! Diaspora and Disinvestment: Perspectives of Syrian Religious Minorities ! March! 2014 ! ! ! !

Acknowledgements

SREO expresses its gratitude to all those who enabled this study, including the Syrians who gave their time to participate in interviews as well as members of the Gaziantep, Antakya, and Mardin communities in Turkey, and the Sulaimaniya and Erbil communities in Iraqi Kurdistan. SREO takes full responsibility for all omissions and errors. The Research Team

The research team that contributed to this report consists of Kristine Anderson, Heather Hughes, Melike Karlidag, Abdulhamid Qabbani, Daniel Seckman, and Matthew Trevithick. This report was authored by Kristine Anderson and Heather Hughes.

About SREO

SREO is an independent, non-partisan research center based in Gaziantep, Turkey. SREO’s team of researchers includes Syrians, Turks and Americans who have all spent significant time in Syria and the Middle East. Its researchers speak local languages and are dedicated to providing objective analysis of what is transpiring inside of Syria as well as in the host communities of neighboring countries. In addition, SREO provides monitoring and evaluation services along with needs assessments and feasibility studies. Together, the SREO team has over 10 years of experience working in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Turkey. Contact: [email protected] Photo Credit: Michael Runkel / Getty Images Title: Tomb of Sex Adi (Sheikh Adi Ibn Musafir) in the Lalish capital of the Kurdish sect of the Yazidis in Iraqi Kurdistan, Iraq. Yazidis tie three knots around the tombs while making a wish, and untie three other knots, which solves the problem or grants the wish of a previous visitor.

www.sreo.org 2 Table of Contents Executive Summary 4

Introduction to Minorities in the Syrian Conflict 6

Sectarianism in Syria: A Socio-historical Background 8

Review of Literature 13

Methods 18

Key Findings 20

Perspectives on Pre-Conflict Sectarian Relations: Narratives of Coexistence and Intolerance 20

Sectarian Conflict: Roots and Causes 23

Fear in Religious Minority Communities 29

Fluid and Reactive Identities 32

Conclusion: Whither Diversity in Syria? 40

Bibliography 41

www.sreo.org 3 Executive Summary isolation of some religious groups vis-a-vis others was often attributed to fear, which respondents claimed the Assad regime Despite alarmist media attention focusing on promoted to keep minority groups subservient. the vulnerabilities of religious minorities in the

Syrian Conflict, little research exists that Fears and anxieties related to minority status documents the viewpoints and experiences of were readily mobilized by the Assad regime these groups. In light of this gap in knowledge, during the Conflict, particularly as the Conflict the current study aims to shed light on the became more violent and the opposition more perspectives of individuals from minority visibly Islamist. Many interviewees expressed religious backgrounds in Syria, examining how fear for the futures of their communities in these groups have been impacted by the Syrian Syria, indicating that these communities were Conflict, and considering the implications of caught between religious extremists and an these impacts on the future of diversity in Syria. authoritarian regime that did not protect Data was collected through qualitative in-depth minority interests. Although many of the interviews with individuals from Christian, interviewees left Syria due to the threat of Alawite, Ismaili, Druze, and Yazidi sects violence by extremist groups, a number also originating from all major areas in Syria and left due to their political activities against the now living in displacement. Interviews regime. Several interviewees reported that they addressed questions of inter-communal were wanted by factions from both sides, an relations prior to and after the start of the indicator of the sharply polarized sociopolitical Conflict, individual and group identities, climate imposed on these vulnerable groups. political subjectivities, as well as perspectives Fear and feelings of being threatened were on the future of minority groups within a post- reported to have led to increased group Conflict Syria. isolation. While such instances were dependant While admitting that sectarian identities had on geographic location and local demographics, sharpened and that groups were increasingly respondents from various groups reported isolated, pre-Conflict social relations were experiencing more rigid group boundaries usually portrayed by respondents as between religious communities, increased harmonious. Respondents, mostly Syriac labelling practices which categorize people as Christians from Hassakeh, described a Syria members of groups, and growing mistrust of where Christians and Muslims enjoyed positive people from outside their respective groups. economic and personal interactions. Current Group and individual identity emerged as an and past sectarian tensions tended to be important factor interactive with the Syrian attributed to the regime or outside actors, such Conflict. Minorities articulated their identities as extremist foreign fighters. Alternately, other along political, sectarian, and national lines, respondents highlighted a lack of and interviews revealed a plurality of political intercommunal relations prior to the Conflict, views and group and individual self- and suggested that the inability to address perceptions. The question of a national identity religious and ethnic differences in the public featured prominently in this context: sphere had hindered genuine tolerance. The

www.sreo.org 4 informants across all sects identified themselves as “Syrian,” with many privileging this identity over other co-occurring markers. However, the criteria that constituted this “Syrian” national identity was often inconsistent or ambiguous. Many informants also described how the Conflict had brought about an involuntary politicization of their religious identities, problematizing their social relations and in some cases exposing them to danger, which was widely reported by Christians and Alawites. The sum of the challenges faced by minority groups have impelled many to feel disinvested in the country for which they express deep loyalty, and many feel dispossessed of a future in Syria. In short, many religious minorities feel that their existence in a current and post-Conflict Syria is fundamentally threatened, and are resigned to a life in diaspora. This withdrawal of religious minorities from the country holds long-term implications for both the direction of the ongoing Conflict, and the eventual sociopolitical landscape of a post-Conflict Syria.

www.sreo.org 5 Introduction to Minorities in these groups - and the future of Syria’s demographic diversity - it has also highlighted the Syrian Conflict the lack of in-depth information on minority groups and sectarian issues in Syria prior to The ongoing Syrian Conflict represents the and after the start of the Conflict. Indeed, a lack most violent and complex armed conflict of the of of non-biased research on sectarian issues in 21st century, resulting in more than 140,000 Syria has forced governments and policy casualties and displacing more than 3 million makers to rely on often speculative media

1 from their homes. While thousands of Syrians reports and unconfirmed rumors. In short, living inside their country or in displacement despite the great interest in the well-being of remain under threat of violence and starvation, Syrian religious minority groups, there exists a members of religious minority groups have significant gap in knowledge on the viewpoints been considered particularly susceptible to and experiences of these communities, which harm. Since the beginning of the Conflict in both undermines the richness and complexity 2011, the international media has shown great of their perspectives and disregards what these interest in the role of Syria’s minority groups, ideas may entail for the future of Syria. often pointing to the country’s ethno-religious diversity as a point of vulnerability and a The current study aims to address this gap by divisive or complicating variable that has led to providing an in-depth examination of the the sectarianization of the Conflict. With the perspectives of members of all of Syria’s major rise of ISIS and other Islamist militant groups in religious minority groups by considering the country in 2013, the media has referenced questions of group and individual identity, the particular vulnerability of Christians and community social relations inside and outside other religious minorities, focusing on security of Syria, and their sense of belonging in Syrian threats to Christians remaining in Syria and society. Our research questions revolved warning of the end of Syria’s pluralism.2 In around three primary objectives: first, we response to reports of increased attacks on hoped to assess how the Syrian Conflict has Christians, western governments have voiced impacted pre-existing minority group identities concern over Christian communities, with the and internal community dynamics. Second, we United States Department of State issuing a aimed to to determine whether and how group press release decrying the abuse suffered by identities and historical memory affect each

Syrian Christians in March 2014.3 group’s way of relating to the Syrian regime, to their host communities, and to other Syrian While the alarmist nature of such reporting has citizens. Finally, this study sought to gain an raised international concern over the safety of understanding of how minority groups

1 BBC News Agencies. (2014, February 13). Syria conflict: ‘Surge’ in fighng death toll. BBC News. Retrieved from hp://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26166834. 2 Brian, Christa Case. (2013, December 22). What the Middle East would be like without Chrisans. Chrisan Science Monitor. Retrieved from hp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/1222/What-the-Middle- East-would-be-like-without-Chrisans. 3 United States Department of State. (2014) “Chrisans Under Threat in Syria.” [Press Statement]. Retrieved from hp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/222802.htm. www.sreo.org 6 conceptualize their collective future in light of the challenges they face inside their country and in displacement. By examining these themes, this study ultimately aims to identify key indicators of vulnerability that play into minorities’ decisions to leave Syria and their plans of returning, as well as to determine how these factors may impact the demographic landscape of a post- Conflict Syria.

www.sreo.org 7 Sectarianism in Syria: A Socio- alleged secular neutrality of the government, and caused divisions and resentment. This has historical Background been augmented by the fact that the same family has been in power since 1970: Hafez Al Prior to examining issues of religious Assad was succeeded by his son Bashar in sectarianism in the Syrian Conflict, it is 2000. Furthermore, the state has often used important to place sectarianism in Syria in a Islamic symbols and has also presented its own social and historical context. Despite the form of state-sponsored Islam through sectarian lens through which the Syrian Conflict mandatory religious education in schools, 8 is often viewed, Syria has long prided itself as which highlights the connection between being a secular country. The ideology of the religion and state. Ba’ath Party, of which current president Bashar Al-Assad is adherent, is firmly secular. A clause While denying the presence of religious stipulating that the President of Syria should be difference,the Assads have adopted a rhetoric Muslim was added to the Constitution in 1973 of protecting minorities, particularly Christians, in response to popular protest,4 but otherwise as a way of proving their legitimacy. As references to religion or sect in public or government spokesperson Buthayna Shaaban political life remains taboo. Indeed the stated early on in the Conflict, “it is obvious that Constitution expressly forbids “incitation to Syria is the target of a project to sow sectarian religious strife.”5 Sectarian identity is not noted strife to compromise Syria and the unique co- on identity cards, though it does play a role in existence model that distinguishes it.”9 The fact issues including marriage and divorce, as these that sectarian violence similar to that in matters are often handled by religious courts.6 Lebanon or Iraq, which both border Syria, had not occurred in Syria has been used as proof of Despite this alleged secularism, various factors the power of this secular vision. However, the demonstrate the longstanding presence of narrative of protecting Christians has been built sectarianism. For example, the Assad on threats and dangers regarding the Muslim government has long been derogatorily “other,” and not one of inclusiveness or referred to as an “Alawite state” or “Alawi solidarity, thereby showing the state’s sectarian

7 regime,” which has thrown into dispute the approach with both majority and minority

4 P. 71, Schaebler, B. (2013). Construcng an Identy between Arabism and Islam: The Druzes in Syria. The Muslim World, 103. 5 P. 92. Geros, P. (2008). Doing Fieldwork within Fear and Silences. In H. Armbruster & A. Laerkes (Eds.), Taking Sides: Ethics, Polics and Fieldwork in Anthropology (89-118), Bergahn Books. 6 P. 138, Moksnes, H. and Melin, M. ed. Rabo, A. (2013) Perspecves on Gender and Cizenship in Syria before the Arab Spring. Faith in Civil Society: Religious Actors as Drivers of Change. Uppsala: Uppsala Center for Sustainable Development. 7 P. 71, Schaebler, B. 8 Landis, J. (2003). Islamic Educaon in Syria: Undoing Secularism. Unpublished conference paper available at hps://www.academia.edu/330976/Islamic_Educaon_In_Syria_Undoing_Secularism. 9 (2011, March 26). Assad adviser warns of sectarian strife in Syria. Reuters. Retreived from hp://uk.reuters.com/ arcle/2011/03/26/uk-syria-adviser-idUKTRE72P24H20110326. www.sreo.org 8 populations. Additionally, the state has often Sects Examined in This Study tried to manipulate or influence religious 10 leadership of minority groups, thereby Syria's diversity is reflected by the presence of treating sects as political units. many ethnic and religious minorities, many of which claim a longstanding history in the area. In effect, the Assad regime has operated with many contradictions to both erase and Migration patterns have also contributed to the encourage differences among sectarian and richness of Syria, as it has long been a ethnic groups since the Ba’ath Party came to destination for religious groups fleeing power. Differences were fostered prior to the persecution in surrounding areas such as

11 Syrian Conflict, and have been utilized by the Turkey and Iraq.12 Figure 1 provides a summary Assad regime throughout the Conflict as a way of the five major groups examined in this study. of consolidating power. Today, these groups are caught in the middle of a relentless conflict Alawites between a supposedly secular regime and a largely Islamist opposition. The Alawite sect is a branch of Shi’a Islam dating to the 8th century. A traditionally esoteric and socially isolated community,

Figure 1 : Religious minority groupings in Syria

Religious Christians* Alawites Druze Ismailis** Yazidis Groups

Estimated 1.9 million 2.1 million 580,000 386.000 10,000 Population

Percentage of 10% 11% 3% 2% Less than .5% overall population

Main Aleppo, Western coastal Sweida Salamiya Afrin area of geographic Damascus, areas including Aleppo, areas Hassakeh, and Lattakia and Hassakeh Homs Tartous governorate

*Figures include Greek Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, Maronite, Syrian Catholic, Roman Catholic, and Greek Catholic. Armenians number 323,000. **Figures include Twelver Shi’ites.

10 See Schaebler, B. (2013). 11 See Rabo, A. (2012) and Schaebler, B. (2013). 12 Altug, S. (2011). Sectarianism in the Syrian Jazira: Community, land and violence in the memories of World War I and the French mandate (1915- 1939). Retrieved from hp://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/205821. www.sreo.org 9 Alawites have been marginalized for much of in the first century CE, and Christian their history. 13 The rise to power of Hafez Al communities were historically found Assad in the 1970s placed many from the throughout Syria, with concentrated Alawite community in positions of political populations residing in Hassakeh, Aleppo, power, and the sect has been considered Damascus, and the Damascus countryside. 16 privileged under Assad family rule. Prior to the Following the tragic episode of 1915 in Turkish- Conflict, Alawites formed approximately 11% of Armenian history, the Hassakeh province the Syrian population, 14 and were heavily absorbed a significant number of Christians concentrated in the western coastal and fleeing persecution.17 Prior to the Conflict, mountain areas. Alawites have been prevailing attitudes in Syrian society viewed particularly stigmatized since the beginning of Christians as economically advantaged over the Conflict as being pro-Assad, and have been other sects and favored by the Assad regime, seen as the most endangered sect should the although in reality socioeconomic status varied Assad regime fall. considerably according to geographic region. In the Syrian Conflict, Christians have been largely Christians cast by the international community as being anti-opposition, an assumption which Christianity represents the second largest undermines the plurality of views held across religious minority in Syria, with Christians of all Christian communities.18 Nonetheless, denominations - including Greek Orthodox, Christians have found themselves the targets of Greek Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, and Syrian multiple factions, and reports indicate that

Orthodox - forming an estimated 10% of Syria’s many are seeking refuge abroad.19 population prior to the Conflict.15 Christianity has held a presence in the Levant and Mesopotamia region almost since its inception

13 Goldsmith, L. (2011) “Syria’s Alawites and the Polics of Sectarian Insecurity: A Khaldunian Perspecve”, Ortadoğu Etütleri. 3 (1). 14 Minority Rights Group Internaonal. (2011) World Directory of Minories and Indigenous Peoples - Syria : Overview. Retrieved from hp://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce5ac.html. 15 Minority Rights Group Internaonal. (2011) World Directory of Minories and Indigenous Peoples - Syria : Overview. Retrieved from hp://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce5ac.html. 16 Mousa, S. (2012). To Protest or Not to Protest: The Chrisan Predicament in the Syrian Uprising. Syrian Studies Associaon Bullen. 17 (2). 17 Altug, S. (2011). 18 Open Doors Internaonal. (2013) Vulnerability Assessment of Syria’s Chrisans. (2013). Retrieved from hp:// www.worldwatchmonitor.org/research/2572679. 19 See for example (2013, October 16). Syria Conflict: Chrisans ‘Leaving Homes’. BBC News. Retrieved from hp:// www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24547263, and Yackley, A. (2014, February 29). Generaons on, Chrisans fleeing Syria return to Turkish homeland. Reuters. Retrieved from hp://www.reuters.com/arcle/2014/02/28/us- syria-crisis-chrisans-turkey-idUSBREA1R09J20140228. www.sreo.org 10 Druze regime and has received little media coverage in the west. Though there is a lack of reliable The Druze faith is an offshoot of Ismaili Islam, data, anecdotal reports collected by SREO originating in Lebanon in the 11th century. A indicate the Ismaili community to be split traditionally closed community, the Druze between support for the Assad regime and religion is a monotheistic faith characterized by support for the opposition. esotericism and a belief in reincarnation. 20 Pre- Conflict estimates number the Syrian Druze Yazidis population around 580,000, with significant communities found in Sweida, a city with a The Yazidi faith is an ancient monotheistic historical Druze majority south of Damascus. 21 religion borrowing elements from The Druze community has been largely Zoroastrianism, Sufi Islam, and other faiths considered to be loyal to the Assad regime, practiced throughout the history of with reports of Druze militias fighting with the Mesopotamia. The Yazidi faith is strongly linked Syrian army. 22 to Kurdish ethnicity, and Yazidis were traditionally spread throughout the Kurdish Ismailis areas of modern day Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. 24 Their religion is not recognized by the Syrian Ismailis represent another branch of Shi’a state; as such, the Yazidi community in Syria Islam, tracing their origin to the split between has been twice marginalized, due to prejudicial Shi’a and Sunni Islam in the 7th century. Prior policies against Kurds and as members of an to 2011, the Ismaili community in Syria unofficially recognized religion. As a result, the consisted of approximately 300,000 people, Yazidi community in Syria has been traditionally and has traditionally been concentrated in the small and closed, 25 and has diminished in size

23 city of Salamiya in western Syria. Since the by migration abroad - particularly to Germany - inception of the Conflict, the sect has largely prior to the Conflict. Since the start of the avoided being stereotyped as pro- or anti- Conflict, little is known about Yazidis’ political

20 For further reading on Druze beliefs, see Benne, A. (2006). Reincarnaon, Sect Unity, and Identy Among the Druze. Ethnology. 45 (2)., and Firrio, K. (2011). The Druze Faith: Origin, Development, and Interpretaon. Arabica. 58. 21 Minority Rights Group Internaonal. (2011) World Directory of Minories and Indigenous Peoples - Syria : Overview. Retrieved from hp://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce5ac.html. 22 Al-Tamimi, A. (2013, November 13). The Druze Milias of Southern Syria. Syria Comment. Retrieved from hp:// www.joshualandis.com/blog/druze-milias-southern-syria/. 23 Williams, L. (2013, November 18). Aga Khan urges Syrians to seek peace through dialogue. Daily Star. Retrieved from hp://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Nov-18/238135-aga-khan-urges-syrians-to-seek-peace- through-dialogue.ashx#axzz2wDEnF1zL. 24 For a background on Yazidis in Syria, see Maisel, S. (2013). Syria’s Yazidis in the Kurd Dagh and the Jazira. The Muslim World. 25 Minority Rights Group Internaonal. (2011) World Directory of Minories and Indigenous Peoples - Syria : Overview. Retrieved from hp://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce5ac.html. www.sreo.org 11 stance, although a 2013 news report indicated that they were benefiting from the Kurdish autonomy in the Qamishli region.26

26 Glio, A. (2013, October 18). Yazidis benefit from Kurdish gains in northern Syria. Al Monitor. Retrieved from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2013/10/syria-yazidi-minories-kurds.html. www.sreo.org 12

Review of Literature Scholars writing on nationalism have unpacked the ways that categories such as religion, ethnicity, and nation are drawn, and the In approaching the subject of religious intricate ways that such categories act upon minorities in Syria, SREO consulted a wide array each other. Roger Brubaker compares language of literature dealing with issues of sectarianism, with religion, writing that “language and religion nationalism, and the religious minority groups are basic sources and forms of social, cultural themselves. Although the term “sectarian” is and political organization.”29 He further frequently deployed to describe ethnic or describes them as both “analogous to ethnic religious conflict in the Middle East, there is groups and nations and variously intertwined disagreement about what the terms “sect” and with them.”30 “sectarian” mean and can mean. While the word “sectarianism” is often employed with the Sectarianism in the Middle East negative connotation of violence and conflict, it can also imply a presence of religious Sectarianism in the Middle East tends to be difference articulated through social viewed through the lens of primordialism, with interactions. Research on sectarianism tends to the assumption of timeless conflict between focus on religious conflict in a specific context, inherently antagonistic groups. Alternatively, such as Northern Ireland or the Middle East, the instrumentalist perspective suggests that rather than taking a broader theoretical view. sectarianism is a modern phenomenon that Although there are lacking theoretical emerged in response to colonialism, frameworks for studying the issue of modernization, and other social changes. The sectarianism, definitions developed in studying reality is somewhat between the two. Much of other contexts were helpful to understanding the literature on sectarianism in the Middle sectarianism in Syria. John Brewer defines East has focused on Iraq and Lebanon, whereas sectarianism as “the determination of actions, Syria, which is significantly underrepresented in attitudes and practices by beliefs about research in general, has not received much religious difference, which results in their being attention on this topic. The authoritarianism invoked as the boundary marker to represent and censorship imposed by the Assad Regime social stratification and conflict.”27 In his study are one reason for this gap, and the absence of on religious conflict in Ireland, Brewer open conflict in Syria until recently could be compares race and sect, writing that both are another factor. When what started as a civil “social markers by which people are uprising turned into a long and drawn-out war, categorized into groups and by which life the war increasingly became portrayed in chances are determined, the roots of which lie sectarian terms, with comparisons being drawn jointly in colonial exploitation.”28 between Syria and Iraq.

27 P. 358, Brewer, J. (1992). Sectarianism and racism, and their parallels and differences. Ethnic and Racial Studies. 15 (3). 28 P. 353, Brewer, J. 29 P. 3, Brubaker, R. (2013). Language, religion, and the polics of difference. Naons and Naonalism. 19 (1). 30 P. 3, Brubaker, R. www.sreo.org 13

While cultural and religious diversity is often In this explanation, Weiss notes the agency that seen as the main cause behind conflicts in the groups have had in creating and participating in

Middle East,31 a holistic study of state policies, a sectarian system, rather than portraying historical and current interactions and group sectarianism as an externally imposed system. dynamics is necessary to understanding Ussama Makdisi, also writing about Lebanon, sectarianism in Syria today. Furthermore, describes sectarianism as a “practice that understanding sectarianism in neighboring developed out of, and must be understood in countries is useful to understanding the context of, nineteenth-century Ottoman sectarianism in Syria, both as a point of reform. Second, it is a discourse that is scripted comparison and also in terms of impact on as the Other to various competing Ottoman, groups that inhabit multiple countries and European, and Lebanese narratives of extend beyond national borders. Certainly, modernization.” 33 While sectarianism has been historical events in neighboring countries - Iraq notably lacking in the Syrian public discourse, and Lebanon in particular - play into the thinking of sectarianism as a “practice” is consciousness and fears of minority groups in applicable. Makdisi also emphasizes the Syria. modernity of sectarianism, noting that “sectarianism refers to the deployment of Sectarianism in Lebanon religious heritage as a primary marker of modern political identity.” The designation of a In the literature on sectarianism in Lebanon, sect as a political marker or a political unity is scholars have attempted to untangle the certainly relevant to the Syrian context, given historical processes by which modern the state’s patronage of religious leaders. sectarianism has come to exist as a state- Although the modern Lebanese state treats the sanctioned social system. In his work about the categorizes of sect and religion very differently Shia of Lebanon, Max Weiss argues the than the Syrian state,the similar historical following: context of colonization and overlap of groups merits the study of sectarianism in Lebanon The ways in which sectarian difference was alongside Syria. made, that is, how Lebanese sects became sectarian in new ways - what I have Sectarianism in Iraq provisionally called sectarianization - must be understood in terms of both “sectarianization from below” - demands for The scholarship on sectarianism in Iraq has communal equality that came from ordinary sought to explain the violence that has racked people, local communities, village councils the country since the US invasion and and other - and “sectarianization from overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Dina Khoury above” - French colonial techniques and argues that the “sectarian politics of present- tactics of divide and rule.32

31 P. 28, Altug, S. 32 See P. 708, Weiss, M. (2010). “Praccing Sectarianism in Mandate Lebanon: Shi’i cemeteries, religious patrimony, and the everyday polics of difference.” Journal of Social History. 33 See P. 6, Makdisi, U. (2000). The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in 19th Century Ooman Lebanon. University of California Press. Berkeley: University of California Press. www.sreo.org 14 day Iraq are rooted in the last 23 years of findings on “a strong sense of national as

Ba'athist rule,” and focuses on the Iran-Iraq War opposed to sectarian identity,”36 contrary to and the 1991 Uprising in an “attempt to to expectations that refugees fleeing sectarian bring into the discussion the centrality of violence would have heightened sectarian violence in the formation of sectarian identities. identities.” 34 This argument highlights violence as a cause and not a product of sectarianism, Sectarianism in Syria and brings to attention the subtler ways that the Ba’ath state in Iraq employed sectarian Despite the declared secularism of the state politics. In her work on sectarianism and and the tabooness of discussing any aspect of politics in post-conflict Iraq, Keiko Sakai notes religious or ethnic difference, scholars have that the mobilization of sectarian identities in noted the presence of sectarianism in political the events of a crisis is not inevitable: “it and social relations. Fiona McCallum describes depends on a variety of political opportunities, the interactions between churches and the patterns of mobilization organization and Syrian state where Christians often rely on networks, the period of validity of repertoires, religious leaders as intermediaries between the abundance of episodes that can be used to themselves and the state as a “reinterpretation mobilize the emotions of members of society, of the millet37 system,”38 and Annika Rabo and the diversity of historical paths that the suggests that the millet system “has both

35 community has followed.” Unfortunately, this survived and been transformed in independent complex set of conditions appears to have Syria,”39 implying that individuals are still been met in Syria, particularly due to the treated as members of religious communities. political opportunities or lack thereof. While she does not elaborate on how the millet Literature has also addressed concerns relating system has been transformed, this illustrates to the spillover of ethnic conflict relating to the the importance of recognizing the current migration of refugees. In his work on Iraqi political context and its impact on sects, rather refugees in Syria, Erlend Paasche reported than viewing the millet system as a historical

34 P. 326, Khoury, D. (2010). The security state and the pracce and rhetoric of sectarianism in Iraq. Internaonal Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies. 4 (3). 35 P. 206, Sakai, K. (2012). De-sectarianizing paerns of polical mobilizaon in the post-conflict Iraq. Internaonal Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies. 6 (2). 36 P. 250, Paasche, E. (2011). Iraqi refugees in a Damascus suburb: carriers of sectarian conflict? Internaonal Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies. 5 (2). 37 Millet refers to the “administrave system for non-Muslims in the Ooman Empire, especially Chrisans and Jews.” Each group or millet had a significant amount of autonomy in managing their internal affairs, and the religious leader, or milletbashi, had civil as well as religious responsibilies. See P. 178, Katsikas, S. (2009). Millets in Naon -States: The Case of Greek and Bulgarian Muslims, 1912-1923. Naonalies Papers, 37(2). 38 P. 121, Macallum, F. (2012). Religious instuons and Authoritarian States: church-state relaons in the Middle East. Third World Quarterly. 33 (1). 39 P. 124, Moksnes, H. and Melin, M. ed. Rabo, A. (2013) Perspecves on Gender and Cizenship in Syria before the Arab Spring. Faith in Civil Society: Religious Actors as Drivers of Change. Uppsala: Uppsala Center for Sustainable Development. www.sreo.org 15 remnant. Not only have these differences been that “religious difference,” in the form of the perpetuated, but they have also been utilized “state-acknowledged sect” (ta’ifa), appeared as by the Syrian state.40 the most significant marker of difference employed in Jazirans’ historical narratives,

In addition to noting the state’s role in especially by Christians.”45 Annika Rabo maintaining difference, scholars have faulted discusses the practice of labelling and the Syrian state with contributing to poor inter- categorizing that occurred in her sample of communal relations. Seda Altug writes that “the informants: “Ideals of national unity, essential politics of difference of the Syrian Ba’ath state similarities or enriching varieties and in the region paved the way for the deepening differences do not, however, preclude of the Kurdish problem and the straining of informants from simultaneously slotting

41 inter-communal relationships.” Birgit citizens into a number of scales of rank and

Schaebler suggests that “it would have been distinction.” 46 wiser to acknowledge difference and admit group identities into the public discourse, Regarding group relations, SREO consulted two thereby creating a viable nation and resolving studies that look at group relations in Aleppo community tensions through political and the Jazira, or what is commonly referred to bargaining, not by hushing and smothering as the Hassakeh governorate. Annika Rabo, in them with an intolerant Arab nationalism.” 42 her research on religious and ethnic diversity in Additionally, scholars have pointed to the roles Aleppo, does not refer to sectarianism but of other state institutions such as the state rather refers to the word “conviviality” to mufti43 or religious education in failing to describe group relations. While both Altug and address diffe r e n c e s a n d p r o m o t e Rabo encountered expressions of unity and understanding among different groups.44 harmony among minorities, they also encountered a sense of fear and anxiety. Few studies have examined the importance of According to Rabo, this was related to the religious identity in Syria, and even fewer have increasingly islamicized public space of looked at the complexities of intercommunal Aleppo.47 Seda Altug found that the historical relations. Despite the inability to visibly express campaign of 1915 against Armenians in eastern religious difference, scholars have noted the Turkey and other anti-Christian violence had importance of religion both as a way to identify significant implications for relations between oneself and others. In her study on Christians and Muslim Kurds in Qamishli: sectarianism in the Jazira, Seda Altug founds

40 See Schaebler, B. (2013). 41 P. 20, Altug, S. 42 P. 78, Schaebler, B. 43 A mui is defined as a “juriconsult who is qualified to give or issue legal opinions.” P. 115, Lock, M. (2013). The Adab of the Mui. Islamic Sciences, 11(2). 44 See Szanto Ali-Dib, E. (2008). Inter-Religious Dialogue in Syria: Polics, Ethics, and Miscommunicaon. Polical Theology, 9(1). 45 P. 22, Altug, S. 46 P. 134, Rabo, A. 47 P. 131, Rabo, A. www.sreo.org 16

First, in nearly all the conversations about the history of their arrival in Syria, a deep anxiety and insecurity about the future was evoked, especially in the descriptions of the communal relations in the past; and second, in the constant comparison to the “other”—namely, the Kurds—in the narratives of those interviewees informed by the Armenian and Syriac establishment discourse.48 While these studies are invaluable to understanding inter-communal relations in Syria, there remains much to be understood regarding group relations in the rest of Syria. SREO hopes to contribute to the literature through its study on a variety of minorities with varying geographic origins, and on perceptions of the self and group identity as well as their view of a collective future considering the ongoing conflict and destruction in their home country.

48 P. 138, Altug, S. www.sreo.org 17

Methods participation. This method was considered the best way to access members of normally closed communities, due to the traditionally esoteric SREO’s assessment of Syrian religious minority tendencies of some religious minorities. perspectives employed a mixed methods Identifying participants via trusted members of approach informed by ethnography and their own social network was also preferred narrative-based analysis, relying upon in-depth given the inherently sensitive nature of this qualitative interviews complemented by study’s subject matter, particularly in the quantitative socioeconomic data. This context of the potential heightened security multidisciplinary approach was utilized in order threats perceived by minorities in to gain insight into the complex and inherently displacement. subjective underpinnings of religious minority In-depth, semi-structured interviews meant to group perspectives, and to gauge how these elicit key indicators of identity, collective have been affected by the violence and memory, and future investment were displacement of the Syrian Conflict. combined with pointed survey questions Study participants were selected based on their intended to supplement qualitative data with membership in one of the religious minority relevant socioeconomic information on groups in Syria- including several participants. Understanding identity to be a denominations of Christianity (Greek Orthodox, multi-layered and fluid product of environment Syriac, Roman Orthodox, and Syrian Catholic), and group and individual experiences, Alawites, Druze, Ismailis, and Yazidis - and their questionnaires approached themes from point of origin in Syria.49 Researchers aimed to multiple facets to allow the informant to obtain a sampling that refle c t s t h e construct a comprehensive narrative. demographic percentage of minorities in Syria Interviews incorporated questions soliciting and represents informants from a diverse information on family history in Syria, geographical point of origin and socioeconomic individual and community social relations, and background. A total of 31 individuals (n=31) hopes and expectations for the future of Syria. were interviewed, ranging in age from 21 to 73 Given that the issue of minority faiths is a and comprising natives of all major regions of historically sensitive and suppressed subject in Syria. All participants in this study had migrated Syria, questionnaires were designed to be from Syria at the time of research, and were politically neutral and respectful of individual living in host communities in Turkey, Europe, or and group standpoints, and subjects were Iraqi Kurdistan. encouraged to express their views only as they felt comfortable. Interviews were conducted in The snowball sampling method was utilized to person whenever possible, and over Skype and select study participants, wherein key email for individuals with geographical or informants from the various communities privacy concerns. All informants participated referred acquaintances to researchers for voluntarily without compensation, having been

49 Although SREO recognizes that a number of parcipants were not religious, informants in this study are referred to by their sectarian idenes to reflect their community background. www.sreo.org 18 informed of their rights as participants and assured of the absolute anonymity of the study. Narrative analysis was employed to identify key patterns in qualitative data, which were then considered in the context of the socioeconomic profiling data obtained. These patterns in the data were considered within the confines of the current body of literature addressing themes of religious and social identity, sectarianism, and displacement, as well as the growing body of work on minorities in the Middle East. Because the issue of religious minorities in Syria is a traditionally sensitive subject, a number of challenges related to data collection had to be overcome. Foremost among these was the difficulty in locating large samplings of minority groups, which can be attributed to the geographic disparity and cultural isolation of certain religious groups, and to security concerns which encourage many minorities to conceal or minimize their religious background. Unprecedented security threats against minorities remaining in their homes in Syria prevented researchers from accessing these populations, as addressing such subject matter even anonymously was perceived by potential informants as endangering their safety.

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Syria, where refugees tended to refer to

Key Findings “normative cosmopolitanism”50 to characterize their group relations. At the same time, other Findings from interviews provided insight into groups in the study described relations the experiences of Syrian religious minorities characterized by isolation and intolerance, on both group and individual levels. Different which illustrated the different ways groups interviewees presented contradictory experienced sect throughout Syria. narratives of sect relations in pre-Conflict Syria, Respect, harmony, and a lack of problems with some reporting harmonious inter- characterized the speech of Syriacs on their sectarian interactions, and others alluding to community interactions in pre-Conflict underlying sectarian-based prejudices. Hassakeh. As one informant poignantly stated: Interviews also addressed how internal and “there could be nothing more beautiful than community dynamics had been impacted by the way in which we all got along.” Another the Conflict, and how these dynamics Syriac Christian from Hassakeh pointed out precipitated migration and displacement. that the Christian community there was not Similarly, informants commented on the role of isolated, which contrasted with accounts from social fear in their communities, sharing that Christians in Damascus and other religious specific fears dictated community reactions to groups. Whether such statements idealized the rupture of the Conflict. Finally, all relations or glossed over differences was not interviewees discussed individual and group clear, but interviewees clearly drew a identities as interactive with circumstances of distinction between pre and post Conflict war and displacement, ultimately affecting relations, and very much believed in the lack of minorities’ sense of interest and investment sectarian problems, at least amongst each regarding their future in Syria. other. One elderly Christian man cited his possession of a Koran as a sign of his respect Perspectives on Pre-Conflict for Muslims: Sectarian Relations: Narratives of Coexistence and Intolerance I respect those who are different from me, and I always have….I even own a Koran, in addition to the Bible. It was among the few books I When asked about their community and group brought with me from Syria when we were interactions prior to the Conflict, Syrians gave displaced here. In every Christian’s house in varying answers about the quality of relations Syria you’d find a Koran. How many Muslim affected by their religion and place of origin. families have a Bible in their home? They Syriac Christians from Hassakeh should all read the Bible as well, as we read the Koran. overwhelmingly described positive inter- communal relations, along with informants Interestingly, this example contrasts the respect from other groups including Druze, Ismailis, and knowledge of the Christian community and Yazidis. These findings corresponded with regarding Islam with the ignorance of Muslims Erlend Paasche’s work on Iraqi refugees in

50 P. 250, Paasche, E. www.sreo.org 20 What has happened in Syria? Minories naming the Syrian Conflict Throughout interviews, SREO researchers used the term “Syrian Conflict,” employing the Arabic word ṣirā’ when posing questions to interviewees. However, informants demonstrated variation in the ways they referred to the series of events that compelled them to leave their lives behind, and these terms often gave insight into political and social subjectivities. Most informants who were actively anti-regime - particularly those who had participated in protests early on or who considered themselves activists - used the word for revolution, thawra. Several of these persons used different terms throughout the course of the interview, with many referring to the beginning of the Conflict as the “revolution” or “mobilization” (ḥurāk), and then changing it to “the war” (al ḥarb) to refer to later developments. While the label “the war” was frequently evoked, not a single informant named the events as a civil war, which may reflect the fact that many informants attribute blame of the turmoil to outside actors such as foreign fighters than to Syrians. The most recurrent designation was “al aḥdāth,” “the events,” a term that reflects the temporally unclear intensification of the Conflict from a series of protests to a full-on humanitarian nightmare. Used by informants of all political views - but preferred by those who were pro-regime or politically neutral - the term is a fittingly ambiguous way to describe the kind of rupture and turmoil that is precisely unnameable. on Christianity, thereby demonstrating the remain inconspicuous as an Alawite. He also limits of mutuality in these relations. reported that the increased mixing in urban environments reportedly exerted a levelling Among the Syriac Christians, friendships and effect on sectarian divisions by facilitating work relationships were cited as examples of open-mindedness: both himself and his the extent to which Syrians coexisted and were brother are married to Sunni women, which integrated. As one Syriac man who had presented no problem for his parents. employed Muslims in his business noted, “We had them over, hosted them in our homes. I Among the Druze participants, one woman still have their numbers in my cellphone.” One described the neighborhood of Jaramana in interviewee reported that “when my uncle died, Damascus as a religiously diverse everyone in the village came to the funeral,” neighborhood where social mixing was quite thereby noting the inclusion of different groups common. She further specified that people in personal and religious rituals. might not even know the religion of their friends and neighbors, yet contrasted this The importance of geographic location in openness and mixing with the past two years, determining sectarian relations was further during which social tensions had lead to addressed by Alawites. One woman compared increasing group isolation. Another Druze the lack of mixing between sects in her participant highlighted diversity while hometown of Tartous with the mixing she later describing his living situation in Yarmouk of encountered in Damascus. Aleppo was Damascus, saying “in my building we had designated by another Alawite participant as a Alawites, Ismailis, and Kurds...it’s not like all place of mixing, despite fears and the desire to Druze are living together, unless they are a big

www.sreo.org 21 family in one building or something. I was in By contrast, other interviewees indicated this open, mixed society…” However, this superficial relations, or pointed to the experience contrasted with his general limitations on their group relations related to perceptions of group relations in Syria, which group boundaries. Furthermore, many Syrian he indicated as fraught with isolation, interviewees contrasted their openness with ignorance, and a lack of understanding. In the the limited relations of others in their sect, narratives of Druze, Jaramana and Yarmouk noting that they were not affected by these provide somewhat of a counterpoint to Sweida, group dynamics. These closed relations were a Druze majority city, further demonstrating noted by Christians in Damascus and most the importance of location for inter-communal Druze informants in particular. locations. Christians living in Damascus discussed the All Ismaili informants came from Salamiya, an isolation of their communities vis-a-vis other area known for having a significant Ismaili sects. One woman of Greek Orthodox population. While the three male Ismailis background who had grown up in a wealthy, reported positive group relations, with one man Christian-dominated area described her stating, “there were different religions and neighborhood as a “ghetto” as a reflection of its political affiliations and relations were positive social and cultural isolation. She also indicated between people,” a female informant described her community’s lack of understanding when social relations as more closed with limited the “revolution” happened as an example of substantive interaction between sects. how “disconnected” her community was from the Syrian people. A Syrian Catholic from The two Yazidi participants described positive Damascus reported limited social interactions social relations, while referring to the with people from other sects until attending oppression that they faced as Yazidis and as university. These anecdotes pointed to a lack of Kurds. One man explained that “Syrian society inter-communal relations in Damascus, despite is open and secular, and relations are based the diversity. Similarly, another woman who upon humanist and moral treatment. However had lived primarily in Homs shared the the Yazidi faith has been a problem for others following about group relations: in Syrian society.” This statement echoed the positive statements of Syriac Christians, yet Christian societies in general are rather closed- pointed to the unique status of Yazidis as a off. They have good social relations with other marginalized group. The second Yazidi sects that may reach the level of intimate participant also described positive relations friendships, but there are always red lines dictating these relations, that are only rarely despite his family’s statelessness. From these transgressed. For example my best friend in statements, it can be deduced that the high school was a Muslim, but I knew with coexistence and positive social relations complete certainty that I was not to have a generally experienced in Syria were [romantic] relationship with a Muslim boy. undermined by the oppression they faced, either as Yazidis or Kurds. The possibility of friendly platonic relationships but not romantic relations between sects demonstrates the limits of social relations, as

www.sreo.org 22 intermarriage can bridge divisions between cohabitation that was exemplified through groups. personal and social practices, this was countered by narratives from other groups Another Syrian from a Catholic background referencing isolation and limitations in their provided a complete counter-narrative to social relations. These narratives differed in previous discussions of cohabitation, saying relation to sect, location, personal outlook, and that “the social relations were fake, I grew up in ethnicity. They reflect the diversity of Jaramanah in Damascus, my street was called experiences regarding sect in Syria, and the Christian street, just calling it the Christian simultaneously challenged narratives of conflict street shows the sectarianism. The reason we and harmony that are imposed on inter- say we had co-living and cohabitation is communal relations in Syria. because it was forbidden to talk about it.” He further elaborated “the idea of co-living in Syria Sectarian Conflict: Roots and is basically fake, my sect is like many other sects, they are closed, they are not open to Causes many other different religions.” These statements bring up two points: one is an Whether informants adhered to narratives of imposed narrative of cohabitation that coexistence or underlying sectarian tensions, prevented genuine discussions on group they overwhelmingly attributed the blame for identities, and another is the boundaries current sectarian tensions to either the regime imposed on his group, both by the community or non-Syrian factions. Interviewees reported and others. Discussing his sect as being the regime as both attempting to maintain “closed” and “not open” implies the divisions prior to the Conflict, and as trying to responsibility of all parties in fostering or in this foment sectarian strife after the uprising. One case hindering intergroup relations. elderly Syriac man saw the state as the sole source of sectarianism in Syria: Among other groups, one of the Ismaili participants discussed her family’s interactions I lived in Damascus for four years, and there with other sects as limited, but noted that she was no sectarianism among the Syrian people. herself did not have these “problems” of It was the Ba'ath party that introduced isolation and discrimination, thereby absolving sectarianism into the minds. The Syrian people herself from any of the sectarian problems of are very open and accepting. Sectarianism is introduced in the schools by the Ba'ath party, her community. An Alawite noted that even through the children’s literature and textbooks t h o u g h h e d i d n o t n o t e x p e r i e n c e they give the kids. When my oldest daughter discrimination in Damascus, the distinctions was in school, during the religion class the between people existed as people would say teacher said that Muslims had to go to one “this person is Sunni” or “this person is Alawite.” side of the room, and Christians to the middle. And she stood in the middle, she refused. I was Labelling people served as a way to reinforce so proud of her….The Ba'ath party also spreads the boundaries that existed between groups. sectarianism through society education, by planting it in people’s heads…. While informants, particularly Syriac Christians, provided heartfelt accounts of coexistence and

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Identifying sectarianism as a product of the the Ba’ath regime as a protector of their group. state delivered through education was a While different groups reported different consistent critique of the state's sectarian treatment at the hands of the regime, the idea policies, yet it also diminished any role that that the regime sought to keep groups divided people themselves might have had in creating was widely held. Whether individuals attributed social differences. The Syrian army was also sectarian issues to the regime or not, several mentioned as an institution that promoted mentioned the impossibility of addressing sectarianism by preventing geographic, ethnic, sectarian issues under the surveillance of the and religious mixing. An Ismaili participant Ba’ath regime. described his experience in the army saying: On top of the maintenance of social division As an army person, and because we have prior to the Conflict, informants from different army people from all over Syria, I've been sects described how the regime contributed to able to interact with all these people. The the sectarianization of the Conflict, particularly army was careful to separate people, the through arming minorities and creating militias. regime segregated people to prevent mixing One Ismaili described how the regime tried to between different areas. I don't approve of this personally....as a person I like to separate Ismailis from Sunnis by providing befriend people for personal merits. arms to a pro-regime Ismaili militia. He explained that these militias have had a In this anecdote the respondent contrasted his negative effect on the larger Ismaili community, views with that of the regime, and given the by making it seem like they are with the regime state’s policies of dividing people, and not the “revolution.” He also described how intercommunal friendships almost take on a the media was contributing to sectarianism by subversive quality. portraying the “revolution” as a “Sunni revolution.” In addition to such practices that divided Syrians on religious, ethnic, and geographical While the state was considered guilty in lines, an Ismaili respondent described how the creating social division and promoting sectarian regime had specifically targeted the Ismaili conflict, religious extremists, particularly community by contributing to the idea that foreign fighters, were blamed for violence and “Ismailis are kafirs51 so that they would be threats against minorities. As one Syriac targeted by extremists. This treatment reported, “When the foreigners52 came here, demonstrates how some participants did not they viewed us as being in different religions, believe in the impartiality of the state regarding and my own religion became separate as religion, just as some individuals did not see well...They viewed us like ‘this one is Christian,

51 A kafir is “one who is ‘ungrateful’ to God, and unbeliever, an atheist.” Newby, G.D. (2002). Kafir. A Concise Encyclopedia of Islam. London: Oneworld Publicaons. 52 The informant is referring to fighters from extremist Islamist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) and the Levant a shoot-off group of Al Qaeda acve in northern Syria and Iraq and the Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Al Nusra. ISIS in parcular is notorious for its strict interpretaon of Islam and reported intolerance of non-Sunni facons. Large numbers of ISIS are reported to be non-Syrian jihadists coming from abroad, hence the label “foreigner.” www.sreo.org 24 this one is Alawite’...I don’t understand how you reasons, and the threat of general violence. can just kill anyone based on that.” Another Figure 2 below outlines the reasons informants Syriac noted the distinction between foreign gave for their decision to migrate from Syria. and Syrian extremists, saying, “of course now, we are being targeted by foreigners. Syrian While these examples demonstrate a diversity fighters don’t target us. Even the Syrians who of reasons for leaving Syria, security reasons, are extremist Muslims don’t target us, because both related to the regime and opposition or they know us.” The assumption in this extremist elements, were the main reason for statement was that years of cohabitation migrating. Syriac Christians living in Hassakeh precluded Syrian extremists from targeting saw themselves as particularly vulnerable to Syrian Christians. The externalization of blame attack, and cited kidnappings and other regarding religious persecution allowed incidents as evidence of the endangerment of participants to maintain their narrative of the Syriac community. One elderly Syriac man coexistence. connected the “oppression” of his community with the oppression that caused his family to Migration Trends: Factors Precipitating leave Turkey nearly a century earlier, referring Displacement to the violence against Christian minorities in 1915. Two Alawite informants expressed similar Syrian religious minorities reported various fears, both in terms of revenge related to the reasons for leaving that included fears for their Assad regime and being the target of safety related to religious persecution from extremists. While none of the Druze left due to extremists, political persecution, economic fears of religious persecution, concern was

Figure 2: Reasons stated for leaving Syria

Yazidi"

Druze"

Ismaili" General"violence"

Alawite" Army"DefecFon"

Catholic" PoliFcal"Reasons"

Greek"Orthodox" Economic"Reasons" Fear"of"Religious"Extremists" Roman"Orthodox"

Syriac"

0" 2" 4" 6" 8" 10"

www.sreo.org 25 expressed that ethno-religious violence could Conflict, particularly in Antakya which has a target their communities. The Ismailis were considerable Alawite population. split between the threat of the regime and religion figuring into their departure from Syria. Many minorities residing in Turkey reported negative relations with Turks, which they The fact that 12 people reported political attributed not to their religious identity but to reasons as necessitating their departure negative perceptions and stereotypes about demonstrates that a significant amount of Syrians in Turkish host communities. This was minorities were involved in the uprising and in noted by a Druze who stated that "they [Turks] protesting the regime, counter to the narrative think we're all in Jabhat al-Nusra." While t h a t m i n o r i t i e s s u p p o r t t h e re g i m e . prejudices against Syrians were reported as Additionally, the four interviewees who general and not religiously motivated, Syrians defected from the military left for political were still perceived by Turks as being reasons, although it should not necessarily be excessively conservative. Additionally, several read as support for the uprising. The Syriac and interviewees shared that they were Alawite participants who defected cited moral discriminated against both as Syrians and as reasons for their defections. As one Alawite members of a religious minority. As one Ismaili stated: “I left Syria because of the killing, I don’t reported, “unfortunately, Turkey has been want to kill anybody, Allah didn’t order us to affected by the sectarianism in Syria, they're kill.” treating us in a very sectarian way. On top of being discriminated against as Syrians, we’re These examples demonstrate the complexities being discriminated against for our sects.” behind peoples’ migration decisions, and the Another Ismaili recounted how he had lost a multiple ways that war and conflict have job at a restaurant due to not participating in affected all people in Syria. Friday prayers, and added that “the same sectarian problems [as in Syria] exist here.” He Host Community Tensions: Importation related an anecdote in which he gave testimony of Sectarian Conflict about human rights violations to a Turkish human rights organization. Although he Many interviewees reported instances of reported crimes from both the regime and the discrimination or discomfort among Turks in rebels, the organization only recorded the the host community, as well as among their crimes of the regime. For him, this provided fellow Syrians, suggesting that they had not evidence of Turkey’s sectarian interests in the entirely managed to escape sectarianism in Syrian Conflict. Syria. In addition to encountering the augmented sectarian perspectives of other In contrast to the negative treatment described Syrian refugees in the host environment, above, an Alawite woman in Antakya reported interviewees encountered the prejudices of feeling “more at ease” in Turkey than in Syria, as Turks towards minorities, particularly towards she did not encounter the same stigma Christians. Furthermore, Turkey’s own sectarian attached to Alawites that she had experienced issues have been aggravated by the Syrian in Syria. Similarly, an Ismaili woman reported positive treatment in Antakya based on

www.sreo.org 26 assumptions that she is Alawite. Both positive identities have been politicized and are and negative treatments in these cases can be assumed to correlate to political outlook. In this grounded in the sectarianism of the Syrian context, the intensity of political viewpoints has Conflict and its spillover into Turkey. been transferred to intercommunal interactions. For Syriac Christians, the lack of interactions with the host community, particularly Turkish Syrian minorities reported experiencing Syriacs, took on its own significance due to the sectarianism in their host communities in historical connections they shared. All the different ways that related to their sect, Syriacs interviewed in the city of Mardin had geographic location, and local demographics. origins in surrounding areas, and were While few reported direct threats to their particularly disappointed by the lack of physical safety, it was clear that sectarian interactions with their co-religionists. Although tensions from Syria had followed them and had one Syriac reported that Turkish relatives in many ways been reproduced in Turkey. facilitated his acceptance by the community, others reported negative or non-existent Perspectives on Religious Leadership relationships with Turkish citizens, including Syriacs. Two other Christian informants, a Despite the alleged secularism of the Syrian Syriac woman and a Roman Orthodox woman, state, sects have very much been treated as referred to the difficulties inherent in being political units, and religious leaders have Christian in the overwhelmingly Muslim- served as intermediaries between their dominant context of Turkey. communities and the state. Given the insecurity that all groups reported during the Conflict due Although most Syrians interviewed interacted to threats from both the regime and external with a diverse group of people both inside Syria actors, leadership had a potential role to play in and in their host community, many indicated protecting the interests of these groups despite fears or negative experiences related to their the lack of viable solutions in most cases. While sectarian belonging. One Alawite described his individuals reported varying levels of experiences at work in Turkey: “I don’t say I am involvement regarding religious and political Alawite, I have problems at work and was leadership in protecting their communities, accused of being a [regime] informer and a overwhelmingly, informants across all sects spy.” For this reason, this man generally reported a lack of leadership in protecting their avoided disclosing his religious identity. interests in Syria. Religious leaders were largely Similarly, a Syriac woman discussed her reported to be politically self-interested or negative experiences working with refugees in completely absent and not protective of Antakya who were suspicious of her when they community interests. found out she was Christian, assuming that she was pro-regime. She also reported that the Not surprisingly, two Alawite respondents predominantly Sunni Syrian community in described the complete incorporation of their Gaziantep regarded her with disapproval religious leadership into the state, thereby because she was unveiled. These examples inherently politicizing their religious leadership. demonstrate the extent to which religious One of these participants further elaborated

www.sreo.org 27 that “Alawite sheikhs are the hand of the the Ismaili organizations in his hometown are regime.” Both of these participants noted the “agents of the regime,” and have been planted presence of neutral Alawite sheikhs who there to monitor anti-regime views. He said, “I promoted peace, but indicated that these don’t depend on them for a single thing.” In leaders are “weak” and “have no voice.” sum, the local leadership was perceived as infiltrated by the regime, and attempts to direct Amongst the Druze interviewed, two the Ismailis ideologically were viewed participants reported that the community had negatively. not been protected by Druze leadership. However, one Druze informant noted that All of the Syriacs interviewed cited a lack of some religious figures have mobilized to leadership on the part of their priests, with protect Druze and non-Druze members of their many noting that most priests had fled the geographical community. Another Druze country. One Syriac woman noted that even described how throughout the Assad regime, before the Conflict, many of the priests were the state had sought to neutralize some forms sending their children abroad to be educated. of leadership while promoting pro-Ba’ath She related an anecdote about her brother’s figures. Now due to the sectarian tension, the experience with the Syriac church’s community regime has encouraged these leaders to create support wing in her hometown. Her brother armed militias, ostensibly to protect the and his friend had requested a piece of community from religious extremists. He said, property from the church in which to open a “They may think they are protecting the small store, and when they went to the church community, but this is debatable.” Such the committee said “just migrate.” These statements show that for the participants, examples indicate a lack of investment in the protection is not necessarily equated with future of Christians in Syria on the part of armed protection against religious extremists. Christian leadership. A Syriac male explained Furthermore, arming and engaging militarily that there was a lot of resentment against the was seen as endangering the community. priests, as they were the first to fl ee. Another elderly man credited the Assad state with Ismailis similarly described regime interference protecting the minorities, and said that while with their community leadership in terms of priests had protected Christians before the who they promoted and their attempts to Conflict, by now most had left and not had any direct this leadership. One Ismaili explained role in protecting their communities. He that the regime wanted the Ismaili higher facetiously threatened, “If I got a hold of one of council to legitimize Ismaili militias, but that the those priests (who fled), I’d bite him in the elders rejected this initiative. Another Ismaili neck!” A young man described how the regime stated that while most well-known Ismaili had given the Kurds weapons, but the Christian politicians have been arrested, the Ismaili leaders had not taken advantage of this option. leadership in Salamiya tried to “neutralize” the For him and another participant, they community as much as possible: “They didn’t considered protection to be armed protection. protect our interests, so much as they directed our views.” Another interviewee stated that the Christians of other denominations described higher-up members and employees of most of not just an absence of religious leadership, but

www.sreo.org 28 also a leadership that had been corrupted by leadership suffers from lots of political splits. the regime. According to a woman of Greek What’s important for the leadership is their Orthodox background, religious leaders were own interests and not the interests of the instrumental in cementing her community’s public. They do nothing for Kurds and this support for the regime. She accused leaders of always frustrates me.” This statement indicated “manipulating” the people and “looking out for his identification within the broader Kurdish their own interests rather than the community, rather than a Yazidi community, community’s.” A Roman Orthodox participant and echoed the same frustrations as that of differentiated between church leaders who religious minorities. supported the regime and those who tried to maintain neutrality: “the reasonable ones tried What constituted protection and leadership to preserve the humanity and neutrality in our among informants for this study differed relations with others. However, those that were according to sect, political affiliation, sectarianist tied themselves to the regime, and geographic location, and perceived and real linked their survival with that of the regime, threats faced by people as individuals and because they were corrupt in the first place.” It communities. While individuals cited different is worth noting that she designated the priests desires and criticism regarding their leadership supporting the regime as “sectarianist” despite (or lack thereof), all respondents were in the secular rhetoric of the regime. Noting the agreement regarding a lack of leadership for alliance between some priests and the regime, their community, and more interestingly, a Catholic in Damascus described priests “who situated their community as in need of were obviously asked to out any parishioners protection, regardless of religiosity. who were with the opposition” and “had no role Respondents portrayed a political landscape in protecting the interests of the people.” where neutrality was impossible, and where Another Catholic informant compared Syria attempts to maintain community neutrality with Lebanon, saying, “when you talk about were either ignored or considered weak. Lebanon you have political and religious Whether a stronger leadership would have leadership that takes a role in protecting induced minorities to remain in Syria is unclear, people, we don't have this at all in yet it is clear that leadership did not add to Syria...Because of the illusion that Assad gave perceptions of minority security in Syria. the Christians that he is a protector of them, this caused leaders to lose their roles in Fear in Religious Minority protecting their groups.” The clear political Communities affiliations of leaders and the state narrative of minority protection were seen as preempting a While participants did not express personal meaningful role for Christian leadership due to prejudices against various ethnic or religious their lack of neutrality, as well as reliance on groups, they often expressed personal fears the state for protection. and fears for their community. These fears A Yazidi informant equated leadership of his acted upon group perceptions and relations; community with the Kurdish political although community-based anxieties had leadership: “unfortunately, our Kurdish increased due to the Conflict, many groups www.sreo.org 29 reported previous fears that often had taxes reflected the potency of historical historical roots. One Alawite expressed the memory in mobilizing Christian fears; fears of his community as going back centuries, additionally, the fact that fear was evoked as related to the general persecution and outsider causing Christians to support the regime status of Alawites. According to him, as a result indicated the survivalist mentality that has of this fear, many Alawites tried to remain motivated this support. inconspicuous or closed off. As such, the children in his family were given very general Other groups cited similar fears motivating names so as not to reveal their Alawite their communities’ support for the regime. One identities. He added that the Alawites have a Druze reported, “those with the regime can’t distinct accent, and in school in Aleppo they hid see an alternative and are afraid of that their background by speaking the Aleppine alternative.” Another Druze noted the presence accent. Two of the Alawite respondents of Islamist fighters as deterring Druze from discussed the threat they were under due to supporting the “revolution.” In these cases, it is the Conflict. One stated that “even if a Sunni difficult to assess where fear of Islamism ends smiles at an Alawite now, the Alawite knows and support for the regime begins. For an that this is his enemy - I know this from my Ismaili woman, the increasingly sectarian time in the army.” Another Alawite claimed that behavior of people during the Conflict, “they want to make the Alawites go back to including labelling her as Ismaili, made her feel working as servants in homes,” a reference to threatened in ways that she had not the lower-class status of Alawites prior to Assad experienced prior to the Conflict.A Yazidi rule, and added that “the fall of the regime will suggested that fear has always been an determine the future of the Alawites.” In effect, important factor for Yazidis, and made the anxieties have always been present in the point that before and after the Conflict, Yazidis Alawite community, and now that the Assad have always been in danger, pointing to their regime is under attack, the possibility of marginalized status in Syria. revenge violence looms as a possible threat. Tying their fate to the regime was not related to External Fears Imposed on Minorities pro-regime feelings, but rather an In addition to experiencing fear related to their acknowledgment of their reality. minority status, particularly in light of the Historical animosities also figured into the Conflict, informants related the role of the narratives of Christians. One male Catholic regime in reinforcing these fears, both prior to described how fears played into Christians’ the Conflict and during. The dynamics of state responses to the Conflict: “there were rumors sectarianism along with the politics of fear coming from adjacent neighborhoods about promoted by the state have been quite Islamist rebels demanding payments from successful in promoting the image of the Christians [as in Ottoman times], and this Assads as the protectors of minorities. caused a lot of fear and turned many Christians Surprisingly, these politics of fear were applied away from the anti-Assad opposition. By the to Assad’s own community, the Alawites. As one end of 2011, many Christians were with the respondent explained, the regime maintained a regime.” The evocation of Ottoman minority www.sreo.org 30

“discourse of fear, not a nationalist discourse” increased and self-imposed isolation of many in the Alawite community to maintain their minority communities. This phenomenon was hold. A participant of Catholic origin illustrated reported by interviewees from all groups. While how the regime promoted Christian fears, some informants described their sects as saying, “when Christians were celebrating New closed before the Conflict, these self-isolating Years, you had a huge mukhabarat presence tendencies increased due to tensions relating which was ostensibly there to protect them to the Conflict. Informants from Alawite, Druze, from Muslims, and Christians were stupid to Ismaili, and Syriac communities spoke to this believe this. And if there was ever an incident, it trend. An Alawite man reported that the could be traced back to the mukhabarat.” With Alawites have become even more closed-off, the onset of the uprising, the regime exploited isolated, and violent, because they felt and created sources of fear to ensure the existentially threatened. A Druze compared loyalty of Christians. As a Greek Orthodox their community with the way it was before the woman narrated: uprising, and noted that in the last two years groups have become increasingly self-isolating At the start, the inundation of propaganda and have withdrawn socially out of fear. Two from regime officials painting the opposition informants utilized the same word, taqawqa’, or as hostile towards Christians really scared “retreating into one’s shell,” to describe the self- many into following Assad lockstep. A lot of imposed boundaries groups developed in Christians in Damascus fled early, fearing they were targets. A lot had the economic means response to their fears. and connections abroad – even in Europe and the States – and thus were able to get out Paradoxically, some communities were relatively easily compared to others. Last reported to have developed greater openness summer they began to get shelled, with in response to demographic shifts and schools and public buildings getting hit. As the migration. Some groups reacted to these conflict wore on, they became more and more demographic changes by both relaxing and attached to the regime because the threat, in their eyes, became fully existential. tightening their group boundaries; these reactions were determined factors such as age Both these narratives reveal the atmosphere of and individual outlook. One Druze narrated fear that the regime sought to create how an influx of internally displaced persons 53 surrounding Christian-Muslim relations, by to Sweida had such an effect, saying that after making Christians feel the need for state the start of the Conflict, there was a large influx protection and portraying Muslims as hostile. of [non-Druze] IDPs into the region, and many Druze were compelled to become more open Self-Isolating Practices of Minority to these new neighbors. This helped to dissolve Groups “the fear of the other” that had prevailed in Sweida before, and precipitated a rise in “ Rising sectarian strife combined with perceived awareness” among the community. existential threats faced by groups led to the

53 Internally displaced persons, or IDPs, are persons who have fled their homes and sought refuge in other areas of their own country. www.sreo.org 31

Another Druze noted mixed impacts within the Druze community remaining inside Syria, and Individuals reported varying levels of fear in explained that “some [in the community] have themselves and their communities, as well as become more open-minded due to their different levels of isolation due to this fear. The positive involvement in the revolution. They isolation of many groups before the Conflict, have come to see the positive possibilities of a combined with the fear induced by the Conflict democratic Syria. Even though [my community] solidified pre-existing group boundaries, has been negatively impacted, people are still despite some rare instances of increased open and good-hearted.” She further noted intercommunal interaction. that some of these differences in views and impact are generational: younger Druze tend to Fluid and Reactive Identities be more supportive of the “revolution,” and older generations tend to feel that there is no Interviews with minorities also revealed a better alternative than Assad. This sentiment stunning diversity in the expression and was echoed by another Druze. Among these conceptualization of group and individual informants, support for the “revolution” was identities, with most informants indicating equated with greater openness towards multiple identities that could be contrary or different sects, whereas isolation and intersective, fixed or unstable. However, closedness was affiliated with supporting the notable patterns emerged within these diverse regime, which demonstrated how these expressions of identity that provide insight into interviewees conceptualized the “revolution”: a minority perceptions of self, their communities, liberal, open movement embracing people of and Syrian society at large, and reveal how all backgrounds. these perceptions have been impacted by the Syrian Conflict. Participants articulated their A Roman Orthodox informant similarly identity along social, national, religious, and described how families have been impacted political lines, ultimately revealing the disparate based on their ideological outlook: nature of individual identities within groups, and the fluid nature of these identities in the Families have been impacted differently context of an ambiguous future. according to their nature...more intellectually open families such as mine for example were more open to the other sects, were in National Identities: What Constitutes solidarity with others, and the red lines began “Syrian”? to disappear. But for families that were more intolerant to begin with became even more Informants overwhelmingly expressed an intolerant. They distanced themselves from identity on the national terms of Syrian their surroundings, and isolated themselves. citizenship, with all but one indicating that they considered themselves Syrian, and many For her as well as for the Druze, the “revolution” privileging this identity over other provided an opportunity for greater openness simultaneously occurring identities. In following and solidarity with different groups, while fear with the complex nature of identity, many and isolation was associated with support for ambiguities and nuances in the articulations of the Assad regime. national identity emerged. Primary among www.sreo.org 32 these was the imprecise nature of Syrian Syriac male. To him, his love for his country was identity, for while most informants insisted that complemented by his identity as a Christian, in they considered themselves “Syrian,” the that his Christian faith had taught him to love criteria that exactly produce and maintain his fellow Syrians regardless of their religion. “Syrianness” was inconsistent or unclarified. A significant number of informants placed their For several informants, “Syrian” identity could Syrian national identity over all other be defined upon the concept of the Syrian categorizations, citing both practical and nation-state as promoted by the Ba’ath party ideological reasons for this. “I am Syrian. I am starting in the 1970’s. “Those of us who lived in proud to be an Ismaili because it has offered the golden age of Syria [referring to the 1970’s me opportunities, but in the end I am Syrian,” and 80’s], we only considered ourselves to be stated a 40-year old Ismaili man, who felt that Syrian,” explained a Syriac male in his 50s. Such the “Syrian” identity is robust enough to be able definitions were more common in informants to withstand sectarian divisions. Several of older generations, who were subject to the informants indicated that privileging Syrian Ba’ath narrative that superimposed a identity helped them to minimize feelings of linguistically and geographically defined alterity inside Syria and in displacement. national identity upon regional and “Usually I’m Syrian...but sometimes when some confessional identities. Interestingly, people ask me about my religion, I don’t dodge informants who defined “Syrianness” upon this the question, I answer simply and honestly that nation-state concept propagated by the Ba'ath I am Christian,” a female Roman Orthodox party were not necessarily supporters of the revealed. Such statements support the idea regime in the current Conflict. “I define my that a nationalist narrative of identity can be identity as a Syrian nationalist, but I’m against superimposed to encompass other potentially the regime,” revealed a 57-year old Syriac man, problematic identities based on sect or ethnic adding that Syrian national identity entailed a background, a theory visited by many scholars sense of belonging to a secular nation-state addressing sectarianism in the Middle East.54 under a constitution, but this was not to be While all informants expressed Syrian national irrevocably tied to any ruling regime. identity to some extent, several communicated a degree of ambivalence over the concept of A number of interviewees indicated their “Syrianness.” While this was observed in national identities to be concurrent with members of several sects, such ambivalence religious designations, with most viewing was most prominent in the two Yazidi national and minority identities as not being in informants, both of whom expressly pointed to conflict. For several individuals, Syrian identity the exclusion of both their Kurdish ethnicity was expressed as an emotional attachment - and the Yazidi religion from the Ba’ath nation- often a sense of loyalty and affection - that was state agenda. One informant, a 35-year old compatible with co-occurring identities. “I’m male, explained that “the Syrian ruling party Al- proud to be Syrian. With all due respect, after Ba’ath had arbitrarily deprived me and my Syria there is no other country,” explained a family from the Syrian nationality and we lived

54 See Paasche (2011) and Schaebler (2013). www.sreo.org 33 in a big prison called Syria...I was classified as a are born with...as you grow up, you get to read ‘foreigner’ in [my] country of birth. I’m one of and develop your thoughts.” those stateless Syrian Kurds whom the Syrian regime stripped him [sic] of the Syrian Within this context of individual and group self- nationality.” In spite of the prejudicial treatment perceptions, the question of separation of his sect, which had compelled him to move between an imposed or voluntary religious abroad more than a decade ago, he designated identity and actual religiosity was addressed by his primary identity as “Kurdish from Syria.” many informants. Multiple interviewees across This ambivalence over Syrian national identity sects indicated a low level or complete lack of was reflected to a lesser extent in another religiosity, characterized by lax adherence to Yazidi informant, a 48-year old male, who while religious mores. This trend was more prevalent expressing resentment for the Syrian state’s among informants under the age of 40, treatment of Kurds and Yazidis, claimed that his although not completely absent in informants identity could be described as the sum of belonging to older generations. These “Kurdish nationalism and Syrian patriotism.” interviewees often reported their membership The persistence of a sense of “Syrianness” even in their minority as a social identity that in individuals excluded from the traditional conflated with other more prominent identities, Syrian nationalist narrative speaks to the but still impacted them in that they were prominence of nationalism in identity perceived by other Syrians on the basis of their expressions observed across all minorities for sect. A Druze who described himself as an this study. atheist explained that while he was not faithful, he felt his Druze background informed his Projections of Self: Group and Individual identity in that negative assumptions about Perceptions Druze were applied to him whenever he travelled to mainly Sunni areas. Several other The question of self-perception on individual informants related to their sect on the basis of and group levels emerged in many interviews family ties, explaining that they felt a sense of as a key indicator of identity, and a number of belonging to their families and their informants pointed to dichotomies between hometowns despite a lack of religious devotion. their own individual identities and that of their One Ismaili revealed that he felt a sense of religious group. Many interviewees rootedness and allegiance to the town of distinguished between individual identities they Salamiya - known for its large Ismaili had developed on professional and personal population - because it was the site of his grounds, as opposed to religious identities that family and formative experiences, even though had been imposed upon them by he was not devout. A male Druze informant circumstances of birth. These diverging indicated similar feelings towards the town of identities resulted in different self-perceptions Sweida, in which there is a Druze majority, and projections. A Catholic man who was not because of his family’s presence and social religious explained this saying “when you talk rootedness there. Such statements speak to about identity, Christianity is not an identity, it's the significance of sense of place and social something that was imposed on you and you belonging in identity formation. www.sreo.org 34

Ultimately, many informants stated that they production of new political identities in activist resented identity designations based on minorities. sectarian, national, or political criteria, preferring to be viewed as individuals, or as a Many informants brought up the involuntary number of informants simply stated, as politicization of their religious backgrounds as a “humans.” “[My primary identity is] humanity. I distressing result of the Syrian Conflict, belong to the world,” explained a female Greek exposing them to perceived or actual Orthodox. Such statements were found among endangerment that in many cases precipitated informants of all sects and generations, and displacement. This effect was particularly even among those who had at other points in prominent in Christian and Alawite the interview indicated a strong or even respondents, although it was brought up by dominant national identity. A female Ismaili, 25, Druze and Ismaili informants as well. Many stated “I want to be seen as just Reem.55 Not an participants indicated that prior to the Conflict, Ismaili, not even as a Syrian, but as myself. they had not perceived their religious Treat me like I’m Reem, like I’m human.” These background as an overtly political marker in sentiments underline the ultimately ineffable Syrian society, but that the advent of the and fluid nature of identity, showing it to be Conflict had changed this. A 47-year old Syriac interactive with multiple social, political, and man explained that Christians had held no religious forces and resistant to political ties to any system of rule over the compartmentalization. This plurality in identity course of their long historical tenure in Syria, was found to influence the way minorities saying: “we were there before the Regime, viewed their individual and community future before Hafez, before the Ba'aths. We have no prospects. attachment to the regime. My cousin in Aleppo has a store that has been in her family for more Politicized Identities than 400 years. Through the Ottomans, the French, and the Ba'ath party.” He expressed The relationship between identity and political resentment that Christians were inaccurately orientation was also widely addressed, and cast as pro-regime, when many were in fact political events and subjectivities were seen to apolitical or neutral. A female Syriac, 21, shared be producers and catalysts of new identities. this feeling of being “accused” of being pro- Many informants indicated reactive changes in regime due to her Christian status: individual and group identities that were politically motivated by the Conflict. Three To be honest, I was perfectly happy with the significant patterns were observed in the way way things were before. There was corruption political events precipitated shifts in minority (politically), and things weren’t perfect. But identities: the politicization of religious identity there is corruption wherever you go, they expect money wherever you go...I was as a result of the Conflict, a reactive grounding comfortable in my life, and had everything I in minority group identity in response to needed. I wasn’t like those people who perceived and real external threats, and the protested because they couldn’t make a living. I didn’t have any political interests.

55 Informant’s name has been changed. www.sreo.org 35

an article about how minorities are disloyal to While she admitted that she supported the the uprising and bring invasion. I feel I need to Assad regime, she had never felt this to be a explain our history and culture and what it defining aspect of her identity prior to or after means to be Ismaili.” Similarly, a male Syriac the Conflict. informant -an army deserter -explained how his Christian identity had been strengthened by All Alawite informants in this study voiced the traumatic experience of fighting in the similar sentiments, with many explaining that regime army. His Christian values dictated that while their religious identities had always been he could no longer participate in fighting even conflated with the Assad Regime, the Conflict those he considered enemies: “Now, if I were to had intensified negative assumptions about the see a terrorist [extremist fighter] about to kill Alawite community. One Alawite male residing me, I pity him. I can forgive him. This is what my in Turkey shared that “I never saw myself as an religion has taught me.” Alawite before the events. I only started thinking of myself as an Alawite after the Alongside the plurality of identity observed events when my life was endangered because across minorities interviewed, significant of it.” Having fled to Turkey after being attacked variation in political views of informants was in his home in a diverse neighborhood of revealed, providing a glimpse into the wide Aleppo, he felt compelled to conceal his Alawite spectrum of political subjectivities in Syrian background even in displacement: “I am now minorities. Informants of all sects interviewed wanted by the regime, because I’m in the for this study affirmed the presence of diverse opposition, and I’m wanted by extremists political views in their communities prior to the because I’m Alawite. I don’t even feel revolution, with many suggesting that the completely safe here.” He felt unable to reside Conflict had uncovered new political identities in refugee camps inside Turkey, stating that if for members of some minorities. An Ismaili his Alawite identity were to be disclosed he man shared that his family had been politically would be subject to attacks in the Sunni- active on both sides of the spectrum for majority camps. generations, and that this was not uncommon in his town of origin. This plurality had As a reaction to these politicized identities, translated to the current Conflict: “The majority several informants shared that they of us are in the opposition, but some family experienced a defensive grounding in their members have had other views, communist, religious group identities in response to socialists, some were employees of the Syrian heightened threats against minorities. An state.” As a result of participating in the anti- Ismaili male revealed that although he had Assad opposition, several informants had considered himself secular prior to the start of willfully acquired new political identities as the Conflict, he had experienced a reactive shift activists. in his religious identity in response to a colleague’s attacks on the Ismaili sect. “I feel Several informants shared that the Conflict had more like I need to defend my identity as an brought about political mobilization in their Ismaili, because of the attacks. I was working communities, by polarizing pre-existing political on a magazine, and my Sunni colleague wrote views and creating new ones. A Druze male

www.sreo.org 36 informant explained how his community had felt that the end of violence was necessary in been split on political lines, saying “It’s like three that the goals that had driven him to activism levels: shabiha, the opposition, and the third were no longer relevant in the face of such line. Shabiha, 56 it’s like Ba’ath, we have religious violence. I want the Conflict to just end as fast people fighting with them, and people who as possible, in any way whether via believe in Bashar because he is secular. When negotiations, or a political solution,” he stated. they saw [ISIS], they don’t believe that it’s for freedom, and they got scared...then there is the Hopes for the establishment of specific political third line, of people themselves, fighting for systems were often expressed as secondary to Syria, looking for a civil state and civil society.” this desire for an end to the violence but were Similar polarization of views were expressed by deemed as significant factors impacting informants of other sects. minority prospects in Syria. Many interviewees expressed desire for a secular state that would The heterogeneity of identity observed in this not distinguish Syrian citizens on sectarian study - whether motivated by political, social, or criteria, a hope shared by a number of personal forces - defies long-held assumptions individuals across all sects and age groups in about minority perspectives by revealing Syria this study. “I hope that Syrian identity is realized to be a disparate political landscape. in a civil state, and that every Syrian is granted a status as a Syrian citizen and nothing else,” Dreams and Realities explained a Roman Orthodox woman. To have Syrian citizenship removed from sectarian Hopes and expectations pertaining to the designation was a frequently-voiced desire future of Syria were addressed by members of across all interviews. all minorities, with most interviewees The subject of hopes for a future Syria was acknowledging a gap between desired and inevitably discussed within the context of the expected outcomes in the context of an uncertainty of the Conflict’s outcomes, with uncertain future and prolonged instability. All most informants pointing to a considerable gap study informants overwhelmingly expressed a between what they hoped for and what they desire for the fighting to end as soon as projected to actually happen. A Druze male possible. These were often expressed explained that “my dream, it’s like a civil state, a apolitically, with the majority of informants country controlled by law. For myself, I’m conceding that the end of the violence was against all religion, but I respect all people. Let’s more important than the achievement of any say I dream about a civil society and a civil particular political objective. “I just want safety state. But in reality, that’s tough.” For some and stability to be restored, by any way, minorities, their hopes were dashed by what whether by the regime or anyone else,” stated a they felt was the inevitability of an eventual Syriac woman. This was echoed in a statement Sunni state that would not recognize the rights from an Ismaili man, who although anti-Assad, of minorities. A Greek Orthodox woman who

56 Shabiha are the Assad regime’s armed milias, acve since the 1970’s and now mobilized with the regime army. For more informaon see BBC News Agencies. (2012, May 29). Syria Unrest: Who are the Shabiha? BBC News. Retrieved from hp://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14482968. www.sreo.org 37 had been an anti-Assad activist for years prior However, the majority of informants expressed to the Conflict, shared that she hoped to see regret over a lack of community and individual war criminals brought to justice and for “justice agency to some degree, and this feeling was and dignity and equality for all,” then conceded particularly prominent among Christians, that she felt this was impossible, saying “I am Alawites, and Yazidis in this study. Alawite not a dreamer anymore…[The future of participants - even those that were anti-Assad - Christians] is in Canada.” equated the fall of the Assad regime as the end of Alawite influence and security in the country. National Agency He felt that negative, if erroneous, assumptions about Alawites among the Sunni majority and In this context, the question of national agency other sects would exclude them from national - defined as a conviction of possessing the participation and endanger their lives. A 35- ability to tangibly influence one’s personal and year old Yazidi man projected that all minority group interests inside Syria - emerged as a groups would have no influence under the central determinant of how minorities viewed current system or a post-Assad Syria: “I’m their future in relation to Syria. Those who pessimistic about the role of my community expressed a sense of agency in current and within Syria’s future, and this is because of the post-Conflict Syrian government and society - bad regime and bad politicians we have and as individuals and as groups - felt more also because of the silence of the international positively about their group’s ability to survive community. I don’t think that my community or the Conflict, as well as their security and role in any other community will be able to do a post-Conflict Syria. Several informants felt anything.” For such informants, feeling that positive qualities in their religious groups impotent to protect their individual and group would forward group interests rather than interests held direct implications for their sense endanger them: as an Ismaili male explained of investment in their country. “when you talk about Ismailis, you’re talking about elites, the cream of Syrian society, they Forced Disinvestment have very clear ideas for Syria’s future, turning it into a civil, democratic society.” Another The absence of national agency coupled with Ismaili man echoed this statement, adding that pessimistic projections was shown to resign he felt confident that Ismailis would integrate many individuals to feel disinvested in their into post-Conflict Syrian society: “my city [the country. While this was observed in informants largely Ismaili Salamiya] is culturally and of all sects, Christians, Alawites, and Yazidis intellectually open-minded, and we alongside demonstrated a higher level of disinvestment other [non-Ismaili] Syrians have a future.” A than other interviewees. This disinvestment Roman Orthodox woman shared similar was attributed to a number of factors including impressions about Christians in Syria: material and emotional losses of the Conflict, “Christians in general are the most accepted by diminishment of minority communities, and both sides of the Conflict, because of their the endangerment of the sect inside Syria. One general neutrality. So I expect that the Syriac female explained that the destruction of reasonable ones will have a mediation role in their homes and lack of job opportunities civil peace proceedings.” would negatively impact their decisions to www.sreo.org 38 return, saying that “it would be difficult for us loyalty to their nation, coupled with a yearning to go back to Syria and start our lives from zero for an unlikely return. One Syriac male again. We’ve had to start from zero here, and if explained that he was leaving to join his family we went back we’ll have to start from zero in Sweden where he anticipated building a life, again.” For many Christians, disinvestment in although, after a pause, he added “but I will the future of Syria was precipitated by the eventually return to my country.” Similarly, a increasing migration of communities from Yazidi informant, though bitterly pessimistic on Syria. This was voiced by Christians from all the future of his sect within what he expected geographical areas.“There will be no role [for to be a fractured nation, said “Syria is the Christians], because there will be no tender mother that I will return to the moment community. They will all have migrated,” the situation improves.” That individuals who explained a Syriac female from Hassakeh. explicitly express deep patriotism and yearning “Everyone is migrating, to Europe, America. I for their country - often coupled with affection don’t know if there will be anyone left in Syria,” for other Syrians - feel barred from a future added another Syriac female. there speaks to the grim magnitude of the obstacles faced by members of religious Beyond this, the prospect of continued minorities. That minorities feel unable to perceived and actual safety threats was a major survive in the country they love - and determinant of disinvestment: minorities who participate heavily in - likely holds serious felt that their own long-term survival or that of implications for both the political direction of their group was threatened were largely the Conflict and the eventual demographic map resigned to a life outside Syria. This was a of a future Syria. recurring theme in interviews with Alawites, who felt that their sect was fundamentally endangered in current and future political climates. “Before the events, I never would have thought of applying for refugee status. But now I see no other option. Of course I’d like to go back to Syria, but I don’t see that happening” explained an Alawite man. Feeling that his sect had no chances for survival in a post-Assad Syria, there was no choice but to live abroad permanently. A Syriac male predicted a similar fate for his sect, saying “we have no future, but I want you to know that we lived in complete happiness before the events. There is no humanity there now.” Notably, this forced disinvestment was often marked by deep ambivalence. Even informants who expressed pessimism on the prospect of their future in Syria indicated a profound

www.sreo.org 39 Conclusion: Whither Within these findings looms the question of Diversity in Syria? what these subjectivities mean for the ongoing Conflict and the eventual demographic and Interviews with religious minorities provided political landscape of a post-Conflict Syria, in insight into their varied experiences and addition to their implications for the fate of perspectives, showing that group and individual Syrian minority communities themselves. As subjectivities have been irrevocably affected by the Conflict enters its fourth year with no the events of the Syrian Conflict. Minorities indications of reconciliation in sight, ever larger presented varied accounts of the sectarian numbers of minorities will be compelled to social landscape inside Syria, with some leave Syria and take refuge in foreign countries. informants adhering to a narrative of This would suggest that the future of many coexistence and others reporting a pre-existing, Syrian minorities lies in diaspora, and that suppressed culture of sectarianism. Syria's former diversity will become yet another Interviewees also discussed personal and victim of the Syrian Conflict. This loss community reactions to the Conflict, as well as notwithstanding, what the absence of minority issues of problematic leadership and social voices on the social and political hemispheres relations both inside war-torn Syria and in will mean remains to be seen. countries of refuge. The role of fear within While this study uncovered revealing insights minority communities and how it determined on Syrian religious minority perspectives, minority political subjectivities and choices was future research is needed to gain a more a prominent theme, showing that the Conflict comprehensive and ongoing understanding of precipitated changes in how minority groups the well being and migration of religious related to other Syrians. While interviewees minorities. Future studies will ideally employ largely expressed a strong Syrian national wider samplings of minorities living in countries identity, the breakdown of intercommunal of refuge to note whether patterns can be relations and the tensions described prior to observed across larger populations. Further the Conflict indicate a lack of integration that research should also try to gain access to Syrian identity alone cannot combat. Interviews minority groups who have remained in or also addressed the subjectivities that returned to Syria, to note any disparities contributed to minority identities, and between their well-being and that of their examined how these identities reacted to counterparts in refuge. displacement and rupture. Finally, findings showed how the sum of these phenomena It is SREO’s intention that these findings will caused many minorities to feel dispossessed of form a baseline for future research that will a future in Syria, impelling many to migrate further document the experiences and abroad. perspectives of these groups as the Syrian Conflict continues, ultimately proposing ways In short, religious minority status increases the to facilitate group relations and promote vulnerability of these groups both inside and minority safety, thereby ensuring the outside of Syria, and in some cases poses an demographic diversity of Syria. existential threat to their survival. www.sreo.org 40

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