Two Floods, a Wildfire, and a Hurricane: the Role of the Canadian Armed Forces in Emergency Management
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Two Floods, a Wildfire, and a Hurricane: The Role of the Canadian Armed Forces in Emergency Management by Johanu Botha A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario © 2018 Johanu Botha THE ROLE OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ABSTRACT The role of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) during domestic disaster response has increased significantly over the last century due to the military’s response capacity and the increased frequency and impact of natural hazards. However, there has been no systematic academic assessment of how effectively CAF is integrated into the civilian emergency management system, particularly during the response phase. Using archival analysis and interviews with senior CAF officers and civilian officials, this study fills that gap with an examination of four of Canada’s worst and most recent natural disasters: Hurricane Igor (2010), the Assiniboine River flood (2011), the Alberta multi-river floods (2013), and the Saskatchewan wildfires (2015). Each event was analyzed to assess the effectiveness of CAF-civilian response across different hazards, provincial jurisdictions, and CAF Joint Task Forces. The analysis is broken down into descriptive, evaluative, and normative concepts to assess the presence and quality of, and barriers to, interorganizational collaboration throughout each response. The presence of interorganizational collaboration was high across all events while the quality of such collaboration was moderately high with room for improvement. Barriers to interorganizational collaboration were low, although conceptual differences on the scope of the formal Request for Assistance and the value of defining ‘disaster end states’ did adversely affect collaboration between military and civilian organizations. Lack of resources generally did not adversely affect levels of interorganizational collaboration, except through the limited availability of Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) aircraft and the limited emergency management capacity of most municipalities. Organizational traits such as conceptions of reality unique to an organization type had more influence on the level of interorganizational collaboration compared to jurisdiction or hazard type, with only wildfires having a hazard-specific effect on such collaboration. The results of this study have implications for emergency management practitioners, as well as the academic literatures of emergency management, public administration, and civil-military relations. Three policy recommendations – the expansion of emergency management networks, the maintenance of Canada’s decentralized emergency management system, and additional disaster response resources for the RCAF and municipalities – are presented in the study’s conclusion to improve Canadian disaster response. ii THE ROLE OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A doctoral dissertation is not unlike disaster response in that both require a high level of supportive collaboration across a dynamic team. The team that took on this dissertation with me includes first and foremost my life partner, Mollie Ryan, who endured countless hours of esoteric conversations and delayed travel plans as research monopolized substantial chunks of my life; my parents, Johan Botha and Elizabeth Holland-Muter, both of whom sparked and sustained my pursuit of knowledge as a valuable ends in itself; my supervisor, Leslie A. Pal, whose experience and expertise were essential to this project’s completion; my supervising committee members, Dan Henstra and Chris Stoney, both of whom added disaster response to already busy schedules; Karine Levasseur and Andrea Rounce, both of whom provided the analytical groundwork and general encouragement so essential to a graduate researcher’s success; and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, which provided the funding support that allowed me to focus on my research full-time. The aforementioned, and all the other friends, family, and colleagues who guided and/or endured me throughout this project, formed a team that will always have my deepest appreciation and gratitude. This dissertation is dedicated to all those individuals across Canada – in and out of uniform – who make it their jobs to protect their communities and fellow citizens during times of disaster. iii THE ROLE OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Table of Contents ABSTRACT II ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS III INTRODUCTION 1 THE RESEARCH PUZZLE 1 THE RESEARCH ROAD MAP 4 CHAPTER I: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND THE MILITARY IN CANADA 12 INTRODUCTION 12 CANADIAN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 12 A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 12 CANADIAN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 17 THE DEFINITIONS OF ‘DISASTER’ AND ‘EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT’ 34 CALLING IN THE CAVALRY: 38 A PRIMER ON MILITARY RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND CAF 38 A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 38 THE MANDATE, ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES, AND BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE OF CAF 40 CONCLUSION 49 CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 50 INTRODUCTION 50 LITERATURE REVIEW 51 ACADEMIA’S BLINDSPOT: CAF AS INVISIBLE PILLAR 51 THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT LITERATURE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 54 THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT LITERATURE: INTERORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION 61 THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS LITERATURE: SHARED-RESPONSIBILITY AND CAF DOCTRINE 66 THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION LITERATURE: NEW PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 73 FUSING THE THREE APPROACHES: AN ORIGINAL COLLABORATIVE FRAMEWORK 82 THE PRESENCE OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION 86 THE QUALITY OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION 87 THE BARRIERS TO INTERORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION 88 CONCLUSION 89 CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY AND THE SELECTED CASES 90 INTRODUCTION 90 QUALITATIVE CASE STUDIES 91 THE IMPETUS FOR CASE STUDIES 91 CASE SELECTION 94 LINKING THE SELECTED CASES WITH THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 97 iv THE ROLE OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 101 THE USE OF INTERVIEWS 101 LINKING INTERVIEWS WITH THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 107 OVERVIEW OF DISASTER EVENTS 116 2010 HURRICANE IGOR | NEWFOUNDLAND & LABRADOR 117 2011 ASSINIBOINE FLOOD | MANITOBA 120 2013 MULTI-RIVER FLOODS | ALBERTA 125 2015 WILDFIRES | SASKATCHEWAN 128 CONCLUSION 131 CHAPTER IV: THE PRESENCE OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION 132 INTRODUCTION 132 INFORMATION SHARING 133 LIAISON OFFICERS AS CONDUITS 134 WILDFIRES: THE COMPLICATED HAZARD 137 ‘LOCAL’ LOS 138 RESERVISTS AND INFORMAL NETWORKS 140 NON-MANIPULATIVE INFLUENCE AND FLEXIBILITY 145 BREAKING THE STEREOTYPE: THE MILITARY DOES NOT TAKE CONTROL 146 THE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE (RFA) AS INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT 148 STRATEGY VERSUS TACTICS: THE FLEXIBILITY OF CAF 151 SUPPORT 154 BOOTS ON THE GROUND 154 THE MACHINES: CAF’S HARD ASSETS BY BRANCH 157 SOFT ASSETS: TECHNOLOGY, INTELLIGENCE, AND FUNDS 162 THE GREATEST RESOURCE: SELF-SUFFICIENCY 167 COLLECTIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 168 CONCLUSION 170 CHAPTER V: THE QUALITY OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION 173 INTRODUCTION 173 COORDINATION 174 WHOSE RECOVERY, WHICH END STATE? 174 REJECTING HIERARCHY: COLLEGIAL NETWORKS AS PREFERRED DISASTER RESPONSE MODEL 182 INTEGRATION 190 THE COMPLEX COMPONENT 190 THE CO-EXISTENCE OF SOLIDARITY AND SEPARATION 190 DIFFERENT MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 195 STRATEGY VERSUS TACTICS 2.0 200 SATISFACTION AND TRUST 204 CONCLUSION 206 CHAPTER VI: THE BARRIERS TO INTERORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION 211 INTRODUCTION 211 EMPIRE BUILDING 213 v THE ROLE OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL SELFLESSNESS: MILITARY-CIVILIAN AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL TEAMWORK 213 THE LIMITS OF DISASTER RESPONSE SOLIDARITY: COMPETITIVE INTRAGOVERNMENTAL BUREAUS 216 UNDERSTANDING LOW LEVELS OF EMPIRE BUILDING WITHIN CAF 220 MANIPULATION AND DISTRUST 223 BENIGN INCAPACITY 228 THE MILITARY AS ANTIDOTE TO BENIGN INCAPACITY 229 MUNICIPAL AND RCAF RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS 232 FEDERAL INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 236 CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCE 237 THE RFA AND END STATES 2.0 238 STRATEGY VS. TACTICS 3.0 240 CAF VS. CAF 241 WILDFIRES: THE COMPLICATED HAZARD 2.0 246 CONCLUSION 249 CHAPTER VII: RESULTS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 254 INTRODUCTION 254 A COLLABORATIVE SYSTEM 255 GENERAL THEMES 260 THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMAL NETWORKS 260 THE HAZARD-SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF WILDFIRES 264 THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS AND WEAK FEDERAL RESPONSE CAPACITY 266 THE LIMITS OF INTEGRATION: A CHINK IN THE COLLABORATIVE FRAMEWORK’S ARMOUR 271 COMPETING BUREAUS: THE DARK SIDE OF DISASTER RESPONSE 275 RFAS AND END STATES: SWAMPS OF CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCE 278 ‘SHARED RESPONSIBILITY’ AFFIRMED: JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY DECISION-MAKING 282 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 283 FOSTER AND EXPAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT NETWORKS 284 MAINTAIN DECENTRALIZED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN CANADA 287 ENHANCE RCAF, MUNICIPAL, AND ALL-HAZARDS CAPACITY 290 CONCLUSION 293 CONCLUSION 295 BIBLIOGRAPHY 327 vi THE ROLE OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT List of Tables TABLE 1: THREE RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................................................. 3 TABLE 2: THREE APPROACHES FROM THREE LITERATURES ....................................... 83 TABLE 3: THE RELEVANT ACTORS ...................................................................................... 83 TABLE 4: THE CONCEPTS AND THEIR COMPONENTS ..................................................... 84 TABLE 5: THE PRESENCE OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION............