THE Proliferation of Advanced Conventional Weapons

CSS Analysis in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 145 • December 2013

The Proliferation of Advanced Conventional Weapons Hitherto, the debate on the proliferation of security-relevant technologies has been focused on weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. However, the increasing proliferation of advanced conventional weapons is similarly momentous in terms of strategic effects. The current trends in this area will continue unabated, thus creating serious challenges for security policy.

tomatic target acquisition, and reduced signatures, or stealth. This could severely raise the cost of future military interventions. At the same time, ACW in the hands of violent non-state actors could facilitate novel and surprising forms of asymmetric warfare and terrorism.

In the following, current developments in ACW proliferation and their consequences for the global security environment will be analysed, followed by a discussion of military countermeasures and options for con- trolling ACW transfers. Finally, the signifi- cance of this type of proliferation for Swiss security policy will be examined. Lockheed Martin The coming struggle for operational access: projected hypersonic surveillance and strike aircraft SR-72. The “democratisation” of high- precision warfare On 17 January 1991, at 1:30am local time, Pentagon; in the wake of the Persian Gulf It is all but inevitable that military in- the guided missile cruiser USS San Jacinto War, however, it gained numerous adher- novations will sooner or later proliferate fired the first of more than 100 Tomahawk ents both within and outside of the US globally. In the case of the latest RMA, this cruise missiles at a target in the city centre armed forces. The growing advantage of process has been marked by three factors: of Baghdad. A few hours later, Iraq’s inte- the US in network-centric warfare (see first of all, the enormous advantage of the grated air defence system had for all prac- Box 1) was identified as a unique resource US military over its competitors; secondly, tical purposes collapsed. For many observ- for enforcing US security interests and the the high cost and organisational impon- ers, this marked not only the beginning of upkeep of a world order patterned on lib- derables involved in its adoption; and third, the Allied air offensive that would make a eral norms. the availability of ACW on the interna- crucial contribution to the expulsion of Ira- tional arms market and of the underlying qi forces from Kuwait, but also the dawn of More than 20 years later, however, the RMA technologies on the civilian market. The a new era in conventional warfare: In Oper- is no longer a source of advantage that is confluence of these factors creates con- ation Desert Storm, the US demonstrated unique to the US military. It is slowly, but tradictory incentives. On the one hand, the its ability to incapacitate an enemy from steadily diffusing, to the benefit of a grow- US advantage means that closing the ca- afar using a combination of sophisticated ing number of actors. This trend poses un- pability gap is an imperative for allies and sensors and precision-guided munitions. familiar challenges for the US and its allies: potential challengers alike. On the other They must anticipate the possibility that hand, building up comprehensively net- Until then, the notion of a “Revolution in their own troops themselves will be tar- worked forces that are equipped with ACW Military Affairs” (RMA), based on advances geted by advanced conventional weapons is beyond the financial means of nearly all in information technology, had mainly (ACW), which are set apart, among other relevant actors and is also fraught with or- been argued by a few experts within the features, by a high degree of precision, au- ganisational risks.

and Belarus. So far, Russia has withheld Network-centric warfare planned transfers to Iran and Syria for po- Network-centric warfare is based on a seamless integration of sensors and standoff weapons litical reasons. On the other hand, it did in a “system of systems” so as to be able to carry out coordinated strikes across great distances. deliver advanced Yakhont anti-ship mis- The aim is to integrate command and control, reconnaissance, information processing, and target acquisition functions in order to be able to react in real time to developments in the siles to Bashir al-Assad’s government. This combat zone. Although the US in particular has made strides in network-centric operations, this is a case where ACW proliferation is also goal has remained elusive due to technical and organisational constraints. Furthermore, the used as a means of great power diplomacy great complexity of networked force structures also enhances vulnerability to physical and vir- in order to deter the US and its allies from tual attacks, necessitating a very careful assessment of their potential benefits and drawbacks. interventions that are contrary to Russian interests. This constellation of factors favours selec- bilities, even if their use as elements of a tive appropriation moves. This includes, networked force is still limited to a small Neither should one underestimate the in particular, the acquisition of individual number of actors. For instance, while the proliferation of short-range ACW that can ACW systems or complexes, which are in- Chinese armed forces still have important be used autonomously by small groups. tegrated into concepts of asymmetric war- shortfalls in this regard, they have mas- This category includes guided mortar and fare so as to be able to stand up against sively expanded their capacity for preci- artillery rounds as well as anti-aircraft and superior US and allied forces at acceptable sion strikes in the past two decades. The anti-tank guided missiles. While such rela- levels of cost. While these approaches are accuracy of the short-range DF-15B ballistic tively affordable weapons will not prevent not in line with the ideal of integrating missile, for example, which carries a con- an intervening power from entering the weapons and sensors in a seamless “sys- ventional warhead and is aimed at targets theatre of operations, they may consider- tem of systems,” the selective integration in Taiwan, is comparable to that of highly ably restrict the freedom of movement of of ACW can facilitate novel operational ap- developed Western systems. Its average invading forces and inflict serious casu- proaches that have a substantial impact aiming error is about one hundred times alties on them. For instance, Hezbollah on military balances. smaller than that of the Scud-B, which the employed modern guided missiles to con- US military faced in the Persian Gulf War. siderable effect during the 2006 Lebanon The practical modalities of ACW prolifera- War when it was able to put nearly half tion are highly diverse. On the one hand, The proliferation of such weapons is bring- of an Israeli tank battalion out of action one sees transfers of complete weapons ing about a change of the threat environ- within hours and to inflict substantial systems, motivated partially by alliance ment in military interventions. Of par- damage on an Israeli warship. politics and partially by commercial con- ticular relevance in this context are highly siderations. Faced with surging develop- developed anti-ship missiles, cruise mis- The selective availability of such ACW rais- ment and procurement costs as well as siles, and extended air defence systems es the probable capability level not only of budgetary limitations, even important that are also effective against standoff insurgents and militias, but also of terror- military powers are concerned about the weapons. In a theatre ist groups the world future of their defence industrial bases. of operations charac- New players on the arms over. The future likeli- Besides the US, these include Russia, the terised by such ACW, market include Israel, hood of guided missile UK, France, and Germany. the survivability of ex- attacks against civilian isting platforms – such South Korea, Brazil, India, aircraft (as used, for On the other hand, a number of newly in- as fighter aircraft or South Africa and Turkey. instance, against an Is- dustrialising and emerging technology surface ships without raeli civilian airplane in nations are acquiring the technological stealth capability – is significantly reduced. Kenya in 2002), government installations, capabilities to produce ACW of their own. Therefore, such systems can consider- or critical infrastructure is significantly Among these “new” players on the arms ably raise the costs of military interference. higher than that of any terrorist attempt market are China as well as Israel, South When combined with appropriate opera- to use nuclear or other weapons of mass Korea, Brazil, and India; at a lower level, tional concepts, they can become parts of destruction. The security forces of most South Africa and Turkey may also be count- an integrated anti-access and area denial states are poorly prepared for such attacks, ed among them. While highly sophisticat- challenge that may prove difficult to over- which may be carried out with high preci- ed electronic components and materials come. sion from a distance of several kilometres. can be purchased on the civilian market, the path to developing an independent In all of the areas mentioned above, there The struggle for military ACW production base usually involves the are clearly discernible trends of prolifera- advantages direct or indirect acquisition of entire tech- tion. According to the Indian Ministry of Currently, it is mainly the US that regards nology complexes. This can be achieved, Defence, there are up to 14 potential buy- the proliferation of ACW as an acute for instance, through licensed manufac- ers of the Indo-Russian BrahMos, which threat, because it faces the erosion of criti- turing and armaments cooperation, re- is currently among the most advanced cal military advantages. For the superiority verse engineering, or industrial espionage. anti-ship missiles. At least 17 states have of the US armed forces relies on a combi- introduced modern land-attack cruise mis- nation of global strategic mobility – i.e. the Transformation of the military- siles into their arsenals, including Pakistan, capability for rapid re-deployment by sea operational environment Saudi Arabia, and South Korea. In the past and air – and the subsequent concentra- The proliferation of information-centred decade, derivatives of the highly efficient tion of great striking power over tactical weapons technologies has brought about S-300 air defence system have found their ranges of a few hundred kilometres. In ar- a powerful upgrading of military capa- way to Algeria, China, Venezuela, Vietnam, eas where access to the theatre is not as-

sured or where frontline troops are subject Limited means of control Even greater challenges arise when look- to considerable attrition, the cost-benefit The proliferation of ACW is garnering coming beyond the documented arms trade. In calculations for military intervention may paratively little attention as a problem of particular, the transfer of individual stand- shift markedly. In both cases, the availabil- international security or global govern- alone ACW systems to insurgent groups ity of ACW to the defender makes a deci- ance. Initiatives introduced at the level of or other violent extremist m is difficult to sive difference, as it may increase the ef- international organisations and treaties tackle, despite a broad international con- fectiveness and efficiency of conventional are predominantly focused on nuclear sensus in this area. The Proliferation Se- strikes by several orders of magnitude. arms and other weapons of mass destruc- curity Initiative (PSI) launched by the US tion. Conversely, there is little political could play a certain role in this context, al- If the current proliferation trends in the leeway regarding the delegitimisation of though its scope would have to be expand- area of ACW continue, the US struggle to conventional weapons, which, due to the ed. The PSI aims at countering clandestine maintain its intervention capability will perceived selectivity of their destructive proliferation through targeted interven- intensify significantly in the coming 10 to effects, are associated with a reduction of tions – such as searching suspect ship car- 15 years. Currently, countermeasures are collateral damage. gos. However, even the introduction of being introduced in areas such as doctrine, stronger monitoring and control efforts procurement, and forward deployment. At For the same reason, there are hardly any could not altogether eliminate the danger the doctrinal level, the US military is work- effective instruments for the control and of sporadic surprise attacks using ACW. ing on new access concepts designed to monitoring of ACW transfers. One partial ensure its long-term superiority through exception is the proliferation of ballistic Implications for Switzerland joint, highly networked, missile systems, which Already today, the growing proliferation of and offensive operation- Modern guided are also suitable for de- ACW is causing considerable shifts in the al approaches. However, livering nuclear weap- military-operational and strategic environ- weapons constitute a in view of potentially ons. They are covered by ment, which also sets important frame- excessive technical and potential threat for two multilateral regimes work conditions for Swiss security policy. financial requirements Swiss citizens overseas. – the Missile Technology There is no immediate threat to Switzer- and difficult organisa- Control Regime (MTCR) land in this regard. While the transfer of tional obstacles, it is uncertain whether and the Hague Code of Conduct – that sophisticated stand-alone guided weap- these concepts can be successfully imple- are, however, limited in their effective- ons constitutes a potential threat for Swiss mented. ness. Other instruments of conventional citizens overseas, it is the indirect effects arms control – such as the Convention on of ACW proliferation that are of greater The procurement of new weapons sys- Cluster Munitions (CCM), which explicitly concern. tems with enhanced survivability and ex- excludes systems featuring autonomous tended range is also affected by budget- targeting – even create additional incen- Trends in this area have the potential to ary constraints. Besides a next-generation tives for modernisation. further undermine extant regional orders stealth bomber and carrier-based attack by significantly diminishing the freedom drone, this applies particularly to the Con- Export control regimes, which are formu- of action of the US as a key security pro- ventional Prompt Global Strike initiative, lated more broadly, offer a certain degree vider. Should this lead to future limitations which includes plans for ballistic missiles of leverage. Among these are the Wasse- of access to the global commons (mari- carrying conventional warheads or hyper- naar Arrangement on Export Controls for time, air, outer space, and cyber space), this sonic gliders, the use of which would, how- Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods would also affect Switzerland as a trad- ever, be fraught with escalations risks such and Technologies and the UN Register of ing nation within a globalised economic as a danger of confusion with nuclear- Conventional Arms, to which Switzerland framework. At the same time, the increas- armed means of delivery. The hypersonic is a party. Their purpose is to monitor arms ing proliferation of ACW is further eroding surveillance and strike aircraft SR-72, which and technology transfers based on volun- the crumbling foundations of convention- is still at an early stage of development, tary self-control. However, none of these al and nuclear arms control between East might prove to be less problematic in this arrangements are intended to ensure ef- and West (cf. Box 2), which is increasingly respect. fective containment of ACW proliferation. incapable of reflecting the shifting bal- Furthermore, in many cases, the security ance of military power. The expansion of theatre missile defence, and commercial interests of the participat- which affords some degree of active de- ing states constitute obstacles to the con- Although a delegitimisation of ACW or of fence to bases and carrier groups, is mean- sistent implementation of existing norms. the transfer of such weapons is unlikely to while continuing unabated. However, since a large number of targets must be defend- Challenges for arms control ed against possible attacks and because each approaching missile may have to be The existing instruments of arms control today are still based on the parameters of the Cold countered with several of the expensive War. For instance, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty reflects notions of industrial interceptors, the defender is at a structural warfare that measure military potential in terms of the number of major weapons systems (such as main battle tanks). However, the proliferation of ACW has created a massive realign- disadvantage. For the time being, there- ment in the determining factors of military balances. For example, the metric of large troop fore, passive measures – such as the hard- concentrations has been replaced by the concentration of standoff weapons effects. At the ening of critical structures and control of same time, observers in Russia and China fear that long-range precision-guided munitions electronic emissions – are at least equally combined with effective missile defences could ultimately jeopardise nuclear deterrence. Thus, important. the traditional approaches of East-West arms control are increasingly proving inadequate.

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