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PRESS. POLITICS

. PUBLICPOLICY.

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A decadeago, the Indian city of Bhopal sud- industrial accident ever recorded. " denly joined a list of infamous place names that But there the story" of Bhopal might have haunts the Twentieth Century. As this century stopped, without an enterprising group of report- dawned, the popular confidence in human reason ers, editors, legislatorsand envi,ronmentalists.In - expressedin the technologicalwonders of the last twenty yearstthe century's growing steam/ electricity, the telephone, and the inter- doubts about the human manipulation of the nal combustion engine- seemedalmost un- natural world has given rise to an environmental bounded.As this century moves toward its end, movement of unprecedentedscope and influ- wonder has been replaced with worry, and ence.By pursuing the Bhopal story, not as an limitless confidencewith concern. isolated tragedybut as part of a pattern of dan- The shattering effects of technology'suses in gersthat touches not only the relatively under- two World Wars, the haunting fears of a half- developedThird World, but reachesinto the century spent in the nuclear shadow,and con- heart of the industrialized West, those reporters stant new discoveriesabout the unintended and editors were able to help set a public agenda. consequencesof DDT, dioxin, thalidomide, and In turn, that new public agenda- about other human inventions meant to make the control of dangerouschemicals, their manufac- world safer,more useful, and more productive - ture/ transportation and storage- helped, have left indelible stains on the human imagina- through an intricate and delicate danceof tion. legislation, to passan important new set of iaws Modern researchon risk assessmentmakes in the United Statesmeant to limit those dan- clear that the public now distrusts science's gers,laws that have since been duplicated progeny.To the dismay of statisticians, when around the world. natural and man-made threats are ranked for Sanjoy Hazarika was among the first reporters dangerby averagecitizens, those made by man to reach Bhopal within hours after tragedyfirst always seem more threatening than those arising struck, and he has pursued the story that has from nature. The researcherspore over their grown out of it with the persistencethat distin- probability tables, and point out the misjudg- guishesall great reporters.As New Delhi corre- ments involved - to no avail. But the issue isn't spondent for the New York Times, he helped one simply of abstractprobabilities, in a case-by- shapehis own paper'searly coverage,and casesense. Something about the hubris of watched proudly as the paper continued its human-made dangerstouches deeply in reporting - along with a handful of others - mankind's collective imagination. Perhapsit is well after the defining moment of disasterhad the seeminginescapability of natural disasters, passed. their senseof being associatedwith forcesIarger As a Fellow of the foan ShorensteinCenter on than humankind - versus the perverse the Press,Politics and Public Policy, Hazarlka inventednessof man-maderisks - that touches steppedback to examine the effectsof press the chord that warns us that we are defying laws coverageof the Bhopal disasternot only on not meant to be challenged.Perhaps it is the gulf public awarenessof technology's dangers,but of of mistrust left by the misplaced certainty that its aftermath when a similar disasternearly the scientists themselvesfostered, by promising occurredhere in the United States.Combining no ill effects.Whatever the reason,the di- extensive interviewing with careful reconstruc- chotomy of fear persists. tion of chronologies,he revealshow the Bhopal The Faustian dimensions of the bargain we disasterultimately led to important new public have made with Progresswas never clearer than checks on a misplaced technological freedom.In in Bhopalon the morning of December3,1984. doing so, he castsimportant new light on the While citizens of that city slept, a silent, invis- intersection between technology, the public ible cloud spreadout among them, carriedby the interest, and the role of reporting. morning breezes.It came from the Union Car- bide plant meant to process fertlltzer for the Richard Patker country's Green Revolution; instead, it killed Senior Fellow, |oan ShorensteinCenter on the more than 4,000 and hospitalized 200,000more. Press,Politics and Public Policy It achieved, in a century filled with achieve- fohn F. Kennedy School of Government ments, a landmark of sorts: the worst single Harvard Univetsity

htsNNEDYSCHOOL OF GOVERNMEI$T Li*RAft 1 FROM BHOPAL TO SUPERFUND: The News Media and the Environment

INTRODUCTION for India: that summer, hundreds had died in a The first news of the Bhopal disasterlanded in Central Government crackdown on Sikh extrem- New Delhi early on December3,1984.I was at ists at the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the the NewYork Times bureau when an Indian holiest shrine of the Sikh faith. A few months gunned news agency ran a flash on the incident, saying later, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was that scoreshad died in a gasleak and many more down by two of her Sikh guards, angeredby the were iniured. It was not immediately clear what assault on the temple. In consequentriots, more had causedit - even a claim by Sikh extrem- than 3,000 Sikhs were battered and burned to ists that they had blown it up drew some public- death in Northern India, most of them in New gas rty - but it was soon establishedthat the city Delhi. The disaster briefly interrupted a general had been overwhelmed by toxic fumes from a campaign for elections called by Indira Union Carbide pesticide plant. Gandhi's untested son and successor/Rajiv. As the toll mounted by the hour and reporters Someimages endure for life. And for me, there caught planes, trains or just drove there, it is one that is a constant reminder of the horror of became clear that this was no ordinary tragedy those days. but a cataclysmic event. Bhopal beganto force In the state-run Hamidia Hospital, the main peopleacross the world, at least briefly, and focus of the battle to savelives during those policymakers in industry and the environment/ traumatic weeks, I walked into a roomful of glucose at greaterlength, to re-examine the paradigm of frightened children, with drips on their gasping development and the relevance of certain tech- arms and oxygen masks on thefu faces, nologies. f.or air, turning restlesslyon soiled beds,unable The unthinkable had come to pass,forcing the to understand what was happening to them and asking of the question: Can it happenhere? even more frightened by the helplessnesson the "What happenedin 1984 at one plant in one facesof their parents and doctors. Indian city prompted a worldwide reexamination The benefits of technology are not worth that price of industrial policy and practice,"r saysSheila anywhere, artymore. fasanof{, of the Program on Science,Technology and Society at Cornell University, who has edited a set of essayson the Bhopal disasterand AN EVENT HAS HAPPENED the community right to know. Edmund Burke once said, "An event has Bhopal would seizethe attention of the world happened upon which it is difficult to speak and and hold it firmly for some days.The disaster impossible to be silent." He could have been lent itself to front-pagecopy and television speakingof Bhopal. footage.There were dramatic figures on center Nine days after the world's worst industrial stage:a giant American multinational corpora- disaster,back in the United States,Rep. Henry tion struck by calamity, doctors desperately Waxman (D-California) called a specialmeeting trying to save lives, the images of blinded, gassed of the subcommittee on Health and the Environ- victims, of relatives and friends searchingfor one ment of the House of Representativesto order another, of bodies laid out on the ground because with those words. the main mortuary was full, of funeral pyres "What happened in India was a terrible, lighting the night sky. The people of Bhopal terrible tragedy of a magnitude that is difficult spoke of grief, incomprehension,fear and aimless for us to grasp. Out of this tragedy we all must anger. make sure that an accident such as happened in Reportersworked the phones,hammered out Bhopal ... will not be repeatedanywhere ... As copy for stuttering telex machines and stayed up horrible as Bhopal is, we must face it and learn late every night to file copy {nothing new for from it," Waxman added. most reporters).A few hours of exhaustedsleep His words - spoken at a state college at merged into another rushed day of travel, inter- Institute, West Virginia, where the subcommit- views, meeting and writing in time for deadlines. tee was meeting - were especiallyresonant, for Bhopal came at the end of a nightmarish year they werespoken a short distancefrom a Union

Sanioy Hazafika 1 Carbide pesticideplant. The factory used the ally have an impact on the laws and regulations same chemicals that had erupted in a gascloud that were later passedto insure better chemical thousandsof miles away.Union Carbide had safety? perhaps shut the Institute Iactory to allow federal inspec- The media's role in this caseis the free- tors to conduct safetYaudits. most difficult to measure:by nature, it is a hard to Out of that meeting, where lawmakers and floating agent that is event-specificand is leadersof Union Carbide, and later meetings pin to causalrelationships and impact. where community workers, residents,state and federal officials spoke,was born a specific campaignto equip communities and local PERSPECTIVE authorities with the ability to respondbetter to The Bhopal disasterneeds to be viewed in the chemical disasters. perspectiveof the steadygrowth of the environ- In this paper,I arguethat the media played the mental movement worldwide in the years role of an intermediary in reporting incidents precedingit. relating to Bhopal and chemical incidents in the Environmentalism surgedrn 1952with the United Statesthat createda platform for change, publication of Silent Spring,Rachel Catson's - for agenda-driving- if not the agenda in classicon the impact of overuseof pesticideson oublic attitudes to the chemical industry. Other humans, animal, plant and bird speciesand on lotn-s played more important roles in influenc- soil. Another benchmark was the Minamata ing policy decisions,especially in Congress' mercury poisioning casein fapan in the 1950s Th" fact that the accident took place in India and 1960swhen a |apanesefirm dumped methyl was not the political issue that provoked debate. rirercury in a channel that flowed into Minamata If it had been an Indian company/ or even a Bay. The villagers who fished in the Bay suffered Europeanone, the disasterwould have made major neurological disorderswhich were not some headlinesbut droppedout of reckoning as diagnosedfor years.The company, Chisso irrelevant to the industrial experienceand Corporation/ was taken to court and forced to culture of the United States. pay compensationto hundreds of victims. As a What made the differencewas the involve- consecluence,the fapaneseGovernment set up a ment of an American multinational. Pollution Control Board. Two other factors - the scaleof the tragedy In 1972,the first world environmental confer- and the question of technology in development encewas held at Stockholm, Sweden,where - were issuesfor the media in the United many nations decidedto createpollution-control States.But they were not as significant as Union agenciesand mechanisms for the first time' Carbide'srole. Inl976, dioxin leakedfrom a Hoffman-La Without Carbide,there would have been no Roche subsidiaryin Sevesoin Italy in I976, story and no impact. forcing the evacuationof more than 700 people and causingthe deathsof thousandsof pets and domestic animals. As in the caseof Minamata, TWO YEARS compensationwas sought and securedfrom It took two yearsfor the processthat beganat Hoffman-La Roche.In 1982,the European Institute with the Congressionalhearings and in Community passedthe SevesoDirective which preventing Washington - although that processwas born laid down rules for member stateson with the disasteritself - to be moulded into industrial accidentsand limiting damagefrom laws to force polluters to {unction within a such incidents, it defined hazardoussubstances, framework. The road through Congressbristled classifiedthem and recommendedstorage levels with obstaclesand delaysat every stage:from for different chemicais. lawmakers supportive o{ businessor protective In the United States,between 1979 and l9BI, Love Canal of iobs, from technical snagsin the wording of more than 400 families in the legislation, from environmentalists who thought neighborhoodin Niagara Falls, New York, were the rules did not go far enough and from an evacuated after thepress extensively reported on industry and an Administration which thought health hazards and complaints about toxic they went too far. chemical waste/ dumped in the areadecades Did the reporting of Bhopal and later coverage earlier, seepinginto their homes. The issue and editorial opinion on chemical-relatedinci- becamea major national news event, forcing had dents in the United Stateshelp developpublic government attention on a problem that consciousnesson the issue?And did this eventu- been ignored for decades.Love Canal led to

2 From Bhopal to Superfund: The News Media and the Environment Congressenacting the Superfundbill, which had Indonesia andBrazll. Workers spoke later of how been pending for some time, giving the govern- they would come to know of leaks: they smelt ment the authority to supervise the cleanup of them first. On the night of the disaster,four out toxic dumps. of five safety systemsfailed to work. In 1980,a radioactive leak at the Three-Mile Poor plant managementwas one problem; Island atomic reactor caused a public outcry/ another was the political responseto thousands leading newspapers andmagazines - as well as of illegal squatterswho had moved onto govern- industry, Congressand regulatory agencies - ment iand around the plant. When the Carbide to reassesssafety conditions at nuclear plants plant was being built, the fields around it were and question the importance of nuclear energy. empty. In December 1984,it was flanked by A dioxin leak in l9B2 at Times Beach,Mis- crowded shantytowns whose residentshad been souri, causedanother scare,another bout of news awardedproperty deedsby the state government reports, another evacuation of a community and with an eye to generalelections around the calls for strongerreguiation for industry. But corner. And when survivors spoke of the lethal efforts to pressfor these changeswere stalled by gascloud that swept out of the plant, killing severalfactors, including the ReaganAdminis- peopleas they slept or fled, my immediate tration pro-industry bias. thoughts went to the Biblical mist of death describedin the Old Testament. Union Carbide was portrayed by the Indian THE BHOPAL BACKGROUND pressand in underdevelopednations as a cynical little concern for Indian Bhopal came in the wake of these events.And multinational, with lives, and a company which introduced a pesti- it was the worst of them all: that one incident technology that failed. The Indian and state killed more people than all the major industrial cide governmentsalso were attacked for their seem- accidentspreceding it this century. More than and inability to develop a bal- 1,600died in the first few days after the leak and ing complicity f or industri alization. 200,000were treated for injuries in hospitals and anced strategy private clinics. The death toll now standsat more than 4,000. IMMEDIATE INTEREST Why did Union Carbide set up its plant in Bhopal?The scaleof the tragedy makes it neces- The scaleof the disasterand the involvement sary to look at the the reasonsbehind the disas- of an American firm ensuredthat the main ter, even briefly. American newspapersfront-paged the news of Union Carbide had built a subsidiarypesticide Bhopal.Television networks flew in crews and plant in Bhopal in the 1970sto take advantageof reportersand gavetop billing to the story. The India's Green Revolution. At the time, a combi- newspapersfollowed up with editorials, detailed nation of new seeds,extensive fertilizer and on-the-spotreporting and analysis. pesticide use led to rapid growth in foodgrain The reports turned out to be a major sourceof production and createdan influential rural information for peoplefigured in the unfolding middle class. Until about 1980,Union Carbide tragedy.For example,Warren Anderson, the imported methyl isocyanate,a lethal liquid Chairman of Union Carbide,listened to radio intermediate used in the manufacture of the broadcastsfor initial details of the incident. pesticide,from the plant at Institute, West At one point the New York Times had four Virginia. Thatyear, the Indian Government reporterson the ground, including a science clearedthe company's application to manufac- specialistordered to India from covering the ture methyl isocyanate,better known as MIC, at Ethiopia famine. Another who was on vacation Bhopal. in the country was enlisted to man the New The MIC unit ran into lossesfrom the begin- Delhi bureau. ning with frequent stoppages.A major drought BetweenDecember 4 and December 18, when led farmers to turn to less expensivepesticides. the story finally went off the front page from The level of qualified engineersat the plant India, the NewYorkTimes published more than dropped.So did its safety record: at least two 50 major and medium-sized news articles, accidentstook place before the 1984 tragedy. reviews, analysisand investigative piecesabout One worker was killed and about 30 others were Bhopal. Other chemical accident/disaster-related hospitalized by the smaller leaks. Tired of its stories were also published, including one about flawed IacIIity, Union Carbide planned to dis- the failure to investigate an oil pipeline explo- mantle the plant and ship it to subsidiariesin sion in Mexico that killed more than 300 per-

Sanioy Hazarika 3 sons.That Mexico City fire occureda few corporatron. out of India in the newspapers/ months beforeBhoPal. The reporting radio forced lawmakers to take In this period, there were 13 front pagestories, on televisiott "ttd incident and its implications for the includinglwo lead stories,and severalfront-page notice of the photogralphs.On two days,the-Times published United States. of the environmental movement lost two Bhopal-relatedstories on the tront page' Leaders pounding that messagehome as they When those of us in the South Asia bureau of no time in to testify before Congress' the Times turned our attention to the Indian were summoned statementswere reported generalelections later in December,the paper Their words and in the Times and elsewhere'The J"trt ont an investigative reporter to follow up' extensively crafted,using the poi- The reporter, Stuart Diamond, collaborated remarks were skilfully the situation to ensurewide press with Robert Rheinhold, the correspondent who gnancy o{ had had his vacation plans ruined by the disaster, covelage. Gus Speth,testifying before a to write the most comprehensiveaccount of the One of them, subcommittee in Washington, disasterat the time: what happenedat the plant Congressional is likely that Bhopal will become the site, the compulsions behind Union Carbide said:-"It industry's Three-Mile-Island - an setting up its factory at Bhopal, the role of the chemical symbol deeply imprinted on public Indian Government and the local state govern- international consciousness."Speth, then Presidentof the ment of Madhya Pradesh. "iust World ResourcesInstitute, addedthat as Three-Mile Island spurreda thorough assessment of nuclear power, Bhopal will bring EDITOR'S CHOICE of the safety j ustif iable demands that hazar dous f acilities in force behind the Times' detailed The driving ihe chemical industry be designed,sited and events was then Executive coverageof the operatedso that nothing even close to Bhopal Rosenthal,who worked Editor;A.M. Rosenthal' can ever happen again." as aTimes correspondent in India in the 1950s Speth'sremarks were backedby others ex- leadership,had retained an and knew its political pt"ttittg public concern.News accounts of these in and affection for the counffy' abiding interest lri"*, heiped establishthat concern in the public that he personally decidedto Rosenthal says domain. The environmentalists were trying to attention on Bhopal' focus the newspaper's frame the agenda: thathazatdous facilities "The question wasr was there a double stan- neededto bi sited, operated,monitored and says."Thatwas what horrified me'"2 dardz."he designedin such a way that Bhopal was not broadenedthe Times' coverageby Rosenthal also repe"ated.Paletz and Entman have referred to this to study whether the Bhopal asking his reporters foim of news coveragewhen they say that personneland the olant was manned by trained journalists perceiveone of their roles as report- technologYused. ielevance of the lrrg ot "developments that may adverselyaffect personsI remember interviewing One of the ,rr"di"rr""t or people audiences identify wlth'"4 a local journalist who had at the time was GeorgeRobinion, Director of Health and at the plant and warned of the reoortedaccidents Safetyin the International Association of Ma- disaster.His reports and warnings polential for chinists and AerospaceWorkers, told the House by state officials and the company' were ignored Subcommittee on Health and Safetythat disaster,the Times In an editorial after the "Chemical companieshave for too long endeav- "sharedvulnerability" as a reasonwhy spoke of ored through the media to persuadecommuni- "Lmericans {eel compassionand concern for the ties of the absenceof any real danger they might in India that could have victims of a disaster pose;that myth no longer exists' What happened Safetyrecords are built on struck anywhere. in India must be a warning that we cannot much as on foresight' The tragedyat accidentsas ignore." understood,should help make all Bhopal,when Robinson was emphasizing that the media plants safet."3 chemical was not fluent with issuesof chemical safety and States,reports focussedon In the United that industry infiuenced what it reported' My Carbide'sembattled chair- Warren Anderson, own feeling was that he was referring to local fight with the Indian Covern- man, on its legal newspapers in maior industry towns where seleition of whiz-kid lawyers by India ment, the .o-pltti". control the lives and jobs of thou- stories on the unravelling cases' and occasional sands. looked at Union Carbide'sl'rattle to The reports Tod I. Kaufman, a state senatorfrom West fight oif a takeover bid by a rival but smaller

4 From Bhopal to Superfund: The News Media and the Envitonment Virginia, reflected this view when he said that bers who represented nearly 90 percent of the beforeBhopal, "Most of our citizens remained industrial chemical manufacturing capacity of resignedto the tradeoffs... We lived with it the United States.Responding to the crisis and becauseour peopleneed jobs. But what we the continuing flow of adversenews - Bhopal thought was a potential long-term health risk prompted a flood of news reports on spills, now seemsa elearand present danger,a matter chemical accidents,leaks, hazardsand public of life and death." fears acrossthe United States - the CMA Kaufman askedthe questions on everyone's developedthree programs. minds: The most important of these was CAER "Are the evacuationplans adequate?Do (pronouncedcare), an abbreviation for Commu- peoplein the surrounding communities know nity Awarenessand EmergencyResponse. CAER what to do when the whistle sounds?Do they askedcompanies to list toxic chemicals on their even know what the whistle means?Are there sites, sharethe information with local officials provisions to transport people away from the and work with them to developemergency area?Should they get into their cars?If they do, evacuationplans.Virtually every maior company do they know which direction to go?Do they quietly called up consultants to conduct safety even know what not to do?" audits and risk analysis at their piants. CMA beganCAER as a voluntary program aimed at re-establishingpublic confidencein the COMMUNITY RIGHT.TO.KNOW industry. These daysit is a prerequisitefor The tension between pro-environment groups membership of the CMA. ttbadt'news reports helped get and industry crackled during the early hearings A fear about going. Another factor was a simple in Congress.Industry was defensiveand Ander- CAER public perceptionsof son, the corporation chief, weakly remarked that businessconcern: that unsafeindustries would hit markets and investor that "It never crossedmy mind that an accident confidence. such as Bhopal could happen." was similar to a program that environ- Industry had long drawn comfort from the fact CAER had pressedfor some yearstone that that the chemical industry was one of the safest mentalists had adoptedknown as the industries in the United States,in terms of man- severalstates already By the time the lethal gases hours lost by on-site incidents. Many chemical right-to-know. Bhopal,as many as 14 statesof the incidents were associatedwith accidentsduring struck at has passedCommunity Right-to-Know transportation rather than with technological Union local communities to de- problems inside plants. But after Bhopal, even acts which enabled mand and secureinformation about hazardous industry askedthe unthinkable question of processesbeing used in neighbor- itself. chemicals and plants. They could also seek information "We wondered,can it happenhete," said Tom ing the health hazardsposed by these facilities Gilroy, a spokesmanfor the Chemical Manufac- about turers Association, the main chemical lobbying and the chemicals. hearing, Robert E. Wise (R-W. group. The CMA is basedin Washington and During an early who was strongly supportive after Bhopal, severalcommittees held meetings Va), a Congressman askedCarbide's chairman, to look at defensivemeasures to take in the light of Union Carbide, Anderson about his views on a federal of the tragedy and the flaws shown up in safety. Warren right-to-know. "Our responsewas that that kind of thing law on Anderson'sreply was significant: happening [in the United States]was highly unlikely," said Gilroy. But the CMA committees I haveno objectionto right-to-know.I'm talking looked at ways to ward off expensiveclass action law. Now what I am concernedabout is state "We lawsthat confusethe issueand suits and attacks by environmental groups. right-to-know complicatethe wholearena. And I think a looked at different issuesto seeif we should do Federalright-to-know actthat canbe actively things differently." administeredand everybodyunderstands could The chemical industry, stung by accusations work makessense. of bad management/poor information and safety I was unable to find news referencesto these recordsthat flowed from articles and analysisin remarks which dealt with the empowerment of newspapersas wellas public debatesand Con- citizens to monitor, if not control, hazardous gressionalhearings, moved to secureits flanks. processesand chemical plants. Perhapsthis was The CMA, founded in lB72 as the Manufactur- so becausea strong/poignant statement or ing Chemists Association, had about 200 mem-

Sanioy Hazarika 5 as right-to- developmentis perhapsseen as more significant wise fought longer and harder,such of the legisla- and eaiier to get into a newspaperthan legisla- know, and blocked at every stage processwas quick by tive sleight-of-hand.Yet the political skills used tive process.Not that the far longer to move and block bills are more significant but any means but it could have taken may not get much notice in the press' than two years. focussedon For example,few newspapersrecorded the fact Newspapersand legislatorsalso enforce- that 14 stateshad passedCommunity Right-to- the record and failures of federalsafety - Protection Know acts before the Bhopal disaster,largely ment agencies the Environmental Safetyand becauseof grass-rootswork by the Working Agency and OSHA, the Occupational for workers' Group on Community Right-to-Know. These Hizards Agency that is responsible - that Union laws gave local communities living around safety at plant sites to insure industry chemical plants the right to seek information Carbide, especially, and the chemical about toxic chemicals and processesin those obeyedexisting rules. subcom- industrial units, the health effectsof exposure In March 1985,the Congressional that 57 and how much was being vented into the air. mittee headedby Waxman reported American companies had listed Z}4hazatdaus chemicals which they were using. TheNewYork Waxman point- LAWSUITS Times published the findings and ed out ihat no U.S. Government agencyhad ever Another factor that kept Bhopal in public attempted to compile a national inventory of view was a raft of lawsuits againstUnion Car- toxic chemical emissions.The study found that that ran into billions of dollars. Newspa- bide many chemical plants routinely emitted tons of pers,news agencies,radio and television net- untreated hazardoussubstances into the air. reported extensively on the compensation works Two prominent pro-environmentalist law- casesfiled in the United States,including one by makers from New |ersey,Rep. fim Florio and the Indian Government. Eighteen of them were SenatorFrank R. Lautenberg,also supported in a FederaiDistrict Court in New consolidated Waxman's efforts. Waxman sent out a letter to York. severalhundred major chemical manufacturers Many more were filed in India by lawyers for demanding information on chemicals they were the victims. The American attorneys who flew storing on plant sites, the toxicity of the materi- Bhopal soon after the disasterto sell dreams into als and in what concentration there were being of billions of dollars of compensationto victims releasedinto the air. becamefigures of criticism and derision in news The industry mistrusted Waxman: in one reports out of India. They were chastisedby the "First case/an earlier internal safety audit of the Union Washington Post: the air was filled with Carbide plant at Institute, West Virginia, where poison. Then with lawYers." the chemical that leaked in Bhopal is also The size of the lawsuits was daunting enough manufactured,had reachedthe California force Union Carbide into negotiations for an to lawmaker soon after the disaster.The report out-of-court settlement with the Indian Govern- spoke of the dangersof a runaway reaction at the ment and a group of attorneys which had ioint American plant and had been basedon a survey {iled private claims on behalf of gasvictims in conducted earlier in the Year. the United States.In May 1986,the casewas Copies of the report found their way to the returned to India by the New York court/ saying New York Times and the Wall Street loutnal. India was the proper forum for such a ttial. that The results were articles by Philip Shabecoff, The negotiations were reportedby the Naw then the Times'environment reporter/ and by York Times, tlneWaLI Street lournal, to a lesser Ron Winslow in the lownal that had Union degreetheWashington Post,and a new and low- Carbide scurrying for cover. key player from the news field that sustained interest in the issue and had the ear of the chemical industry. This was Chemical and PROCESSSLOWS Engineering News, a ftade and scientific journal given about the chemical industry that, under the But by the middle of 1985,the impetus in leadershipof its editors, felt compelled to follow by the Bhopal disasterhad slowed, especiaily presshad Bhopal closely. the legislative process.Interest in the The other impact of the lawsuits as well as waned and the story moved into the business perceivedones was to force industry to accept pagesas other issueswere found more note- Lhrnges in legislation that it would have other- worthy.'

6 From Bhopal to Superfund: The News Media and the Envitonment The delayswere also causedby overlaps:as would run into trouble in the full committee many as nine committees claimed jurisdiction which Dingel controlled: "He controlled access, over the reauthorrzation of the Comprehensive the clock, the votes," saysBud Ward, a former Environmental Response,Compensation, and environmental journalist and currently Execu- Liability Act of l9B0 (CERCLA),better known as tive Director of the Environmental Health Superfund. Later it was called the Superfund Center in Washington. The Center is part of the Amendments Reauthorization Act or simply National SafetyCouncil. SARA. During markup, the SenateEnvironmen- As the feuding continued, Congressional tal and Public Works Committee adopteda staffers met with environmentalists and a small suggestionof SenatorFrank Lautenberg(D-NI) group of lobbyists who supported a {ederal that provisions of his Bhopal-inspiredbill be community right-to-know law. They saw an incorporatedinto SARA. Thus, hazardouswaste advantagein slipping the clause in, not as a disposaland emergencyresponse to chemicals, separatebill on its own, but in Lautenberg's becameclosely related.5 style, as an addition to the multi-billion dollar The authorization of Superfund was a debate SARA. They thought that the clause had a better that had continued in the United Statesfor years chanceof successbecause Congressmen were without resolution. Industry fought fiercely interested in the bigger questionsand would not against Federal campaigns to force specific pay as much attention to smaller details. companies to contribute funds to clean up toxic They also decidedto incorporate another waste sites.These sites were placeswhere the regulation, later called the Toxic ReleaseInven- firms had dumped toxins over many yearsl tory | that proposed to list emissions of hazardous without concern for long-term impacts on the chemicals from plants. Individuals would be able soil or the health effectson neighboring commu- to get lists of chemicals producedor emitted by nities. The Love Canal casehad brought the calling telephonenumbers or accessinginforma- issue to the fore and Bhopal occurredright in the tion electronically. middle of a fierce debateon Superfundauthoriza- The Community Right-to-Know provisions tion and severalagendas associated with it. required states to form emergency planning These included regulation of the chemical districts centeredon facilities that handled more industry. And the scaleof the tragedyat Bhopal than a threshold amount of any of.366chemi- increasedthe pressureon industry to reform. cals. Facilities handling more than that quantity In the months after Bhopal, more than ten neededto fiie reports for use by emergency bills were introuduced in Congressthat included responsepersonnel, environmental agency various provisions concerning either emergency officials and the public. responseto chemical accidentsor giving the Industry disputed this as unfair, especially as public accessto information about chemicals in it was aheady burdened with paying for the their communities. cleanup of toxic dumps. But becauseof the In 1985,the subcommittees led by Waxman financial implications - and Right-to-Know and Gaydos on Health and Environment and was a non-tax measure - it stayedlargely Health and Safetyrespectively also struggled focussedon Superfund. with opposition from the overall committee There was little news coverageof the in- chair, |ohn Dingel. Dingel voiced industry's fighting in Congressin the main newspapers worries about being forced to pay a heavy price although the specialistpress and especially and the potential loss of jobs in his constituency Chemical and Engineering News, the trade- of Detroit. He pressedfor weaker laws. The scientific journal, documented the tangled battle over the changeswas stymied by drafts process.Chemical Week, andEnvfu onmental and counterdrafts as lawmakers shot down each Law Repofter aLsofollowed it. other's proposals. Paul Shrivastava, author of Bhopal: Anatomy of a Crisis,6sees this as a reflection of a flaw in general news coverage:"the media usually does CENTRAL FIGURES its front end stuff and then moves orJt."7He says In the United States, the main figures around that the mainstream news reporting of Union positive whom the legislative process revolved were Carbide was toward the corporation, Waxman, Florio, Ed Markey (D-Mass.),Gaydos, stressingits long safety record and the trauma Dingel, Lautenberg. It was a frustrating period: and dilemmas of its executives.Rarely had news amendments that men like Waxman and Florio analysisrelating to Bhop'albeen harsh on Car- would press through at the subcommittee level bide althor;gh it was critical of Indian workers

Sanioy Hazarika 7 -

and government officials, he says. Democrat from West Virginia, flew to Institute Chemical and Engineering News (CEN) was . with a group of specialists from EPA and the led in its coverageby Senior Editor Wil Department of Health on the following day. Lepkowski and his editor, Michael Hayden. In the flurry of activity, EPA Adminstrator Lepkowski's visits to Bhopal had sensitizedhim Lee A. Thomas spoke of a "heightened senseof to issuesof safety and development on a per- urgency" in tightening regulations. sonal and professionalbasis. On August 15, the chemical industry prepared "I think one cannot approachthis issue for strong controls as the Times reported that without taking a spiritual approach,strange executives were "bracing for greater government though it may sound," he remarked in a conver- regulation and more intense public scrutiny.,, "I sation. used to speakto Union Carbide about Another Times report out of Washington the need for repentanceon their part for what spoke of how Congressand EPA were working "programs had happened."8 on to identify hazards." The article said that the prospectsfor quick action were "complicated, both by Congressdisputes and by ANOTHER TRIGGER a fundamental disagreement between lawmakers As the legal, news and political pace slack- and regulatorsover the extent to which chemical plant ened,an event in August 1985brought what I owners should be required to provide call the Bhopal Syndromeback to the top of the information about their operationsand over the environmental agenda.It forced industry and role the FederalGovernment should play in government to changetheir views. planning and enforcing emergency procedures at That month, a leak of aldicarb oxime gas state and local levels." swept out of a Union Carbide plant and into the neighborhoodin Institute/ West Virginia, forcing the evacuationof hundredsand the hospitaliza- POWER EQUATION tion of 135 with breathing problems and other These reports,allied to industry fearsover ailments. There were no deaths. regulation, graphically defined power equations: ' Yet, it had occurred less than ayear after the Bhopal had been viewed as an important but disasterin India and despitea $5 million safety distant tragedyin a foreign country involving an upgradationof the Institute plant. Union Car- American plant. bide was providing evidenceof the limits of Institute was in the American backyard.It had technology and reinforcing fears about commu- neededa local incident to drive home the lessons nity safety.It tried to hide behind the excus.e of an international incident. that the computer had not been programmed to CaseyBurko, the Environment Editor of the track a leak of this nature. Chicago Tribune, wrote in his newspaperon The development also mocked a statement by Augrrst18, 1985: the corporation'sdirector for health, |ackson 'The Browning, who had proclaimed earlier that year big question'after the disa'sterat Bhopal that "It can't happenhere." wascan it happenhere? in the chemicalvalley The outcry in the media was tremendous. of Charleston,West Virginia. The New York Times made the leak its lead Despitea subsequentcrackdown on the chemicalmanufacturing industry in the U.S., story on August 12 and was ioined in its focus the answerhas become alarmingly clear last on the chemical industry, and especiallyUnion weekwith leaksfrom two Union Carbide Carbide'ssafety record, olants by the Washington Post two daysapart. and the Wall Streetlournal. Chemical and EngineeringNews also reported the develop- Burko emphasizedthat local incidents were ments in low-key fashion. more significant to public perceptionsand policy There was more bad news for Union Carbide than foreign disasters: and the chemical industry the day "My of the Insti- own senseis that the concern of people tute leak: a train carrying toxic chemicals in this country seemsto be greaterwith what derailedin Arizona and another spill was re- happenedin Institute, comparedwith Bhopal,,, ported from New |ersey. he quoted an aide to Waxman as saying. Lawmakers sought explanations from the SenatorLautenberg expressed a prevailing company, from EPA and OSHA officials " and view to the Times: AIter Bhopal, there was still hastenedwith their views to the press. some complacencyin Congress... Institute is SenateMajority Leader,Robert C. Byrd, going to changethings ... the chemical industry,s

8 From Bhopal to Superfund: The News Media and the Envfuonment Inventory were slipped into the back is against the wall and there is going to be Toxic Release the "bigger" issues of funding sreaterregulation." proposed SARA, " Title III moved quietly by' Ou", tlie next days,a spurt of smail spills and iook ou"t and continued between House- fires made news in the Times in addition to a |oint meetings confereeson amendments to the right-to- detailed piece about how about 50,000processing Senate "were provisions and on SARA. The omnibus law units at ihemical plants not designedto know took two conferencecommit- prevent leaking hazardous substances'" The *"s ro oast that it the usual one to reconcile the ,"oort"r, Stuart Diamond, was among a handful tees rather than the two houses. SARA finally *iro .r* the core of the problem in technology differences between 17, 1986after the inner battles and the need to change industrial designs to passedOctober and was signedinto law by Presi- incorporate safetY. were resolved {ollowing month. Diamond quoted a senior chemical engineeras dent Reaganthe //frr remarkable is that virtually all news- saying that such basic.changeswere. ghtfully What is CEN, ignored Title III altogether "*p"*in" ... On the other, they are frightfully papers,except passed.The focus stayed instead on chiap when you considerthe cost of an acci- when the biil which appearedto be a bigger dent." And OSHA fined Carbide for the leak at the omnibus SARA, The few who picked up on Institute the followingyeal- with a $1.38 million and meatier story. had been following it penalty f.or 22I safety and health violations and a Title III were those who "specialist" presssuch as ;wilful disregardfor health and safety'" It was over months: the Engineefing News and the environ- the biggestsuch fine on an industry that the Chemical and agencyhad levied. mental media. " believesthat the main- Meanwhile, EPA published the first toxic list Lepkowski of CEN did not associatethe incidents at of hazardouschemicals in November 1985' The stream media Institute closely to the pass-ageof the following month, both Housesof Congressvoted Bhopal and slauses'Philip narrowlyito incorporate the TRI into the proposal community right-to-know former Times environmental corre- for the federal right-to-know. The TRI enjoined Shabecoff,a agrees. chemical manufacturers to annually and publicly spondent, "At time, a lot of us did not realize the report emissionsof more than ten pounds of any . the of Title III, we missed it and played of 350 toxic substancesto the EPA, extending importance heard accountsof how much it government control over industry. "rrch.tp when we people," ShabecoffsaYs. One of the factors that helped nudge SARA empowered along was a grass-rootscampaign, conducted with 'RAINBOW" COALITION sophistry by the Toxic Waste Campaign, that r"iri-"i""a fa[. Four trucks s.t o,,t from'differ- It appearsthat the U.S. presscoverage of the ent parts of the United Statesseeking signatures tragedyat Bhopal and the near-missat Institute of local people to the passageof SARA and Title createda platform from which different voices III. Title III was the part of the Superfundbill could speak. dealing with TRI and the Community Right-to- Chemical safety becamethe focus of a strange "rainbow" Know. political coalition in the United Two million signatureswere collected and States.These elements differed sharply in their presented to Congress after organiztng a public ideological views but shareda common interest: ielations campaign that touched local, state-wide, ensuring that such incidents were not repeated, regional and national newspapersas well as radio particularly in this country. For different reasons/ stations and television networks acrossthe they wanted the same thing. country. The organizers gave the campaign a Environment groups, including Friends of the "Super catchy title: Drive for SuperFund" that Earth, in Washington viewed it as an opportunity ensured good coveragewherever they went' to tame what they regardedas an unregulated Bhopal and Institute provided the triggers that industry. The Chemical Manufactulers Associa- enablei legisiation aimed at curbing the chemical tion, the main representativebody of the indus- industry. Public interest groups worked with try, and especiallyUnion Carbide,thought of it as sympathetic lawmakers - especially those an unwelcome step but one they could not ""g"i to be in the public eye and seize the issues oppose.Instead, they respondedby seekingto be of-the day - and their aides,as well as unde- more open and win pubiic confidence. cided legislators,to support the inclusion of Lawmakers such as Waxman, Florio and trade broad industry regulation in SARA. union leadersand government of{iciais, including Once the Community Right-to-Know and

Sanioy Hazafika 9 "BAD individuals in the Environmental Protection NEWS" was a Agency - saw the oPPortunities., - It is important to note here that Bhopal "I think three factors came together that "bad news" story which led to significant policy enabledthe passageof the {ederalright-to-know changes. laws: grass-rootswork that had seenthe passage And what Paletz and Entman have to say of state laws in severalstates, a think-tank about threats and reassurancesas important organrzationthat looked at companies producing characteristicsof news is relevant here: *"rt" and the Bhopal disaster," said Paui Orum, "fournalists ... also searchfor aspectsof the the Coordinator of the Working Group on story that calm, assuage,uplift."t3 Such elements Community Right-to-Know. are to be seenin Bhopal and Institute' Fred Millar of Friends of the Eafth, who had Yet, for the U.S. media, the core issue lay in followed generalpollution issues,began working the involvement of an American chemical full time on chemical emissionsand accidents, company. becoming an invaiuable sourcefor reportersin "ihe significancewas that there was a rel- Washington and outside on the issue. evant message,it had this profound impact "Bhopal offeredan extraordinary opportunity becauseit was Union Carbide,it came all the groups to change an industry here," saysRichard Zeckhauser, to enviionmental "It way back was virtually unregulated," saysMillar'8 Professorof Political Economy at the |ohn F' that "Congress- was clear that atrain would be leaving the Kennedy School of Government.13 station soon, in terms of federal regulations for men worried about it (becauseof the possibiiity the chemical industry, and it was up to us to get that it could happenhere) and this was signifi- some of the issuesthat the disasterraised cant becauseit got so much attention in the hitched to the trair:'" media. If you had stoppedthe New Yotk Times, IndustrY too knew it was on trial' the los Angeles Times and maybe, theWashing- "The media determineswhat is on our minds ton Post,the impact would have been l0o/oof at any time," said Gilroy, a spokesman for what it was."14 CMA.e "When they report on an emergencyor Badnews in the elite media has more of an an incident, the industry comes under strict impact than reports in other pressforums scrutiny of the iocal legislatures,lawmakers as altiough CEN's sustainedcoverage had, it can be well as Congress."ro argued,as much of an impact on business' Louis Fernandez,then chairman of Monsanto, A two-month-long study of the presscoverage spoke after the Bhopal disasterof the need for of the disasterpointed out that 54 percent of the tire industry to do a better job of interacting with coveragerelate-d to Bhopal,while technological the press.After attacking unnamed members of hazardsreceived little sPace.t5 "free "knee- Congressfor seeking publicity" and The study also said that most of the articles jerkieactions," Fernandeztold CEN that the about Bhopal and the concernsit raisedwere ;'big irro"... is to gain public confidence - that publishedln Decembet 1984.It noted too that it is acting responsiblyand that it isn't putting news interest in the issue beganto flag a few - dollars and profit aheadof everything else weeks after the incident. which is a common PercePtion."rr Yet, the wide readership of the New York Fernandezelaborated on this point, connect- Times in the constituenciesof severalprominent ing the need to developpublic confidencewith Congressmen,including Florio, Markey and beiter communication skills and a better rela- Lautenberg,influenced their sensitivity to tionship with the Press. concernsvoiced by constituents. They were "We have to spendmore time communicating associatedwith the campaignfor a chemical with people in the media, helping them-to cleanup.This was significant in itself: they undeistand what the industry is doing, helping formed'part of a drive that enabledthe passageof them to understandhow to interpret things that the relevant law. are happening, making them comfortable with But had there been no significant media *h"t *-e't" doing, being honest with them when coverage/had an American company not been we're doing something wrong and when we involved, the results of environmental con- make mistakes."r2 sciousnesswould have been limited' There Significantiy, his remarks were to CEN, the would, at the most, have been editorials about keeperof industrY'sconscience. the price of progressin developingnations, a batch of sympathetic news reports about tne - tragedy and a passingreference in Congress

10 From Bhopal to SuPe{und The News Media and the Envfuonment for the record - to the magnitude of the CONCLUSIONS disaster. Through their coverageof the Bhopal disaster Thus, lawmakers invoked laws after the issue and issues,two influential but totally different came to the public mind. The tragedyregistered newspapergroups played crucial roles in the on public consciousnessbecause of media development of the common platform referredto coverage. earlier. One was the New York Times with its Yet, the larger issuesthat Bhopal raised:of national outreach.The other was CEN with its development and technology were seen as of accessto and influence in industry. limited public interest, especiallyamong the It is difficult, under most circumstances,to popular press. establisha causallink between news coverageof Other issuesthat were raisedbut not followed events and development of public policy. Yet, included whether the United Statesand other few I have spokenwith dispute that the Bhopal Western nations should export low-quality and disaster played a greaterrole than any other high-risk technology to underdevelopednations technology-relatedinternational mass disasterin seeking to industrialize rapidly, disregarding the heightening public interest in the United States social and environmental consequencesof such on the cluestionof safety in and around chemical changes.The news media questionedthe rel- industries. But on its own, Bhopal could not have evanceof high technology for developingcoun- producedthe changesnecessary. Institute was tries as a matter of course. in the processof enabling legisla- "development" another factor The paradigm was not fol- tion to pass. lowed up adequately.The system was essentially CEN found businessa better listener than did taken for granted and the heart of it, the technol- the mainstream newspapers/which were largely bgy of the control room, was unchallenged.What viewed as critical if not hostile. CEN was re- was challengedwas that technology's ability to spectedfor its solid baseof scientific and busi- copewith a crisis: the post-control room syn- nessreporting. That basegave it a credibility in drome. that other, larger newspapersand "The the industry media coverageof the Bhopal incident magazineslacked. But without Lepkowski and and a substantial number of chemical accidents Hayden guiding its turn to environmental afterward have ensuredthat industrial and journalism, it would not have been that effec- chemical plant safety gets on more front pages tive. than comparedto what would have appeared SARA Title III empoweredordinary people earlier," saysNicholas Ashford, Professorof with accessto information that could savetheir Chemical Engineeringand Policy Researchat the lives and the Toxic ReleaseInventory got indus- MassachusettsInstitute of Technology. try to improve its emissionsrecord by insisting (Till this day, Union Carbide insists, as does on transparency.Major changestoo came in the Arthur D. Little, the consulting firm which it attitudes of administrations, local authorities, hired to investigate the leak, that the disaster community leadersand reporters.Industry's was the result of an act of deliberatesabotage by defensiverole was shapedby the media's reflec- a worker. That is a different story and not tion of a public outcry over chemicalhazards. germaneto this diseussion.) The pressappears to have been predominantly Later articles in the Times and other news a reactive agent to developments.It would react media on issuesrelating to chemical safety in to an incident, a spill, a disasterand determine the United Statesrarely referredto the bench- its importance in terms of safety and the need to mark of Bhopal.The resonancefaded although reacha wider audiencewith news of the event. reliance on the use of environmental activists as The overall political and pressreaction devel- sourcesfor news and analysisgrew. around the following themes which, even "In oped areasof extreme public interest, such as today, influence American news reporting of chemical safety,we dependa lot on environmen- international events: One, the scaleof the event tal groups;often, the corporation suppresses and human interest. Two, American interests: in information and they [environmental groups] this case,the involvement o{ a major American supplement what we do," saysLepkowski of and American nationals. Despite the "We corporation CEN. cooperateand that is a role that has to high loss of lives, Americans were also seenas be handled very carefilly." victims - such as in the arrest of Union Carbide Chairman Warren Anderson when he landed in Bhopal - of an inadequatepolitical system.Three,questions about the limits of

Sanioy Hazarika 11. people living near environmentally hazatd- technology, of human controls and whether such ity of incidents could happen elsewhere,especially the ous industries. is divided on the media's role' U.S. Four, the location of the event is also Industry a Vice-President of Arthur D' important with regard to the question of Ameri- Ashok Kalelkar, one viewpoint. Kalelkar says that can interests.Take, for example,the massive Little, takes bodies,such as CMA, CAER and a earthquakethat killed about 25,000Indians in professional group of chemical scientists moni- October 1993.The story stayedon the front professional "have had more of an irnpact pagesand among televison's top stories for four toring plant safety ^days news reports'"r7 beforebeing banishedto the inside pages'It on chimical safety than for Public Opinion Re- was seen as a horrible caiamity but one that no The Roper Center University of Connecticut in Storrs one could do anything about. Not so for Bhopal' searchat the in 1985 on public attitudes on Lepkowski says that groups other than the conducted surveys reflected the impact of presswere better organized - such as industry, chemical safetywhich - public opinion and consequentlyon iobbyists, environmentalists and lawmakers bad news on policy.tsIn contrast to Kalelkar's asser- and saw issuesthrough a policy-shapingprocess' public showed that those inter- In the detailed battie to push SARA and Title liott, s"neral surveys viewed had little faith in industry's ability to III along its iourney, I think that trade unions from toxic spilJs' and lobbyists who representedconcerns voiced protect the community recently as 199I, a Tufts University by groups such as Friends of the Earth, Toxic Yet, as that hardly any of the members of Campaign Fund, Natural ResourcesDetense studytb found planning committees regarded Council, the World ResourcesInstitute and locaf emergency or the print media as a SierraCiub played a strongerrole than the media either the television of information on chemical risk' in influencing public policy. They articulated reliable source not a mantra that can end these concernsto lawmakers, federaland state Title III is cleariy incidents. These will continue regulators and to reporters which, when pub- soills or chemical The existenceof laws has never ended lished, would act as a further goadto the first tb happen. provided a means to tackle it' three groups.For lawmakers, especially,the crime tut only implementation. possibility of pressurefrom constituents after There are flaws in 1987and 1991,at least 14 major ieading news reports and watching television Between took place at refineries and chemical ,""o,rtttt about risk has often been enough to explosions the United States,killing-79 make them pro-change. plants across 933 and causing $2 billion in BeforeBhopal, environmentalists and risk i.rron., iniuring of these incidents took place in analystsfound it difficult to get an audienceor d"-"g". Ten Louisiana, in maior industrial areas' mobilize public interest in toxic materials and Texas and III is an enabling clause that can prevent their potential for disaster'But the size of the Title from having wider footprints' The nhopal tragedy ensuredthat these issuesbecame such incidents level, needsto use the tools part of the national agenda' news mediaI at every to focus on immediate and The attitude of the chemical industry toward of right-to-know risks, investigate these risks and EPA officials in the pre-Bhopaldays was dismiss- long-1"t- public. ive. It changed dramatically, says Rick Horner, a inform the raisesanother question, which is specialistai the EPA on emergencyresponse and Title III this paper:of the actual preparedness,after BhoPal. beyond the scopeof impact of both clauses - Community Right-to- - on curbing, controlling and If you wantedto inspecta chemicalplant before Knbw and TRI potential and near-disastersor maior the Bhopalincident, they'd laugh you out: they defusing incidents. My understandingis werenot obligedunder law to permit inspections chemicafspilis or CRTW, has played a part in or evenreport chemicalspills. Bhopaland the that TRI, more than to clean up its act becauseit reportingoi it changedthat: they droppedtheir getting industry units to publish annual reports aggressiveness,they actuallybegan to cooperate/ -ofpt"tt"i chemical chemicals into the air' sharedinformation and looked for hazards'16 releasesof specific The fact that this is mandatedby law is one the process.But what is The media is viewed by industry and environ- Iactor in influencing is that the emissionshave to be mentalists as an important medium to affect more important quietly to a federal agency but public policy, to assureor raise concernsin reported not print, to the public and regularly, with communities with regardto perceivedrisks' loudly, in watchdogs ready to pounce on Both groups, and lawmakers, know the sensitiv- environmental

72 From Bhopal to Superfund: The News Media and the Envfuonment every flaw and noisiiy demand explanations, (SERC)that is supposedto overseethe overall especiallythrough the press. planning activity in the region. Even lobbying groups and environmentalists Until last year, SARA Title III did not "explic- acknowledgethat the Community Right-to- itly advocatechemical accident prevention. Know and Local EmergencyPlanning Commit- Corporateexecutives can keep their worst-case tees/set up for evacuatingcommunities during scenariossecret ... Peopletherefore wely obtain toxic leaks, have not been as effective as earlier a graphic picture of potential chemical hazards hoped. One of the reasonsfor this, say environ- in the community. Thus uninformed, citizens do mentalists such as Millar of Friends of the Earth, not appreciatethe need for emergencyplanning is becauseindustry and pro-industry groupsin and prevention ... While LEPCsare empowered small and medium-sized towns, such as local to request the information they need from a politicians and officials - fire chiefs or police facility for emergencyplanning, few have made - are strongly represented.Title III, according suchrequests."22 to the Working Group on Community Right-to- Know, has not been able to activate the 4,000 Local EmergencyPlanning Committees that POWER,AGENDAS, EXTERNAT FORCES " exist nationwide in active risk communication This study perhapsillustrates the following to inform the public about potential chemical remarks by a writer in the Washington Post: accidents."20 "Activists find LEPCsunresponsive/ or may The "powerof the press,"it is oftensaid, is the be deliberately excluded," saysthe Working powerto 'setthe agenda'in the arenaof public Group on CRTW.2IThe group finds fault with a{fairs.But the morewe look into the agendasof data integration and lack of funding. There is no the mediaand their newsselection processes, the generalfederal support and as many as 32 states more we recognizethe largeroles played by lack even local funding although each state has a external forces.23 separateState EmergencyResponse Commission

Endnotes

1. Sheila|asanoff, ed. Learning from Disaster: Risk I l. Interview with Chemical and Engineering News, Management after Bhopal, Philadelphia: University of October 7, 1985. PennsylvaniaPress, 1994. 12.rbid. 2. Interview,October 29,1993. 13. Interview, October 6, 1993. 3. NewYorkTimes, December5,1984. r4.rbid. 4. David L.Paletz and Robert M. Entman, Media Power Politics, New York: The FreePress, 1981. 15. Lee Wilkins, SharedVulnerability: The Media and Amefican Perceptionsof the Bhopal Drsaster,New 5. Susan G. Hadden, Citizen Participation in Environ- York: GreenwoodPress, 1987. mental Policymaking, Learning from Disaster, University of PennsylvaniaPress, in press. 16.Interview, October 13,1993.

6. Paul Shrivastava,Bhopal: Anatomy of a Crisis, 17. Interview, October 6, 1993. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987. 18.Various surveysconducted by Opinion Research Corporation, Roper Organization, Louis Harris and 7. Interview,October 4,1993. Associates,Gordon S. Black Corporation;research sponsorsincluded U.S.A. Today andTime. The data 8. Interview, October 20, 1993. was provided by the RoperCenter at the University of Connecticut. 9. Interview, September20, 1993. In February1985, Gordon S. Black Corporation 10.rbid. conducteda poll on behalf of U.S.A. Today on the chemical leak at Bhopal and whether "the event had

Sanioy Hazarika 13 -

job" protecting the community during any impact on you at all, either directly or on your what bad of processes.Thirty-three mood or how you feel." Of the 1,504persons inter- manufacturing and storage good marks. viewed, 78 percent said yes; 2l percent said no and percent gave them only 1 percent respondedby saying they did not know' Given these pressuresand perceptions, it was clearly the chemical industry Asked further if the impact of the Bhopal disaster was only a matter of time before interests. Those interests negative or positive, 80 percent of all respondents said acted to protect its own any other time earlier, not in it had been negative.And on ^ zero to 10 scaleof were seen/ more than at sharing in{ormation with importance of news storiesthat impacted people, covering up but in actually agenciesas well as Bhopal was listed by 2l percent as critically important the press,government regulatory to the way they thought and 33 percent said that it local community leaders. was "somewhat important'" Another 46 percent //not "Risk Right-to- describedit as very important." 19. Communication and Community Know: A four community study of SARA Title III," In a separatereview, the Roper Organization said that March 1991,Tufts UniversitY. 53 percent of respondentshad doubts about companies assuring the public of the safety of their systems' 20. Working Notes on Community Right-to-Know, Twenty-thre" p"t"ettt said they did not believe such lunelluly 1992. statementswere reliable. Seventeenpercent said they felt the remarks were to be counted upon. 21. rbid.

Four months after Bhopal, the Opinion Research 22.rbid. Corporation turned out a survey that said that 59 "Who oercent of those interviewed felt that the chemical 23. Richard Harwood, Really DecidesWhat's "very "some- industrv had done either a bad iob" or a News?", Washington Post, September25, 1993'

L4 From Bhopal to super-t'und:The News Media and the Envfuonment