pressure on the passes (14-15 april) 271

Chapter Ten

Pressure on the Passes (14-15 April)

By the morning of 14 April the Axis invasion of had entered a new phase. By now W Force was firmly on the Olympus-Aliakmon Line, the British-Dominion right flank of Papagos’ Aliakmon-Venetikos Line, which the Greek Commander-in-Chief still intended to stretch across the Greek peninsula. To the west of W Force the Greek WMFAS and EFAS were with- drawing to their allocated positions on this latest defensive line. Papagos still had hopes for this new front as Wilson had yet failed to inform the Greek High Command of his own quite divergent plan to withdraw W Force further south to a position at Thermopylae. For both of these now conflict- ing operations to succeed, however—Wilson’s retreat to the Thermopylae Line and the Greek Albanian armies’ withdrawal to the Aliakmon-Venetikos Line—a series of critical passes needed to be held. Moving from west to east the first crucial string of such passes were at Pisoderion (Greek Cav- alry Division), Klisoura (20th Greek Division), and (12th Greek Di- vision). These three gaps in the mountain range southwest of Vevi protected , and the line of retreat for the bulk of the Greek Albanian armies. Further east, W Force was positioned to defend the key passes along three routes leading south through the Olympus-Aliakmon Line: the Kosani-Elasson- road (at the Servia Pass); the - Elasson-Larissa road (at the Olympus Pass); and the Katerini-Tempe-La­rissa railway (Plantamon tunnel pass leading to the Pinios Gorge). The key point for W Force was the town of Larissa, as all routes led through it. If the Olympus-Aliakmon passes were breached and Larissa taken, then further W Force withdrawal would be unlikely. The following phase of the campaign was therefore to be defined and decided by how much pressure the Germans could apply to these passes and how well the Allies could resist them. With little knowledge of how easily any of these passes could be forced, believ- ing the British to be in full retreat towards Larissa, and with troops to spare, List decided to press them all at once.1

1 List, Generalfeldmarschall, A.O.K.12, Ia Nr.810/41 geheim, 20.10, 14 April 1941, ‘Fern­ schreiben oder Funk’ to XXXX.A.K. and others, BA MA RH 20-12/93, pp. 1-2; ‘“War for the Passes”, an extract from American Infantry Journal of October, 1941’, AWM 3DRL 6643 3/42. 272 chapter ten As 14 April dawned clear and sunny, with temperatures seemingly on the rise, the German push south continued. The western German axis of advance, Stumme’s 40th Corps, was preparing to continue its advance from Ptolemais. To this end a pursuit group from the German 9th Armoured Division was formed under the control of Colonel Graf von Sponeck, based on Sponeck’s own 11th Infantry Regiment, reinforced with motorcyclists from the 59th Motorcycle Battalion, a troop of tanks, and various artillery elements. Sponeck was instructed to advance immediately upon , and, if possible, to push reconnaissance elements onwards as far south as the Servia Pass. The eastern German wing, Boehme’s 18th Corps, was simi- larly ordered to pursue the withdrawing Allies south with all available forces, with Larissa as its target. Boehme’s plan was to thrust the leading elements of the 6th Mountain Division through and of the 2nd Ar- moured Division through Katerini to ‘destroy the English wherever they are found’.2 The most significant obstacle predicted by the Germans was Allied demolitions, which had damaged the roads to such an extent that the pursuit would no doubt ‘entail much loss of time’.3 From a W Force perspective the immediate impact of List’s plans for 14 April fell upon the New Zealand cavalry regiment. At first light, with Luft- waffe reconnaissance overhead, forward infantry elements of the German 2nd Armoured Division advanced in trucks from the south bank of the Aliakmon and approached the anti-tank ditch that had been dug north of Katerini. At this point they jumped from their lorries and began filtering across the ditch. NZ cavalrymen in the vicinity, having retired from the Aliakmon the day before, opened fire and German mortars and machine guns replied. Despite the fire directed upon them German infantrymen soon managed to scramble across the ditch, while tanks began to flank it on the coastal side. No further delaying action was possible from this point

2 ‘Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete)’, AWM 534/2/27; ‘Appendices to 2 Pz Div Admin Diary (Greek Campaign)’, AWM 534/2/27. 3 ‘Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete)’, AWM 534/2/27. Entry for 14 April 1941, ‘KRIEGSTAGEBUCH Nr. 2 der 6.GEB.DIV.’ BA MA RH 28-6/8; Eberl, Lt., Kat- erini an 6. Geb.Div/Ia, 1530 14 April 1941, and Eberl, Lt., Katerini an 6. Geb.Div/Ia, 20500 14 April 1941, BA MA RH 28-6/9a; entry for 14 April 1941, ‘Kriegstagebuch Nr. 8 Generalkom- mando XVIII. Armeekorps, Führungsabteilung Begonnen: 6.April 1941 Abgeschlossen: 2.Juni 1941’, BA MA RH 24-18/75; ‘Bericht über den Einsatz Südost der Panzerjägerabteilung 38’, BA MA RH 20-12/105, p. 7; ‘History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941’, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139; draft report written by G. Long, 12 April 1941, AWM 67 3/220A; ‘Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign), AWM 54, 534/2/27; ‘“War for the Passes”, an extract from American Infantry Journal of October, 1941’, AWM 3DRL 6643 3/42; Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, pp. 233-4.