Results of the Household Survey

Save the Children

External Evaluation of the SHO-Funded Program: Action to address emergency and recovery needs for children and families affected by typhoon Haiyan on Panay Island in the Philippines

FINAL REPORT 24 September 2015

Maria Dolores Alicias-Garen, Gabrielle Dominique Garen & Ernesto Tomas, Jr. Photos by G. Garen and E. Tomas Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 4 PART 1: INTRODUCTION ...... 14 Evaluation Objectives ...... 15 Evaluation Design & Methodology ...... 15 Technical Approach ...... 15 Data Gathering Methods...... 16 PART 2: FINDINGS ...... 21 Assessment of Effectiveness ...... 21 SHO 1: Shelter/NFI Kits ...... 21 SHO 1: Cash Transfer for Boat Repair ...... 22 SHO 2: Education ...... 24 SHO 2: Food Security and Livelihood (FSL) ...... 35 SHO 2: WASH ...... 45 Assessment of Organizational Effectiveness ...... 51 Achievement of Objectives: ...... 51 Preparedness and Implementation: ...... 53 Data Management, Monitoring and Reporting: ...... 56 Assessment of Relevance ...... 57 Shelter kits and NFIs ...... 57 Food Security and Livelihood ...... 58 Education ...... 60 WASH ...... 61 Assessment of Sustainability ...... 62 Food Security and Livelihood ...... 63 Education ...... 63 WASH ...... 64 Assessment of Efficiency (Budget Utilization and Management) ...... 65 Program Budget Management of SHO 1 ...... 65 Program Budget Management of SHO 2 ...... 67 Assessment of Coherence, Coverage and Participation ...... 71 Partnership and Coordination ...... 71 Coverage and Participation ...... 72 PART 3: RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 76 REFERENCES ...... 79 ANNEX 1: List of Interviews and Focus Group Discussions ...... 80 ANNEX 2: Results of the Household Survey ...... 84 Part 1: Shelter, Non- Food Items and CCT -Boat Repair ...... 85 Part 2: Food Security and Livelihood (FSL) and Education Intervention ...... 88 Part 3. Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) ...... 93

List of Tables and Figures Table 1. Survey Sampling Design 17 Table 2: List of SHO 1 FSL and Shelter Survey Areas 18 Table 3: List of SHO 2 – WASH Sample Barangays 18 Table 4: List of SHO 2 – FSL and Education Survey Areas 19 Table 5: List of Focus Group Discussions 20 Table 6: Support From other Organizations among SHO 1 Beneficiaries 21 Table 7. SHO 1 Beneficiaries’ Income Before Haiyan vs. Current (Past 6 mos.) 23 Table 8: SHO 1 Beneficiaries’ Assets & Wealth Before Haiyan vs. Current (Past 6 mos.) 23 Table 9: SHO 1 Beneficiaries’ Participation in Orientation/Trainings 24 Table 10: Survey Result of School Kit Receipt 27 Table 11: Time the Beneficiaries Received the School Kit 27 Table 12. Waiting time for the School Kit 28 Table 13: Rating Performance – Distribution of School Kit 28 Table 14. Most Useful Items in the School Kit 28 Table15: Distribution of UCT and CCT Beneficiaries 36 Table 16: Cash Grant Spending among UCT Recipients 37 Table 17: UCT Recipient Households’ Present Income Compared to Pre-Haiyan 37 Table 18: Cash Grant Spending among CCT Recipients 39 Table 19: Livelihood Activities Established by CCT Recipients 40 Table 20: Beneficiaries’ Income (last 6 mos.) 41 Table 21: CCT Recipient Households’ Present Income Compared to Pre-Haiyan 42 Table 22: UCT & CCT Recipient Households’ Present Income Compared to Pre-Haiyan44 Table 23. Construction of 25 Water Facilities in 6 Barangays 46 Table 24: Source of Drinking Water 47 Table 25. No. of Trips to Fetch Drinking Water and Water for Other Uses 48 Table 26. Demand for Water Containers for Collecting / Fetching 48 Table 27. Attended the WASH Activity 49 Table 28. Shelter, Non-Food Items, and CCT- Boat Beneficiaries 52 Table 29: SHO 1 Final Financial Report Summary (in Euro) 65 Table 30: SHO 2 Final Financial Report Summary (in Euro) 67

Figure 1: SHO 1 Actual Distribution of Expenses 67 Figure 2: SHO 2 Actual Distribution of Expenses 68

List of Acronyms

ACF Action Against Hunger CAMPCO Caburihan Multipurpose Cooperative BSC Barangay Selection Committee CCT Conditional Cash Transfer CG Community Grant DAC Development Assistance Committee of OECD DepEd Department of Education ES Elementary School FSL Food Security and Livelihood HH Household ICT Information and Communications Technology MOA Memorandum of Agreement NFI Non-Food Items OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development SCI Save the Children International SCNL Save the Children Netherlands SCP Save the Children Philippines SCPPO Save the Children Panay Program Office SHO Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties or Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies WASH Water, Sanitation and Health UCT Unconditional Cash Transfer UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UN United Nations ZODC Zero Defecation Campaign

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Save the Children Netherlands (SCNL), through Save the Children Philippines, carried out for 21 months (one year and 9 months) an emergency and early recovery humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan affected communities in Panay Island or Western Visayas. The interventions were implemented in the provinces of Iloilo and Capiz, with the bulk going to the municipality of Carles, Iloilo. The program is funded by SHO (Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies).

SHO-SCNL’s Typhoon Haiyan’s program was undertaken in two phases—phase 1 focused on emergency and early recovery and phase 2 focused on recovery. The first phase of the SHO funded intervention consists of providing shelter and non-food items and also providing direct conditional cash transfers to replace boats and other fishing inputs. The second phase of the SHO funded intervention has three components: food security and livelihood (FSL); education; and, water, sanitation and health (WASH). The FSL component consisted of providing resources to a thousand vulnerable households in the fishing communities, including non-boat owning households, geared at recovering their livelihood and/or starting an alternative livelihood. It also provided support to fishing associations to aid in coral recovery, and to small-scale traders for market recovery. The education program includes activities aimed at resuming learning and school activities. Moreover, the education component includes institutional and capacity building support to the education cluster. The WASH activities consists of repair or construction of WASH facilities in seven schools and provision of latrines to more than a thousand vulnerable households.

The program has ended in June 2015 and this final external evaluation is needed for accountability and learning. Based on the DAC criteria, the external evaluation study focused on effectiveness, relevance, efficiency, sustainability. It also looked at coherence, coverage and participation. The evaluation study used both quantitative (household survey) and qualitative methods (FGDs, interviews, observation). It was carried out for thirty working days by a team composed of three consultants in close cooperation with Save the Children Panay Program Office.

Summary of Findings:

Both SHO 1 and SHO 2 interventions were effective in achieving their respective outputs despite being implemented in the context of a category 5 storm destruction and in different phases of emergency humanitarian response. Most components of the SHO-funded programs have even exceeded the target number of people who benefitted from the interventions. This evaluation also confirms that all the different activities under multiple components of the SHO-funded intervention were implemented as planned, except for debris clean-up component in the SHO 2 education program and the support for small market traders in the SHO 2 FSL program. Cleaning-up of the typhoon debris was no longer needed at the time of the project implementation while the support for small market traders was carried out under a different grant. In terms of achieving the outcomes, this evaluation study finds that

4 the SHO programs had saved lives and some components contributed to safer and better recovery as discussed below:

Effectiveness of SHO 1:

The completeness of the shelter and NFI kit and the fact that these were used by the beneficiaries means that this component has achieved its objectives of providing relief. However, the SHO 1 program was not implemented as designed (i.e. support for livelihood/boat repair should complement the provision of shelter and NFI kits). Only about a third of the beneficiary households received both shelter kit/NFI and boat repair support. Moreover, this evaluation study finds that the aim to increase food security from a resumed livelihood seems ambitious for the amount of cash transfer given and the seasonal effects of the fishing livelihood. The amount of the cash transfer was not enough to repair or build a boat (to the point of beneficiaries becoming indebted to supply the additional funding needed), thus it is not reasonable to expect that their incomes from resuming livelihood activities would be sufficient to ensure food security, much less shelter repair.

Effectiveness of SHO 2-Education:

The SHO-funded education intervention was effective in providing relief to parents, children and teachers and also in recovering the infrastructure and capacity of schools and teachers to provide quality learning environment for children. The infrastructure development (repairs and construction) has resulted in safer and more conducive learning space for the teachers and school children. It has no effect on the children’s access to schools and school attendance. The construction of WASH facilities facilitated access to water in schools and a healthier learning environment. The teacher’s and student’s kits provided the teachers and parents economic relief and it also helped encourage children to go to school. A large majority of parents confirmed that their children received the school kit. The distribution process of teacher’s and student’s kits is found to be effective and orderly. However, selective distribution of the WASH kit has unintentionally left the excluded children heavy- hearted and disappointed. This has also created undue burden to school heads and teachers. Inconsistency in the contents and quality of the teacher’s kits (possibly from various SCI grants) has also unintentionally created comparisons and discontent among the teachers of different schools. This should prompt SCI to be more careful and sensitive to the subculture of public school teachers when managing similar type of intervention under different grants.

The capacity building activities for teachers are found to be effective in not only increasing knowledge on dealing with school children but also in dealing with their own well-being. However, the psychosocial training would have been more effective had there been practical exercises and skills transfer. Likewise, the teachers said that the SHO-funded training intervention would have been more valuable had it included the DRR training for teachers.

The effectiveness of the SHO-funded education intervention could be attributed to the effective functioning of the education cluster system. Having dedicated staffs to co-coordinate the Western Visayas cluster and manage the information system was beneficial to both SCI and DepEd. The cluster system and its database were instrumental in determining the relevant types, phases and areas of intervention. To a large extent, it has also helped avoid duplication of similar interventions among cluster members.

Effectiveness of SHO 2- FSL:

For overall livelihood recovery, the UCT, CCT, and Community Grant (CG) contributed to livelihood provision (UCT and CCT), livelihood protection (UCT and CCT), and livelihood promotion (CG).

This evaluation finds that the UCT intervention successfully provided the means for households to provide food and other essential needs (livelihood provisioning). It was also successful in protecting livelihood, by enabling over a third (36%) of the households who received only the UCT to conduct income-generating activities using this cash transfer. As measured by their income status as compared to before Haiyan, the UCT was effective in contributing to livelihood provision for those that have reported the same income as pre-Haiyan and livelihood protection for those that have reported increase in income compared to pre-Haiyan. Overall, it contributed to livelihood recovery of 65% of all UCT recipient respondents (i.e. those who reported having same and increased incomes).

This evaluation finds that the CCT intervention successfully enabled a large majority (88.64%) of the beneficiaries to replace their productive assets enough to resume livelihood. The evaluation survey result also reveals that not all of the CCT beneficiaries used the cash transfer for livelihood. Those who did not use it for livelihood (11.36%) used it mostly for food, an indicator of prevailing food insecurity in the target communities. The survey results further show that respondents also used the cash grant for non-food items. The use of the CCT for items other than livelihood may be reflective of the cash flow management system/practice of the recipient households. This cash management practice allowed the beneficiaries to provide for their most immediate needs without sacrificing their livelihood activities. Thus, this evaluation finds that the CCT distribution design (with two tranches) has allowed beneficiaries greater flexibility and empowerment in responding to their needs.

The CCT also contributed to livelihood provisioning as indicated by use of the cash on food and non-food essential needs. Measured by change in income, the CCT intervention was also successful in livelihood protection for those that have regained their pre-Haiyan income or even increased it. Overall, the CCT intervention contributed to livelihood recovery of 68% of all CCT respondents (i.e. those 40% who reported having same income plus those 28% who reported increased income). Still, almost one third of the beneficiaries (32%) reported that their incomes have

6 decreased, compared to their incomes before Haiyan. Additionally, because the CCT beneficiaries were already poor before the typhoon (as this was one of the criteria for beneficiary selection), even those whose incomes have increased are still mostly economically vulnerable. Livelihood promotion, through alternative livelihood activities, could have improved economic resilience of the beneficiaries. However, the intervention was less successful in livelihood promotion, with only 34% of the survey respondents (who received either CCT only or both UCT&CCT) opting to engage in alternative livelihood sources. Thus, while the CCT effectively contributed to livelihood protection, it was less effective in livelihood promotion.

This evaluation finds that the community grant is an effective livelihood promotion intervention. It shows positive signs of contributing to coral reef and marine life recovery, and thus to sustainable livelihood for the surrounding communities.

In general, this evaluation finds that the FSL interventions were successful in facilitating access to food and livelihood for its target beneficiaries. The project met the targeted number of households for both CCT and community grant, while it exceeded the target for the UCT. Further, this evaluation finds that there is no significant difference in the proportion of beneficiaries who recovered their income status among those who received only UCT, those who received only CCT, and those who received both UCT and CCT.

Effectiveness SHO 2-WASH:

SCI’s latrine distribution have direct benefits to families. Together with its hygiene promotion and Zero Open Defecation (ZOD) campaign, the WASH intervention has effectively helped not only at the household level but also the entire Municipality of Carles improve its sanitation situation. The magnitude of success of the WASH intervention is also due to the complementary efforts by the municipal and provincial government. Some of the communal water facilities have yet to be fully utilized because of seasonal water availability.

SCI’s capacity:

SHO 1 interventions were implemented under an emergency response team (i.e. SCI Estancia Haiyan Field Office), an ad hoc structure established by SCI in emergency situations such as Haiyan. SHO 2 implementation was undertaken in the context of structural and staff transition. The emergency structure was effective in providing quick and early response but it faced challenges in data recording and data management. The organizational transition and staff turn-over somehow affected the implementation of the SHO-funded program but it did not affect the achievement of targets. Overachievement in terms of number of FSL beneficiaries reached is indicative of high efficiency but it is also partly due to the conservative estimate of the amount of cash transfer coupled with a design factor wherein the beneficiary selection criteria favor expansion over concentration.

Logistically there had been no major problems when it comes to the implementation of the SHO-funded intervention. In terms of financial controls, SCI has established an effective financial control system especially with regard to cash transfer activities. The only control issue when it comes to cash transfer is the utilization of PhilPost as delivery mechanism since the way it happened has defeated its purpose. The biggest challenge of SCI lies in data recording and data management. There was also insufficiency in the nuancing of the needs assessment or context analysis which can be gleaned from the design and/or operationalization of some interventions.

Relevance:

All SHO interventions are found to be relevant in responding to the post-disaster needs of the affected communities. However, some interventions, like the WASH latrine distribution and ZODC, are more relevant in addressing pre-existing vulnerabilities and thus contribute strategically to better recovery and development. This is also true for some components of the education intervention, like the infrastructure development and capacity building for teachers.

The FSL interventions are relevant. The need to resume livelihood to get food and cash for other needs, coupled with functioning markets, made cash transfer an ideal mechanism for distributing support. The unconditional cash transfer, in particular, was an ideal mechanism because it gives recipients a greater sense of dignity and choice over their own welfare. This is less so for the household CCT and community grant because of the design for these grants (i.e. putting conditions on how the grant is spent).

For SHO 1, the community’s high dependence on fishing as a main source of income meant that the boat repair cash transfer was particularly responsive to the community’s livelihood restoration needs. The SHO 2 CCT for household livelihood diversification was relevant to the emergency context and the local economic context of the beneficiaries because it aimed to address the pre-existing vulnerability of households that rely on a single source of income. To this end, it succeeded in promoting alternative livelihoods in 34% of the recipients of this grant (i.e. relevant albeit not very effective in fostering livelihood diversification).

In terms of livelihood recovery, 28% of the CCT recipients reported increased income. These households are now in a better position to generate necessary assets to generate income than the other groups. Those CCT-only recipients whose present

8 incomes are the same as pre-Haiyan (40%) have recovered to their pre-existing economic vulnerability. Those whose current incomes are still below pre-Haiyan levels (32%) are the worst off among the three groups.

For SHO 2, the community grant for artificial coral reef construction is relevant not just in addressing immediate problem of having much less fish for catching but also in restoring marine biodiversity.

Efficiency (Budget Utilization and Management):

This evaluation finds that, in general, the budget utilization and management in SHO 1 and SHO 2 reflects the findings on effectiveness. That is, where resources were maximized, this translated into more effective components of the SHO intervention and organizational effectiveness, and vice versa. No evidence of unnecessary or unrelated expenditures was found in either SHO 1 or SHO 2. Further, the over- or underspending experienced in each component and in the project as a whole did not affect its ability to reach and even exceed its intended targets. The over- or underspending experienced is within the budget flexibility allowance of 10% and might be attributable to the use of a floating exchange rate to some extent.

There is underspending in some items within budget “chapters” that suggests that there is room for more efficient budget allocation to maximize implementation/program effectiveness and organizational effectiveness. This evaluation finds that underspending occurred mostly when some budgeted program activities were dropped because of changes in context, or because there were likely not enough beneficiaries found for that intervention (for CCT and UCT). Nevertheless, the underspending within program components (e.g. trainings, hygiene promotion, construction of wells, UCT, CCT) could be reduced to improve intervention quality so as to expect better effectiveness and relevance. Similarly, there is underspending for monitoring and evaluation within “Program Management Support” that could have been more efficiently utilized.

Sustainability:

In general, this evaluation finds that some elements of the whole SHO intervention are more sustainable than the others. Given that the intervention was short-term and undertaken when the communities and even the government (e.g. barangay, municipal) institutions were recovering from the disaster, any intervention will be taken as an external assistance rather than community-owned.

This evaluation finds evidence pointing to the sustainability of livelihood activities supported by the conditional cash transfers to households. For the boat repair CCT, the output of the intervention (i.e. repaired boats) can be used indefinitely to secure livelihood. For the UCT and CCT for alternative marine livelihood, some (3.64% of survey respondents) are reinvesting the cash transfers they received into the livelihoods they have set up, thus ensuring sustainability of these livelihoods. In terms of sustainability of

9 the community grants in Carles, this evaluation finds that the results of the intervention can be sustained because of the legal and political support of the local government.

In terms of education, this evaluation study finds that all interventions in education are likely to be sustainable, except for interventions with consumable items (i.e. hygiene, school, and teacher kits). The school infrastructure and WASH facilities will be maintained by the schools from their annual budget. As for the psychosocial training and the teachers circle it is likely that the schools will sustain these. This is because disaster risk management is already a mandated responsibility of schools and part of it is the capacity to give psychosocial first aid or intervention. As for the teacher’s circles, the present workplace culture and DepEd structure lends itself to teachers continuing to work together and interact socially within the school and with other teachers from other schools

The sustainability of WASH intervention in the communities depends on how the package of support (water-latrine-hygiene) works to make the ZOD program sustainable. Given the strong support of the municipal government to the program, it is likely that the ZOD communities will be sustainable. Sustainability is also anchored on the maintenance of the facilities constructed. This evaluation finds evidence that the barangay council can take an active role in helping maintain the facilities.

Coherence, Coverage and Participation:

This evaluation study confirms that the SHO-funded program was implemented in close coordination with UN and other international humanitarian agencies in the region via the cluster system. This evaluation study also finds that SCI’s priorities and types of intervention are in line with cluster recommendations. As such, it has contributed, to a large extent, to the achievement of the goals of set forth by the international community and national government.

Coordination did not only happen among non-state institutions, but also between SCI and government institutions. Coordination with barangay officials (Barangay Council) is also observed in the implementation of the SHO-funded intervention. SCI has also established partnership with the Department of Education and to a certain extent with the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Partnership with DepEd was not only institutionalized via a Memorandum of Agreement but it was also strong to the point that SCI is treated as a member of the DepEd community in the region.

In terms of coverage and participation, this evaluation finds that the SHO program has a wide geographic coverage and benefitted vulnerable people and institutions, as the discussion on effectiveness has shown. However, there are issues in participation and inclusion, notably in the FSL Cash Transfer intervention. Challenges in meaningful community participation generated issues of inclusion-exclusion. It is in the level of setting vulnerability criteria and in selecting the actual household beneficiaries vis-à-vis SCI criteria that issues of participation and exclusion became apparent. One issue concerns the community’s own notion of vulnerability and target unit of assistance (i.e. family versus household) vis-à-vis SCI’s vulnerability criteria. The

10 other issue concerns exclusion of other vulnerable households vis-à-vis inclusion of households who do not fit the criteria. Another issue concerns the role of the Barangay Selection Committee vis-à-vis the role of the elected Barangay Officials. These have unintentionally created and/or aggravated social tension and friction among residents and between the residents and barangay officials or BSC, with no appropriate mitigating measures put in place.

Recommendations:

This evaluation study recommends that when the SHO 1 and SHO 2 interventions are replicated in a similar situation, the following be considered:

 For all relief support packages (hygiene kits, student’s kits, teacher’s kits) provide uniform sets and aim for universal coverage when possible. When resources limit universal coverage, adhere to the SPHERE guideline which says, “If the general living conditions of an affected population were already significantly below the minimum standards before the disaster, agencies may have insufficient resources to meet the standards. In such situations, providing basic facilities for the entire affected population may be more important than reaching the minimum standards for only a proportion” (SPHERE Handbook, 2011).  For FSL, continue providing cash transfers with sufficient flexibility in the use of the funds especially when there is a functioning market. There is a need to clarify and have a common understanding among the project staff on what the UCT and other cash transfers are meant to do. Consider avoiding conditions on how the cash transfers should be spent as this negates the purpose of providing flexibility. o In addition, ensure the amount given primarily to alleviate immediate hunger (food aid) is matched with the area’s food basket cost for the average family size plus the inflationary effect of a disaster.  Continue partnership with a third-party delivery mechanism for cash transfers to intended beneficiaries. Consider revising the operational process of transferring the cash to households (i.e. minimize instances of PhilPost staff distributing the money in person; explore other ways to deliver the cash). Consider utilizing money remittance centers or bank-based facilities (e.g. BPI BanKo) or telecommunication-based facilities (e.g. Globe G-Cash).  For boat repair support, consider including a skills training activity with accompanying distribution of tools (similar to training and tools provision for shelter construction under a different grant) especially if the amount of cash support is insufficient to complete the repair or construction. o In addition, consider differentiating support depending on the degree of destruction of the boat (i.e. higher amount for totally damaged than partially-damaged).  When tying livelihood support to shelter repair or construction, provide sufficient capital to ensure enough income will come out of the livelihood intervention

to be able to support house construction and/or repair. Otherwise, aim for a more realistic outcome.  For education, continue providing disaster risk reduction trainings and other activities, in line with the Philippine government’s National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan. Consider providing the teachers of SHO- funded target schools with psycho-social first aid and DRR training.  For WASH, continue zero open defecation initiative, and consider providing a standard amount of materials for each household across all barangays. Otherwise, when barangay council and community members are involved in decisions regarding allocations, strengthen buy-in strategies and implement such strategies across all target areas.  For all interventions, improve on using a participatory framework and processes to take the communities’ knowledge and perceived vulnerability into account.  Strengthen coordination with other aid agencies down to the type of intervention vis-a-vis beneficiary list level to avoid duplication and unnecessary tension in the community.  Cultivate more partnerships (as opposed to coordination) with relevant government agencies and local non-government organizations  In a humanitarian assistance context, where aid agencies and resources are abundant, aim for multiple intervention in fewer areas to maximize results.  Ensure timely, proper and thorough recording coupled with a more systematic data management even during emergency phase, in order to make data reconciliation (finance versus program) and reporting more efficient and less burdensome. Further, it could provide timely information to program staff and senior management for making critical decisions regarding program intervention, especially with regard to striking a balance between expansion (reach) and concentration (completeness).  Continue streamlining data management within SCPPO. In particular, further strengthen the process of integration of MEAL in program development and implementation to ensure high standard of quality in implementation and improvement of institutional and staff capacity. That is, the MEAL produces commendable internal studies and monitoring reports. These knowledge products that MEAL produces should feed into how programs conduct the interventions (using analysis of data made by MEAL and recognizing recommendations).

In SCPPO’s transition to recovery and development work, the following should be considered:

 For MEAL and programs, strengthen research skills and capacity. For Finance, consider using an independent data source when reconciling figures with programs and MEAL. For Logistics, consider more staff exposure to target areas to have a better idea of the logistical requirements of the intervention.  To ensure smooth transition from recovery to development, aim to finish untested infrastructure such as the communal water facilities and latrines. Also,

revisit finished constructions to ensure these are still working within the life of the project.  The projected poverty impact of typhoon Haiyan would certainly worsen the socio-economic condition of the already impoverished beneficiaries. Continue to aim for increased resilience by supporting livelihood and DRR management. When FSL program is to be implemented, conduct a political- economy study of the target areas as a basis for program design and operational plan.  In considering FSL interventions for women, consider taking into account gender parity of labor. Providing women with economic empowerment (thru alternative livelihood) without transforming gender roles at home, would only add to women’s burdens.  Meaningful participation is in the heart of a successful and sustainable intervention. Ensure depth of participation as opposed to just consultation in all phases of project cycle.

PART 1: INTRODUCTION

On November 8, 2013, a category 5 typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) hit the Philippines devastating 36 provinces and affecting 13.2 million people. The super typhoon left 5,000 people dead, 4 million people displaced, and more than half a million houses destroyed (TOR External End Evaluation SHO Funded SCNL Response to Typhoon Haiyan, p. 2). Save the Children Netherlands (SCNL), through Save the Children Philippines-Panay Program Office (SCPPO), carried out for 21 months (one year and 9 months) an emergency and early recovery humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan affected communities in Panay Island or Western Visayas (SCNL. 2015. TOR External End Evaluation SHO Funded SCNL Response to Typhoon Haiyan, p. 4, p. 10). The program is funded by SHO (Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies).

Save the Children (SCI) is an international child-centered community development organization, which has been operating in the Philippines for 30 years. In the past three years, it has been implementing emergency response and recovery programs for children, families and communities affected by natural and mad-made disasters such as the Typhoon Bopha; Habagat; Zamboanga Armed Conflict; Bohol Earthquake; and Yolanda/ Haiyan (SCNL. 2015. TOR External End Evaluation SHO Funded SCNL Response to Typhoon Haiyan, p. 14).

SHO-SCNL’s Typhoon Haiyan’s program was undertaken in two phases. “Phase 1 focused on emergency and partly early recovery, including shelter and livelihood activities. Phase 2 focused on recovery, and included livelihood, education and wash activities” (TOR External End Evaluation SHO Funded SCNL Response to Typhoon Haiyan, p. 4). The first phase of the SHO funded intervention consists of providing shelter and non-food items and also providing direct conditional cash transfers to replace boats and other fishing inputs. As an emergency and early recovery response, it aimed to allow more than a thousand vulnerable families to immediately acquire shelter and resume their livelihood (SCNL. 2015. TOR External End Evaluation SHO Funded SCNL Response to Typhoon Haiyan, pp. 4-5).

The second phase of the SHO funded intervention has three components: food security and livelihood (FSL); education; and, water, sanitation and health (WASH). The FSL component consisted of providing resources to a thousand vulnerable households in the fishing communities, including non-boat owning households, geared at recovering their livelihood and/or starting an alternative livelihood. It also provided support to fishing associations to aid in coral recovery, and to small-scale traders for market recovery.

The education program includes activities aimed at resuming learning and school activities, including support to temporary learning spaces and repair of classrooms, distribution of teaching and learning kits, and capacity building for teachers. It was expected to benefit nearly 2,000 school children and 500 teachers. Moreover, the

14 education component includes institutional and capacity building support to the education cluster.

The WASH activities consists of repair or construction of WASH facilities in seven schools and provision of latrines to more than a thousand vulnerable households (TOR External End Evaluation SHO Funded SCNL Response to Typhoon Haiyan, pp. 4-8).

The SHO interventions were implemented in the provinces of Iloilo and Capiz, with the bulk going to the municipality of Carles, Iloilo. The SHO-funded program was administered and implemented directly by SCP in coordination with concerned government agencies and local government units. Moreover, the program is coordinated with other international aid agencies and in line with the priorities identified by the education cluster (Save the Children being the co-lead of this cluster), and other clusters (Save the Children being member of WASH and shelter cluster).

As the “program activities ended in June” (SCNL. 2015. TOR External End Evaluation SHO Funded SCNL Response to Typhoon Haiyan, p. 12), a final external evaluation is needed for accountability and learning. In line with accountability, the external evaluation assessed the achievements, results and reach of the SHO-funded program based the OECD-DAC Criteria for Evaluation and the extent of compliance of the project’s implementation with the Core Humanitarian Standards on Quality and Accountability. It terms of learning, the external evaluation looked at the preparedness and capacity of the SCP to carry out emergency response in an accountable and timely manner, document lessons learned and identify areas for improvement for future project development. The result of the end of project evaluation will serve as input for future emergency and recovery responses of Save the Children as well as input to the Meta evaluation of SHO program operation in the Philippines (SCNL. 2015. TOR External End Evaluation SHO Funded SCNL Response to Typhoon Haiyan, p. 8).

Evaluation Objectives The external evaluation has the following objectives:

1. Assess the effectiveness, relevance, efficiency and coherence and coverage of the SHO-funded program vis-à-vis program objectives and quantitative targets; 2. Document successes and challenges as lessons learned for future responses.

Evaluation Design & Methodology

Technical Approach The evaluation team has envisioned the external evaluation as a research and learning exercise. The assignment was regarded as a way of validating previous internal monitoring and assessment and contributing to generation of insights and learning that will guide future program development. The evaluation study was

15 conducted following standards of quantitative and qualitative research; ethical standards of field research and principles in participatory research. Moreover, Save the Children’s Child Safeguarding Policy was observed in the conduct of the study.

The external evaluation was carried out in close cooperation/coordination between the evaluation team and SCI. The evaluation team worked with designated focal persons of Save the Children Panay Office.

Data Gathering Methods The over-all review process was approached using mixed-method (quantitative and qualitative) research. The evaluation study employed both a household survey and qualitative data gathering techniques such as group or individual interviews, observation and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The household survey data were processed and analyzed using a statistical software (i.e. STATA 13). Existing or previous monitoring and internal evaluation results (i.e. assessment reports, monitoring reports) were also used as the basis for triangulation of data generated through field work. A desk review of related literature and project documents helped define the parameters for the subsequent data-gathering and analysis. The guide questions for the focus group discussions, key informant interviews were developed by the consultants and approved by the SCI prior to the field work. The guide questionnaires for the FGDs and interviews are attached in the Inception Report as annexes. The process of primary data collection started on August 6, 2015 and concluded on August 17, 2015.

Household Surveys

Due to the nature of the intervention, separate surveys were needed in order to accurately represent the beneficiaries of the various components of the project. This is especially because the majority of the SHO Phase 1 and SHO Phase 2 implementation was done in different non-overlapping barangays1. Within SHO Phase 2, the WASH component was implemented in areas distinct from the other two components (FSL and education). On the other hand, there are 16 barangays where SHO 2 FSL and education interventions overlapped (SCPPO. July 2015. “Matrix of SHO 2 funded Interventions”). These three separate areas of implementation correspond to three separate target population, which in turn necessitates three separate surveys.

These three separate household surveys were conducted on samples representative of the target populations for Phase 1 (shelter and non-food items, boat repair), Phase 2 WASH, and Phase 2 FSL and education (UCT, CCT, community grant and school kits of children from these families). For the household survey, the evaluation study’s

1 There are only 5 out of 82 total barangays that have interventions in both SHO 1 and SHO 2. Specifically, barangay Manlot (Carles) has SHO 1 FSL and SHO 2 WASH. Barangays Abong, Bancal, Lantangan, and Gabi have SHO 1 FSL and SHO 2 Education. As there are no barangays where SHO 1 FSL and SHO 2 FSL interventions overlap, SHO 1 FSL and SHO 2 FSL are treated as different project areas with different target populations.

16 sampling design used multi-stage cluster sampling2 based on the actual number and distribution of beneficiaries for each component of the project3. Table 1 contains the total population and sample sizes for the three surveys. These are discussed in detail below.

Table 1. Survey Sampling Design (Sample size computed using 95% confidence level and 10% margin of error, 0.5 standard deviation, 1.5 design effect) Total No. of No. of Total No. of No. of Project Areas Sample Target Sampled (Beneficiary Barangays Population Households Barangays) (Beneficiary Households) SHO 1 – FSL & Shelter 13 4 870 130 SHO 2 – WASH 7 4 1,403 136 SHO 2 – FSL & Education* 7 4 585 113 Total 2,858 379 *Note: This includes only barangays that have both an FSL and a student’s kit intervention (i.e. those barangays with only FSL or only non-student kit education interventions are not included).

Survey 1: SHO Phase 1 (shelter, non-food items, boat repair)

The first survey focused on the implementation of SHO Phase 1. The target population is composed of the household beneficiaries of shelter, non-food items distribution (1,250 households) and boat repair support (870 households). Following the UN Handbook on Designing Household Survey Samples (2005)4, the total number of households is based on the smaller of the two groups, which in turn is based on the beneficiary list, disaggregated by barangay, of livelihood support.

The sample size for this survey is 130, computed using a 95% confidence level, 10% margin of error, 0.5 standard error, and 1.5 design effect. Households with non- response were replaced with randomly-selected alternates. Respondents were chosen in two stages. The primary sampling unit (PSU) is chosen through probability proportional to size (PPS) from the 13 barangays covered by Phase 1 in Carles, Iloilo. From each barangay, households (i.e. secondary sampling unit or SSU) were randomly selected from each sample barangay. The number of selected households per barangay is proportional to the share of the barangay’s beneficiary population to the total number of sample households (i.e. more sample households will be selected in barangays with more beneficiary households). The number of beneficiary households

2 The sample sizes are computed with a base sample computed from simple random sampling, adjusted for clustering with a finite population correction. 3 The actual number (as opposed to the target number of beneficiaries in the project proposal) and geographic distribution beneficiaries are based on “Matrix of SHO 2 funded interventions” provided by SCPPO and SHO 1 Terminal Report. 4 UNSTATS. (2005). “Designing Household Survey Samples: Practical Guidelines” (p.38) UN DESA Statistics Division

17 per barangay and identification of specific households were based on the beneficiary profiles/list compiled and kept by SCPPO.

The randomly selected barangays for this survey are as follows:

Table 2: List of SHO 1 FSL and Shelter Survey Areas Municipality Barangay No. of Beneficiary No. of Sample Households Households Carles Tarong 43 12 Carles Punta 51 15 Carles Barancalan 116 43 Carles Manlot 81 25 No Answer/Unclassified 35 TOTAL 130

Survey 2: Phase 2 WASH (latrine construction)

While both Phase 1 – FSL & Shelter and Phase 2 – WASH were implemented in Carles, Iloilo, separate surveys were warranted for each intervention as there are different beneficiaries (target populations) for all but one barangay (Brgy. Manlot) of these two interventions.

For WASH, this survey uses a sample size of 136 distributed among 4 clusters (barangays) from a population of 1,403 households. Again, the sample size was computed with a 95% confidence level, 10% margin of error, 0.5 standard error, and 1.5 design effect. Households with non-response were replaced with randomly- selected alternates. The PSU is the barangay, while individual households per barangay make up the secondary sampling units. The number of selected households per barangay will be proportional to the share of the barangay’s beneficiary population to the total number of sample households (i.e. more sample households will be selected in barangays with more beneficiary households). Each sample household will be identified based on SCP’s list of beneficiaries.

The randomly selected barangays for this survey are as follows:

Table 3: List of SHO 2 – WASH Sample Barangays Municipality Barangay No. of Beneficiary No. of Sample Households Households Carles Cabilao Pequeno 344 40 Carles Cabilao Grande 226 25 Carles Pantalan 348 40 Carles Manlot 279 31 TOTAL 136

Survey 3: Phase 2 FSL and Education (UCT/CCT/community grant and students’ kit)

Another survey for FSL/education is needed because of the different area of implementation for these components. In consideration of efficiency in data gathering without sacrificing reliability and validity, the target population for this survey was limited to those barangays that have received both an FSL and student’s kit education intervention (e.g. students’ kit and UCT or students’ kit and community grant). Individual households with children that have received a students’ kit were targeted in order to obtain the household’s, particularly the parents’, perspective on the education intervention. Additional information on education was obtained through FGDs with teachers and children.

Random selection of sampling units for this survey was done using probability proportional to size in two stages: barangay then individual household. The sample size for this survey was computed using a 95% confidence level, 10% margin of error, 0.5 standard error, and 1.5 design effect. Again, households with non-response were replaced with randomly-selected alternates. A sample size of 113 from a population of 585 households was taken from 4 barangays. The number of selected households per barangay was proportional to the share of the barangay’s beneficiary population to the total number of sample households (i.e. more sample households will be selected in barangays with more beneficiary households). Households were randomly chosen from either SCP’s list of beneficiaries (for UCT and CCT) or from fishing associations’ list of members (for community grant).

The randomly selected barangays for this survey are as follows:

Table 4: List of SHO 2 – FSL and Education Survey Areas Municipality Barangay No. of Beneficiary No. of Sample Households Households Batad Embarcadero 47 16 San Dionisio Madanlog5 52 27 Concepcion Nipa 178 526 Estancia Tanza 46 18 TOTAL 113

Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and Key Informant Interviews (KII)

5 Barangay Madanlog replaced the originally proposed Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio. Based on information obtained during the briefing meeting with SCPPO at the start of the field work, this was a typing error and that the figures for Bagacay included in the matrix of interventions given to the evaluation team are actually from Madanlog. Survey results from Barangay Madanlog was again dropped from the analysis since there was no education intervention in the area. This information was known to the evaluation team only during the presentation of the draft report. 6 Four households from this barangay are missing because they have relocated to a different barangay. All pre-selected alternates were exhausted, but there were still some missing from the total number of sample households. These were subsequently taken from other households within the FSL-Education survey.

To provide depth and context, FGDs and KIIs were also used during the field visit. A purposive selection of interviewees and participants in the FGDs was conducted in the sample barangays. The sample barangays were generally not covered by the household survey and are chosen with focus on education (i.e. teachers and children) and other respondent groups not covered by the household surveys (e.g. barangay selection committee, small-scale market traders, fishing association). For the education component, two (2) FGDs (one with teachers and one with children/pupils) were conducted in the three (3) beneficiary barangays/target areas where education intervention was implemented. For FSL, one FGD was conducted with community grant recipients, done jointly with an interview with the Barangay Council of Barangay San Fernando, Carles. Additional FGDs with the Barangay Selection Committee members and/or barangay officials were conducted in three other barangays where FSL was implemented. A total of eleven (11) FGDs with a total of 82 participants were conducted among the beneficiaries and stakeholders.

The FGDs conducted are as follows:

Table 5: List of Focus Group Discussions Barangay Barangay Barangay Barangay Barangay San Bancal Tanza Abong Nipa Fernando (Carles) (Estancia) (Carles) (Concepcion) (Carles) FSL – Community 1 Grant Education – 1 1 1 Teachers Education – 1 1 1 Children Barangay Selection 1 1 1 1 Committee and/or Barangay Council

Key informant interviews with local government units and DepEd officials, with a total of 9 respondents, were also conducted. In addition, the evaluation team also carried out FGDs and informal conversations with SCI staff, with a total of 13 participants.

The guide questions for the surveys, focus group discussions and key informant interviews were developed by the consultants and approved by the SCPPO and SCI. The survey instruments, guide questions for the FGDs and interviews were included in the inception report as annexes.

PART 2: FINDINGS Assessment of Effectiveness

SHO 1: Shelter/NFI Kits Facilitating repair of homes as well as collection of drinking water

The shelter kits and NFIs were among the first items distributed by Save the Children in the emergency period (FGD with Bancal Barangay Officials, 12 August 2015). SCI distributed 1,250 of these kits achieving its target 100% (SCNL.2014. “SHO 1 Terminal Report”; SCNL. 2015. “TOR External End Evaluation SHO Funded SCNL Response to Typhoon Haiyan”)7. In terms of supporting rebuilding of houses, the kit was able to provide tarpaulin for make-shift tents or roof/ceiling as immediate protection from the elements. Provisions for house construction was not included in this kit. On a longer-term basis, this support provided recipient families with the basic household items needed for more comfortable sleeping (e.g. blankets, mosquito nets), cooking, cleaning, washing clothes and collecting/storing water. Furthermore, households were given access to potable water through provision of water treatment tablets and water containers (FGD with Bancal Barangay Officials, 12 August 2015; FGD Tanza Barangay Officials, 6 August 2015).

The beneficiary households regarded the kits as being complete and useful (FGD with Bancal Barangay Officials, 12 August 2015; FGD Tanza Barangay Officials, 6 August 2015). Evaluation survey result shows that the top 5 most useful items kitchen set, tarpaulin, sleeping mat, blankets, and mosquito net. Along with soap and buckets, these are also the items that beneficiaries most easily recall (98-100% certainty) receiving from SCI. Less easily recalled were the jerry can (93% certainty), rope and AquaTabs or Pure sachets (58- 72% certainty). The shelter/NFI kits were confirmed by all survey respondents to be new and in excellent condition, and that all the items have been used.

Having the shelter kit was particularly important for majority of the beneficiaries (76.7%) since this was the only shelter/NFI kit they received. Other beneficiaries (23%) admitted having received similar items from other international and local NGOs, as seen in the table below.

Table 6: Support From other Organizations among SHO 1 Beneficiaries SIMILAR ITEMS FROM OTHERS, NOT SCI HH % YES 14 23.3 NO 46 76.7 TOTAL 60 100.00

7 There are inconsistencies in the figures of distributed shelter/NFI kits. In the SHO 1 Terminal Report, p. 3 says 1,333 HHs have received NFI kits but in p. 12 of the same report it says 1,250 kits have been distributed. SCP National Office record says that 2,250 Hygiene kits, 4,143 Household kits, and 4,143 Plastic sheetings were distributed (Louis Malleit, email correspondence with Annegre de Roos, 16 September 2014). This inconsistency in figures points to the challenges in recording and data management in the context of an emergency response (see Organizational Effectiveness part of this evaluation report).

SHO 1: Cash Transfer for Boat Repair Supporting the resumption of livelihood activities and generation of sufficient income for food security and market stabilization

The SHO-supported boat repair intervention was done only in 13 barangays in Carles, Iloilo where each recipient household received Php 15,000 (SCNL. 2015. “SHO 1 financial report”; SCNL. 2013. “SHO 1 Project Proposal”; FGD with Bancal Officials, 13 August 2015) to either repair or reconstruct their boat, depending on the damage it sustained. Evaluation survey result shows that all of the respondents (100%) had indeed received the 15,000 cash transfer. The cash grant was given in two tranches, with the release of the second tranche conditional on finishing a certain portion of the repairs (SCPPO. 2014. “PDM Boat Repair”).

Result of the evaluation survey shows that the majority of beneficiaries used the cash received according to its purpose. 61% used it to make a new boat, while the rest used the money to repair their old boat (35%), to buy fishing implements (3%), and other uses (1%). The post-distribution monitoring report (PDM) for the boat distribution confirms the survey results. It indicates that most of the recipients used the cash grant to purchase materials and equipment for boat repair, most notably engines.

In terms of sufficiency of support, most of the survey respondents (88 %) claimed that the amount of cash transfer was insufficient for them to complete their boat repair. Further, they indicated that they required an additional Php 5,000 – 10,000 to complete the task. Although a good majority (94.3%) of the beneficiaries were able to finish repairing and making a new boat, they did so by borrowing from family (37.7%), borrowing from local banks or microcredit agencies (37.7%), or savings (19.3%). Insufficiency of resources is one of the related reasons why 5.7% of the survey respondents were unable to complete the repairs on their boats.

The reported insufficiency of cash transfer confirms the data from the PDM report saying that 70.59% of the PDM respondents claimed that the cash grant was not enough for them to complete the repairs/reconstruction of their boats. The PDM further elaborated that this is because some materials were hard to acquire and were therefore more expensive (SCPPO. 2014. “PDM report”).

In terms of impact to livelihood and economic conditions, this evaluation finds that while the project was able to restore sources of livelihood for boat owners, it has not yet helped significantly increased income for the majority of the recipients to ensure food security. Fishing is the main source of livelihood for all of the beneficiaries

22 although they get supplemental income comes from government transfers (e.g. DSWD 4Ps) and from part time labor in farm and non-farm activities (Evaluation HH survey). FGD with beneficiaries revealed that while beneficiary households have resumed fishing activities they are currently generating only enough income for subsistence (FGD with Bancal Barangay Officials, 12 August 2015). One reason for this relates to the vulnerability of fishing-based livelihood to weather and climate. At the time of the evaluation, the stormy season normally experienced in the area has made fishing challenging, as their boats as small and the waves are high. This resulted in reported hunger and insufficiency of income for other needs, such as completing house repairs and generating savings. In addition, traditional coping mechanisms are not working as well as they did before. FGD participants indicated that it is now more difficult to borrow rice or money from within the community, as their usual person for recourse before Haiyan have also suffered losses and are similarly not yet back to pre-Haiyan income levels (FGD with Bancal Barangay Officials, 12 August 2015).

In terms of changes in income, the evaluation survey shows that a large majority (70%) of the beneficiaries claimed that their income in the past six (6) months has either stayed the same or decreased, while the rest indicated that their incomes have increased. Most of the beneficiaries (87%) have incomes below Php 5,000 per month, while 13% report incomes between Php 5,000 and Php 10,000 a month.

Table 7. SHO 1 Beneficiaries’ Income Before Haiyan vs. Current (Past 6 mos.) INCOME STATUS HH % THE SAME 46 36.22 INCREASED 38 29.92 DECREASED 43 33.86 TOTAL 127 100.00

Comparing to their status before Haiyan, 78% of surveyed beneficiaries claimed that their present assets and wealth are either the same as or less than their assets and wealth before Haiyan. In contrast, 22% said that their present assets and wealth are higher than they were before Haiyan.

Table 8: SHO 1 Beneficiaries’ Assets and Wealth Before Haiyan vs. Current (Past 6 mos.) ASSETS & WEALTH HH % THE SAME 51 40.16 INCREASED 28 22.05 DECREASED 48 37.80 TOTAL 127 100.00

These figures on income, assets and wealth combined indicate that while some of the respondents have already recovered, others have not. This is confirmed by the

23 statement from an FGD: “Nakabangon na, pero kulang siguro. Hindi pa tuwid.” (Recovered but still a little lacking. We are not yet standing straight). Given that the amount of the cash transfer was not enough for most of the beneficiaries, to the point of them becoming indebted to finish boat construction or repair, it is perhaps not reasonable to expect that their incomes from resuming livelihood activities would be sufficient to ensure food security.

Part of the boat repair cash transfer is capacity building on fishing regulations, environmentally-friendly fishing practices, and disaster risk reduction for recipient households (SCNL. 2013. “SHO 1 Project Proposal”). When asked about their participation in these trainings (Table 4), most do not recall having attended trainings or orientations on fishing regulations or environmentally-friendly fishing practices (74% and 70%, respectively). In contrast, more beneficiaries reported having attended the training on disaster risk reduction (63%) than those who said they did not attend these.

Table 9: SHO 1 Beneficiaries’ Participation in Orientation/Trainings FISHING ECO-FRIENDLY ATTENDED? DRR REGULATIONS FISHING YES 29 HH 25.9% 38 HH 30.2% 80 HH 63.0% NO 83 HH 74. 1% 88 HH 69.8% 47 HH 37.0% TOTAL 112 HH 100% 126 HH 100% 127 HH 100%

SHO 2: Education Facilitating safe access to schools

To facilitate safe access to schools of grade school students, SCI undertook repair of eight classrooms in three public elementary schools and constructed safety and security features in five public elementary schools and six day care centers, surpassing its target by 14%. In addition, SCI also constructed WASH facilities (latrines and hand washing stations) in seven elementary schools (SCPPO. 2015. “MEAL IPPT Report”). Debris clearing activities were not pursued because by the time the SHO-funded program started the schools were already cleared of debris (SCPPO staff. 2015. Meeting with authors, 4 August 2015).

SCI’s support to school infrastructure is considered important and helpful by the teachers and the school officials not only because it allowed classes to resume in a safe environment but also because national government’s action on restoring damaged infrastructure is perceived as slow (FGD with teachers; Interview with Aileen Sobremonte, 7 August 2015). Thus, the school heads, teachers, and school children felt relieved when their school was repaired by SCI (FGD with teachers consolidated findings; FGD with children consolidated findings), as one principal said, “we were not included and recommended by the municipal Mayor but we are praying for our sponsor because other school has double sponsors…luckily, Abong Elementary School was sponsored by the Save the Children; saved by the Save the Children. They repaired 3 classrooms which is very good” (FGD with teachers, 10 August 2015).

To be sure, the repairs and construction work did not have much impact on the resumption of classes or in the school attendance of students. In the SHO-funded areas, classes in elementary school resumed a week after the typhoon but they held the classes under the tree or in makeshift spaces (Interview with Aileen Sobremonte, 7 August 2015; FGD with teachers, 10 August 2015). In the two elementary schools where FGDs for this evaluation were conducted, the students’ drop-out rate and cohort survival rate remain the same as their pre-Yolanda rates (FGD with teachers). However, what the infrastructure support did was build back a safe and conducive space for teaching and learning. Hence, the teachers and children felt inspired and more motivated in going to school (FGD with teachers; FGD with children). The children are particularly happy with the repair of their classrooms as they had been holding classes in a tent or on the stage after the typhoon. So when it rains they run to covered areas and some children slip on dirt (FGD with children, 10 August 2015). This issue has been addressed with the repairs of their classrooms.

Except for few problems in the construction work which were quickly resolved, the quality of the classroom repairs and construction work are positively rated by the school heads and teachers (FGD with teachers). The district supervisor said: “Yung Save, yung mga engineers, mas istrikto. Kaya nga sabi ng mga school heads, puro na lang kaya NGO ang gumawa ng mga schools natin kasi matibay, maganda pa ang quality (The SCI engineers are stricter that is why the school heads wished that the NGOs would do all the school repairs so that the all are durable and in good quality)” (Interview with Aileen Sobremonte, 7 August 2015). The construction and repair of WASH facilities in schools are also regarded as important and useful by the teachers and school heads. The teachers are relieved that the students do not have to walk far and outside of the school to fetch water (FGD with teachers, 12 August 2015).

The recreational materials are also found to be useful and are used by both girls and boys when they need them (FGD with teachers Consolidated Findings). What the teachers appreciate more are the armchairs as they are found to be in better quality compared to the ones issued by the government (FGD with teachers Consolidated Findings).

Quickly Re-engaging Children and Teachers in the Learning Process

SCI’s support in school infrastructure rehabilitation is complemented by its provision of teaching and learning materials, including hygiene kits. SCI has distributed 12,699 school kits to children, surpassing its target by 270%. It has also distributed hygiene kits to seven schools benefiting 1,286 school children (SCPPO. 2015. “MEAL IPPT Report”). For the

25 teachers, SCI provided 101teaching kits, surpassing its target by 3%. In addition to student’s kits and teacher’s kits, SCI also distributed blackboards, arm chairs, tables and recreational materials to seven public elementary schools (SCNL. 2014. SHO Program Interim Report).

Teacher’s kit:

The teacher’s kit was very much appreciated by the teachers and the school heads. All the teachers who participated in this evaluation study said that the teaching materials were complete and useful to the point that only few of the materials are left nowadays (FGD with teachers Consolidated Findings). The manila paper and markers were especially useful when classes resumed after the typhoon as the teachers used them as substitute for the lost or damaged blackboards (FGD with teachers Consolidated Findings). The raincoats and umbrella for teachers are perceived by teachers to be durable and in good quality (FGD with teachers Consolidated Findings). The kits did not only help the teachers in teaching but it also helped them economically, as one teacher said, “Nakatulong talaga ang kit sa paggamit sa school at nakasave kami dahil wala kaming pambili (the kits are really useful in school and it allows us some savings which is a big deal because we don’t have money to spare) (FGD with teachers, 12 August 2012).

The only issue mentioned in terms of the materials is the red marker, as this is not often used by teachers in their lessons and one teacher got all red markers in her kit (FGD with teachers, 10 August 2015). The more important issue as regards the teachers’ kits stems from confusion over ownership of the kit. For instance, a teacher who was transferred to another school brought her teaching kit with her which caused displeasure to the principal of her former school. The principal has been demanding that the she gives back the kit to her former school to which the teacher refuses (FGD with teachers, 12 August 2015). This issue could be avoided by clarifying ownership/custodianship with the school head and recipients (teachers) at the outset. Another unintended consequence of the distribution of teacher’s kits (and student’s kits) is brought about by non-uniformity in the kits supported by different SCI grants. Fueled by social media, the varying kits unintentionally caused comparison and discontent among the teachers (Interview with Aileen Sobremonte, 7 August 2015).

Student’s kit:

The evaluation survey result shows that of the 83 households, 55 (66.3%) received the school kit, and 28 (33.7%) did not8. Of those who received the school kit, 42 of the recipients (76.4%) remember having received the school kit once while 13 others

8 The sample for the education survey was drawn from the list of FSL beneficiaries. Barangay Mandanlog was covered by the education survey as it has replaced the original survey site which is Bagacay (see Introduction part on methodology). However, there was a mistake in nominating Madanlog since there was no education intervention in the area. This information was known to the evaluation team after the fact, hence, education survey data from Madanlog were excluded in the analysis contained in this final report.

(23.6%) claimed receiving it twice. FGDs with teachers and children reveal that all the children receive the student kit. It is possible that some of those who said not having received the school kit have no children in elementary school or transferees. But, it is also likely that some children received two kits at the expense of the other children.

Table 10: Survey Result of School Kit Receipt SCHOOL KIT EMBARCADERO NIPA TANZA TOTAL Yes 6 32 17 55 % 46.15 61.54 94.44 66.27 No 7 20 1 28 % 53.85 38.46 5.56 33.73 Total 13 52 18 83 % 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

Of the 55 households that received the school kit, 54 have children in grade school. The survey encountered 1 beneficiary who should not have qualified, e.g. child is not in elementary or grade school level. There are three possible reasons for this: 1) the kit was gifted; 2) the child was in grade 6 when the kit was given and are now in high school when the survey was conducted; 3) there was a leakage in the distribution process.

There seems to be a general satisfaction in the distribution of the student kits. Survey results show that many remember receiving the kit within 2 months after Haiyan (41%), others claimed it was on the 3rd month (31%), and the rest answered 4 months and more (28%).

Table 11: Time the Beneficiaries Received the School Kit TIME RECEIVED HH % BETWEEN 1-2 MOS 24 41.38 AFTER 3 MOS 18 31.03 OTHERS, SPECIFIED (ANSWERED 4MOS, 16 27.59 6MOS, 1YR) TOTAL 58 100.00

On the average, 50 of the 55 respondents have confirmed receiving all items in a kit (i.e. 9 items plus the bag). 53 households (96.4%) received the kit in excellent and new condition, while there were 2 beneficiaries (3.6%) receiving a poor or dilapidated set. All 55 beneficiaries responded that they were satisfied about the school kit.

The process of distribution was orderly (FGD with children consolidated findings; FGD with teachers consolidated findings). Distributing the kit in the classrooms or in school made the experience a familiar one (96.4% respondents confirmed the location). The children were made to line up, as it is the way in schools. Getting the kit was a breeze, i.e. 48.2% got their kits in less than 15 minutes. The rest after that but only up to an hour.

Table 12. Waiting time for the School Kit Waiting Time No. of HH % 15min-Less 26 48.2 15min-30min 13 24.07 30min- 1hr 13 24.07 W>1hr 2 3.70 TOTAL 54 100.00

During the actual distribution of kits, some respondents (11 out of 55 parents or 20%) witnessed pushing and scrambling among participants, but this was all the trouble that’s been observed. Overall, the children and teachers are satisfied with the distribution of school kit (FGD with teachers consolidated findings; FGD with children consolidated findings). The parents are satisfied as well, with the majority (56.36%) giving the organizers the highest mark (Excellent= Fast and orderly, and children are well taken care of). No failure marks for this one.

Table 13: Rating Performance – Distribution of School Kit RATING HH % EXCELLENT 31 56.36 VERY GOOD 21 38.18 GOOD 3 5.45 POOR 0 0 VERY POOR 0 0 TOTAL 55 100.00

The student’s school kits are well appreciated by the children, teachers and school heads (FGD with children, FGD with teachers, Interview with District Supervisor, 7 August 2015). Survey result also shows all the parents expressed satisfaction (100%). And the same with the children, parents reported that they were all happy (100%).

The children liked most items in the kit although they wished that shoes and umbrella were included in the kit (FGD with children, 10 August 2015). Survey result also shows that parents would have wanted shoes, umbrella and uniform included in the kit. All 55 parents found every item in the kit useful (All useful = 90.9%, Most contents useful = 9.1%). However, the children find some items like the raincoats and bags (because they are easily torn) and the rain boots (because of misfit sizes) not to their liking (FGD children Consolidated Findings). The top most useful according to the parents are presented in Table 14.

Table 14. Most Useful Items in the School Kit SCHOOL BAG 46 votes NOTEBOOKS 38 votes PENCILS 28 votes RAIN COAT 20 votes RAIN BOOTS 15 votes

In terms of impact, the teachers have observed that the children are more excited in going to school wearing their new bag packs and school supplies. Right after receiving the kits, some children wore their raincoats even if it is not raining (FGD with teachers consolidated findings).

The school kits have no effect on the children’s school attendance, yet it has helped in the health and well-being of the children and bolstered their motivation in going to school, as a teacher in an island barangay said, “may gagamitin na ang mga bata sa klase. Noon pumapasok pa rin ang mga bata kahit umuulan pero basang basa sila pagdating sa eskwela. Ngayon, hindi na sila nababasa dahil gamit na nila ang raincoat (Now the children have the things needed to go to class. Before, the children go to school even when it is raining but they are dripping wet when they get to school. Now, they are no longer wet from the rain because they are using their raincoats)” (FGD with teachers, 10 August 2015). In addition, the lunchbox and tumbler enabled the children to bring packed lunch to school instead of going home thereby keeping them safe and more rested, as the children said: “mas OK ang gabalun kay layo among balay, kapoy” (it is better to bring our lunch in school because our house is far and walking home for lunch is tiring) (FGD with children, 10 August 2015).

Equally important, the provision of school kits has contributed economically to the households as the provision of the kits defrayed the cost of children’s school supplies (Interview with Aileen Sobremonte, 7 August 2015). The principal of Abong Elementary School said: “the parents are aware that Save the Children will give some school supplies so they don’t buy their children school supplies anymore” (FGD with teachers, 10 August 2015). A complete set normally cost between Php500 and Php2,000 for each child. Had the parents bought the school supplies It would have been a heavy financial burden given that the estimated monthly income of majority of the beneficiaries is below Php5,000 (Evaluation HH Survey).

Hygiene kit:

The hygiene kits and the WASH IEC activities were also deemed important and useful (FGD with teachers Consolidated Findings). However, the hygiene kits were not distributed to all students. Only grade 5 and 6 students were given hygiene kits, and not all of students in these grade levels got them (FGD with teachers, 10 August 2015 & 12 August 2015; FGD with Children 10 August 2015). Hence, in the interest of fairness, some schools resorted to redistribution or augment the supply from their own pockets so others can have the hygiene materials (FGD with teachers, 10 August 2012). The teachers said, “selected pupils lang binigyan, kulang siguro ang supply. Kung kulang ang supply sana huwag na lang magbigay kasi ang bata masama ang loob kung hindi nabigyan. May mga

29 batang umiyak, kami na lang ang nagprovide ng mga gamit kasi nakakaawa” (Only selected students were given hygiene kits probably because the supply was not enough. If indeed there was insufficient supply, it would have been better not to give at all because a child will feel bad if he/she does not receive something. Students who were not given hygiene kits cried so we took it upon ourselves to given them something because we felt sorry for them) (FGD with teachers, 12 August 2015). The wisdom of universal provision, as implied by the teachers, is reflected in the SPHERE guideline which suggests, “If the general living conditions of an affected population were already significantly below the minimum standards before the disaster, agencies may have insufficient resources to meet the standards. In such situations, providing basic facilities for the entire affected population may be more important than reaching the minimum standards for only a proportion” (SPHERE Handbook, 2011).

Building teachers’ capacity in providing psychosocial support and protective learning environment for children

To help children recover psychologically from the traumatic effect of the super typhoon SCI equipped teachers with the knowledge and skills in providing psychosocial support as well education in emergencies. SCI conducted training on psychosocial support to 428 public elementary school teachers and organized seven Teacher’s Circles which served as support group for teachers (SCPPO. 2015. “MEAL IPPT Report”).

All the teachers who participated in this evaluation study recalled having attended the psychosocial training and teacher’s circle training (FGD with teachers consolidated findings). Some even said that SCI carried out psychosocial intervention session with the teachers and children (FGD with teachers, 12 August 2015; FGD with San Fernando ES children, 10 August 2015). The teachers said that both training were important and useful but the psychosocial support training was more on a theoretical level; it fell short of providing teachers with practical exercises, something that the teachers said would be more useful (FGD with teachers Consolidated Findings). In terms of application of the psychosocial training, some of the teachers said that there were able to apply what they have learned to children who have not yet recovered from their traumatic experience (FGD with Abong ES teachers, 10 August 2015). Other teachers said that they have not yet applied what they had learned from the training because the children have already recovered from the trauma of typhoon Yolanda (FGD with San Fernando ES teachers, 10 August 2015). Still, other said they have been instinctively applying psychosocial intervention all along only to find out in the training that those are part of the psychosocial intervention.

The teachers’ circle and the teachers’ circle training were positively perceived by most of the teachers and all of the school heads who have participated in this evaluation study. The teachers perceive the teacher’s circle training as useful as they have learned something new from it such as what the District Supervisor said, “Knowing yourself and knowing others and how to deal with people around

30 you”(Interview with Aileen Sobremonte, 7 August 2015). Moreover, the teachers said, “in teachers’ circle we learn to be relaxed, to have recreation activity, stress debriefing, sharing and teambuilding” (FGD with teachers, 10 August 2015). The way the training was organized (i.e. participants were teachers from all public elementary school covered by the 5th Congressional District) had a positive effect in socialization and fostering a sense of teacher’s community. The follow-up activities in each participating school reinforced cooperation. The District Supervisor and Head Teacher of Concepcion Central school said, “Parang nag-iiba ang outlook ng mga teachers. Dati kasi mayroon din namang teacher na kayo lang diyan. Pero now they feel they belong. Kahit minsan ayaw lang maging outcast…Kahit ang mga retireable age, sumasabay na rin sila” (It seems the outlook of teachers has been changing. Before, there were teachers who just mind their own business but now they feel that they belong even if at times they join social activities because they don’t want to be outcast. Teachers of retireable age are now also joining social activities) (Interview with Aileen Sobremonte and Anne Suiza, 7 August 2015).

SCI’s training-orientation on education in emergencies and child-centered learning environment has reinforced and complemented prior knowledge and disposition of school heads and teachers. To be sure, the Philippines has existing legal frameworks that guarantees child protection in schools—i.e. Dep Ed Order No. 40 Child Protection Policy issued in 2012 and the Anti Bullying Act of 2013. Thus, it is not surprising that the school heads would say, “kahit walang Save the Children at UNICEF (Even in the absence of Save the Children or UNICEF), we see to it that we have child friendly spaces. More or less 90% of the school heads are doing the right thing… nowadays we see to it we go more on the needs of our children than our personal needs” (Interview with Aileen Sobremonte and Anne Suiza, 7 August 2015).

What the teachers need in terms of capacity building is the DRR training and DRR drills (FGD with teachers Consolidated Findings). The principal of Abong Elementary School explains: “hindi kami naka undergo ng DRR ang mga teachers, that’s why you can’t see nga may anu kami plan where the people go during typhoon (we haven’t had a DRR training for teachers that is why you cannot see that we have a plan of where the people should go during typhoon). We are required to have DRR plan and the principal is required to have a DRR manual, but because we have not undergone a DRR training, we don’t have that yet” (FGD with teachers, 10 August 2015). Unfortunately, while this type of training was provided by SCI under different grants, this was not

31 included in the SHO-funded program, hence the schools targeted for the SHO grant did not receive DRR training for teachers.

Ensuring nuanced needs assessment of school children and comprehensive support to children and the education system

Ensuring the comprehensive support to school children and the education system during emergency was primarily done thru supporting the staff and operations of the International Humanitarian Assistance Education Cluster. SCI (at that time the SCI Estancia Haiyan Field Office) devoted its Education Program Manager as co- coordinator of the said education cluster in Panay Island or Western Visayas. In addition to the co-coordinator position, SCI also deployed a MEAL officer to the education cluster to take charge of the cluster’s information management system. SCPPO’s co-coordination of the education cluster lasted until June 2014 at the time when the UN-led Cluster system has phased out and turned over management to the relevant government agencies such as the Department of Education for the education cluster (Interview with Felinor Villa, 12 August 2015).

Under the co-leadership of SCI, the education cluster in Region 6 worked as planned. It has trained 132 Dep Ed officials, cluster members and field responders in INEE Minimum Standards (SCPPO. 2015. MEAL IPPT Matrix). It has also trained Dep Ed personnel in data management and supported the infrastructure of the cluster’s information system (Interview with Felinor Villa, 12 August 2015).

DepEd officials, school heads and LGU officials speak highly of SCI’s cluster coordination work. The cluster was composed of Dep Ed, SCI, UNICEF and other major NGOs with education intervention such as Action Against Hunger (ACF), Child Fund and World Vision. Cluster coordination meetings were held regularly--once a month at the regional level and also once a month at the district level (5th Congressional District of Iloilo (Interview with Aileen Sobremonte, 7 August 2012; Interview with Felinor Villa, 12 August 2015). Inter-cluster meetings were also held at the regional and town/municipal level (Interview with Felinor Villa, 12 August 2015; Interview with Concepcion municipal Mayor, 7 August 2015; Interview with Carles municipal Mayor, 11 August 2015).

There was a clear division of tasks and division of geographic coverage between SCPPO and UNICEF as co-leads of the cluster. Discussions and decisions made at the education cluster had informed SCI’s and other cluster members’ decisions in terms of where to support and what specific types of intervention be made. This was possible because of the up-to-date information and efficient data management system established in the cluster thru the SCI education MEAL person. Monthly needs assessment and mapping of intervention in schools were done via the Dep Ed structure (i.e. from school heads to the division supervisor and up to the division superintendent) and centralized in the cluster’s data base system which was managed by SCI (Interview with Felinor Villa, 12 August 2015). A district supervisor explains:

“Noon una lahat ng district supervisors na affected ng Yolanda kasama sa meetings pati na rin yung ICT coordinators namin dahil sila ang focal persons sa data banking. Yung mga data diretso yan sa Save then naka-cascade na iyan sa regional at division office. Makikita dyan lahat ng mga project, lahat ng mga benefits. Kasi may updating kami. So nag-baseline data kami: ilan ang schools na na-damage, ilan na ang mga na-temporary--at may monthly reporting kami. Anything from anyone naka-record doon. Nakatulong talaga itong data banking na ito kasi makikita, kahit sa regional office, makikita kung ano ba talaga ang mga schools na hindi naka-receive ng mga tulong. And even iyong mga assistance from other schools in the division” (In the beginning all the district supervisors of Yolanda-affected areas participated in the meetings, including our ICT coordinators because they are the focal persons for the data banking. The data went directly to Save the Children and then cascaded to the regional and division office [of DepEd]. From the data bank you could see all the projects, all the benefits because we do have updating. We conducted a baseline— how many schools were damaged, how many schools have temporary learning spaces—and then we have a monthly reporting [updates]. Anything from anyone are recorded in that data base. This really helped us a lot because you can see what schools have not yet received any assistance up to the regional and division level) (Interview with Aileen Sobremonte, 7 August 2012).

The cluster system and having dedicated person for cluster activities had helped SCI in the implementation of the SHO-funded interventions. For example, the focus of SHO-funded intervention in the psychosocial training for teachers and the phasing of some of its activities were certainly based on DepEd’s proposals as discussed in cluster meetings (Interview with Felinor Villa, 12 August 2015). In addition, cluster coordination was able to limit overlaps and resolve potential duplication of interventions among cluster members by striving for complementation instead. Moreover, the cluster coordination has also contributed to expand SCI’s reach beyond Iloilo and Capiz—i.e. since the cluster is organized at the regional level stakeholders from the provinces of Aklan and Antique were also able to attend cluster-organized training (Interview with Felinor Villa, 12 August 2015).

However, there were challenges in the cluster coordination work. Rapid turn-over of cluster meeting representatives from other cluster members and certain personality clashes produced some misunderstandings over cluster agreements. More significantly, the cluster was not able to totally abate duplication of interventions in certain areas. Non-cluster NGO members and foundations tended to go directly to areas with ongoing or planned intervention from cluster members without coordination with the cluster or even the LGUs (Interview with Felinor Villa, 12 August 2015; Interview with Concepcion LGU officials, 7 August 2015; Interview with Carles municipal Mayor, 11 August 2015). There were also cases where duplication of intervention resulted from

33 oversupply of relief goods coupled with the school head’s desire to receive same type of interventions from multiple agencies (Interview with Felinor Villa, 12 August 2015). For instance, this evaluation finds that in two schools wherein SCI distributed SHO-funded student’s kits, they have also received student’s kits from two or more agencies, thereby creating unnecessary comparisons between the kits of different agencies.

Summary of Education Effectiveness:

This evaluation finds the SHO-funded education intervention effective in providing relief to parents, children and teachers and also in recovering the infrastructure and capacity of schools and teachers to provide quality learning environment for children.

The infrastructure development (repairs and construction) has provided a safer and more conducive learning space. The construction of WASH facilities facilitates a healthier learning environment although its effectiveness (utilization) is dampened by deeper environmental issues (availability and portability/safety of water) and poor piping materials.

The teacher’s and student’s kits provided the teachers and parents economic relief and it also helped encourage children to go to school. The distribution process of teacher’s and student’s kits is found to be effective and orderly. However, selective distribution of certain items like the WASH kit has unintentionally left the excluded children disappointed and heavy-hearted. This has also created undue burden to school heads and teachers. Inconsistency in the contents and quality of the teacher’s kits (possibly from various SCI grants) has also created unnecessary discontent among the teachers of different schools. This should prompt SCI to be more careful and sensitive to the subculture of public school teachers when managing similar type of intervention under different grants.

The capacity building activities for teachers are found to be effective in not only increasing knowledge on dealing with school children but also in dealing with their own well-being. However, the psychosocial training would be more effective had there been practical exercises and skills transfer. What is missing in the SHO-funded training intervention which the teachers articulated as their need is the DRR training for teachers.

The effectiveness of the SHO-funded education intervention is partly a result of the effective functioning of the education cluster system. Having dedicated staffs to co- coordinate the Western Visayas cluster and manage the information system was beneficial to both SCI and DepEd. The cluster system and its data base were instrumental in determining the relevant types, phases and areas of intervention. It has also limited duplication of similar interventions to a certain extent.

SHO 2: Food Security and Livelihood (FSL)

Among the goals of the second phase of the SHO grant is to support increase in income and food access for fishing communities, through diversification of marine livelihoods and increased capacity to manage fishing resources (SCNL. 2013. SHO II Project Proposal). To achieve this, SCI planned three cash-based livelihood support that were intended to follow up on the support to the fishing sector given in SHO I: the Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT) to fishing households; Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) to households for alternative livelihood; CCT or community grant to community associations for marine environment recovery; Cash transfer or in-kind support for construction of fish aggregating materials; Cash transfer for small fish market traders (SCNL. 2013. SHO II Project Proposal). Of these five types on intervention, only three were implemented the under SHO grant. These are the UCT, CCT for household livelihood, and community grant to fishing associations. All of these interventions took place in 2014. The other two (support to small market traders and support for construction of fish aggregating materials) were implemented albeit supported by a different grant9.

Using the classification on livelihood recovery used by the UNISDR in the 2010 Guidance Note on Recovery: Livelihood, the FSL interventions under SHO fall under “livelihood provisioning”, “livelihood protection” and “livelihood promotion”. Livelihood provisioning entails “a set of relief-based interventions that involve providing food and meeting other essential needs for households to maintain nutritional levels and save lives”. Gauging from the project proposal, the UCT intervention has goals that reflect that of livelihood provisioning and livelihood protection. On the other hand, the CCT falls under both livelihood protection and livelihood promotion. Livelihood protection “is a set of interventions that involve protecting household livelihood systems to prevent an erosion of productive assets and replacing or rebuilding of productive assets”. Finally, the community grant falls under livelihood promotion as it is a “development based interventions that involve improving the resilience of household livelihoods so that food and other basic needs can be met on a sustainable basis” (UNISDR. 2010. pp.7-8). These definitions and classifications

9 The SHO 2 IPTT report indicates that 269 households (531 less than the target of 800 households) have benefitted from the support to construct fishing aggregating devices. However, there is no trace of budgetary spending for this item among the SHO 2 financial documents, thus it is likely that this activity was supported by a different grant. The support for small market traders was also charged to a different grant (Briefing with SC Staff, 3 August, 2015).

35 are used in this evaluation study to gauge whether the UCT, the CCT, and the CG have contributed to livelihood recovery of the beneficiaries.

Based on the household survey of beneficiaries conducted for this evaluation, 37.3% (41 households) of respondents received both UCT and CCT (see Table 15 below). Of the 41 household respondents, 63.4% received both UCT and CCT support from the SHO grant (from Barangay Nipa, Concepcion), while the rest received either CCT or UCT from a different SCI grant.

Table15: Distribution of UCT and CCT Beneficiaries Intervention No. of Sampled % to Total Households Households Unconditional Cash Transfer 22 20.0 (Php 4,100) Conditional Cash Transfer 47 42.7 (Php 6,000) Both (Total of Php 10,100) 41 37.3 TOTAL 110 100.0 Total UCT Recipients (UCT-only + Both) = 63 households Total CCT Recipients (CCT-only + Both) = 88 households

Unconditional Cash Transfer to sustain food intake and limit negative coping strategies and further loss of productive assets

Based on financial records10, the UCT was distributed to 2,066 households, 106.6% more than the target of 1,000 households. Originally, SCI targeted 1,000 households, with the cash grant given in two tranches of Php 4,600 each. However, this was changed to a one-time transfer of Php 4,100 that covered more beneficiaries. “The changes were made to meet the food basket value and to ensure standard rate applied across different [SCI] grants. It had been also necessary to do one tranche instead of two since the general food security situation was improving and the target was too small to maintain two tranches” (SCNL. 2015. SHO II Interim Report).

This evaluation finds that the UCT has achieved the goal of enabling beneficiaries’ access to food (livelihood provisioning). It was also successful in enabling beneficiaries’ access to livelihood activities (livelihood protection). That is, of the 63 households who received UCT (includes those who received UCT-only and those who received both UCT and CCT), 92.06% (58 households) spent the money on food items. A large majority of households also used the grant for livelihood activities (71.43%), while eighteen households (28.57%) also used part of the money on non-food items. For households that only received UCT, 28.57% spent the cash grant on food while 11.11% spent the cash on non-food items.

10 This figure varies from the figure reported in the SHO II IPTT matrix, which is 2,936.

Table 16: Cash Grant Spending among UCT Recipients Food Non-Food Livelihood No. of HH % to total No. of HH % to total No. of HH % to total UCT-Only 18 28.57% 7 11.11% 8 12.70% UCT and CCT 40 63.49% 11 17.46% 37 58.73% TOTAL 58 92.06% 18 28.57% 45 71.43%

Interestingly, among the UCT-only recipients, the survey showed that 36% (8 HH out of 22 HH) also spent part of the cash grant they received on livelihood activities, such as fishing (including dried fish, crab harvesting), livestock-raising, vending, and services (e.g. passenger tricycle). Of these households, two households claimed that their livelihood established through the cash grant still exist. Those that no longer exist are due to lack of money or credit to buy inputs, bad or unreliable weather conditions, fishing season considerations (i.e. fish used for drying is not in season), and health issues.

It is clear that UCT recipients (both UCT-only and UCT and CCT) preferred to spend most of the cash grant on food items over other uses (see Table 16). Those who used the money for non-food items used them to provide for housing, health, livelihood/business, and repayment of loans. Of these, health reasons and repayment of loans were the most frequently reported (9 incidences each), followed by house construction (5 incidences), and livelihood/business (3 incidences).

The household survey also asked whether or not the uses of the UCT were able to help the beneficiaries recover their income from livelihood. In the survey, this is measured by the degree to which beneficiaries have been able to recover to their pre-Haiyan income status. The table below shows how they compare their pre-Haiyan income to their income for the past six months. Almost half (45.45%) of the UCT-only respondents said that their current income is already the same as their pre-Haiyan income and 18.18% said their income is now higher than pre-Haiyan levels. On the other hand, 36.36% of UCT-only respondents said their incomes have decreased compared to pre- Haiyan levels. For those who received both UCT and CCT, 41.46% stated that their current income matches their pre-Haiyan income, while 24.39% said that their incomes now are higher than before the typhoon. However, a little over one third (34.15%) of those who received both UCT and CCT claimed that their present incomes are a decrease from their incomes before Haiyan hit (i.e. have not yet recovered to pre- Haiyan income status).

Table 17: UCT Recipient Households’ Present Income Compared to Pre-Haiyan Same Increased Decreased No. of HH % to total No. of HH % to total No. of HH % to total UCT-Only 10 45.45% 4 18.18% 8 36.36% UCT and CCT 17 41.46% 10 24.39% 14 34.15% TOTAL 27 42.86% 14 22.22% 22 34.92%

Looking at whether having multiple FSL interventions per household is better, we can see that 65.85% of households that received both UCT and CCT have already recovered (same income or increased income compared to pre-Haiyan). Among those that received only UCT, the figure is only slightly less at 63.64%. This implies that there is no significant difference among those who received only UCT and those who received both UCT and CCT in terms of success in recovering income.

This is corroborated by the data that shows that there is no significant difference among the households that declared a decrease in income compared to pre-Yolanda among UCT-only recipients (36.36%) than among those who received both UCT and CCT (34.15%).

This lack of significant difference in income recovery may be because the additional support that households received from other donors acted as an equalizer. Among UCT-only recipient households, 68.18% reported that they also received different packages of support from other agencies. Combining the UCT with other support received from other donors may have made up for the Php 6,000 difference in the cash grants between UCT-only and UCT and CCT recipients.

This evaluation finds that the UCT intervention successfully provided the means for households to provide food and other essential needs (livelihood provisioning). It was also successful in protecting livelihood, by enabling some households who only received the UCT to conduct income-generating activities using this cash transfer. As measured by their income status as compared to before Haiyan, the UCT was effective in contributing to livelihood provision for those that have reported the same income as pre-Haiyan and livelihood protection for those that have reported increase in income compared to pre-Haiyan. Overall, it contributed to livelihood recovery of some 65% of all UCT recipient respondents (same and increased incomes).

Conditional Cash Transfer to households for alternative marine livelihood activities

The design for the conditional cash transfer for alternative marine livelihoods recognizes that lack of access to livelihood, having only a single income source, and seasonal vulnerability of fishing are challenges to recovery (SCNL. 2013. SHO II Project Proposal). To respond to these, the project aimed to provide 1,000 households with cash transfers to engage in alternative livelihood sources. The grants were delivered in two tranches, wherein the second tranche is conditional on recipient households having fulfilled terms related to the spending of the cash grant. By the end of the project,

1,00011 households have been given Php 6,000, along with training on disaster risk reduction, achieving 100% of its target (SCNPPO. 2015. SHO Interim Financial Report).

The result of the evaluation household survey shows that a large majority (88.64%) of all CCT beneficiaries (CCT only and both CCT&UCT) used the CCT for livelihood purposes. The evaluation survey result also reveals that not all of the CCT beneficiaries used the cash transfer for livelihood. The survey results indicate that 11.36% (1012 of the 88) sample households reported that they did not spend the cash grant on livelihood activities, which could mean that these beneficiaries slipped through the conditionality assessment (i.e. they were still given the second tranche) or that the cash grant has served its purpose of providing flexibility to recipients (see discussion on household cash flow management below). All but one of these 10 households indicated that they spent the money on food, with one stating they spent the money on non-food items (not classified in the survey choices). Only two have received support from other institutions (both indicated the support came from private donors/other NGOs). This may be indicative of prevailing food insecurity as it seems these households preferred to use the grant for immediate survival (i.e. food).

Table 18: Cash Grant Spending among CCT Recipients Food Non-Food Livelihood No. of HH % to total No. of HH % to total No. of HH % to total CCT-Only 27 57.45% 11 23.40% 41 87.23% UCT and CCT 40 63.49% 11 17.46% 37 58.73% TOTAL 67 76.14% 22 25.00% 78 88.64%

The survey also shows that of the total CCT recipients (including CCT-only and CCT & UCT recipients), 76.14% reported that they used the cash grant for food items, while 25% used the cash grant for non-food items. It should be noted that households may have spent the money on two or three of the spending categories (i.e. they spent part of the money on food and part on livelihood, or spent part on food and part on non- food items).

The use of the CCT for items other than livelihood may be reflective of the cash flow management system/practice of the recipient households. This evaluation finds that the CCT distribution design (with two tranches) allowed beneficiaries greater flexibility in responding to their needs, and fulfils one the common reasons13 for giving cash

11 This figure was derived from the SHO grant interim financial report as of January 2015. The data from the SHO 2 IPTT indicates that 2,000 households were given CCT. 12 These households are all located in Nipa, Concepcion and Tanza, Estancia. 13 Cash transfers increase recipients’ purchasing power and empowers them by allowing recipients to provide for their personal needs based on locally-available goods. Other reasons for providing cash grants during emergency response are to assist in reviving local markets and to promote self-directed recovery. Additionally, cash-based interventions are easier to deliver than in-kind support, and can be timelier (Jaspars & Harvey. 2007; UNISDR. 2010; Creti & Jaspars. 2006).

rather than in-kind support. Part of the grant required that households meet conditionalities before the second tranche of the grant is given to them. Several beneficiaries narrated that they used the cash grant for other, non-livelihood purposes after having already passed the conditionality assessment to receive the second tranche (personal communication/fieldwork observation). Despite not using all or part of the second tranche of the CCT for their livelihood, over 70% of the beneficiaries claimed that their chosen livelihood still exists. Thus, the households may have just used the immediately available cash (from the CCT 2nd tranche) for other uses and found other sources of cash to plow back into their livelihood activities. This cash management practice allowed the beneficiaries to provide for their most immediate needs without sacrificing their livelihood activities.

Table 19: Livelihood Activities Established by CCT Recipients Fishing/ Small Grocery Food Stall Livestock Others (not Farming Store Raising classified) No. of % to No. % to No. of % to No. of % to No. of % to HH total of HH total HH total HH total HH total CCT- 28 59.57% 0 0.00% 1 2.13% 2 4.26% 13 27.66% Only UCT and 23 56.10% 1 2.44% 1 2.44% 2 4.88% 10 24.39% CCT TOTAL 51 57.95% 1 1.14% 2 2.27% 4 4.55% 23 26.14%

This evaluation finds that the CCT for household livelihood has had some effect on fostering livelihood diversification. The survey shows that the while majority (57.95%) of all CCT beneficiaries spent the cash grant on fishing and farming (including seaweed farming) activities, 26.24% all CCT beneficiaries also spent the grant on other businesses not otherwise classified (e.g. pedicab, rice buy and sell, dried fish). Other livelihood activities engaged in were livestock raising, food stall (kainan), and small grocery store (sari-sari store). This distribution is roughly the same for both CCT-only and CCT and UCT recipients. Combing all those who engaged in non-fishing/farming livelihood, 34% of CCT recipients (both CCT-only and CCT&UCT) diversified their livelihood sources.

Of the households (CCT only and UCT+CCT) that said they used the cash grant for livelihood activities, 72.34% of CCT-only recipients said that this activity is still existing, while 73.17% of those who received both UCT and CCT have retained their livelihoods. For those whose livelihood activity they spent the grant on no longer exists, lack of money or credit to buy inputs was the most frequent reason. Other reasons cited were bad or unreliable weather, fishing season considerations (i.e. fish used for drying is not in season), health issues, and lack of household labor (Evaluation HH survey). Thus, this evaluation finds no evidence of unsustainable coping practices such as sale of productive assets.

Looking at income recovery to pre-Haiyan status (see Table 21), the evaluation survey reveals that less than 40% of the beneficiaries have incomes that are already similar to their pre-Haiyan levels. On the other hand, 28% of the respondents indicated that their incomes have increased compared to before the typhoon. Still, there is a significant portion (32%) that reported that their incomes have decreased, compared to their incomes before Haiyan. In terms of livelihood recovery, these data collectively mean that the 28% of the respondents who reported increased income are in a better position to generate necessary assets to generate income than the other groups. Those whose present incomes are the same as pre-Haiyan have recovered, but only to their pre-existing vulnerability. Those whose current incomes are still below pre- Haiyan levels are the worst off.

At present most (71%) of the beneficiary households (UCT only, CCT only and UCT+CCT) have their income below Php 5,000 in a month. There is a significant number (23%) who reported that they earn incomes between Php 5,000 and Php 10,000, while there are four respondents who said their income is between Php 10,000 and Php 15,000. These monthly income profile suggests that the beneficiaries are still economically vulnerable. Most beneficiaries having incomes the same as pre-Haiyan and/or decreasing means that their current economic situation is either unchanged or worse-off as current income level is below the national food threshold (i.e. extremely poor)14 and national poverty threshold (poor)15.

Table 20: Beneficiaries’ Income (last 6 mos.) HH w/ HH w/ HH w/ Share to total Share to total Share to total Income Income Income beneficiaries beneficiaries beneficiaries Intervention between between below per per per Php 5,000- Php 10,000- Php 5,000 intervention intervention intervention 10,000 15,000 UCT-only 18 81.82% 3 13.64% 1 4.55% CCT-only 36 76.60% 9 19.15% 2 4.26% Both UCT 26 63.41% 14 34.15% 1 2.44% and CCT TOTAL 80 70.80% 26 23.01% 4 3.54%

Comparing single and multiple FSL support, 65.85% of households among those who received both UCT and CCT that have recovered their incomes (same or increased income compared to pre-Yolanda). While there are slightly more (70.21%) CCT-only households that have already recovered, this is not significant enough to differentiate between the effectiveness of income recovery between single (CCT-only) and

14 The national food threshold for a family of 5 is PhP 6,150 in 2014 and PhP 5, 513 in 2012. (http://maps.napc.gov.ph/drupal/articles/poverty-statistics-0; http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2012/highlights_fullyear.asp). 15 The national poverty threshold for a family of five is PhP 7, 890 in 2012 and PhP 8,778 in 2014 (http://maps.napc.gov.ph/drupal/articles/poverty-statistics-0; http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2012/highlights_fullyear.asp).

41 multiple (CCT+UCT) cash transfers. Similarly, there is no significant difference in the figures on decreased income compared to pre-Yolanda (not yet recovered) for CCT- only and CCT+UCT beneficiaries.

Table 21: CCT Recipient Households’ Present Income Compared to Pre-Haiyan Same Increased Decreased No. of HH % to total No. of HH % to total No. of HH % to total CCT-Only 18 38.30% 15 31.91% 14 29.79% UCT and CCT 17 41.46% 10 24.39% 14 34.15% TOTAL 35 39.77% 25 28.41% 28 31.82%

This evaluation finds that the CCT intervention successfully enabled a large majority (88%) the beneficiaries to replace their productive assets enough resume livelihood. It also contributed to livelihood provisioning as indicated by use of the cash on food and non-food essential needs. Measured by change in income, the CCT intervention was also successful in livelihood protection for those that have regained their pre- Haiyan income or even increased it. Overall, the CCT intervention contributed to livelihood recovery of 68% of all CCT respondents (same and increased income). But because the CCT beneficiaries were already poor before the typhoon (as this was one of the criteria for beneficiary selection), even those whose incomes have increased are still economically vulnerable. Livelihood promotion, through alternative livelihood activities, could have improved economic resilience of the beneficiaries. However, the intervention was less successful in livelihood promotion, with 34% of the survey respondents opting to engage in alternative livelihood sources. Thus, while the CCT effectively contributed to livelihood protection, it had less effect on livelihood promotion.

Community Grant for construction and dispersal of artificial reef structures to facilitate coral recovery

For the community grant, SHO targeted two community associations for construction of “jackstone”-type artificial reefs in their respective areas. Each association constructed 225 artificial reefs from August – September 2014 (SCNL. 2015. SHO II Interim Report). These were constructed in protected waters in two island barangays in Carles, Iloilo. The two associations are 1) Asluman Small Fisherman Farmers Association, Inc. (in Barangays Asluman); and 2) Caburihan Multi-Purpose Cooperative (in Barangay San Fernando) (SCI Haiyan Response Estancia Office Check Vouchers).

This evaluation finds that this intervention is an effective livelihood promotion intervention. It shows positive signs of contributing to coral reef and marine life recovery, and thus to sustainable livelihood for the surrounding communities. The construction of artificial reefs will only show impact in the long-run, as these are designed to support re-population of marine life and to protect fish sanctuaries from non-environmentally friendly fishing practices. At the time of the evaluation, however,

42 evidence that the marine life is regenerating and even diversifying in the area is already observable. As one FGD participant claimed, “Last week may friend ako na foreigner pinadive ko; may nakita siyang 4 na pirasong lapu-lapu sa area. Dati wala. (Last week I asked a friend to dive and he saw 4 pieces of lapu-lapu (grouper)16 in the area. There never used to be any there.)” (FGD with San Fernando Barangay Officials and CAMPCO leaders, 10 August 2015) If such influx of new species in the area continue, this could also lead to livelihood diversification to a high-value catch for fisher folk in the area.

The community recipients of the grant in San Fernando, Sicogon Island view the artificial reef favorably. One respondent went further to say that “Kung sa akin kung ikukumpara ko ang bigay na artifical reef ng Save the Children buong isla ang mabenepisyuhan kaysa sa pump boat na ikaw lang ang makikinabang. (For me, when I compare the artificial reef from Save the Children, it benefits the whole island, as opposed to pump boats that only benefit you)”. (FGD with San Fernando Barangay Officials and CAMPCO leaders, 10 August 2015).

However, the community association CAMPCO in Sicogon Island remarked that the amount received for the reef construction is not enough considering the vastness of the area they needed to cover. To fill in the funding gap, CAMPCO turned to another NGO – the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA). ADRA provided them with funds to construct 800 artificial reefs and payaw17 (FGD with San Fernando Barangay Officials and CAMPCO leaders, 10 August 2015).

As importantly as the FGD participants regarded the artificial reef, they consider the DRR trainings and equipment given as the most important support given to them. This support is perceived as complete and fully-finished (“tinatapos talaga”) in the sense that trainors strive to help participants understand and trainings are accompanied by giving of equipment to operationalize the trainings given. This is embodied in this quote from the FGD in San Fernando:

Di tulad ng iba, nagconduct sila ng seminar tapos pagseminar may nakuha na mga volunteer kung sino a-attend sa seminar, wala namang equipment na pinapadala. So anong gagamitin mo…pagdating sa rescue wala ka namang gamitin. (Not like the others who conduct seminars; they get volunteers to attend the seminar, but there are no equipment given. So what will you use? When it comes time for the actual rescue operation, you don’t have anything to use.)

16 Lapu-lapu or grouper is a kind of high-value fish. 17 A payaw is a floating fish shelter with light to attract fish traditionally used by Filipino sustenance fisherfolk (Pastoral, 1987).

The only point for improvement mentioned by the barangay council was the lack of emergency drills in their barangay. They indicated that the timeframe was too tight to allow for conducting drills in each barangay. Instead they, along with other barangays, just observed the drill done in another barangay. They said that having an actual experience with an emergency drill is important and something they would like to have (FGD with San Fernando Barangay Officials and CAMPCO leaders, 10 August 2015).

The effectiveness of SCI’s support in San Fernando is perhaps starker than in other communities, because it was the only NGO that was able to provide assistance in the area. This is because Above: A warning bell in the barangay sits on Sicogon Island, where land dispute between the plaza in Brgy. San the communities living there and a private company with a strong Fernando, Sicogon Island security system prevented most NGOs from assisting the residents. Support for shelter and direct livelihood interventions were, in particular, blocked by the private company (Sicogon Development Corporation or SIDECO).

Summary FSL Effectiveness:

This evaluation finds that the project was successful in facilitating access to food and livelihood for its target beneficiaries. The project also met the targeted number of households for both CCT and community grant, while it exceeded the target for the UCT. In terms of providing alternative livelihoods, over a third of the CCT beneficiaries reported that they spent the cash grant on alternative livelihood activities. In terms of income recovery, this evaluation finds that 43% of all cash grant recipient households (figure for UCT-only, CCT-only and UCT&CCT recipients) have recovered income to the level of pre-Haiyan. Further, 22.22% of household cash grant (UCT-only, CCT-only and UCT&CCT) beneficiaries reported that their incomes are now greater than their pre-Haiyan incomes. This evaluation also finds that there is no significant difference in the proportion of beneficiaries who recovered their income status between those who received only UCT and those who received both UCT and CCT. In terms of improving fishing resource management, the community grant was successful in fostering reef and marine life recovery. For overall livelihood recovery, the UCT, CCT, and CG contributed to livelihood provision (UCT and CCT), livelihood protection (UCT and CCT), and livelihood promotion (CG).

Table 22: UCT & CCT Recipient Households’ Present Income Compared to Pre-Haiyan Same Increased Decreased No. of HH % to total No. of HH % to total No. of HH % to total CCT-Only 18 38.30% 15 31.91% 14 29.79% UCT-Only 10 45.45% 4 18.18% 8 36.36% UCT and CCT 17 41.46% 10 24.39% 14 34.15% TOTAL 27 42.86% 14 22.22% 22 34.92%

SHO 2: WASH

“(SAVE)… they have helped the people of Carles. It's really in almost all of the facets of our needs. So I would like to commend and thank Save the Children for giving that contribution which is really necessary and a must for Carlesenians.” - Mayor Segfredo Betita (Municipality of Carles, Iloilo)

The WASH component of SCI’s work includes water quality monitoring, the repair and construction of temporary water and sanitation facilities in communities and learning centers, access to safe water and sanitation in all households and evacuation centers, latrines for every house, and support for the country’s (Philippines) awareness- raising on zero open defecation campaign.

Facilitating access to safe and protected water facilities:

SCI, together with the town’s public officials (Sanitary Inspector and Health Officers), identified, assessed and worked on six locations (Buenavista, Cabilao Grande, Cabilao Pequeno, Isla de Cana, Manlot, and Sitio Naburot Island) to which yielded 25 water facilities, i.e. pump water and dug well. This is four more than the number of facilities recommended for action based on the WASH Technical Assessment done – an additional two facilities were constructed in Manlot and 2 facilities were constructed in an additional barangay (Pantalan).

Except for Buenavista and Isla de Cana (these two did not make it as sample areas to the survey), all the other barangays were visited, and the well and hand pump facilities inspected (a sample of the facilities, 11 to be exact) to ascertain the construction, and more important, proximity to population of the said facilities.

Table 23. Construction of 25 Water Facilities in 6 Barangays Barangay Sitio # of Water Facilities Basyaw 1 Buenavista Luyo 1 Naborot 1 Zone 2 2 Cabilao Grande Zone 5 1 Zone 8 1 Purok 1 4 Purok 2 3 Cabilao Pequeno Purok 3 1 Purok 4 2 Isla De Cana Isla de Cana 1 Purok 1 1 Purok 2 1 Manlot Purok 3 2 Purok 4 1 Purok Proper Lemon 1 Pantalan Purok Sambulawan 1

Regarding the construction of the facilities, the water pump and dug well appear taken care of, they look almost new and unused. In two instances, the hand pump is still wrapped in plastic (in Cabilao Pequeno) while the other is missing a handle (in Cabilao Grande) to which it was explained that barangay officials are keeping it since the water pump cannot produce water anyway, with low water levels this period of the year.

Moreover, all the dug well and pumps are dispersed, on average a kilometer or more apart, but in locations near or surrounded by people. Not to say that there needs to be more facilities, but the geography as well is a constraint to access and one or two facilities in a purok of mountainous terrain or open farm land is prohibitive to say the least. In any case, the situation in these areas has much improved.

From the survey, Table 2 below shows that everyone in the area already has access to water. It is just a matter of how secure and safe the source is. Some respondents still get theirs from open water sources like ponds and

46 rivers (3%). The greater population though depends on pump water and dug well for their drinking needs (81.6%). Water bought from water vendors and refilling stations is an alternative with 8.1%.

As with water for other home uses, the respondents use the same sources except for the private water vendor and bottled water. In order of use, namely: dug well (52.5%), borehole and pump water (37.4%), piped water (5%), public tap/ communal faucet (2.9%), and lastly, open water sources, e.g. ponds, river, lake, etc. (2.2%).

Table 24: Source of Drinking Water Source Of Drinking Water HH % Piped Water 8 5.9% Public/ Communal Tap 2 1.5% Borehole/ Pump 56 41.2% Dug Well 55 40.4% Open Pond/ Lake/ River 4 2.9% Rainwater 0 0.0% Water Vendor/ Bottled 11 8.1% TOTAL 136 100.0%

Access to water in these areas is, as hinted, meant to challenge anyone physically. Fetching entails transporting water through the use of a container, e.g. bucket, from one point to another, or in this case, from the house to the water source and back. It would be less a concern of households if their water sources are nearby, thus the location of the facility is paramount. This is the case for a majority (68%) of the survey respondents, who claimed that their water facilities are less than 50 meters from home. 20.6% (20) respondents said theirs is between 100 meters and 500 meters while the rest of the respondents (7.2%) estimate up to a kilometer.

The situation with water for other uses is the same: 76% of the respondents are within the 50 meter Above: A map showing the location radius; Next is more than 100 meters but not over and walking distance from each 500 (19%); and then there are those who really other of the water facilities in Barangay Barancalan, Carles. have to travel for more than 500 meters up to a kilometer (5%).

In terms of time spent waiting and fetching for drinking water, households reported having to spend five minutes and 10 minutes (with 27% of respondents each); followed by 20 minutes (14.4%), and 15 and 30 minutes each by 8.1%of the respondents. In the

47 most extreme case, two respondents have answered one and three hours. Again, all of this is a function of proximity to the water facility. The time spent waiting and fetching water for other home use share a similar account: most cited are that it takes five and ten minutes with 25% and 23.6% of respondents respectively; then 20 minutes by 12.7% of respondents; and 3 minutes as told by 10%.

In collecting their water, one to two trips can be enough for drinking water while water for other uses requires more than that. Table 3 below gives the details.

Table 25. No. of Trips to Fetch Drinking Water and Water for Other Uses TIME HH % HH % Trips Drinking Other Use 1-2 trips 102 92.73 27 39.13 5-10 trips 5 4.55 25 36.23 Others 3 2.73 17 24.64 Total 110 100 69 100

How many trips depend in part on the implements that the household have. SCI has distributed water buckets, basins, drum in these areas. The survey confirmed the arrival of WASH items (that came along with the latrine). Water containers for fetching and storage are necessary tools to access to water, and shown here are the demand, i.e. most used water containers for the household. Buckets are the most handy (42% response), followed by jerry cans (28.2%), basin (7.4%), and so on (see Table 25).

Table 26. Demand for Water Containers for Collecting / Fetching Water Containers HH % Jerry can 42 28.2% Bucket 63 42.3% Clay pots 1 0.7% Drum or Barrel 3 2.0% Bottles 4 2.7% Basin 11 7.4% Others 25 16.8%

Deeper wells and pumped water does not guarantee anyone of clean and safe water, especially one for drinking. Proper care of the facilities and treatment of the water source are expected. At one point and as part of the non-food item kit given immediately after Haiyan, chlorine tablets were distributed to the people. Due in large part to WASH orientation and awareness campaigns, the population has adapted in that front.

The survey has found evidence that the people have been treating their water in many ways, depending on use. Cloth filtration was cited as the most common practice with 71.7% saying so; boiling came in second with 15%; the use of chlorine tables, 6.7%; and other water filtration techniques, etc. 6.7%.

Raising Public Hygiene Awareness:

Access to clean and safe water is combined set of implements and people behavior. In rural Panay and island communities where SCI operates, it is not enough that water facilities and WASH items are given. People need to do their part as well to make things happen.

SCI carried out in these communities several orientations and trainings on WASH. The survey indicates that the people still remember these activities (83% of them on average). And when they were asked if they (including any member of their household) have attended any one of these event to which it was determined that, at one time or another, the people belonging to these beneficiary barangays and their HH members have participated in the said activities (92% participation rate). In Table 5, an attendance sheet is generated based on respondents’ recall.

Table 27. Attended the WASH Activity WASH COMPONENT HH ATTENDED ZERO OPEN DEFECATION CAMPAIGN 115 WATER FACILITY REPAIR / CONSTRUCTION 94 HYGIENE PROMOTION 96 LATRINE INSTALLATION / CONSTRUCTION / REPAIR 100 WASH MANAGEMENT TRAINING 97

Thus, when asked if they think the SCI’s WASH activities, training sessions and orientations are useful, 93.4% answered positively.

Building Safe Latrine and Household Level

It is best to start with figures: 1,287. This is the number of families helped under SCI- WASH’s latrine distribution. Five barangays namely Buenavista, Cabilao Grande, Cabilao Pequeño, Manlot and Isla de Caña were targeted to receive the support. Then one more was added, Barangay Pantalan.

The method for picking these areas were rigorous, and criteria as strict; i.e. communities are devastated by Haiyan, communities must be among the most indigent and vulnerable, with the poorest of access to water and sanitation, they must be among the highest incidence of open defecation, and many more (see SHO 2 Implementation Guide for WASH).

There is only provision for 1,000 latrines and though there may be a demand, still SCI cannot provide to everyone. To which the Local Chief Executive understood. Thus, SCI and with the help of local officials, namely the Local Health and Sanitation Office, and barangay officials, together implemented the search within barangays for the families most in need; again, under the guidance of SCI’s “Criteria for the selection of direct project beneficiaries”.

In latrine distribution, SCI has exceeded its target by 28.7%. It was able to provide latrine materials to 1,287 households. Savings on the part of SCPPO made it possible to increase the beneficiaries. The 1,000 household beneficiaries were already an achievement in itself, but 287 more families with money saved is remarkable. How does this translates to the overall situation of the beneficiary barangays? The survey conducted on latrine ownership shows all household (except for 6 households) in those barangays now has one latrine in use, a 95.6% tally. This is a considerable leap considering that these communities widely use the unsanitary “buho” or open pit latrine for defecation before the SCI program.

Furthermore, those latrines are accessible in each household as far as their circumstance allows them to be. The survey shows that latrines are within HH’s dwelling units in 57.9% of cases, and the other 42.1% have their latrines just outside of the house to around (but not more than) 50 meters distance.

On the question whether everyone in the family uses the latrine, the answer is a Yes or 100% latrine use rate by parents and their children. There’s a minor problem however that was uncovered; an exception that nonetheless needs attending to. The survey has noted that several households would use the neighbors, or a public latrine, or just go down the field or the sea. The reason for these cases behavior was straightforward: respondents revealed that their latrines are not yet finished (not functional), while the latter respondent still believes open defecation is not an issue.

This brings us to SCI’s Zero Open Defecation Campaign (ZODC). Similar to the problem on clean and safe water, the facilities are a necessary element to the issue of access, but it is not sufficient to address the rest of the problem. As long as there is one who believes that open defecation is a non-issue and admissible, the problem will not go away.

Along with SCI’s hygiene promotion, WASH facilities management training, and the training on latrine construction, the ZODC took all opportunities to tackle the absence or lack of information regarding the dangers of unhygienic practices, specifically open defecation. Thus, if we refer to Table 5 earlier, the ZODC is one of those activities that people attended. The campaign was also realized with the help of Barangay Health Workers (BHWs), barangay WASH committees, and WASH volunteers who were trained to disseminate the information, i.e. ZOD and mass hygiene promotion to the people in the barangay. There were also campaign materials, i.e. printed tarpaulins bearing the ZODC information) strategically posted all over the SCI areas.

Summary of Effectiveness: WASH

In summary, 2 years ago, around 50% of families in Carles Town had no toilets or own one but that is unsanitary (buho / open pit latrine). This is reflected in the critical “red” score of the municipality in terms of sanitation and hygiene. SCPPO’s latrine distribution to 1,287 households have direct benefits to families, and in combination with its hygiene promotion and Zero Open Defecation (ZOD) campaign, have effectively helped the entire Municipality of Carles improve its sanitation situation. The sanitation and hygiene score now is up, to “yellow” (FGD with Carles Municipal Officers, 11 August 2015).

Assessment of Organizational Effectiveness

Achievement of Objectives: As the discussions of effectiveness of the different components indicate, both SHO 1 and SHO 2 interventions were effective despite being implemented in the context of a category 5 storm destruction and in different phases of emergency humanitarian response. Except for debris clean-up component in the SHO 2 education program and the support for small market traders in the SHO 2 FSL program, this evaluation confirms that all the different activities under multiple components of the SHO-funded intervention were implemented as planned, with most components even exceeding the target number of people who benefitted from the interventions. This indicates that not only has SCPPO effectively reached and overachieved in its planned activities and target beneficiaries, but was also efficient in the implementation of these activities.

Achievement of outcomes/results presents a varied picture. In the first place, for both SHO 1 and SHO 2 programs, the outcomes/results were vague and ambiguous18 (except for FSL) making it difficult to ascertain what results/outcomes are expected of the programs. However, drawing out the outcomes from the project proposals and progress reports, and from the phasing by which the programs were conceptualized and implemented, this evaluation finds that the SHO programs had saved lives and some components contributed to safer and better recovery as discussed below.

SHO 1: Provision of shelter and NFI kits and CCT for boat repair

The shelter and NFI kits are relief and start-up kits to help affected households begin repairing their homes (or building temporary shelter), providing better protection from the elements, as well as have the means to collect and treat drinking water. The completeness of the kit and the fact that these were used by the beneficiaries means that this component has achieved its objectives of providing relief.

18 I.e. the program proposal did not have a results matrix or Log Frame, thus the theory of change is not explicit.

However, the SHO 1 program was not implemented as designed. Based on the project design, the livelihood (boat repair) support was supposed to have complemented or followed the shelter/NFI support, and enhanced the shelter/NFI recipients’ ability to begin or finish rebuilding their houses (SHO 1 Project Proposal). But result of the evaluation survey reveals that only about a third of the beneficiary households received both shelter kit/NFI and boat repair support, while 66% received only boat repair cash transfer. One respondent (0.8%) stated that they received only the shelter kit and NFI.

Table 28. Shelter, Non-Food Items, and CCT- Boat Beneficiaries INTERVENTION No. of HOUSEHOLDS % SHELTER AND NFI only 1 0.8 CCT BOAT REPAIR only 85 66.4 BOTH 42 32.8 TOTAL 128 100.00

This means that complementation of the two sectoral interventions has been diminished and impact (recovery) from this SHO-funded program could only expected in about a third of the beneficiaries19.

The cash support for boat repair was intended to help affected households resume livelihood activities and generate sufficient income by project month 3, leading to increased food security and market stabilization. This evaluation study finds that because the amount of the cash transfer was not enough to repair or build a boat (to the point of beneficiaries becoming indebted to supply the additional funding needed), it is perhaps not reasonable to expect that their incomes from resuming livelihood activities would be sufficient to ensure food security, much less shelter repair. In this respect, the logic inherent in the design of the project proposal, tying livelihood support to shelter repair, was too stretched out. In addition, the aim to increase food security from a resumed livelihood seems ambitious for the amount of cash transfer given and the seasonal effects of the fishing livelihood.

SHO 2: Education, FSL and WASH

SHO 2 program interventions were implemented in different stages of emergency humanitarian response. Hence there were activities in each sectoral component that are directed to provide immediate relief and the others are directed at supporting early recovery. For instance, in the education intervention, the provision of teacher’s kits and student’s school kits, and WASH kits was relief assistance it has indeed produced economic relief to parents and teachers and psychosocial relief to the children. In the FSL intervention, the provision of UCT was a relief support provided

19 However, it is possible that complementation happened among various SCI grants (inter- grant) and not necessarily within the same grant (intra-grant).

52 earlier in 2014. The CCT and community grant interventions, on the other hand, were given later in the year as part of recovery efforts.

In the education intervention, all its components have produced results, albeit in the case of classrooms repairs the result was more on building back a safe and conducive space for teaching and learning rather than in facilitating resumption of classes or in school attendance. The training for teachers has built the capacity of teachers in providing psychosocial support for children. The teacher’s circle has also given teachers psychosocial relief and resulted in better cooperation.

In terms of FSL intervention, the UCT was successful in facilitating access to food and, to some extent, livelihood for its target beneficiaries. The CCT succeeded in providing alternative livelihoods as over 70% of the beneficiaries reported that they spent the cash grant on non-fishing related activities. However, in terms of income recovery, this evaluation finds that the bulk (over 40%) of the beneficiaries experienced no changes in income as compared to their pre-Haiyan status and even as some of them have recovered their pre-Haiyan income level, they still remain poor. In terms of improving fishing resource management, the community grant was successful in fostering reef and marine life recovery.

The WASH intervention have effectively improved accessibility of water and it has helped the entire Municipality of Carles improve its sanitation situation.

Preparedness and Implementation: The SHO-funded interventions (Phase 1 and 2) were undertaken in the context of an emergency response organizational structure, which had been transitioning into SCI’s regular organizational structure. To be sure, SHO 1 interventions were implemented under an emergency response team (i.e. SCI Estancia Haiyan Field Office), an ad hoc structure established by SCI in emergency situations such as Haiyan. The team was led by expatriates who specialize in emergency responses. This operational structure lasted for a year and by January 2015 SCI began re-aligning into the regular operational structure, hence it is now called the Panay Program Office. Part of this transition is the phasing out of emergency experts (expatriates) and bringing in of local staff to fill-in the management positions. SHO 2 implementation was undertaken in the context of these structural and staff transition. The SHO2-funded intervention bore witness to a lot of organizational changes (FGD SCPPO staff, 11 August 2015 & 13 August 2015).

Having an emergency response team had its advantages and challenges. The timeliness in identifying needs and quickness of implementation of relief support packages (relative to other NGOs) could be attributed to the expertise brought by a team of emergency specialists. Amidst the enormity of the needs and urgency of responses, the team was able to deal with the demands and challenges effectively, as can be gleaned from the achievement rate of implementation and effectiveness of the outputs. However, the issue in targeting and complementation of SHO 1 interventions could be reflective of the inherent limitations of planning in emergency

53 situation. The fast-paced distribution required of emergency response meant that staff time and energies were spent more in delivery of support/assistance than in thinking through the various interventions and making nuanced needs assessment or context analysis.

There was enough staff to implement the SHO-funded interventions even when SCI downsized its staff in Panay from more than 100 to its current size of 37. But there was a variation in the capacity among staffs even among the expatriates. Rapid turn-over of staff in key positions (often the expatriates) made implementation difficult especially when there are no reports turned over as what happened in most cases (FGD SCPPO staff, 11 August 2015 & 13 August 2015). But the most challenging was the organizational transition because not only was there changes in operational structure (from sector-based to area-based) and financial control system but there were changes in the personnel (downsizing and localization). This has caused some confusion, adjustments, unlearning and relearning among the staff that somehow affected the pace of implementation. “It took us a while, the whole staff, how to change from a sectoral approach to area approach because the sectoral projects are already in place and are just waiting to be finished and then you have to do the area-based approach…There is a lot of adjustment needed to match people’s strengths and capacity with the demand of area approach. For example if you are WASH engineer then you are fit to do WASH work but in the area approach you are also now expected to do education work or FSL work” (FGD with SCPPO staff, 13 August 2015).

Deviations from SHO 2 program plans such as omission of cash for work (debris clearing) and support for market traders is not an indication of lack of capacity but of flexibility on the part of SCI to adjust activities according to changing situation. Changes in the plan or major deviations/modifications from the proposal are in most cases a result of cluster agreements/recommendations; effort to find complementation in various grants (and avoid double charging or reporting); and SCI’s ability to identify and respond to changing context and community needs. For instance, the activities to support small market traders were implemented but were charged to a different funder/program that has the same type of intervention. Moreover, the inclusion of WASH/ZOD in the program was based on SCI’s needs assessment and flexibility of the member (SCNL) and donor for budget re-alignment.

Overachievement in terms of number of FSL beneficiaries reached is indicative of high efficiency but it also partly due to the conservative estimate of the amount of cash transfer coupled with a design factor wherein the beneficiary selection criteria favor expansion over concentration. To illustrate, the amount for UCT/food aid (4,100) is way below the national food threshold of 6,100/month for a family of 5 members20.

20 National food threshold data is from the National Anti-Poverty Commission, see http://maps.napc.gov.ph/drupal/articles/poverty-statistics-0. Food threshold is the amount a family needs to satisfy its basic food and nutritional requirements while remaining economically and socially productive (i.e. subsistence or extreme poverty level).

When given to a proportion of the village population following a strict selection criteria and strict verification process, this ends up with a situation where the budget becomes more than enough to meet the target21. Hence, the tendency is to expand to other villages to look for beneficiaries instead of relaxing the criteria to accommodate more beneficiaries in one particular village or increasing the amount of cash support to be able to make realistic expectations on income changes and food security.

Logistically there had been no major problems when it comes to the implementation of the SHO-funded intervention. One difficulty comes with the nature of the emergency response—the inability to make long term procurement plan vis-à-vis big and simultaneous demand for logistical support. Another difficulty comes with the geographic nature of the SHO program sites—changes and delays in delivery are often due to weather conditions and tide changes. Still, another challenge was the inability to make logistical plan and make sound prioritization since the logistics budget was not known to the logistics coordinator (FGD SCPPO staff, 11 August 2013). There were also cases where changes in requested type of vehicle has caused delays or difficulty in conducting activities and cases where sudden decisions on transportation movement caused inefficiency and embarrassment to the field staff (FGD with SCPPO staff, 13 August 2015). Despite this, the SCI was able to meet the logistical demand of the SHO intervention. There was no missing or damaged NFI or education kits for distribution and damaged WASH items were replaced by the supplier. Issues and problems were resolved through stronger coordination between the logistics and program staff and replacement of logistics staff whose competencies do not match the demand of the work (FGD with SCPPO staff, 11 August 2015).

SCI has different but clear financial systems and protocols for emergency and development operations. SHO 1 and SHO 2 Education and FSL were implemented under the emergency system and protocol while SHO 2 WASH was implemented under development system and protocol. A crucial difference between the two systems is the role of the finance unit in financial control. During the emergency phase, the sector’s program managers were the budget holders, which could be understandable given the nature of the operations. However, the programs/sectors’ coordination with the finance unit was weak to the point where the programs (particularly FSL) made certain decisions on cash transfer without proper information as to the availability of funds, thereby creating problems in cash flow management (FGD with SCPPO staff, 11 August 2015). But in terms of controls, the Haiyan Estancia Field Office (i.e. emergency structure) established an effective financial control system especially with regard to cash transfer activities. For example, conditional cash transfers are given in tranches wherein the release of the second tranche is tied to compliance of required financial documents. The only control issue when it comes to cash transfer is the utilization of Phil Post as delivery mechanism. The idea of having a third-party delivery mechanism (as opposed to personally handing over the cash) is

21 In the two barangays visited by the evaluation team, the Barangay Selection Committee reported that the final or actual beneficiaries is less than what they have identified—an attrition rate of 20-30%.

55 to avoid leakages in the transfer of funds. This is why, for example in the government’s 4Ps CCT program, the beneficiaries are given bank ATMs so that the cash goes directly to the beneficiaries’ hands. But as it happened, having the Phil Post did not serve its purpose because the cash transfers were personally administered by the Phil Post personnel, together with SCI program and finance staff.

Alongside the organizational transition, issues of coordination and roles between the finance department and programs are now being resolved by giving the finance department a central role in budget management and by having regular budget and program monitoring meetings (FGD with SCPPO staff, 11 August 2013). It is then not surprising that the SHO-funded intervention undertaken during the new operational set-up (i.e. WASH) is the most cost-effective (see efficiency part of this report).

Data Management, Monitoring and Reporting: It is in the process of data management that SCI has had the most challenges. Missing information and inconsistencies in figures and information are apparent in the course of this evaluation study22. This is indicative of difficulties in data recording and management during the emergency phase. Moreover, reconciliation of data coming from different sources (programs, MEAL and finance) often come only at the end of the project or reporting period (FGD with SCPPO staff, 11 August 2015), thus creating inconsistencies and making the exercise tedious and time-consuming.

SCI has a MEAL (Monitoring Evaluation Accountability and Learning) unit that takes care of collecting data (independently or through the programs), validating the collected data (cross-checking sources), monitoring progress and achievement of programs, and conducting internal studies such as baseline and end line surveys, post- distribution surveys, consolidated lessons learnt. In addition, the MEAL team also manages the feedback from the beneficiaries—i.e. it receives the feedback/comment and sends these to appropriate bodies inside the organization (FGD with SCPPO staff, 11 August 2015 & 13 August 2013). But during the emergency phase, the MEAL unit was only skeletal (SCPPO staff, draft report presentation proceeding, 1 September 2015). Even though there was a MEAL staff designated to each program/sector, coordination on data reporting between the programs and MEAL was not adequate.

The gap lies in how the emergency structure appreciated MEAL’s function. Apparently, MEAL then was just seen as repository of data and a watchdog (FGD SCPPO staff, 11 August 2015). Such lack of appreciation could be understandable in an emergency situation wherein the interventions are short term, implementation is fast- paced, and delivery of life-saving support takes paramount importance. This is even truer when the majority of the staff at the emergency period are short-term

22 For example, 1,043 households were originally listed as household recipients of boat repair cash transfer (SCPPO. “List of Boat Repair Beneficiaries”), but this list was later adjusted by adding 3 households to 2 barangays and removing 176 households from other barangays, leading to the final figure of 870 households benefitted as stated in the Terminal Report (List of Boat Repair Beneficiaries, SHO 1 Terminal Report). See also footnote #7 of this report.

56 international staff and volunteers, who sometimes fail to turn over critical information on the project implementation and context. However, timely, proper and thorough recording coupled with a more systematic data management could have made data reconciliation (finance versus program) and reporting more efficient and less burdensome. Further, it could have provided timely information to program staff and senior management to make critical decisions regarding program intervention especially with regard to striking a balance between expansion (reach) and concentration (completeness).

So, in terms of system and personnel, SCI had sufficient capacity for data management and supporting planning and improvements in operations. The problem was in the process or communication flow between the programs and the MEAL. Under the new organizational structure (SCPPO) efforts are underway to streamline data flow and improve MEAL system and products and uplift the role of MEAL in terms of contributing to program development and implementation. This will ensure better institutional and staff capacity in the current and future SCPPO interventions.

Assessment of Relevance Super Typhoon Haiyan (called Yolanda in the Philippines) affected an estimate of 14 million and killed 6,000 people (UNICEF 2014, p. 3). SCI’s holistic (i.e. multi-sector) intervention is relevant to the situation and needs of typhoon-affected communities in Panay Island or Western Visayas. The damage done by typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in Panay Island was catastrophic. The region has the most number of affected families reaching 770, 905 (OPARR, 2014). 78% of the total barangays and close to three million people in the region were affected. The most affected areas in Western Visayas were Northern Iloilo, the whole province of Capiz, Northern Antique, Central and Southern part of Aklan and Northern Negros Occidental (NEDA Region VI & Regional DRRMC Region VI, 2013).

Shelter kits and NFIs Typhoon Haiyan totally destroyed at least 518,878 houses across the country. It left 228,980 houses (44%) damaged in Western Visayas and over a half million families homeless. The region comprises more than half of the total displaced families by the super typhoon (Rappler, February 20, 2014). SCI’s rapid assessment made five days

57 after the typhoon showed 96,000 totally damaged houses, 20,000 partially damaged and 158,000 people in evacuation centers in Capiz. The towns of Concepcion and Estancia in Iloilo reported 7,775 and 7,296 damaged houses, respectively (Mulliez, 2013).

As affected households start to rebuild their homes, the shelter kits and NFIs, particularly, were well received as these were regarded as “complete”, containing all the basic household items for cooking and cleaning and basic items to provide shelter (FGD with Bancal Barangay Officials, 12 August 2015). Five items in particular were regarded by respondents of the evaluation household survey as being the most important: kitchen set, tarpaulin, sleeping mat, blankets, and mosquito net.

The following quote from a child demonstrates how the provision of critical household items also resonates with them and reveals which items are important to them:

“Nagbigay din po sila ng tuwalya, mga pinggan po at mga plato po…sa bawat pamilya. ([Save the Children] also gave towels and plates for each family)” – FGD with Children, 10 August 2015

In terms of relevance to the current context, shelter support is still relevant for some households, albeit in a different form. Some households have not yet been able to complete construction in their houses. Though a shelter kit similar to the one distributed under SHO might no longer be relevant, support for completion of construction of houses are still necessary for select households.

Food Security and Livelihood In 2012, 20.8% of families in Iloilo province and 23.2% in Capiz province are poor (ACAPS, 2014). Poverty worsens as a result of the typhoon’s devastation. The Asian Development Bank estimated that post-Haiyan poverty incidence rates may reach 37.3% in Western Visayas. Further, the Bank estimated that in severely affected provinces such as Capiz and Northern Iloilo, the poverty gap23 may increase 8 percentage points as a result of typhoon Haiyan (ADB. N.D. “Summary Poverty Impact Assessment”). In the immediate aftermath of typhoon “95% of fishing gears in Northern Iloilo and Capiz were lost or destroyed while the agroforestry crops (abaca, banana, coffee, coconut, fruit trees) in the uplands along the 30- kilometer radius of the eye of the storm were totally wiped out” (NEDA Region VI & Regional

23 “the income shortfall of the poor from the poverty line” http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/47337-001-sd-04.pdf

DRRMC Region VI, 2013, p. 3). The cost of damage to infrastructure, agriculture and fisheries is pegged at PhP 7,623,913,499 (NEDA Region VI & Regional DRRMC Region VI, 2013). Despite widespread devastation, markets were functional although prices for some commodities have increased (Save the Children, 2014, p.3).

The need to resume livelihood to get food and cash for other needs, coupled with functioning markets, made cash transfer an ideal mechanism for distributing support. The unconditional cash transfer, in particular, was an ideal mechanism because it gives recipients a greater sense of dignity and choice over their own welfare. This effect is less so for the household CCT and community grant because of the design for these grants. This is because conditions were imposed on the use of the cash itself, rather than a set of merit conditions for receiving the cash, which beneficiaries were then free to spend on what they deemed most relevant to their welfare. By making the receipt of the cash grant conditional on how they used the money (i.e. strictly for livelihood or artificial reef construction), it effectively limited the range of decisions that the household can make regarding their needs. Some households were able to go around these conditions by only using the second tranche of the grant for non- conditioned uses (see this evaluation report- Effectiveness: SHO 2 FSL).

Regardless of how it was designed, the cash transfers for boat repair and marine livelihood certainly responded to a palpable need. Because of the community’s high dependence on fishing as a main source of income, the boat repair cash transfer was particularly responsive to the community’s livelihood restoration needs. The household CCT for alternative marine livelihood in SHO 2 was set to respond to both the immediate situation of having no means to generate income, as well as to the pre- existing vulnerability of fishing households to seasonal changes. Despite its relevance not only to the emergency context but also to the local development context of the beneficiaries, the CCT only succeeded in promoting alternative livelihoods in 34% of the recipients of this grant, based on this evaluation’s household survey. This implies that support more specifically tailored to their main source of income (such as the SHO 1 boat repair) would have been equally, if not more, relevant.

In the current context, livelihood support is also still relevant. At the time of the evaluation, the seas are made rough due to the climate (rainy season, punctuated by many storms). The choppy/high waves means their catch is lower, making it difficult for beneficiaries to make enough income from fishing activities. However, once the season passes, the beneficiaries expect their situation to improve (FGD with Bancal Barangay Officials, 12 August 2015).

Looking to the future, the artificial coral reef construction was well appreciated by beneficiaries. This is no wonder, as they related that there are much less fish available for catching due to the destruction of the coral reef system in the area. The artificial reefs will help restore the marine biodiversity. As one respondent said of the marine life, “Maibabalik po. Unti unti lang. (It can be restored. Little by little.)” (FGD with San Fernando Barangay Council and CAMPCO, 10 August 2015).

Education In the immediate aftermath of typhoon Yolanda, over a million pre-school and school-aged children were out of school and close to 31,600 teachers were affected (UNICEF 2014, p. 7). In Western Visayas, 1,205 schools were destroyed (NEDA Region VI & Regional DRRMC Region VI, 2013). Damaged schools were a major barrier for the children to go to schools. For those who went back to school after the typhoon, the damaged school infrastructure and furniture effectively constrained learning since this resulted in double-shifting or multi-grade teaching. This did not only limit the learning opportunities of the children but also created additional workload on the teachers. The teachers and the children reported that students were not accessing schools because of financial constraints (including lack of school materials and teaching materials and the need to help their parents in earn a living), displacement and psychosocial trauma from the typhoon experience (CPWG and Education Cluster Joint Needs Assessment, February-May 2014, p.49).

All components of education intervention are found to be relevant in addressing the needs of schools, teachers, students and parents and are all in line with the recommendations of the DepEd and the education cluster.

The school repair’s relevance is even magnified when seen vis-à-vis the slowness of the government side in repairing damaged school infrastructure. The teachers’ kit is relevant particularly because some items were used as substitute for the missing and damaged blackboards. The student’s kit certainly did come as a relief to all. For one, the kit can be used by both girls and boys (58 of 59 households or 98.3% agreed). It came at a time when children need it most (58 of 59 respondents or 98.3% agreed) and at the time that the families do not have the money to spare.

The training for teachers also matched the needs of the teachers and the children. The psychosocial training was specifically cited by DepEd officials as SCI’s niche as SCI was the only NGO that responded to this articulated demand by the DepEd (Interview with Aileen Sobremonte, 7 August 2015). However, while the psychosocial training remains relevant in the long term, its immediate application varies according to the pace of recovery of children from the traumatic experience of the super typhoon. Interestingly, in the island barangay and coastal barangay visited by this evaluation study, the children have already recovered, hence learnings from the training have not been applied yet (FGD with San Fernando ES teachers, 10 August 2015; FGD with Bancal ES teachers, 12 August 2015). In the inland barangay, the psychosocial training was deemed very appropriate as there are children who have not yet recovered from their traumatic experience (FGD with Abong ES teachers, 10 August 2015).

SCI’s package of support to education is similar to the intervention provided by other non-government aid agencies. Compared to other agencies doing the same type of support, the beneficiaries perceive SCI to be “the first to come”, its support to be comprehensive including both immediate needs and long-term needs (Interview with Aileen Sobremonte and Anne Suiza, 7 August 2015). Moreover, SCI is the only agency that paid particular attention to inland communities that were equally ravaged by typhoon Yolanda, as the teachers of Abong Elementary School said, “parang hindi naming maku-kompara kasi wala namang ibang [tumulong]. Marami talaga ang picture picture lang, picture tapos kumukuha ng information pero hanggang ganoon lang” (we could not compare Save the Children with the others because there are no other agency that helped us. Many came here but they only took photographs and asked for information).

WASH The destruction brought about by the super typhoon exacerbated the pre-existing WASH gaps in Western Visayas. “Historically, the limited national and local WASH governance and the limited financial capacity of the population to access reliable WASH services, results in chronic qualitative and quantitative gaps in the service provision and access” (WASH Cluster Philippines, WASH Baseline Assessment, May 2014, p.13). The construction and management of sanitation facilities are often left to households’ initiative that is beset with lack of adequate and appropriate WASH access coupled with non-existent waste management. This situation poses chronic public health challenges which was exacerbated when typhoon Haiyan hit the region (WASH Cluster Philippines, WASH Baseline Assessment, May 2014, p.13).

In the aftermath of the typhoon, there was a general decrease in access to potable water facilities. In Iloilo province, where SCI’s SHO-funded WASH intervention was carried out, there was an 11.8% decreased access in tube wells utilized for drinking water and 13.1% in communal water facilities’ coverage, which meant a reduced water access for 605 households and 1,946 households, respectively (WASH Cluster Philippines, WASH Baseline Assessment, May 2014, p. 14). The town of Carles has the most number of households (43%) using unprotected water source, followed by Balasan (30.69%) and Concepcion (24.83%) (WASH Cluster Philippines, WASH Baseline Assessment, May 2014, p. 18).

In terms of sanitation, typhoon Haiyan left 197,288 persons without access to private latrines. In Iloilo province, there was a 2.3% loss in private latrines and around 1,500 households have lost access to private and communal sanitation. The incidence of open defecation increased in 57% of its barangays after Haiyan and at present, open defecation is practiced in 71 % of its barangays (WASH Cluster Philippines, WASH Baseline

Assessment, May 2014, p. 21). In Carles where around 40% of the households have no private toilets prior to the typhoon, the situation became worse with the loss of 2.37% of private toilets and 1.46% of communal toilets (WASH Cluster Philippines, WASH Baseline Assessment, May 2014, p. 25).

The SCI’s foresight into matters of disaster preparedness and emergency response has proven most valuable. Local government officials of Carles has this to say

“Save? Ah kasi nung 2013 noon dumating yung bagyo so after Yolanda daming dumating na NGO's na tumulong, so yung Save the Children dumating one week, one week after. Yung unang ginawa talaga nila naalala ko yung unang pritority nila yung sa in-analyze yung tubig inuman, kumuha ng sample sa birthing clinic saka dinala, then later on bumalik sila yung priority nila yung WASH. WASH talaga yung nauna, sunod na yung nutrition program, health program, sunod- sunod na…” (FGD with Carles Municipal Officials, 11 August 2015).

Translated:

“Save? Back in 2013 when Yolanda happened and after, there were so many NGOs who were helping…then there’s Save the Children who arrived one week after. The first thing they did, their first priority, I remember, was to test and analyze the drinking water. They took a sample from the birthing clinic, and then later when they came back, the priority was WASH. WASH was really the first, and then came the nutrition program, health program, one after the other…” (FGD with Carles Municipal Officials, 11 August 2015).

The town of Carles has much to celebrate. They have been in the receiving end of Save the Children International‘s (SCI) careful and evidence- based work. SCI’s interventions speak of volumes as it addressed a need that was key, not only through the darkest of times, but more importantly after, with the continuation of functioning WASH facilities and changes in hygiene practices.

Assessment of Sustainability In general, this evaluation finds that some elements of the whole SHO intervention are more sustainable than the others. Given that the intervention was undertaken when the communities and even the government (e.g. barangay, municipal) institutions were recovering from the disaster, any intervention will be taken as an external assistance rather than community-owned. It takes time for community acceptance to turn into ownership, a factor in sustainability. Those that were grafted in existing community structures or practices and those which complemented or supported the government and/or barangay council’s plans are most likely to be sustainable.

The interventions delivered by the SHO grant are composed of those that are meant to be “consumable” and those that are meant to be more sustainable from the recipient point of view. Among the “consumable” items are the shelter kits & NFIs, student kits, teacher kits, and the unconditional cash transfer. These items do not need to be maintained and are not discussed in this section.

On the opposite side are the interventions that require maintenance on the part of the beneficiaries in order to sustain its effects. These include the conditional cash transfers for livelihood (boat repair and alternative livelihood), artificial reefs, school and communal water facilities, household latrines, classroom repair and furniture, and teachers’ circles. Also included are the trainings conducted, particularly on DRR and psycho-social support.

Food Security and Livelihood This evaluation finds evidence pointing to the sustainability of livelihood activities supported by the conditional cash transfers to households. For the boat repair CCT, the output of the intervention (i.e. repaired boats) can be used indefinitely to secure livelihood. For the CCT for alternative marine livelihood, some (3.64% of survey respondents) are reinvesting the cash transfers they received into the livelihoods they have set up, thus ensuring sustainability of the intervention’s effect.

Another factor affecting sustainability is the community’s access to formal credit (FGD with Bancal Barangay Council, 12 August 2015; field observation). Though informal lending still exists such as loans from relatives, neighbors, etc., this is currently not a sustainable option as all members of the community are still in the process of regaining their wealth and income. It is access to and utilization of formal credit that can really grow and expand businesses. It also enhances their business’ ability to withstand and recover from future shocks.

In terms of sustainability of the community grants in Carles, this evaluation finds that the results of the intervention can be sustained because of the legal and political support of the local government. The municipal government of Carles has already declared Marine Protected Areas in the municipality and has taken steps towards a public-private partnership with Ayala Land to protect the area in Sicogon Island (Interview with Mayor of Carles, 11 August 2015). In addition, the community association and barangay council in the sample barangay is confident that they can support the maintenance and operating costs of the artificial reefs and other equipment given to the barangays (FGD with San Fernando Barangay Council and CAMPCO, 11 August 2015).

As part of the FSL support to households and to community associations, SCPPO also provided disaster risk reduction trainings. Members of the barangay council related that the lessons from their DRR training is highly relevant to them and will likely be helpful in the face of future disasters.

Education In terms of education, this evaluation study finds that all interventions in education are likely to be sustainable, except for interventions with consumable items (i.e. hygiene,

63 school, and teacher kits). The school infrastructure and WASH facilities will be maintained by the schools from their annual budget.

Replenishment of the children’s school supplies and WASH items depends on the disposable income of their parents. The distribution of school kits lifts an economic burden from parents, but the replenishment of the items in the kit will be highly dependent on each household’s ability to raise extra income for school supplies.

As for the psychosocial training and the teachers circle it is likely that the schools will sustain these. This is because disaster risk management is already a mandated responsibility of schools and part of it is the capacity to give psychosocial first aid or intervention (Interview with Ms. Aileen Sobremonte, 7 August 2015; FGD with teachers, 10 August 2015). The psychosocial training provided teachers with the theory on the subject and made them aware that their actions to support children after Haiyan were already forms of psychosocial support (Interview with Ms. Aileen Sobremonte, 7 August 2015). Armed with more information on providing psycho-social support to children, the teachers will likely again provide psycho-social support to children immediately after any future disaster. As for the teacher’s circles, the present workplace culture and DepEd structure lends itself to teachers continuing to work together and interact socially within the school and with other teachers from other schools (Interview with Ms. Aileen Sobremonte, 7 August 2015).

WASH The WASH component had interventions for both households and for children in schools. For the WASH interventions in the households, SCI provided communal water facilities, household latrines, and hygiene promotion. These three reinforce each other in that latrines can only be used and maintained properly when there is accessible, sufficient and clean water source. Behavior modification through hygiene promotion rounds up the trio and emphasizes why these two elements are needed and how they work together. This package of support (water-latrine-hygiene) works to make the ZOD program sustainable.

Sustainability can also be seen in terms of the maintenance of the facilities constructed. The survey results show that the beneficiaries regard maintenance of the water point as the responsibility of the community members (42% answered this way), and neighbors, family members, owner (classified under ‘others’ with 22% answering this way). It should be noted, however, that there are those who answered that no one is responsible for maintaining the water point (16% answered like this). To be sure, this type of response this may be attributable to the communal nature of the facility

64 in that since it is no one’s private property, then it is no one’s responsibility to care for these facilities. As with any communal resource, free-riding (i.e. taking benefits from the resource without contributing to its sustainability) can take place. The good news from this evaluation is that there is evidence that the barangay council can take an active role in helping maintain the facilities (see this Evaluation – Effectiveness: WASH).

Assessment of Efficiency (Budget Utilization and Management) In this evaluation study the focus is on the efficient use of resources rather than on cost-effectiveness because the very short length of the project means that the impacts cannot yet be evaluated and quantified (i.e. only immediate outcomes can be gleaned from evidence). The budget efficiency comparison done is among the different components of the project using the final financial reports for SHO 1 and SHO 2. True cost-efficiency analysis (that is, taking costs of individual items of the budget and comparing with the costs incurred in other similar projects) is also not possible given the data available. This section of the report is thus limited to cost analysis and comparison of relative budget utilization efficiency among the components of the SHO programs. The analysis also looks at the efficiency of budget utilization in relation to the effectiveness of the interventions (i.e. efficient relationship between inputs and outputs).

Program Budget Management of SHO 124

Table 29: SHO 1 Final Financial Report Summary (in Euro) Actual % Sector Commitments Balance Expenses Difference Water and Sanitation 230,134.94 240,008.54 (9,873.60) -4.29% Livelihood/Household 421,798.88 340,631.39 81,167.49 19.24% Security Program Management 46,014.24 2,051.94 4.27% Support 48,066.18 Total Emergency Aid 700,000.00 626,654.17 73,345.83 10.48%

Table __ shows the budget, actual expenses and rate of over- or underspending (see column “% Difference”) as they appear on the SHO 1 Final Financial Report. The Final Financial Report for SHO 1 shows “Water and Sanitation”, “Livelihood/Household Security”, and “Program Management Support” as the budget categories listed. Using these categories, it can be seen that there is a 19% underspending in

24 The financial report for SHO 1 shows the FSL (boat repair) under “Livelihood/Household Security” and shows the shelter kit and NFIs under “Water and Sanitation”. This classification is observed in this section of the report to avoid contradiction with the financial report already submitted. However elsewhere in this report, the boat repair is lodged under FSL (food security and livelihood), while the shelter kit and NFIs are lodged under shelter, to be consistent with other SC documents and common classification used by staff on the ground.

“Livelihood/Household Security” and a 4% underspending in “Program Management Support”. The underspending in “Livelihood/Household Security” come from underspending in “Training” (94% underspending), “Transfer Fee” (84.05% underspending), and also to “Livelihood Vouchers/Transfers” (9% underspending). The underspending for “Livelihood Vouchers/Transfers” is € 20,176.87, which is roughly equivalent to around Php 1 million would have been enough for 67 more beneficiaries. On the whole, there is some underspending (10% of the total budget), but this is within the allowed budget flexibility. More importantly, the underspending did not affect the ability of the project to reach its intended targets. Moreover, there was no evidence of spending for unnecessary items and/or items not directly related to the intervention.

Note that the over- and underspending could also be a reflection of the difficulty of having a more realistic budget in a situation where floating exchange rate is used and activities are subject to changing conditions and cluster agreements. SCI staff reported that among the challenges of managing the grant is the uncertainty in the exchange rate to be used, leading to unexpected instances of over- or underspending that is only finally resolved at the closing of the project (FGD with SCPPO staff, 11 August 2015).

Looking at the share of each component to the total expenditure, “Program Management Support” took up 7.34% of the total expenses, while “Livelihood/Household Security” and “Water and Sanitation” took up 54.36% and 38.30% respectively. Strictly for comparison in this report, combining the expenses for “Livelihood/Household Security” and “Water and Sanitation” under the heading of Program Costs shows that the combined total of these two components made up 92.66% of the total expenses (EUR 580,693.93). Note that the figures for “Livelihood/Household Security” and “Water and Sanitation” include expenses for thematic personnel (e.g. Program Quality Assurance, Program Coordinator, Community Mobilizer/Distribution Agent, and MEAL staff). This ratio of program costs versus support costs (92.66% vs 7.34%), while far from the prescribed ratio of 70% program costs and 30% support costs25, means that almost all resources went to implementation. This scenario is expected in the emergency phase wherein the delivery of support packages took paramount importance. In addition, 20.33% of the total SHO 1 expenditure went to personnel costs. This is also reflective of Haiyan Estancia Field Office’s status as an emergency structure with staff of over 100.

25 The prescribed standard ratio is taken from the SHO 1 and SHO 2 final budget documents.

Looking at the costs for Figure 1: SHO 1 Distribution of Actual monitoring and evaluation, Expenses there is underspending in all Program the budget items related to Management this. Specifically, there is Support 7% 51.37% underspending in MEAL Water and national personnel, 26.53% Sanitation underspending for 38% international M&E Officer, and 73.74% underspending for Livelihood/H audit and evaluation. The ousehold Security underspending in monitoring 55% and evaluation expenses coincides with the finding elsewhere in this evaluation that documentation and data management were challenges for the program. The total monitoring and evaluation spending (including personnel and audit costs) totaled € 9,637.21 or 1.54% of the total expenses. During SHO 1 implementation at the time of emergency, most of the information on the project are fluid, scattered and sometimes undocumented, with only a skeletal MEAL staff in place (Draft Report Presentation, 1 September 2015). High staff turnover, without handing over reports or documents, resulted in crucial information (e.g. data, basis for decisions) being lost at that time. A greater investment in developing MEAL processes and systems, along with appropriate staffing, would have made up for the contextual limitations and effects of the high staff turnover.

Program Budget Management of SHO 226 This evaluation finds that for SHO 2, there is some underspending for “Water and Sanitation”, “Food Security/Nutrition”, and “Livelihood/Household Security”, and a slight overspending in “Education” and “Program Management Support”, but these are all within the 10% budget flexibility allowance. Overall, there was a 100% budget utilization (no over- or underspending in total). The evaluation further finds that there was no evidence of the grant being used for items that did not directly concern the SHO 2 interventions.

Table 30: SHO 2 Final Financial Report Summary (in Euro) Actual % Commitments Balance Spending Difference Water and sanitation 247,637 237,918 9,719 4% Food security/ nutrition 148,826 137,780 11,046 7% Livelihood/ household security 145,026 134,933 10,093 7% Education 179,386 188,723 (9,337) -5% Program management support 601,688 623,209 (21,521) -4% TOTAL 1,322,563 1,322,563 - 0%

26 The financial report for SHO 2 shows the UCT under Food Security/Nutrition, while the household CCT and community grant are placed under Livelihood/Household Security. These three interventions are lumped under FSL (food security and livelihood) elsewhere in this evaluation report.

Comparing the different components, it can be seen that “Water and Sanitation” incurred the highest cost and largest share of the budget (18% of the budget), followed by “Education” (14% of the budget), Food Security/Nutrition (11% of the budget), and “Livelihood/Household Security” (10% of the budget). The high spending in the top two items, “Water and Sanitation” and “Education” are found to be consistent with the finding in this evaluation that these two are the most effective interventions of SHO 2.

In terms of share to total cost, 47% of Figure 2: SHO 2 Distribution of the total expenses went to “Program Actual Expenses Management Support”. Meanwhile,

Water and 53% of the budget went to the sanitation combined total program cost (i.e. 18% combined costs for “Water and Program Food Sanitation”, “Food Security/Nutrition”, management security/ support nutrition “Livelihood/Household Security”, and 47% 11% “Education”). This ratio of program Livelihood costs vis-à-vis support costs (i.e. 53% vs / 47%) strays from the prescribed ratio of household Education 70% program costs to 30% support 14% security 10% costs. Figure __ shows the share of each individual program component and the “Program Management Support” to the total expenditures. Note that unlike in SHO 1, the staff costs for thematic personnel are included in “Program Management Support” in SHO 2. Had the thematic personnel cost been included in the program cost, as the budget guideline prescribes, the ratio of program cost and management support cost (81% program cost vs. 18% support cost) for SHO 2 would be closer to SHO 1.

Delving into the specific components, there was a 3% underspending27 in total program costs (combining the four program components) for SHO 2. The most likely cause for this is the none implementation of some planned activities because of changes in context, such as debris clearing, DRR drills, and hygiene promotion and training for Barangay Health Workers. Another possible reason for is that the SHO 2 was also implemented using a floating exchange rate that resulted in final financial figures only resolved at the end of the project.

For “Livelihood/Household Security”, the underspending came largely from underspending in trainings (25% underspending) and also partly from “Alternative Marine Livelihoods” (household CCT). For the CCT, the unspent budget is € 6,715, equivalent to around Php 335,750. This would have been enough for 56 more beneficiaries had SCI opted to relax the qualifications. Of this component’s budget for trainings and workshops, only 75% was spent (equivalently, 25% or € 3,378 was not

27 Underspending can be indicative of one of three things – overestimation of budget (i.e. wrong programming), cutting corners in implementation (i.e. compromising quality), or dropping/ not implementing parts of the intervention.

68 spent). Among these trainings is one for DRR, part of which includes having drills. FGD participants indicated that they would have liked to have also done drills in their community, but that this was no longer included because of time constraints. Instead they just participated as observers in other barangays’ drills (FGD with San Fernando Barangay Council and CAMPCO, 10 August 2015). The removal of drills in some barangays could account for the underspending in trainings for FSL. This underspending, though it did not affect the achievement of FSL output targets, did affect the relevance of the SHO 2 DRR intervention as respondents indicated that actual conduct of drills in their community would be useful for them (FGD with San Fernando Barangay Council and CAMPCO, 10 August 2015).

For “Food Security/Nutrition” (household UCT), € 11,046 was not spent. This is equivalent to around Php 552,300. Like the CCT underspending, one reason for underspending in the UCT could be the challenge of finding qualified beneficiaries as determined by strict adherence to the selection criteria (see this Evaluation: Coverage and Participation for more details on the selection process). This unspent amount is enough for 135 more beneficiaries of PhP 4,100/HH or SCI could have opted to give a UCT amount closer to the food basket without compromising its target or actual number of beneficiaries.

In the case of “Water and Sanitation”, there was 17% overspending on the cost of latrines. Additionally, there was also 28% overspending in “supervision and monitoring cost (transportation)”. Despite these overspendings, there was enough underspending in other areas to offset the overspending, such that there was underspending for the whole “Water and Sanitation” chapter. Note that this underspending (4%) is still within the budget flexibility allowance. Items with large underspending include technical assessments, trainings, hygiene promotion, and construction of wells. The savings from “hygiene promotion activities” (€ 4,771) or from “hygiene promotion materials” (€ 6,416) could have been used to purchase hygiene kits for school children, thus reducing the tension created by unequal distribution of hygiene kits in schools.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the underspending in technical assessments, trainings, and hygiene promotion did not seem to negatively affect the effectiveness of the WASH initiative. This may be because government interventions in the area have already laid groundwork (e.g. data gathering, technical assessments, earlier hygiene promotion) that eased the way for the SCI’s WASH intervention. Examples of these are the Department of Health Region VI’s Environmental and Occupational Health Program, and the Iloilo Provincial Health Office’s anti-dengue campaign.

The “Education” component overspent in almost all areas except for “classroom repairs”. In total, there was a 5% overspending, which is within the budget flexibility allowance. The overspending is starkest for “teacher kits” (85% overspending), “repair or provision of temporary learning spaces” (67% overspending) and “blackboards” (35% overspending). Note that the education component exceeded targets in all areas and that the education intervention was highly effective. It was also the

69 intervention that generated the least social tension among the beneficiaries, primarily because of its universal coverage for the teacher and student kits.

“Program management support” overspent by 21,521 Euros (4% overspending). Items with overspending were “logistics” (19% overspending), “direct personnel cost” (5% overspending), and “travel and per diem” (4% overspending). The overspending in logistics is consistent with the wide geographical reach of the program that required much transportation expenses especially for island barangays.

The other items, “local administrative cost” and “audit and MEAL” had underspending of 1% and 26%, respectively. The total monitoring and evaluation spending (including personnel costs, MEAL activities cost, audit cost, evaluation cost) formed 3.42% of the total expenditures. There is underspending in all the related monitoring and evaluation items. For example, the actual expenses for MEAL activities was 25% less than its approved budget (equivalently, it only used 75% of its budget). This underspending is consistent with the findings in this evaluation that the MEAL has not been maximized, and further emphasizes the need to more meaningfully involve the MEAL in programming.

Summary of Program Budget Management:

This evaluation finds that, in general, the budget utilization and management in SHO 1 and SHO 2 reflects the findings on effectiveness. That is, where resources were maximized, this translated into more effective components of the SHO intervention and organizational effectiveness and vice versa. No evidence of unnecessary or unrelated expenditures was found in either SHO 1 or SHO 2. Further, the over- or underspending experienced in each component and in the project as a whole did not affect its ability to reach and even exceed its intended targets. The over- or underspending experienced is within the budget flexibility allowance of 10% and might be attributable to the use of a floating exchange rate to some extent.

There is underspending in some items within budget “chapters” that suggests that there is room for more efficient budget allocation to maximize implementation/program effectiveness and organizational effectiveness. This evaluation found that underspending occurred mostly when some budgeted program activities were dropped because of changes in context, or because there were likely not enough beneficiaries found for that intervention (for CCT and UCT). Nevertheless, the underspending within program components (e.g. trainings, hygiene promotion, construction of wells, UCT, CCT) could be reduced to improve intervention quality so as to expect better effectiveness and relevance. Similarly, there is underspending for monitoring and evaluation within “Program Management Support” that could have been more efficiently utilized.

Assessment of Coherence, Coverage and Participation

Partnership and Coordination The SHO-funded program was implemented in close coordination with UN and other international humanitarian agencies in the region via the cluster system. As discussed in the preceding sections, SCI co-coordinated the education cluster and was a member of other clusters such as WASH, food security, shelter, etc. Coordination via the cluster system has ensured that duplication is avoided and complementation is enhanced. In fact, coordination via the cluster system worked so well that decisions made by SCI in the course of the SHO program implementation are sometimes based on cluster recommendations. This evaluation study also finds that SCI’s priorities and types of intervention are in line with cluster recommendations and as such it has contributed, to a large extent, to the achievement of the goals of set forth by the international community and national government. SCI’s intervention has ensured that communities are built back safer. SCI’s eye on recovery and increasing resilience (not just immediate relief) in its intervention bodes well to long-term development outcomes.

Coordination did not only happen among non-state institutions but also between SCI and government institutions as well. In three of the towns (Concepcion, Carles, Estancia) covered by the SHO-funded intervention, coordination between local government bodies and NGOs were led by the municipal/town Mayor. SCI has benefitted from the high capacity and good governance practice of certain local government units (LGU) such as the municipality of Concepcion and Carles. Information needed for appropriate responses were easily accessed via the LGU in such a case. Moreover, SCI’s successes, such as in WASH ZODC, is largely attributable to the LGU’s preparation work and participation.

Coordination with barangay officials (Barangay Council) is also observed in the implementation of the SHO-funded intervention. This evaluation study finds that regardless of the issues accompanying SCI’s engagement with the barangay members, the barangay officials appreciated SCI’s intervention in their areas. The ease by which SCPPO has arranged evaluation-related meetings and field work for this evaluation study in the barangays, despite tight schedule, is indicative of a high degree of coordination between the SCI and the barangay officials.

SCI has also established partnership with the Department of Education and to a certain extent with the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Partnership with DepEd was not only institutionalized via MOA but it was also strong to a point where SCI is treated as a member of the DepEd community in the region. The District Supervisor has this to say, “parang family na namin ang SCI talaga. They just come and go” (SCI is like our family. They can just come and go) (Interview with Aileen Sobremonte, 7 August 2015).

Coverage and Participation In terms of coverage and participation, this evaluation finds that the SHO program has a wide geographic coverage and benefitted vulnerable people and institutions as discussion on effectiveness has shown. However, there are issues in participation and inclusion.

The SHO1 and SHO 2 FSL, Education and WASH components of the SHO program have different standards of coverage/targeting. SCI’s plan and effort to prioritize and reach the most vulnerable in targeting is commendable not only because it is sensitive to the relative resilience of communities and social groups but also because it adheres to the rights-based principles. In targeting for the SHO-funded intervention (both for education, WASH and FSL) SCI has chosen the most vulnerable barangays for coverage. For the education component, SCI has given universal coverage for all elements of the education intervention, except for infrastructure-related support. In other words, all the elementary school children and teachers in the vulnerable barangays were given school kits and teaching materials, respectively. Likewise, all elementary schools in the vulnerable barangays were given recreational materials. This approach ensured the widest reach/coverage and it is deemed apt because the social benefit in education are very high and immediate. The only problem when it comes to school intervention was in the selective coverage of hygiene kits which adversely affected the excluded children.

The targeting for school rehabilitation also stemmed from identification of vulnerable barangays. From there, SCI coordinated with DepEd to avoid duplication with other agencies’ support and the government’s plan. There seems to be no problem with regard to participation in the infrastructure work. While most of the teachers had no participation, the school heads were consulted and in fact were able to negotiate concessions in repairs (FGD teachers consolidated findings). In terms of children’s inclusion, the education intervention benefited most of the school children in the target areas. But, they have no participation even in identifying contents of the school kit or recreational materials.

In terms of the FSL, SCI adopted a more complex and careful approach in targeting coverage. The targeting in FSL also stemmed from the selection of most vulnerable barangays and from there, SCI selected the most vulnerable households according to its criteria. It is in the level of setting vulnerability criteria and in selecting the actual household beneficiaries vis-à-vis SCI criteria that issues of participation and exclusion became apparent. One issue concerns the community’s own notion of vulnerability and target unit of assistance (i.e. family versus household) vis-à-vis SCI’s vulnerability criteria. The other issue concerns exclusion of other vulnerable households vis-à-vis inclusion of households who do not fit the criteria. Another issue concerns the role of the Barangay Selection Committee vis-à-vis the role of the elected Barangay Officials. These have unintentionally created and/or aggravated social tension and friction among residents and between the residents and barangay officials or BSC, with no

72 appropriate mitigating measures28 put in place. In some barangays, the officials run the risk of losing in the next election because of the exclusion-inclusion problems (FGD with BSC and Barangay Officials, 12 August 2015).

To elaborate on these issues, SCI has a set of criteria for targeting actual beneficiaries in the chosen barangay. The criteria contain SCI’s notion of vulnerability. Although SCI created a Barangay Selection Committee (BSC), its members did not have participation in the setting up of the criteria, thus the community’s notion of vulnerability was not included (FGD with BSC and Barangay Officials consolidated findings). The actual participation of the barangay selection committee was in identifying the beneficiaries based on SCI’s criteria, a function that is done in parallel by SCI through its validation procedure. In case of clash or difference between the barangay selection committee’s list and the SCI’s own list, final decision as to “who gets what” rested with SCI (FGD with BSC and Barangay Officials Consolidated Findings). In this sense, the BSC served more as an initial data-gathering mechanism and not a truly participatory mechanism, as BSC members in Barangay Tanza contend, “Taga-gather lang talaga ng data at wala po talaga kaming final decision kasi kami nga hindi nakasama eh. Bale, kami po ma’am talaga nag house to house sa buong barangay tapos sila nalang yong sumala ng form na-pinasa namin”(We were just there to gather data and we really did not have the final decision because even we, ourselves, were not included in the list of beneficiaries. We did the house to house gathering of data and then they [SCI] filtered the list that we gave them).

As discussed elsewhere, SCI’s criteria is designed to include only people in the extreme continuum of vulnerability (i.e. those that are socially and economically poor). A barangay captain explained succinctly: “masyadong mahigpit, dumadaan sa butas ng karayom ang criteria nila, at saka hindi flexible kasi ang criteria nila ma’am kailangan 3 kids and above pero meron namang may 2 kids lang na mas kawawa talaga, kahit meron sila o pasado sila sa dalawang criteria pang 3rd hindi sila pasado, hindi ka na qualified.” (the criteria are very strict, it is almost as if you are passing through a needle hole to qualify and the criteria are not flexible. The criterion says you must have 3 kids and above but there are also those who only have 2 kids but who are more pitiful. Even if they pass in two criteria but they fail in one they are automatically disqualified (FGD Barangay Officials and BSC, 6 August 2015).

28 SCP reported that mitigating mechanism on complaints and problems of exclusion is the Beneficiary Selection Committee.

Problems such as these stem from the contested notion of vulnerability (i.e. community’s own criteria versus SCI’s criteria); clash in value priorities (equality vis-à- vis equity); and not enough meaningful participation of the community in the design. SCI’s assumptions about the household/family could have been debated and negotiated at the outset had the barangay been involved in setting out the criteria. For instance, some barangay officials argued that the target unit should be family instead of household because typically, there could be more than one family living in one household. A PWD parent who passed all criteria but happen to live with his parents was automatically disqualified because his parents receive a small pension (FGD with BSC and barangay officials, 06 August 2015). Barangay officials in some barangays were automatically disqualified by virtue of being an official and not because they did not pass the criteria (FGD with BSC and Barangay Officials, 06 August 2015 & 12 August 2015).

But even as the strict SCI’s set of criteria prevailed, there are still those who slipped through the criteria. SCI’s post-distribution survey on CCT for boat repair showed that 58.09% of the respondents did not have household members regarded as vulnerable (e.g. pregnant or lactating women, persons with disabilities). A barangay captain in one barangay also qualified for the latrine distribution in another barangay where his second house is located (Field work observation notes).

As mentioned elsewhere, SCI’s criteria in beneficiary selection led to wider geographic reach than wider household reach in one geographic area. Had SCI been more sensitive to the socio-economic and cultural context of the barangay, it could have opted to relax its criteria within a barangay instead of including more barangays with fewer beneficiaries per barangay. A simple indicator such as the high incidence of 4P’s29 beneficiaries signals that a barangay is generally poor and inequality is low. In all the barangays (except Bancal) visited for the evaluation, 4Ps recipients make up a third to half of the HH population. Doing universal coverage or more distribution in a barangay would have benefitted more or less the same number of vulnerable households but with less community tension.

This is especially crucial since, in the communities where SHO-funded interventions were implemented, this evaluation study has observed a general preference for equality rather than equity when it comes to allocating support. There could be three reasons for this. One, pre-existing inequality could be low, and the typhoon’s devastation equalized their socio-economic situation such that the community members felt that what little inequality there was, is now gone. Two, the country’s villages are made up of households that are related thru kinship, hence strong kinship ties prevail (i.e. the village is one big extended family). Three, a patrimonial and patronage political culture coupled with strong kinship ties tends to allocate resources equally, just like in the family. This is implicit in what a Barangay Captain said (FGD with Barangay Officials and BSC, 06 August 2015): “Syempre ma’am masakit. Kagaya ko, ako ang

29 4Ps or the Pantawid Pilipino Program is the government’s CCT program that targets poor and extremely poor households. While targeting in this program is arguably debatable, it could serve as substitute indicator for poverty incidence in the absence of a baseline study or hard data such as during the case of emergencies.

74 nanay ng barangay anak ko sila syempre masakit sa akin kung hindi maabutan ng tulong yung kawawa [kasi anak ko sila]. May donor na dapat naintindihan namin na limited lang, pero ano ba naman yong isang tao lang na maipahabol pa di ba?”(Of course, it hurts. For instance like me, I am the mother of the village and my constituents are my children, thus it pains me if those who are needy could not be given assistance [because they are my children]. We understand that some donors will just give limited support, but what is one more to add?)

Another issue of coverage and inclusion is that the basis for choosing whether to give single or multiple FSL interventions in a barangay is unclear. There are villages where both UCT and CCT were implemented and there are villages where only UCT was carried out.

PART 3: RECOMMENDATIONS “I would like to thank the personnel of Save the Children as well as the management of Save the Children for helping us in no small measure. Really, the Municipality of Carles is very appreciative of what [they] have been doing when it comes to humanitarian mission. So far, it's an excellent job.” – Mayor Segredo A. Betita of Carles, Iloilo

Save the Children’s quick response and continued support to the recovery and rehabilitation of Panay is well-received by the communities and by the local government. Its support package, ranging from multi-sectoral emergency relief to early recovery initiatives to setting foundations for sustainable development, proved to be relevant and effective in addressing the needs of the beneficiaries in the aftermath of typhoon Haiyan.

To further strengthen the approach, this evaluation study recommends that when the SHO 1 and SHO 2 interventions are replicated in a similar situation, the following be considered:

 For all relief support packages (hygiene kits, student’s kits, teacher’s kits) provide uniform sets and aim for universal coverage when possible. When resources limit universal coverage, adhere to the SPHERE guideline which says, “If the general living conditions of an affected population were already significantly below the minimum standards before the disaster, agencies may have insufficient resources to meet the standards. In such situations, providing basic facilities for the entire affected population may be more important than reaching the minimum standards for only a proportion” (SPHERE Handbook, 2011).  For FSL, continue providing cash transfers with sufficient flexibility in the use of the funds especially when there is a functioning market. There is a need to clarify and have a common understanding among the project staff on what the UCT and other cash transfers are meant to do. Consider avoiding conditions on how the cash transfers should be spent as this negates the purpose of providing flexibility. o In addition, ensure the amount given primarily to alleviate immediate hunger (food aid) is matched with the area’s food basket cost for the average family size plus the inflationary effect of a disaster.  Continue partnership with a third-party delivery mechanism for cash transfers to intended beneficiaries. Consider revising the operational process of transferring the cash to households (i.e. minimize instances of PhilPost staff distributing the money in person, but explore other ways to deliver the cash). Consider utilizing money remittance centers or bank-based facilities (e.g. BPI BanKo) or telecommunication-based facilities (e.g. Globe G-Cash).  For boat repair support, consider including a skills training activity with accompanying distribution of tools (similar to training and tools provision for shelter construction under a different grant) especially if the amount of cash support is insufficient to complete the rapir or construction.

o In addition, consider differentiating support depending on the degree of destruction of the boat (i.e. higher amount for totally damaged than partially-damaged).  When tying livelihood support to shelter repair or construction, provide sufficient capital to ensure enough income will come out of the livelihood intervention to be able to support house construction and/or repair. Otherwise, aim for a more realistic outcome.  For education, continue providing disaster risk reduction trainings and other activities, in line with the Philippine government’s National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan. Consider providing the teachers of SHO- funded target schools with psycho-social first aid and DRR training.  For WASH, continue zero open defecation initiative, and consider providing a standard amount of materials for each household across all barangays. Otherwise, when barangay council and community members are involved in decisions regarding allocations, strengthen buy-in strategies and implement such strategies across all target areas.  For all interventions, improve on using a participatory framework and processes to take the communities’ knowledge and perceived vulnerability into account.  Strengthen coordination with other aid agencies down to the type of intervention vis-a-vis beneficiary list level to avoid duplication and unnecessary tension in the community.  Cultivate more partnerships with relevant government agencies and local non- government organizations  In a humanitarian assistance context, where aid agencies and resources are abundant, aim for multiple intervention in fewer areas to maximize results.  Ensure timely, proper and thorough recording coupled with a more systematic data management even during emergency phase, in order to make data reconciliation (finance versus program) and reporting more efficient and less burdensome. Further, it could provide timely information to program staff and senior management to make critical decisions regarding program intervention especially with regard to striking a balance between expansion (reach) and concentration (completeness).  Among the records that should be maintained are: o Dating of activities (timeline) broken down by emergency, transition, recovery, and rehabilitation phases. This will serve as a benchmark for future responses. o Keep detailed records of interventions per barangay (better if per household) for better targeting depending on the goal of the program o Documents processes and systems as they were actually used based on Haiyan/SCPPO experience. Consider translating these into a manual of operation or standard operating procedures for future responses of similar scale in the Philippines.  Continue streamlining data management within the organization. In particular, further strengthen the process of integration of MEAL in program development and implementation to ensure high standard of quality in implementation and

improvement of institutional and staff capacity. That is, the MEAL produces commendable internal studies and monitoring reports. These knowledge products that MEAL produces should feed into how programs conduct the interventions (using analysis of data made by MEAL and recognizing recommendations).

In SCPPO’s transition to recovery and development work, the following should be considered:

 For MEAL and programs, strengthen research skills and capacity. For Finance, consider using an independent data source (such as attendance sheets accompanying activity financial reports) when reconciling figures with programs and MEAL. For logistics, consider more staff exposure to target areas to have a better idea of the logistical requirements of the intervention.  To ensure smooth transition from recovery to development, aim to finish untested infrastructure such as the communal water facilities and latrines. Also, revisit finished constructions to ensure these are still working within the life of the project.  The projected poverty impact of typhoon Haiyan would certainly worsen the socio-economic condition of the already impoverished beneficiaries. Continue to aim for increased resilience by supporting livelihood and DRR management.  When FSL program is to be implemented, conduct a political-economy study of the areas as a basis for program design.  The SHO grants paid particular attention to women in selection criteria of FSL beneficiaries. However, the whole intervention does not have enough affirmative action in addressing women’s particular vulnerabilities. In considering FSL interventions for women, consider taking into account gender parity of labor. Providing women with economic empowerment (thru alternative livelihood) without transforming gender roles at home, would only add to women’s burdens.  Meaningful participation is in the heart of a successful and sustainable intervention. Beneficiaries are rights-holders and have agency. Ensure higher level of participation as opposed to just consultation in all phases of project cycle.

REFERENCES ACAPS. 2014. “Secondary Data Review Philippines Typhoon Yolanda”, January 2014. ADB. N.D. “Summary Poverty Impact Assessment: Emergency Assistance for Relief and Recovery from Typhoon Yolanda”. CPWG and Education Cluster. 2014. “CPWG and Education Cluster Joint Needs Assessment, February-May 2014”. Mulliez, Julien. 2013. “Philippines Haiyan Response Panay Rapid Assessment”. NEDA Region VI & Regional DRRMC Region VI. 2013. “Western Visayas Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (Aftermath of Super Typhoon Yolanda)”. Pantaleo Creti & Susanne Jaspars (eds.). 2006. “Cash-Transfer Programming in Emergencies”. Oxfam GB: Oxford, UK Save the Children UK. 2015. “Philippines Haiyan Response—A Multisectiral Review of the Use of Market Analysis and the Design and Implementation of CTPs”. The SPHERE Project. 2011. SPHERE Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. United Kingdom: Practical Action Publisher. SCNL. 2015. “TOR External End Evaluation SHO Funded SCNL Response to Typhoon Haiyan”. SCNL. 2015. “SHO 1 Terminal Report”, April 2015. SCNL. 2014. “SHO II Program Interim Report”, January 2015. SCNL. 2014. “SHO 1 Final Donor Financial Report”, 25 April 2014 SCNL. 2013. “SHO II Program Proposal: Action to address emergency and recovery needs for Children and Families affected by Typhoon Haiyan on Panay Island in the Philippines”, November 2013. SCNL. 2013. “SHO 1 Program Proposal: Emergency Response for Children and Families affected by Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines”, November 2013. SCP. 2015. “SHO II Final Donor Financial Report”, 14 September 2015. SCPPO. 2015. “Matrix of SHO 2 funded Interventions”, July 2015. SCPPO. 2015. “MEAL IPPT Report”, June 2015. SCPPO. 2014. “PDM Boat Repair”. Susanne Jaspars & Paul Harvey. 2007. “A Review of UNICEF’s Role in Cash Transfers to Emergency Affected Populations”. ODI: New York, New York Rappler, February 20, 2014. “Yolanda’s Homeless mostly in Western—not Eastern—Visayas”. http://www.rappler.com/nation/51037-yolanda-homeless-statistics-western-visayas UNICEF. 2014. “Philippines Humanitarian Situation Report”, SitRep No.16, January 2013. UNISDR. 2010. “Guidance Note on Recovery: Livelihood”. International Recovery Platform Secretariat: Kobe, Japan UNSTATS. (2005). “Designing Household Survey Samples: Practical Guidelines” (p.38) UN DESA Statistics Division WASH Cluster Philippines. 2014. “WASH Baseline Assessment”, May 2014. http://maps.napc.gov.ph/drupal/articles/poverty-statistics-0; http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2012/highlights_fullyear.asp

ANNEX 1: List of Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

List of Interviews Interview Respondent Position/Designation Carles Municipal Segfredo A. Betita Municipal Mayor Government Franco Paulo B. Bacinillo Nurse I 11 August 2015 Mee M. Antay Sanitation Inspector I Interviewer/s: M.D. Alicias- Garen and G.D. Garen Concepcion Municipal Milliard S. Villanueva Municipal Mayor Government Lito Carrerra Municipal Administrator 7 August 2015 Engr. Rene Sobremonte Municipal Planning and Interviewer/s: M.D. Alicias- Development Officer Garen and G.D. Garen Estancia Municipal Engr. Eugene Tentativa Municipal Disaster Risk Government Reduction and 13 August 2015 Management Officer Interviewer/s: M.D. Alicias- Garen Department of Education Aileen Sobremonte District Supervisor Concepcion District Office Anne Suiza Head Teacher, 7 August 2015 Concepcion Central Interviewer/s: G.D. Garen School SCI – UN Education Cluster Felinor Villa SCI Area Manager 12 August 2015 (South) Interviewer/s: M.D. Alicias- Garen

FGD with SCI Respondent Position/Designation SC Panay Program Office Abohair Candado Logistics Coordinator 11 August 2015 Dia Basas Finance Interviewer/s: M.D. Alicias- Garen and G.D. Garen Jasmine Ferrer Awards Coordinator Joel Balaquit PDQ Manager Vivien Grace Martin Field Manager SC Panay Program Office Felinor Villa Area Manager (South) 14 August 2015 Flor Angel I. Tulio Infra Project Engineer Interviewer/s: M.D. Alicias- Gladys A. Montales Area Manager (North) Garen and G.D. Garen Mickah Erickah Joy Celiz MEAL Assistant Queen Harley Artillano Area Coordinator (South) Razelle Garcia Community Mobilizer Whimcy Luck C. MEAL Officer Sagpang

FGD with Children School Respondent Designation Abong Elementary School Angel A. Narciso Grade IV Ilang Ilang 10 August 2015 Evalyn Bullos Grade IV Yellowbell Interviewer/s: G.D. Garen Hannah Mae Destna Grade IV Yellowbell

Jovelyn Detoga Grade IV Yellowbell Katrina Colen Alarcon Grade IV Yellowbell Leorceine Dela Cruz Grade V Sampaguita Marc Nixus L. Sorita Grade IV Yellowbell Natalie Jenh Alarcon Grade IV Yellowbell Shyn Marie Bangiban Grade V Sampaguita Bancal Elementary School Ara Cobarobias Grade VI Hyacinth 12 August 2015 Eljen S. Fuentes Grade V Dahlia Interviewer/s: G.D. Garen Jo Marie B. Sandoy GradeVI Ivory Kathlyn Charm Sandoy Grade V Dahlia Kyla Alexie D. Candelario Grade V Orchid Ma. Ninna Flores Grade V Dahlia Rose Mae Renalaje Grade VI Hyacinth Shaica May Decara Grade V Orchid Shalvina Mae Sabanal Grade VI Hyacinth San Fernando Elementary Jhoneo V. Morales Grade VI- 1 School Leoneil Z. Caberon Grade VI- 1 10 August 2015 Mary ann M. Gairlangoso Grade VI- 1 Interviewer/s: G.D. Garen Melgeline O. Canizo Grade VI- 1 Melzon S. Baisa Grade VI- 1 Mjay C. Ajusan Grade V PJ L. Villegas Grade VI- 1 Ray Ian G. Mahinay Grade VI- 1 Sherie Anne L. Mahilum Grade VI- 1

FGD with Teachers School Respondent Designation Abong Elementary School Ella Mae A. Omena Teacher I 10 August 2015 Emily Reseline S. Chiquito Teacher I Interviewer/s: M.D. Alicias- Fely M. Agramon Teacher I Garen Geraldine S. Tungala Teacher I Kent B. Chavez Teacher II Magdalina R. Calvo Teacher I Mila C. Golingay Teacher I Wilfred S. Dalman Teacher I Bancal Elementary School Arlyn V. Nallos Teacher II 12 August 2015 Benje B. Mahilum Teacher I Interviewer/s: M.D. Alicias- Harlequin D. Oro Teacher I Garen Janet B. Arcenas Teacher III Nedy B. Hasañon Teacher I Richard T. Gonzales Teacher I Ruth V. Billones Teacher II Victoria A. Saber Teacher II San Fernando Elementary Elpidio Atanas Teacher I School Jocelyn B. Abong Teacher I 10 August 2015 Ma. Lida C. Mangasang Teacher II Interviewer/s: M.D. Alicias- Garen Mercy P. Magno Teacher II Rodelyn N. Mahinay Teacher I Roger S. Abrise Jr Teacher Samuel A. Bangiloy Teacher I

FGD with Barangay Council/Barangay Selection Committee/Community Grant Barangay Respondent Designation/Position Bancal, Carles Connie S. Bandojo Punong Barangay 12 August 2015 Elena Bandojo Kagawad Interviewer/s: M.D. Alicias- Hera B. Bandojo Kagawad Garen and G.D. Garen Lorly B. Cabio Kagawad Lory S. Bensurto Kagawad Norma Albor Brgy. Secretary Reynante Sayat Kagawad Nipa, Concepcion Angela A. Asmand BHW 7 August 2015 Jocelyn A. Caton BHW/PL/PIO Interviewer/s: M.D. Alicias- Juhra A. Narciso Secretary Garen San Fernando, Carles Deary Boy Redilca CAMPCO 10 August 2015 Dorlib Manggarong Kagawad Interviewer/s: M.D. Alicias- Edwin Bantillo Kagawad Garen and G.D. Garen Florentino Atanas Kagawad Joebert Merlolita Secretary Nolan Sampan CAMPCO Norman Dumaguin Kagawad Pem Alcala Jr. AMMSAN/FESFFA REP. Ponciano Redelle BOD/CAMPCO Rubio Mahuning Kagawad Teresita Abrise BOD/CAMPCO Tanza, Estancia Annabele M. Bantillio BHW 6 August 2015 Belen A. Geremiano Lupon Interviewer/s: M.D. Alicias- Cory N. Arizala Secretary Garen and G.D. Garen Cynthia Bulan Lupon Helen F. Caberoy Kagawad Ma. Eden Duslas Barangay Captain Ma. Rosa A. Glo Rep.from women Mercedes B. Alajar Lupon Ronnie S. Bendrino Kagawad Sheryl T. Sultan BSPO/BHW Pres. Tyna G. Jordan BSPO

ANNEX 2: Results of the Household Survey

HOUSEHOLD SURVEY FOR THE EVALUATION OF SCI’s EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND RECONSTRUCTION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES AFFECTED BY TYPHOON HAIYAN FUNDED BY SHO.

BACKGROUND

This report presents the results of the Household Survey conducted for the evaluation of a select program of Save the Children International (SCI) in the Philippines, specifically SCI’s Emergency Response and Reconstruction for Children and Families affected by Typhoon Haiyan funded by SHO. The survey gathered information from a representative sample of beneficiary households residing in 11 barangays belonging to 5 municipalities within the Panay Region. The survey used structured interview to collect demographic and socioeconomic information about persons and households. Moreover, the interviews captured program results and outcomes on the ground, and beneficiaries’ perception regarding the emergency aid and its delivery. The data will be used to validate the implementing agency’s operational conduct, if in accordance with targeted objectives and proposed activities. The survey can also inform on capacity or needs requirement in developing and implementing future programs in the region. All data collection activities, i.e. sampling, survey design, and reporting methodologies, are compliant with standard procedures for conducting scientific household surveys.

SURVEY OBJECTIVE

The SHO-SCI Household Survey’s primary objective was to provide data for the evaluation of SCI’s conduct in the implementation of SHO-funded emergency response and reconstruction programs in select areas of the Panay region. Specifically, it was to verify and corroborate facts already been reported in SCPPO’s various monitoring and implementation reports. The resulting data will also be used to generate insights and improved understanding of operational realities that will guide SCI’s program development. In order to achieve the said results, the household survey had the following goals: . Capture a random sample of households within SCI’s areas, specifically areas that received SHO- funded programs. . Collect relevant socioeconomic and demographic data about beneficiary households. . Collect data on delivery and receipt of goods and services under the Emergency Response and Recovery Program. . Capture data on beneficiary behavior relating to financial and in-kind support received. . Capture the sentiments of beneficiaries regarding goods and services received. . Collect on survey activities and details relevant to discussion of logistics and operational concerns.

SURVEY RESULTS

Part 1: Shelter, Non- Food Items and CCT -Boat Repair

Note: This survey covers SCP activities on shelter, non-food items, and cash grant for the repair of fishing boats, all under the Emergency Response for Children and Families affected by Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, a program funded by SHO.

1. There are 128 respondents for this survey, 85 households (66.4%) of which disclosed that they are recipient of the CCT intended for boat repair; 42 households (32.8%) identified themselves as recipients of both CCT and Shelter and non-food. And there’s 1 household (0.8%) who claimed to be a shelter and non-food item only beneficiary.

Table 1. Shelter, Non-Food Items, and CCT- Boat Beneficiaries INTERVENTION No. of HOUSEHOLDS % SHELTER AND NFI only 1 0.8 CCT BOAT REPAIR only 85 66.4 BOTH 42 32.8 TOTAL 128 100.00

2. Just when did help arrive? (Conversely, when did they receive the assistance from SCP?) This appears to be a difficult exercise for all the beneficiaries as their answers varied so widely. A majority of the recipients (71.2%) of the shelter kit and nonfood items estimated that help started arriving between 1 to 4 months after Haiyan. The second best answer was between Week 2 and Week 4 and this answer was shared by 23.1% of recipients.

3. Fortunately, the CCT is more memorable and almost all of the recipients (102 of 104, or 98.1%) remembered receiving the 1st tranche around March to April 2014, that is, 3 to4 months after Haiyan; then the 2nd tranche was reportedly given from Months 6 to 8 (July-August 2014).

4. From the recipients of the shelter and non-food kit, we tried to establish a list of the items that was given:

98%-100% Certain (52-53 of 53 respondents confirm) . Tarpaulin . Mosquito Net . Blankets . Sleeping Mat . Bucket . Soap . Kitchen set

93% Certain (49 of 53 respondents) . Jerrycan

58%-72% Certain (31&38 of 53 respondents) . Rope . AquaTabs or Pure sachets

5. The same recipients have confirmed (100%) that the kits are new and in excellent condition. In addition, they affirmed that all of the items (missing ones notwithstanding) were used accordingly.

6. Asked to rank the most useful items for the family, the result are as follows:

. Kitchen Set (41 votes) . Tarpaulin (27 votes) . Sleeping mat (25 votes) . Blankets (22 votes) . Mosquito Net (20 votes)

7. Apart from SCP, other organizations operated around the Panay Region. The recipients confirmed this when 14 respondents (23.3%) admitted to receiving similar support and items from them. From their accounts, 12 of the 14 respondents have identified their sponsor as an International NGO, while the other 2 have identified a local NGO.

Table 2. Support From other Organizations SIMILAR ITEMS FROM OTHERS, NOT SCP HH % YES 14 23.3 NO 46 76.7 TOTAL 60 100.00

8. Regarding the conditional cash transfer intended to support continued livelihood, all 126 recipients (100%) confirmed receiving the amount of Php15,000.

9. The majority of CCT recipients used the money to making a new boat (79 of 130 respondents, 61%), others used it to repair their old boat (45 respondents, 35%), 4 recipients (3%) used it to buy fishing implements, the last 2 used it somewhere not in the category.

10. A good majority (115 CCT recipients out of 122, 94.3%) were able to finish repairing and making a new boat, and there’s just 7 recipients (5.7%) who were unable to finish.

11. However, most of the respondents also claimed that the Php15,000 CCT was insufficient, and that they used up to Php5,000 to 10,000 more in order to complete their boat. They did get their additional money borrowing from their family (37.7%); others borrowed from formal institutions like the local bank and or microcredit agencies (37.7%); still 21 recipients (19.3%) were able to take it from their savings.

12. As part of the CCT, the beneficiaries and their families were asked to participate in the following orientation and or learning sessions hosted by SCP and partners. The beneficiary respondents’ participation is presented below.

Table 3. Participation in SCP Sponsored Learning Sessions (1)Fishing Regulations; (2)Eco-Friendly Fishing; (3)Disaster& Risk Reduction ECO-FRIENDLY ATTEND FISHING REG DRR FISHING YES 29 HH 25.9% 38 HH 30.2% 80 HH 63.0% NO 83 HH 74. 1% 88 HH 69.8% 47 HH 37.0% TOTAL 112 HH 100% 126 HH 100% 127 HH 100%

13. Finally, a determination was made whether there are improvements in the life of the program beneficiaries. By all accounts, all beneficiaries (100%) still depend on fishing and farming as their main source of living. This is followed (supplemented) by government transfers, specifically the DSWD-4P CCT, and engaging in temporary or part time work in other people’s farm and non-farm activities.

14. Thus, in their estimate, most of them can only earn below Php5,000 a month (86.6%), 16 of 127 (12.6%) reported a slightly higher income between Php5,000- 10,000, and 1 beneficiary who reported an income above Php15,000 in the past 6 months.

15. Comparing their incomes before Haiyan with the one they have in the last six months, Table 4 below shows their responses.

Table 4. Income Before Haiyan vs. Current (Past 6 mos) INCOME STATUS HH % THE SAME 46 36.22 INCREASED 38 29.92 DECREASED 43 33.86 TOTAL 127 100.00

16. And comparing their assets and wealth before Haiyan with the one they have in the last six months, Table 5 below again shows their responses.

Table 5. Assets and Wealth Before Haiyan vs. Current (Past 6 mos) ASSETS & WEALTH HH % THE SAME 51 40.16 INCREASED 28 22.05 DECREASED 48 37.80 TOTAL 127 100.00

Part 2: Food Security and Livelihood (FSL) and Education Intervention

The survey for FSL and Education covered those barangays that have received both FSL and an education intervention (conditional cash grant, unconditional cash grant, and or student kit, respectively). Not everyone in the list received both FSL grant and student kit, but those who did, were ask for their opinion on the latter.

The actual areas in consideration are . Brgy. Embarcadero, Batad (16 HH) . Brgy. Madanlog, San Dionisio (27 HH; Not an Educational Intervention Area) . Brgy. Nipa, Concepcion (52 HH) . Brgy. Tanza, Estancia (17 HH)

Altogether, the four barangays yielded 113 household respondents. Out of this group, three (3) were immediately dropped for having answered in the negative, i.e. they claimed not having received any support (CCT or UCT or school kit) from SCPPO.

KEY FINDINGS CONDITIONAL AND UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER

1. The rest of the 110 respondents have admitted to receiving SCPPO’s grant, 42.7% of which reported it was the conditional cash grant, 20% mentioned the unconditional cash grant, and also, 37.7% answered having received both.

Table 1. Household Beneficiaries of CCT, UCT, or Both CCT+UCT

SCP CASH GRANT HH % CCT (Php4,100) 47 42.7 UCT (Php6,000) 22 20.0 BOTH (Php10,100) 41 37.3 Total 110 100.00

2. The respondents also confirmed the grant they signed in for with the amount they have in mind. We note that majority of the respondents had indicated the correct amount (CCT-91.5%, UCT-59%, BOTH-85.4%).

3. All the grants were awarded following strict criteria by SCP while imposed upon the recipient a schedule of merit actions to fulfill. The respondents, specifically the CCT awardees, were aware of the said conditions. In Table 2 below, CCT or otherwise, and regardless of grant conditions, the respondents recall having used their grants on other concerns. Several beneficiaries shared that they did so after meeting the terms of the grant.

Table 2. Households, by Cash Grant and Spending (Categories are not mutually exclusive) CASH SPENT Food Nonfood Livelihood CCT 27 11 41 UCT 18 7 8 BOTH 40 11 37 TOTAL 85 29 86

4. The 29 households that spent on non-food did so on the following items: school fees and other educational costs (43.6%), health emergency (30.8%), house repair (12.8%), business opportunities (5.1%) and others (7.7%).

5. We also note that 86 households reported having spent their grants on livelihood, i.e. opportunity to earn income. This is expected of CCT and those who received both CCT and UCT grants. But even UCT recipients whose grant by definition is a food aid, were able to spare the amount (Php4,100) for use in livelihood as well.

6. Fishing and farming activities account for most of the households’ investment on livelihood (with 60.7%), then livestock raising (6.7%), food stall or popularly known as “eatery” (2.2%), and the small grocery store, also known as “sarisari” (2.2%). The remaining 28.1% of households spent their grant on activities not captured by the instrument, such as buying and selling of rice and dried fish, among others.

7. Furthermore, spending for livelihood turned out right in 67 of the 86 households (77.9%). They continue to hold on to these backyard enterprises up to now. However, there are 19 other households (22.1%) who were not as fortunate, citing the lack of money, or access to credit to buy the necessary inputs. Bad or unreliable weather was the second reason given for the failed undertakings.

Table 3. Households and their Livelihood LIVELIHOOD PROJECT STILL THRIVES

Yes No Total No. of HH 67 19 86 % 77.9 22.1 100

8. Aside from SCPPO, local and national government offices, and other non-profit organizations worked around and ran parallel programs in the Panay area. It should not be a surprise then to find SCPPO beneficiaries as recipients of other endowments. Thus, nearly half of the sample (50 households out of 110, or 45.9%) disclosed receiving additional support. The distributions are as follows: received from local government offices, 9.3%; from national government agencies, 29.7%; and from other local and international non-government organizations, 61.1%.

9. Has there been any change in the lives of beneficiaries since Haiyan? What impact can be attributed to SCPPO’s program in the said areas? This survey can only report on the intervention carried out by SCPPO and the resulting actions by the beneficiaries. What is clear is that both CCT and UCT have reached their targets. It also confirmed that, for the most part, and under strict monitoring by SCPPO, the beneficiaries used the grants to its intended purpose.

10. At present, a majority of the beneficiaries still depend on fishing and farming as their main source of income (56.5%); others rely on government transfers specifically the DSWD’s 4P-CCT (13.8%). There are those who work temporary assignments (10.9%), a few salaried employees (2.2%), self-employed in sarisari (2.9%) and as kainan operators (1.4%). Lastly, a significant number (12.3%) are uncategorized but definitely earning thru buy and sell activities, or as tricycle drivers and motor riders, charcoal making, etc.

11. When asked to estimate how much are they earning in a regular month, 80 households (72.7%) reported below Php5,000. The other 26 households (23.6%) pegged their monthly income between Php5,000 and Php9,999. There were also 4 households (3.6%) who reported having income between Php10,000 and Php14,999.

12. Comparing their income in the past 6 months with the one before Haiyan, 40.9% of respondents claimed it has not changed at all, and 32.7% believed their income level even went down, while 29.3% reported an increase.

Table 4. Current Income vs. Before Haiyan HH INCOME HOUSEHOLD % THE SAME 45 40.9 INCREASED 29 26.3 DECREASED 36 32.7 TOTAL 110 100.0

13. The survey also asked the respondents to compare their present assets and wealth with the situation before Haiyan. Almost half, that is, 48.2% stated that there’s no change, while 35.4% claimed it went down. And there’s 16.4% whose overall wealth went up.

Table 5. Current HH Assets and Wealth vs. Before Haiyan HH ASSET & WEALTH HOUSEHOLD % THE SAME 53 48.2 INCREASED 18 16.4 DECREASED 39 35.4 TOTAL 110 100.00

EDUCATION INTERVENTION: SCHOOL KIT

14. Of the 83 households, 55 (66.3%) received the school kit, and 28 (33.7%) did not. Brgy. Nipa (Concepcion) has the most number of recipients while Embarcadero (Batad) has the least. Take note that the number of respondents shown here are in proportion to the size and scale of intervention.

Table 6. School Kits to Household Per Barangay BARANGAY IN FSL-EDUC KIT RECEIVED EMBARCADERO NIPA TANZA Total YES 6 32 17 55 % 46.15 61.54 94.44 66.27 NO 7 20 1 28 % 53.85 38.46 5.56 33.73 Total 13 52 18 83 % 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

15. Of the 55 households that received the school kit, 54 have children in grade school. The survey encountered 1 beneficiary who should not have qualified, e.g. child is not in elementary or grade school level.

16. 42 of the recipients (76.4%) remember having received the school kit once while 13 others (23.6%) claimed receiving it twice. As a follow-up, we asked the respondents to identify in detail the contents of the school kit. On the average, 50 of the 55 respondents have confirmed all 9 items were in the bag.

17. Regarding the period the kit was given, many remember receiving the kit within 2 months after Haiyan (41%), others claimed it was on the 3rd month (31%), and the rest answered 4 months and more (28%).

Table 7. Time the Beneficiaries Received the School Kit TIME RECEIVED HH % BETWEEN 1-2 MOS 24 44.4 AFTER 3 MOS 14 25.9 OTHERS, SPECIFIED (ANSWERED 4MOS, 16 29.6 6MOS, 1YR) Unanswered 1 - TOTAL 55 100.00

18. On the brighter side of distribution, 53 households (96.4%) received the kit in excellent and new condition, while there were 2 beneficiaries (3.6%) receiving a poor or dilapidated set. All 55 beneficiaries responded that they were satisfied about the school kit.

19. More on the contents of the bag, all 50 beneficiaries found every item useful (All useful = 90.9%, and Most contents useful by 9.1%of respondents). Further, we asked the respondents to identify those most useful to their children, and the items that garnered the most votes are presented below.

Table 8. Most Useful Items in the School Kit SCHOOL BAG 46 votes NOTEBOOKS 38 votes PENCILS 28 votes RAIN COAT 20 votes RAIN BOOTS 15 votes

20. Other items that are not included but parents (and children) wished it was part of the kit were also identified namely: umbrella, shoes, and uniform.

21. SCP’s education intervention did come as a relief to all. For one, the kit can be used by both girls and boys (54 of 55 households or 98.2% agreed). It came at a time when children need it most (54 of 55 respondents or 98.2% agreed). At the time, families do not have the money to spare. A complete set normally cost between Php500 and Php2,000 for each child. It was a heavy financial burden given that the estimated monthly income of majority of the beneficiaries is below Php5,000.

22. Thus with the school kit, all the parents expressed satisfaction (100%). And the same with the children, parents reported that they were all happy (100%).

23. On the side of logistics, would it have been better for all stakeholders had information been clear and known? In the distribution of the school kit for example, 43 respondents (78.2%) have known that their children will receive the kit, while the other 12 respondents (21.8%) did not.

24. From the same respondents that have known about the distribution, the most effective channel of information was derived:

. Heard the news from children (19) . Heard from the teachers and other school personnel (9) . Heard from barangay officials (6) . Heard from SCP (1)

25. During the actual distribution of kits, some respondents (11 out of 55 parents or 20%) witnessed pushing and scrambling among participants, but this was all the trouble that’s been observed.

26. The children were made to line up, as it is the way in schools. Getting the kit was a breeze, i.e. 48.2% got their kits in less than 15 minutes. The rest after that but only up to an hour.

Table 9. Waiting time for the School Kit WAITING TIME HH % 15MIN LESS 26 48.2 15MIN-30MIN 13 24.07 30MIN- 1HR 13 24.07 W>1HR 2 3.70 TOTAL 54 100.00

27. Distributing the kit in the classrooms or in school made the experience a familiar one (96.4% respondents confirmed the location), compared to a couple of families having to get theirs in the barangay office or plaza. The same respondents were mentioned earlier having to wait for more than 1 hour.

28. Overall, parents and children are satisfied with the distribution of school kit with the majority (56.36%) giving the organizers the highest mark (Excellent= Fast and orderly, and children are well taken care of). No failure marks for this one.

Table 10. Rating Performance – Distribution of School Kit RATING HH % EXCELLENT 31 56.36 VERY GOOD 21 38.18 GOOD 3 5.45 POOR 0 0 VERY POOR 0 0 TOTAL 55 100.00

Part 3. Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH)

Note: This survey covers SCI’s activities on water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), under the Emergency Response for Children and Families affected by Typhoon Haiyan, a program funded by SHO. The survey was administered from August 6 to August 13, 2015. The areas covered were Barangay’s Cabilao Grande, Cabilao Pequeno, Manlot, and Pantalan. These barangays all belong to Carles, Iloilo.

1. A total of 136 beneficiaries were interviewed, the breakdown of sample respondents for each barangay is presented below.

Table 1. Areas and Respondents BARANGAY HH RESPONDENTS % C. PEQUENO 40 29.41 C. GRANDE 25 18.38 PANTALAN 40 29.41 MANLOT 31 22.79 TOTAL 136 100.00

2. The survey started with trying to determine if the people have heard (conveniently, remember) of SCPPO’s various WASH activities. The responses are presented below. On average, 83.5% have known or is familiar with all WASH activity.

Table 2. WASH Activities AWARE- LATRINE HEARD- ZERO OPEN WATER FACILITY WASH HYGIENE INSTALLATION/ KNOW THE DEFECATION REPAIR & MANAGEMENT PROMOTION CONSTRUCTION/ PROGRAM CAMPAIGN CONSTRUCTION TRAINING REPAIR

YES 121 (89.0%) 111 (83.5%) 106 (79.1%) 116 (85.9%) 108 (80.0%) NO 15 (11.0%) 22 (16.5%) 28 (20.9%) 19 (14.1%) 27 (20.0%) Total 136 (100%) 133 (100%) 134 (100%) 135 (100%) 135(100%)

3. Moreover, respondents have known about the different WASH components because, at one time or another, they and their HH members have participated in the said activities (125 of 136, 92% participation rate).

Table 3. Attended the WASH Activity WASH COMPONENT HH ATTENDED ZERO OPEN DEFECATION CAMPAIGN 115 WATER FACILITY REPAIR / CONSTRUCTION 94 HYGIENE PROMOTION 96 LATRINE INSTALLATION / CONSTRUCTION / REPAIR 100 WASH MANAGEMENT TRAINING 97

4. Thus, when asked if they think the SCPPO’s WASH activities, training sessions and orientations are useful, 93.4% (127 of 136 HH) answered positively.

5. The tally on whether the same respondents received any support originating from SCPPO-WASH (cash or in-kind) is as follows: 51 respondents (46%) remember receiving from SCPPO, while the larger group of 60 (54%) said they did not (?). The kinds of support received by the 51 respondents are hereby listed.

Table 4. WASH Items that Respondents’ Received ITEM HH ITEM HH Latrine 31 PVC 2 Drum 34 Wire 2 Pipe 1 Food aid 1 HAVE Basin 14 Shelter 2 RECEIVED THE CHB 7 Livelihood 1 FOLLOWING Cement 7 Tumbler 3 WASH RSB 7 DRR 1 ITEMS Lumber 7 Lansang 1 Hygiene kit for Sand and gravel 7 2 children Nails 1 ---

Hereon, data on Water and Sanitation are presented to make a WATSAN profile of the area.

6. Table 5 below shows that a large part of the area of coverage remains dependent on pump water and dug well for their drinking needs (81.6%). Water bought from water vendors and refilling stations is a far second with 8.1%. The third option, piped water is not the same as in Level 3 water systems but piped from borehole water source.

Table 5. Source of Drinking Water Source of DRINKING Water HH % PIPED WATER 8 5.9% PUBLIC/ COMMUNAL TAP 2 1.5% BOREHOLE/ PUMP 56 41.2% DUG WELL 55 40.4% OPEN POND/ LAKE/ RIVER 4 2.9% RAINWATER 0 0.0% WATER VENDOR/ BOTTLED 11 8.1% TOTAL 136 100.0%

7. As for water for other home uses, the respondents named the same sources except for the private water vendor and bottled water. In order of use, namely: dug well (52.5%), borehole and pump water (37.4%), piped water (5%), public tap/ communal faucet (2.9%), and lastly, open water sources, e.g. ponds, river, lake, etc. (2.2%).

8. The father was “voted” as the person who usually collects or fetches water for the family (105 votes). The mother comes second with 70 votes, followed by the male child with 44 votes, and female child (15 votes). The “delivery man” is not a member of the household but is in line with 2 votes for getting the water right to the family’s doorstep.

9. Fetching is less a concern if households have sources nearby. This is the case for 68% of the respondents, who claimed that they are less than 50 meters from one; then 20 respondents (20.6%) said theirs is between 100 meters and 500 meters; other respondents (7.2%) estimate up to a kilometer.

10. The situation with water for other uses is the same. 76% of the respondents are within the 50 meter radius; next is more than 1oo meters but not over 500 (19%). Then there are those who really have to travel for more than 500 meters up to a kilometer (5%).

11. In terms of time spent waiting and fetching for drinking water, respondent households reported 5 minutes and 10 minutes (with 27% of respondents each); followed by 20 minutes (14.4%), and 15 and 30 minutes each by 8.1%of the respondents. In the most extreme case, 2 respondents have answered 1 and 3 hours.

12. The time spent waiting and fetching water for other home use share a similar tally: most cited are that it takes 5 and 10 minutes with 25% and 23.6% of respondents

respectively; then 20 minutes by 12.7% of respondents; and 3 minutes as told by 10%.

13. In collecting their water, 1-2 trips can be enough for drinking water while water for other uses requires more than that.

Table 6. No. of Trips to Fetch Drinking Water and Water for Other Uses TIME HH % HH % Trips Drinking Other Use 1-2 trips 102 92.73 27 39.13 5-10 trips 5 4.55 25 36.23 Others 3 2.73 17 24.64 Total 110 100 69 100

14. How many trips depend in part on the implements that the household have. Water containers for fetching and storage are necessary tools to access to water, and shown here are the demand, i.e. most used (and useful) water containers for the household. Buckets are the most handy (42% response), followed by jerrycans (28.2%), basin (7.4%), and so on (see Table 7). Other containers not specified in our list but with a 16.8% result include reused plastic containers and water jugs provided by water vendors.

Table 7. Demand for Water Containers for Collecting / Fetching WATER CONTAINERS HH % JERRYCAN 42 28.2% BUCKET 63 42.3% CLAYPOTS 1 0.7% DRUM OR BARREL 3 2.0% BOTTLES 4 2.7% BASIN 11 7.4% OTHERS 25 16.8%

15. Water barrels or drums are the most used storage facility (49.7% of respondents), followed by the bucket and jerry can, each with 14.6%, then the bottles, basin, and clay pot.

Table 8. Water Storage Facilities WATER STORAGE HH % JERRYCAN 22 14.6% BUCKET 22 14.6% CLAYPOTS 3 2.0% DRUM OR BARREL 75 49.7% BOTTLES 4 2.6% BASIN 3 2.0% OTHERS 22 14.6%

16. Respondents were then asked if they treat their water, to which all respondents (100%) answered yes. Furthermore, cloth filtration is cited as the most common practice with 86 respondents reporting so(71.7%) ; boiling came in second with 18 respondents (15%), then the use of chlorine tables (8 respondents, 6.7%), and other water filtration techniques, etc. also with 8 respondents(6.7%).

17. For public tap and communal water sources, we asked if who’s responsible for maintaining it, and people believe that it’s the community members in general (49.1%). And there were respondents who said and believed that no one is in charge (22 respondents =19%), barangay leaders are (5.2%), and there was 1 respondent who voted his neighbor (0.9%). We note that many others (30 respondents =25.9%) do not quite have a grasp of the concept of what’s communal or shared property and so point to the “owners” not including themselves.

18. And for latrines, almost all household respondents have one (130 of 136, 95.6%) except for 6 households (4.4%). Most (72 respondents) reported that they constructed the latrines themselves; some with the help of relatives (31 respondents), 19 with the help of neighbors, others did so with hire labor (8 respondents), etc.

19. Pour flush with septic tank is the dominant system (reported by 91 respondents), and flush with septic tank (37 respondents); only a few (3 respondents) are without septic tank and another 2 respondent declaring that they have a pit latrine.

20. The question whether latrines will last or if it’s “cyclone- proof” depends on the construction material used. Here, respondents reported that their latrines were made of light materials, makeshift and reused items intended for other purpose, etc. Table 9 shows the details.

Table 9. Latrine Construction LATRINE CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS HH MAKESHIFT MATERIALS: RICE SACK, CANVAS, TARPAULIN 51 LIGHT MATERIALS: SAWALI /BAMBOO MATTING 53 CONCRETE AND GI ROOF 26 OTHERS: PLYWOOD, GI, CONCRETE COMBINATIONS 20

21. Regarding how far latrines are to respondent’s house, it is good that 57.9% (77 respondents) have theirs within their dwelling units. Again, there are still 42.1% (56 respondents) who have theirs outside of the house to around (but not more than) 50 meters distance.

22. On the question whether everyone in the family uses the latrine, the answer is a yes or 100% on parents and their children for all respondents. There’s a problem however when other household members are concerned, and 5 respondents have conveyed that on occasion, the said household members would use the neighbors, or a public latrine, or just go down the field or the sea. The reasons given by respondents over other HH members’ behavior were straightforward: defecation is not an issue (1 respondent) and the other 6 respondents told us that their latrines are not yet finished (not functional).