Treaty No. 9: D.C. Scott’s Accidental Gift
JOHN S. LONG Nipissing University
There are good reasons to be disgusted with Duncan Campbell Scott, the poet, writer, and infamous Indian Affairs of¿cial (Titley 1992). He was recently included on the ballot of an online poll of “The Worst Canadians in History” (Canada Newswire 2007) and there is a small Facebook group called “Let’s Piss on Duncan Campbell Scott’s Grave.” But I want to suggest another dimension to the man: in 1905 he concluded an oral treaty of peace and friendship with the “Ojibeway[,] Cree and other Indians” (Archives of Ontario 2005) in far northern Ontario, leaving their aboriginal title and aboriginal rights undiminished. The of¿cial treaty that was signed included legal notions of surrender and submission that indigenous participants would likely have rejected, had these been read or openly discussed. Instead, in explaining Treaty No. 9 orally, Scott made statements and promises that he knew the Ojibwe and Cree would ¿nd agreeable, and would induce them to sign. His spoken words were a gift Scott knew indigenous signatories could not refuse, and one he never intended to actually give them. By the end of the summer, Scott the bureaucrat had succeeded in his goal of obtaining indigenous signatures on the of¿cial version of Treaty No. 9, but today this document seems entirely fraudulent. Scott the writer, and his colleagues, left records of the oral treaty negotiations that now cast doubt on the of¿cial version of the treaty. These records show that Scott’s unintended gift was offered to and accepted by ancestors of the original Algonquian inhabitants of the region today. For the sake of brevity, I will limit this discussion to the Cree, who today call themselves Mushkegowuk. If we skip the ¿rst few pages of this document and turn to the signatures, we see they are preceded by the words “Signed . . . after having been ¿rst interpreted and explained” (Archives of Ontario 2005:3–6). Starting with these words leads us to two key questions. How would the treaty have been understood? How was Treaty No. 9 actually explained by the treaty commissioners?
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Descendants of those signatories today maintain that they agreed to share the land in 1905, so I will ¿rst review their ancestors’ prior experiences with sharing the land, for the indigenous treaty signatories’ perceptions would be based on these cumulative experiences (Preston 1990). Neither Scott nor his fellow commissioners would have known this history, of course, especially the oral history. Then I will examine the historical sources— particularly the commissioners’ journals, referring for convenience to full transcripts of these and other primary sources contained in my recent book (Long 2010)—to determine what the commissioners and Mushkegowuk leaders said prior to signing Treaty No. 9. This analysis does not rely on Scott’s poetry and other writings; some ¿nd clues to Scott’s views in this realm (Titley 1986:32; Calverley 1999:283-6), while others ¿nd them much less helpful (Dragland 1994:64, 264, 2000:xiii).
SHARING THE LAND
In the beginning, the ¿rst people heard about the land we now call far northern Ontario from a voice. They never saw the speaker, who seems to have been a manitou (Cooper 1933:48). They were living in the land above at that time, but they were lowered here by “the great net-maker”— the one who never runs out of twine, the spider. A bear and a wolverine helped these ¿rst people, by rescuing them from the eagle’s nest in which they had landed. The ¿rst people followed the bear and it taught them everything they needed to know to survive and make a living in their new home (Scott 1995b). So it was the animals who ¿rst shared the land with the Mushkegowuk, but a manitou ¿rst told them about it; descendants of the ¿rst people, now heavily inÀuenced by Christianity (Long 1987), might think of that homeland today as their God-given home. Ever since that distant time immemorial, the lands and waters and their resources have provided the people with food, warmth, and a holistic well- being that is as spiritual and emotional as it is physical (Adelson 2000:61– 62). One winter followed another; some years were harder than others, but each one followed the cycle of life. On foot, by canoe or raft, with snowshoes and toboggan the Mushkegowuk harvested birds, ¿sh, mammals, gathered berries, medicines, and fuel. One to ten families lived and shared together at any given location, depending on the season and circumstances. Dispersed across the vast territory that the people relied upon and looked TREATY NO. 9 181 after, they commuted in the spring and fall to the shores of the great salty sea (Flannery 1995:xiv). They shared or traded and maintained relations with distant kinfolk and neighbors. They obtained power through dreams, respecting not only people, but animal- and spirit-persons. And they passed on their culture, history, values, and beliefs through oral tradition. It is said that one man, Gishay Joseph, was so powerful that he dreamed of swimming eastward in a very large body of water, knowing that there was another land on the other side. When he came close to that shore, however, he turned around and returned to this continent. He was so powerful that if he had set foot on that shore, it is said, no one would have seen the white-faced people who later arrived here (Wesley 1988a). If not for him, the people would never have shared the land with them. But one day people saw evidence on the coast of newcomers— footprints, and driftwood that had been cut in a novel way. It is said that they saw a ship with sails, and initially hid from view—not realizing that they could perhaps be seen through the lens of a telescope. The people decided to take a risk and approached the strangers, thinking, “Maybe they will not harm us or kill us.” They could see that the strangers were glad to see them. This ¿rst encounter was a positive one, although neither could understand the language of the other. The strangers gave gifts of tobacco and clay pipes, and a Àintlock with powder but no shot (Wesley 1988c:230). This was the respectful, hopeful way that sharing the land with Europeans began. It is said that the newcomers were very happy to see the beaver and otter furs that the people wore. Although they did not know one another’s language, the visitors showed that they wanted those furs (Scott 1995a)—and in so doing they indicated how they wished to share the land. The people were not always satis¿ed with this trading relationship. It is said that the gun was soon used as a measure and people had to pile their furs to a great height to obtain one, an indication of greed and exploitation. The people experienced pressures and confusion—and catastrophic diseases like measles and smallpox (Lytwyn 2002:162, 192–4, 203)—that had not existed in earlier times (Wesley 1988e). When they were encouraged to drink three cups of ¿ery liquid before trading their furs, it is said they did not receive fair value in the exchange (Wesley 1988d). Some traders, like the infamous Macdonald, were cruel (Wesley 1988b). But for more than 200 years the people bartered furs, meat, feathers, and hand-made objects at the trading posts or factories set up at strategic locations where dozens of families could gather for a 182 JOHN S. LONG few weeks in summer to socialize, make collective decisions—especially regarding land use (Oldmixon 1931[1708]:389)—and later ¿nd seasonal employment as stevedores, canoe men, or sailors. They were Partners in Furs (Francis and Morantz 1983) who sometimes became more than ¿ctive kinsmen, intermarrying with the immigrant traders (Brown 1980). Early visitors, coming from a hierarchical society headed by a king, looked for a similar system of inequalities among the people of the great muskeg. They found, instead, that everyone here was equal. There was an “Okimah” an old man known for wisdom and experience, a situational leader who had “no Authority but what they think ¿t to give him on certain Occasions” (Oldmixon 1931[1708]:389)—for the family was the basic organizational unit. In informal treaties of peace and friendship the Europeans introduced the symbol of the Union Jack, presenting each Okimaw with a coat. The Mushkegowuk asked for “pity”—by which they meant generosity in times of need, for an Okimaw was someone obligated to help you, not your boss. As Jackie Hookimaw-Witt explains, being a leader “is not based on power, but on caring” (1998:160). The ¿rst people accepted these newcomers in their midst, agreeing to their request for a modest sharing of the land, for traders—like the missionaries who followed—left very small footprints on the vast Mushkegowuk homeland. During the fur trade era, the Cree “did not sell or give away any of their land” (Lytwyn:203). Sharing the land was conditional upon mutually satisfactory relations, a Àexible, renewable agreement among equals symbolized by gift-giving and feasting, and accompanied by speech-making (Long 2010:17–19).
WORDS SPOKEN PRIOR TO THE TREATY-SIGNING When the three commissioners arrived at historic Fort Albany, commissioner Duncan Campbell Scott’s journal says “Made Treaty & wrote out list . . . Paid Indians . . . made choice of Reserve” (Ibid.:218). Commissioner Samuel Stewart’s journal says “full explanations were given of the Treaty and its provisions” (Ibid.:219). Scott and Stewart were Indian Affairs employees representing the federal government and, thus, in what we would today deem an inherent conÀict of interest—for they legally represented the interests of the ¿rst peoples whom the Indian Act considered wards of that government. George MacMartin, the miner from Perth who was nominated as commissioner by the province of Ontario, tells us more. He says that, through Scott, TREATY NO. 9 183
it was explained . . . that the King had sent his representatives to enter into Treaty with them as he wished all his subjects both whites and Indians to be happy and prosperous and that he wished to set aside a tract of land for their sole use and bene¿t upon wh[ich] no white man would be permitted to trespass. he also wishing to assist them would after the signing of the Treaty make a present this year of 8 per capita and an annuity during all time of 4 per annum. that an Agent would be appointed to meet them at a season to be agreed upon and he would pay to all present absentees [those at Attawapiskat] 8. in addition to the 4 annuity falling due next year, and they would be paid the money promised after signing the Treaty as soon as the pay list[s] were prepared. Also that the King had ordered a feast for them [bannock and tea] . . . it was also explained that so many of their band being absent the choosing of chief and councillors would be deferred until next year” and then the “chief would be given a Àag . . . They were then asked if they had anything to say in return[.] Wm Goodwin said that they were very glad to accept the terms as stated, that the King was good & that his present would help them very much. then said we are ready to sign the treaty (Ibid.:221–222).
Besides these three journals. a fourth source, the commissioners’ of¿cial report, says there was “an interesting and satisfactory discussion . . . the explanations that had been given at the other points were repeated here, and two of the Indians . . . spoke at some length expressing . . . the pleasure they felt upon being brought into Treaty and the satisfaction they experienced on receiving such generous treatment from the Crown” (Ibid.:224). This source, perhaps written by Scott, is clearly drawn from Stewart’s account of treaty-making. We do not know for certain what word the interpreter expressed in English as “Treaty,” but it may have been naskoomitowin, a reciprocal oral agreement, that William Goodwin accepted. And it may have been masinahiikan, something inscribed with a tool like a book or paper, that he agreed to sign. The Cree verb masinah, mark using a tool, is the root of masinahikew, she or he writes or borrows or gets credit at the store—in today’s parlance, “Charge it” (Jonathan Solomon, personal communication). Fur traders kept ledgers and wrote in them each time the Mushkegowuk received something and sometimes used the cross to signify a unit of debt, as well. So the crosses of First Nation leaders who may have simply touched the tip of the pen do not necessarily imply any understanding of, or consent to, what was written in beautiful calligraphy on duplicate parchments. The marks of these “chiefs and headmen,” as they were referred to, merely 184 JOHN S. LONG signify, at best, that they were present when solemn promises were made, like witnesses at a wedding, and acknowledge the receipt of gifts, as in a ledger (Long 2010:345–346). The commissioners’ of¿cial report mentions a ¿fth source—a message written in Cree syllabics. The ¿rst part of the message was translated in the commissioners’ of¿cial report, perhaps by Anglican Bishop George Holmes, as follows: “From our hearts we thank you, O Great Chief, as you have pitied us and given us . . . help. We are very poor and weak. He (the Great Chief) has taken us over, here in our own country, through you” (Ibid.:224). MacMartin tells us that the message was written by William Goodwin (Ibid.:222)—so we might wonder why Goodwin has a cross to signify his name on the parchments (Ibid.:218), instead of Cree syllabics. Scott reproduced a portion of this syllabic message in a 1906 magazine article, a sixth account of treaty-making. A much more recent translation, by William (Bill) Louttit, Sr. of Moose Factory (whose grandfather Andrew Wesley was a treaty signatory), shows that the commissioners’ translation was a little self-serving. It does not, apparently, say that the King has “taken us over.” It does thank the great okimaw “for how you’ve pitied us and how you’ve helped us, as our spirits are poor, and how you came to our land and helped us in our weakness.” Pity is a respectful way of acknowledging the King’s generosity. But it seems that the King wasn’t understood to have taken anyone over, he just sent his commissioners to visit the Mushkegowuk in what William Goodwin calls “our own land,” using the exclusive form nitaskiinaahk (Ibid.:223)—ours but not yours. So this syllabic message, re-translated, is more consistent with MacMartin’s account of treaty-making than with Stewart’s (and the of¿cial report). It would be impolite for Crees to refuse gifts from a person of power like King Edward VII, the head of the Church of England, and a man much like the kings of the Bible that they had been hearing about for half a century, someone benevolent but never seen. Indeed William Goodwin’s syllabic message to the manitou-like sovereign goes on, according to the commissioners’ version, to:
pray for thee to Our Father in Heaven . . . Every day we pray, trusting that we may be saved through a righteous life; and for thee we shall ever pray that thou mayst be strong in God’s strength and by His assistance. And we trust that it may ever be with us as it is now; we and our children will in the church of God now and ever thank Jesus. (Ibid.:224) TREATY NO. 9 185
The commissioners do not tell us whether there was a discussion at Fort Albany about hunting or ¿shing, or living on a reserve. Neither do they suggest any discussion about the imposition of Canadian and provincial laws. When the commissioners reached Moose Factory and New Post, they promised that hunting and ¿shing would be unchanged, and no one would be forced to live on the reserve (Ibid.:237, 259–260). I doubt that there was any mention of surrendering the land, at least in 1905. If we believe Stewart and the of¿cial report, there were “full explanations” of the words on vellum that required the Cree and their neighbors to surrender their lands and their rights. In MacMartin’s account, bolstered by Goodwin’s message, however, all we have are gifts and goodwill—with appreciation for those gifts, thanks for the King’s pity, and gratitude for his assistance. Scott’s article may help us to decide which account of treaty-making is more likely, and more likely to resonate with Cree experience. But we will leave Mr. Scott for now, and return to him later. The following year, the commissioners decided there would be no signing at Chapleau but the Crees there would get a small reserve, while those at Missanabie would have neither a signing nor a reserve (Scott, Stewart, and MacMartin 1906). Pelham Edgar, D. C. Scott’s secretary, published a series of articles about the 1906 treaty deliberations, which he witnessed, suggesting in the ¿rst installment that Ontario intended no restrictions on hunting or trading (Edgar 1906:255). Similar sentiments can be found in the so-called adhesions to Treaty No. 9 in 1929 and 1930. Two commissioners, Indian Affairs of¿cial H. N. Awrey and Ontario deputy minister of Lands and Forests, W. C. Cain, recommended that all of Ontario north of the Albany River be “exclusively left to the Indians as far as hunting, trapping and ¿shing are concerned” (Cain and Awrey 1930:32). Scott was still a few years away from retirement, and he was Awrey’s superior, so he would have approved this idea “in the far distant unsettled and unorganized sections” of the province, where “Indians” were “solely dependent upon the chase for a means of livelihood” (Cain and Awrey 1931:41). Following the 1929 signing at Big Trout Lake, Awrey explained to a reporter that indigenous treaty partners “would still have the privilege to hunt as usual” (Anonymous 1929). A year after his ¿rst summer of treaty-making, in a magazine article with the misleading title “The Last of the Indian Treaties,” Scott suggests that the words on the parchment were not fully interpreted and explained. 186 JOHN S. LONG
He writes that just “the simple facts had to be stated, and the parental idea developed that the King is the great father of the Indians, watchful over their interests and ever compassionate” (Long 2010:293). This seems consistent with what MacMartin records and what William Goodwin implies as well. We should now examine this treaty in more detail.
THE PARCHMENTS REVISITED
There are two copies of what we might call the of¿cial version of this treaty (Archives of Ontario 2005; Treaty No. 9). They have the same words, but the calligrapher squeezed more words per line onto Canada’s copy. Duncan Campbell Scott’s name is near the beginning of the third line on Canada’s copy, but near the end of that line on Ontario’s. There are 13 elements to Treaty No. 9 and we have seven pieces of evidence. The parchments are exhibit one. What do the other six exhibits— three commissioner journals, their of¿cial report, a syllabic text, and a magazine article—suggest about the likelihood that the words on parchment were interpreted and explained?
1. The blanket surrender clause: cede, release, surrender and yield up to . . . Canada forever, all rights, titles and privileges to the lands? Maybe (Stewart), but probably not (MacMartin, Goodwin, and Scott). 2. The “privilege” of hunting, trapping and ¿shing, subject to regu- lation, and except on lands which may be “taken up” for mining, lumbering and so on? Maybe (Stewart), but probably not (Mac- Martin, Scott); probably an aboriginal right that was con¿rmed without any limitation (MacMartin). 3. Reserves using the formula of one square mile per family of ¿ve? Maybe (Stewart), but probably a tract of land with no mention of a formula (MacMartin [except at Moose Factory], Scott). 4. Administration of reserves by the government? Maybe (Stewart), but probably not (MacMartin, Scott). 5. A signing bonus of 8 per capita? Yes (Stewart, MacMartin, Scott). But is it for good behavior and extinguishing any claims? Maybe (Stewart), but probably not (MacMartin, Scott). TREATY NO. 9 187
6. A perpetual annuity of 4 per person (an amount that is much lower than in Treaty No. 8 or Treaty No. 10)? Yes (Stewart, MacMartin, Scott). 7. A Àag for the chief? Yes (Stewart, MacMartin, Scott). 8. A copy of the treaty provided? No. 9. Teacher salaries, buildings, and equipment? Maybe yes (Stewart), but probably only vaguely at Moose Factory (MacMartin). 10. Promise to obey the treaty, and be good and loyal subjects? Maybe yes (Stewart), but probably not (MacMartin, Scott). 11. Promise to obey the law and keep the peace? Maybe yes (Stew- art), but probably not (MacMartin, Scott). Whose laws? Mush- kego and Anishinaabe laws, or federal and provincial laws? Does the law protect the indigenous way of life or threaten it? 12. Promise to bring other Indians to justice and punishment? Maybe yes (Stewart), but probably not (MacMartin, Scott). 13. Mention of a prior agreement signed by the two governments? Maybe (Stewart), but probably not (MacMartin, Scott).
So we seem to be left with gifts of treaty money and a Àag, and the promise of continued indigenous use of the land.
SCOTTS’S OTHER DIMENSION
We can certainly view Scott as simply a dishonest man, Scott, the ambitious bureaucrat, saying whatever it takes (without the authority to do so) to get the marks of agreement on the parchments, pay the money, and be on his way. “Whatever has been written down and signed by king and chief both will be bound by so long as ‘the sun shines and the water runs’ ” (Long 2010:289). But another reason that he misrepresented the treaty is that he empathized to some degree; he recognized in 1905 and 1906—like Cain and Awrey in 1929—that hunting and ¿shing were absolutely essential for the Mushkegowuk and their neighbors in far northern Ontario, “transitional Indians” dependent on resources that were not disappearing, unlike the bison in western Canada, in lands not desirable for settlement (Calverley 188 JOHN S. LONG
1999:287ff, 2000). He knew that they would never agree to the words engraved on the vellum, and the commissioners’ ambitious summer travel schedule would make any real negotiation impossible. They would ¿nd out one day that Treaty No. 9 was something else entirely, but that was just the way of the British Empire, following the St. Catherine’s Milling decision (Russell 2005:113–116). At the end of his magazine article Scott writes, “The James Bay treaty will always be associated in my mind with the ¿gure of an Indian who came in from Attawapiskat to [Fort] Albany just as we were ready to leave. The pay-lists and the cash had been securely packed for an early start next morning, when this wild fellow drifted into the camp. [The Oblate priest] Père Fafard, he said, thought we might have some money for him. He did not ask for anything, he stood, smiling slightly. He seemed about twenty years of age, with a face of great beauty and intelligence, and eyes that were wild with a sort of surprise—shy at his novel position and proud that he was of some importance. His name was Charles Wabino [Wabano]. We found it on the list and gave him his eight dollars. When he felt the new crisp notes he took a cruci¿x from his breast, kissed it swiftly, and made a fugitive sign of the cross. ‘From my heart I thank you,’ he said” (Long 2010:298), echoing the words in William Goodwin’s message. Scott makes no mention of any strings attached to the gift, of the cash being compensation for surrendering aboriginal title and aboriginal rights. Scott the writer leaves us with this view of Charles Wabano: “There was the Indian at the best point of a transitional state, still wild as a lynx, with all the lore and instinct of his race undimmed, and possessed wholly by the simplest rule of the Christian life, as yet unspoiled by the arts of sly lying, paltry cunning, and the lower vices” (Ibid.). There is no doubt that Scott—despite his own aboriginal ancestry (McNab 2004)—¿rmly believed in assimilation and had the distasteful racist views of his time (Titley 1992). He believed that cultural differences would eventually be eliminated with the help of treaties, teachers, missionaries, and traders. But he also recognized that this would take more than a couple of generations. “Final results,” Scott wrote, “may be attained, say, in four centuries” (Long 2010:297–8). In the meantime, the Cree and their neighbors had to eat and make a living. Scott’s infamous statement that “I want to get rid of the Indian problem . . . Our objective is to continue until there is not a single Indian TREATY NO. 9 189 in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic, and there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department” is widely agreed to be proof of Scott’s long-term assimilationist goals (Titley 1992:50). He also stopped publishing the reports of Dr. Peter Bryce, the department’s ¿rst medical of¿cer, an advocate of healthier conditions in the residential schools of western Canada where tuberculosis was largely unchecked (Ibid.:83–87)— for some, proof that Scott held blatant genocidal views. But there is another dimension to Scott. Historian David Calverley notes that after Scott was promoted to deputy minister in 1913, he wrote a detailed report to his minister, arguing that the department should defend treaty hunting rights in Ontario. When the minister failed to support him, Scott pleaded directly to provincial representatives at a national wildlife conference, arguing for ¿sh and game law exemptions in remote areas like northern Ontario. And after this failed he arranged for the department to hire a lawyer to defend an Anishinaabe man charged under Ontario’s Game Act, arguing that Indian Affairs was a “guardian of the Indian interest” (Calverley 1999:344)—at least when it came to hunting. Ultimately, without his minister’s support, Scott was unable to mount much of a challenge to provincial game laws (Calverley 1999:295–299, 2000). He tried, but the constitutional deck of cards was stacked against First Nations until 1982. By 1905, when Canada and Ontario negotiated the words on the parchment known as Treaty No. 9, the central government was weakened after losing three times to Ontario in the highest court in the British Empire. The two governments agreed that they would avoid the courts in future and negotiate instead (Harring 1998:146) and by then it was clear who was the stronger party in these negotiations. Ontario had insisted that it must approve any treaty within its boundaries. Ontario dictated some of the wording in the parchment version of the treaty and insisted on naming one of the commissioners. Ontario also insisted on approving the location of any reserve inside the province, lending the land to Canada and expecting it returned if it was no longer needed (Long 2010:61–67). Treaty No. 9 was also one of the least generous treaties, with gratuities and annuities much lower than either Treaty No. 8 or No. 10 and no tools or cattle, ammunition or twine (Ray, Miller, and Tough 2000:247–251)—but this was an Indian Affairs proposal that does not necessarily have Scott’s ¿ngerprints on it, although he was the department’s accountant. Treaty No. 9’s annuity rates were based on the 1850 Robinson 190 JOHN S. LONG treaty annuities. James A. J. McKenna and James Ansdell Macrae wrote the initial proposals for a treaty. Deputy minister Frank Pedley preferred a numbered treaty with the 1850 rates, rather than an adhesion to the Robinson treaty. Pedley felt that Ontario “might be considered fortunate to cancel the Indian title at this time by considerations which were thought adequate in the year 1850” (Long 2010:48–53, 58). Pedley’s statement suggests a timid Canada begging Ontario to approve a bargain.
SCOTT’S GIFT
Scott and his fellow commissioners met privately with First Nation leaders instead of explaining Treaty No. 9 in a public meeting, the practice followed in most earlier treaties, in compliance with the Royal Proclamation of 1763 (Miller 2009:70). After the ¿rst signing, at Osnaburgh, those leaders were not permitted to leave the room and ask their relatives outside for advice (Long 2010:164, 168, 176, 339). Unlike the earlier numbered treaties, the terms of Treaty No. 9—that is, the gifts of money and, in this case, the lack of twine or gunpowder or tools for agriculture—were not negotiable (Miller 2009; Ray, Miller and Tough 2000), although Yesno tried to negotiate at Fort Hope (Long 2010:185; 340). Yet, in apparently failing to mention the central issue of surrender of aboriginal title, Scott failed to mention the crucial words written on parchment. He also failed to mention any limits on aboriginal rights, actually con¿rming them when he denied there were any restrictions on hunting and ¿shing. I think—if we asked MacMartin, if we asked William Goodwin and his fellows chiefs and headmen, and if we challenged Scott—they would agree that Scott actually negotiated an oral treaty of peace and friendship, and that his spoken gift was accepted. At Fort Albany, by MacMartin’s account, William Goodwin “said that they were very glad to accept the terms as stated”; at Moose Factory, Fred Mark “replied . . . that they concurred in all that had been said”; and at New Post, Angus Weenusk “replied that they accepted the terms as stated” (Ibid.: 222, 237, 260). Scott’s promises of continued hunting and ¿shing arguably guarantee much more than what people eat, and would have implied much more to the chiefs and headmen in 1905 and 1906. If First Nations can hunt and ¿sh without restriction, they can hunt anywhere within their territories (and, with permission, on the territories of their neighbors), regulate their hunting TREATY NO. 9 191 and ¿shing and land use, teach and protect their children in the ancestral language and culture, exercising what we today call self-government—and they can count on the Crown to protect them (e.g., laws that protect, not restrict, their hunting, ¿shing and trapping). Whether he meant what he said or not, Scott’s promises of happiness and prosperity, of hunting and ¿shing as always and not being forced onto reserves can be seen as a very positive part of his legacy. Those simple promises were not kept, of course. In 1930 an Anglican clergyman informed some of the Mushkegowuk who traded in the lower Albany River that the terms of the agreement that their ancestors accepted “as stated” in 1905 were contradicted by the words on parchment (Long 1993:60). Those who traded at Moose Factory or near the lake called Takwata (from Taykwa Tagamou) saw massive hydroelectric dams and railways constructed in their territories without their consent, despite the promises made and accepted in 1905 (Long 2010:245, 255). Their neighbors at Chapleau and Missanabie were forbidden to make a living within their own territories when a huge game preserve was established, bounded on three sides by railways (Calverley 2009), in violation of the treaty promises that Pelham Edgar suggests Scott made there in 1906. Perhaps Canada and Ontario did not know, in 1905, how Treaty No. 9 was negotiated, relying on the commissioners’ of¿cial report that says no outside promises were made (Long 2010:282). Perhaps they did not care very much until our Constitution and our courts—and the United Nations (Venne 1997)—became more supportive of First Nations. Treaty No. 9 seems to have been explained and understood as a treaty of peace and friendship and cultural continuity. Treaty No. 9 has not brought economic certainty to far northern Ontario and far too many First Nation citizens have not seen their lives improved in the century since that agreement was made. The Métis, or some of them, were totally left out of Treaty No. 9 (Long 2010:80–83, 240–242). We cannot all be treaty people unless we agree what Treaty No. 9 was— and what it is today. Is it a liberal interpretation of the self-serving words dictated in advance by two governments, neither interpreted nor explained, and signed through deception? That means consultation and accommodation, according to recent Supreme Court decisions (Canada AANDC 2011). Or is it a set of promises and guiding values, long misunderstood by the state but deeply rooted in the history of what we call far northern Ontario, a vision 192 JOHN S. LONG of sharing that involves permanent First Nation interests in those lands and waters and resources? Is it the oral agreement that those chiefs and headmen and Duncan Campbell Scott seem to have agreed to, the words that MacMartin recorded? I think that means negotiation and partnership; Bill Louttit’s late brother Stan, when he was Grand Chief of the Mushkegowuk Council, said it meant indigenous consent (Louttit 2012:27). The Council recently supported a legal test case based on the MacMartin diaries—which con¿rm D. C. Scott’s gift (Mushkegowuk 2013).
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Dragland, Stan. 2000. Introduction. Duncan Campbell Scott: Addresses, essays, and reviews, ed. by Leslie Ritchie, pp. xi–xl. London, Ontario: Canadian Poetry Press. Edgar, Pelham. 1906–1907. Twelve hundred miles by canoe. Canada: An Illustrated Weekly Journal for All Interested in the Dominion, 24 November: 255; 22 Decem- ber: 436; 5 January: 515–16; 19 January: 61–2; 2 February: 156–7; 16 February: 245–6; 16 March: 412–13. Flannery, Regina. 1995. Ellen Smallboy: Glimpses of a Cree woman’s life. Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press. Francis, Daniel, and Toby Morantz. 1983. Partners in furs: A history of the fur trade in Eastern James Bay, 1600–1870. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Harring, Sidney L. 1998. White man’s law: Native people in nineteenth-century Canadian jurisprudence. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Hookimaw-Witt, Jacqueline. 1998. Keenebonanoh keemoshominook kaeshe peemishi- khik odaskiwakh [We stand on the graves of our ancestors] Native interpretations of Treaty #9 with Attawapiskat elders. MA thesis, Trent University. Long, John S. 1987. Manitu, power, books and wiitihkow: Some factors in the adop- tion of Christianity by nineteenth century western James Bay Cree. Native Studies Review 3:1–30. Long, John S. 1988a. Narratives of early encounters between Europeans and the Cree of western James Bay. Ontario History 80.3.227–245. Long, John S. 1988b. Coping with powerful people: A Hudson’s Bay Company ‘boss’ and the Albany River Cree, 1862–1875. Native Studies Review 8.1.1–21. Long, John S. 1993. The government is asking you for your land: The treaty made in 1905 at Fort Albany according to Cree oral tradition. Unpublished Manuscript. Long, John S. 2010. Treaty No. 9: Making the agreement to share the land in far northern Ontario in 1905. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Louttit, Stan. 2012. The real agreement as orally agreed to. The James Bay Treaty: Treaty No. 9. Online:
Russell, Peter. 2005. Recognizing Aboriginal title: The Mabo case and indigenous resis- tance to English-settler colonialism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Scott, Simeon. 1995a. mâwaci-oskac ê-takošinowâkopanê ininiwak ôta askîhk The arrival of people here on earth at the very beginning. Âtalôhkâna nêsta tipâcimôwina: Cree legends and narratives from the west coast of James Bay, ed. by C. Douglas Ellis, pp. 8–13. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press. Scott, Simeon. 1995b. tântê ka-ohcîwâkopanê ništam-ininiwak Where the ¿rst people came from. Âtalôhkâna nêsta tipâcimôwina: Cree legends and narratives from the west coast of James Bay, ed. C. Douglas Ellis, pp. 2–7. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press. Scott, Duncan Campbell, Samuel Stewart, and Daniel George MacMartin. 1905. Of¿cial report to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 5 October. Online: