Lärande och samhälle
Självständigt arbete II 15 högskolepoäng, avancerad nivå
Rousseau and Nietzsche on Education, not Altruism
Rousseau och Nietzsche om utbildning, ej altruism
Morgan Deumier
Masterexamen i pedagogik, 120 hp Examinator: Jonas Qvarsebo Slutseminarium 2020-06-02 Handledare: Morten Korsgaard
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ABSTRAKT
Syftet med denna uppsats är att granska det altruistiska idealet i relation till Rousseaus och Nietzsches föreställning om den gode läraren. Att altruism är moraliskt gott är något som oftast ses som självklart. Även den allmänna förståelsen av lärarrollen präglas av sådant antagande, så till den milda grad att det blir praktiskt omöjligt att tänka sig en bra lärare som inte är altruistisk. Tidigare forskning har dock visat att det altruistiska idealet kan vara problematiskt. För att kunna övervinna detta problem använder jag Rousseaus och Nietzsches utbildningsfilosofier. Trots att de två ofta ses som varandras motsatser, synes det som att Rousseau och Nietzsche delar någon gemensam och paradoxal föreställning om den gode läraren: att denne odlar självbehärskning, och kan undervisa såsom ett exempel. Utifrån dessa perspektiv, och med hjälp av fiktiva exempel från filmer, argumenterar jag att det altruistiska idealet inte endast är ohållbart, utan även förvränger föreställningen av den gode läraren.
Nyckelord: education, Rousseau, Nietzsche, altruism, philosophy, teaching.
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ABBREVIATIONS
Rousseau's Works
DOI Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality among Men
E Emile or On Education
ESS Emilius and Sophia or the Solitaries
SC On the Social Contract
Nietzsche's Works
BGE Beyond Good and Evil
C We, Classicists
SE Schopenhauer as Educator
TSZ Thus Spoke Zarathustra
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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION 7 Altruism Vs. Egoism 7 Aim and Research Questions 8 Disposition 8
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 10 Previous Research on Good Teaching 10 Previous Research on Good Teaching and Altruism 11
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 14 1. Theoretical Foundations 14 2. The Pedagogical Paradox, an Analytical Strategy 14 3. Film Characters as Fictive Examples 16 4. Selecting and Interpreting the Fictive Examples 17 5. Discussion: of what use is this thesis? 18
PART ONE SELF-MASTERY AND EXEMPLARITY IN ROUSSEAU 20 §1 Human Nature 21 §2 Authenticity 21 §3 Self-love and Amour-propre 22 §4 On Self-Mastery: Force me to be my own master 23 §5 Jean-Jacques as an Example 24 §6 Jean-Jacques as a Paradoxical Example 25 Summary and Relevance for the Notions of Good Teaching (Part One) 25
PART TWO SELF-MASTERY AND EXEMPLARITY IN NIETZSCHE 27 §1 Why do we need educators? 27 §2 Where can we find educators? 28 §3 Inspiring Encounters 28 §4 Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Exemplar 29 §5 Exemplars and Inspiration, in a Contemporary Context 30 §6 Independence and its Danger 31 Summary and Relevance for the Notions of Good Teaching (Part Two) 31 Comparative Summary Rousseau and Nietzsche 32
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PART THREE THE IDEAL OF ALTRUISM 34 1. The (Ironic) Ideal of Altruism 34 Ellis' Altruism 34 The Three Ironies of Ellis' Altruism 35 2. The Ideal of Altruism in Teaching 36 Miss Barrett's Altruism and Burn-in 36 The Logic of Altruism 37 Consolations: My dear, my dear, It is not so dreadful here 39 Summary The Ideal of Altruism 40
DEAR ALTRUIST, IT IS VERY DREADFUL HERE 41 1. Why the Ideal of Altruism is Unviable 41 2. How Altruism Misses the Point of Education 42 3. The Distortion of Good Teaching in the Ideal of Altruism 43
Bibliography 44
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INTRODUCTION1
Altruism Vs. Egoism We tend to take for granted the moral equation that altruism = good. An altruistic act is usually understood as something done for the welfare of others. In other words, an altruist is ready to make selfless sacrifices and to spend her/himself for others. Conversely, an egoist is usually depicted as self-absorbed, too focused on her/his own needs and desires to care about others. Hence the equation, egoism = bad. In brief, everyday understandings of altruism are often associated with what is seen as morally good. This ideal of altruism tends to be associated with how we imagine good teaching, as illustrated in films on teaching. Films can be seen as an arena that can stage, produce, and reproduce the ideal of altruism, as well as delimit what a good teacher can be, and what a good teacher cannot be.
Films on good teaching tend to tell the same story over and over again. The teachers typically face some obstacles that prevent them from rescuing their students, for example: an unsupportive direction (as in Up the Down Staircase, 1967; The Ron Clarke Story, 2006). Then, the teachers tend to overcome most of the obstacles by making sacrifices for their students. In the end of the film, the teacher tends to receive praises and recognition for their good deeds, usually from the students themselves (Dead Poets Society 1989; Dangerous Minds, 1995; Freedom Writers 2007). The list of examples of teachers praised for their altruism is so long that it is extremely difficult to find an example of a good teacher in mainstream film who is not altruistic.
In contrast to the representation of the good teachers as altruists, the bad teachers tend to be portrayed as egoists. As in Whiplash (2014), where the music teacher pushes his students to extreme states of exhaustion, with the purpose of raising the next Charlie Parker. Even more disturbing, there are the portrayals of teachers who satisfy their own sadistic pleasures through teaching (see The Piano Teacher for an example of a sexual sadist, 2001). On a lighter note, teachers who are passionate about the subjects they teach can also be depicted as egoistic. In The Kindergarten Teacher (2014; 2018), for example, the teacher uses a child's talent for poetry in order to fulfill her own desire for fame and glory. In short, bad teachers tend to be represented
1 The present thesis is a continuation of my first thesis: Egoistic Teaching. On Rousseau, the Good Life, and the Teacher's Role (2020). Concretely, they address a similar problem (altruism in teaching). Furthermore, the present thesis includes renewed interpretations of Rousseau’s work, and the addition of Nietzsche’s approach. Both writings can be read independently. 7 as egoists in mainstream films, which comforts the taken for granted assumption that altruism = good.
Even if the assumption that good teachers are altruists seems well-anchored in how we conceive the practice of teaching, previous research suggest that altruism might be more problematic than it seems.
Aim and Research Questions The aim of this thesis is to examine the ideal of altruism in relation to the notions of good teaching in Rousseau's and Nietzsche’s philosophical perspectives.
Hence the following research questions: 1. How can we understand the ideal of altruism through Rousseau's and Nietzsche's philosophical perspectives? 2. How does the ideal of altruism relate to Rousseau's and Nietzsche's notions of good teaching?
Disposition Based on Rousseau’s and Nietzsche’s notions of good teaching, I argue that the ideal of altruism in teaching is not only unviable but also misses the point of education and distorts the notions of good teaching.
First, Previous Research includes a review of studies on the notions of good teaching in educational philosophy, as well as on good teaching and the ideal of altruism.
The second section introduces the Theoretical and Methodological Foundations of the thesis. The theoretical foundation of the thesis is based on Rousseau's and Nietzsche's philosophical perspectives. Most notably, on the concepts of self-mastery and exemplarity, which can highlight what a (good) teacher can be outside of the ideal of altruism. Then, I also introduce the pedagogical paradox, which operates as an analytical strategy. Thereafter, I present the film characters that will be used as fictive examples of the ideal of altruism (in Part Three). To conclude this section, I discuss why the present thesis can be useful for relevant and irrelevant reasons.
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The core of the thesis is divided in the three parts that lay ground for the concluding arguments. In Part One (Rousseau's philosophical perspective) and Part Two (Nietzsche's), I will focus on developing the two fundamental ideas that they seem to share: self-mastery and exemplarity. These two ideas will be used as concepts further on. In Part Three, I attempt to understand the ideal of altruism with two film characters as fictive examples: Ellis and miss Barrett.
In Part One, I delineate the notion of (good) teaching in Rousseau's philosophical perspective. To do so, I turn to his most influential work on education, Emile or On Education3. Likewise, in Part Two, I outline the notion of (good) teaching in Nietzsche's philosophical perspective, and based on his essay, Schopenhauer as Educator. At the end of Part Two, I give a comparative summary of the concepts of self-mastery and exemplarity in Rousseau and Nietzsche, and their (paradoxical) notions of good teaching.
In Part Three, I use two film characters as fictive examples to interpret and discuss the ideal of altruism: the young boy Ellis, in the film Mud (2012); and Miss Barrett, the teacher from the film Up the Down Staircase (film, 1967; and Kaufman's novel, 1965).
The three parts of this essay lay the ground for the concluding arguments (under the title, Dear altruist, It is very dreadful here). There, based on Rousseau's and Nietzsche's philosophical perspectives, I criticize the ideal of altruism on the grounds that: it is unviable; it misses of education (with the concepts of self-mastery and exemplarity; and the pedagogical paradox); it distorts the notions of good teaching.
3 Other complementary works by the same philosophers will also be used. For Rousseau, I refer to his works via the corresponding abbreviations (followed by the page numbers). I also indicate the book number when salient, for example: Emile is referred to as E1, E2,... For Nietzsche's works, their abbreviations are followed by the section, paragraph, or aphorism numbers. The translators are referred to in the bibliography. 9
Previous Research Although there are plenty of studies dedicated to what good teaching might entail, studies on the association of the ideal of altruism with good teaching are relatively rare. In this section, I will present a brief review of influential and recent studies that have addressed (directly or not) the notions of good teaching within the field of educational philosophy. Then, I turn to Chris Higgins (2003) who is one of the few scholars who have examined the ideal of altruism in relation to good teaching.
Previous Research on Good Teaching Unlike the other studies reviewed in this section, the articles edited in Tomas Englund's anthology4 (2015) explicitly address the notions of good teaching. To be more precise, they reflect upon how the good teacher is represented (den goda läraren, Englund, 2015). Each article gives an account of, and problematizes, how on the constructions of the good teacher in different fields and/or at specific time and place. For example, one of the articles explores how international educational policy may shape the good teacher as an "effective teacher" (Wahlström, 2015). This series of articles (in Englund, 2015) is unlike the other studies cited in this section. Indeed, they focus more on exploring and problematizing how the good teacher is represented, than on what good teaching might be.
For an ethical and normative approach, David Carr (2006) uses Aristotle's virtue ethics (from the 4th century BCE; 2000) to make sense of good teaching. Indeed, Carr (2006) uses the term of phronesis to conceive good teaching (good in the sense of virtuous). Phronesis (practical wisdom) differs from the other main types of knowledge, such as episteme (theoretical knowledge) and techne (know-how, skills) (Aristotle, 2000; Carr, 2006). It is important to insist that phronesis is always coupled with seeking eudaimonia, meaning with the quest of the good life. It implies that good teaching cannot be reduced to episteme, techne, nor detached from its ethical dimension. Teaching also involves seeking eudaimonia, by cultivating virtues. Inspired by Aristotle's ethics (2000), Carr (2006) conceptualizes the good teacher as a virtuous teacher.
Likewise, in The Rediscovery of Teaching (2017), Gert Biesta also explores what good teaching might be from diverse philosophical sources. His notion of good teaching is extremely eclectic
4 This anthology received funding from the Riksbanken, Sweden's central bank (Englund, 2015). 10
(Biesta, 2013a; 2013b; 2017), mainly because he attempts to unify a very broad range of philosophical perspectives. Roughly speaking, one of Biesta's central claims is that educating is not about "learning" but about "being taught" (2017, p. 57; 2013b). His works tend to discuss the educational questions of freedom5, of emancipation, and of coming into existence (to cite but a few; 2017). Those questions are also present in the scholastic perspective, though in different ways.
A scholastic perspective on good teaching can be found in Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons' work, In Defence of the School: A Public Issue (2013; which is inspired by Hannah Arendt's approach to education, 1961). The scholastic perspective derives from the etymology of the word school, skolê in Greek, which means free time (Masschelein & Simons, 2013, pp. 9-10; 38). Accordingly, school, and thus teaching, do not only serve as an instrument for fulfilling external goals, such as producing employable workforce. School takes place in a time that is free from non-educational demands coming from the private and public spheres, from family and society. There, the (good) teacher can be described as an amateur (Masschelein & Simons 2013, pp. 65-74): a person who has a certain presence in, and passion for, the subject s/he teaches.
Despite addressing a rich variety of problems and using a wide range of perspectives, research on (good) teaching in philosophy of education rarely engage with the ideal of altruism. Higgins' influential work (2003) remains one of the few studies that directly and consistently addresses the ideal of altruism in relation to good teaching.
Previous Research on Good Teaching and Altruism In Teaching and the Good Life: Critique of the Ascetic Ideal in Education (2003), Chris Higgins problematizes the role of altruism in teaching, within the field of educational philosophy6. I propose to recall three parts of his main argument that can be useful for this thesis: firstly, the link between altruism and burn-out and burn-in; secondly, a hypothetical progression of altruism into an undesirable ideal; thirdly, the ascetic critique.
5 Like Biesta's work on teaching, the philosophical perspectives used in this thesis also attempt to "[reconnect] teaching to the question of human freedom" (2017, p. 97). 6 More precisely, Higgins states that he works on the "ethics of teaching" (2003; see also 2011).
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Firstly, Higgins advances the convincing hypothesis that there is a link between altruism and teacher burn-out. He does so by distinguishing a burn-out from a burn-in. Here follows one example of what could be interpreted as an expression of a burn-out. It comes from a scene from the film Entre les murs (2008), in which a teacher enters the teachers’ lounge, and bursts out: I'm sick of these clowns! Sick of them! I can't take it anymore! They're nothing, they know nothing, they look right through you when you try to teach them. They can stay in their shit! I'm not going to help them […] Enough! No more. We're not animals. Sorry, I'm… It's dumb. (film script, original spelling; Cantet, Campillo & Bégaudeau 2006, p. 29)
Burn-in is a variant of a burned-out teacher (in state of exhaustion or despair) but who does not, or cannot, say "enough". In a state of burn-in, the teachers do not quit or let their anger out as in the latter example, but continue teaching despite suffering from burn-out (Higgins 2003). To a certain extent, burn-in could be even worse than burn-out. Indeed, after a burn-out may come the possibility of change, perhaps a change of career or of environment. Regrettably, this is not possible in the state of burn-in. Higgins (2003) claims that there could be a link between believing that teaching demands selfless and altruistic efforts and teacher burn-out (including its variant, burn-in). This link may be illustrated as a form of progression.
Secondly, altruistic premises can lead to a progression into an undesirable ideal: 1. Teaching is a deeply moral endeavor in which the welfare of other human beings (that is their current vulnerabilities and their future possibilities) is the teacher’s primary concern. 2. Unfortunately, acting on this concern requires a high degree of selflessness and sacrifice. Teachers who are self-absorbed, or are trying to meet their own needs vicariously through their teaching, betray the moral core of teaching. 3. Ultimately, then, good teaching is a selfless labour of love. The best teachers simply decide that the good they accomplish for others make their own sacrifices worthwhile and carry on in the name of benevolent service. (Higgins 2003, p. 151)
The first statement, that the teacher’s “primary concern” is others’ welfare, is not problematic; it is an acknowledgement of teaching as a fundamentally moral occupation (according to Higgins, 2003). The second statement is problematic. It indicates that teaching demands selfless acts. Furthermore, it confirms that "teachers who are self-absorbed" (egoists) are not suitable for teaching. The third statement is also worrying. Not only does teaching require selfless acts, it requests the teachers to sacrifice their own projects, desires, and needs, for the sake of others. It marks the end of the progression of altruism from an unproblematic premise into a problematic ideal.
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Thirdly, Higgins (2003) warns us that taking for granted altruistic premises can progress into a self-sacrificial ideal, which can lead to burn-out and burn-in. To conduct this argument Higgins (2003) uses Nietzsche’s notion of the ascetic ideal. Here, living an ascetic life can be read as an unviable way of "existing for others" (Nietzsche, C, 64). This idea is most clearly expressed in this quote by Nietzsche: In the so-called vocations of life where everybody must make a choice, men reveal a pathetic modesty. They say in effect, “We are ’called’ to serve our fellow men and be useful to them, and the same is true of our neighbor and his neighbor too.” And so each man serves another, nobody has a calling to exist for himself, but always for others. (Nietzsche, C, 64; also cited in Higgins, 2003, p. 131)
In other words, tending towards an altruistic ideal can lead to a displacing of one's own life- purpose with others. Proceeding from morally good (altruistic) intentions, this displacement of life-purpose implies not living one's own life any longer, but living entirely for others: being selfless.
To summarize, Higgins insists on the dangers of the ideal of altruism in teaching (2003). He claims that: (i) there is a link between altruism and teacher burn-out, and burn-in; (ii) altruism can progress into an undesirable ideal; (iii) altruism can progress into ascetic living (2003). While not exhausting the problem of altruism, Higgins' critique (2003) calls for further investigation. Hence the need for the present thesis. Unlike Higgins, I do not only criticize altruism on the ground that it is unsustainable, but also on the ground that it is incompatible and conflicts with the notions good teaching. To conceive what good teaching might be, I turn to two influential philosophers7, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and Friedrich W. Nietzsche8 (1840-1900).
7 Previous interpretations of Rousseau and Nietzsche that I used will be cited in the footnotes. 8 Note that Higgins also uses Nietzsche in his work, though with parsimony. Higgins (2003) mainly uses the notion of ascetic ideal to criticize altruism. Conversely, in this thesis, I use Nietzsche's philosophical perspective (his educational philosophy, SE) on (good) teaching. 13
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS Before going to the grain, I will introduce the theoretical and methodological foundations of the thesis in the following five sections. First, I present the theoretical foundations for the thesis. Afterwards, I introduce the methodological aspects. The second section treats the pedagogical paradox, which operates as an analytical strategy. Third, I introduce the film characters that are used as fictive examples to examine the ideal of altruism. Fourth, I reflect on the processes of selecting and interpreting the film characters. Fifth, I discuss how the present thesis can be useful for relevant and irrelevant reasons.
1. Theoretical Foundations Rousseau's and Nietzsche's philosophical perspectives constitute the main theoretical foundations of this thesis. Despite usually being read as two opposites9, Rousseau (E) and Nietzsche (SE) seem to share some fundamental ideas on education.
Roughly speaking, the notions of good teaching that I use here may correspond to what Rousseau and Nietzsche would call educating. This is another way of saying the good teacher is a teacher who does not only instruct, but who can educate. Their philosophical perspectives can converge on two fundamental aspects of good teaching (on educating), which are self- mastery and exemplarity. On the one hand, self-mastery can regroup slightly different ideas: from cultivating authenticity and mastering one's emotions (in Rousseau, E); to increasing the students' independence and self-discipline (in Nietzsche, SE). On the other hand, exemplarity is used in the sense of teaching by acting as an example (as an "exemplar", in Nietzsche's vocabulary, SE). Most importantly, the concepts of self-mastery and exemplarity are instrumental insofar as they can help us understand good teaching otherwise than in altruistic terms.
2. The Pedagogical Paradox, an Analytical Strategy In this section, I introduce the pedagogical paradox, and thereafter clarify how I will use it as an analytical strategy (a guiding thread).
9 Reading Nietzsche against Rousseau is legitimate, as they disagree on a number of issues (see, for instance, Nietzsche contra Rousseau, Ansell-Pearson, 1996). Nevertheless, as Mark E. Jonas (2010) has demonstrated in his comparative reading on compassion, Rousseau and Nietzsche can also converge on certain fundamental ideas. 14
The pedagogical paradox seems both fundamental and inevitable, when studying (good) teaching10 (Uljens, 1998; Løvlie, 2007). This paradox has been present in at least two centuries of research on education. To formulate the pedagogical paradox, one tends to turn to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Notably, to two specific words that Kant (2003) used to address the pedagogical paradox: Selbst- and Fremdbestimmung (see Uljens, 1998; Løvlie, 2007). Education to individual autonomy requires Selbstbestimmung: to encourage the students' own freedom of thinking and of taking independent decisions. Simultaneously, the student is required to submit to Fremdbestimmung (to the teacher's rules, authority, restrictions) to be eventually liberated from the teacher's authority once educated.
The pedagogical paradox has different dimensions; there are plenty of ways of formulating it and of addressing it. Previously, Lars Løvlie (2007, p. 11) has interpreted the pedagogical paradox as a conflict "between what I say and what I do", between what the teacher tells the student and what the teacher does. This interpretation can be useful to find examples that show that the practice of teaching is paradoxical. For instance, a teacher may tell the students: feel free to say whatever comes to mind while at the same time imposing the rules for the seminar. Or, a teacher may tell young children that they can play freely, while forbidding them to leave the fenced schoolyard. The teacher tells the students one thing, while at the same time imposing something else.
In this thesis, the pedagogical paradox is used as an analytical strategy: as an underlying guiding thread11. The pedagogical paradox, as a guiding thread, is instrumental in two ways. First, it can frame and guide the discussion to shed light on the notions of good teaching in Rousseau (in Part One), and in Nietzsche (Part Two). Second, the pedagogical paradox can provide a loose structure in order to approach good teaching, and therefore also influences the concluding arguments. Interestingly enough, I will argue that both Rousseau (E) and Nietzsche (SE) can address the pedagogical paradox (though differently), while the ideal of altruism cannot. This impossibility will support one of the concluding arguments; namely, that the ideal of altruism misses the point of education.
10 Likewise, Meno's paradox (Plato, 2005) is often presented as the paradox of learning (Uljens, 1998). 11 What makes a paradox paradoxical is that it provokes unsettling reflections. That is partly how a paradox differs from a question that can be answered, or a puzzle that can be solved. 15
3. Film Characters as Fictive Examples Earlier, in the introduction, I cited a series of films to outline the problematic association of the ideal of altruism with how we usually conceive good teaching. Throughout thesis, I continue using films, and film characters, as fictive examples. These examples are instrumental to understand the ideal of altruism; the aim of the thesis being to examine the relation between the ideal of altruism and Rousseau's and Nietzsche's notions of good teaching. In Part Three, I use two specific film characters as fictive examples: first, the young boy Ellis in the film Mud (2012); second, miss Barrett, the teacher character in Up the Down Staircase (1967).
Mud (2012) is a film directed by Jeff Nichols that takes place along the Mississippi River. It tells the story of two young teenagers, Ellis and Neckbone, who encounter a mystical man called Mud12, on a small island on the Mississippi. This encounter leads the teenagers to help Mud in his quest: to rescue the woman Mud loves, named Juniper. One might claim that Ellis is the main character since the spectators follow the story from his standpoint most of the time, though Mud's character is just as decisive for the film plot (while Neckbone and Juniper play secondary roles). In Part Three of this thesis, I reflect on all the sacrifices that Ellis makes to help Mud in order to reflect on the ideal of altruism. To choose a film that is not strictly related to teaching might be surprising, however the character of Ellis can be relevant to better understand the ideal of altruism as such.
Up the Down Staircase (directed by Robert Mulligan, 1967) is the film adaptation of Bel Kaufman’s eponym novel (1965). Before introducing the main character, I wish to give some context on the novel and its film adaptation. The original novel is a work of fiction loosely inspired by the author’s own teaching experiences. The main noticeable differences between the novel and the film regards the way the story is told (the form). Indeed, the novel is a fragmentary collection of intern messages, formal and informal letters that miss Barrett exchanges with her friends, relatives, colleagues, and with school administrators (Kaufman, 1965). Conversely, the film tells a more linear story, and adopts miss Barrett's point of view (1967). Apart from this minor difference, the film adaptation remains faithful and very close to the novel, especially when it comes to the main character: miss Barrett. For this thesis, I chose
12 Interpreted by Matthew McConaughey. 16 to focus mainly on the character of miss Barrett as a fictive example (as portrayed in the book13 and in its film adaptation).
Apart from a few commonplaces (a troubled class, in a poor neighborhood), Up the Down Staircase (1967) remains much more nuanced than the usual mainstream fiction on teaching. It has the merit of portraying a teacher, miss Barrett14, working in relatively realistic school settings. It does not tell the typically success story of heroic triumph. Furthermore, the problems that miss Barrett faces seem similar to those that teachers can meet nowadays: disciplinary issues, bureaucratic trouble, tensed relations with her students, and not knowing how to reach the students. The character of miss Barrett, remains remarkably ordinary and contemporary, including in her attempts to work as a teacher for making a difference (her altruism). That is what makes her a relevant example to understand the ideal of altruism.
4. Selecting and Interpreting the Fictive Examples Amid the long list of altruistic film characters, one may wonder why I chose to focus on Ellis and miss Barrett. That is why I would like to briefly reflect on the processes of selecting, and even interpreting, those two film characters as fictive examples.
To attempt to understand the ideal of altruism, I have selected two film characters that stand out for being both relatively realistic and representative. By doing so, I excluded other possible ways of studying the ideal of altruism in films. For instance, I chose not to study stereotypical teacher characters, as the teachers in films The Ron Clarke Story (2006) and Freedom Writers (2007), to cite but a few. Although they can be worth studying elsewhere, stereotypes could have provided less nuanced and less realistic examples. Besides, selecting only two fictive examples implies that the argument of the thesis may be generalized to altruism only to a limited extent. This is a main delimitation of this thesis, though both Ellis and miss Barrett might seem relatively representative of the typical portrayals of altruists in inspirational teacher films.
The ideal of altruism is usually left implicit; hence the need to use fictive examples to study it. The characters who display evident altruistic traits rarely, if ever, explicitly state that they are altruists. They would not say that: what I just did was a true altruistic deed, or my name is Ellis
13 This is mainly for practical reasons: I use the novel (Kaufman, 1965) in order to give more precise quotes and references in Part Three. 14 Interpreted by Sandy Dennis. 17 and I'm an altruist. However, the film characters might appear altruistic, in the same way that a giving hand, the hand giving the alms, might evoke the ideal of altruism. This interpretative process, of making the implicit ideal of altruism (in films, as an arena) explicit, is subjective. Thus, it leaves room for the spectators' own interpretations. In its turn, this thesis also stages, produces, and reproduces the ideal of altruism, and the notions of good teaching within its own arena of sorts (the study field of philosophy of education). Nonetheless, being aware of this play of representations, the present thesis attempts to provoke a reflection on the taken for granted association of altruism with the notions of good teaching.
5. Discussion: of what use is this thesis? Even though relevance appears to be the most standard criterion to measure the value of today's educational research (Mintz, 2018), I suggest that this thesis can be potentially useful for the study field of educational philosophy, both for relevant and irrelevant reasons.
On the one hand, this thesis can be relevant for contemporary problems met in teaching. In previous research (Higgins 2003), altruism has been linked with teacher burn-out and burn-in (which makes altruism a contemporary and practical problem). This thesis can be useful as it proposes another way of understanding this issue: by addressing the compatibility of altruism with the practice of teaching. This being said, I am also aware of the dangers of trying to make history relevant for the present. This desire can lead one to distort the past in order to tackle a present issue (to a sort of presentism) (Mintz 2018; Siegel, 1981). Therefore, this thesis attempts to be relevant, yet in a tentative and cautious way.
On the other hand, this thesis can also be worth writing and reading for irrelevant reasons (Mintz 2018). To a certain extent, the theoretical foundations of this thesis attempt to destabilize our common understanding of the history of philosophy. Despite usually being portrayed as two opposites in the canon, I wish to draw attention to some educational ideas that Rousseau and Nietzsche may share (as Jonas did on the theme of compassion, 2010). Although this thesis is not a comparative study, using Rousseau and Nietzsche side-by-side to tackle the same problem can provoke some interesting discussions. I suggest that they share two fundamental ideas on the notions of good teaching (educating). Even if this suggestion may be irrelevant, it remains worthwhile to study influential educational philosophers. Perhaps even more so, when this
18 study has the potential of questioning how we usually interpret them in the history of philosophy.
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PART ONE SELF-MASTERY AND EXEMPLARITY IN ROUSSEAU Before discussing altruism, we need to get acquainted with Rousseau's (Part One) and Nietzsche's (Part Two) philosophical perspectives on education. Their perspectives will lay the ground for addressing the viability of altruism in the practice of teaching, and its compatibility with education. But, first of all, I wish to give some background information on Emile. Thereafter, I will recall Rousseau's philosophical perspective, while emphasizing the paradoxical aspects of educating for self-mastery, and via examples.
Rousseau's Emile ou de l'éducation has not ceased to be a provoking and influential work from its first publication in 1764. Emile has the particularity of being a philosophical novel with two main characters: Jean-Jacques and Emile. The readers can follow Emile's education, from his first tears and first steps (E1), until he enters society as a grown man (E5). He is placed under Jean-Jacques' guidance, who is to be his only guide (E1). Jean-Jacques designs his education in concordance with our human nature (i.e. Rousseau's view of human nature); hence offering a radically different educational design than the instruction of his time.
Before turning twelve, Emile grows up in a state of quasi-isolation from society (negative education, in E1). Indeed, at this stage, Jean-Jacques makes sure to delay Emile’s exposure to society for as long as possible, until Emile is ready for it. When he is (emotionally) ready, Emile slowly learns to live with others: his moral education commences. This part of his education consists in learning through examples, listening to Jean-Jacques' lectures, and learning from his own experiences. Then, Emile falls in love with, and marries, Sophie (E5). He travels around in the search for an uncorrupted country, until he comes back despite not having found one (E5; cp. CS). Towards the end of his education, Emile becomes his own master, able to live among others (as a "man" and a "citizen"; E5).
The character of Jean-Jacques is harder to read. We know close to nothing about Jean-Jacques character, even though he is present in most of, if not all, the pages of Emile (merging with the narrator's voice and always being nearby Emile). Read as a novel character, Jean-Jacques would be anonymous and dull. Conversely, when one reads Emile as a philosophical novel, Jean- Jacques becomes much more interesting.
Nonetheless, I will emphasize Jean-Jacques' educational role, and how he acts as an example further on (§5; §6). Before that, we need to explore some pivotal ideas of Rousseau's 20 philosophical perspective. These ideas can help us shed light to the fundaments of educating, as expressed in Emile16: human nature (§1); authenticity (§2); mastering emotions from self- love and amour-propre (§3); self-mastery (§4).
§1 Human Nature Rousseau envisions that "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains" (CS:I, 1). Thus, the point of departure of Rousseau's philosophy is that society can corrupt our human nature. Accordingly, the natural state is good (insofar as innocent), and free (independent and solitary)17 (DOI; E4). Emile's early childhood can be seen as a kind of natural state (E1-3; DOI). Based on the notion of human nature as originally good and free, that Rousseau criticizes the instruction paradigm of his time.
He regrets that the schools of his time produce "civil men", ignoring and corrupting our human nature: Natural man is entirely for himself. He is numerical unity, the absolute whole which is relative only to itself or its kind. Civil man is only a fractional unity dependent on the denominator; his value is determined by his relation to the whole, which is the social body. Good social institutions are those that best know how to denature man, to take his absolute existence from him in order to give him a relative one and transport the I into the common unity, with the result that each individual believes himself no longer one but a part of the unity and no longer feels except within the whole. (E1, pp. 39-40)
Civil men are no longer themselves after their education. They are enchained to others' desires and opinions, to the extent that they cannot feel emotions individually ("no longer feels except within the whole"). Although civil men might seem civilized, they are not educated. Simply put, civil men have lost the capacity of being themselves and of feeling their own emotions. That is partly why education has to designed on the basis of nature's ways.
§2 Authenticity Based on the idea on natural man as being whole (one), Rousseau emphasizes the educational task of forming an authentic individual: "to be oneself and always one, a man must act as he
16 This list is not meant to be exhaustive. It could, perhaps should, be completed with the notions of suffering and compassion (as extension of self-love) (see Mintz, 2012; Jonas, 2010). 17The common formula, human nature is good is not meant in a moral sense. The natural state is good insofar as it is "beneath" good and evil: prior to (the corruption of) social relations, prior to the emergence of amour-propre (Rousseau, DOI; E4). 21
18 speaks " (E1, p. 40). What does this quote tell us? Rather than educating Emile to be a civil man, Rousseau proposes an education that can give Emile the capacity to remain "oneself and always one" — even when living in a corrupted society, once educated. This education, in adequation with human nature, does not only value the uniqueness of each human being, but even the need to strive for individual authenticity19 (to "act as [one] speaks", as genuinely as possible). It contrasts with the civil men's inauthenticity: as they cannot act otherwise than as others act, and cannot speak otherwise than as others speak. In the quest of becoming and remaining genuinely himself, Emile will need to learn how to master his emotions.
§3 Self-love and Amour-propre According to Rousseau's notion of human nature, our emotions come from two sources: amour de soi (self-love) and amour propre20 (love of self) (E4-E5). Both may sound similar, whereas they are radically different. On the one hand, self-love is the "primitive, innate passion, which is anterior to every other", and it is a source of benevolent feelings (E4, p. 213). On the other hand, amour-propre is a source of another kind of feelings, which make Emile "attach more importance to himself than to anyone else" (note XV, DOI, p. 147; cp. E4). Feelings such as kindness and compassion21 come from self-love; while pride and envy come from amour- propre.
Self-love is what makes Emile good in his natural state, it is the “first principle” that orders his earlier benevolent emotions (E4, p. 273). Then, at the moment Emile recognizes himself in the gaze of others, and starts comparing himself to others, he grows out of his natural state (E4). From this moment onward, he is corrupted by storms of violent passions coming from another emotional source — from amour-propre. Emile has to learn how to master emotions from both sources22. He cannot afford to obey his every single impulse, every single child's "caprice" (see E2, p. 121). Neither can he negate all of his emotions, nor be submerged by his amour-propre. So, he has to learn to master his emotions, not only those coming from amour-propre, but emotions stemming from both sources.
18 "To be something, to be oneself and always one [être soi-même et toujours un], a man must act as he speaks... I am waiting to be shown this marvel so as to know whether he is a man or a citizen, or how he goes about being both at the same time" (E1, p. 40). 19 To insist on the importance of authenticity in Emile is coherent with authoritative readings of Rousseau's philosophy (as in Bernardi, 2004, for instance). 20 I use Bloom's in-text translations: self-love and amour-propre (E4). 21 Compassion (pitié) is a "modification" of self-love (E4, p. 213), an extension of self-love. See Mintz (2012) and Jonas (2010), on suffering and compassion. 22 "All passions are good when one remains their master; all are bad when one lets oneself be subjected to them" (E5, p. 445). 22
§4 On Self-Mastery: Force me to be my own master Granted that we are all born free and naturally good, why do we need an education? And, why do we need an education that is designed to liberate us? To address this pedagogical paradox on freedom, I propose to briefly distinguish different understandings of freedom through Emile's education. Thereafter I will describe how Emile has to submit to his master, Jean- Jacques, to eventually become his own master (see Jonas' comparative study self-mastery23, 2010).
The early freedom of the natural state differs from the educational quest for liberation. The original freedom of the natural state (of infancy and early childhood; E1) is a radical form of independence versed by the innocent feelings that come from self-love: the freedom of a solitary creature. However, one has to renounce to this original freedom in order to grow up, and to live with others. The other understanding of freedom is more of a liberating and educational quest, to unchain oneself from the dominion of others. Paradoxically, to learn to unchain himself from others, Emile must unchain himself to Jean-Jacques.
Indeed, Emile needs to be subjected24 to his master, Jean-Jacques, in order to eventually become his own master (E4, p. 325; ESS, p. 204). While being subjected to Jean-Jacques' guidance, it remains vital that Emile still has the sensation, or the illusion, of being free of movement (during the first part of his education, or negative education). Curiously, the emergence of amour- propre changes the rules. It calls for another type of guidance. Emile himself realizes that he needs to subject himself to Jean-Jacques: Make me free by protecting me against those of my passions which do violence to me. Prevent me from being their slave; force me to be my own master. (E4, p. 325)
Paraphrasing, Emile makes the following request to his tutor: enslave me to your educational laws, force me to freedom. To a certain extent, Emile desires to be his own master, and even grasps that he needs to submit to Jean-Jacques who can guide him in this process.
23 I am indebted to Jonas' comparative reading (2010), which is a source of inspiration for the concept of self-mastery. According to his reading on compassion and suffering in Rousseau and Nietzsche (2010), both of their philosophical perspectives aim at encouraging "self-mastery", as their "ultimate goal" (Jonas, 2010, p. 45). Self-mastery is developed through suffering and compassion. By self-mastery, he means "the ability to choose to disobey certain internal inclinations in favour of others" (2010, p. 48). His view of self-mastery is coherent with the one I use in this thesis. However, I use this term in a slightly different manner as to highlight the similarities and the nuances in Rousseau's and Nietzsche's philosophies. 24 Rousseau often uses the verb s'assujettir. Its use might not be as striking in Bloom's translation as it can be translated as to submit or to be subjected (E). 23
Self-mastery regroups all the preceding threads of the discussion: on learning to be genuinely oneself (§1; §2), learning to master one's emotions (§3) (cp. Jonas, 2010). Finally, and paradoxically, Emile needs to submit to his master, in order to eventually be his own master (§4). Besides, it is worth noticing that the teacher ought to master her/himself in order to educate others: "...the child's master one must be one's own master" (Rousseau E2, p. 97; see also E4, p. 325; ESS, p. 204). It might sound obvious, yet it is instrumental to understand that Jean- Jacques can act as an example for Emile.
§5 Jean-Jacques as an Example Drawing from Harvey's interpretation (2002, Chapter 4), one can read Jean-Jacques through the lenses of exemplarity.
One can notice that Emile learns by being exposed to examples. All that Emile experiences, sees or hears can be interpreted as such: as good and bad examples (Harvey, 2002). There, Jean- Jacques has a vital role to play. He has to inspire Emile to follow good examples, while at the same time enabling him to resist bad examples (e.g. civil men). It requires therefore that Jean- Jacques knows Emile, and knows of our human nature, in order distinguish the good examples from the bad ones (for Emile, at a given moment in his upbringing).
Jean-Jacques' role is to guide Emile in his encounters with examples, while being himself a good example for him: Masters, leave off pretenses. Be virtuous and good. Let your examples be graven in your pupil's memories until they can enter their ears. Instead of hastening to exact acts of charity from my pupils, I prefer to do them in his presence... (E2, p. 104)
Jean-Jacques does not try to give orders to Emile, Be kind!, or tell him Imitate me, do as I do! which would be vain. Instead, Jean-Jacques simply acts virtuously, when Emile is there (e.g. acting compassionately, or simply gardening). By acting as an example, Jean-Jacques draws a line of future possibility for Emile.
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§6 Jean-Jacques as a Paradoxical Example According to Rousseau: "one must find in himself [the child] the examples that one should then propose to him25" (E2, p. 95; cited in Harvey 2002, p. 123). What does it mean?
Jean-Jacques finds examples in Emile's own potential in order to show Emile what he could realize in the future. There is a twist in the tale though: Jean-Jacques' role is to act as an example for Emile, without disclosing that this example comes from Jean-Jacques' interpretation of Emile's own potential. Accordingly, Jean-Jacques does not need to force his student to be virtuous or (only) to give him lectures. Jean-Jacques secretly gives birth26 to something that was already there in Emile: a dormant potential that Emile can realize after having seen it through Jean-Jacques' examples. Unbeknownst to Emile, the example that Jean-Jacques "wants to inspire in him27" comes from Emile himself (E4, p.323). It is a thought-provoking idea, which blurs the lines between both characters.
Formulated differently, one could also say that Emile learns to "act as he speaks" (E1, p. 40), via Jean-Jacques, who, knowingly, does not act as he speaks28. It opens a reflection on the need to lure and manipulate the students ("[not] to act as one speaks") for their own individual liberations (to "act as one speaks"; E1, p. 40). In brief, Jean-Jacques' role is to secretly act as virtuous example of Emile's potential yet dormant future self.
Summary and Relevance for the Notions of Good Teaching (Part One) Drawing from Rousseau's philosophy (E), one can delineate two paradoxical aspects of good teaching: first, self-mastery; second, exemplarity.
First, self-mastery refers to a quest for authenticity and for mastering one's own emotions (cp. Jonas, 2010). Indeed, Emile needs to learn to be genuinely himself (authentic, §1; §2), which requires him to master his emotions coming from self-love and amour-propre (§3).
25 I usually quote Bloom's translation of Emile, with one notable exception. Here, I use the translation from Harvey (2002). Cp. Bloom's translation (E2, p. 95): "One must find within oneself the example of the pupil ought to take for his own". The quote in the original is also ambivalent: "[Souvenez-vous qu'avant d'entreprendre de former un homme, il faut être homme soi-même]; il faut trouver en soi l'exemple qu'il se doit de proposer" (E2). From this untranslatable quote, one could also interpret that the tutor must remember his own childhood, in order to find adequate examples for Emile. Either way: Emile could potentially be a young Jean-Jacques, and Jean-Jacques an adult Emile. 26 See Harvey (2002, p. 124) for a comparison with the Socratic maieutic. 27 "I shall put in my eyes, my accent, and my gestures the enthusiasm and the ardor that I want to inspire in him" (E4, p. 323). 28 It also reminds of Løvlie's interpretation of the pedagogical paradox (2007, p.11): as a conflict "between what I say and what I do". 25
Furthermore, and paradoxically, good teaching requires the teacher to lure the students, as Jean- Jacques lures Emile (who is already free) to his own liberation (§4). Second, Emile and Jean- Jacques' relation were interpreted through the lenses of exemplarity (Harvey, 2002). Through these lenses, Jean-Jacques educates Emile by secretly acting as an example of Emile's potential (§5); which is also paradoxical (§6).
The upcoming Part Two will describe and discuss Nietzsche's philosophical perspective. The end of Part Two includes a comparative summary of the notions of good teaching in Rousseau and Nietzsche.
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PART TWO SELF-MASTERY AND EXEMPLARITY IN NIETZSCHE In his usual provocative tone, Nietzsche claimed that: "Never have moral educators29 been more needed, never has it been less likely they would be found" (in Schopenhauer as Educator, 2). This quote raises two questions: (§1) why do we need educators?; (§2) where can we find them? These questions will serve as an introduction to Nietzsche's educational ideas (in SE).
Thereafter, I recall some aspects of Nietzsche's philosophical perspective30: on how the encounters with educators can inspire (§3); as in the encounter between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, his exemplar (§4). Those encounters can be inspiring not only for one student but for everyone (§5). The encounters with educators seek at fostering independence, yet Nietzsche also warns us on the potential danger of independence (§6). In the summary, all of those aspects will be regrouped under the concepts of self-mastery (self-discipline and independence), and of exemplarity.
§1 Why do we need educators? Nietzsche notices the absence of educators (SE). In their absence, the need for educators is palpable. He claims that the schools and universities of his time instructed but did not educate. Nietzsche criticizes the cultural values that reigned at this time, as he observes a lack of self- discipline and of independence: ...it is on account of their laziness that men seem like manufactured goods, unimportant, and unworthy to be associated with or instructed. Human beings who do not want to belong to the mass need only to stop being comfortable; follow their conscience, which cries out: "Be yourself! All that you are now doing, thinking, and desiring is not really yourself." (SE, 1)
This passage can remind us of two images, from the film Modern Times by Charlie Chaplin (1936): (1) the image of human masses rushing to the factory, juxtaposed with (2) the image of a flock of sheep. Nietzsche observes the stream of human masses who have graduated from schools and universities. Members of these masses33 are not much more than passive spectators of their own lives. They are docilly governed by the desires of others, which guide their actions and thoughts, weak and unable to truly exist individually (not unlike the civil men, in Rousseau,
29 When Nietzsche used the term of educators the term, it was not primarily meant to refer to teachers. Nietzsche had something else in mind. He refers almost interchangeably to "educators", "true educators", "moral educators", "exemplars", "great men", etc. (SE). On the other side, "instructors" and "academic labourer" are used pejoratively (SE). Nietzsche insists that education is more than instruction. In this part, I will use the term of educator first, and then introduce the term of exemplar further on. 30 This is only my interpretation, which is not meant to be exhaustive. It could be completed with Jonas' study (2010) on the educational value of suffering and compassion, which can encourage self-mastery. 33 It is important to note that this critique is not addressed to the masses, but to the education and the cultural values that shaped the masses and need to be reformed (Breazeale, 1998; Wotling, 1995). 27
E1, p. 40). Hence the wake-up call: "All that you are now doing, thinking, and desiring is not really yourself" (Nietzsche, SE, 1). According to Nietzsche, educators (the few) are needed to liberate others (the many) from this mindless state.
§2 Where can we find educators? Granted that we need educators, where can we find them? Nietzsche started his essay with the project of seeking educators, yet he could not find any contemporary ones (in 1874; SE). Accordingly, the absence of educators was due to the cultural values that conditioned his time. The same cultural values that encourage the production of lifeless herds, are those that cannot produce any educator. Notwithstanding, this situation is not irreversible.
There are two ways of finding, or producing, educators: by looking back and by renewing cultural values (SE; Wotling 1995). On the one hand, one can look back at the past in the search for educators from other times and places. For instance, the following historical figures are some of Nietzsche's potential educators34: Diogenes the cynic (ca. 4th century BCE), Montaigne (16th century), and most notably, Schopenhauer (1788-1860). On the other hand, Nietzsche advances that the cultural values of his times have to be renewed (SE; Wotling 1995). Nietzsche proposes us to focus on the cultural task of producing educators, and cultivating their traits. Educators may inspire all others to break free from the mindless passivity and conformism that marked the absence of educators.
§3 Inspiring Encounters Nietzsche describes the encounter with the educators as an inspiring and liberating process. In this rich passage, Nietzsche describes how the educators can inspire "the youthful soul35": Let the youthful soul look back on life with the question: what have you truly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft, what has mastered it and at the same time blessed it? Set up these revered objects before you and perhaps their nature and their sequence will give you a law, the fundamental law of your own true self. Compare these objects one with another, see how one completes, expands, surpasses, transfigures another, how they constitute a stepladder upon which you have clambered up to yourself as you are now; for your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to be. (SE, 1)
34 Cited in SE; see also Breazeale (1998). 35 See Breazeale (1998) and Jonas (2016) on Nietzsche's aristocratic views, and on the distinctions he draws between the masses, the youthful soul and the educators. 28
For the students, this reflexive "look back" would be a first step for realizing that which makes them unique (taste, distaste, past experiences, weaknesses) — "what has drawn your soul aloft, what has mastered it and at the same time blessed it?" (SE, 1). Looking back at that which has made one unique can lead to a desire for new experiences and for surpassing oneself.
In other words: the educator is someone "who could raise me above my insufficiencies insofar as these originated in the age" (Nietzsche, SE, 2). It means that the educator can raise one towards excellence, by surpassing one's own "insufficiencies", and overcoming the detrimental values "in the age" that condition our lives. In brief, Nietzsche describes the educating process as a kind of liberating strive. A similar movement took place, when Nietzsche found an educator (or, exemplar) in Schopenhauer.
§4 Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Exemplar Nietzsche found an exemplar in the person of Arthur Schopenhauer (philosopher, 1788-1860). What is an exemplar? To put it simply, the educators act as exemplars, as living examples. As we shall see, an exemplar can inspire others to surpass themselves: genius, a talent, or exemplary traits such as honesty and simplicity (SE, 2).
Oddly, Nietzsche actually rejects most, if not all, of Schopenhauer's philosophy (such as his pessimism). Moreover, at this time, it was a polemical choice to pick Schopenhauer as an exemplar rather than to choose a saint, or a patriotic hero. Back then, Schopenhauer used to be generally mocked and satirized. He was portrayed as a hermit who withdrew himself from society to philosophize, with his dog as his only companion (Breazeale, 1998). Still, Nietzsche finds an educator in the person of Schopenhauer, through his work. This choice is coherent with Nietzsche's critique against conformism and laziness.
Nietzsche never met Schopenhauer in person. So, he had to “see through the book and to imagine the living man” (SE, 2). Through this encounter, Nietzsche had "bright sparks" and inspiring "visions" that genuinely moved him. The encounter with the person of Schopenhauer inspired and awoke something in Nietzsche: ...this is how Schopenhauer's philosophy should also always be interpreted at first: individually, by the individual only for himself, so as to gain insight into his want and misery, into his own limitedness... He teaches us to distinguish between those things that really promote human happiness and those that only appear to do so. (SE, 3).
29
One should perhaps insist that the exemplar is not supposed to be exemplary in the ordinary sense (exemplary does not mean ideal). Schopenhauer is not portrayed as a hero, nor as a God, but as a limited human being who has some inspiring traits. Nonetheless, through this encounter (SE, 3), Nietzsche learned to "distinguish" that which is viable and joyful and to detach himself from that which is unviable for himself at this precise moment of his life.
To sum up, the encounter with an exemplar can give birth to a reflexive process that precedes a sort of liberating movement.
§5 Exemplars and Inspiration, in a Contemporary Context Concretely, inspiration can be found in very ordinary ways (see Jonas, 2016). Outside of a strict educational context, many may have already felt the desire to surpass themselves, when seeing someone excelling at playing soccer, or at dancing. Likewise, in an educational context, one can feel inspired by a passionate teacher. For example, a teacher's passion for mathematics, for its dry rigor or for its creativity, may inspire some of her/his students to surpass themselves in this particular discipline. Somehow, this encounter can liberate a part of the student that wants to become better at mathematics.
It goes even further, as Nietzsche's proposal implies renewing the whole educational culture. Indeed, he proposes that the task of culture should be "to promote the production of [exemplary traits] within and without us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature36" (Nietzsche, SE, 5). To re-contextualize to a classroom, one could imagine that the teacher's role would be to inspire and to create a sort of classroom culture that encourages students to surpass themselves (cp. Jonas, 2016). The students excelling at mathematics, for instance, could in their turn, inspire and help others do so. This way, the encounter with an exemplar is not only inspiring and liberating for one student, but ultimately for everyone.
Once again, it also requires the educators to be their own masters, at least to a certain extent. This idea is best expressed in the following quote, which can be extended to educators: “Physician, heal yourself: thus you will heal your patient too. Let his best healing-aid be to see
36 Accordingly, the single task of culture would be "to promote the production of the philosopher, the artist, and the saint within and without us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature" (SE, 5; emphasis in the original). I interpret the philosopher, the artist, the saint, as exemplary traits. These traits also anticipate the theme of the overman that appears in Nietzsche's later works (e.g. TSZ). 30 with his own eyes him who makes himself well” (Nietzsche TSZ, I, Of the Bestowing Virtue; see also SE). Likewise, a teacher who would not be her/his own master would not be able to be an exemplar (Nietzsche, SE).
§6 Independence and its Danger The relation between students and educators is paradoxical37. The students have to renounce to some of their independence while being educated, in order to increase their own self-mastery (as independence and self-discipline).
To be independent one should "not remain stuck" to anyone or anything for too long (BGE, II, 41). Conversely, education requires the students to remain temporarily "stuck" to their educators. When being educated the students "attach [their] heart" to their educators (SE, 6). The task of the educators is to liberate them. Not only to liberate them from what they are (§3), but also to liberate themselves from their own educators — to "detach their heart" from their educators (BGE, II, 41). In other words: the students need to learn to liberate themselves from their own "liberators", though it requires being attached to them in the process (SE, 1). It goes one step further: one should "not remain stuck to one's own detachment38" (BGE, II, 41). The students even have to learn to liberate themselves from their own independence. Why is it necessary? According to Nietzsche, independence can become unviable and dangerous — the "danger of the flier" (BGE, II, 41). The experience of liberation might lead one to an excess of detachment (of independence), which might cause indifference, or apathy (BGE, II, 41).
In my reading, a rigorous self-discipline may be required to gain in independence (while avoiding "the danger of the flier", BGE, II, 41). Interestingly enough, the term of self-mastery can comprise both terms: independence and self-discipline.
Summary and Relevance for the Notions of Good Teaching (Part Two) During the two introductory threads, I recalled how Nietzsche witnessed the absence of educators (§1). Then, question where can we find educators? led us to exploring how one could produce, and promote the cultural production of, educators (§2). Thereafter, through the
37 This my interpretation, based on the comparison of two of Nietzsche’s writings: SE and BGE, II, 41.I use the term of students here to facilitate the comprehension, while Nietzsche refers to "the youthful soul" (SE) and "the free spirit" (BGE, II). 38 [Nicht an seiner eignen Loslösung hängen bleiben] (BGE, II, 41). 31 inspiring encounters with educators (§3), as Nietzsche's encounter with his own exemplar Schopenhauer (§4). Those being educated gain in self-mastery (as independence and self- discipline). Interestingly enough, this process can be enriching not only for one student but for everyone (§5). Finally, the relation between those being educated and educators is paradoxical, as it entails learning to be independent (and self-disciplined) by renouncing a part of one's independence while being educated (§6).
Drawing from Nietzsche's philosophical perspective (SE), one can argue that two fundamental, and paradoxical, aspects of good teaching are self-mastery and exemplarity. Self-mastery, as students' gain in independence and self-discipline, can be seen as one of the aims of Nietzsche's education (cp Jonas, 2010; 2016). Furthermore, one can educate and inspire others via exemplars (exemplarity).
Comparative Summary Rousseau and Nietzsche Since their philosophies tend to be read as being opposite, it remains surprising to note that Rousseau's (E) and Nietzsche's (SE) perspectives on good teaching (as educating) can converge. Indeed, in my reading, they converge on the fact that good teaching is a paradoxical endeavor, and on the importance of two concepts in how they conceive good teaching: (i) self-mastery; (ii) exemplarity.
First, in Rousseau (E) and Nietzsche (SE), good teaching, aims at increasing students' self- mastery (cp. Jonas, 2010). For Rousseau, self-mastery can be defined as a quest for authenticity, and for the mastering of his emotions. For Nietzsche, the encounters with good teachers can increase their students' self-mastery: defined as independence, self-discipline (cp. Jonas, 2010). Second, one can claim that both of Rousseau's and Nietzsche's philosophies can be read as teaching via exemplarity (in the broadest sense). Jean-Jacques acts as an example for Emile, while finding the examples in Emile's potential (Rousseau, E; Harvey 2002). Likewise, Nietzsche found an exemplar in his own interpretation of Schopenhauer (SE). In one sentence: Rousseau and Nietzsche can converge (albeit differently) on the notions of good teaching as a paradoxical endeavor that aims at cultivating students' self-mastery, via exemplarity.
In Part One and Part Two, I have laid the ground for conceiving good teaching according to Rousseau and Nietzsche. Concretely, the concepts of self-mastery and exemplarity outline some
32 fundamental aspects of good teaching (educating) — which seem unrelated with, and outside of, the ideal of altruism. Further on, in the concluding arguments, I will answer the first research question, on how to understand the ideal of altruism through Rousseau's and Nietzsche's philosophical perspectives. Then, I will use the concepts of self-mastery and exemplarity to answer the second research question, on how the ideal of altruism relates to Rousseau's and Nietzsche's notions of good teaching.
Yet, before getting to the concluding the arguments, we need to take a closer look at the ideal of altruism.
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PART THREE THE IDEAL OF ALTRUISM As I mentioned in the introduction, an altruistic act is usually defined as an outward and generous gesture directed towards others. In the present part, I wish to use two film characters as fictive examples to better understand the ideal of altruism. The two film characters, that were briefly announced earlier (in the Theoretical and Methodological Foundations), will serve as fictive examples. First, Ellis, a young boy who dedicates his life to other(s), in the film Mud (2012). Then, miss Barrett who wishes to make a difference in others' lives by working as a teacher, in Up the Down Staircase (1967).
1. The (Ironic) Ideal of Altruism
Ellis' Altruism In the film Mud (2012), Ellis ,14-years old, embodies a form of modern altruism39. His altruism seems to come from a desire to help others, at whichever cost, and from the belief that acting upon this desire is worthwhile. At first sight, altruism may seem well-intended and even heroic. In this section we will take a closer look at Ellis' altruism.
Ellis is a young teenager who desperately wants to believe in the existence of love, probably due to the fact that his parents have fallen out of love. At the beginning of the film, Ellis makes an odd encounter. Accompanied by a friend, Ellis gets to know a man named Mud who lives on a small deserted island of the Mississippi river. Who is Mud? Unlike Ellis, Mud is a kind of character that could only exist in fiction: he is a runaway who carries a gun, he says that he is pursued by villains who guard the woman he loves, Juniper. Mud's quest is simple: he wants to stay on this island to discreetly repair a boat, in order to rescue the woman he loves and thereafter run away with her. Mud's love story reminds us of a contemporary version of fin'amor40: a tale of a medieval and courteous knight who is in a quest to rescue a damsel in distress (Auvray-Assayas, Baladier, Būttgen, & Cassin, 2014, p. 598). Mud asks Ellis to help him in this quest.
39 I wish to tell the story of Ellis' altruism, that is why I under-emphasize other elements of the film plot, such as the role of secondary characters, such as Neckbone or Juniper (Mud, 2012). 40 Fin'amor is an Occitan expression that can be translated as courtly love. The love represented by the troubadours or knights in a quest to rescue their princesses (see Auvray-Assayas, Baladier, Būttgen, & Cassin, 2014). 34
Early in the film, a shift occurs: Ellis appropriates himself Mud's knight-quest. Quite naïvely, Ellis devotes most of his time to rescue Juniper. It leads him to steal a boat motor and to risk his own life when delivering messages between Mud and Juniper. Out of altruism, Ellis engages himself in Mud's quest, no matter what it costs him. Finally, Ellis realizes that Mud's love is not as true as he believed. Disenchanted41, Ellis finally confronts Mud: "You never cared about her... You used us", "You made me a thief!" (2012). It is at this moment that Ellis finally awakens and distances himself from his own altruistic quest.
The Three Ironies of Ellis' Altruism What does Ellis' adventures tell us about altruism? The young Ellis' reckless quest symbolizes the three ironies of altruism: first, altruism as self-absorbed; second, altruism as others- absorbed; leading to the third irony, the altruist is a savior who needs to be saved.
The first irony of Ellis' altruism is that his quest is self-absorbed inasmuch as it is driven by Ellis' own need to prove to himself that real love exists while his parents are separating. Unbeknownst to him, Ellis primarily seeks to console himself, by helping a mystic character. His altruistic quest is self-absorbed, thus ironically egoistic. This leads us to the second irony of altruism: Ellis' quest shows that altruism is unviable. Ellis is so other(s)-absorbed that he abandons himself entirely and unconditionally42 to Mud's quest. Ellis voids his own projects and own needs, in order to recklessly offer himself to someone else's project and presumed needs. Finally, the third irony of altruism is that the young Ellis, the altruist, wants to save Mud, while the one who really needs to be saved is not the adult runaway, but the young Ellis himself. Here, the altruist wants to rescue other(s), ignoring that he himself really needs to be saved, yet the altruist cannot rescue himself from his own misguided altruism. Each of the three ironies sheds some light on the recklessness and unviability of altruism.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that taking an example from outside of a strict educational context is instrumental to appreciate a more extreme form of altruism. Indeed, altruism as a naïve, untamed, and reckless passion seems easier to observe in childhood (and early teenage years) than adulthood. Likewise, one can more easily notice extreme forms of egoism in the
41 Before this realization, Ellis seemed to believe in Mud's enchanting tales. To those who doubted him or Mud, he would retort: “They’re in love and they’re gonna make it! If you weren’t such a worn out old man you’d know it’s true” (Mud, 2012). 42 Ellis' altruism reminds of a form of unconditional love, a variation of the Christian agape; and to a lesser extent to a unilateral love as philia (Auvray-Assayas, Baladier, Būttgen, & Cassin, 2014). Both form some of the main roots of the Judeo-Christian theme of neighborly love. 35 conventional sense in children, as with the examples of capricious children (Rousseau, E2, p. 121). The ironies of altruism are still present in the grown-ups who perform altruistic deeds, yet in a less noticeable fashion. That is partly why the teacher character, miss Barrett, who we will meet in the next section displays more nuanced forms of altruism.
2. The Ideal of Altruism in Teaching
Miss Barrett's Altruism and Burn-in Up the Down Staircase (Bel Kaufman’s novel, 1965, and its film adaptation43, 1967) is a work of fiction inspired by the author’s own teaching experiences. It has the merit of portraying an incarnated teacher character, miss Barrett. But, who is miss Barrett? She is introduced as a “young, inexperienced, idealistic teacher” who is thrown “into the maelstrom of an average city high school” (Kaufman, 1965, Introduction). Miss Barrett teaches English in a high school in New York City.
In a letter to a friend, miss Barrett explains why she wanted to teach, leading her to admit that she considers quitting: I wanted to make a permanent difference to at least one child. “A Teacher I’ll Never Forget”? Yes. [...] I wanted to mold minds, shape souls, guide my flock through English and beyond. To be a lady- God? That’s close. I wanted to fight the unequal battle against all that stands in the way of teaching. To blaze a trail? Indeed. Yet I am about to quit. Am I but another dropout? (Kaufman, 1965, Part XI, 53)
I wish to direct our attention to two elements of this passage, which may be related: the altruistic motive that led miss Barrett to work as a teacher (to make a "difference"), and that she is "about to quit".
First, and as many teachers before and after her, miss Barrett wants to teach in order to make a difference, which can be read as an altruistic motive. Her own phrasing is notwithstanding interesting: "to make a permanent difference in at least one child44" (1965, Part XI, 53). It shows an ambitious purpose, to make a "permanent" difference in others' lives; worryingly tuned down to an unambitious intent, to do so for "at least one child". As if she had sensed that making a "permanent difference" was so ambitious that she needed to lower her expectations, and to not
43 For the sake of clarity, and to give more precise references, I will mainly refer to the novel. Note that, due to the fragmentary nature of the novel, I refer to its chapter and short sections, rather than page numbers, as follows I, 1; I, 2, etc. 44 "That's it; that's why I want to teach, to make a permanent difference in the life of a child" (Kaufman, 1965, Part IV, 20). 36 focus on all of the students. Miss Barrett's un/ambitious motive remains altruistic, insofar as she intends to primarily teach for others (or, at least one other).
Second, miss Barrett's self-conflicted position — "I am about to quit" (Kaufman, 1965, Part XI) — reminds us of the experience of burn-in (Higgins, 2003). She often endures “frustration, thanklessness, defeat” and “exhaustion” (Kaufman, 1965, Part XI, 53). Her work turns out to be so exhausting that she seriously considers quitting. She even finds another job opportunity in a private school and announces to her colleagues that she is resigning. Nonetheless, she never actually quits. Her desire to resign seems genuine and persistent though never accomplished, as if she was stuck in this stage: being "about to quit" though continuing to teach (my emphasis). Curiously, this desire of quitting seems linked with the altruistic motive that led her to teach in the first place. There is a need to further investigate why and how miss Barrett is drawn back to teaching despite her desire to quit.
The Logic of Altruism What seems to draw miss Barrett back to teaching is the fact that she feels that teaching can be rewarding (Kaufman, 1965). She submits to, what can be called, the logic of altruism (in the context of teaching). The rare compensations of this logic might not be so rewarding, yet rewarding enough not to quit teaching. In this section, I explore how this logic operates, based on the example of miss Barrett.
Miss Barrett feels the need to keep a list of what she has given and received, in order to remind herself why she does not quit teaching: But whenever I feel too frustrated to go on, I find an unexpected compensation: a girl whose face lights up when she enters the room; a boy who begins to make sense out of words on a printed page; or a class that groans in dismay when the end-of-period bell rings. In order to remember the rewards when the going gets rough, I’ve made out a list of Debits and Credits.
DEBITS CREDITS
Ferone (still unreached) Vivian Paine losing weight; likes herself better.
Eddie Williams ( “ “ ) Jose Rodriguez no longer signs “Me”!
Harry Kagan ( “ “ ) Lou Martin, in the midst of clowning, raises a hand to answer a question!
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McHabe ( !!!!!! ) Four kids took out public library cards for first time!!!
Mild bladder symptoms (This is an occupational I may look forward to retirement... (Kaufman, disease: There is simply no time to go to the 1965, Part VIII, 39) bathroom!)
Lunch hour at 10:17 A.M.
Clerical work piling up, up, up!
Nov. Faculty Conference: problems of overworked teachers, overcrowded classrooms, dropouts, building scandals, integration, teacher’s strikes, salary raises, teacher training, –were all “postponed for lack of time”–just as they were in Sept. and Oct.
etc., etc., etc.!
This list of debits and credits makes explicit the (usually implicit) logic of altruism in teaching. In the column to the left, miss Barrett recounts the altruistic "debits", which may fuel her desire to quit teaching. One can notice two different kinds of debits. On the one hand, those that include her sacrifices ("overworked", "overcrowded classrooms", "etc."). All of which, should be compensated by the next column, by credits, in order to be rewarding. On the other hand, debits also include the students who could not be reached. In this regard, it is a list of debts, rather than debits. In the column to the right, one may hope that the teacher can find some "compensations" for all sacrifices and debts (Kaufman, 1965, Part VIII, 39). Most of the debits come from the students themselves45. Keeping in mind that miss Barrett "wanted to make a permanent difference" (1965, Part XI, 53), the list is rather underwhelming.
Why is the above described logic of altruism problematic? Partly, because such logic is flawed: it cannot compensate the teachers for what they offer out of altruism. It may give the illusion of compensation, but it cannot compensate. Indeed, the column of debits (of sacrifices and debts) seem to weigh much heavier than the credits. The compensations (or credits) seem so very light in comparison that they cannot really compensate the teacher for all the sacrifices
45 With the exception of the last entry in the debit column. The only one that does not come from students but concerns the teacher's own project: to "look forward to retirement". Seeking a consolation in the hope to retire after less than a year of teaching can also confirm the unviability of this logic. Note her list reminds also of the gratitude diaries designed for teachers. These diaries follow a similar logic of altruism, though they tend to conveniently omit the debits and focus on the list of credits. See for instance: The Gratitude Journal: A Gift for an Awesome Teacher Paperback ( Nathan, 2018). 38 and debts (debits) made out of altruism. What is more, this logic creates debts, rather than debits, which seem to be a redundant cross to bear. It raises the question: could the altruist ever be debt-free? Ultimately, the logic of altruism forms an unviable loop: indebting oneself (debits) and expecting compensations from the students (credits), which never really compensates.
To conclude, the only real rewards that the teacher might harvest in the logic of altruism are consolations. The meagre consolations that all altruistic debits (sacrifices and debts) were perhaps not in vain. In short, the logic of altruism cannot compensate the teacher for all her/his efforts (debits), but it can offer consolations — no more and no less than consolations.
Consolations: My dear, my dear, It is not so dreadful here Submitting to the logic of altruism, the only rewards that miss Barret can find are consolations. Coincidentally, miss Barrett presents a poem on the theme of consolation to her students: Edna St. Vincent Millay's Prayer to Persephone46 (2012, p. 128). The poem ends on these verses: Lost in Hell,—Persephone, Take her head upon your knee; Say to her, “My dear, my dear, It is not so dreadful here”. (cited in Kaufman, 1965, III, 14)
After reading it out loud, she asks a question to the class: "Who do you think is consoling the child?". A student answers her that it might be a teacher (Kaufman, 1965, III, 14). In a sense, and by accident, this student hears the logic of altruism through this poem, and sees miss Barrett's altruism.
The value of consolation in education is questionable, at best. Miss Barrett and her students find themselves in an "overcrowded" class, in a relatively rough neighborhood, and in a classroom with a broken window (Kaufman 1965, VIII, 39). Is the teacher's role to console the students? Is it her role to say to each student: “My dear, my dear, it is not so dreadful here”? Consoling would mean accepting the status-quo: accepting the world as it is.
Ironically, the consoler (who is "about to quit") is the one who really seeks, and needs, to be consoled. Consolation, if applied to an educational context, would thus provide a loop that may
46 The poem was first published in 1921. It refers to the mythical figure of Persephone, whose tragic fate is recounted in the fifth book of Ovid's Metamorphoses (1989). 39 console for a moment, but without consoling the consoler her/himself. This loop of consolations reminds of the displacement of life-purposes (and of Higgins' ascetic critique, 2003). It also reminds of the third irony of altruism previously discussed with Ellis’ character: the one who attempts to save others is the one who needs to be saved.
Summary The Ideal of Altruism In the present part, we have observed two fictive examples: Ellis (on the ideal of altruism), and miss Barrett (on the ideal of altruism, associated to teaching). At first sight, Ellis' altruism may strike us as more extreme than miss Barrett's, however, both can be interpreted as altruists, in their own ways. Based on these examples, the ideal of altruism appears to be as ironic as it is unsustainable, despite some rare consolations. Associated to teaching, one might already sense that altruism seems dangerous. In the concluding arguments, and with the concepts of self- mastery and exemplarity, I will shed light on the unviability and the incompatibility of the ideal altruism with the notions of good teaching.
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DEAR ALTRUIST, IT IS VERY DREADFUL HERE48 Even after having met Ellis and miss Barrett, one might still want to believe in altruism, and to believe that altruism = good. However, the upcoming concluding arguments suggest that this assumption is neither desirable, nor compatible with good teaching. Against the background of Rousseau's and Nietzsche's philosophical perspectives, I argue that the ideal of altruism is not only unviable (1); but also misses the point of education (2); and distorts the notions of good teaching (3).
1. Why the Ideal of Altruism is Unviable In this section, I answer the first research question of this thesis: on how we can understand the ideal of altruism (Part Tree) through Rousseau's and Nietzsche's philosophical perspectives (Part One; Part Two).
It can be argued that Ellis' and miss Barrett's altruism come from their own amour-propre, which could explain the ironies of altruism. One can read the self-absorbed side of their altruism as a way to "attach more importance to [oneself] than to anyone else" (Rousseau, note XV, DOI, p. 147). It is ironic to find traces of egoism (as self-absorption) in altruism. Furthermore, and contradictorily, Ellis and miss Barrett are also others-absorbed. They are so absorbed in others that they may "no longer [feel] except within the whole" (Rousseau, E1, pp. 39-40). They can no longer sense, or act upon, their own needs, desires, and projects, unless through others. The latter ironies (self-absorbed, others-absorbed) leads us to the paroxysm of altruism. Indeed, the altruist who is willing to rescue others is the one who really needs to be rescued (from his/her own altruism); the altruist willing to console others is the one who really needs to be consoled (from his/her own altruism).
In summary, altruism is unviable for five main reasons. First, altruism is essentially ironic, as it self-absorbed, and even others-absorbed. Second, such ironies operate as the fuel and the product of amour-propre that corrupts not only self-love, but also the altruist's own desires and projects. Third, the latter reasons also confirm the link between altruism, burn-in, and ascetic living (Higgins 2003, 2010). Fourth, altruism leads to a form of reckless and mindless conformism. Finally, the fifth reason regards the meagre consolations that one may find in
48 I am paraphrasing Edna St. Vincent Millay's brilliant poem, cited earlier, "My dear, My dear! It is not so dreadful here" (2012, p. 128). 41 altruism. Consolations might be what can blind the altruist, preventing her/him from seeing how unviable altruism is. Furthermore, it can blind the altruist from glimpsing other ways of living (and of teaching) that can be less unviable.
2. How Altruism Misses the Point of Education Here, I propose to address the second research question of this thesis: on how the ideal of altruism (Part Tree) relate to Rousseau’s and Nietzsche’s notions of good teaching (Part One; Part Two). I answer it in two steps: firstly, by reflecting on self-mastery and exemplarity (as concepts to delineate good teaching); secondly, by observing that the ideal of altruism cannot address the pedagogical paradox.
Firstly, what the ideal of altruism seems to encourage can hardly be further away from the notions of good teaching in Rousseau and Nietzsche. Indeed, the altruist seems dependent to others, slave of her/his own reckless passion to rescue others, caught in a logic of debts and credits. It is impossible to conceive that miss Barrett (Kaufman, 1965; 1967) could act as an example to increase her students' self-mastery. This is, in great part, due to the same reasons that make altruism unviable. In all evidence, Miss Barrett's altruism hinders her from cultivating self-mastery, from acting as an example for her students, and from increasing her students' self- mastery. Based on this fictive example, one can argue that believing in the ideal of altruism can prevent teachers from teaching. Provided that good teaching is about cultivating self-mastery, and that one can teach by acting as an example, then the ideal of altruism is incompatible with teaching (with educating).
Secondly, Rousseau's and Nietzsche's philosophical perspectives can address the pedagogical paradox (in my reading). As we have seen through this thesis, they address it in different ways. For Rousseau (E), good teaching can be described as paradoxical insofar Jean-Jacques lures Emile, who is born free, to liberate himself. In addition, acting as an example is also paradoxical (see also Harvey, 2002). For Nietzsche too (SE), good teaching can be seen as paradoxical: the students need to compromise a part of their freedom (independence) while being educated, in order to be relatively freer (more independent, and more self-disciplined) once educated. Conversely, the ideal of altruism cannot address the pedagogical paradox. If good teaching is a paradoxical endeavor, then the ideal of altruism misses the point of education.
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3. The Distortion of Good Teaching in the Ideal of Altruism So far, I have argued that altruism was neither viable, nor compatible with Rousseau's (E) and Nietzsche's (SE) notions of good teaching (paradoxical, for self-mastery, via examples). Yet, altruism is not only incompatible with life; not only incompatible with good teaching; not only missing the point of education. Each of the conclusions drawn previously indicate that the problem of altruism in teaching is more serious than a mere problem of incompatibility. Still answering the second research question (on how the ideal of altruism relates to Rousseau’s and Nietzsche’s notions of good teaching), I conclude that the ideal of altruism goes as far as distorting the notions of good teaching.
What is most worrying with the problem of the ideal of altruism in teaching is that it forces the notion of good teaching to fit in the ideal altruism. When a teacher attempts to be altruistic (as miss Barrett; in Kaufman, 1965; 1967) the belief in altruism seems to distort the practice of teaching into something that it is not. Trying to insert the ideal of altruism in good teaching means forcing the practice of teaching (of educating), into an un-educational and unviable logic that encourages dependency and consolations. This idea can be illustrated by Procrustes, the stretcher, a mythical outlaw from Ancient Greece. Procrustes was known for his inhospitable ways: this man compelled the travellers who passed by to lie down upon a bed, and if any were too long for the bed he cut off the parts of their body which protruded, while in the case of such as were too short for it he stretched their legs, this being the reason why he was given the name Procrustes [προκρούω]. (Diodorus Siculus49, 1939, 4, 59.5).
In a sense, altruism distorts, truncates, and disfigures the (good) teacher. No matter how hard one tries, the teacher's contours could not possibly fit the altruistic mold. Hence, the ideal of altruism is the teacher's own Procrustean bed.
49 Diodorus Siculus was a Greek historian, from the first century BCE. 43
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