Smer. SaS has made rejection of things-communist part of its explicit appeal. Were it an older party, it might be able to change its mind. explicit appeal. Were it an older party, it might be able to change its mind. As a new party it probably cannot. As a new party it probably cannot. Coalitions>Highly unlikely

HZDS KDH

SNS SDKU

Smer SaS

SMK Most

There are a few other combinations that are highly unlikely but not impossible: There are a few other combinations that are highly unlikely but not impossible: •SNS and the “right”. Those parties have repeatedly excoriated SNS for its extreme nationalism •SNS and the “right”. Those parties have repeatedly excoriated SNS for its extreme nationalism and alleged its corruption. Right parties have not explicitly excluded the combination (and such and alleged its corruption. Right parties have not explicitly excluded the combination (and such stated exclusion would not mean much in any case—Meciar explicitly excluded coalition with stated exclusion would not mean much in any case—Meciar explicitly excluded coalition with SNS in 2006 and then changed his mind) SNS in 2006 and then changed his mind) •SDKU and Smer. While theoretically possible, these parties have been so thoroughly •SDKU and Smer. While theoretically possible, these parties have been so thoroughly antagonistic to one another that the combination is highly unlikely. antagonistic to one another that the combination is highly unlikely. Coalitions>Difficult

HZDS KDH

SNS SDKU

Smer SaS

SMK Most

A number of coalition possibilities—listed here in gray—would be costly: A number of coalition possibilities—listed here in gray—would be costly: •HZDS with KDH or SaS. KDH has extensive negative experience with HZDS and its supporters would be unlikely to go •HZDS with KDH or SaS. KDH has extensive negative experience with HZDS and its supporters would be unlikely to go easily into a coalition with HZDS. SaS leaders have made statements suggesting the difficulty as well. On the right only easily into a coalition with HZDS. SaS leaders have made statements suggesting the difficulty as well. On the right only SDKU appears capable of working relatively easily with HZDS SDKU appears capable of working relatively easily with HZDS •Smer with Most-Hid or MKP-SMK. Smer would lose the ability to play Hungarian issues and might face an exodus of •Smer with Most-Hid or MKP-SMK. Smer would lose the ability to play Hungarian issues and might face an exodus of some hard-won SNS and HZDS voters if it accepted this coalition. It would not be easy for the Hungarian parties either. some hard-won SNS and HZDS voters if it accepted this coalition. It would not be easy for the Hungarian parties either. •Most-Hid and MKP-SMK. These parties probably would align in the end but there is no love lost among their leaders •Most-Hid and MKP-SMK. These parties probably would align in the end but there is no love lost among their leaders •Smer and KDH. Both of these parties—especially KDH—would have difficulty explaining the coalition to supporters. •Smer and KDH. Both of these parties—especially KDH—would have difficulty explaining the coalition to supporters. Chemistry Coalitions (can they get along?)

CombiningCombining the the coalition coalition math math plusplus the the coalition coalition chemistry chemistry producesproduces a a schematic schematic like like the the followingfollowing in in which which the the coalitions coalitions withwith the the most most chance chance are are closest closest toto the the grail. grail. The The grail grail for for any any givengiven party party is is for for that that party party to to havehave enough enough seats seats on on its its own own to to formform a a government. government. •The•The only only candidate candidate for for the the one- one- party grail—Smer alone—is enough?) party grail—Smer alone—is currentlycurrently mathematically mathematically unlikelyunlikely and and therefore therefore resides resides in in thethe medium-gray medium-gray ring. ring. •The•The current current coalition coalition is is less less have cohesivecohesive but but mathematically mathematically moremore likely. likely. Smer Smer plus plus one one of of its its twotwo current current coalition coalition partners partners is is betweenbetween the the two two in in terms terms of of

mathematical likelihood and  mathematical likelihood and they chemistry.chemistry. These These lie lie in in the the inner inner ringring •Smer•Smer plus plus two two Hungarian Hungarian partners is mathematically partners is mathematically •The 2002-2006 coalition lies in the certain but with lower •The 2002-2006 coalition lies in the Math (Will certain but with lower outer ring: a cohesive version does not chemistry;chemistry; one one Hungarian Hungarian outer ring: a cohesive version does not partner might be more palatable havehave enough enough seats; seats; adding adding more more parties parties partner might be more palatable lowers cohesion. butbut would would have have less less chance chance of of a a lowers cohesion. majority. These lie in the •Also•Also in in the the outer outer ring ring is is Smer Smer and and majority. These lie in the KDH. Mathematically possible and just middlemiddle ring. ring. KDH. Mathematically possible and just barelybarely thinkable thinkable in in terms terms of of chemistry. chemistry. Coalitions>Threshold

HZDS+SNS SNS alone TheThe 5% 5% threshold threshold may may HZDS alone playplay a a major major role role in in Neither determiningdetermining the the outcome outcome becausebecause 5 5 parties parties are are SaS or not currently near that currently near that HZDS+SNS thresholdthreshold and and the the presence presence oror absence absence of of these these parties parties SNS alone couldcould account account for for up up to to HZDS alone 25% of all seats being 25% of all seats being 2 Hungarian Neither redistributedredistributed to to the the larger larger parties.parties. parties or 5 parties on the threshold 5 parties on the threshold just 1 HZDS+SNS meansmeans 32 32 possible possible combinations, but I SNS alone combinations, but I HZDS alone presumepresume that that the the failure failure of of bothbothHungarianHungarian parties parties is is Neither unlikely,unlikely, which which reduces reduces it it toto 16. 16. Here Here is is what what that that SaS or not looks like: looks like: HZDS+SNS SNS alone HZDS alone Neither Coalitions>Threshold ArrayingArraying these these combinations combinations vertically vertically lead leads sto to the the following following parliamentary parliamentary combinations combinations Smer SNS HZDS SaS Two Hungarian One Hungarian KDH SDKU

(using current polling numbers). Chances for Smer alone TheseThese have have consequences consequences for for the the viability viability of of coalitions coalitions (using current polling numbers). Chances for Smer alone it possible). Smer plus only one of its current partners increaseincrease with with more more parties parties falling falling below below (3 (3 fails fails makes makes it possible). Smer plus only one of its current partners e current coalition survives in every case. needsneeds at at least least one one party party to to fall fall short. short. Th The current coalition survives in every case. Smer alone 65 68 68 74 68 73 73 79 67 72 72 78 72 76 76 84 Smer+HZDS 75 ‐ 80 ‐ 78 ‐ 85 ‐ 77 ‐ 84 ‐ 82 ‐ 89 ‐ Smer+SNS 75 80 ‐ ‐ 78 85 ‐ ‐ 77 84 ‐ ‐ 82 89 ‐ ‐ Smer+SNS+HZDS 84 ‐ ‐ ‐ 88 ‐ ‐ ‐ 87 ‐ ‐ ‐ 93 ‐ ‐ ‐ Coalitions>Threshold

Smer SNS HZDS SaS Two Hungarian One Hungarian KDH SDKU

both Hungarian parties SmerSmer plus plus only only one one of of Hungaria Hungariann party party at at least least one one other other part partyy to to fall fall short. short. Smer Smer plus plus both Hungarian parties survivessurvives in in every every case. case.

Smer+SMK or Most 74 78 78 84 78 83 83 90 73 78 78 85 78 83 83 91

Smer+SMK+Most 83 87 87 94 87 93 93 101 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐

Smer+KDH 81 85 85 93 82 88 88 95 84 90 90 98 87 92 92 101 Coalitions>Threshold

Smer SNS HZDS SaS Two Hungarian One Hungarian KDH SDKU ly if both Slovak national parties fall short but not any of the others TheThe 2002-2006 2002-2006 coalition coalition becomes becomes possible possible on only if both Slovak national parties fall short but not any of the others htly more likely but only assured if SNS fails and no (quite(quite unlikely). unlikely). The The 2002-2006 2002-2006 coalition coalition plus plus HZDS HZDS is is slig slightly more likely but only assured if SNS fails and no otherother party party does does (again (again not not likely) likely) SDKU+KDH+SaS+ Hungarians 66 70 70 76 62 65 65 71 63 66 66 72 57 61 61 66 SDKU+KDH+SaS+ Hungarians+HZDS 66 ‐ 82 76 62 ‐ 77 71 63 ‐ 78 72 57 ‐ 74 66 Coalitions HZDS KDH So how do these coalitions stack up in terms of So how do these coalitions stack up in terms of SNS SDKU consequences?consequences? I Iassess assess 4 4 possible possible combinations combinations

Likelihood: Smer SaS

Moderate to High SMK Most Consequences: Business as usual, with somewhat more clientelism and national‐emphasis Stability: Relatively high but decreasing with time. Coalitions HZDS KDH

SNS SDKU

Likelihood: Smer SaS

Low to Moderate SMK Most Consequences: Ameliorated ethnic policy, but significant clientelism Stability: Fractured and unstable Coalitions HZDS KDH

SNS SDKU

Likelihood: Smer SaS

Low but possible SMK Most Consequences: Slightly ameliorated ethnic policy Increased accountability Stability: Conflictual Coalitions HZDS KDH

SNS SDKU

Likelihood: Smer SaS

Low SMK Most Consequences: Ameliorated ethnic policy Return to slight pro‐market emphasis Stability: Highly conflictual and unstable Coalitions HZDS KDH

SNS SDKU

Likelihood: Smer SaS

Very low SMK Most Consequences: Ameliorated ethnic policy Return to pro‐market emphasis Stability: Conflictual and unstable More questions?

IfIf you’ve you’ve gotten gotten this this far, far, thanks thanks for for reading. reading. This This documentdocument and and longer longer ve versionsrsions of of all all of of these these thoughtsthoughts are are available available in in various various posts posts on on my my blog, blog, thethe address address of of which which is is below. below. Please Please feel feel free free to to askask follow follow up up questions, questions, ask ask for for more more details details or or eveneven ask ask for for additional additional data data analysis. analysis. Your Your questionquestion will will probably probably be be interesting interesting for for me me as as wellwell and and I’ll I’ll try try to to find find an an answer. answer. --Kevin--Kevin

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