NO. 45 NOVEMBER 2019 Introduction

International Schemes, Libyan Realities Attempts at Appeasing Risk Further Escalating ’s Civil War Wolfram Lacher

Almost eight months into the offensive on by Khalifa Haftar’s “Libyan Arab Armed Forces” (LAAF), the war shows no signs of abating. Ongoing diplomatic efforts are divorced from realities on the ground. The current balance of forces rules out any possibility for a return to a political process. This would require either robust inter- national guarantees or a fragmentation of both opposing camps. As long as Haftar has the chance to advance in Tripoli, he and his foreign supporters will view negotia- tions as a tactic to divide his opponents and move closer to seizing power. To create the conditions for negotiations, Western states should work to weaken Haftar’s alliance – and ultimately to prepare the post-Haftar era.

After the first few days of the offensive in adversaries pulled even in mid-May by ob- April, Haftar’s forces for months made no taining combat drones from . Since more territorial gains in Tripoli. Nor were late June, UAE fighter jets have also repeat- Haftar’s adversaries – an alliance of armed edly bombed Haftar’s opponents. The UAE groups from western Libyan cities that go gradually established air superiority; Turk- back to the 2011 war against Qadhafi – ish drones have largely stopped operating. able to repel the attackers. The recapture Despite this, Haftar has made little pro- of in late June 2019 was the last gress because he has been unable to mobi- major success of the anti-Haftar forces. lise greater numbers of determined Libyan Since he lost Gharyan, Haftar has been rely- fighters. His forces include units he built up ing solely on as the base for his during recent years in eastern Libya as well ground offensive. The militia of the Kani as western Libyan armed groups, whose loy- brothers in that city has come to play a alty to Haftar is often doubtful. Among them, central role in Haftar’s alliance. hardline Salafis and former supporters of the As the war has dragged on, foreign mili- Qadhafi regime form prominent subgroups. tary support has become ever more impor- To boost his forces, Haftar has deployed tant for both sides. At the same time, inhi- ever more Chadian and Sudanese fighters – bitions towards causing civilian casualties but most importantly the of have steadily fallen. In mid-April, the the Russian private military company Wag- (UAE) started using ner, who arrived in Tripoli in September, combat drones in support of Haftar. His and by mid-November numbered well over

1,000 men. Only with this Russian contin- War of Attrition gent, which was undoubtedly approved by the Kremlin, was Haftar able to regain the As the stalemate persists, each side hopes offensive during November. But his modest that the opposing camp will fragment at advances came at the cost of US permissive- some point. These hopes are not entirely ness towards Haftar’s offensive. Alarmed baseless, but they are often misplaced. over the Russian mercenaries, the United Haftar is waging a war of attrition States called on Haftar to end his offensive. against his opponents, with generous for- It remains unclear whether further steps eign support: The Chinese-made Emirati will follow that call. drones are clearly superior to the Turkish The long stalemate caused war fatigue model, and the Russian air-defence bat- among armed groups on both sides. Haf- teries provided by the UAE give Haftar’s tar’s increasing reliance on foreign merce- bases an important advantage. Haftar is naries is a case in point. Among his adver- seeking to slowly degrade his adversaries’ saries, there are growing accusations that capabilities with relentless airstrikes. This the Government of National Accord (GNA) assumes, however, that the Tripoli govern- in Tripoli lacks determination in the fight ment will not get better at replacing de- against Haftar, is failing to mobilise the stroyed weapons and vehicles. needed weaponry from abroad, and that Haftar and his foreign backers also ex- many of its members are busy with self- pect that some militia leaders in the enemy enrichment, or even complicit with Haftar. camp may soon switch sides. In fact, this Mobilisation for the defence of Tripoli has been unlikely since the beginning of the has declined in recent months. Since the war: Defectors cannot trust Haftar to keep frontlines had not seen any real changes any promises he makes now, once he has in months, many no longer saw the won. urgency of the situation. Major advances It is true that Haftar’s enemies are only by Haftar would likely prompt renewed united by the threat he poses to them. There mobilisation. are real tensions between some of the com-

SWP Comment 45 November 2019

2 ponent elements in the anti-Haftar alliance. was to create the conditions for a ceasefire Past conflicts and expectations of future and a return to a Libyan political process. rivalries fuel distrust between them, but the However, among Haftar’s foreign sup- opportunism of these forces is often over- porters, , France, and the UAE pushed estimated. Most commanders and fighters to expand the agenda beyond the issue of not only firmly believe that they are fight- foreign meddling to include the outlines ing for a just cause: against the establishment of an intra-Libyan settlement. Suspending of dictatorship by force. Many of them are UAE drone strikes while fighting continues also deeply rooted in the social fabric of par- on the ground would probably lead to Haf- ticular cities and are convinced that they tar’s defeat. These states therefore cannot are defending their families and communi- trust that an end to foreign meddling would ties. If they lose the war against Haftar, they lead to a negotiated settlement favourable will have to flee abroad. It is therefore un- to them. As a result, the discussions have likely that Haftar’s opponents will give in come to include ceasefire arrangements, the easily. contours of a political process, and certain The forces fighting Haftar are placing “reforms” that Haftar’s backers see as part their hopes in ceasefire negotiations with of a settlement. These notably include militias from Tarhuna that would sideline easier access to Central Bank resources for Haftar. This idea does not lack plausibility: Haftar – through the restoration of the Local ceasefires also ended the last civil board of governors of the Central Bank and war, in 2015. The Kani brothers’ militia its absorption of debt accumulated in east- only joined Haftar’s alliance with the start ern Libya over recent years – and the of his Tripoli offensive and had previously demobilisation of “militias”, by which been opportunistic in the choice of its Haftar’s supporters only mean those of allies. Contacts between forces in the anti- his adversaries. Haftar camp and representatives of Tar- The international alignments reflected in huna have never broken off; attempts at the Berlin process mean that Haftar’s oppo- negotiations continue. But for these to pro- nents would need to make major conces- gress, two conditions would need to hold: sions in exchange for a ceasefire. At the First, Haftar would need to suffer reversals same time, Haftar’s forces would remain that would increase pressure on Tarhuna – in greater Tripoli – if only because militias which is currently not the case. Second, from nearby Tarhuna are there anyway. Haftar’s opponents would need to guaran- Such ideas are incompatible with the tee that they will not try capturing the city options open to Haftar’s opponents – who, once it has broken with Haftar. This would like other Libyan parties, are not partici- require the deployment of units that enjoy pating in the Berlin talks. The anti-Haftar respect on both sides. alliance is fragile and lacks strong political leadership. Should some of its representa- tives accept an unconditional ceasefire – let The Berlin Process alone more wide-ranging concessions – the alliance would splinter into proponents and In September 2019, UN Special Representa- opponents of such a deal. Latent distrust tive Ghassan Salamé and the German gov- would turn into open enmity. The fragmen- ernment launched the Berlin process, a tation of his opponents would allow Haftar series of consultations between the five per- to move forward militarily and persuade manent members of the UN Security Coun- some of his enemies to switch sides. Under cil and the states intervening in Libya. The current circumstances, talks with Haftar initial aim was to hold a high-level confer- would therefore be fatal for his opponents – ence at which these states would commit and they are acutely aware of this danger. to discontinue their support to the warring The launch of the Berlin Process was parties and respect the arms embargo. This based on the assumption that, after months

SWP Comment 45 November 2019

3 of war, Haftar’s foreign backers had con- photography would fail entirely to offer cluded that a military victory was unrealis- security. But a peacekeeping mission is tic, and they would therefore be ready to currently not on the table. negotiate. This assumption was wrong, as The second possible condition would shown not only by the arrival of Russian be that Haftar’s alliance fragments as well, mercenaries since September. France, Egypt, removing the threat of a renewed offensive and the UAE also appear to view negotia- following negotiations. This could happen tions merely as a step towards Haftar’s cap- as a result of military reversals and local ture of power. There is no reason to believe negotiations in western Libya, or if his for- that these states have now abandoned their eign backers change course – by diversi- © Stiftung Wissenschaft longstanding goal of empowering Haftar. fying their Libyan clients, or in response und Politik, 2019 If a minority among the forces fighting to increased Western pressure. The United All rights reserved Haftar were to agree to a ceasefire and States would certainly need to play a key negotiations, this would not bring about role in this regard, particularly to contain This Comment reflects an end to the conflict. Rather, it would risk Russian influence. That said, the current the author’s views. ushering in a much more violent phase administration will hardly pursue a predict- The online version of of the war. Haftar could exploit tensions able and consistent Libya policy. this publication contains among his opponents to advance into But Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, functioning links to other densely populated neighbourhoods of Tri- and other European states could also exert SWP texts and other relevant poli. There, the conflict could take a much more influence than they have done to sources. higher toll on civilians. If Haftar actually date – by engaging more intensively with SWP Comments are subject ends up taking control of Tripoli – after France. French political backing for Haf- to internal peer review, fact- months or perhaps years of fighting, which tar’s war clearly harms European interests. checking and copy-editing. would cause major destruction – he will France’s European partners have rarely For further information on not yet have captured the cities that form addressed this issue openly, and there has our quality control pro- the strongholds of his opponents: , been little public debate about it in France. cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- Zawiya, and the Amazigh towns. Yearnings This is largely due to the discretion with berlin.org/en/about-swp/ for revenge against these communities are which the French government has pursued quality-management-for- widespread in his alliance. Attempts to sub- its line since French weapons were found in swp-publications/ jugate these cities would certainly see war Haftar’s Gharyan base in June 2019, briefly crimes and arbitrary repression. raising eyebrows. Opening up a debate on SWP this policy would force the French govern- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ment to explain its position. The aim should German Institute for Alternatives be a unified European approach towards International and Haftar’s foreign supporters. Security Affairs A political solution will only become imagi- A fragmentation of Haftar’s alliance nable once Haftar no longer has the pos- could also weaken his authority in the east Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin sibility of using negotiations to exploit rifts and cause renewed instability there. But Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 among his opponents for military gains. given that Haftar is 76 years old and report- Fax +49 30 880 07-100 There are two conditions that could prevent edly ill, this is a likely scenario anyway. For www.swp-berlin.org him from doing so. First, the United States now, the personality cult surrounding Haf- [email protected] and European states offer robust guarantees tar and the repressive apparatus run by his that they will prevent Haftar from violating inner circle hold the conflicting interests in ISSN 1861-1761 doi: 10.18449/2019C45 a ceasefire. This would require much more his eastern alliance together. But Haftar’s than words, as the United States, the EU, and departure could at any moment provoke a (English version of the UN lost most of their remaining cred- scramble to fill the vacuum. Preparing the SWP-Aktuell 65/2019) ibility in Libya when they failed to react to post-Haftar era would be a more sensible Haftar’s offensive. Merely supervising the realpolitik than helping to empower him by ceasefire with civilian observers and aerial watching the current war to its bitter end.

Dr. Wolfram Lacher is a Senior Associate in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP.

SWP Comment 45 November 2019

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