Idea of 'One Person One Party' Makes for a Crowd in Switzerland
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Entrer En Politique Pour Adapter La Suisse À La Révolution Numérique : Analyse Des Cadres Et De L’Imaginaire Technique Du Parti Pirate Suisse De 2009 À 2013
Université de Lausanne Faculté des Sciences Sociales et Politiques Institut des Sciences Sociales Session de janvier 2014 Entrer en politique pour adapter la Suisse à la révolution numérique : Analyse des cadres et de l’imaginaire technique du Parti Pirate Suisse de 2009 à 2013 Mémoire de master en Sciences Sociales Orientation Sociologie de la Communication et de la Culture Présenté par : Sylvie Guillaume Directeur : Dr. Olivier Glassey, MER, OSPS Expert : M. Michael Perret Table des matières 1 Introduction 7 1.1 Brève présentation du Parti Pirate Suisse . .8 1.2 Revue de la littérature . 10 1.3 Problématique . 14 1.4 Cadre théorique et grille d’analyse . 16 1.4.1 La perspective des cadres . 16 1.4.2 L’imaginaire technique . 20 1.5 Méthodologie . 28 1.5.1 Les modes d’élaboration des textes sélectionnés . 29 1.5.2 Analyse et présentation des résultats . 31 2 De la fondation du parti à la première élection nationale 33 2.1 Répondre aux défis de la révolution numérique . 33 2.2 La surveillance, une menace pour les droits fondamentaux . 38 2.2.1 Diagnostic . 41 2.2.2 Pronostic . 44 2.3 Les entraves au libre accès à l’information . 46 2.3.1 Diagnostic . 47 2.3.2 Pronostic . 55 2.4 La laïcité : un problème hors-cadre ? . 59 2.5 Des politiciens avant tout . 62 2.6 Conclusions . 66 3 Vers un renouvellement des cadres ? 73 3.1 Un processus de frame extension . 73 3.2 Bildung statt Kameras . 77 3.3 Le principe de libre accès élargi . -
Denis Simonet (DS), Thomas Bruderer (TB), Pat Mächler (PM), Michael Gregr (MG), Jos Doekbrijder (JD)
Piratenpartei Schweiz PROTOKOLL Datum: Samstag 28. Mai 2011 10:00h-18:30h Ort: Petersgraben 50, Basel Anwesend: Denis Simonet (DS), Thomas Bruderer (TB), Pat Mächler (PM), Michael Gregr (MG), Jos Doekbrijder (JD) Abwesend: - Text Zuständig Datum/Zeit 1. Kommunikationskonzept Präsentation Vorschlag Kommunikationskonzept. Siehe Anhang 1 und 2. Fazit: Die Positionsdokumente sollen regelmässiger, übersichtlicher, einfacher und strukturierter sein. Ziele: 1. Professionalität 2. Branding 3. Wiedererkennungswert 4. Hohe Reaktionsfähigkeit 5. Transparenz (Intern und Extern) 6. PPS Knowledge-base Das heutige System der Positionsdokumentation ist nicht genügend DS, TB 2011-06-02 strukturiert und führt zu Hinterfragung und Unzufriedenheit. Es genügt nicht unseren Anforderungen. Wir werden beim Vorstand beantragen, den vorgeschlagenen Prozess des Kommunikationskonzeptes gemäss Anhang um zu setzen. Unser Ziel ist, einen Mechanismus zu haben, um ein volles PPS Parteiprogramm, basierend auf unsere Grundwerten, zu erreichen. Die gesamte PPS Kommunikation wird auf unsere Grundwerten aufgebaut und deshalb nachvollziehbar und konsistent. Wir gehen davon aus, dass dies als selbstverständlich empfunden wird und zu einer effizienten Kommunikation führt. 1.1. Die heutige PPS hat eine Struktur, welche nicht zu einem offenen Alle Informationsaustausch einlädt. Wie hoffen, dass eine Kommunikationsstruktur wie oben unter Punkt 1 vorgeschlagen dazu beiträgt, dies zu verbessern. Alle 1.2. Mitglieder: Die gegenseitige Wahrnehmung sollte verbessert werden. – Idee: Eine „PPS -Zeitung“, Multimedial auf unser Webseite, wo einzelne Mitglieder ihre PPS-Arbeiten präsentiert können. – Idee: Mitglieder können vorschlagen, für welche PPS-Projekte ein Teil ihres Mitgliederbeitrags verwendet werden sollte. – Die Organisation von verschiedenen Treffen sollte ausgedehnt werden. d.h. mehr Ortschaften. 2. Finanzierung Alle Es ist zu erwarten, dass eine professionelle Kommunikation zu einer besseren externen Wahrnehmung unserer Partei führt. -
Wikileaks' Servers in Sweden Under Attack
Wikileaks' servers in Sweden under attack Written by Johan Nylander Monday, 06 December 2010 17:20 - Last Updated Monday, 06 December 2010 22:02 • Julian Assange arranging to meet police • Swiss close bank account of Julian Assange • WikiLeaks back in Sweden • WikiLeaks gets new host -- Sweden's Pirate Party {loadposition inline ad} WikiLeaks' Swedish servers came under attack again Monday, the whistle-blowing website's Swedish hosting company said. "We are investigating cause," Mikael Viborg, head of the Internet service provider PRQ, told AP. WikiLeaks confirmed in a tweet it was having difficulty with its PRQ severs. Mikael Viborg said the servers had become unresponsive, probably due a so-called denial of service attack aimed at WikiLeaks. WikiLeaks is already fighting to stay on the Internet. It switched its domain to Switzerland because its original web address was shut down by a US provider, as it continues to release thousands of classified US diplomatic cables. WikiLeaks was on Sunday redirected back to a server in Sweden. Denis Simonet, president of the Pirate Party of Switzerland, said that his group moved wikileaks.ch after the main server in France went offline. A denial-of-service attack (DoS attack) is an attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users. However, WikiLeaks claims to have several backups, so even a 1 / 2 Wikileaks' servers in Sweden under attack Written by Johan Nylander Monday, 06 December 2010 17:20 - Last Updated Monday, 06 December 2010 22:02 successful attack on the PRQ might not necessarily slow or shut it down, AP said. -
Domains of Convenience: Open Country Code Top-Level Domains And
DOMAINS OF CONVENIENCE: OPEN COUNTRY CODE TOP-LEVEL DOMAINS AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE By Kenneth A. Merrill Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Communication of American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy In Communication Chair: Laura DeNardis, Ph.D. Patricia Aufderheide, Ph.D. Kathryn Montgomery, Ph.D. Derrick Cogburn, Ph.D. Dean of the School of Communication Date 2018 American University Washington, D.C. 20016 © COPYRIGHT by Kenneth A. Merrill 2018 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED DOMAINS OF CONVENIENCE: OPEN COUNTRY CODE TOP-LEVEL DOMAINS AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE BY Kenneth A. Merrill ABSTRACT This project draws on multiple case studies to investigate the ways in which so-called “open” country code top-level domain names (ccTLDs) (ccTLDs with no local presence requirements) mediate global debates over Internet governance. Specifically, it focuses on three cases in which open ccTLDs became implicated in cross-border controversies over (1) political censorship (wikileaks.ch), (2) intellectual property rights enforcement (rojadirecta.me), and (3) cybercrime (the redelegation of .TK). Using an interpretive comparative approach, the project draws on interviews with ccTLD technical operators, regulators, civil society groups, and users, as well as analysis of relevant documents (e.g. registry and registrar policies, court documents, media reports, and minutes from various governance fora) to examine the outsized role that open ccTLDs play in the networked information economy. Identifying the “commodification of sovereignty” as a key component in the co-production of open ccTLDs, the project draws on a sociotechnical approach to examine the ways in which these country-specific identifiers simultaneously reinforce and undermine notions of sovereignty in cyberspace and the consequences this poses for Internet governance. -
Statutes of Pirate Parties International Statutes of Pirate Parties International (PPI)
18thApril, 2010 Brussels,Belgium PirateParties International Statutes Chairmanof the Meeting {hovrtas tsurQ.e t?I;3[?- 8ll,',H:r r tno'"',l;il;* * 7€er6ia Romania / ,r'\ J{ertneth '.d I. y'' ?eiruza Cerdan ^ ""Xo^,w ,o/.,^-*, ./hL'mt-,c Ro *""'83'fl??Kenneth Peiruza Sven Clement r Qsldqn &- Luxegrbourg -* lr .'",,,"iJ,fr"f:Tg SPain """,#illlItaly Brazil C(Ih,*[ o""''uFai: Ole Husgaard.- t r Denmark.- il lrent Mander Jakub Michalik . Luxembourg -* *ech RePubtic \ KT#;;- Ramania @ R&.t u{ d'*.^ $?iu- An{re R.osa AndreasPopp Rodrigo'Ei'],ffi I ru,o"nn1jffi'l j o"o;;,ffn? 'r'Il#.1s aiermanv ffi ;t ..i\,L- - -\ D [/I Stanislav DenisSimonet ru $ft6laiyey - $1111il2syl2nj v r"lnT,,lf'l - - Australia Russia - @\--:s-v-l \tK 4J\L\,r.L,tr Borisfurpvfrkiy R"dSgr""" AndreasZettl ,r^n /pflesis J !ss6 -r Germanv- Z!:;;* The Netherlands - Statutes of Pirate Parties International Statutes of Pirate Parties International (PPI) PREAMBLE Pirate Parties International exists to help establish, to support and promote, and to maintain communication and co-operation between pirate parties around the world. Pirate Parties International is not a political or authoritative entity. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENTS I. Name (1) The name of the association is Pirate Parties International (PPI). (2) The association is not for profit. The rights and duties of the association and its Members shall be disjunct. TASKS AND AIMS II. Goals (1) The goals of the association are: (a) to act according to the major interests and goals of its Members, (b) to raise awareness and widen the spread of the pirate movement, and (c) to unify the pirate movement and strengthen its bonds internally and externally. -
The Pi-Vote Evoting System
The Pi-Vote eVoting System How the Pirate Party Switzerland uses ADDER . Denis Simonet, Stefan Thöni Pirate Party Switzerland May 24, 2012 Part I Why does the Pirate Party Switzerland use eVoting? About Pi-Vote Part II How Pi-Vote works and what Problems remain Assumptions . .We assume... Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption is true; Integer factorization is hard; SHA-2 is sufficiently close to a random oracle; . Random number generators in PCs/OS are good. Potential problems . Possibility of decryption exists and could be forced e.g. by law . Parts of secret may be lost or given away later . Real problems . Authorities can be unreliable! Secrecy . How is secrecy achieved? . Homomorphic encryption of ballots . 4 out of 5 sharing of the secret . Real problems . Authorities can be unreliable! Secrecy . How is secrecy achieved? . Homomorphic encryption of ballots . 4 out of 5 sharing of the secret . Potential problems . Possibility of decryption exists and could be forced e.g. by law . Parts of secret may be lost or given away later Secrecy . How is secrecy achieved? . Homomorphic encryption of ballots . 4 out of 5 sharing of the secret . Potential problems . Possibility of decryption exists and could be forced e.g. by law . Parts of secret may be lost or given away later . Real problems . Authorities can be unreliable! . Real problems . Proofs take many CPU cycles to verify Correctness . .How is the correctness of ballots ensured? . Zero knowledge proofs with Fiat-Shamir heuristic Correctness . .How is the correctness of ballots ensured? . Zero knowledge proofs with Fiat-Shamir heuristic . Real problems . Proofs take many CPU cycles to verify .