The NGO Safety Office Issue: 56 16-31 August 2010

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-5 In the CENTRAL region on the Khanadab road Musa Qala a joint IMF/ long running Hazara/Kuchi while AOG checkposts in ANSF raid uncovers an Northern Region 6-11 disputes quieted in KABUL BAGHLAN continue to AOG detention facility Eastern Region 12-14 while unknown assailant tar- actively search for NGO housing up to 30 prisoners. geted officials from the Su- staff. In GHAZNI AOG launch Southern Region 15-19 preme Court. Opposing Par- In the EAST region AOG assaults on multiple Dis- 19-21 Western Region liamentary Candidates launched an assault against trict Administration Cen- clashed with small arms fire tres while fighting in Andar ANSO Info Page 22 two US Military bases in in Charikar and Kohi Safid in KHOST with up to 30 continues to cause internal PARWAN while in WAR- displacement. In KANDA- YOU NEED TO KNOW fighters, many wearing US DAK AOG’s threatened lo- military uniforms, engaging HAR the Daman Chief of cals against voting in Nirkh Police is killed in a • Parliamentary elections re- in a five hour battle. Mag- lated violence countrywide and Saydabad and challenged netic IEDs continue to SVBIED while unknown an NGO community devel- plague road travel in Jala- assailants fire RPG rounds • Multiple NGO abductions in opment project in Jaghatu. in to the compound of Ah- Faryab labad, NANGAHAR, with In the NORTHERN re- one device targeting the med Wali Karzi. In ZA- • AOG complex attack against gions multiple NGO staff District Governor of Lal BUL use of rockets esca- IMF bases Khost were abducted by AOG Pur. Unknown assailants lates while the Director of across FARYAB, an election attacked a local parliamen- Tribal Affairs is killed in • Major AOG activity across ZABUL. Helmand and Kandahar worker is abducted (Shirin tary candidate in Aligar, Tagab) and an IO vehicle is LAGHMAN, killing his In the WEST supporters • Elections related intimida- caught in the cross fire of an body guard, while AOG of opposing parliamentary tion in the West AOG ambush (Dawlatabad). warned locals in Gardez, candidates clashed in Jan- In TAKHAR the ANBP are PAKTYA, to avoid voting dak, GHOR, while an routed by AOG attack in the or risk having their fingers NGO vehicle was stopped ANSO is supported by border area of Yangi Qala cut off. In KUNAR AOG by supporters in Murghab. while in JAWZJAN abducted the District Gov- In HERAT city NGO of- (Shibirgan) two persons car- ernor of Chawkay. fices received threatening rying suicide vests are ar- In the SOUTH major emails while in Karuk an rested on a public bus. In AOG activity continues NGO vehicle was stopped Shahri Buzorg area of across HELMAND prov- and questioned by un- BADAKSHAN two NGO ince despite US presence. known men. In Injil an staff are killed in an IED In Haiberabad area upwards NGO office was asked to strike in what looks like a of 200 AOG stage a 12 post anti-election poster on case of mistaken identity, a hour assault against a PSC the walls. In BADGHIS an parliamentary candidate is compound leaving up to ANP officer shot and killed attacked while AOG warn 130 dead from both sides. two IMF in a dispute while locals in Kisham against par- In Lashkar Gah NDS de- in FARAH multiple ticipation in elections a warn- tained eight persons for BBIED’s targeted the com- ing repeated in Marmul dis- planning attacks on election pound of the Provincial trict, . In KUNDUZ officials while IMF seize Governor an NGO vehicle convoy was more than 40 IEDs and in robbed by armed criminals THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 7 50 This Report Period 0 The overall threat picture pertain- 40 ing to NGO operations in Kabul the interests and agendas of local 30 Province has not changed signifi- election stakeholders inside the 20 cantly. AOG intent and capacity communities. The recurring con- 10 to stage high-profile, media- frontation between the Kuchi and 0 grabbing attacks in the capital re- the Hazara communities in Kabul, main of concern, particularly in which was the origin of the vio- light of the upcoming Parliamen- lent demonstrations in the past KABUL AOG KABUL ACG tary elections. period, seems to have been tem- porarily resolved through negotia- students and teachers of Tuteya Girls’ School Despite the assumption that some tions between the leaders of both in Karte Naw, PD 8 on 25 August and on 31 of the election-related incidents, communities, assisted by GOA August, a private vehicle used by the Supreme particularly intimidation cases, and UN. The current resolution Court for daily transport of its employees be- remain unreported, the province accepted by both parties specifies tween Musayi and Kabul City was accosted by has not seen significant election- that the core matter of the con- two unknown attackers riding a motorbike. 2 related incidents during this pe- frontation, i.e. particular land occupants were killed and another 5 were riod. So far, recent developments rights issues, will be reopened wounded by weapons fire. This incident seem to indicate that the dynamics after the Parliamentary elections. marked the first lethal attack against civilian related to the election campaign GOA employees in the district and occurred and ensuing risks to NGOs re- Despite the overall low rate of one day after the District Governor publically main localized in nature, reflecting incidents in , two attacks were intensively covered in voiced his concerns about the security situa- the media, while for both of them, tion in Musayi. As well, increased AOG activ- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the identity of perpetrators and ity targeting IMF convoys was reported from Spectacular attacks the underlying motives have not the previously calm northern district of Qara- Elections related incidents been determined. The first was bagh, including a SAF attack on 20 August, Criminality the case of a poison attack against followed by an IED attack on 28 August.

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 50

This Report Period 0 40

Similar to the patterns registered 30 in the first half of August, Kapisa Incident levels recorded in August 20 witnessed 5 AOG initiated attacks 2010 roughly correspond to the during this period, although the July 2010 rates, while they mark a 10 district-wide distribution changed decline in intensity as compared 0 with 3 AOG attacks reported to the usual monthly incident from Tagab, and one respectively rates of the first six months of from Nijrab and Mahmudi Raqi. this year. Despite the fact that KAPISA AOG KAPISA ACG The tactics used by AOG during hard security incidents concen- tant to a limited imprint by ANSF and IMF. this period pertained mainly to trate mainly in the eastern districts Besides AOG, political rivalries in the western SAF attacks, while no IED place- of Tagab, Alasay and Nijrab districts are dominated by the standoff be- ments were reported. However, a where NGO operations remain tween Hezb-e- Islami and Jamiat; while AOG weapon cache including an un- very limited, NGOs should note of both HIG and pro- (IEA) affiliation specified amount of IEDs was the overall increase in combined appear to disapprove of the election and its discovered on 21 August in Qala- AOG and ACG initiated incidents integrity. Factional clashes among the support- cha, Mahmudi Raqi district. in Kapisa. They have almost dou- bled in absolute numbers with 93 ers of Jamiat, Hezb-e-Islami and other Pashtun incidents reported for the first parties may eventually affect Kohistan 1&2 KEY THREATS & CONCERNS eight months of 2010 in compari- and Mahmud Raqi during the upcoming elec- AOG in Alasay, Nijrab, &Tagab son to 58 incidents recorded in tion period; however, previous reporting has Factional disputes in Kohistan I the same period in 2009. not revealed any significant incidents related to & II AOG freedom of movement in factional disputes. the eastern districts is concomi- THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 3 PA RW A N 50

This Report Period 0 40 NGOs operating in Parwan should monitor the developments the past week, ANSF continue 30 in the western districts located exercising only a limited footprint 20 along the Ghorband Valley (which in the area, while being outnum- 10 are dominated by AOG activity) bered by AOG and ACG net- 0 due to the potential for spill-over works. into adjacent districts. Other areas Sporadic stand-off attacks, more PARWAN AOG PARWAN ACG of concern are Kohi Safid district, effective in demonstrating AOG which neighbours the restive Ta- presence rather than actually dis- strations are staged in Bagram district. gab district of Kapisa. rupting the IMF base in Bagram, The on-going parliamentary campaign brought Six combined AOG and ACG continued with 2 IDF incidents additional elements of violence, as demon- incidents were reported from Par- reported on 17 and 22 August strated by two specific clashes among local wan in the past two weeks, half of respectively. On 23 August, Ba- campaigners in Chaharikar and Kohi Safid. On them occurring in Shinwari. On gram district was the site another 28 August, local residents with suspected ties 17 August, AOG staged a com- demonstration, and due to an un- to HIG burned the house used as the cam- bined IDF and SAF assault on prepared ANP, resulted in a vio- paign headquarters by a new political figure. Administrative lent clash leaving 1 protestor On 29 August, partisans of a local Jamiate Centre, during which the ANSF killed and 3 others wounded. The Islami commander campaigning for his second personnel requested air support to demonstration originated from term in Wolesi Jirga clashed with supporters of repel the attackers. On 25 August, backlash to an ANP arrest of a a newly emerged businessman turned inde- AOG ambushed an ANP convoy local mullah in Ghulam Ali for pendent politician in Rabat, Chaharikar. Fol- transporting detainees en route to suspected ties to AOG, whose lowing deterrence SAF from both sides, local the DAC in Astana area; 3 days followers set off for a march to- elders engaged leaders of both groups in nego- later, the DAC came under an- wards Bagram DAC. The casual- tiations that eventually resulted in a commit- other IDF attack during which an ties occurred as a result of ANP ment made by both parties not to disrupt each ANP member sustained injuries. attempts at containing the crowd other’s campaign. The two incidents reveal the Despite a slight build-up of ANP when a radicalized group among likelihood of election-related clashes to erupt forces in Shinwari DAC during the 300 protestors turned on the when a newcomer steps in to challenge exist- troops monitoring the demonstra- ing local power-structures. In mitigation of KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tion. In the light of this incident, such threats, NGOs should assess potential NGOs are advised to sensitize Elections related violence localized conflict lines in their particular areas their staff members about in- AOG activity in Ghorband as well as avoid association with any of the creased potential for escalations high-profile stakeholders involved. of violence when larger demon-

GRAPHS: Please note that graphs in this report are current as of 31 August 2010. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40

Security dynamics in Daykundi 30 23 August, an armed clash have not changed significantly, as 20 a security vacuum continues to erupted between two parties of 10 span over large remote areas of local residents in Tokhmojoy vil- the province. With the exception lage, Kiti district, allegedly revolv- 0 of the DAC, Gizab essentially ing around a land property. The remains out of reach to GOA incident had a political undertone DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI ACG structures and two other southern in the sense that one of the parties districts (Kiti and Kijran), with a is believed to have ties to HIG. tions over his taking over the position of COP predominant Pashtun population, Negotiations are still on-going in , which could in turn spark as well as the Hazara-inhabited between GOA and a particular violent reactions from the local communities districts in the North, remained Hazara AOG commander, whose in the district. Further developments in the calm over the reporting period. networks are active in Khadir and case are required in order to assess its potential Only one security incident was Gizab. Another in the series of impact on the security environment in the area. reported during this period. On deadlines for the commander to Despite the low level of security incidents, lat- disarm has expired without tangi- est data indicate a 45% increase in combined KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ble outcomes. As mentioned in AOG and ACG initiated incidents for the first Security vacumn previous reports, the command- eight months of this year as compared to the Ethno-political tensions ers’ eventual acceptance to disarm same period in 2009. may lead to consequent negotia- Spoilers-to-peace in Gizab

NGO Incidents WARDAK WARDAK 100 Year to Date 4 80 This Report Period 1 During the reporting period, an 60 INGO with long-established pres- and intensity of both stand-off 40 ence in the province faced explicit and close range AOG initiated 20 intimidation from AOG networks attacks matched the patterns re- 0 against continuing the implemen- corded in the previous period. tation of a combined rural devel- The variation of tactical methods WARDAK AOG WARDAK ACG opment/local governance pro- spanned the typical range. IED gram in Jaghatu. Following similar emplacement, close range SAF of Highway 1 is therefore ever more difficult threats voiced against program attacks, IDF against DACs, oc- as motivations and support structures are in- beneficiaries in what may eventu- curred along with simple displays creasingly intertwined compounding the crimi- ally be a part of AOG intimida- of force, as witnessed in the dis- nal threat. tion campaign in the light of the trict centres of Jaghatu, Maydan The legacy of previously reported inter-AOG upcoming election, the INGO has Shahr, Nirkh and Chaki Wardak. clashes in Nirkh featuring HIG and pro- put its operations in the district It is of note, however, that AOG Taliban factions found an echo in a single inter on standby in order to assess the attacks in Wardak seem to in- -AOG incident on 16 August, when two rival situation and undertake negotia- creasingly converge with the commanders clashed in Mar Khana. Despite tions with local communities. agenda of criminal groups and this incident, the two main AOG networks still In general, Wardak constitutes a local competitors, all having seem to be locked down in a delicate status high-risk security environment for stakes pertaining to the lucrative quo with peace negotiations brokered by local NGO operations. During the past freight traffic on the Kabul – elders on-going. In reaction to the relative two weeks, the incident levels, Ghazni highway. Salar area in popularity of Pashtun political parties in the territorial distribution of incidents, Saydabad can be singled out as the Pashtun belt, partisans of both major AOG most prominent ambush point on networks warned the locals against taking part KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the Wardak part of the road with in the election with anecdotal evidence sug- AOG prevelance in Sayadabad 3 IED strikes and 1 SAF attack and Nirkh gesting that election related intimidation will recorded. Differentiating attacks Attacks along Hwy 1 continue apace particularly in Saydabad, Nirkh by AOG and ACG in the vicinity and Jaghatu. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 1 50

This Report Period 0 40

AOG-initiated attacks against 30 IMF, ANSF and PSC, concen- of attacks. Out of 12 AOG initi- ated incidents in total, 5 were IED 20 trated within the proximity of the 10 strikes against ANSF/IMF/PSC Kabul-Gardez highway, is the 0 defining factor of insecurity in Baraki Barak (3), Kushi and within this province and reflects Mohammad Agha (1 in each dis- the stakeholders’ convergence of trict); while 2 IEDs were discov- LOGAR AOG LOGAR ACG interests around a strategic supply ered in , and another air support. The clash resulted in 2 IMF killed artery. This also presents the main one in Mohammad Agha. Out of and 1 wounded along with 12 AOG fatalities. challenge to NGO safety and 22 armed clashes either initiated Further reports indicate that a high-ranking freedom of movement across the by AOGs, or resulting from pro- IEA commander, purportedly the deputy province. active engagement of AOGs by shadow governor, was identified among the While overall conflict patterns in ANSF and IMF, Puli Alam district casualties., While such cases of elimination of Logar remained largely un- stood for 50% of such operations, high-rank leaders may decrease particular changed, this period did record a while the second half was evenly AOG capacity in the short term (due to the decline by 25% in AOG-initiated distributed between Chark, Mu- essentially local roots of AOG networks in attacks in comparison to July. hammad Agha and Baraki Barak Logar) in general the leadership vacuum is usu- IED placement continued to be a with 3 incidents each, followed by ally swiftly taken over and the chain of com- favoured tactic for engagement of Khushi where 2 such operations mand restored. ANSF/IMF by AOG, limiting occurred. Given the preponderance of AOG influence their own exposure to immediate The intensity of clashes between and outreach in the province, it can be as- retaliation while maximizing the IMF/ANSF and AOG came to sumed that intimidation against participation in effect as compared to other types the fore on August 18 in Qala the elections is going apace but remains unre- Juma Area of Puli Alam, when ported. NGOs should avoid any exposure to KEY THREATS & CONCERNS AOG ambushed an IMF patrol election related venues, premises, institutions IED with SAF and RPGs. IMF re- and higher-profile stakeholders in the prov- Abduction turned fire and called in for close ince.

BAMYAN NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 0 50 40 This Report Period 0 With no reported incidents for the 30 past three weeks, Bamyan is cred- by ANSF, the drop in the number 20 ited as representing one of the of reported incidents may be as- 10 safest areas for NGO operations. cribed to the lack of information 0 The exception to this is Kahmard, on the district developments rather than to an eventual de- where a variety of local AOG and BAMYAN AOG BAMYAN ACG ACG co-exist and occasionally crease in AOG/ACG presence in the North-East. host larger AOG groups commut- or less pronounced ties to Hezb-e Wahdat, ing from neighbouring Tala wa Election campaigning in the prov- ince has continued without signifi- while Hezb-e Harakat ,represented by a former Barfak district of Baghlan. Of jihadi commander and current parliamentarian, note, this area has a higher con- cant hampering, although hard information is lacking on the ac- seems to maintain its position in Waras. centration of lower-rank Pashtun Risks specific to NGO community mainly in- jihadi commanders as well as nu- tual situation. In the North-East, among the Pashtun communities volve the elevated threat of attacks along the merous ACG which are respon- access road from Parwan to Bamyan via sive to occasional calls for action several former jihadi commanders compete for seats in the Wolesi Ghorband valley. ANSO also cautions NGOs sponsored by larger AOG. While against using the access road from Kabul to Kahmard remains lightly policed Jirga , either as independent candi- dates, or under the wings of HIG. Bamyan via Hajigak Pass (Wardak), as well as KEY THREATS & CONCERNS The Hazara communities in the the road from Bamyan to Dushi via Tala wa Barfak. Civil unrest rest of the province follow in ma- Instability in Khamard jority local candidates with more THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents weapons and fighters over the past three JAWZJAN Year to Date 0 months, where ANSF has been reluctant and This Report Period 0 unable to maintain a sustainable presence. The In Jawzjan Province this period an AOG offensive in southern Jawzjan will surely IMF air strike in Base north of Darzab District compel further IMF/ANSF operations in the Centre mistakenly killed four Centre. The respite in AOG activ- area, and the probable continuation of AOG- ANP and injured thirteen others, ity was short-lived, however, as ANSF/IMF clashes, as well as in the sur- possibly including some civilians. ANSF were unable to maintain rounding areas of eastern Bilchiragh (Faryab), The air strike was called in by security in the area. In June and Sayyad (Sar-e Pul), and northwestern Kohis- ANSF during a clash with AOGs July a series of direct-fire and IED tanat (Sar-e Pul). In March 2010 the new IMF in the District Centre. According attacks were reported in Qush Police Mentoring Unit arrived in the northern to ANSO data, this is the first Tepa District, with increasing effi- region with additional helicopters, increasing “friendly fire” incident involving ciency near the end of July, when IMF/ANSF’s access to air assets and the prob- IMF air assets to result in ANSF two separate IED attacks killed ability that such assets will be used during op- deaths in the northwestern region. three ANA members and injured erations and clashes. Thus, an increase in the In the neighbouring northeastern nine others. AOGs first attacked use of air assets will also likely be seen in this region, at least two “friendly fire” the Darzab District Centre with area. Friday’s incident will most likely have a incidents have resulted in ANSF SAF and RPGs on the afternoon negative impact on public perceptions of IMF, casualties this year. AOG activity of 18 August, showing their intent as well as relations between ANSF and IMF at in Darzab and Qush Tepa districts to undermine ANSF’s newly es- the local, provincial and perhaps regional level. has resurged in the past three tablished presence in Jawzjan’s months, following a month-long southern-most district which links In the provincial capital of Shibirgan, two local pause in April 2010 after ANSF AOG networks and supply lines nationals, allegedly from established an Forward Operating from (Sar-e Pul) to (Faryab), were arrested from a public bus for Bilchiragh District (Faryab). possession of two suicide vests. While the po- AOGs in the tri-provincial area tential for suicide attacks in the northern re- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS (where Jawzjan, Faryab and Sar-e gion is always a present, the legitimacy of this Clashes in Darzab & Qush Tepa Pul meet) are suspected to have arrest and seizure have been doubted by some consolidated a large amount of security sources.

NGO Incidents BALKH BALKH Year to Date 6 50 This Report Period 0 was relatively 40 quiet this period, with a virtual three AOGs were injured when 30 the IED they were planting deto- two-week respite from day-time 20 nated. Over twenty IED-related attacks on the Mazar-Shibirgan 10 Road. One SAF attack was re- incidents have been reported in ported on an ANP checkpoint in Balkh Province since the begin- 0 the late evening hours, and one ning of June 2010 when the first direct-fire attack occurred against IED in six months was discovered BALKH AOG BALKH ACG an IMF convoy in the early eve- along the Mazar-Shibirgan Road. ning hours. The latter attack was Balkh experienced a similar surge gara District, which injured a local civilian. the second-recorded direct-fire in IED-related incidents in No- Intimidation was reported in three districts of incident involving IMF, and signi- vember 2009; however, that rate Balkh – in Chahar Bolak a large group of fies an increasing boldness among rapidly fell off after an AOG AOGs entered a village and requested villagers AOGs in the area, who previously shadow governor was killed when to pay Ushur; in Kishindeh a group of AOGs reserved direct-fire power for the IED he was transporting pre- discouraged locals from participating in the soft-skin vehicles such as ANSF maturely detonated. The sudden elections and requested Ushur; and in Marmul rangers and PSC vehicles. In Ali- surge in IED-related incidents night letters were found discouraging locals zai Village of suggests the re-emergence of IED from cooperating with IMF and asking them capabilities in the province, and to join Jihad. While intimidation is more com- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the current rate of IED-related mon in Chahar Bolak District, the latter two incidents supersedes that of No- incidents are significant of AOG mobilization Night letters & intimidation vember 2009. One IED was also efforts outside their typical areas of operation. IED reported east of the river in Shol- THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

BADAKHSHAN NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 1 40 The relatively peaceful province 30 of Badakhshan experienced a sec- moments before. However, the 20 ond fatal NGO incident this pe- INGO itself was not the target. 10 riod, when an INGO vehicle was Rather it is logical to assume that 0 struck by an RCIED in Shahri the vehicle was mistaken for an- Buzorg District. The RCIED, other high-profile target. Local which is believed to have been authorities suggest that the in- BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN ACG tended target was the vehicle of a intended for the convoy of a par- who carried out last month’s murders. While liamentarian candidate, struck an parliamentarian candidate which was supposed to pass through the their likely objectives are to target GOA and INGO unmarked white Land ANSF establishments, their suspected associa- Cruiser, killing two INGO staff area around the same time. This incident adds to the body of evi- tion with last month’s attacks should be noted. and injuring a third. One commu- Non-local AOGs are a greater threat to NGOs nity volunteer was also killed and dence emphasizing the dangers of traveling in unmarked white 4x4 because they are not bound by the same social another was injured in the attack. contract to adhere to the consensus of the lo- While RCIEDs have been em- vehicles. Two INGO vehicles have been struck by RCIEDs in cal population, as are local AOGs. The border- ployed on occasion against secu- ing districts to Zebak and Kuran Wa Munjan rity forces in the district, this is the past nine months in the north- ern region, both of which were such as Yamgan, Baharak, Jurm and Warduj, the first time in which NGO op- already host a degree of radical influence which erations in the district have been unmarked white 4x4 vehicles. The previous incident occurred in may be readily mobilized by the groups com- directly impacted by the conflict. ing in from outside. To date there has been no The incident comes on the heels Balkh Province along the Mazar- Shibirgan Road in December concrete evidence of their presence; however, of last month’s brutal murder of NGOs should be conscious of the potential 10 INGO-affiliated staff in Kuran 2009, and it was evident that the IED was intended for a white future impact of the presence and influence of Wa Munjan District, which may non-local AOGs in these districts. temporarily raise international unmarked ANSF vehicle which donor and headquarters’ concerns had been passing at the same Pre-election violence in Badakhshan has been about the safety of the province as time. In another notable incident characterized primarily by conflicts between a whole. Despite the series of un- in northern Takhar, AOGs local candidates, rather than general opposition fortunate events, ANSO asserts stopped an unmarked white to the elections (aside from a number of night that the incidents were isolated; INGO vehicle and requested that letters against the elections which were distrib- however, they do bear valuable the NGO staff either mark their uted by a newly formed intellectual-religious lessons-learned for the NGO vehicles or use a different type to group which appears to be unarmed). One community. avoid confusion between the high-profile incident involved an attack on a INGO and similar security force parliamentarian candidate in which the son of It is important to distinguish be- vehicles. Based on this body of a local power broker was an alleged perpetra- tween incidents of intentional tar- evidence, it is clear that the use of tor and was subsequently shot dead. These geting, such as the killings in such vehicles significantly in- incidents do not pose a general threat to NGO Kuran Wa Munjan, and the risks creases the risk of being mistak- security, but highlight the importance of NGO of collateral involvement, such as enly targeted. neutrality and ensuring that both operations the IED in Shahri Buzorg. The and staff remain politically neutral. Further vehicle struck by the RCIED in Concerns have been raised regard- ing the presence of exogenous developments may be expected in Kishim Dis- Shahri Buzorg is suspected to trict ahead of the elections, where AOGs from have been targeted, due to the AOGs from Nuristan and Paki- stan in the southeastern districts within and outside of the province have re- evidence that two civilian vehicles portedly gathered to disrupt pre-election and had passed by the same spot only of Badakhshan. According to un- confirmed reports there has been election-day proceedings. Thus far kinetic at- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS an influx in the number of AOGs tacks have been limited to a single RPG attack RCIED in Zebak and Kuran Wa Munjan against the vehicle of the provincial chief of NDS as he was traveling during the day along Instability in Kishim districts, who are possibly associ- the Feyzabad-Kishim Main Road. Election related tensions ated with the non-local AOGs THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 Following a period of concern regarding increased armed actors in , some NGOs have resumed their operations after proactively soliciting security guarantees from local government and community elders. IMF reportedly came under SAF while inspecting polling centres in the province; however, this was not confirmed by official sources. AOG-initiated incidents targeting GOA or security forces ahead of the elections may be expected.

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 4 100 This Report Period 1 As developments in the majority 80 of were defined infiltrating the district centre, and 60 by conflict between AOGs and that the government may be un- 40 security forces, a rare criminal der increased pressure to support 20 the militias in order to ward off incident impacted an NGO this 0 period. An NGO convoy of white additional attacks. Comparatively, marked Land Cruisers were the majority of Archi District has stopped on the Aliabad-Khanabad fallen to AOG control over the KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ ACG course of the past year. While Main Road, among other civilian ing the past two weeks, a series of IMF night GOA maintain control over the vehicles, and robbed of their VHF raids and air operations continued in Chahar district centre, AOGs have typi- handsets. This incident asserts Dara and Kunduz districts, resulting in the cally challenged that control that criminal activity continues in deaths of at least two AOG commanders and a through direct-fire or long-range some remote areas of Kunduz several other AOGs, as well as a number of attacks directed toward the district (particularly in Khanabad Dis- arrests. These operations may be seen as suc- centre and the government- trict), despite the preeminent cesses by security forces; however, that the use controlled area of Qarlogh. This AOG control throughout most of of air strikes have occasionally resulted in civil- period the first RCIED strike re- the province. ian casualties and damage to civilian property, corded in the district displayed an Elsewhere in the province, two such tactics appear to alienate the civilian emergence of IED capabilities. In rare RCIED strikes challenged population. addition, the timing and location government control in both Qala- of the strike (bazaar day in the Sporadic attacks within the Kunduz City limits e Zal and Archi District Centres. district centre) appeared to have continued this period. Most notably, the Over the past twelve months in targeted public opinion ahead of checkpoint in Bandar-e Imam Sahib Area was Qala-e Zal District pro- elections, an alarming tactic that is attacked with SAF in the early morning hours, government militias led by an in- not typically employed by Afghan resulting in the deaths of eight ANP and the fluential commander have man- AOGs, who strategically avoid injury of one other. The AOGs were able to aged to maintain a relative degree direct attacks against noncombat- inflict such a high number of casualties due to of security as compared to its ants. The blast resulted in the the fact that the ANP at the checkpoint were neighboring districts. However, an deaths of two ANP, two civilians sleeping. A similar attack occurred in Decem- RCIED which targeted a passing and the injury of sixteen others. ber 2009 in Baghlani Jadid. Such an attack IMF convoy, resulting in the in- IED capabilities may have been would demand a high degree of planning and jury of six civilians and the death introduced to the district via the will therefore not likely occur frequently in the of one child, demonstrated that Archi-Khwaja Ghar road, where future; however, it does demonstrate an ability AOGs continue to be capable of another RCIED struck an ANP to survey and infiltrate this part of the city. vehicle this period. The road links Also, in Zakhil Area of Kunduz City an KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the district with AOGs in north- RCIED detonated against an ANP vehicle Attacks against ANP ern Takhar. which was escorting the provincial head of NDS. This is the fourth RCIED detonation Criminality While joint ANSF/IMF opera- targeting security forces in this area of the city IMF night operations tions have been put on hold dur- since June 2010. THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 5 BAGHLAN 50 This Report Period 1 While Operation Tawhid III may 40 have temporarily disrupted AOG tinue to search for NGO employ- 30 ees, as AOGs do not target capabilities within the outlying 20 NGOs for abduction elsewhere in areas of western Baghlan, instabil- 10 the northern region, aside from ity on the major highways contin- 0 ues to inhibit safe movement both . On occasion north and west of Pul-e Khumri NGOs have been abducted for BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN ACG City. On the Pul-e Khumri- the purposes of ransom; however, Kunduz Road, AOGs continue to these abductions are apparently sumed this period, following a two-week pause establish illegal checkpoints in carried out by low-level AOGs or during Operation Tawhid III. In addition to a search of GOA, ANSF or NGO ACGs who only claim to have an day-time RCIED and SAF attack which re- employees. One NGO staff mem- ideological orientation. More of- sulted in the injury of three IMF soldiers, ber was abducted and released this ten, as has been seen in both AOGs also ambushed the convoy of the son period while travelling in public provinces, low-level AOGs or of a national powerbroker. transportation along the road. The newly appointed AOG leaders have carried out abductions in Two high-profile incidents involving civilian individual did not identify himself casualties raised local animosity towards ANSF as an NGO staff member; how- order to demonstrate their author- ity in an area. Once NGOs are and IMF this period. In southwestern Tala Wa ever, AOGs proceeded to call the Barfak District, an air strike aimed at routing contacts in his phone in order to able to prove their local accep- tance and neutrality from parties out AOGs along the Bamyan border mistak- determine his affiliation. The indi- enly killed six civilians and injured twelve oth- vidual was released less than to the conflict, the staff are inevi- tably released. ers. Within Pul-e Khumri District, an arrest twelve hours later through nego- operation led by a newly appointed pro- tiations with local elders. It is not In addition to AOG checkpoints government militia commander resulted in the clear why AOGs in this area con- north of Pul-e Khumri City, mistaken killing of a civilian boy. This RCIED and direct-fire attacks on prompted an immediate reaction among the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ANSF and IMF continued along community, who staged a demonstration AOG checkpoints both major highways. West of Pul against ANSF and IMF in Dand-e Shahabud- Attacks along main routes -e Khumri City, attacks on the Pul din Area, blocking off the Pul-e Khumri- IMF operations -e Khumri-Mazar Highway re- Kunduz Road for several hours.

COMBINED (ACG/AOG) 2010 DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS

Searches Arson Armed Attacks 6% 3% Armed Robbery 20% 12%

IED/Explosives 8%

Beatings 1% Threats Abduction 17% 31%

NOTE: This graph represents countrywide data and is current as of 31 August 2010 THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 13 FARYAB This Report Period 0 50 Though AOGs have undergone a 40 concerted effort to establish a with local elders. It appears that 30 functional provincial and sub- once the perpetrators are made 20 provincial shadow government in aware of the local support for the 10 Faryab Province, there appears to NGO, the AOGs release the staff 0 be a continued disconnect be- with their sanctioning to continue operations in the area. On one tween official AOG policy and FARYAB AOG FARYAB ACG local-level practice with regard to occasion it was rumoured that an NGO abductions. Throughout AOG leader responsible for ab- efforts have been directed toward securing the province newly appointed ducting NGO staff collected ran- polling centres and major population centres. AOG leaders and local-level som from the families, but then In , security forces have thus AOGs who claim to be associated were reprimanded by higher AOG far refrained from re-entering Khwaja Kenti with the broader movement are authorities and made to reimburse Village for the same reason, as polling centres carrying out NGO abductions for the ransom. Until the trend in in Khwaja Kenti and southern Qaysar are not what appears to be their own per- abductions subsides, it is recom- expected to open. AOGs have once again gone sonal gain. The reprimanding re- mended that NGOs proactively on the offensive in Almar and Bilchiragh dis- sponse of legitimate AOG author- engage their beneficiaries to assert tricts, expanding activity into areas where ity has been late to react to this their neutrality and communicate GOA have fought to maintain control. In trend, and the threat of abduction their purpose in order to ensure southern AOGs assassinated a persists in virtually all regions of their protection. In all cases of prominent former jihadi commander and com- the province. In Qaysar District abduction NGOs should attempt munity leader with an RCIED, a tactic used to the threat of abduction presented to resolve the abductions at the undermine local informal authority structures. itself in Chilgazi Area, where it local level through the support of The same tactic was employed against an influ- appears that an AOG commander familial ties and community eld- ential pro-government commander last period from a neighbouring district is ers. Attempting to resolve abduc- in Chilgazi Area of Qaysar District. In Bilchi- attempting to establish his place tions through political pressure or ragh District AOGs continue to attack ANSF among the plethora of sub-district the use of force will inevitably targets in Qorchi Village, the eastern-most vil- level commanders in Qaysar. In endanger the abductees and com- lage in the district which has remained under Kohistan District, AOGs who promise the organization’s neu- virtual siege for the past month. While the have infiltrated from Pashtun Kot trality. neighbouring villages have fallen to AOG con- and have mobilized local opposi- Day-time direct-fire and RCIED trol, Qorchi has been isolated by GOA in or- tion groups in Bandar Area have attacks have proliferated on the der to inhibit AOG access between eastern presented a threat to NGOs who Ring Road in Dawlatabad District Bilchiragh and the neighbouring provinces of have attempted to remain neutral where an IO vehicle was caught in Jawzjan and Sar-e Pul. The sustainability of in the face of AOG efforts to il- the cross-fire of an ambush on a enforcing GOA control in this area is ques- licit local support for the shadow parliamentarian candidate late this tionable, however, as major military operations government. In Qaramqul District reporting period. Though four day have to be undertaken in order to bring in ba- the threat of abduction has been -time attacks were reported on the sic commercial goods and supplies. presented by a group which is road in the course of one week, Election-related violence was also reported in likely linked to AOGs in Dawlata- this is the first such incident to the province, where an election campaigner bad District, which currently hosts impact an IO or NGO vehicle. was abducted just 500 meters east of the Ring the centre of authority for the The proximity of the IO vehicle Road in . Election-related provincial shadow government. In to the attack may place additional violence is often characterized as AOG- each past incident of NGO ab- pressure on security forces to pro- initiated; however, as seen throughout the duction, the NGO staff have been actively engage the AOGs who northern region, AOG attacks against particu- released following negotiations have recently increased their day- lar campaign or candidates may be mobilized time activity on this road; how- the victim’s political opposition. Abductions KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ever, it is questionable whether and attacks in Shirin Tagab and Dawlatabad, NGO abduction security forces will direct their however, are genuinely believed to be anti- AOG expansion attention toward this area ahead governmental. Election related violence of the elections, at a time when all THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 2 TAKHAR This Report Period 0 50 Fighting in northern Takhar in- 40 ANSO, an individual from a part- tensified this period, where AOGs 30 ner contractor organization was attacked both district centers of 20 Darqad and Yangi Qala districts, abducted by AOGs this period in 10 and managed to over-run a num- Darqad. The objective of the ab- 0 ber of ANBP checkpoints in duction appeared to be to gain the Darqad, forcing seven ANBP attention of local stakeholders, as members to flee and seizing their upon his release the AOGs an- TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR ACG weapons and ammunition. Large nounced the creation of a newly areas of the three northern dis- established mechanism to monitor has been the development of a mature and tricts of Yangi Qala, Darqad and and coordinate the activities of all functional shadow government with freedom Khwaja Bahawuddin appear to organizations working in the area. of movement along two provincial borders and have come under AOG control in While pressure to pay illegal taxes access to an international border-crossing. The the course of the past several is evident in all areas under AOG situation as it is seen thus far will likely con- weeks. While NGO workers have control, this is the first organized tinue for the foreseeable future, as neither na- not been harmed to date, accord- commission of its kind seen thus tional or international forces have prioritized ing to what has been reported to far in the northern region. The this area. Given that the current power struc- conflict in northern Takhar has ture will likely remain in place for an undeter- developed at such a rapid pace mined amount of time, the administrative pres- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS due to the fact that it has essen- sure placed on NGOs demands an organized AOG shadow governance tially been unencumbered by any response which will allow the NGOs to con- IED along airport road serious degree of international or tinue operating without compromising their Increased instability in north military force presence. The result neutrality.

NGO Incidents SAR- E PUL Year to Date 0 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 0 50 The security situation in Sar-e Pul 40 remains stable in the majority of change of fire the AOGs dis- 30 the province, despite what appears persed. In addition, AOGs at- 20 tacked the Imam Jafar checkpoint to be a gradual rise in AOG activ- 10 on the north end of Sari Pul City. ity in some areas outside tradi- 0 tional AOG strongholds in Sayyad Notably, both incidents were not new in form, as AOGs had previ- District. While kinetic activity SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL ACG within Sari Pul City is rare, the ously established a checkpoint in presence of AOGs in the city and the same area at night approxi- village in Sar-e Pul District, discouraging locals surrounding villages was demon- mately one month prior, and had from cooperating with IMF, and threatening strated by a series of night letters attacked Imam Jafar checkpoint in ANSF to quit their jobs. The letters definitely and a few security incidents within a similar manner in January of this belie an underlying AOG influence in the sur- the city and along the Shibirgan- year. The significance of the for- rounding villages, and an attempt to expand Sari Pul Road. The first ever day- mer incident is apparent, however, that influence, perhaps with the assistance of time AOG checkpoint was re- as it occurred during the day, per- Sayyad-based AOGs. ported along the Sar-e Pul- haps signifying an increased bold- ness among the AOGs. In Alef Safed Area of , a Shibirgan Road, at which armed joint IMF/ANSF operation appears to have men were searching vehicles for In the first ANSO-recorded inci- temporarily deterred AOG activity on the road GOA or ANSF employees in the dent of night letters in Sari Pul linking Kohistanat to its neighboring districts. mid-morning hours. The ANP City, 40 night letters were distrib- As access along this route is a strategic advan- responded and after a brief ex- uted in various parts of the pro- tage to AOGs who are transiting from Sayyad vincial capital, urging locals to into Sar-e Pul, forming a link between Faryab KEY THREATS & CONCERNS resist the influence of “foreign and Sar-e Pul provinces, it is likely that control AOG checkpoints infidels” and pay tithes to the of the territory continue to be contested by Night letters AOGs. In a second incident a AOGs who remain present in Kohistanat. Instability in Kohistanat different letter was discovered in a THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 4 NANGARHAR This Report Period 0 100 On 30 August in City, an 80 30 August with two rockets that explosive device, apparently a 60 magnetic IED, detonated against impacted in Zone 1 in the early morning, causing no damage or 40 the private vehicle of the District 20 Governor of casualties. It should be noted that 0 when the vehicle was approaching IDF assaults in Jalalabad City are the Provincial Governor’s Office. rather unusual; however, they are As a result of the explosion, the used frequently against JAF, with NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR ACG District Governor was killed, and three incidents recorded during four of his bodyguards as well as the present cycle. Nonetheless, In all, 20 AOG initiated incidents were re- two civilians were wounded. This despite the fact that IDF is corded during the present cycle across the marks the second high profile marked by rather limited effi- province displaying a decrease of 20% in com- attack recorded in Jalalabad City ciency, it is more often used with parison to the last period. Yet, AOGs remain this month, the first of which oc- intention to intimidate; therefore active in Nangarhar’s south and south-eastern curred on 2 August in Zone 2 it is likely that frequency of such districts of Khogyani, Chaparhar, Hisarak and targeting the convoy of a presi- attacks will increase before the Muhmand Dara. Of note, sporadic attacks dential advisor from Kunar which upcoming elections. continued along the Jalalabad-Torkham Road. wounded eight. In addition, an Another characteristic of the pre- For instance on 19 August, in Bati Kot, a mag- RCIED detonated on 28 August sent reporting period was a dem- netic IED detonated against a fuel tanker in Zone 4 against an ANA vehicle onstration that took place on 18 truck. Three private vehicles in the vicinity on the secondary road, slightly August in Surkh Rod District caught fire, killing one local and injuring an- injuring two ANA officers and blocking the Jalalabad-Kabul other. Subsequently, local villagers protested one civilian. Besides this incident Highway. The motivation behind and blocked the main road for about three one should note that the AOG the demonstration was a dissent hours, vowing to deny all fuel tankers passage activity in Central Nangarhar has towards an IMF operation in on that portion of the highway. The occur- decreased in line with seasonal Zalmabad, when an IMF team rence of such incidents may suggest an in- trends during the Holy month of allegedly killed two civilians. It is creased influx of AOG into surrounding areas Ramadan. Nonetheless, another worthy to note that this kind of although it still remains unclear if all of the incident of note occurred also on civil unrest or public discontent is incidents are AOG related as in the abovemen- rather a usual feature in Nan- tioned incident local villagers suspected a KEY THREATS & CONCERNS garhar and it should encourage driver to be involved for reasons that are un- IEDs NGOs to monitor their surround- clear at this time. Attacks on ANSF/IMF ings as such events occur often AOGs in south of province with little or no warning.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents KUNAR KUNAR Year to Date 5 200 This Report Period 0 Although the province witnessed 150 significant flooding this did not in Sirkanay District, AOG ab- 100 ducted at least 12 workers from a slow the pace of AOG initiated 50 incidents with 91 being recorded project site of a construction com- in the past two weeks. It indicates pany in Donai area. Asadabad 0 that Kunar continues to be the District experienced another inci- most active province in the East- dent of note, on 24 August in An- ern Region and also that August darsheer area. AOG apparently KUNAR AOG KUNAR ACG has become the most violent wearing also ANA uniforms es- month in 2010 so far. In line with tablished a mobile CP along the Road, as well as in Sirkanay. Compared to the ANSO assessments, it appears main road between Asadabad and previous report the geographical concentration that ANSF have not been able to Wata Pur. The influx of Pakistani of AOG activity has shifted once again to- ensure the security along the Jala- AOG, already described in the wards Pech Valley (Manogai and Water Pur labad-Asadabad Road. On 21 Au- previous reports, into the men- districts) which experienced around 36% of all gust, AOG purportedly dressed in tioned areas appears to have in- AOG initiated incidents. As mentioned previ- ANA uniforms, stopped the vehi- creased further, and it is assumed ously, the main AOG tactic in the area is by cle of the District Governor of that at least the abduction in direct attacks, therefore IDF assaults against Chawkay on the main Jalalabad- Sirkanay is the work of a specific security forces and DACs remain high with 13 Asadabad Road in Asadabad Dis- Pakistani group which was also incidents reported during the present cycle. trict and abducted him, his son responsible for previous abduc- Besides IDF related incidents in Manogai, Nari and his bodyguard. AOG de- tion incidents in Chawkay and and Sirkany, on 23 August in Asadabad Dis- stroyed the vehicle, and brought Sirkanay districts. It seems that trict AOG fired five mortar rounds towards an them to an unknown location. following this abduction security ANP HQ. Moreover, around the same time forces have increased patrols in Intimidation efforts and abductions of the lo- the area, but without setting up cal population continued as well across the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS further static positions. This led to province. For instance, on 22 August in Nari AOG attacks along Jalalabad- the conclusion that the threat of District, AOG abducted a local teacher, and on Asadabad road abduction still remains elevated the same day, but in Manogai, another three Abductions along the Jalalabad-Asadabad civilians were abducted from Tarale area.

NGO Incidents LAGHM AN LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 During the present cycle AOG 30 activity in Laghman significantly , where 8 inci- 20 dents were reported with 6 in increased with 19 AOG incidents 10 Dawlat Shah and 2 in Alingar. On recorded in comparison to the 0 previous period. The large major- the one hand the appearance of ity of reported incidents took AOG check points is a clear dem- LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN ACG place at mobile check points es- onstration of expanded AOG tablished by AOGs on an inter- presence but on the other it is Dawlat Shah when, on 16 August, AOG dis- mittent basis searching vehicles probably related to upcoming tributed night letters, ordering the local com- for civilians working for the elections and AOG efforts to in- munity to compel their sons and family mem- GOA/ANSF/IMF. These check timidate the local population. This bers to quit their jobs with GOA/ANSF/IMF. points were concentrated in the has been underlined, for instance, NGOs should be aware of an increase in AOG northern Laghman, particularly in with an attack on a parliamentary presence in Dawlat Shah where the bulk of candidate’s vehicle that occurred AOG activity and especially intimidation ef- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS on 18 August in , forts were recorded. Finally, no incidents have killing a bodyguard and injuring Instability in Mitharlam been reported in the past two weeks along the another one. Additionally, intimi- Jalalabad-Kabul Highway which confirms the dation attempts continued in trend already underlined in previous reports. THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 2 KHOST This Report Period 0 100 The security environment in 80 Khost was dominated by an AOG and five arrested, with four IMF, 60 complex attack targeting two IMF one ANSF and one civilian being 40 bases - FOBs Salerno and Chap- wounded. Moreover, one IMF 20 helicopter made a hard landing man. On 28 August, at around 0 0230-0300 hrs, AOGs, some of after being engaged by AOG and them wearing U.S uniforms, at- one ANP vehicle was destroyed. KHOST AOG KHOST ACG tacked simultaneously both IMF The attack seems to be a part of facilities. The attack included a an AOG campaign targeting IMF failed (S)VBIED (stuck in mud en facilities across the country (i.e. In conjunction with the neighboring province route and captured by IMF later) Bagram on 19 May, Jalalabad Air- of Paktya, after a temporary lull, AOG activity and BBIEDs (at least three suicide field on 30 June and Kandahar throughout Khost continued to increase, with vests were found), a mortar/ both on 23 May and 3 August,) 36 AOG incidents recorded during the present RPGs attack, and a direct armed and should be underlined for its cycle, which represents an increase by 17% assault attempt. A prolonged fire coordination, scale and duration. compared to the previous report. Therefore, fight of more than five hours en- Nonetheless, Khost has witnessed the level of AOG incidents remains far behind sued, involving IMF air assets. already similar sporadic high pro- the peak recorded in July. In the past two Casualty reports indicate that at file attacks. For instance, last De- weeks, AOGs operating in Khost, concen- least twenty AOGs were killed cember, a BBIED attacker deto- trated their activity particularly in Tani, Musa nated his device inside the FOB Khel and Bak districts. It is worth noting that Chapman killing seven CIA em- during the present cycle, IDF has become KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ployees and later on 8 March in AOG’s tactic of choice, with rocket strikes/ IEDs in Matun Khost City, AOG launched a mortars reported from Tani, Bak, Musa Khel, IDF in Bak & Sabari complex attack involving several Nadir Shah Kot and Spera districts. Complex attacks BBIEDs.

NGO Incidents PAKTYA PAKTYA Year to Date 1 100

This Report Period 0 80 After the temporary lull that had been observed during the previ- ous reports, AOG’s tactic of 60 ous period (partially related to choice in the district remains IED 40 heavy floods affecting eastern deployment with a total of 14 de- 20 areas of the province), AOG ac- vices detonated. During the pre- 0 tivity has resumed in Paktya. sent cycle, Gardez and Shwak dis- Compared to 10 AOG incidents tricts experienced the bulk of IED PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA ACG recorded during the last reporting attacks. However, regarding the period, the overall level of AOG province as a whole, the main activity has increased sharply in AOG tactic continued to be direct ANP officer's house, wounding his mother. the past two weeks to 38 AOG attacks with 19 incidents re- Another incident, this time related to the elec- initiated incidents. During the corded. It is worth noting that tion period occurred on 16 August, also in present cycle AOG activity re- besides the usual AOG targets of Gardez, when AOG warned locals not to vote mained concentrated in Gardez IMF/ANSF, PSCs constitute the during the upcoming parliamentary election, District, which experienced more second favoured target through- with threats to cut off their fingers. then 39 % of all AOG intiated out the province. For instance, In order to counter this AOG activity IMF incidents. As underlined in previ- during this period PSC convoys conducted several operations which, during the came under attack in Shwak, present cycle, were focused particularly on Gardez and Lilja Ahmad Khel Zurmat and Wuza Zadran districts. For in- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS districts. stance, on 27 August in Zurmat (Sahak area), IEDs Intimidation continued unabated twelve AOG were killed and another five were Direct attacks against ANSF when, on 18 August in Gardez, a arrested as a result of a series of IMF air strikes hand grenade was hurled into an and ground operations. THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents GHAZNI GHAZNI Year to Date 1 250 This Report Period 0 has not only 200 however, the movement is a result remained one of the most inse- 150 cure provinces in the country, the of the inexorable increase of inse- 100 level of AOG activity has actually curity over months, with no end slightly increased over the past point in sight. Demonstrations 50 protesting the continued insecu- reporting period. Over 90 sepa- 0 rate direct and indirect fire attacks rity occurred in Ghazni City and in , and will likely were recorded during the last two GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI ACG weeks, and this level of violence continue as the situation persists. has resulted in reports of families Andar District alone accounted leaving villages in Andar District, for 26 AOG attacks, primarily times in each location. Rockets struck the the most affected and arguably the direct attacks on ANP vehicles DACs of Gelan (three times), Muqur (three most dangerous area in the coun- and IMF convoys. In these at- times), Ajristan (twice) Ab Band (twice), and try. This displacement of civilians tacks, AOG appeared to follow a Dih Yak (once), while SAF and RPGs were is even more troubling when one similar pattern – ambush the tar- used against the DACs of Waghaz (three considers that such movements get, inflict as much damage as times), Rashidan (twice), Qarabagh (twice), and have in the past occurred as a re- possible, and then retreat before a Khogyani (twice). Outside of the DACs, at- sult of a distinct military opera- decisive response could be organ- tacks on moving targets consisted mainly of tion, with specific start and end ized. On a few occasions AOG ambushes on IMF/ANSF convoys along the points, such as in Marja District in also used indirect fire (rockets, Kandahar – Kabul highway. Helmand. In these current cases, mortars) on IMF facilities, but As with , the frenetic activ- without inflicting considerable ity of AOG was in stark contrast to the lull in damage. IMF/ANSF operations. During the reporting KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Elsewhere in the province, the period, only six reported operations took IDF against DAC DACs of most of the remaining place, in the districts of Ghazni, Muqur, AOG attacks against convoys districts were attacked by both Waghaz and Gelan, with a total of 15 AOG indirect and direct fire, multiple killed and another 22 detained. Airstrikes were

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA This Report Period 0 140 120 remained ex- 100 tremely insecure and the profile of wherein AOG attacked a peace 80 jirga of tribal elders and GOA 60 security incidents was much like 40 that of neighbouring Ghazni officials. No one was killed in the 20 Province – a large number of di- attack, however needless to say, 0 rect and indirect AOG attacks, the proceedings ended rather employing significant numbers of abruptly. rockets and mortars against static In the center, IMF PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA ACG IMF targets as well as DACs. detained six ANBP who allegedly IEDs were a significant problem had deserted their unit and were of local citizens complaining of the inability of during the report period as well. trying to join local AOG units. ANP to provide security to the district. This Also mirroring Ghazni Province, This latter incident perhaps pro- report was initiated after local AOG had it appears IMF/ANSF operations vides a glimpse into the morale of posted messages throughout the area warning were somewhat muted. the ANSF forces in the area, how- civilians to stop using the cameras on their Of note is an AOG attack which ever incidents like these remain mobile phones. Local citizens then com- took place in the Khair Kot DAC, relatively isolated, and should be plained to authorities about these threats, monitored to determine if any which were in turn reported on the local news. important patterns emerge over This incident will be monitored closely to see KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the coming weeks and months. if other media outlets are threatened or closed IED Lastly, a local radio station in Sha- when reporting the realities of the deteriorating Attacks against DAC ran was shut down by ANSF, af- security situation in the south. ter the station broadcast reports THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 3 HELMAND This Report Period 0 200 Putting to shame those who have 150 over the last weeks claimed mately 50 PSC and 80 AOG ‘progress was being made’, Hel- members were killed, and over 30 100 construction vehicles of various mand province witnessed an enor- 50 mous, and increasing, amount of types were either destroyed or AOG activity, mostly in the form stolen. Accurate reports about 0 of direct attacks on all types of the incident were difficult to as- IMF and ANSF targets – posts, certain, as ANP sources publicly – HELMAND AOG HELMAND ACG bases, patrols, convoys and even and tellingly – admitted it took helicopters. The recent report place in an area which ANSF Gah, AOG fired a total of five rockets, which period represents an impressive could not at the present time ven- landed in various parts of the city and caused demonstration of the ability of ture into. no significant damage. The use of rockets is AOG to strike at will throughout In , AOG somewhat rare in the Helmand – as opposed all parts of the province. launched attacks on both patrols to the provinces further east, as the majority of these types of munitions come from Pakistan. There were over 50 recorded di- and convoys, however AOG also It will be important to monitor any increase in rect attacks by AOG during the managed to attack IMF helicop- their use in the province. report period, the most ever re- ters on two different occasions, corded for this type of incident in once with SAF and once with There were 16 IED incidents during the report Helmand. In Marja, IMF patrols RPGs, but to no reported effect. period, however it is apparent that many of and convoys were attacked four AOG were particularly active in these were not RCIEDs, but rather IEDs that times, and IMF facilities were at- Nahri Sarraj District during the had been left by AOG to generally impede tacked on three other occasions. report period, as they attacked movement. As a result, many of the incidents ANP patrols were also attacked ANP posts on eight occasions, involved civilians accidentally detonating the six times in the district. Impor- overrunning one such post near devices; in this manner, a total of seven civil- tantly there were significant num- Wazir Manda village, killing four ians were killed and six others wounded. bers of civilian casualties in the ANP, abducting two more and IMF/ANSF activity was rather muted in the attacks taking place in Marja, indi- taking the post’s weapons, vehicle face of such an unprecedented level of AOG cating that the majority of these and supplies. Near Grishk, a joint attacks; in total there were reports of 14 delib- took place in built-up areas such IMF / ANSF patrol was attacked erate operations throughout the province. In as the DAC. The DAC was also by heavy weapons – RPGs and Lashkar Gah City, NDS detained eight men the location of the majority of mortars – however the only re- accused of planning to carry out attacks related clashes in , which ported casualties were two civil- to the upcoming elections. In Garmser Dis- witnessed a total of 11 attacks, ians. IMF patrols were attacked trict two IMF operations resulted in a total of targeting a mixture of IMF vehi- in the district a total of six times, 40 IEDs and 11 Motorola radios being seized, cles and ANP patrols. Of note primarily in the area of Charhar- and four individuals arrested. Most signifi- however is a large-scale attack bagh, near Babaji village (which is cantly, however, was a joint IMF/ANSF raid launched by AOG – over 200 in actually located in neighbouring on an AOG prison complex in Musa Qala Dis- all – in which the assailants Lashkar Gah District, and is a trict, which resulted in 13 AOG killed and a stormed a PSC compound sup- historical hotspot for clashes), and total of 27 civilian prisoners released. During porting a road construction pro- near the villages of Band-e-barq the operation, however, five prisoners were ject near Haiderabad village. A and Grishk. Not wanting to be killed, including two local employees of a pri- prolonged fire-fight took place, outdone by their brothers in Nad vate development organization who had been reportedly over the space of 12 Ali District, AOG in Nahri Sarraj abducted several weeks earlier. For most ob- hours, during which approxi- also attempted to down an IMF servers it was surprising that AOG actually ran helicopter using SAF, without any such operations, instead of housing abductees success. Finally, in Lashkar Gah in smaller groups; having the ability to run a KEY THREATS & CONCERNS District, AOG in Babaji village ‘prison complex’ speaks to the ability of AOG AOG attacks attacked an IMF patrol, killing to operate openly in certain parts of the prov- IMF operations one IMF and wounding two oth- ince. IEDs ers, and in the city of Lashkar THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR KANDAHAR Year to Date 4 200

This Report Period 0 150 Over the past report period, Kan- dahar Province has had arguably ANP in District 3, two ANP in 100 District 6, and two ANP in Dis- the highest levels of security inci- 50 dents to date. This may seem sur- trict 2. Lastly, in Daman District, 0 prising, as there has been a rela- the District CoP was killed, along tive lack of ‘spectacular’ attacks in with five others, when a SVBIED attacker drove into an ANP con- Kandahar City, however AOG KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR ACG have maintained a vigorous pace voy near the Tarnak Bridge and of direct attacks in the surround- detonated, wounding 18 others. ing districts, and have increased Target killings rose in Kandahar IMF operations have increased throughout the rate of targeted killings within City, with 20 such incidents in the most of the province, with the majority of ef- the city itself. IMF/ANSF have city and two others in neighbour- fort focused on construction/enhancement of also clearly stepped up the activity ing Arghandab District. These the series of checkpoints leading into Kanda- levels, initiating operations on the numbers will undoubtedly rise as har City, as they have publicly stated that by outskirts of Kandahar City. In election-related killings become the end of September the security perimeter addition, it is apparent that IEDs more likely in the next month. In will be complete. As a result, the south- are being deployed at a greater this report period, victims have western edge (District 2) and the western edge rate, reflected in both the number included: three GOA employees, (District 8) of Kandahar City have become of IED strikes and also the in- three prominent tribal elders, two primary locations for clashes between IMF and creasing number of IED discov- local Shura members, two retired AOG. During the period 25 – 29 August, a ery and disposal operations by ANP officers, two IMF transla- series of night operations in the Malajat area of IMF / ANSF units. tors, two local employees of pri- District 2 involved prolonged exchanges of heavy weapons and small arms fire, and re- Direct AOG attacks in the prov- vate development organizations, sulted in the arrest of over 150 individuals, ince took place a total of 33 times. and six others labeled as currently being processed by ANSF. In Dis- 11of these attacks were launched ‘collaborators’ with either IMF or trict 8, near the villages of Deh Kochi and Pir against IMF / ANSF convoys, GOA. It is important to note that Paimal, IMF airstrikes were conducted three travelling to support IMF / ANSF these are in addition to those inci- times to dislodge AOG positions during the presence in the districts of Zhari dents in which crime and/or fam- report period. Both districts are critical to stop and Maywand. ANP posts were ily disputes are suspected, of the flow of AOG personnel and arms into also targeted at total of nine times. which a total of six additional Kandahar City. In addition, IMF operations in In , ANP posts in bodies were discovered. Arghandab itself, in the villages of Chargolba the villages of Howz-e-Madad, In an incident which cannot yet and Zhwando Hadira, resulted in four AOG Ashogha, Makwan, Jawar Manda, be attributed to AOG, unknown killed, and six detained. Lastly, IMF opera- and Pashmul were attacked by assailants fired three to four RPG tions, including airstrikes, near the village of AOG, with Pashmul witnessing rounds at the compound resi- Wali in claimed three AOG AOG on at least five separate oc- dence of the head of the Provin- and resulted in the arrest of eight others. The casions. In the cial Council and half-brother to use of airstrikes in IMF operations in Kanda- DAC was attacked but with no the President, Ahmed Wali Kar- har province is clearly increasing, and this can significant results. In Kandahar zai. Three of his guards were be attributed somewhat as a response to the City, AOG limited their direct wounded in this attack, as well as complaints of mid-level commanders who, attacks to ANP posts, killing six one guard of a nearby IO. The under recently departed General McChrystal, possible motives for this attack had claimed they were being asked to fight KEY THREATS & CONCERNS are numerous, as this individual ‘with one arm tied behind their back’ in an Assassinations holds a variety of formal and in- effort to limit airstrikes and consequent civilian Attacks against ANP formal roles in the country. casualties. IMF airstrikes THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 0 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 As in recent months, incidents in 80 Uruzgan were a mix of AOG at- twice against the IMF airbase, and tacks and IED strikes. The over- once against an ANA base near 60 all level of incidents remained the village of Balochi. An addi- 40 approximately the same as in pre- tional two rocket attacks were 20 conducted in the Poza area of vious report periods, however one 0 new trend is a marked increase in and in Ghoram the use of rockets by AOG in the area of Dihrawud District, the URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN ACG province, implying a greater sup- latter being directed towards an ANP post. In all cases, there were ply of such munitions flowing in District – in the villages of Paytoto, Shoraki, no significant damages incurred, from the neighbouring provinces and Deh Sang – it was reported that AOG implying that, although the muni- of Ghazni and Zabul, where weak killed civilians who they accused of supporting tions may be flowing into the border controls with Pakistan per- IMF/ANSF efforts. mit their importation. province at an increased rate, the skills required to employ them IMF/ANSF activity was subdued, with only In all, AOG launched 26 separate effectively has not. five reported operations in the province. Near attacks, targeting joint IMF/ the village of Surkh Murghab in Tirin Kot Dis- Targeted killings of ‘collaborators’ ANSF patrols in Tirin Kot and trict, ANA arrested six suspected AOG in an continued at a steady pace as Char Chino Districts, as well as operation while in the Nawa area of Dihrawud compared with previous report ANP posts in Chora District. six AOG were killed during a joint IMF/ periods. In Garmab Manda vil- Three rocket attacks were ANSF operation. Two other operations in lage of Tirin AOG launched in Tirin Kot District, Khas Uruzgan resulted in the deaths of four killed four civilians accused of AOG, and two ANA. Finally, a joint opera- having links with the GOA. Kill- tion uncovered a substantial amount of ammu- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ings also occurred in the market nition in the village of Mayan Do in Dihrawud IED strikes area of Tirin Kot City and in the District, resulting in the seizure of approxi- Attacks against ANSF/IMF village of Qalacha. Lastly, in three mately 150 RPG rounds and almost a dozen Targeted killings separate incidents in Dihrawud hand grenades. No suspects were detained.

NGO Incidents NIMROZ Year to Date 0 NIMROZ This Report Period 0 100 Nimroz Province has remained 80 quiet during the report period, lage of Ghorghori in the same with only a handful of incidents to District assaulted an ANP station 60 report. AOG undertook targeted with SAF and RPG fire for two 40 hours. Reports indicate that two killings on two occasions, killing 20 an ANP officer in the Lokhi area AOG and two ANP were killed of , as well as and several civilians were 0 beheading a civilian whose wounded in the initial moments brother is employed by a private of the attack. NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ ACG In the provincial capital of Zaranj, construction company near the ever it remains to be seen if incident levels rise two RCIEDs were deployed by village of Posht-e-Hassan. In this over the next weeks, especially in light of the AOG, one in the Cinema Square same area, AOG set up an illegal upcoming elections. and another in the Shuhada checkpoint a few days later, ap- With respect to ANSF operations, ANP seized Square. The latter exploded pre- parently searching for IMF/GOA a substantial amount of raw and processed maturely near an ANP post, caus- employees. opium, along with some other processing ma- ing no damage or injuries, and the In a rare direct and rather pro- terials, near the Zaranj Airport, arresting three former was discovered and safety longed attack, AOG near the vil- suspects. In addition, a raid on a warehouse disposed of by ANP forces. In near Zaranj produced a large but unspecified the past Zaranj, despite its status quantity of hashish and heroin, and two ANP KEY THREATS & CONCERNS as the capital, has escaped the type officers were arrested. AOG checkpoints of serious incidents which take Attacks against ANP place in Khash Rod District how- THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents ZABUL ZABUL Year to Date 1 100 This Report Period 0 has enjoyed a sig- 80 nificant drop in incidents during file incident, the Provincial Direc- 60 the report period, with both AOG tor of Tribal Affairs and his wife 40 and IMF/ANSF appearing to were shot at their residence near 20 the main bazaar area of the town. scale down their activities. 0 Whether this lull will hold through In a significant operation near the the remainder of Ramadan and village of Dagger in Shamulzayi into the fall period remains to be District, it was reported that 28 ZABUL AOG ZABUL ACG seen. AOG were captured, including AOG activity was confined to two local commanders, when their detention of five more fighters. Lastly, a rou- several targeted killings, all taking compound was located and sur- tine search of vehicles at an ANP checkpoint place in . In rounded by IMF units. in the area of Zanzeer, in , Pasano village, a tribal elder was ANP conducted several search yielded a total of 127 pistols and 80 AK-47s. killed, and in the main town of operations, primarily in Qalat Dis- This last incident, along with the drop in direct Shahjoy AOG abducted two trict, and seized a total of 350 kgs and indirect attacks, suggests that AOG – as brothers from the Abdul Aziz of opium from two separate loca- IMF also plan to do – are shifting their forces mosque who were accused of tions. In the Seghan area of Shah- and concentrating on more critical areas of the working on the nearby IMF base; joy, a large IMF/ANSF operation south, leaving Zabul as a transit/storage point they are both presumed to have killed five AOG and resulted in for weapons and narcotics. Helmand and been killed. In the most high pro- the capture of a mid-level com- Kandahar are most likely the recipients of new mander along with three others. groups of AOG, where incident levels have Near the village of Show Bar, also risen, in response to IMF/ANSF plans to be- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS in Shahjoy District, IMF forces gin pulling forces from areas such as the north Targeted killings clashed with AOG, resulting in and the west and shifting them to these prov- IMF operations the deaths of four AOG and the inces.

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 5 GHOR 50 This Report Period 0 Tensions in the Murghab Area of 40 District is on the tion, armed men, allegedly sup- 30 porters of two election candidates increase in the run-up to the par- 20 in the area, clashed and attacked liamentary elections in September. 10 Already on 12 August, armed men each other with SAF on 30 Au- blocked the road and forced an gust in Jandak Village. At present, 0 INGO convoy in Murghab Valley local elders have brokered a truce between the both groups and the (15 km from Shuraba Village) on GHOR AOG GHOR ACG the way to Chaghcharan City to Governor of Ghor has sent a stop and take another route. The peace delegation. Government the first successful IED strike recorded for this INGO afterwards discussed the control in Murghab Area has typi- area and also the first one against IMF in Ghor situation with local commanders, cally been limited and the area is since the beginning of 2008. However, com- who advised to suspend NGO under de-facto control of several pared to the other districts in Ghor, Chaghcha- activities until after the elections local – though more or less pro- ran has had the highest number of IED dis- as there are indications that the government – commanders, who coveries (around 35%) since 2009 as witnessed presence of NGOs, IOs or the are linked to certain election can- by the recent IED discovery in Nar Koh Area government is not welcome in the didates, the likely source of the of Chaghcharan and the explosives seizure in area during this period. In addi- present instability. Turbulagh Area of Du Layna. Further IED Beyond this, an incident of oc- related incidents especially in Chaghcharan KEY THREATS & CONCERNS curred on 30 August when an District, probably targeting ANSF and IMF, AOG activity in Pasaband & IED hit an IMF patrol in Pushtae should be expected, although it is too early to Tarwara Wardakha Area of Chaghcharan. predict the efficacy of these efforts. IEDs According to ANSO data, this is THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents HERAT HERAT Year to Date 13 50 This Report Period 5 During the present reporting pe- 40 riod, once again pound on 22 August, allegedly 30 discussing a planned suicide at- experienced several incidents di- 20 rectly related to NGOs. Of note, tack. In light of the recent in- the sum of these incidents do not crease of threat reports in regard 10 present an increase in the overall to suicide attacks in the city, it 0 threat profile for NGOs, rather cannot be excluded that the con- constitute part of a more general versation has taken place as re- HERAT AOG HERAT ACG increase of tensions during the ported, but it also needs to be also run-up period to the elections as taken into account, that the in- NGO took place on 27 August in Injil, where well as the prevailing climate of creased threat warnings enhance men appeared at an INGO compound and instability and opportunistic crimi- the likelihood of misunderstand- handed over two copies of a letter requesting nality which accompanies it. ings. In regard to the possibility of that the guards put them on the compound a suicide attack against an NGO wall. The letter requested people to not partici- On 17 August, an e-mail, threat- compound, there have been no pate in the upcoming parliamentary elections. ening to target Afghan nationals such attacks against an NGO Of note, since the letter does not include a working for foreign organizations, compound recorded in the West- threat, the main intention seems to be influ- was sent to a list of undisclosed ern Region. Nevertheless, loca- encing public perception. Similar letters were recipients by a group claiming to tions which would generate high also distributed in in June and be from Herat. One national and media attention are generally at a now again on 26 August. In addition, letters two international NGO staff higher risk of being targeted, were found in Kushk on 26 August and Syaw- members have received the e-mail; which includes compounds with a shan as well as Dadshan Village of Guzara however, it seems unlikely at pre- concentration of internationals. District on 25 August. AOG are visibly step- sent that NGOs are specifically ping up their anti-election activities in Herat targeted since two of the recipi- On 18 August, in Neyestan Area Province. ents do not even fit the target pro- of Karukh six unarmed men file. Therefore, the intention of stopped a rented vehicle with four In the final incident, a national and an interna- the e-mail seems aimed at causing INGO national staff and ques- tional IO staff member were abducted in the a climate of fear rather than pre- tioned them. ANP assessed after south-eastern part of Guzara. Reports indicate sent a specific threat. arresting the perpetrators that that the abduction was conducted by one spe- they were criminals and the inci- cific ACG, and though a certain level of plan- In Herat City, four suspicious dent was related to the upcoming ning appears likely, the IO in question was men were seen in the vicinity of elections. Travel is expected to be more a target of opportunity. While the target- the Albiruni Clinic in Herat City increasingly affected by the elec- ing focus of ACG in the area will likely con- (District 5) and an INGO com- tion period, especially in areas of tinue to be targets of opportunity (primarily of high political tension as well as nationals); one cannot rule out the risks to KEY THREATS & CONCERNS more unstable areas with signifi- NGOs and the International Community in Election related incidents cant AOG presence. general, since both are usually perceived as Abductions lucrative targets in such activities. Intimidation efforts The fourth incident involving an THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 On 25 August in the morning, them were wounded due to stones 40 Qala-I-Naw City witnessed a gun 30 fight at the PRT base in the city and gun fire of other demonstra- 20 centre. An ANP officer shot and tors. ANSF restored full control 10 killed two IMF soldiers as well as in the city in the afternoon and 0 an interpreter and wounded two ANP re-enforcements where IMF soldiers, after refusing to brought Qala-I-Naw from Herat. The situation since then has re- hand over his weapon at the en- BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS ACG trance. IMF soldiers nearby re- mained calm; however, it is too turned fire and killed the ANP early to see the full impact the indicates a relationship between the ANP offi- officer. The incident very quickly incident will have on the public’s cer in question and AOGs. – approximately within half an perception regarding ISAF and/or Murghab, Ghormach and – after a quieter pe- hour – aroused a violent demon- ANP. The PRT has enjoyed a riod in the beginning of August – Muqur were stration by locals. According to generally positive reputation the focus of AOG activity as usual. The major- reports, the demonstration caused among locals for several years ity of incidents were direct attacks targeting 25 civilians casualties, most of already, so this incident suggests ANSF and IMF in these districts as well as in that the shooting and the demon- Qadis, where AOG attacked an ANP patrol stration were planned and exe- with RPGs and SAF in Takak Area. ANSF/ KEY THREATS & CONCERNS cuted for the purpose of tarnish- IMF had intensive operations in Murghab and Deteriorating security in Qala-I- Naw ing this reputation as well as nega- a search operation in Ghormach, seizing mor- tively impact local stability, further tars. Armed clashes supported by reporting which

NGO Incidents FARAH FARAH Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 On 29 August, two BBIED at- 40 tempted to enter the Governor’s tacks should be expected in the 30 Office in Farah City and deto- upcoming months, primarily tar- 20 geting high profile facilities as well nated when they were stopped. 10 Apart from the suicide attackers, as ANSF and IMF. 0 no casualties were reported. While In addition, Farah City once again suicide attackers are usually rare in had the highest IED related inci- Farah City, during the last report- dent rate compared to other areas, FARAH AOG FARAH ACG ing period a suicide attacker deto- accounting for nearly one-third of nated prematurely in the Abdulla all IED incidents in the Province. Buluk. Khan Mosque, and the last suicide All of the incidents during the Intimidation cases were recorded in the Dis- attack before that was recorded current reporting cycle occurred trict Centre Area of Gulistan, where AOG eight month ago. Two BBIED in District 1: directly at the Gov- killed an official and a shopkeeper, and in attacks in one month after such a ernor’s Office, in Chawke Walayat Farah Rod Bazaar Area of Bala Buluk, where long pause is suggestive of per- Area and Ganj Gandum Area on an ANSF officer was killed. In general, AOG haps the arrival of the technical Farah - Bakwa Main Road. The activity was concentrated on Gulistan, Bala expertise to deploy such weapons. other IED related incidents were Baluk and Farah City as well as to a lesser ex- If this is the case, more such at- concentrated on hotspots of tent on Pusht Rod, where also an ANSF/IMF AOG activity such as Bakwa, Bala operation was conducted. During the ANSF/ Buluk, Pusht Rod and especially IMF operation, an airstrike was targeting an KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Gulistan. The detonations were AOG facility and accidently killing also three Suicide attacks targeting ANSF, IMF and supply civilians, which highlights again the risk for Intimidation efforts trucks; however, also one civilian civilians in areas where AOG and ANSF/IMF AOG activity in Gulistan was hit by a roadside IED in Bala clash. THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) inces of: ANSO is hosted by Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 Panjshir NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Nuristan Elizabeth Detwiler - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 This is because we To Register with ANSO do not know enough contact: EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) about the area to [email protected] Vacant - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 comment on the sig- nificance of the inci- Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 dents occurring there. ANSO is managed by an NGO SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR)

Board. If you have any Peter Dimitroff - [email protected] 0796 688 416 feedback, good or bad, let Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 If you can help us them know on: understand the prov- ince better, please [email protected] WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) contact us. Rachel Adam - [email protected] - 0799 322 192

ANSO ACRONYMS Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Police / ANP-Afghan National Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 Police / AOG-Armed Opposition Group / APPF-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local depu- tised militias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire ANSO VACANCY (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised Explosive Device / IMF- International Military Forces / ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers. This month, ANSO is recruit- NDS-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / PRP- ing for a Regional Safety Advisor (Jalalabad City). Previous Reporting Period / PSC-Private Security Company If you have NGO experience, an analytical background, and the desire to be / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- challenged, all while being part of a close-knit team, pass your CV, cover letter, nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- and two substantive English writing samples to [email protected]. vised Explosive Device FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES

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