DRAFT SOMERSET COUNTY ENERGY RESILIENCY FRAMEWORK
NOVEMBER 2018 SOMERET COUNTY PLANNING BOARD
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Somerset County Board of Chosen Freeholders Patrick Scaglione, Director Brian D. Levine, Deputy Director Brian G. Gallagher Patricia L. Walsh Mark Caliguire
2018 Somerset County Planning Board Bernard V. Navatto, Jr., Chair Christopher Kelly, Vice-Chair Marian Fenwick Albert Ellis John Schneider John Lindner Patrick Scaglione, Freeholder Director Brian Gallagher, Freeholder Liaison Matthew D. Loper, County Engineer/Board Secretary William Ziegler, 1st Alternate Dennis Quinlan, 2nd Alternate Adam Slutsky, County Engineer Alternate
2018 Somerset County Planning Division Walter C. Lane, AICP/PP, Director of Planning Anthony T. McCracken, Sr., AICP/PP, Assistant Director of Planning Laurette Kratina, AICP/PP, Chief of Strategic Planning Thomas R. D’Amico, AICP/PP, Supervising Planner Kenneth Bruce Wedeen, AICP/PP, Supervising Planner James P. Ruggieri, AICP/PP, Principal Community Planner Katelyn Katzer, Principal Planner Andras Holzmann, AICP/PP, Senior Planner Nora Fekete, Planner Andrew Phillips, Principal GIS Draftsperson Melissa Harvey, Manager of Solid Waste Kaitlin K. Bundy, Manager, Cultural and Heritage Commission Natalie N. Zaman, Program Coordinator, C & H Commission Cynthia Melluci, Office Manager Catherine Bunting, Administrative Assistant Patrice Thomas, Administrative Assistant John M. Lore, Esq., Deputy County Counsel for Planning
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Cover i Table of Contents iii Appendices List v Acknowledgements vi Preface vii I. PURPOSE 1 II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 3 1. Energy Resilience 3 2. Energy System Vulnerabilities 3 III. DRAFT ENERGY RESILENCY GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES 8 1. Draft Energy Resiliency Goals 8 2. Draft Energy Resiliency Toolkit 8 IV. ENERGY RESILIENCY SOLUTIONS 13 1. Back-up Power 13 2. Fuel Supply Protection 14 3. Smart Grid Technologies 16 4. Microgrids 17 5. Fuel Cells and CHP 19 6. Renewable Energy Generation 21 a. Solar 22 b. Wind 23 c. Biopower 24 7. Energy Storage 24 8. Energy Efficiency and Conservation 25 9. Demand Management 28 10. Transportation Options 29 V. ENERGY RESILIENCY PLANS, PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES 30 1. New Jersey 30 a. State Energy Master Plan 30
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b. State Hazard Mitigation Plan 32 2. Regional Grid Operations 33 3. Energy Generation and Distribution 34 a. PSE&G 37 b. JCP&L 38 4. Local Government 40 a. 2018 Municipal Energy Resilience Questionnaire 40 b. Municipal Hazard Mitigation Plan – Projects and Initiatives 41 5. Somerset County 42 a. Proposed Critical/Essential Facility Microgrid Feasibility Study 42 b. County-level Hazard Mitigation Plan – Projects and Initiatives 43 c. Somerset County Energy Council 45 VI. IMPLEMENTATION RESOURCES 47 1. State 47 2. Federal 48
SOURCES: 51
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APPENDICES LIST
1. New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (BPU) – Order EO11090543, 1-23-13 2. PSE&G Energy Strong Fact Sheet 3. Municipal Energy Resilience Questionnaire Results Summary 4. Energy-Related HMP Mitigation Initiatives by Participating Jurisdictions 5. HMP Focus Group Meetings – Energy Related Highlights
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Preparation of this document was accomplished through a joint effort of the Somerset County Planning Division and AECOM. Input was provided by some members of the Somerset County HMP Mitigation Planning Committee. The primary authors are Laurette Kratina, PP, AICP, Chief of Strategic Planning, Somerset County Planning Division and Anna Foley, Project Manager, AECOM. Policy guidance and assistance with final editing was provided by Walter Lane, PP, AICP, Director, Somerset County Planning Board.
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PREFACE
This draft document will serve as the basis of a new resiliency element to be added to the Somerset County Master Plan. The central component of the County Master Plan is the 1987 Master Plan document (available at the following link: https://www.co.somerset.nj.us/government/public-works/planning/master-plan. This document is comprised of the following plan elements: 1) Land Use, 2) Housing, 3) Circulation, 4) Environment and Open Space, 5) Capital and Public Facilities and 6) Utility Services. Several of these elements have been updated in whole, or in part, since 1987. Most recently, an update of the Housing Element was adopted in November 2017. The 1987 Land Use Management Map was substituted with a new County Investment Framework Map, which was adopted in October 2014. The most recent update of the Circulation Element was completed in 2012. An update of the County Parks, Recreation and Open Space Plan was accomplished in 2000, and is undergoing another update at this time as part of the County’s Preservation Plan initiative. The new Preservation Plan will also include an update of the County’s Farmland Preservation Plan and the addition of a new Historic Plan Element. A Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) and Trends and Indicators Report were adopted as elements of the County Master Plan in 2014 as well.
Hazard mitigation and resiliency themes have begun to be integrated into each of the County Master Plan elements that have been updated or prepared post-Superstorm Sandy, but it has become apparent that more needs to be done at both the County and local levels in light of the increasing frequency and severity of severe storms and other climate change impacts affecting the region. When the 5-year update of the Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP) commenced in 2017, it was seen as an opportunity to strengthen the integration of hazard mitigation and resiliency strategies into land use and infrastructure plans, policies and investment decisions. The County Planning Board built into the HMP update process the development of an Energy Resiliency Framework that could serve as a resource and “toolkit” that could be used to update the HMP mitigation strategies at both the county and local levels; and show how energy resiliency can be integrated into local and regional land use and infrastructure plans, policies and programs.
Upon completion of the HMP update process, it is the County Planning Board’s intention to refine the information that comprises the draft Energy Resiliency Framework Document contained in the HMP Appendix into an Energy Resiliency Element of the County Master Plan that includes information, resources and mitigation strategies specific to Somerset County, and addresses its unique geographic, climate, hydrologic, environmental and development characteristics.
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I. PURPOSE
Resilient communities need resilient energy systems. Extreme weather events and resulting power outages deprive communities of their most basic need – the electricity that makes the multiple levels of urban and suburban infrastructure, economic activity, social independence and security possible. All infrastructure systems, critical operations and facilities are vulnerable to power disruptions, whether they involve communications (including wireless), buildings, utilities, transportation, water, wastewater, food supply, solid waste or public safety. Prolonged, widespread power outages will have cascading impacts that must be taken into consideration in hazard mitigation, continuity of operations and recovery planning at all jurisdictional levels and by all stakeholders. The resilience of all power-dependent systems is only as strong as the energy systems upon which they depend. Climate research suggests that, in the future, stronger storms, longer and more intense heat waves, together with other natural hazards will pose new challenges to the energy system. “Extreme weather is a top concern, as hurricanes, blizzards, floods, heat waves, and even solar flares can overwhelm aging power lines – the average age of power plants is over thirty years old, while power transformers are, on average, more than forty years old. In addition, most grid infrastructure is built above ground, which is cheaper to construct but more vulnerable” according to the Council on Foreign Relations. (McBride) The need to identify risk-based strategies in preparation for low- probability, high impact events has become a reality. Hardening and modernizing energy infrastructure, making it more flexible by diversifying energy sources and applying smart grid technology; coupled with enabling more rapid restoration of service when disruptions occur are just a few of the topics addressed in the following pages.
The primary goal of this effort is to build understanding and awareness of the importance of increasing energy resiliency in Somerset County. Significant changes are on the horizon concerning the Nation’s energy system which will, in turn affect all of New Jersey. A new sustainability and resiliency framework is needed to underpin modernization and transformation of the energy system, which are now underway. This document serves as a “primer” aimed at informing policy-makers and the public by providing a general introduction to regional and local energy resiliency issues and solutions; and identifying current and proposed efforts to enhance energy system reliability and resiliency. It establishes draft goals and objectives and general implementation strategies for improving energy system resiliency and reducing hazard risks; which comprise the Draft Energy Resiliency Toolkit included in Section III. The strategies in the Draft Toolkit can be tailored in accordance with the unique circumstances and characteristics of individual communities and stakeholder organizations and the energy systems they are served by and/or are responsible for. Additional planning and implementation resources are needed to advance the recommendations contained in this document.
Many different entities are involved in and share responsibilities regarding the ownership, management, regulation, oversight and operation of the various components of the energy system. All play a vital role in making sure the overall system is safe, efficient, reliable and resilient; and that the needs of diverse customer groups and entities are addressed. It is recognized that local
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communities are important stakeholders as well as customers. They also serve as advocates regarding the energy needs of critical/essential facilities and infrastructure, businesses and residents within their communities. One of the primary roles local governments can play is to oversee and monitor energy conditions and that service needs are being addressed at the local level. But their advocacy role is even greater, in terms of educating the public and informing energy utilities of community needs and priorities. Areas where municipalities can play an important role are highlighted throughout this report.
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. Energy Resilience Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents. Resilient energy systems have the capacity to tolerate disturbances and can provide alternative means of satisfying energy service needs while avoiding cascading impacts to other critical facilities, infrastructure and operations in the event of prolonged and/or widespread power outages.
Reliability and resilience are related but distinct concepts. In many cases projects and investments that improve day-to-day reliability contribute to resilience. Energy resilient technology includes distributed generation or other technologies that can operate independently from the regional grid (island-able), are capable of black-start, and can operate at critical load. Emergency back-up generators are important stop-gap measures, but they are not considered to be resilient technology.
2. Energy System Vulnerabilities Energy systems include electric power systems, natural gas and liquid fuel systems as they relate to electric power, and emergency and standby power systems. Each component of the energy system has unique characteristics and hazard vulnerabilities. Society has high performance expectations for energy systems due to their importance in terms of community stability, security, public health and safety and as a key economic driver. Electricity and fuel availability are critical to the restoration of most other critical community and infrastructure systems and services after a hazard event.
The electric distribution system, referred to herein as the regional power grid or “megagrid” is the largest component of the electric power system. It includes substations and transformers, circuits, switches, networks of transmission lines and distribution wires, utility poles, and towers supported by operations technology and equipment. Nationwide, the aging power grid continues to deteriorate; and although it has expanded for decades, its basic structure remains the same. The average age of power plants is over 30 years old, while transformers are, on average, more than forty years old. (McBride).
The distribution system is vulnerable to several hazard events, including tree-related damage during wind events; failure of utility poles during hurricanes and tornadoes; circuit overload, fire and other damage caused by lightning strikes; and snapped wires and pole damage caused by earthquakes. The aging energy system is a major issue in many older urban and suburban areas, increasing the vulnerability of their residents, businesses and critical and essential facilities and services. (NIST)
The liquid fuel system involves the production, storage and distribution of gasoline, diesel and kerosene-based products that are produced from petroleum. Other liquid fuels include compressed natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, synthetic fuels, biodiesel and alcohols. Liquid fuels are critical to back-up power generation and most modes of transportation. Pipeline systems include a number of components, each having unique hazard vulnerabilities. Major components include transmission and distribution pipelines, pump
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stations, compressor stations, processing and storage facilities and metering stations. In addition to pipelines, fuels are transported via railroad, ship and tanker truck. Similar to pipeline components, each of these transport modes have unique vulnerabilities to natural hazards. (NIST)
A substantial number of homes and businesses in Somerset County rely on natural gas, heating oil or propane for heating. Natural gas has emerged as a leading fuel for electric power plants as a result of the expanding production capacity of the fracking industry and this fuel’s current abundance and comparatively lower cost. Natural disasters can cause serious delays to the distribution of liquid fuels, which can lead to loss of back-up power generation when onsite fuel supplies are exhausted. Disruptions in heating fuel deliveries during cold weather can become a serious public health and safety issue.
The “Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy” developed by HUD’s Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force in 2013 notes that one of the biggest problems with the liquid fuel supply chain after Superstorm Sandy was flood damage to major terminals and docks in the Arthur Kill area of New Jersey, which led to gasoline shortages. These shortages were complicated by the lack of shared priorities and coordination among emergency response officials and fuel providers. Access to information about which gas stations had fuel and power to operate was limited. Local safety rules for back-up generators, including limiting the amount of fuel storage (e.g., a 72 hour supply), and requiring larger volumes of fuel for back-up generators to be stored in basement locations. As a result, these problems reduced the effectiveness of back-up power systems, delayed power restoration and led to additional unsafe conditions following Sandy.
As technology continues to evolve, incremental upgrades and improvements to the electric power and fuel pipeline infrastructure systems are taking place that will improve energy efficiency and reliability, while reducing vulnerability to hazard events. However, regulatory and permitting issues associated with the location and design of new construction and upgrades; additional severe weather events; and maintenance deficits have led to increasingly frequent power disruptions. At the same time, the demand for reliable power is expected to increase as Somerset County’s population and economy continue to grow. Resilient, flexible energy systems depend on the ability to implement cost-effective repairs and upgrades over time; and require cooperation and support among community and energy industry leaders, regulators, power suppliers, grid operators, consumers and other stakeholders.
Electric power systems involve generation, transmission and distribution functions. Components can be sited, designed and constructed to provide improved performance during hazard events. However, many of the earlier codes and standards first used to ensure the safety and reliability of this infrastructure system did not consider hazards, as modern codes and standards do now. Therefore, older components of the energy system are particularly at risk. Over time, old system components will be updated to meet the newer codes and standards that take into account hazard events leading to improved resilience, provided necessary regulatory, planning, implementation and oversight programs are put into place and supported by all stakeholders. (NIST 1190-1) Between 2003 and 2014, 34 major power outages were recorded in New Jersey, of which two thirds (21) were caused by natural disasters such as severe storms, winter snow and ice, flooding, hurricanes and high winds shedding light on the need for energy
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system resiliency and reliability improvements. (Inside Energy) A series of fuel pipeline failures in the United States since 2008 led to the adoption of new federal safety requirements in 2011. (NIST 1190-1)
Buildings and infrastructure systems depend on electric power and fuel supplies in order for services to be provided and for businesses to operate. Even though a hospital or emergency operations center may not be physically damaged by a hurricane or flood, loss of power will equate to loss of services and disrupted operations. Power failures lead to the inability to run electric- powered equipment such as lighting, heating, ventilation, air conditioning systems, appliances, medical equipment; communication equipment (computers, telephones, etc.), fire and security systems, well and sump pump systems, elevators, and more. Emergency backup or standby power systems may be used to minimize service disruptions until power through the electric grid is restored, assuming fuel is available to run backup/standby power systems.
After the previous Hazard Mitigation Plan for Somerset County was prepared and submitted for agency review to NJ Office of Emergency Management and FEMA, critical facilities, neighborhoods and entire communities throughout New Jersey were significantly impacted by energy system disruptions caused by Superstorm Sandy, which struck in New Jersey on October 29, 2012. Power outages and liquid fuel supply chain disruptions were the largest problems caused by this storm in Somerset and other non- coastal counties within the storm’s path. Roadway closures caused by downed trees and utility poles prevented repair crews from reaching broken power lines, poles and transformers. Access to liquid fuel is tied to the transportation system, and blocked roadways also prevented fuel deliveries by truck after the storm. The ability to continue operation of back-up power generators dependent on gasoline and diesel fuel was compromised in many areas affected by prolonged power outages due to access constraints. Very few New Jersey communities and facilities maintained operational capacity and continued to function in areas affected by prolonged, widespread power outages because of their pre-existing resilient energy systems. Examples include Princeton University, which is served by a microgrid system powered by a combined heat and power (CHP) generator fueled by natural gas that operated in island mode while surrounding areas were without power for over a week.
One of the most significant and lasting impacts from Sandy was the environmental damage and health risks caused by the secondary impacts of power failures. The shut-down of regional potable water supply and wastewater treatment plants due to power outages and flooded electrical components caused widespread impacts. Off-line wastewater treatment facilities discharged billions of gallons of untreated sewage into the Passaic River and Raritan Bay during the storm and for a considerable amount of time afterwards, while major costly repairs to these facilities were being made. The following is a brief synopsis of the energy-related issues in Somerset County caused by this storm, which brought energy resiliency to the forefront of mitigation planning in the County:
Areas in Somerset County experienced electric power outages ranging in duration up to two weeks due to the extensive damage sustained by the electric distribution system/power grid in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy. Businesses sustained significant damages caused by prolonged closures, lost inventories, staff shortages and restricted customer access caused by power outages and access constraints. Liquid fuel supply chain disruptions significantly impacted Somerset County and surrounding areas. The State’s bulk storage terminals along the Arthur Kill, as well as two major refineries and several petroleum pipelines were shutdown. Supply deliveries to gas stations were hindered by extended road closures due to the many DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 5
downed trees and powerlines. Over 70% of gas stations in northern NJ were off line a week after Superstorm Sandy. (BPU, 2016) Gas-rationing, long lines at gas stations, and lack of fuel supplies were major issues for residents who were trying to run gasoline generators to power their homes and businesses. Price gouging became a problem, forcing stricter enforcement of price gouging laws. Vehicular travel was also significantly impacted due to both gasoline shortages and impassible roads. Emergency responders, tree removal services, roadway repair crews and utility workers were affected, increasing emergency response times, complicating debris removal and delaying the repair of extensively damaged utility systems. The prolonged power disruptions also severely impacted communication systems, including broadband- and electricity-dependent cell-phone and internet systems and land-line based telephone communications. Impromptu public “charging stations” were established in areas where power was available, but many residents did not have access to them. Backup generators were needed at cell towers to enable the provision of cellular coverage, and at internet-based distributed cable TV and phone network elements, which are vulnerable to liquid fuel supply chain and access issues. Residents were affected by water supply issues. Boil water advisories and bottled water distribution centers were implemented. Access to potable water significantly impacted residents in areas served by private wells with electricity-dependent well pumps. Water purification of public potable water supplies became a necessity for residents, but was difficult to accomplish without operating stoves and appliances necessary for boiling water. Long lines at laundromats became commonplace and local fitness centers opened their shower facilities to residents of nearby neighborhoods without power. Residents were also faced with cold weather in the storm’s aftermath. Many were unable to heat their homes and businesses without power. Public “warming stations” were provided in some areas. Residents and businesses dealing with prolonged power outages were confronted with food constraints due to limited refrigeration and cooking capabilities, and difficulties accessing operating grocery stores and eateries. Residents in areas affected by prolonged power outages and roadway closures experienced disruptions in medical care including problems with medication prescription refills and access to health-care services. The provision of support services to the elderly and people with disabilities were also affected.
According to the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (BPU) 2016 Microgrid Report, “In October of 2013, the State announced the award of the $25 million Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) Energy Allocation Initiative (EAI) to support back-up power and alternative energy solutions for local governments to enhance energy resiliency. Because of overwhelming demand for this program and the availability of additional HMGP funding, the State provided an additional $13 million in HMGP funds under the Lifeline/Life Safety Program to fund additional local energy projects at critical facilities. Collectively these programs were able to provide funding awards to 337 local governments in all twenty-one (21) counties. Despite availability of the HMGP funds, only eight percent (8%) of the backup generator EAI requests could be funded statewide, demonstrating the need for additional resources to improve and enhance energy resiliency at local critical facilities. A total of $3,813,305 in 4086 Hurricane Sandy HMGP funds were made available to fund back-up generators in sixteen Somerset County municipalities, as well as to acquire and demolish repetitive loss properties in Green Brook Township and Manville Borough according to the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management.
Due to the magnitude of the HMGP requests, a portion of the State’s Hazard Mitigation Plan developed by the NJ Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was updated in 2014 to address this issue. A new goal was added requiring the enhancement of energy resiliency at critical facilities through the use of alternate energy sources. The Power Failure chapter in the Risk Assessment component of the State HMP was significantly updated (see http://ready.nj.gov/programs/pdf/mitigation2014b/mit2014_section5- 22.pdf). It now encourages the development and implementation of alternate energy sources for improving resiliency at the local level within county and municipal hazard mitigation plans. The update notes that power failure is particularly problematic for residents of homes that are heated with electricity. In Somerset County 8.4% of homes (9,647) were heated with electricity DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 6
according to the plan. The impacts of widespread power outages are exacerbated during winter months and pose greater risks to vulnerable populations such as the elderly and those who are medically frail. Power is also vital to maintain out-of-hospital lifesaving systems for patients such as oxygen concentrators and ventilation machines. Without power, these individuals will require shelter at a medical-needs shelter or admission to a hospital. Although voluntary systems are in place to locate these individuals during disasters such as New Jersey’s Register Ready system, definitive, comprehensive information about the number and location of individuals who require lifesavings systems is not available. The State HMP also recognizes risks caused by the interruption of wastewater and potable water utilities due to power failures, which can have cascading economic, environmental and public health impacts. It includes information about the impacts power failures had on retail and wholesale fuel suppliers in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy and the importance of providing backup power at gas stations. Other secondary impacts are also described, including food spoilage and associated negative health impacts; increased risk of carbon monoxide poisoning due to improper ventilation of portable generators; the risks posed to utility workers by back feeding power lines and increased traffic accidents due to inoperable traffic control signals. The updated State HMP also recognizes increasing risks for more frequent widespread power outages in the future due to power overload during periods of prolonged extreme heat in addition to problems caused by increased frequency and severity of storms due to climate change. “Support continuity of operations pre, during and post hazards” was added as a new goal to the 2014 State HMP, along with the following associated objective: “Encourage planning and the implementation of alternative energy sources”.
To sum-up the necessity for making our energy systems more resilient, Regional Plan Association’s (RPA) “Fourth Regional Plan: Making the Region Work for All of Us”, November 2017 (of which Somerset County is a part) states that, “Nearly 60 percent of the region’s current power-generating capacity will be at risk of flooding by 2050”, and will need to be upgraded, protected or relocated to withstand the consequences of climate change. The plan notes that power plants and other components of the region’s infrastructure are already struggling with the effects of age and underinvestment, and that the gradual rise of sea levels, higher temperatures and more intense precipitation place them at even greater risk. The plan states, “The region must not only upgrade and repair assets like power plants and wastewater treatment facilities to withstand the threats of climate change, but also redesign critical systems like energy and telecommunications so that disruptions are as limited as possible, and do not lead to cascading failures across multiple systems”. The plan further states, “Systems and facilities must also be designed with some level of redundancy so that when a failure occurs, it will not devastate a larger part of the system. Additionally, infrastructure systems should have a level of self-sufficiency, so they can keep operating even when the systems it relies on fail. Finally, through all upgrades to critical infrastructure systems, strategies, and projects which produce multiple benefits should be prioritized”. (RPA)
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III. DRAFT ENERGY RESILIENCY GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES
1. Draft Energy Resiliency Goals
The following draft energy resiliency goals were developed by the Project Management Team (PMT) with input from the Mitigation Planning Committee during 2018 as part of the Somerset County Multi-jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan Update. These goals are coordinated with, and nested in the 2019 updated Somerset County Multi-jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan’s “Mitigation Strategy Goals”.
Goal 1 Mitigate the risks to public health, safety and the economy posed by energy disruptions: Upgrade,
harden and protect the regional power grid, energy resources and the liquid fuel supply chain in order to
reduce energy system vulnerabilities. Address emergency backup power needs in order to prevent
cascading impacts to critical/essential facilities, infrastructure and operations.
Goal 2 Transform the energy system to achieve resiliency, security, operating efficiency, power quality and
affordability: Modernize the energy system to accommodate diverse, clean energy resources, add energy
system redundancies and reduce stress factors in order to strengthen energy resilience and sustainability.
Balance the protection of communities and the environment from the harm caused by energy system
disruptions with the goal of providing inexpensive, convenient power. Goal 3 Increase the ability to quickly respond to and recover from energy system disruptions: Strengthen the
institutional framework needed to coordinate and manage complex energy systems and interdependencies;
respond quickly and effectively during emergencies and expedite recovery from energy system disruptions.
2. Draft Energy Resiliency Toolkit
A Draft Energy Resiliency Toolkit was also prepared by the PMT in collaboration with the MPC in 2018 as part of this initiative. The Toolkit comprises an inventory of potential generalized strategies for moving forward that are organized according to the Draft Energy Resiliency Framework’s goals and objectives. They are provided as a resource that local jurisdictions and other stakeholders can draw upon for the development of updated municipal-specific mitigation strategies and for informing stakeholder hazard mitigation, response and recovery plans and programs. It is recognized that most of the strategies are applicable to specific agencies, organizations and jurisdictional levels. All strategies can be refined and adapted in accordance with the unique circumstances and characteristics of individual communities and stakeholder organizations. The Draft Toolkit is intended to be used as a general guide, source of information and ideas. Only those strategies deemed to be locally applicable by municipal hazard DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 8
mitigation committees should be considered for inclusion in the updated municipal HMP Annexes. The Draft Toolkit recommendations can also be used to identify ways energy system resiliency considerations can be integrated into local and regional land use, infrastructure and utility plans, policies, programs and investment decisions.
The Draft Energy Resiliency Toolkit is included on the following pages. A larger 11” x 17” stand-alone version of this table is available by e-mailing the Somerset County Planning Division at [email protected].
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DRAFT SOMERSET COUNTY HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN: ENERGY RESILIENCY FRAMEWORK STRATEGIES TOOLKIT DRAFT GOALS & OBJECTIVES DRAFT STRATEGIES TIMEFRAME LEAD ENTITY PARTNERS 1. Mitigate the risks to public health, safety and the economy posed by energy disruptions 1A. Evaluate energy system vulnerability, reliability, and Promote enrollment in and implementation of the NJ Register Ready Program. Complement this with a GIS-based inventory of nursing homes, assisted living facilities, group homes and other places where vulnerable residents are Short-to-mid- Municipalities, emergency preparedness. 1a State and County Agencies 1B. Protect and enhance power supplies to concentrated and ensure they have emergency preparedness, response and continuation of operations plans that term facility operators ensure back-up power and other supplies for sheltering-in-place. critical/essential facilities, services and infrastructure Electric utilities, Relocate, redesign and protect energy system components that are vulnerable to damage caused by flooding, wind, systems. Liquid fuel extreme temperatures and other hazards. Upgrade components to make them more efficient and reliable, strategically Federal and State Agencies, 1C. Identify and Implement strategies that ensure liquid 1b mid-to-long-term processors and add redundancies and the ability to compartmentalize problems to minimize impacts when failures occur; and allow for County and Municipalities distributors, energy fuel supply chain continuity during emergencies. alternate options and substitutions when system components are under stress. 1D. Protect vulnerable population groups and individuals generators with power-dependent health and safety needs. Provide back-up power for wireless and wired communication system components including cellular towers, data Wireless centers and other critical data and communications networks (upon which the energy system depends) to ensure Short-to-mid- communications Federal, State Agencies, County 1c 1E. Evaluate critical infrastructure system continued operation during emergencies and to minimize cascading impacts. Provide a network of emergency term providers, energy and Municipalities interdependencies. Identify and implement strategies communication/cell phone charging sites throughout communities for use by members of the public. companies that will minimize cascading impacts caused by energy County, Determine the feasibility of implementing one or more Towns-Center Microgrid systems that address the back-up Short-to-mid- Municipalities, system disruptions and facilitate socio-economic 1d Federal and State Agencies continuity. power needs of multiple clustered critical facilities within Somerset County. term electric utilities, facility operators 1F. Ensure all critical/essential facilities, infrastructure Identify interdependences among critical/essential facilities, infrastructure systems and operations. Utilize vulnerability County, and services have reliable back-up power systems that assessments to identify ways they can be strengthened and protected. Update individual emergency response and Municipalities, 1e Ongoing Federal and State Agencies will allow them to remain operational during both continuity of operations plans and ensure their backup power and associated on-site fuel supply needs are met and that electric utilities, isolated, limited duration and widespread, prolonged they can continue to operate during prolonged, widespread power outages. facility operators power outages. Enhance areawide Water Quality Management Plans (WQMPs) by integrating hazard mitigation and emergency County, Municipalities, 1G. Prioritize energy resiliency upgrades and back-up response considerations. Use WQMPs as a tool for ensuring wastewater system operators and other NJPDES Permit- Short-to-mid- Federal and State 1g Wastewater and Water Supply power investments that produce multiple public health, holders have in place appropriate emergency preparedness and continuation of operation plans that ensure back-up term Agencies Utilities & Authorities safety and economic benefits. power needs are addressed to protect water supply, public health and the environment. Electric and Federal and State Agencies, Adopt municipal forest/tree management plans and ordinances. Encourage routine ongoing tree-trimming in overhead Short-to-mid- Communications 1h County, Vegetation utility line areas. term Utilities, Management Specialists Municipalities Increase the availability of backup power systems at motor vehicle fuel stations dispersed throughout the community Short-to-mid- Station owners and 1i Municipalities, State, County and make real time information publically available regarding fuel availability, deliveries and access. term operators County, State and Federal Agencies, Encourage acquisition of back-up power systems and the development of emergency response and continuation of Short-to-mid- 1j Municipalities, County and Local OEM operation plans by all private and non-profit providers of goods and services essential for daily living. term private businesses coordinators Adopt development review policies and ordinances that require the provision of back-up power, emergency supplies and common areas for cooling, warming, cell-phone recharging and supply distribution to residents and employees in State, County, developers, local 1k Short-term Municipalities all major development and redevelopment projects to facilitate sheltering in place. Establish policies and programs that residents and businesses incentivize the retrofit of these provisions into existing facilities. Identify and address the back-up power needs of critical transportation network components such as traffic signals and Federal, State and Municipalities, County, utilities, rail lines. Provide continuity of power to transportation systems to prevent gridlock, ensure access to essential facilities Regional 1l mid-to-long-term infrastructure and critical and and services, prevent fuel supply chain disruptions, facilitate evacuation and provide access to rescue and repair crews Transportation and essential facility operators before, during and after hazard events. Transit Agencies
Promote the development and use of structurally sound energy-efficient buildings for sheltering-in-place. Maximize short-to-mid- Federal and State Agencies, 1m Municipalities their ability to better maintain temperatures during power outages. term County, building owners
Promote utilization of safe, clean, efficient, reliable "right-sized" backup power systems aligned with locational and site characteristics, fuel supply availability and operational needs. Educate the public about safe utilization, maintenance, Short-to-mid- Municipalities, 1n Federal and State Agencies fuel transport and storage. Encourage routine testing to ensure good operating condition and deployment readiness. term facility operators Promote replacement of outdated systems with new resilient technology.
DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, December 2018 10 DRAFT SOMERSET COUNTY HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN: ENERGY RESILIENCY FRAMEWORK STRATEGIES TOOLKIT DRAFT GOALS & OBJECTIVES DRAFT STRATEGIES TIMEFRAME LEAD PARTNERS 2. Transform the energy system to achieve resiliency, reliability, security, operating efficiency, power quality and affordability 2A. Coordinate the modernization and upgrade of Electric and Research universities, Provide wireless communication, data processing, and network upgrades needed to deploy efficient and secure smart Communications technology companies, and interdependent land-line and wireless communication 2a grid and smart-metering technology such as sensors that will allow real-time monitoring of disruptions and breakdowns mid-to-long-term Utilities, Federal and other engineering, energy and infrastructure, liquid fuel supply chains, distribution and the efficient identification of necessary corrective actions. State Agencies technology experts pipelines and the electric macrogrid. Adopt coordinated macrogrid modernization policies, standards, regulations and incentives necessary for implementing Electric and communications 2B. Take the impacts of climate change into Federal and State 2b smart grid and smart metering technologies; integrating microgrids, distributed energy sources and energy storage; mid-to-long-term utilities, research universities Agencies consideration when updating energy system capital facilitating demand management; and the transition to electric vehicles. and technology companies plans, long-range functional plans, and operation and Strengthen policies and strategies that facilitate the diversification of energy resources and the expansion of de- Municipalities, electric utilities, maintenance strategies. centralized distributed clean, efficient energy generation (i.e. solar, wind, combined heat and power (CHP), fuel cell and Short-to-mid- Federal and State 2c distributed energy and energy biofuel generation) and that support the deployment of the grid-scale energy storage systems needed to help manage term Agencies 2C. Promote the diversification of energy resources and storage system providers the expanded use of de-centralized generation with an peak demand stressors and integrate intermittent distributed energy sources. Federal and State Public and private-sector emphasis on clean and sustainable distributed energy. Promote public and private-sector implementation of energy efficiency and conservation measures and utilization of Short-to-mid- 2d Agencies, County entities, businesses and 2D. Promote energy resiliency improvements that will demand response strategies for managing peak demand stressors during emergencies and demand growth periods. term and Municipalities residents enable the system to operate reliably and efficiently under both emergency and non-emergency conditions. Macrogrid operators, electric Strengthen design and performance standards for all components of the energy system, including power generation, utilities, energy generators, 2E. Maximize energy system investments by addressing 2e mid-to-long-term Federal, State transmission and distribution. liquid fuel processors and immediate repair and maintenance requirements in a distributors, pipeline operators manner that also enhances long-term resiliency and sustainability. Macrogrid operators, electric Support the use of societal benefits fees and leveraging of public/private sector resources and partnerships maximize Short-to-mid- utilities, energy generators, 2F. Expedite adaptation to changing energy system 2f State Agencies resources available to implement energy system improvements. term liquid fuel processors and opportunities, technologies and applications. distributors, pipeline operators 2G. Prioritize macrogrid modernization investments that Federal and State Strengthen and apply higher energy efficiency standards tor all new buildings and major reconstruction and short-to-mid- will expedite the identification of problems and the 2g Agencies, County Building and facility owners redevelopment projects. term restoration of power caused by hazard events and Municipalities Promote consumer utilization of smart meters, smart technology applications and devices that allow for real-time, Federal and State Electric and communications Short-to-mid- 2h automated, interactive, remote control and management of the physical operation of appliances, heating and cooling Agencies, County utilities, educational institutions, term systems and other consumer devices to enhance energy efficiency and conservation. and Municipalities technology companies
Encourage use of microgrids that can operate in both macrogrid-connected and independent modes for powering State, County and Building and facility owners, 2i mid-to-long-term critical/essential facilities, infrastructure systems and operations during power outages. Municipalities electric utilities
Electric utilities, Federal and State Agencies, Swap-in new, updated, more resilient energy system components rather than simply fixing broken outdated Short-, mid- and 2j critical and essential liquid fuel processors and components where practical and feasible. long-term facility operators distributors, pipeline operators
Support regulatory and policy changes that will result in the de-coupling of power generation and power distribution Short-to-mid- Federal and State Private sector stakeholders, 2k costs and incentivize energy efficiency and conservation term Agencies County, Municipalities Federal and State Improve demand response and capacity assurance programs to reduce stress on the energy system and the risk of Short-to-mid- Electric Utilities, energy 2l Agencies, megagrid power failures during emergencies; and improve operational efficiencies under normal conditions. term generators operators Federal and State Support increased widespread deployment of high efficiency vehicles, including electric vehicles to reduce stress on Short-to-mid- Auto industry, businesses, 2m Agencies, County, liquid fuel supplies during emergencies. term residents Municipalities Identify opportunities for biogas-powered systems that can keep wastewater treatment facilities (WWTF) operating Short-to-mid- State Agencies, 2n County, Municipalities during and after a hazard event, improve WWTF efficiency and resiliency. term WWTFs Municipalities, Identify opportunities where underground electric lines are feasible and appropriate, and put into place implementation Short-to-mid- electric and 2o Federal and State Agencies polices and procedures. term communications utilities
DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, December 2018 11 DRAFT SOMERSET COUNTY HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN: ENERGY RESILIENCY FRAMEWORK STRATEGIES TOOLKIT DRAFT GOALS & OBJECTIVES DRAFT STRATEGIES TIMEFRAME LEAD ENTITY PARTNERS 3. Increase the ability to quickly respond to and recover from energy system disruptions 3A. Enhance the capacity to mobilize the necessary Develop and implement training programs with updated curriculum focused on advanced energy and communication Federal and State Agencies, Short-to-mid- Academic 3a system design, engineering and management skills in response to rapidly changing conditions, technology and business Energy utilities, professional energy resources and services during and after term institutions emergencies models. associations County and 3B. Promote the implementation of integrated Municipal Critical and essential facility, Maintain a current inventory of critical and essential facilities and infrastructure that includes detailed information Short-, mid- and communication and energy system technologies and 3b Emergency infrastructure and service about their back-up power needs and capabilities. long-term strategies that facilitate rapid power restoration and Management operators support emergency response, life safety and economic Officials recovery. Strengthen regulations and policies that ensure back-up power systems are provided for all critical and essential Federal and State Critical and essential facility, Short-to-mid- 3c facilities and infrastructure. Where stable fuel supply sources for backup generators cannot be assured, require Agencies, County, infrastructure and service 2C. Strengthen monitoring and oversight requirements term and enforce safety standards and regulations concerning utilization of alternative backup power systems. Municipalities operators energy system performance, operation, management Macrogrid operators, electric Federal and State utilities, energy generators, and upkeep. Establish communications systems for sharing real-time information about regional and local liquid fuel availability, Short-to-mid- 3d Agencies, County, liquid fuel processors and supply levels and delivery schedules with oversight entities, first responders, supply-chain stakeholders and consumers term 3D. Ensure continuity in power supply to critical and Municipalities distributors, pipeline essential facilities infrastructure and services before, owners/operators during and after hazard events. Macrogrid operators, electric Organize a corps of certified electricians, engineers and other experts who can be called upon during emergencies to Federal and State utilities, energy generators, 3E. Shorten electric power and liquid fuel supply chain 3e identify solutions to complex interconnected electric, liquid fuel system and communication technology disruptions at mid-to-long-term Agencies, County, liquid fuel processors and recovery and restoration timelines. the regional and local levels. Municipalities distributors, pipeline 3F. Expand the technical and institutional capacity and owners/operators resources necessary for interdisciplinary and cross- Macrogrid operators, electric Require enhanced coordination of energy and communications system preparedness and continuity of operations plans utilities, energy generators, Short-, mid- and Federal and State jurisdictional coordination of mitigation and continuity of 3f that address the mobilization of resources, establish restoration priorities and strategies, assign partner roles and liquid fuel processors and long-term Agencies operations plans, policies, programs and investments. responsibilities and define communications strategies. distributors, pipeline 3G. Promote public- and private-sector emergency owners/operators preparedness, continuity of operations and recovery Macrogrid planning activities that address emergency backup operators, electric utilities, energy power needs. Prioritize and implement hazard mitigation strategies that harden and protect energy system components, minimize Short-, mid- and Federal and State Agencies, 3g generators, liquid 3H Encourage the adoption of stringent safety cascading impacts to critical and essential facilities, operations and infrastructure and protect socio-economic stability. long-term County, Municipalities fuel processors and regulations and improved oversight and enforcement of distributors, pipeline energy system design and performance standards, owners/operators management and upkeep. Liquid fuel Promote the adoption and implementation of appropriate winterization standards for liquid fuel distribution and liquid processors and Short-to-mid- Federal and State Agencies, 3h fuel-dependent power generation systems to reduce extreme temperature -related mechanical problems and distributors, pipeline term County, Municipalities malfunctions. owners/operators, energy generators
State and County Promote the identification and adoption of energy system performance goals for the deployment of resources, Short-to-mid- OEM Coordinators, 3i Federal and State Agencies restoration of system operations and other recovery actions during and after hazard events. term energy companies and utility providers
Develop and disseminate outreach resources including but not limited to videos, handbooks and infographics, website Short-to-mid- Municipalities, County, Federal and State 3j postings and blogs to convey information about mitigating, preparing for and responding to long-term, widespread term Utilities Agencies power outages.
NOTES: Timeframes are estimated. Short-term = 1 to 5 years, Mid-term = 6 to 10 years, Long-term > 10 years. The numbering system applied to the Goals and Objectives is for reference purposes only. It does not denote prioritization or level of importance. The implementation strategies that align with the objectives associated with each goal are shown in parentheses in order to assist the reader. More information about the strategies included above can be found in the Energy Resiliency Framework document text.
DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, December 2018 12 IV. ENERGY RESILIENCY SOLUTIONS
This section is intended to represent a “primer” for informing local government entities about potential energy resiliency solutions that may be applied by the energy sector, government agencies, other public, private and non-profit entities and individuals to achieve energy resiliency goals. These solutions expand upon several of the implementation strategies recommended in the above Draft Energy Resiliency Toolkit. General information is provided about a range of resiliency-enhancing options that are currently available or anticipated in the future. Solutions should be tailored to meet the unique needs, characteristics and resources of the organizations and the facilities for which they are being considered. These solutions are supported in the 2015 State Energy Master Plan Update and/or the 2014 Updated State Hazard Mitigation Plan, as well as in the State’s recently enacted Clean Energy Law and other plans, policies and programs, which are described in greater detail in Section V – Energy Resiliency Resources.
1. Back-up Power The availability of back-up power during and after a hazard event that involves failure of the normal power supply system is essential to public health and safety, improving community resilience and supporting the recovery process. Regulations and building codes require back-up power for some infrastructure and critical facility components; but it is not mandated for all. Legally required standby systems are typically installed for life safety systems such as communication, ventilation and smoke removal, sewage disposal and other facility systems that would create and/or exacerbate hazards or hamper rescue and fire-fighting operations if power is lost. Emergency and standby power systems are essential for continuous operation of critical facilities such as hospitals and emergency operations centers. Adequate back-up power systems can mitigate cascading failures of transportation and infrastructure systems that depend on electric power such as communication networks, wastewater treatment plants, transportation fueling stations, and roadway traffic and railway signals. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers developed a secure, web-based “Emergency Power Facility Assessment Tool (EPFAT) that provides guidance to public entities for addressing back-up power needs. A summary of the EPFAT tool is available at the following link: http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/Emergency%20Ops/National%20Response%20Framework/power/EPFAT_Fact_Sheet_21 _April_2015.pdf. The identification and implementation of safe operation standards for all back-up and standby power systems are also necessary and can be promoted at the local level.
Having an adequate on-site fuel supply for emergency back-up power systems is an important consideration, along with a reliable fuel delivery system. As noted previously, liquid fuel supply chain disruptions can impact the duration that back-up power systems can be sustained, particularly mobile and stationary gasoline and diesel generators. Generators of different types and scales have pros and cons concerning maintenance, reliability, frequency of refueling, safety, and operational ease. Stationary, permanently installed generators generally have more substantial fuel capacities and are safer to operate, especially those that are fueled by natural gas. The number of natural gas back-up generators that have been installed at hospitals, other critical facilities, business establishments and apartment complexes has risen in recent years due to the greater reliability of this fuel source and associated natural gas infrastructure, which was demonstrated during recent severe storm events. Back-up power systems that include solar DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 13
and storage and are coupled with microgrid islanding capabilities can potentially operate for extended periods of time with reduced liquid fuel supply demands. Combined Heat and Power (CHP) is a highly efficient method of providing uninterrupted power and thermal (heating or cooling) services for the host facility. They are typically powered by natural gas. They have lower emissions, higher efficiency, better reliability and lower fuel costs compared to diesel generators and can be coupled with microgrid technology. (NIST) As noted previously, the microgrid at Princeton University located in Princeton, New Jersey operates with a gas-fueled CHP plant that produced the heating, cooling and electricity that enabled the campus and downtown Princeton to continue to operate when surrounding areas were in the dark during and after Superstorm Sandy. A detailed case study by Ted Borer, Princeton University Energy Plant Manager is available online at the following link: https://www.csemag.com/single-article/case-study- microgrid-at-princeton-university.
Municipalities are responsible for adopting and implementing Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs). Federal, state and local laws and regulations define minimum requirements for emergency management. These plans should address the emergency back-up power needs of all critical/and essential facilities within their borders. The American Red Cross is the agency tasked with operating emergency shelters in collaboration with the municipalities. However, more can be done to ensure reliable back-up power systems are provided for these and other critical facilities during extended power outages. State leaders have taken notice and legislative solutions are beginning to emerge that address the need for emergency standby/back-up power at facilities that are important to public health and safety, particularly the wellbeing of vulnerable populations such as the elderly and residents with medical, access and mobility and/or functional needs. Local government entities, critical/essential facility and infrastructure operators, key public-sector service providers and businesses and non-profit organizations that provide goods and services that are essential for daily living are also encouraged by the federal government to develop Continuation of Operations Plans (COOPs) aimed at facilitating the performance of essential functions during hazard emergencies that disrupt normal operations. COOPs include procedures for alerting, notifying, activating and deploying employees; identify critical business/operating functions; establish an alternate facility to which employees and resources can be relocated in an emergency; and rely upon personnel with authority and knowledge of functions. COOPs should also address the back-up power supply requirements associated with performing critical operations during emergencies.
2. Fuel Supply Protection Following Superstorm Sandy, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) reviewed the preparedness, response, recovery, and restoration activities performed within its organization and by the energy industry sector in order to understand the range of challenges encountered by owners and operators of energy infrastructure, state and local government entities, and utility customers. The results are summarized in the DOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability’s February 26, 2013 “Overview of Response to Hurricane Sandy-Nor’easter and Recommendations for Improvement”. This report identifies the damage to energy infrastructure, particularly fuel refineries and fuel transportation and distribution systems due to the unprecedented storm surge, which caused fuel disruptions affecting New York and New Jersey that lasted several weeks. Six refineries serving the region were damaged by this storm, causing gas rationing to be instituted in both states. This report identifies the need for improved information and situational awareness regarding where fuel is located versus where it is needed; and for better communication among public and private sectors DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 14
regarding the availability of resources, restoration times, priorities and community needs. It notes that wind and flooding caused damage to critical fuel facilities such as terminals, pipelines, storage facilities, truck racks and the electric power infrastructure that energizes those facilities. This led to significant fuel shortages. At the same time, retail gasoline stations were without power and/or fuel supplies. This report includes a host of recommendations ranging from “establishing real-time monitoring of fuel availability and storage levels; better engaging fuel industry experts in recovery operations; developing “Continuity of Operations Plans” to “creating a corps of certified electricians and other experts to aide in restoration activities; revising state policies that deal with short-term and prolonged fuel shortages; and establishing industry standards and guidelines for providing back-up power and resiliency improvements to fuel supply infrastructure”.
The nation’s liquid fuels infrastructure has expanded dramatically as a result of increasing domestic and Canadian sources of supply coupled with increased domestic production of ethanol and biofuels, and concurrent reduced national dependence on fossil fuel imports from other regions of the world. This is evident by the number of existing and proposed pipeline projects impacting virtually all areas of New Jersey. Ten (10) pipelines currently crisscross New Jersey, half of which carry natural gas and half carry petroleum. (Johnson) There has been a proliferation of new pipeline proposals affecting New Jersey in recent years. This trend and associated cost impacts have generated the need for greater understanding of the characteristics, capacities and vulnerabilities of liquid fuel transportation, storage and distribution (TS&D) infrastructure. Severe storms represent the greatest natural threat to TS&D infrastructure, causing widespread power outages that can shut down coastal and inland facilities and operations. TS&D infrastructure technologies have evolved significantly, and now include sensors and detection systems, communication systems, and greater automation of transportation, processing, storage and distribution networks and systems. These advances continue to reduce costs, improve efficiency, increase safety, and reduce environmental impacts in this critical sector of the nation’s economic and industrial base. However, safe operation of TS&D infrastructure is dependent on electrical power supply and external communications systems, the loss of which can contribute to its vulnerability to natural disasters. A series of reports entitled, “United States Fuel Resiliency: US Fuels Supply Infrastructure: Volume I – Infrastructure Characterization, Volume II Vulnerability to Natural and Physical Threats and Volume III Vulnerability and Resilience were produced by Intek, Inc. for the U.S. Department of Energy in September 2014 and are available at the following website: https://www.energy.gov/policy/downloads/united-states-fuel-resiliency- us-fuels-supply-infrastructure. These reports highlight the impacts that high-profile weather events including Hurricane Sandy, Hurricane Katrina and recent Polar Vortex event (2014) that was characterized by extreme winter weather in the Northeast, have had on fuel supply infrastructure. Severe storm & weather impacts included large production losses and supply disruptions. The changing and expanding fuel supply infrastructure, together with the increased severity of storms linked to climate change requires updated mitigation approaches for addressing these vulnerabilities that take into consideration cascading disaster effects. These reports include many resiliency recommendations and options including modernizing and hardening natural gas transmission and distribution infrastructure; establishing and implementing higher efficiency standards for natural gas compressors; and improving the safety, reliability and capacity of the rail network with regard to the transport of crude oil. Some of the resiliency measures recommended in these reports are currently moving forward. For example, after Hurricane Sandy, the U.S. Dept. of Energy has developed a Northeast Refined Petroleum Product Reserve (NERRPPR) to create new reserves to address fuel demand in the northeast region in the event of a significant interruption caused by a hurricane or other severe weather event.
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General strategies for protecting liquid fuel supply systems from natural hazards include conducting vulnerability assessments; developing facility-specific emergency response plans; diversifying transportation venues, corridors and storage locations; providing alternate means of fuel delivery to end users; and coordinated planning for future system modernization and recovery. Expanded utilization of renewable energy can reduce dependence on fossil fuels and help reduce these vulnerabilities over the long term; which is especially important in light of the finite nature of liquid fuel resources.
3. Smart Grid Technologies RPA’s Fourth Regional Plan states that, “Today’s grid is outdated and ill-equipped for the cleaner, distributed, and digitized power system of the future. The regions electrical grid has not kept pace with advances in energy technology”. (RPA) The growth of renewable energy and distributed generation, as well as the shift toward electric cars are placing the aging regional power grid under increasing pressure at a time when concerns over its reliability are increasing. Modernization of the regional “megagrid” can help create a more resilient, reliable, flexible and sustainable cleaner overall energy system. A modern megagrid will be able to incorporate localized renewable energy resources and grid-scale storage technology. It will be able to accommodate smart grid communication technology in a secure manner (including those that help operators and consumers manage energy use and reduce peak demand), distributed generation and microgrids. Smart grid (distributed automation) technologies are currently being developed and incrementally deployed in many areas of the United States that are aimed at improving the electric grid’s resilience, reliability, operating efficiency, power quality and affordability. Smart grid technology can be used to help identify potential opportunities to improve circuits, better predict performance and more efficiently identify corrective actions needed after a hazard event. Smart grid technology will modernize the electric grid nationally and move if from being a centralized, producer-controlled network to a less centralized, more consumer-interactive, environmentally responsive model. A fully functioning smart grid will feature sensors throughout the transmission and distribution system that will collect and move real-time, two-way data between utilities and consumers; and will have the computing power to utilize this information for making the grid more resilient and reliable. The “Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy” recommends the development and deployment of smart grid technology that allows problems to be isolated so that surviving power generation can be optimally dispatched to high priority essential and critical facilities. (HUD)
The U.S. Department of Energy has made smart grid development a national policy goal. Title XIII – Section 1301 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 comprises the United States’ current policy in support of electric grid modernization through the use of smart grid technology. It calls for:
1. Increased use of digital information and controls technology to improve reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric grid; 2. Dynamic optimization of grid operations and resources, with full cyber-Security; 3. Deployment and integration of distributed resources and generation, including renewable resources 4. Development and incorporation of demand response, demand-side resources, and energy-efficiency resources;
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5. Deployment of `smart' technologies (real-time, automated, interactive technologies that optimize the physical operation of appliances and consumer devices) for advanced metering, communications concerning grid operations and status, and distribution automation; 6. Integration of `smart' appliances and consumer devices; 7. Deployment and integration of advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving technologies, including plug-in electric and hybrid electric vehicles, and thermal-storage air conditioning; 8. Provision to consumers of timely information and control options; 9. Development of standards for communication and interoperability of appliances and equipment connected to the electric grid, including the infrastructure serving the grid; and 10. Identification and lowering of unreasonable or unnecessary barriers to adoption of smart grid technologies, practices, and services.
Deploying smart grid technology can allow continuous assessments by grid operators, enable them to prevent disruptions rather than simply react to them, and act expeditiously to resolve fast-moving problems. Smart grid technology will enable the megagrid to safely and seamlessly accommodate both large centralized power plants and small distributed energy generation sources including renewable energy and energy storage; as well as support the growing use of electric vehicles. Most important from a hazard mitigation perspective, smart grid technology will reduce the megagrid’s susceptibility to disruption from natural disasters, physical breakdowns and cyber-attacks by addressing critical security issues. Resilience can be built into each element of the system, and it can be designed to deter, detect, respond and recover from man-made and natural hazard disruptions such as severe storms and earthquakes. Smart grid technology involves sophisticated levels of automation that can provide wide-area monitoring, remote system control and predictive tools for dealing with impending disruptions before they happen. In addition, the system must be capable of enabling microgrid “islanding” so that power to critical and essential facilities that are served by microgrids will not be disrupted in the event of a regional grid outage.
Federal, state and local policies and regulations are needed that allow utilities to recoup the cost of security and resiliency upgrades that are part of the overall grid modernization and smart grid development process. (Litos) States have an important role to play in smart grid development by enacting policies and incentives that enable and encourage smart grid development while reducing regulatory barriers. Addressing the upfront costs associated with implementing innovative grid technologies can be challenging. New Jersey is considerably behind other states when it comes to deploying smart grid and smart metering technology, ranking 47th in the nation. Regulating entities, power suppliers, private utilities, regional transmission organizations and independent system operators also play a critical role in grid modernization. The existing network of stakeholders is complex, each with their own guidelines, territories, responsibilities, capabilities. Substantial investment and resources are needed to take advantage of innovative opportunities to transform the megagrid. RPA’s Fourth Regional Plan recommends the formation of a regional energy policy taskforce that brings together all stakeholders to promote coordinated efforts to advance megagrid modernization and smart grid technologies. (RPA)
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4. Microgrids Microgrids are small-scale power grids that can operate independently or in tandem with a region’s main electric grid – which is also referred to as the macrogrid. Microgrids take advantage of distributed energy resources and technology, and can be isolated from the regional “macrogrid” when necessary, benefitting those inside and outside the microgrid by adding redundancy and promoting self-reliance. Microgrids can enable the continued operation of critical and essential facilities thereby avoiding cascading impacts when the macrogrid fails. Microgrids can serve one or a group of interconnected loads (building/facility electricity users), have their own distributed energy resources (DER) and clearly defined electrical boundaries that enable them to act as a single controllable entity with respect to the megagrid. A microgrid can connect and disconnect from the megagrid, operating in both connected or island-mode. Decentralized DERs can be modular and flexible or stationary, and may include one or more of the following: combined heat and power (CHP) also known as cogeneration, micro-turbines, fuel cells, solar photovoltaics, wind power, and biogas, diesel or gas generators. They may also include energy storage devices such flywheels or batteries. Microgrids can operate both during emergencies (black sky conditions) and when the macrogrid is operating properly (blue sky conditions). (NIST 1190-1) With microgrids, the power supply and distribution systems are located in close proximity to the consumption site. Power moves over shorter distances and therefore, less energy is lost through transmission, and risks such as wind damage from falling trees can be reduced. In New Jersey, an average of 9.6% of electricity was lost during transmission and distribution from 1990 – 2013. (Wirfs- Brock, 2015) In addition to maintaining power supply to the facilities they serve during emergencies, microgrids provide other energy resiliency benefits. For instance, microgrids that operate using clean energy and renewable energy distributed generation can help to reduce overall emissions and potentially result in cost savings. (Ribeiro)
Currently in New Jersey, there are a number of regulatory, technical and financial barriers preventing widespread utilization of microgrids designed to serve single or multiple facilities/customers. In 2016, the Board of Public Utilities (BPU) prepared a Microgrid Report focused on advanced Town Center Distributed Energy Resource (TCDER) microgrids (those that serve multiple facilities/customers). This report presents the results of an evaluation of a number of current microgrid studies and reports; as well as information obtained from stakeholders and officials from several states, NJ electric distribution companies, the U.S. Dept. of Energy (DOE), microgrid developers and customers. The BPU report indicates that in general, TCDER microgrids can provide enhanced energy resiliency for critical/essential facility customers at the local level, as well as enhanced reliability and efficiency for the distribution system. The TCDER microgrid can accomplish this with enhanced energy efficiency, clean energy generation including both renewables and natural gas combined heat and power, lower air emissions and other environmental impacts, as well as provide overall energy cost savings to the group of critical/essential facility/customers. If designed properly and its location is optimized, a TCDER microgrid can potentially benefit the broader distribution system by helping to improve overall system performance. However, it is clear that a case-by-case analysis is needed to determine the benefits of each specific TCDER system; which could be accomplished through a detailed feasibility study. Expanded use of microgrid technology is dependent on the deployment of smart grid technology, which would provide the necessary communication technology and energy management systems to support microgrids. Smart grid and microgrid technologies will play a significant role in modernizing the distribution system so that it becomes more reliable, resilient, flexible and sustainable. As noted previously, a new policy directive for the State of New Jersey is needed to support grid modernization. DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 18
The following illustration shows a simple component breakdown of a microgrid:
Source: http://www.pitt.edu/~erb84/trends.html
5. Fuel Cells & CHP Both fuel cells and CHP systems are distributed energy technologies that can support energy resilience. Both can provide safe, reliable back-up power for critical and essential facilities during natural hazard events. When strategically located, they can also obviate the need for more expensive infrastructure expansions and transmission upgrades and associated environmental impacts.
Fuel cells are compact, modular, do not involve internal combustion and have minimal siting constraints. There are several types of fuel cells, which are classified primarily by the kind of electro-chemical reactions they employ, the catalysts required, temperature range in which they operate, and the fuel that is required. The more common types utilize natural gas, and emit water as a by- product. Fuel cells provide a clean, decentralized, reliable power source that’s located in close proximity to the point of consumption, and has proven to be useful during hazard events.
According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Fuel Cells Technologies Office, $0.6 Million was awarded to two New Jersey Companies from FY 2013 – 2017 through its “Competitively Selected Projects and National Lab Core Capabilities Initiative” to
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promote the development and deployment of fuel cell technology. This technology was utilized successfully as a back-up power source for keeping some cell phone towers in New Jersey operational during and following Superstorm Sandy, and can be used in conjunction with microgrid technology. Most cell phone towers run on electricity from the regional grid, and as cell phones increasingly replace landline phones, a loss of cell service due to a power grid failure can cut off access to emergency services like 9-1-1 and warning systems. Fuel cells are a technological solution for cell phone towers because they can be sited in harsh terrain and rural areas, withstand extreme climate conditions and can operate for days without intervention. They are quiet, have low emissions and overall efficiency ranging from 62 to 75 percent. They have also been used successfully by hospitals to help provide life-supporting services during and after hazard events and by schools that serve as emergency shelters. (CleanEnergyGroup). More information about fuel cell technology is available on the U.S. Dept. of Energy website at: https://www.energy.gov/eere/amo/downloads/fuel-cells-doe-chp-technology-fact-sheet-series-fact-sheet-2016. Regulatory reforms are needed in New Jersey to enable greater utilization and integration of fuel cell technology.
Similarly, combined heat and power (CHP) is a distributed energy technology fueled by natural gas that can improve resiliency. CHP is also a type of distributed energy generation that is located at or near the point of consumption. When designed to operate independently from the macrogrid, they can provide electric power and reliability for critical infrastructure and facilities as well as other types of businesses and organizations, while also providing thermal energy to the sites they serve, resulting in operating cost savings. CHP systems allow the heat that would normally be lost in the power generation process to be recovered for the purpose of meeting a facility’s heating and cooling needs, making it a highly efficient, low-emissions back-up power choice. (Riberio) It has proven to be a technology that can be deployed quickly and cost-effectively, and with few geographic limitations. CHP systems can also improve grid resiliency by removing significant electrical load from key areas of the macrogrid, particularly during peak demand periods. This is possible when CHP is installed in areas where the local electricity distribution network is constrained or where load pockets exist. CHP design and placement can be coordinated with the utility’s centralized resources to maximize benefits. (ICF International) Natural gas fueled CHP produces comparatively lower emissions than power generation systems that run on diesel and coal, and are highly efficient (65 to 75%). CHP is the primary driver of most of the microgrid systems in-place in the United States today. CHP has great untapped potential, representing only about 8% of installed US electric generating capacity, and their popularity may increase as their resiliency benefits become integrated into energy investment decisions. (Chittum & Relf)
Costs for both fuel cell and CHP systems have been decreasing during recent years, and this trend is expected to continue, enhancing the feasibility and deployment of this technology. They are well-suited for use as part of microgrids developed to ensure power supplies to critical facilities. Incentives are provided through New Jersey’s Clean Energy Program for CHP and Fuel Cells. See http://www.njcleanenergy.com/). Regulatory reforms and performance-based incentives are needed at the State level to facilitate broader deployment of these technologies at the local level. More information about CHP technology is available on the U.S. Dept. of Energy Website: https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/12/f46/CHP%20Overview-120817_compliant_0.pdf.
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6. Renewable Energy Generation
Increased utilization of clean, renewable energy is an important component for creating resilient and sustainable communities. New public policies and regulations are emerging, technological advances continue to be made, and energy business models are being updated making renewable energy systems increasingly more technically and financially viable. Currently, about 5 percent of New Jersey’s energy comes from renewable sources (mostly solar). Nearly half of New Jersey’s energy comes from nuclear power plants, which emits nearly zero greenhouse gasses but has other significant environmental impacts (including but not limited to cooling water requirements and radioactive waste disposal). (RPA) Clean, renewable generation is beginning to play a larger role in replacing more costly, pollution-generating energy systems such as oil and coal-fired power plants. With the closure of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant in Lacey Township, New Jersey in September 2018 (the Nation’s oldest nuclear power plant) and as other aging nuclear power facilities and those that are no longer able to operate economically close in the future, the availability of clean, safe, renewable energy options will continue to grow in importance. Below is a list of the seven (7) major types of renewable energy and associated website links for learning more about them. Federal and state regulations, policies and incentive programs often predicate the degree to which different types of renewable energy are deployed. As a result, some types are more prevalent statewide and in Somerset County than others.
Biopower - https://www.energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/biopower-basics Geothermal Heat Pumps - https://www.energy.gov/energysaver/heat-and-cool/heat-pump-systems/geothermal-heat-pumps Hydroelectric - https://water.usgs.gov/edu/wuhy.html Hydrogen - https://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/hydrogen_basics.html Wind - https://www.awea.org/wind-101/basics-of-wind-energy Solar - https://www.nrel.gov/workingwithus/re-solar.html Ocean: Thermal and Mechanical - https://www.wbdg.org/resources/ocean-energy
Legislation was passed by the NJ State Assembly and Senate during the spring 2018, which was signed into law on May 23, 2018 that requires power companies in New Jersey to generate 50% of their electricity from renewable sources by 2030 and 100% clean energy by 2050. (A3723) The Draft “New Jersey’s Clean Energy Program FY19-FY22 Strategic Plan” released in May 2018 calls for an increase in the level of energy savings delivered through energy efficiency (EE) and distributed energy resources (DER) by over 56% through 2022. New Jersey is one of 30 states with a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), aimed at increasing the amount of renewable energy production and use. Legislation supporting the development of off-shore wind energy was also passed in 2018 in New Jersey, further supporting this policy goal.
A separate “nuclear bailout bill” was signed into State law in May 2018, which addresses losses as nuclear power plants can no longer compete with low-cost natural gas and renewable energy, although they are the source of half of the state’s electric power DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 21
supply. This action prevents the forced early closure of nuclear facilities and their replacement with pollution-generating fossil fuel alternatives, which would cancel-out carbon emissions benefits provided by renewable energy systems installed in the state thus far.
The BPU’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) rules and net-metering and interconnection rules implement the State’s statutory provisions designed to facilitate renewable energy market development. These policies and regulations are central to increasing the production of renewable energy in the State. Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) provisions within the RPS and the net metering and interconnection rules provide incentives for investment in, and operation of renewable energy facilities connected to the regional electric grid in New Jersey. Market restructuring and revised net-metering policy solutions are still needed to allow non-utility generators and distributors to be paid for renewable energy generation. Consumers, including local jurisdictions that are involved in energy aggregation programs have the ability to opt to increase the proportion of the energy they purchase from renewable sources.
An overview of the predominant types of renewable energy systems underway in New Jersey at the current time is provided below:
a. Solar
Solar photovoltaic (PV) generation coupled with battery storage and microgrid technology can enable communities to benefit from long-term energy cost savings while protecting critical and essential facilities, operations and infrastructure, and vulnerable populations from the damaging effects of widespread power outages. Solar PV distributed energy systems are not affected by liquid fuel supply chain disruptions caused by severe storms. Increased use of solar PV distributed generation is believed to have a long- term advantage over fossil fuel-based generation because of volatile fuel prices and the fact that fossil fuels are a finite resource. To provide a general perspective on how limited fossil fuel resources are expected to become in the future, “The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimated that as of January 1, 2015, there were about 2,355 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of technically recoverable resources of dry natural gas in the United States. At the rate of U.S. Dry natural gas consumption in 2015 of about 27.3 Tcf per year, the United States has enough natural gas to last about 86 years. The actual number of years will depend on the amount of natural gas consumed each year, natural gas imports and exports, and additions to natural gas reserves”, as noted by the American Geosciences Institute (see https://www.americangeosciences.org/critical-issues/faq/how-much-natural-gas-does-united- states-have-and-how-long-will-it-last). Based on BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy, there are about 115 years of coal production, and roughly 50 years of both oil and natural gas remaining according to Hannah Ritchie with Our World in Data. (See: https://ourworldindata.org/how-long-before-we-run-out-of-fossil-fuels). Costs will rise as fossil fuel resources grow scarce, changing the current economic advantage that natural gas generation holds over renewable generation.
Currently, New Jersey’s RPS rules require all electric suppliers serving retail customers to procure 20.38% of their electricity from eligible renewable energy sources by June 2020; and an additional 4.1% of their sales from eligible solar energy sources by 2027. As a result of these policies, there has been an increase of 267.25 Megawatts (MW) of photovoltaic (solar) power generation per year in New Jersey between 2011 and 2015 thus far. In Somerset County, solar generation increased from 22 MW in 2011 to 80 MW by 2015.
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Solar leasing and power purchase agreements (PPAs) can be used to expand the deployment and utilization of PV energy. Net- metering could also help. The use of net-metering would allow customers who own their own electricity generating equipment, most often solar panels, to receive credit for the electricity they produce while reducing their energy bill. Virtual net-metering is similar, in that it allows neighborhood or group net-metering through which communities or groups with shared ownership of electricity generating systems to receive credits proportional to their ownership. Policies that allow these metering practices can hasten the integration of renewable energy resources into the electric grid. Net-metering is enabled through the implementation of smart grid and advanced metering technologies. During 2018, a series of bills have been proposed in New Jersey including A1236, S2422 and S596 that support the installation and utilization of renewable energy and energy saving devices, including net-metering and advanced metering technology.
b. Wind
Wind power can help diversify and thereby add stability and resiliency to the State’s energy system. Offshore wind farms provide a renewable domestic energy source. Wind speeds tend to be faster and more consistent than on land. Offshore wind farms have the potential to yield a steady supply of clean energy for population centers with high energy needs that are concentrated in the coastal areas of the State. Turbine and cable engineering, design and construction solutions are emerging that are making offshore wind farms more economically viable while reducing their environmental impacts. New Jersey’s Clean Energy Bill (A3723) which was signed into law this year codifies the goal of providing 3,500 MW of offshore wind energy in New Jersey by 2030. It reinstates an expired program to provide tax credits for offshore wind manufacturing activity. Wind energy is expected to play an important role in attaining the State’s goal of obtaining 100 percent of its power from clean energy sources by 2050. In October 2018, the Governor released a report entitled, “The State of Innovation: Building a Stronger and Fairer Economy in New Jersey”. This report states that, “One area in which we are uniquely well-equipped to lead in is offshore wind energy. Based on our geographic and geological position, we have an opportunity to be the home of a strong offshore wind industry and to benefit from the carbon-free energy it will generate. The BPU has opened a 1,100 MW application window for offshore wind projects, the largest single-state wind solicitation in the country, and we have directed the BPU to issue two additional 1,200 MW solicitations in 2020 and 2022 to achieve the 3,500 MW capacity target. This is an important signal to the international wind industry of our long-term commitment. Additionally, New Jersey has the skilled workforce needed to quickly respond to the emerging needs of the wind energy supply chain and has some of the leading maritime and coastal research institutions in the region, including at Rutgers and Monmouth Universities”. This report calls for the establishment of a “Wind Innovation & New Development” (WIND) Institute for coordinating and expediting activities involving regulations, permits, siting, logistics and deployment of off-shore wind; and building connections to resources, workforce training, research and development, and capital investments. For more information, visit the website at: https://www.njeda.com/pdfs/StrongerAndFairerNewJerseyEconomyReport.aspx.
Small-scale wind turbines can potentially be used to contribute clean, renewable energy for powering municipal facilities, households and small businesses. In New Jersey, small wind energy systems generally must be connected to the utility grid, which can then
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provide the balance of a facility’s energy needs. In Somerset County, there is generally insufficient wind to make their use economically feasible. Annual Average Wind Speed in this area is generally 4.0 m/s or less at 30 meters according to wind resource estimates developed by AWS Truepower for the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (see https://windexchange.energy.gov/maps-data/325). These systems are typically practical in areas with an annual average wind speed of at least 4.5 m/s (10 mph); and where incentive programs are available. Sustainable Jersey’s Certification Program allows municipalities to earn up to 10 points for the installation of a small wind system (see http://www.sustainablejersey.com/actions- certification/actions/#open/action/109)
c. Biopower
Electric generation using sustainable biomass fuel sources can turn waste into a cost-effective renewable source, reduce reliance on other fossil fuels, and support regional energy resiliency and sustainability goals by providing an alternative power source for critical facilities such as wastewater treatment plants. Currently, biopower projects in NJ include those at wastewater treatment plants that generate electricity and thermal energy from the biogas produced by the anaerobic digestion of sewage sludge; and those at landfills where electricity is generated with methane produced from the decay of organic materials within landfills. Large amounts of energy are required to treat and convey water and wastewater. Expanded utilization of biopower systems at water and wastewater treatment plants coupled with microgrid technology could lower their energy costs, reduce demand on the regional energy system and protect treatment plant operations during widespread power outages. Biopower has been successfully deployed at wastewater treatment facilities in New Jersey operated by the Camden County Municipal Utilities Authority, Landis Sewerage Authority in Vineland, and the Ridgewood Village Sewage Treatment Plant. Information about the Ridgewood biogas renewable energy project is available at the following link: http://americanbiogascouncil.org/projectProfiles/ridgewoodNJ.pdf. There are 14 publically and privately owned wastewater treatment facilities and two major potable water supply treatment plants located in Somerset County where biopower deployment could potentially be considered. Incentives are available through the NJ Clean Energy Program (NJCEP) for certain biopower projects that generate electricity (and thermal energy if a CHP is proposed) using sustainable Class I biomass resources as defined by N.J.A.C. 14:8-2.5. A biomass sustainability determination from the NJ Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) is required as part of the NJCEP application. Legal, regulatory and funding incentives are needed in order to enable more widespread implementation of biopower systems by sewer and water utilities, authorities and companies in New Jersey.
7. Energy Storage
Grid-scale energy storage systems can be used to improve macrogrid resiliency and reliability; enable the deployment of smart grid technology, accommodate microgrids and distributed energy; and allow for a more seamless transition to clean renewable energy generation. Affordable, efficient grid-scale battery storage technology can facilitate the integration of intermittent renewable power sources such as solar and wind into the energy system on a large scale. Grid-scale storage can create new options for managing the electricity system in a new era of decentralized and intermittent power supply and demand. It can help balance changes in
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consumer behavior and respond to weather events that affect renewable generation and cause supply disruptions. Grid-scale storage can also enable power resources to be used more effectively.
Grid-scale lithium-ion batteries have begun to be deployed on a large scale basis; and other storage technologies are rapidly emerging as production and deployment becomes safer and more cost effective. (Hart) The following four (4) storage technology types are considered deployed: Pumped Hydroelectric Storage, Compressed Air Energy Storage, Advanced Battery Energy Storage and Flywheel Energy Storage. Thermal Energy Storage is also considered deployed. Several additional energy storage systems are in the research and development phase. More information is available at the following link: http://css.umich.edu/sites/default/files/U.S._Grid_Energy_Storage_Factsheet_CSS15-17_e2017.pdf.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued final rules in February 2018 (Order No. 841) that remove barriers to the participation of electric storage resources in the capacity, energy and ancillary services markets operated by regional transmissions organizations and independent system operators (Somerset County is part of the PJM region). This order will enhance competition and promote greater efficiency in the nation’s electric wholesale markets, and will help support the resilience of the bulk power system. In New Jersey, grants have been made available through the NJ Clean Energy Program that support energy storage projects that are paired with renewable energy generation in an effort to promote the deployment of grid-scale energy storage. Many questions remain to be answered with regard to how energy storage can be successfully integrated into the modernizing energy system, both technologically and economically. New Jersey currently has a goal of developing 600 megawatts of energy storage by 2021, which is critical for supporting the expanded utilization of intermittent renewable energy sources in the State.
8. Energy Efficiency and Conservation
Energy Efficiency (EE) and conservation is a strategy that can enhance the resilience of energy systems and the communities they serve. Energy efficiency reduces demand for energy resources, which in turn increases energy reliability during times of stress on the electric system and improves the ability to respond to system emergencies. Energy efficiency also plays an important role in preventing power disruptions by helping to balance electricity supply and demand. Reducing energy use lowers power demand on the grid, which is particularly beneficial during peak demand periods. It also can obviate the need for new supply sources and transmission and distribution infrastructure. Energy savings from efficiency improvements means fewer emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants, improved public health and lowered energy costs.
Energy efficient buildings and infrastructure have increased economic value, durability and safety in the event of a disaster. Efficient buildings are better able to maintain temperatures suitable for occupation, and can accommodate sheltering in place as long as their structural integrity is maintained. Energy efficient buildings generally have enhanced building envelopes with a higher level of insulation and air sealing, which is why they can maintain more livable conditions for occupants when electricity from the grid is unavailable. Buildings that allow residents to stay in their homes during power outages are of particular importance for housing vulnerable populations that often have mobility constraints and are more sensitive to temperature changes, including people with access and functional limitations and health or medical conditions. Buildings that can maintain comfortable indoor conditions during DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 25
hazard events can also reduce demands on public shelters and both the risks and costs associated with relocating people during extreme weather events. The cost of energy spikes when extreme temperature conditions occur. (Ribeiro) Efficient buildings enable a reduction in spending on energy costs and free-up income so that other needs can be addressed. High performance buildings can help reduce peak electricity demand, therefore placing less stress on the regional grid and back-up power systems during emergencies. They can have a stabilizing effect on energy prices as well. Implementation of energy efficiency and conservation measures is strongly supported by the Somerset County Energy Council due in part to their significant contribution toward community sustainability and resiliency. (SCEC)
From a climate change perspective, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE) show energy efficiency is a vital climate solution. Half of the carbon dioxide emission reductions in the electric power sector since 2005 have come from stopping growth in demand for electricity, while the balance can be attributed to the increased use of renewable energy and natural gas generation, as shown below in the EIA graphic. For more information, see https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37392.
The results of the EIA study confirm the findings in the above-referenced 2016 ACEEE report that shows the US economy has grown even as US electricity use has plateaued.
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A large part of the demand reduction has been attributed to consumer energy efficiency by the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE) in its 2016 Report entitled, “The Greatest Energy Story You Haven’t Heard: How Investing in Energy Efficiency Changed the US Power Sector and Gave Us a Tool to Tackle Climate Change”, available at the following link: https://aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/u1604.pdf. The ACEEE report shows that policy-driven energy efficiency since 1990 has become the third-largest electricity resource in the United States; without it, we would need the equivalent of 313 additional large power plants to meet the country’s energy needs. If savings from appliance standards, utility programs, and building codes reached their full potential, they would become our nation’s largest electricity resource by 2030, providing a wealth of benefits. Research conducted by the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) has also found that energy efficiency holds the potential for even greater CO2 emission reductions in the future. It can contribute at least half of the 80% reduction by 2050, which many consider the necessary contribution from the United States to meeting climate goals, while growing the economy and saving consumers money.
For information about climate trends and associated hazard concerns impacting Somerset County and the State, please see the Climate Memorandum that comprises Appendix FRF-8, which is included in the Draft Flood Resiliency Framework (Appendix K) of the 2019 Somerset County Multi-jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan.
The State Energy Office within the BPU coordinates efforts to implement the Energy Savings Improvement Program (ESIP). ESIPs allow municipalities and school districts individually or collectively, to enter into long-term energy savings contracts. BPU staff reviews applications and assists local governments in navigating through the ESIP Process. The Somerset County Energy Council contracted with experts from the New Jersey Institute of Technology’s Center for Building Excellence to produce an ESIP Feasibility Study for Somerset County in 2014. This study demonstrates significant energy and cost savings can be achieved by local governments through the implementation of EE initiatives; which can potentially be accomplished through the establishment of ESIPs. It is available online at the following link: https://www.co.somerset.nj.us/government/public-works/planning/energy- council/energy-council-projects
The use of smart meters as an energy efficiency strategy is expanding. In New Jersey, several bills have been proposed aimed at allowing for and regulating the use of smart meters. They can benefit utility customers by helping them to better manage their energy use and reduce both energy consumption and cost. Uncertainty about the cost of installing smart meter devices and the associated communication and other requisite technologies by utility companies has delayed its deployment. The BPU approved a $16.5 million plan to install smart meters for Rockland Electric’s 74,000 customers within its service area in September 2017, but this opportunity has yet to be extended across the State. The BPU is using Rockland Electric, which is the State’s smallest utility, as a case study to determine how well the program succeeds before moving forward in other areas. (Johnson)
New Jersey’s Clean Energy Act signed into law on May 23, 2018 mandates that electric utilities reduce customer usage by 2 percent per year and that gas utilities decrease customer usage by at least 0.75 percent per year, which could lead to substantial savings for customers. The legislation creates a board-administered system of financial incentives and penalties to reward or penalize a
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company for its energy efficiency measures while limiting the recovery of lost revenue for specific energy saving projects. Funding and incentives for identifying and implementing energy efficiency improvements by homeowners, businesses and local government entities are available through the NJ Clean Energy Program (see http://www.njcleanenergy.com/).
Local governments can take steps to make their communities more energy efficient and support the deployment of clean energy as an energy resiliency strategy. Enforcement of building codes and the application of higher efficiency standards such as the International Green Construction Code (IGCC) for all new buildings and major reconstruction/redevelopment projects can be highly effective at the local level. Nineteen (19) of Somerset County’s 21 municipalities are involved in the Sustainable Jersey Certification Program. (For more information, see http://www.sustainablejersey.com/actions-certification/). A large number of actions for which municipalities can earn sustainability credits are in the “Energy” category. Points can be earned for implementing actions that align with improving energy resiliency including “Energy Tracking and Management”, “Energy Efficiency for Municipal Facilities”, “Municipal On-site Solar System”, “Municipal Geothermal Energy System”, “Municipal Wind Energy System”, “Commercial Energy Efficiency Outreach”, “Residential Energy Efficiency Outreach”, “Make Your Town Solar Friendly”, “Community-led Solar Initiatives”, “Wind Ordinance”, “Purchase Alternative Fuel Vehicles”, and more. Sustainability credits earned for actions listed under the “Sustainability and Climate Planning “ category can also contribute to improving energy resilience, including, “Climate Action Plan” and “Community Asset Mapping”.
9. Demand Management
Demand response (DR) is being increasingly implemented as a strategy for avoiding brown-outs and black-outs during peak demand periods. DR provides an opportunity for consumers to play a significant role in the operation of the electric grid by reducing or shifting their electricity usage during peak periods in response to time-based rates or other forms of financial incentives. DR programs are being used by some electric system planners and operators to help balance supply and demand. These programs can lower the cost of electricity in wholesale markets, which can lead to lower retail rates. They can also help electricity providers save money through reductions in peak demand and the ability to defer construction of new power plants and power delivery systems, especially those reserved for use during peak demand periods. DR programs become increasingly viable options when coupled with grid modernization and smart grid development that includes advanced metering technology. DR management is based on the ability to control, operate and monitor remote assets. (Vos) DR systems provide the ability for customer loads to respond to external controls during an energy system emergency, and also support energy system performance while power restoration activities are underway. To be successful, consumers must be provided with pricing queues. Smart home systems and individual appliances that can communicate with the grid and know current demand and current rates are emerging. Incentive programs and rebates could be provided to expand the use of smart home systems and appliances. (RPA)
DR management is also important for managing microgrid systems in terms of maintaining a balance between load and generation in order to keep the grid system stable. Microgrids are often provided for large scale campus facilities and buildings such as
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universities, high-rise office buildings or large-scale retail store chains that enter into a contract with demand response companies. (NIST)
10. Transportation Options
The availability of multiple modes of transportation increase travel options during evacuations and when other transportation systems are disrupted, and are important from a hazard mitigation perspective. Bus and train transit generally requires less energy per capita and are generally more efficient compared to single-occupancy vehicles since they can move more people. They can also reduce the strain on liquid fuel supplies during emergencies. Energy-related mitigation actions can be taken to make transportation systems more resilient, so that they remain in service during emergencies. For example, microgrids can be used to keep electric rail systems operating during power outages and back-up generators can keep traffic signals in operation. Regional transportation systems that integrate energy efficiency are more resilient and better able to support emergency response efforts. Public transit is inherently energy efficient because it uses less energy as compared to moving the same number of people in private vehicles, and electric transit buses can potentially be recharged from a microgrid and continue to provide service during widespread power outages. Well- connected multimodal transit networks reduce reliance on single-occupant vehicles. They can be vital during emergencies when residents in transit-served areas are required to evacuate. Having multiple transportation modes and options available during emergencies can expedite evacuation processes. (Ribeiro)
However, the expansion of the electric vehicle (EV) market will have the greatest implications from an energy resiliency standpoint. The emerging EV market has the potential to become a significant electric demand response management, voltage regulation and distribution-level service opportunity that can boost energy system resiliency, without vehicle-to-grid power flows. A car with a 30 kWh battery stores as much electricity as the average U.S. residence consumes in a day. (Nelder) Emerging technology can allow charging to be managed while meeting EV operator needs. Vehicle-to-grid power flow could become part of our modernized megagrid and microgrid systems in the future. New technologies, regulations and business models are now being developed that open up the possibility of feeding the energy stored in vehicle batteries back to the electric grid, which can facilitate renewable energy integration and grid stability, efficiency and reliability. For example, vehicle-to-grid technologies could allow electric cars to absorb excess power when demand for electricity from the regional grid is low and/or when renewable production is high; and return some back to the grid during peak demand periods, or when renewable production is low. (Briones)
A transition from gasoline- and diesel-fueled vehicles to electric vehicles has begun in New Jersey and is supported by Somerset County. The growing fleet of highly fuel efficient “hybrid” vehicles and all-electric vehicles can mean less strain on gasoline and diesel supplies, which are also needed for back-up power systems during emergencies. Liquid fuel supply chain disruptions caused by Superstorm Sandy and other severe weather events led to fuel shortages at gas stations and rationing in the past. New Jersey’s current administration has adopted a goal of having more than 300,000 zero emission vehicles on the road by 2030. (NJ Economic Plan) As the State transitions to renewable energy, and as more flexible smart grid and microgrid technologies take hold, electric vehicles may prove to be a more resilient and reliable form of transportation during emergencies.
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V. ENERGY RESILIENCY PLANS, PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES
The following is a summary of the primary plans, programs and initiatives that are underway, were recently completed, or have been proposed at the regional and local levels by government entities and energy utilities. Many of these initiatives have been identified and implemented through investigations of utility company responses in the wake of recent severe storms which causes extended power outages and extensive damage to energy system infrastructure. Others are part of the ongoing roles and responsibilities of government entities and utility companies, which must be addressed pursuant to regulatory and legal requirements and ratepayer obligations.
1. New Jersey
a. State Energy Master Plan
Overarching energy system goals and priorities for the State of New Jersey are contained in the State Energy Master Plan. This plan includes valuable information for understanding the inter-relationships, roles and responsibilities of utility companies, regulatory oversight agencies and other stakeholders. The current 2015 update of the State Energy Master Plan is available on line at the following link: http://nj.gov/emp/docs/pdf/New_Jersey_Energy_Master_Plan_Update.pdf. This Plan includes five overarching goals and associated implementation actions. Many of the energy resiliency strategies described in Section II, “Energy Resiliency Solutions” above align with these goals, which are listed below:
1. Drive Down the Cost of Energy for All Customers 2. Promote a Diverse Portfolio of New, Clean, In-State Generation
3. Reward Energy Efficiency and Energy Conservation/Reduce Peak Demand
4. Capitalize on Emerging Technologies for Transportation and Power Production
5. Maintain Support for the Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard.
The 2015 State Energy Master Plan Update includes a new section that addresses the challenges to New Jersey’s energy infrastructure in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, which is accompanied by a new section, “Improve Energy Infrastructure Resiliency & Emergency Preparedness and Response”. This new section was added based upon a review of severe storm events and their consequences. Below are the goals that align with this section. The Energy Master Plan update catalogs the actions that have taken place thus far to implement these goals, and recommends additional strategies for moving forward. The plan can be found online at the following link http://nj.gov/emp/docs/pdf/New_Jersey_Energy_Master_Plan_Update.pdf.
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Protect the State’s Critical Energy Infrastructure: “Reduce the vulnerability of the State’s critical energy infrastructure by encouraging the assessment of current vulnerabilities to threats and promoting efforts to reduce those vulnerabilities to threats and promoting efforts to reduce those vulnerabilities and increase response and restoration times to damage to the State’s critical energy infrastructure”.
Improve EDC Emergency Preparedness and Response: “The State should encourage and promote greater emergency preparedness and response among its local and county governments to reduce the impact of future energy events”.
Improve and Enhance the EDC Smart Grid and Distribution Automation Plans: “The BPU will require the four EDCs to submit updated plans for Smart Grid/Distribution Automation (SG/DA) that further detail the progress to date, future plans and the overall costs and benefits of SG/DA for reliability and resiliency. BPU will initiate a proceeding to work with the four EDCs to further develop and enhance a smarter grid through distribution automation with detailed plans for future development for SG/DA by the EDC”.
Increase the use of Microgrid Technologies and Applications for Distributed Energy Resources (DER): “Increase the use of microgrid technologies and applications for DER to improve the grid’s resiliency and reliability in the event of a major storm”.
Create Long-Term Financing for Local Energy Resiliency Measures through and ERB and other Financial Mechanisms: “Use the federal funds provided to New Jersey to improve and increase local energy resiliency through DER microgrid systems that can operate during and after an emergency and to make the local energy systems stronger than they were before the storm”.
On May 23, 2018, Governor Murphy signed Executive Order 28 which requires the BPU to develop a new Energy Master Plan for the State by June 19, 2019. The order specifies that the plan shall:
Provide a strategy for achieving the total conversion of the state’s energy production to 100% clean energy sources by 2050, including specific actions to be implemented over the next 10 years; Incorporate the offshore wind development goal of providing 3,500 megawatts (MW) by 2030 consistent with Executive Order 8; Include provisions guiding the continued development of solar energy in NJ, including the provision of community solar projects; Double the net metering soft cap; Include energy storage goals and implementation strategies to occur during the next 10 years that will result in 600 MW by 2021 and 2,000 MW by 2030; and Identify ways to incentivize the use of clean energy and electric technology in the transportation sector and ports.
The updated State Energy Master Plan will align with the Clean Energy Bill (A3723/S2314), which was adopted by the State legislature in April 2018 and signed into law in May 2018. This law requires NJ to obtain 50% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2030, and modifies the State’s solar program to reflect the significant drop in solar energy costs that have occurred over DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 31
the last decade, allowing more businesses and residents to gain access to low-cost clean energy. It also calls for a community solar program that allows all customers, including lower-income residents in multi-family housing to benefit from solar power through subscriptions to larger, shared systems. This law establishes a 3-year cap that limits the cost of renewables to no more than 3% over what consumers pay today for electricity, and after 2022, the cost cap is reduced to no more than 1% of what consumers pay now for renewable energy. It aims to stabilize the solar market, and establishes energy efficiency goals and incentives aimed at reducing electricity consumption by 2-percent per year. This law is expected to yield secondary benefits in terms of air quality improvements, greenhouse gas reductions, and savings on energy costs.
b. State Hazard Mitigation Plan
Since the 2011 State Hazard Mitigation Plan was submitted to FEMA for review and approval, the State experienced seven Federal Disaster Declarations, including Superstorm Sandy. State agencies were actively engaged in Superstorm Sandy Recovery efforts at the same time the 2014 State HMP update process was underway. The 2014 Update includes some new actions that respond to problems caused by Superstorm Sandy. It also recognizes the need for additional activities that could not be accomplishes during the 2014 update process. One of these future actions is to integrate additional recommendations from the report entitled, “Resilience: Preparing New Jersey for Climate Change: A Gap Analysis from the New Jersey Climate Adaptation Alliance”, December 2013 published by Rutgers University.
The Risk Assessment of the State of New Jersey 2014 Hazard Mitigation Plan was significantly enhanced to include a detailed description of power failures as a hazard, including the location, extent, occurrence history, probability of future occurrence, severity, warning time and secondary impacts. Details regarding power outages related to Superstorm Sandy and climate change impacts are discussed. A vulnerability assessment has been completed and a consequence analysis for power failure events has been added. (For more information, see http://ready.nj.gov/programs/pdf/mitigation2014b/mit2014_section5-22.pdf). In the wake of Superstorm Sandy, a few mitigation projects and initiatives have been included as new Mitigation Actions in the 2014 State HMP. In addition, several recommendations made by Federal and State agencies were referenced, including FEMA’s Mitigation Assessment Team (MAT) review of Superstorm Sandy and a November 2013 MAT Report which identified a number of possible code and regulatory initiatives that should be reviewed by appropriate agencies, specifically NJDEP and NJDCA and addressed in future State HMP updates. Below is a snapshot of the new energy resiliency related Actions/Initiatives included in the 2014 State HMP, the details of which can be found at http://ready.nj.gov/programs/pdf/mitigation2014b/mit2014_section6.pdf:
Implement an Energy Allocation Initiative that provides government units with financing for alternative energy
projects to reduce demand on the power grid during an event while the State recovers from any grid disruption.
Improve retail fuel station’s ability to provide fuel in the event of power disruptions through the Liquid Fuel Resilience Program, which provides funding for onsite generators and quick connect points for portable generators.
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2. Regional Grid Operations
In New Jersey, power generation has been traditionally supported through bulk power plants that incorporate large electrical generators. New Jersey is a “deregulated state”, which means generation and transmission are handled separately, allowing independent power producers (IPPs) to generate power in a competitive market that allows consumers the opportunity to choose among generators. IPPs negotiate contracts to sell power through PJM to electric utilities that are responsible for managing electric delivery to consumers through the grid. The energy system in NJ is rapidly evolving as renewable power generation and other distributed generation has been added; and as demand response strategies emerge (energy efficiency and energy storage). Further evolution is expected to occur as utilization of energy storage technology expands; and in response to the transformation of the statewide vehicle fleet from primarily conventional combustion engines to an increasing proportion of electric vehicles. (NIST)
PJM Interconnection operates the regional grid of which Somerset County is a part, and is responsible for coordinating the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of 13 states and the District of Columbia. In light of the increasing contribution of natural gas –fired generation and retirement of coal-fired generation; increasing diversification energy generation resources (which also includes nuclear and renewables); emerging maximization capabilities through demand response management and Smart Grid technologies; and other changes in the electric power industry, PJM conducted an analysis to ascertain how these changes impact reliability, the results of which are presented in a paper entitled, “PJM’s Evolving Resource Mix and System Reliability”, March 30, 2017. This analysis concludes, “A more diverse system is more likely to have increased flexibility and adaptability to (1) mitigate the risk associated with equipment design issues or common modes of failure in similar resource types, (2) address fuel price volatility and fuel supply disruptions and (3) mitigate risk caused by weather and other unforeseen system shocks. In this way, resource diversity can be considered a system-wide hedging tool that helps ensure a steady, reliable supply of electricity”. PJM further notes that “relying too heavily on any one fuel type may negatively impact resilience because resources do not provide generator reliability attributes equally.” Given the expected rapid growth in natural gas generation and increased dependence on this resource, PJM will continue to examine resilience-related low probability weather events which can have significant reliability impacts and determine potential techniques to identify and mitigate natural gas infrastructure vulnerabilities. However, the paper points out that the analysis addresses reliability of services and that criterion for assessing resilience are not explicitly defined or quantified today. It recognizes it has yet to determine how distributed energy resources (including demand response and microgrids) and renewable resources can provide additional reliability or resilience services through improved inverter and storage technologies. Some additional questions raised in this paper include “Should PJM and the natural gas pipelines coordinate, study and operate joint electric and natural gas contingencies? Should PJM also consider this for other critical infrastructure industries such as telecommunications and water?”
PJM’s provides Demand Side Management (DSM) services that involve planning, implementation and monitoring of utility company activities, including but not limited to demand response and capacity assurance. Demand response activities often involve the use of contracts with large-scale power users. Contracted power users are paid to lower their usage during peak demand periods. PJM then sells the reduced-load to the utility during peak demand periods. Large contracted electric users thereby lower their annual
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electric costs and the utility can avoid brown-outs or black-outs, capacity assurance power purchases and/or the need to develop new generation capacity.
The effects of the January 2014 polar vortex, a prolonged period of extreme cold temperatures and icy conditions across the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic states impacted Somerset County as well as New Jersey and led to significant changes in PJM’s capacity market aimed at improving reliability during wintertime peak demand periods. During the polar vortex, peak demand for electricity was 25% higher than typical January peaks; which drove up prices for both electric power and gas. A near-crisis occurred on January 7th when peak-demand set a new wintertime record at the same time power plants started to fail in the cold weather due to mechanical issues such as frozen pipes and gearboxes along with gas supply chain issues. At that point in time, 22% of all generation capacity – including coal, gas and nuclear was out of service, well above the normal range of 7% to 10%. In order to improve reliability, PJM established a new “Capacity Performance” program intended to ensure the reliability and capacity of demand response (DR) providers and power plant operators during peak demand periods in both winter and summer, which became effective in July 2017. Some actions that were implemented include winterizing facilities, adding dual-fuel capability and executing firm contracts with natural gas providers. Significant penalties would be imposed on DR responders that fail to meet the program’s requirements, which could eventually cause the least reliable plants to cease operation. (Paulos) For more information about updated capacity performance requirements, see “PJM Manual 16: PJM Capacity Market Revision: 38” available at the following link: http://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/settlements/msrs/5-minute-settlements/redline-manual-18-capacity-market.ashx?la=en
3. Energy Generation and Distribution
A number of activities have been undertaken and are underway to improve energy system resilience by the major utility companies that operate energy systems within the County (PSE&G and Jersey Central Power and Light). The Electric Utilities Territory Map for New Jersey is provided below.
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Source: NJ Board of Public Utilities - http://www.njcleanenergy.com/main/public-reports-and-library/links/electric-utilities-territory-map
Following Hurricane Irene and the October 29, 2011 snow storm, the BPU led an investigation of the responses of the State’s power companies in addressing the electric outages. While the BPU was reviewing the associated reports and recommendations, Superstorm Sandy struck (October 29, 2012), leaving massive destruction in its wake. The BPU determined that existing power company practices were insufficient for responding to such large scale, severe weather events, and that electric utilities must be as prepared as possible. The following problem areas were identified: 1) poor communications with local officials regarding restoration times and the status of efforts to make downed wires safe, and hindered ability to provide timely and accurate information to residents so they could make informed decisions about shelter, sustenance and property security; 2) poor underlying condition of the infrastructure, reliability concerns and susceptibility to tree damage; and 3) vulnerability of substations to flooding and extensive substation damage particularly in the JCP&L and PSE&G territories. The BPU adopted the 2011 Hurricane Irene Electric Response Report, which required power companies to take immediate actions to improve communications, including the addition of staff during storm events, use social media to inform customers and establish scalable communications plans. The BPU then commissioned a
DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 35
review of power company preparedness and responses to Hurricane Irene. The resultant report released for public comment in September 2012 contained over 130 recommendations designed to enhance responses to and recovery from major storm events. BPU’s Executive Order EO11090543 issued on January 23, 2013 requires the implementation of specific actions within specified timeframes; while also recognizing the tremendous affect that Superstorm Sandy had on the State and the need for a separate assessment, which will be conducted so that additional actions or update of the actions in this order may occur. Its findings and directives are aimed at “ensuring continued provision of safe, proper and adequate service, to help mitigate future outages, and to help develop more effective communications among electric utilities, municipalities, customers and the Board during extreme weather events”. The requirements specified in BPU’s Order that are applicable to electric utilities that serve Somerset County are highlighted on pages 44 through 59 in the copy included in the Appendix. Sixty-five (65) requirements pertain to all electric utilities serving the State, nineteen (19) requirements are specific to JCP&L and twelve (12) are specific to JCP&L. The requirements pertain to the following topics:
PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS MUTUAL ASSISTANCE CREW/WORK MANAGEMENT/WORKFORCE LEVELS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES DAMAGE ASSESSMENT PLANNING ESTIMATED RESTORATION TIMES EXERCISES/DRILLS COMAND AND CONTROL TRAINING RESPONDER SYSTEMS, TOOLS AND JOB AIDS WEATHER MONITORING/FORECASTING LOGISTICS AND FIELD SUPPORT FOLLOW-UP WORK COMMUNICATIONS POST EVENT STORM RESTORATIN PROCESS METRICS PRE-EVENT COMMUNICATIONS BENCHMARKING.EXTERNAL ANALYSIS CUSTOMER SERVICE/CALL CENTER POST EVENT PROCESSES EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS UNDERLYING INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES RESTORATION AND RESPONSE SUBSTATION FLOODING VEGETATION MANAGEMENT ACTIVATION CIRCUIT OUTAGES
In April, 2018, the BPU launched its review of electric utility responsiveness during the major winter storm events that occurred on March 2, 2018 (Nor’easter snow storm) and March 7, 2018 (winter storm Quinn), which caused prolonged power outages in several areas of New Jersey including Somerset County. Similarly, the BPU had been tasked with reviewing utility company storm protocols that were implemented following Superstorm Sandy to assess whether the protocols were followed and if improvements should be made. In particular, the BPU will be reviewing mutual aid assistance protocols to ensure New Jersey utilities make restoring power in NJ their first priority. Progress in upgrading infrastructure will also be evaluated.
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a. PSE&G
The following is a summary of the major energy resiliency initiatives underway by PSE&G. In May 2014, the BPU approved a $1.22 billion investment in infrastructure hardening and resiliency by PSE&G to mitigate the effects of future severe storms on the utility’s electric and natural gas delivery systems. Referred to as PSE&G’s “Energy Strong” settlement, the improvements to be funded by this program during the ensuing 5 year period are outlined in the Energy Strong Fact Sheet included in the Appendix. According to PSEG’s 2017’s Sustainability Report, PSE&G has completed the following:
Raised, eliminated or rebuilt 18 substations or switching stations that were impacted during severe weather events. At the end of the program, 26 projects will be in service, including protected substations and switching stations Installed 240 miles of new sturdy and durable plastic natural gas pipes in flood-prone areas. Approximately 90,000 customers served by those pipes are no longer at risk of losing gas service from floodwaters seeping into these previously leak-prone mains. Created redundancy and installed technology to reduce the number and duration of outages for 260 critical customers, including hospitals, wastewater treatment facilities, police and fire stations. Also benefiting from this work are 412,500 customers and businesses in close proximity to these critical customers. Expanded its use of microprocessor relays, installed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) equipment at key substations and deployed a centralized Distribution SCADA Master Station that enables remote control and visibility of distribution circuits and enables rapid diagnosis of circuit conditions during severe weather events. (PSE&G received the 2018 POWERGRID International and DistribuTECH Grid Optimization Project of the Year award for this work)
PSE&G Energy Strong Implementation Summary (Through 12-31-2016)
PROGRAM APPROVED ($ Millions) SPENT ($ Millions) Flood Mitigation $620 $310 Electric Contingency Reconfiguration $100 $79 Electric Advance Technologies $100 $99 Gas Utilization Pressure Cast Iron (UPCI) $350 $370 Gas Metering and regulating (M&R) Station $50 $20 Flood Mitigation Total $1,220 $879 Source: PSEG 2017 Sustainability Report http://investor.pseg.com/sites/pseg.investorhq.businesswire.com/files/doc_library/file/sustainability_report.pdf
In September 2018, PSE&G filed a six-year $4 billion-plus capital spending proposal that aligns with new state energy policies. The proposal includes nearly $800 million for smart meters, $2.8 billion for a suite of energy efficiency programs and $2.5 billion to upgrade its power grid. The company plans to install smart meters for all of its customers by 2024.The work would include replacement of aging substations with an average age of 73 years. An electric- vehicle component is included involving $364 million for electric vehicle infrastructure for charging electric vehicles, including the installation of stations to plug-in cars in 37,000 DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 37
residences. $180 million to develop energy storage systems critical for integrating renewable energy is also part of the proposal. (Johnson, September 2018)
b. JCP&L
According to information provided on the company’s website (https://www.firstenergycorp/content/fecorp/newsroom/news_articles/), JCP&L has undertaken several projects expected to help reduce the number and durations of power outages. According to JCP&L, the company has invested more than $3 billion over the past 10 years to strengthen the durability and resiliency of its electric transmission and distribution systems. Projects scheduled annually for the past few years by JCP&L are summarized below:
2014: $251 million was slated to be spent in 2014 on the following projects: Upgrading more than 118 distribution circuits at a cost of nearly $6 million in a variety of communities to enhance service reliability. The improvements – adding animal guards, spacer cable, fuses, reclosers and adding new wire – are expected to reduce outages on distribution circuits that serve 184,000 customers in northern and central New Jersey. Initiating a Department of Energy $7 million smart grid technology modernization project on three circuits serving Bernards Township, Harding Township and Morristown. Implementing additional recloser technologies to allow the automatic transfer of customers to other circuits to minimize outage impacts and reduce restoration times. Inspecting 233 circuits starting at substations to proactively identify and replace equipment. Replacing underground distribution cables. Performing infrared scans on 300 circuits to detect equipment in need of replacement and proactively perform work. Inspecting and proactively replacing, if needed, more than 34,000 utility poles. Performing tree trimming work on 3,400 miles of line.
2015: $267 million was slated in 2015 for projects and other work to enhance and maintain a strong electrical system and help meet future demand within the State. These include: Upgrading more than 90 distribution circuits at a cost of nearly $6 million in a number of communities to enhance service reliability. The improvements – adding animal guards, spacer cable, fuses and new wire – are expected to reduce outages on distribution circuits that serve 180,000 customers in northern and central New Jersey. Performing tree trimming work on more than 3,300 miles of power lines at a cost of approximately $24 million. Redesigning circuits so the load they carry can be transferred to an adjacent circuit to help restore customers sooner if an outage occurs. Adding remote-controlled equipment so circuits can be automatically reset during power outages. Performing infrared scans on more than 280 circuits to determine condition of equipment and proactively making repairs, as needed. Inspecting 283 circuits from substation to substation to proactively identify potential service issues and replace equipment, as needed. Replacing more than 100,000 feet of underground distribution cables. Inspecting and proactively replacing, if needed, more than 28,000 utility poles.
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In order to enhance communications, JCP&L posted outage maps on the FirstEnergy website at www.firstenergycorp.com that customers can use to see when crews have been dispatched, when they are working on a repair, and when additional crews or equipment are needed to complete restoration work. Customers can also subscribe to JCP&L’s new e-mail and text message alert notification system to receive weather alerts and power outage updates by visiting https://www.firstenergycorp.com/content/customer/help/communication_tools.html.
2016: $387 million was slated for distribution and transmission infrastructure projects within the State. These include: Completed construction on the final phase of a new 11.5 mile, 115-kV transmission project from a substation in Englishtown to one in Manalapan at a cost of $17.7 million in 2016. The project will benefit nearly 34,000 customers in Mercer, Middlesex and Monmouth counties. Completing a project to enhance and expand a substation in Morris County at a cost of $16.6 million in 2016. Completing the substation expansion project in Old Bridge at a cost of $4.6 million in 2016. Starting construction of a new 16-mile, 230 kV transmission line from a substation in Howell to a substation in Neptune at a cost of $94.1 million in 2016. The project includes installing five one-ton circuit breakers. Upgrading more than 90 distribution circuits at a cost of nearly $6 million in a variety of communities to enhance service reliability. The improvements – adding animal guards, spacer cable, fuses, reclosers and adding new wire – are expected to reduce outages on distribution circuits that serve 180,000 JCP&L customers. Completing flood protection measures and installing monitoring devices at 19 substations. Replacing underground distribution cables in multiple areas. Performing infrared scans on more than 358 circuits to detect equipment in need of replacement and proactively perform the work. Inspecting and proactively replacing, if needed, more than 28,000 utility poles. Inspecting more than 1,200 reclosers and nearly 5,000 capacitors to proactively identify and replace equipment if necessary.
2017: $359 million was slated for large and small scale transmission and distribution projects. These include: Completing construction of a new 16-mile, 230 kV transmission line from a substation in Howell to a substation in Neptune, and installing five one-ton circuit breakers at a cost of about $24 million. Installing new high-speed communication equipment across the JCP&L service area at a cost of $11.6 million to help enhance the remote operation of the electric system. Upgrading more than 90 distribution circuits to enhance service reliability at a cost of $4.7 million. Upgrading transmission protective devices, circuit breakers and other equipment across the JCP&L service area at a cost of $5.4 million. This equipment automatically disconnects from the system when a problem is detected to reduce the length of an outage and the number of customers that are affected. Adding a new 34.5 kV transmission line in Eatontown at a cost of $4.8 million. Installing new 230 kV circuit breakers at a substation in Matawan at a cost of $2.1 million. Replacing switches at substations in Jefferson Township and Sayreville at a cost of $1.4 million. Replacing underground distribution cables in multiple areas. Inspecting and proactively replacing, if needed, more than 27,800 utility poles.
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2018: $357 million has been allocated for energy infrastructure projects and other work to enhance system reliability across the company’s 13-county NJ service area. These include: Replacing 40 automated control units at various substations that can be operated remotely from a company dispatch center at a cost of $7.3 million. The equipment provides operators the ability to restore power more quickly and efficiently than if a crew was needed to investigate the problem. Enhancing security systems at seven substations at a cost of $14.3 million. Completing underground and overhead circuit improvements in Morris County at a cost of $10.3 million. The work includes replacing cable, enhancing connection points where two circuits join, and relocating transformers. Replacing 24 substation circuit breakers to automatically disconnect from the system when a problem occurs at a cost of $6.6 million to help reduce the length of power outages and the number of customers affected. Upgrading more than 90 circuits at a cost of $4.7 million. Work includes adding remote-control devices to automatically restore service, installing animal guards on poles and in substations to limit the number of outages, installing lightning arrestors to help protect the system from stormy weather, and proactively replacing poles, cross-arms and wire, as needed. Upgrading and replacing distribution oil-filled circuit breakers with newer more efficient equipment. Adding new equipment to increase capacity at a substation in Ocean County Installing new "smart" equipment at 54 sites on the distribution system that can automatically restore customers quicker should an outage occur. Upgrading remote control equipment and adding new circuits to help add redundancy in Morris and Monmouth counties.
4. Local Government a. 2018 Municipal Energy Resilience Questionnaire
As part of the process of preparing the 2019 update of the Somerset County Multi-jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan, the Project Management Team (PMT) issued a questionnaire to municipal hazard mitigation officers (MHMOs) entitled, “Work Sheet 5 – Municipal Energy Resilience” to gather local information about both municipal-specific and area-wide energy resilience/reliability activities and improvements that took place by utility companies, government entities and other stakeholders within their communities in response to recent hazard event impacts and recovery efforts; utility company responses to the above-described BPU executive orders; and implementation of the mitigation initiatives included in the 2014 Somerset County Hazard Mitigation Plan. The degree to which MHMO’s and their committee members currently have access to utility information appears to vary significantly from community to community. The information provided by MHMOs in the questionnaire responses regarding activities aimed at improving infrastructure reliability and resilience that have been completed or that are currently underway by utility companies is summarized in Appendix ERF-3. This table also summarizes initiatives undertaken by local government entities to address municipal energy resilience and reliability needs as reported by MHMOs in their questionnaire responses. The County also attempted to gather information about remaining/outstanding area-wide and community-specific energy resilience/reliability needs from MHMOs and their committee members.
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Based on these findings, it is clear that more information-sharing and collaboration among municipal officials, electric and natural gas utilities and regulatory entities are needed. Forums are needed through which these groups can to work together to understand how communities will benefit from the improvements and upgrades that have been made and/or are planned; determine if additional gaps remain to be addressed; and develop additional appropriate strategies that will result in improved energy system resiliency and reduced hazard risks and associated secondary impacts. Four (4) MHMOs noted that vegetation management activities by electric utilities have been taking place. Six (6) MHMOs identified the need for routine on-going vegetation management activities by utility companies to reduce risks from tree damage. Two (2) MHMOs noted that solar arrays have been installed by local government entities on municipal buildings and by private entities on private facilities. They did not indicate whether they are part of microgrid systems that can be used to supply power to facilities in the event of a megagrid failure. The replacement of certain utility poles has been reported in a few municipalities. Several reported the installation of natural gas back-up generators at municipal facilities such as schools, police headquarters, firehouses and public works garages; and at private facilities such as gas stations and nursing homes. Back-up power generators have been provided at the municipally-owned wastewater treatment plants in Warren. The need for additional back-up power generators is clearly evident, with eleven (11) municipalities reporting the need provide back-up power at critical facilities such as emergency shelters, senior centers and other municipal facilities with a few expressing interest in microgrid systems for this purpose. A few support the installation of underground electric lines for all new development. The relocation of municipal facilities out of flood hazard areas was recognized as a need in the Borough of Manville. The need for additional trained CERT volunteers was identified in Bernardsville. b. Municipal Hazard Mitigation Plan – Projects and Initiatives
During the process of preparing the 2019 Somerset County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP), Somerset County and its participating local jurisdictions were asked to provide information about the implementation status of projects and initiatives included in their 2014 includes 24 local jurisdictional annexes. Each annex shows which projects are being carried forward from the 2014 HMP, as well as any new initiatives that have been added. It is important to note that some local jurisdictions may have already completed the initiative types addressed in the table, and therefore they no longer need to be included in their updated initiative list. A summary of these initiatives is provided in the following table; and a table listing each 2019 energy-related initiative by municipality is included in Appendix ERF-4. The 2019 HMP annexes for each participating jurisdiction are available at the following link: https://www.co.somerset.nj.us/government/public-health-safety/hazard-mitigation.
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2019 HMP : ENERGY -RELATED HAZARD MITIGATION INITIATIVES NUMBER OF ANNEXES NUMBER OF ANNEXES THAT INCLUDE THIS THAT INCLUDE THIS INITIATIVE TYPE INITIATIVE INITIATIVE TYPE INITIATIVE Adoption of Underground Utility Install Backup Power Generators Installation Requirements for at Critical/Essential Facilities 14 new development 8 Tree Management to protect Analyze feasibility of Electric transmission and undergrounding existing Communications Infrastructure 12 overhead utilities 1 Permit fee waivers for the installation of back-up power Provide microgrids at Critical generators at private facilities 9 Facilities 1 Public Education and Outreach on proper back-up generator Gasoline storage and pump installation and use 11 facility upgrades 1
Source: Draft 2019 Somerset County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan
5. Somerset County
a. Proposed Critical/Essential Facility Microgrid Feasibility Study
In response to the energy vulnerabilities and risks that became evident as a result of Superstorm Sandy, members of the Somerset County Energy Council, Planning Division and OEM Office staff collaborated to form a work group in 2014 that focused on compiling energy data on critical facilities in order to potentially apply for funding available through the NJ Energy Resiliency Bank1 (NJERB). This initiative involved potentially seeking ERB funding to determine the feasibility of creating one or more microgrids powered by distributed energy systems that would protect critical/essential facilities in the event of a widespread, prolonged power outages such as that which was experienced as a result of Superstorm Sandy in 2012. The group compiled a countywide inventory of
1 The mission of the NJ Energy Resiliency Bank (NJERB) was to assist critical facilities with securing resilient energy technologies that will make them – and, by extension, the communities they serve – less vulnerable to future severe weather events and other emergencies. DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 42
critical/essential facilities, which were defined based on NJERB, FEMA and Homeland Security Standards. Approximately fifty (50) facilities were identified and grouped into two (2) categories, according to their importance during emergencies. A questionnaire was prepared and distributed to each critical facility point of contact, with an accompanying cover letter, which was focused on gathering information about peak demand requirements, back-up power need and other energy-related factors. Roughly 75 percent of the targeted facilities did not submit a response. The remaining 25 percent provided incomplete responses.
Follow-up activities involving collection of the missing response data, creation of a GIS database of critical facilities, and an assessment of their potential to benefit from microgrid systems were suspended in 2015 because the NJERB funding, which is comprised solely of Sandy recovery funds allocated to NJ by FEMA, was not be available for use in counties such as Somerset that have been deemed ineligible for FEMA funds. When the NJERB was initially established, the state contemplated adding non-FEMA funding to the bank so that counties such as Somerset could potentially participate. However, the State later determined that no other sources of funding were to be allocated to the NJERB. Therefore, only the nine (9) coastal counties designated by FEMA were eligible. NJ ERB grants were awarded to fund microgrid feasibility analyses for 13 entities across all electric utility service areas within New Jersey. Homeland security issues and resource constraints have also hampered Somerset County’s efforts to move this initiative forward during the HMP update process. The outcome of this effort helped to shape the updated County-level mitigation projects included in the 2019 Somerset County Multi-jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan.
b. County-level Hazard Mitigation Plan – Projects and Initiatives
During the process of preparing the updated 2019 Somerset County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan, three (3) energy resiliency related county-level initiatives were identified and included in the mitigation strategy portion of the County Annex. A few of these initiatives are an outgrowth of the lessons learned in section a. Proposed Critical/Essential Facility Microgrid Feasibility Study described above. Implementation of these initiatives is dependent on the availability of staff and funding resources. An overview of these initiatives is provided in the following table. More information is available at the following link: https://www.co.somerset.nj.us/government/public-health-safety/hazard-mitigation.
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Initiative Name Initiative Description Determine the feasibility of providing a microgrid for the County Complex to provide a backup power system that enables essential county functions to continue to operate during prolonged widespread power outages 1) Identify and secure funding. County Complex 2) Define the scope of work and obtain consultant services. 3) Identify and engage partners (utility companies, NJBPU, etc.). Microgrid 4) Develop and issue Phase 1 RFP. 4) Complete the Feasibility study and submit results to Department Heads and Elected Officials. 5) If feasible, investigate implementation funding and define a strategy for moving forward.
Promote the provision of emergency preparedness measures in all new multifamily residential development, redevelopment and group living facilities including but not limited to nursing homes and assisted living facilities through updated local development review requirements and zoning ordinances. Encourage the identification and Residential implementation of strategies for retrofitting these measures into existing multifamily residential development and group Emergency living projects to enable residents to safely shelter in place. The Borough of Somerville has adopted zoning ordinance and Preparedness land development review policies and requirements that can serve as a model. The identification of incentives that encourage property/facility owners to provide emergency support services could be included. Measures can include but are not limited to the provision of backup power systems, emergency food and water supplies, warming and cooling of common areas, and other health and safety measures.
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Advocate for the creation and implementation of public and private-sector investment programs aimed at addressing backup power needs; as well as for the development and implementation of a backup power management plans. Advocate for the establishment of a county &/or local backup power oversight system for critical essential facilities. Promote the leveraging of prior investments in on-site solar installations and backup generators in order to establish microgrid systems where feasible and appropriate. Develop and maintain a centralized database of information on backup power capabilities at critical facilities in order to facilitate monitoring and enforcement and serve as an emergency response tool. The following potential sequence of Backup power steps could be implemented using a phased approach: 1) Perform assessments of short and long-term backup power availability and needs at all critical and essential facilities and collect and compile this information in GIS format. 2) Identify gaps; and implement reliable backup power improvements that will allow critical/essential facilities to continue to operate during prolonged power outages; perform vital services/functions before, during and after hazard events; and maximize their utility during the recovery process. 3) Establish a reporting system for regular backup system evaluation, monitoring, testing and maintenance. 4) Implement system enhancement or replacements as needed.
c. Somerset County Energy Council
The following recommendations included in the Somerset County Energy Council’s 2017 Annual report would advance energy resiliency countywide:
The preparation of energy audits for the County’s facilities has been recommended by the Council. Information about the BPU Clean Energy Program – Local Government Energy Audit Program for which the County may be eligible was provided to County leaders. Building upon the Council’s ESIP Feasibility Study, establishment of an ESIP that serves a small aggregate of municipalities within the County is supported by the Council, for which funding through the BPU could be pursued. Expanded education and outreach to municipal officials and planners regarding site and building design strategies that can make new development and redevelopment projects more energy efficient and energy resilient while incorporating new energy technology such as renewable and/or distributed energy generation, microgrid (islanding) capabilities and smart meters.
DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 45
Guidance to municipalities regarding location and design of electric charging stations; promoting the use of audits and the implementation of energy efficiency measures by local residents and businesses; and strategies for tracking energy performance is also needed. Expanding upon the infographics developed during 2017, the Council supports the development of enhanced messaging tools that first emphasize the cost and energy savings that can be achieved by implementing various energy conservation measures, and second, illustrate the environmental and quality of life benefits that can be achieved. The provision of reliable and efficient back-up/standby power for essential/critical public facilities and services in the event of prolonged grid outages is recommended, particularly systems that involve distributed energy which can enhance grid resilience and leverage prior investments in renewable/solar generation facilities.
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION RESOURCES
1. State
Below is a sample of potential statewide funding opportunities and financial incentive programs currently available in New Jersey for implementing energy and community resilience initiatives. This list is subject to change as programs evolve in response to emerging issues, needs and opportunities.
NJ Board of Public Utilities - Clean Energy Program (NJCEP): The Office of Clean Energy was established in 2003 to administer NJCEP. This program promotes increased energy efficiency and the use of clean, renewable sources of energy including solar, wind, geothermal, and sustainable biomass. The goals are a stronger economy, less pollution, lower costs, and reduced demand for electricity. The NJCEP offers financial incentives, programs and services for residential, commercial and local government customers. Financial incentives include residential rebates for energy efficiency upgrades and the use of Energy Star appliances, rebates for energy efficient heating and cooling systems, rebates for energy efficient new home construction, and improvements that reduce energy costs for income-eligible households. Commercial, Industrial and Local Government Programs include “Smart Start Buildings” which provides financial incentives for energy efficiency measures, free energy audits for local government facilities, “Pay- for-Performance”, a method for implementing comprehensive energy efficiency measures, “Direct Install” which pays up to 70% of the installed cost of energy efficiency improvements for qualified customers; Incentives for CHP and Fuel Cells; and renewable energy programs including the SREC Registration Program and associated SRP Program for registering solar projects. A Utility Financing Program that supports the installation of solar systems is also offered by the BPU. For more information, visit the following website: http://www.njcleanenergy.com/
NJ Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), Bureau of Mobile Sources – Clean Air and Diesel Emissions Reduction Demonstration Projects: The DEP has been awarded competitive grant money to fund repowers, replacements and retrofits on diesel powered non-road equipment. It also manages funding for voluntary demonstration projects aimed at reducing diesel emissions using various off and on-road equipment using various retrofit technologies. DEP does not have a dedicated source of funding for these projects but does receive federal grants and settlement funds periodically. More information is available at the following website: https://www.stopthesoot.org/sts-retrofits.htm.
NJ DEP, Bureau of Mobile Sources - It Pay$ to Plug In: New Jersey is accepting applications for recently expanded funding opportunities available through this electric vehicle charging grants program as part of the State’s “Drive Green NJ” initiative. For more information, visit the following website: https://www.drivegreen.nj.gov/programs.html.
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Rutgers, New Jersey Agricultural Experiment Station EcoComplex – EcoIgnite Clean Energy Proof of Concept Center and Accelerator Program: Funded by the US Dept. of Commerce, Economic Development Authority, this program provides assistance to clean energy technology companies with concept assessment, business model development, technology verification, scale-up and commercialization. It supports clean energy industry growth by assisting existing and start-up companies in the renewable energy and energy efficiency sectors. For more information, see: http://ecocomplex.rutgers.edu/EcoIgnite.html.
Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE): Legislation has been proposed during 2018 (S1611/A1902) that is designed to enable property owners to access financing for implementing clean energy, water and storm resiliency projects without any upfront cost. Participating municipalities would arrange financing through lenders who would be repaid through the use of voluntary special assessments on the improved buildings. The program would initially be available to commercial, industrial and nonprofit entities. If adopted, this program could be used to finance energy efficiency systems, energy storage, microgrids, and district heating and cooling systems and other types of projects. If it proves to be successful, it could be expanded to include residential properties.
2. Federal
Below is a sample of potential federal/nationwide funding opportunities currently available for implementing energy and community resilience initiatives. This list is subject to change as programs evolve in response to emerging issues, needs and opportunities.
U.S. Dept. of Energy (DOE)
DOE, Office of Community Services - Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP): a percentage of this funding can be used for low cost weatherization, energy efficiency improvements and deployment of renewable energy. More information about this program is available at the following website: https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ocs/programs/liheap/about.
DOE, Alternative Fuels Data Center – Alternative Fuel Incentive Programs: A series of incentive programs including but not limited to grants, tax exemptions, tax credits are offered by the DOE that promote the development and implementation of biofuels initiatives, alternative fuel vehicles, electric vehicles and other alternative fuel systems. For more information, visit the following website: https://www.afdc.energy.gov/laws/fed_summary
DOE, Solar Investment Tax Credit (SITC): a 30 percent federal tax credit claimed against the tax liability of residential (Section 25D) and commercial and utility (Section 48) investors in solar energy property. The Section 25D residential SITC allows the homeowner to apply the credit to his/her personal income taxes. This credit is used when homeowners purchase solar systems outright and have them installed on their homes. The Section 48 SITC is available to businesses that install,
DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 48
develop and/or finance solar projects. For more information, see: https://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/SEIA-ITC- 101-Factsheet-2018-June.pdf and http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/658
DOE, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy Resources for State and Local Governments: Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC): This tax credit steps down incrementally for wind facilities commencing construction after 2016, ending after 2019. For more information, see: http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/734
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Energy Star Program: This program offers tools, resources and rebates for businesses and organizations, homes, utilities and local governments that utilize Energy Star-certified products. Through this certification program, EPA ensures products are high-quality, well-performing and are energy efficient, delivering energy savings to consumers. For more information, visit the program website at https://www.energystar.gov/about, and the Energy Star Rebate Finder available at the following link: https://www.energystar.gov/rebate-finder?zip_code_filter=80528&page_number=0.
NOAA Climate Program Office, Division of Communication, Education and Engagement Division - Building U.S. Communities’ and Businesses’ Resilience to Extreme Events: Grants are offered to support activities that increase coordination and collaboration within the “Resilience Ecosystem”. The Resilience Ecosystem is comprised of all agencies, organizations, and individuals focused on helping local governments, communities, and businesses in the U.S. adapt and build resilience to climate- related impacts and extreme weather events. See the following program website for more details on goals, priorities and available funding: https://cpo.noaa.gov/Our-Work
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): Detailed information about the below-described grant programs is available at the following website: https://www.fema.gov/faq-details/FEMA-Grants-Program.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP): The purpose of the HMGP program is to help communities implement hazard mitigation measures following a Presidential major disaster declaration. U.S. States and Territories, and Federally-recognized tribes, apply for the grant. Non-profits and local governments access funding for individual projects by going through their respective state, tribe, or territory.
Pre-disaster mitigation (PDM) grant program: The purpose of the PDM grant program is to assist States, U.S. Territories, Federally-recognized tribes, and local communities in implementing a sustained pre-disaster natural hazard mitigation program. U.S. States and Territories, and Federally-recognized tribes, apply for the grant. Non-profits and local governments access funding for individual projects by going through their respective state, tribe, or territory.
Emergency management performance grant (EMPG) program: The EMPG Program provides resources to assist state, local, tribal and territorial governments in preparing for all hazards. EMPG funding supports projects such as strengthening a community’s emergency management governance structures; updating and approving specific emergency plans; and DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 49
initiating or achieving a whole community approach to security and emergency management. State emergency management agencies apply for the grant.
U.S. Economic Development Administration (EDA)
Disaster Recovery & Resiliency Grants: facilitates timely and effective delivery of Federal economic development assistance to support long-term community economic recovery planning and project implementation, redevelopment and resiliency. Information about this funding source is available at the following link: https://www.eda.gov/programs/disaster-recovery/
Public Works Program: helps distressed communities revitalize, expand, and upgrade their physical infrastructure. This program enables communities to attract new industry; encourage business expansion; diversify local economies; and generate or retain long-term, private-sector jobs and investment through the acquisition or development of land and infrastructure improvements needed for the successful establishment or expansion of industrial or commercial enterprises, including investments that will make infrastructure systems more resilient and reliable. More information about this program is available at the following link: https://www.eda.gov/pdf/about/Public-Works-Program-1-Pager.pdf
Economic Adjustment Assistance Program: designed to leverage existing regional assets and support the development and implementation of economic development strategies that creatively advance economic prosperity in distressed communities. EDA gives particular consideration to applications for communities with low income and high unemployment, and where severe weather has impacted businesses. Projects must include a focus on encouraging job growth. More information about this program is available at the following link: https://www.eda.gov/pdf/about/Economic-Adjustment- Assistance-Program-1-Pager.pdf
Threshold Foundation – Thriving Resilient Communities Grants: Funds are available for regional and national network hubs in the US aimed at building leadership and capacity for communities to address their strategic needs in the face of energy, climate, economic and social challenges. For more information visit the Foundation’s website at: https://www.thresholdfoundation.org/thriving-resilient-communities
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SOURCES:
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Brown, Casarah, “States Get Smart: Encouraging and Regulating Smart Grid Technologies”, National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), July 2013. http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/regulating-and-encouraging-smart-grid-technologies.aspx
Center for Sustainable Systems, University of Michigan, 2017 “U.S. Grid Energy Storage Factsheet”, Publication. No. CSS15-17, August 2017. http://css.umich.edu/sites/default/files/U.S._Grid_Energy_Storage_Factsheet_CSS15-17_e2017.pdf
Chittum, Anna and Relf, Grace, “Valuing Distributed Energy Resources: Combined Heat and Power and the Modern Grid”, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, April 2018
Clean Energy Group, “Fuel Cells for Cell Phone Towers: Fuel Cells Keep Mobile Communication Services Running”, Resilient Power Case Study Series, 2015. https://www.cleanegroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Fuel-Cells-for-Resilient-Power-Case-Studies-2015.pdf; website: www.cleanegroup.org
Elliott, Neal, Senior Director for Research, U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the U.S. Power Sector have Declined 28% since 2005”, Today in Energy, October 29, 2018. See: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37392
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), “Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators” Docket Nos. RM16-23-000; AD16-20-000; Order No. 841, February 15, 2018. https://www.ferc.gov/whats- new/comm-meet/2018/021518/E-1.pdf
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ICF International for Oak Ridge National Laboratory, “Combined Heat and Power: Enabling Resilient Energy Infrastructure for Critical Facilities”, March 2013
DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework - October 2018 51
Intec, Inc. for the Office of Policy, U. S. Department of Energy, “United States Fuel Resiliency: Volume I –Infrastructure Characterization, Volume II – Vulnerability to Natural and Physical Threats and Volume III – Regional Vulnerability and Resilience”, 2014. https://www.energy.gov/policy/downloads/united-states-fuel-resiliency-us-fuels-supply-infrastructure
Johnson, Tom, “Is New Jersey Becoming the Pipeline Capital of the Northeast?” NJ Spotlight, May 28, 2015. http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/15/05/28/is-new-jersey-becoming-the-pipeline-capitol-of-the-northeast/
Johnson, Tom, “State Still Not Sold on Smart Metering for Utility Customers”, NJ Spotlight, March 7, 2018. http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/18/03/06/state-still-not-sold-on-smart-metering-for-utility-customers/
Johnson, Tom, “PSEG Plans to Spend More than $5 Billion on Power Grid Upgrade, Clean Energy”, NJ Spotlight, June 1, 2018.
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McBride, James, “Modernizing the U.S. Energy Grid Backgrounder”, Council on Foreign Relations, January 26, 2016. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/modernizing-us-energy-grid
Molina, Maggie, Kiker, Patrick, Nowak, Seth, “The Greatest Energy Story You Haven’t Heard: How Investing in Energy Efficiency Changed the US Power Sector and Gave Us a Tool to Tackle Climate Change“, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE), August 2016, Updated October 2016. https://aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/u1604.pdf
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Commerce, Special Publication 1190-1, “Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems", Volume II, May 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1190v2
National Governors Association (NGA), Learning Lab on Enhancing State Energy Assurance Coordination, Trenton, New Jersey, May 15, 2015. https://classic.nga.org/cms/home/nga-center-for-best-practices/meeting--webcast-materials/page-eet-meetings-webcasts/col2-content/main- content-list/learning-lab-on-enhancing-state.html
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Nedler, Chris, Newcomb, Janes and Fitzgerald, Garrett, “Electric Vehicles as Distributed Energy Resources”, Rocky Mountain Institute, 2016 https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/RMI_Electric_Vehicles_as_DERs_Final_V2.pdf
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Northeastern University (NU) - George J. Kostas Research Institute for Homeland Security and New York University INTERCEP, “After Hurricane Sandy: Lessons Learned for Bolstering Energy Resilience”, Hosted by Kostas Research Institute for Homeland Security, Northeastern University & Read Ahead Materials. https://www.preparecenter.org/sites/default/files/website-version-2.pdf
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Appendix 1 – BPU Order EO11090543
DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 Appendix 1
Appendix 2: PSE&G Energy Strong Fact Sheet
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Fact Sheet Making New Jersey Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) has begun to proactively protect and strengthen its electric and gas systems against severe weather conditions under its “Energy Strong” program, approved on May 21, 2014 by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities.
PSE&G will invest $1.22 billion in infrastructure investments during the next few years: • $620 million to protect, raise or relocate 29 switching and substations that were damaged by water in recent storms. • $350 million to replace and modernize 250 miles of low-pressure cast iron gas mains in or near flood areas. • $100 million to create redundancy in the system, reducing outages when damage occurs. • $100 million to deploy smart grid technologies to better monitor system operations to increase our ability to more swiftly deploy repair teams. • $50 million to protect five natural gas metering stations and a liquefied natural gas station affected by Sandy or located in flood zones.
PSE&G estimates that the work approved by the BPU will create about 2,900 jobs, which will bolster the state’s economy. The utility is hiring more than 300 additional employees this year, about half of them in union positions. The infrastructure investments also are putting skilled contractors and laborers to work installing new gas mains, raising or relocating substation equipment and erecting water barriers.
Gas pipe replacements are under way By year end, the utility will replace the first 88 miles of low-pressure cast iron gas mains that are in or near flood areas. These new pipes will prevent water from entering the mains, increasing the reliability of gas service in these locations. The work is on schedule and under way in Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Mercer, Middlesex, Passaic and Somerset counties.
In addition to replacing the cast iron mains with ones made of plastic, PSE&G is upgrading older service lines with plastic piping that brings gas to individual homes and businesses. The utility has been working with local officials to minimize traffic and other disruptions.
Substation hardening to begin early next year PSE&G has been finalizing engineering plans and expects to begin raising or fortifying substations early in 2015. The work schedule will also depend on material availability and the issuance of local construction permits. The 29 substations slated for hardening are located in Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Mercer, Middlesex, Passaic, Somerset and Union counties.
PSE&G has also started making the redundancy improvements and deploying smart grid technologies in a number of locations throughout its service territory. Making New Jersey
Filing Fact Sheet Phase 2 June 2018
On June 8, 2018, PSE&G proposed to invest an additional $2.5 billion during the next five years to further strengthen the utility’s electric and gas systems to withstand storms, improve reliability and significantly enhance resiliency.
If approved by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, the proposal will mean that more customers OLD NEW will experience fewer outages, faster restoration times and other More than 4,600 PSE&G customers in Ewing and Trenton had power at the end of May improvements to already strong thanks to Energy Strong. The program built a new, elevated station (on right) that did not flood customer service. The program will while the lower old station (on left) flooded on May 27, 2018 after storms. When completed also create jobs, improve worker safety later this year, 490,000 of PSE&G’s 2 million customers who lost power during Sandy won’t and add more advanced technology lose power again due to flooding. and redundancy to make our systems even more resilient. • improve PSEG’s already strong • $145 million to upgrade to smart Under Energy Strong II, PSE&G will customer service. grid technologies to reduce the continue its momentum to modernize number of people impacted by an its infrastructure across New Jersey by Proposal Highlights outage (rerouting electricity quickly being able to: around problems), enable swifter Electric ~ $1.5 billion • raise critical electric and gas deployment of repair teams and equipment in flood prone areas • $428 million to raise and harden 14 reduce outage durations stations and eliminate two stations • modernize aging electric and gas • $107 million to create an advanced in flood zones stations distribution management system • $478 million to rebuild 15 outdoor – deploying advanced technology • install stronger poles and wires to stations, many built before 1956 and to upgrade and secure vital reduce wind and tree damage in need of replacement communications networks. • deploy advanced technology to • $345 million to upgrade 475 miles of quicken restoration circuits, reducing power outages by • build additional pipes to distribute making them more resistant to tree natural gas to enhance reliability and limb damage Gas ~ $1 billion • Installed smart communications devices at 111 stations that serve 1.4 million customers, allowing for the remote • $863 million to add redundancy to the gas distribution detection of outages system to ensure more reliable service in the event gas deliveries into New Jersey are curtailed by a supplier • Created redundancy in the system, reducing outages when damage occurs • $136 million to modernize seven natural gas metering stations, including two located in flood zones. • Replaced and modernized 240 miles of low-pressure cast iron gas mains in or near flood areas, removing 90,000 Modest Impact on Customer Bills customers from risk of losing gas service due to flooding • Protected five natural gas metering stations and three For the typical combined residential electric and gas gas storage facilities affected by Sandy or located in customer, bills are 21 percent lower than they were in 2010, flood zones. or 30 percent lower when adjusted for inflation. PSE&G gas bills are the second lowest in the region and electric bills are “As customer needs and weather patterns lower than average, allowing our customers to get better service at a lower cost than most of the region. change, we must continue to make the necessary investments in the infrastructure and programs The total cumulative cost for a typical residential electric that are the very foundation of our state’s economy customer who uses 750 kilowatt-hours per summer month and way of life,” said John Latka, PSE&G senior and 7,200 kilowatt-hours annually will be an average vice president for electric and gas operations. of about $4 more per month. A residential gas heating “Thanks to everyone who worked so diligently to customer who uses 165 therms in a winter month and make Energy Strong a huge win for New Jersey.” 1,010 therms annually would pay an average of about $5 more per month. The total impact for a typical combined electric and gas customer would be about 1 percent per year over the 5-year period.
Under the first phase of Energy Strong (2014 – 2018), PSE&G: PSE&G’s proposal calls for upgrades statewide, • Raised, relocated or protected 26 switching and with significant work on electric and gas facilities substations that were damaged by water in recent in Bergen, Burlington, Camden, Essex, Gloucester, storms, including Sandy, benefiting 490,000 customers Hudson, Mercer, Middlesex, Morris, Passaic, • Made additional circuits available to 260 critical facilities (police, fire, hospitals, etc.) to improve resiliency; 412,500 Somerset and Union counties. An estimated 3,150 other customers also benefit from this work jobs will be created annually for these projects.
• Deployed smart grid technologies to better monitor system operations to increase our ability to more swiftly deploy repair teams
Appendix 3: Municipal Energy Resilience Questionnaire – Results Summary
DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 Appendix 3
Energy Resiliency and Reliability Initiatives: Somerset County Jurisdictions ACTIONS ACTIONS COMPLETED/UNDERWAY BY COMPLETED/UNDERWAY BY ADDITIONAL UTILITY COMPANY LOCAL GOVT. ACTIONS MUNICIPALITY PSE&G JCP&L ACTIONS NEEDED COMPLETED/UNDERWAY ADDL. LOCAL GOVT. ACTIONS NEEDED
1) Solar Panels installed on township buildings 1) Acquisition of generators that can provide back- Bedminster Twp. 2) Solar panels installed by private property owners up power for the Twp. offices and school
1) Social media and communications 1) Utility Company and State technical and funding applications for keeping the public and local 1) Installation of a back-up power generator at the support including access to Energy Resilience Bank officials better informed during power municipal building which serves as a shelter and funding for local microgrid applications Bernards Twp. emergencies warming center 2) Absent the availability of microgrids, essential 2) Vegetation management around power and critical facilities operated by the Township and infrastructure its constituents must rely on back-up power 3) aerial inspections of power infrastructure generators
1) A fixed natural gas generator was installed by the Borough at the library building which includes municipal offices and community room and serves as a shelter, warming/cooling center, emergency POD and community resource center using a FEMA Sandy 1) An on-site natural gas back-up power generator recovery grant at the Claremont Rd. Field House has been 2) Upgrades to electrical outlets at Bernards High proposed so the facility can support emergency School gym/wrestling room which serves as an operations. 1) Vegetation management within the utility emergency shelter for residents with disabilities using 2) Additional emergency generator/electrical R.O.W. by JCP&L School District funds capacity is needed at all of the shelter locations in Bernardsville Boro. 2) Vegetation Management provided by the 3) A utility pole was replaced through a collaborative Bernardsville including Bernards High School, Borough DPW and funded by JCP&L within effort involving the Borough, Verizon and JCP&L to Bedwell School and Bernardsville Middle School the Borough R.O.W improve energy system resiliency at the municipal that will support shelter operations. building which houses municipal emergency 3) Back-up power generator and MOA to enable the management operations center and warming/cooling use of Our Lady of Perpetual Help and St. Elizabeth center School for shelter operations 4) The installation of natural gas back-up owner 4) Additional trained CERT Volunteers generators are programed for Bedwell School and Bernardsville Middle School which will provide power to life safety systems within these buildings. The are not intended to met "shelter-ready" status
Bound Brook Boro. Vegetation management at PSE&G switching 1) Vegetation management at 13 JCP&L 1) Ongoing vegetation management for power Branchburg Twp. station located on Route 202 within the Twp. Substations located within the Twp. lines, phone lines and substations
1) The Twp. through the County Solar Initiative installed 1) an additional back-up power generator is needed solar panels at Bridgewater Library, Senior Center and 1) PSE&G upgraded several substations, utility at the Municipal Complex to enable more of this 1) Ongoing vegetation management and Municipal Complex lines and poles within the Twp. facility to be used for providing essential services Bridgewater Twp. facility maintenance by utility companies is 2) The school board installed solar panels at the High 2) PSE&G is constructing a new Utility Control 2) a back-up power generator is needed for the needed School and Jr. High School. Center on Rt. 22 in the Twp. Senior Center so that it can be used as a 3) The County School Board installed solar panels at the cooling/warming center VoTech High School
1) A back-up power generator system was installed for Far Hills Boro. 1) Run power lines underground the municipal building/police dept.
1) Power issues at the Municipal Complex must be 1) Vegetation management along rural roads 1) PSE&G upgraded the Bennetts Land and resolved. The complex is served by two different where one fallen tree knocks out power for an Schoolhouse Road Substations. feeds with dead ends between the Police Dept. and entire neighborhood Franklin Twp. 2) Additional interconnections including new poles Senior Center buildings. There have been ongoing 2) Additional back feeds from power lines were completed between the Brunswick and power phase and "Clean" power issues resulting in along the main highways or county roads Bonnets Road Substations. electronic problems with high usage units (i.e. would reduce resident downtimes HVAC) Source: Completed Somerset County HMP Worksheet 5 - Municipal Energy Resilience, 2018 for Somerset County local jurisdictions Prepared by: Somerset County Planning Division, October 2018 1
Energy Resiliency and Reliability Initiatives: Somerset County Jurisdictions ACTIONS ACTIONS COMPLETED/UNDERWAY BY COMPLETED/UNDERWAY BY ADDITIONAL UTILITY COMPANY LOCAL GOVT. ACTIONS MUNICIPALITY PSE&G JCP&L ACTIONS NEEDED COMPLETED/UNDERWAY ADDL. LOCAL GOVT. ACTIONS NEEDED
1) Improvements underway to PSE&G facilities in Green Brook 2) PSE&G has run a redundancy line through the Twp. that extends through Dunellen, N. Plainfield 1) A portable generator was recently purchased & Plainfield 1) no areawide improvements to gas or water through a FEMA grant and will be "quick-connect" Green Brook Twp. 3) PSE&G is currently constructing an utilities are known fitted for the fire house and elementary school which interconnection between substations to provide serves as a deployment center during floods the ability to maintain primary electrical service to the community in the event of a substation failure.
1) back-up power generators have been installed at all fire houses 2) a back-up generator has been provided for the Municipal Complex which houses the police 1) Ability to make direct contact with Utility headquarters, emergency operations center and acts as Company Managers so information could be 1) some tree trimming around overhead a shelter. 1) The installation of back-up generators at all gas Hillsborough Twp. expeditiously communicated utility wires has taken place 3) a back-up generator has been installed at the public stations in the Twp. 2) ongoing vegetation management to works building prevent damage to power lines 4) A back-up generator has been installed at the Quick Check gas station on Rt. 206 5) All nursing homes/assisted living facilities in the Twp. have back-up generators
1) The Somerville substation has been raised to prevent flood damage 2) Upgrades to the grid were performed leading up to the Finderne substation 1) Back=up generators are needed for the 3) Bridgewater's switch design and transmission following essential public facilities: OEM Building, system were reinforced Borough Hall, Firehouses 1, 2, & 3, Rescue Squad, 4) PSE&G will work prominently within electric Public Works Building, Manville Library (which Manville station fence lines to complete substation serves as an emergency shelter) and Manville High upgrades. Once complete, critical equipment School which serves as an overflow shelter and within the station will be elevated to protect from showing facility. flood damage to provide enhanced reliability and 2) Relocation of the Rescue Squad, Fire Company system redundancy. #1 and DPW Garage out of the flood hazard area 2) Two miles (25,676 ft.) of gas mains were replaced throughout the Borough between 2015 and 2017.
1) the Borough is researching the potential for a mobile, dual fuel generator to provide backup Millstone Boro. power for temporary shelters during extended outages
1) A new PSE&G substation has been provided on Montgomery Twp. US 206 in the vicinity of Cherry Valley Rd.
1) vegetation management including tree North Plainfield 1) PSE&G has been replacing gas mains and house 1) Back-up generator is needed at the Borough's replacement in the public R.O.W. to prevent Boro. services shelter/reception site damage to utility lines
Source: Completed Somerset County HMP Worksheet 5 - Municipal Energy Resilience, 2018 for Somerset County local jurisdictions Prepared by: Somerset County Planning Division, October 2018 Appendix 3-2 Energy Resiliency and Reliability Initiatives: Somerset County Jurisdictions ACTIONS ACTIONS COMPLETED/UNDERWAY BY COMPLETED/UNDERWAY BY ADDITIONAL UTILITY COMPANY LOCAL GOVT. ACTIONS MUNICIPALITY PSE&G JCP&L ACTIONS NEEDED COMPLETED/UNDERWAY ADDL. LOCAL GOVT. ACTIONS NEEDED
High School, Middle School, Ease End School, West End School and Stony Brook School are in need of generators. The High School and Middle School can North Plainfield BOE serve as shelters during an emergency. Generators are needed to ensure the operation of these emergency shelters.
1) The installation of two generators at the two 1) Undergrounding of power lines would Borough sewerage pumping stations that will ensure significantly reduce the vulnerability of this service and safety in the event of an extended outage is Peapack & Gladstone infrastructure to the frequent outages that currently being completed. Boro. have been occurring due to ice, wind, snow 2) Most of the Borough's critical infrastructure is and auto accidents. protected with back-up generators that run on diesel of natural gas.
1) Sanitary Backflow Preventer needed to prevent flood water and raw sewage from entering the basement of the Municipal Building, which is preventing this facility from being used as a shelter and/or warming center 1) The purchase and installation of a back-up generator 2) A back-up generator for at least one local gas Raritan Boro. for the Thompson St. Fire Station station is needed so residents and local business owners can in turn run their generators during extended power outages. 3) A feasibility study for a microgrid that can provide more efficient, reliable backup power in key locations within the Borough during emergencies.
1) Installation of a backup generator at a water 1) backup generator for powering the Borough Hall Rocky Hill Boro. pumping site using FEMA grant funds & associated emergency center
1) PSE&G modified its substation on South Bridge 1) backup generators are needed at all public Street to protect if from potential flood damage Somerville Boro. schools, the municipal building, fire houses and first 2) Natural gas lines were replaced in portions of aid squad. Somerville
Underground gas mains between South Bound Brook (in the vicinity of Montgomery Ave) and South Bound Brook Middlesex that are located under the Raritan River Boro. and D & R Canal are being replaced by PSE&G. This work is anticipated to be completed by mid- summer 2018
Source: Completed Somerset County HMP Worksheet 5 - Municipal Energy Resilience, 2018 for Somerset County local jurisdictions Prepared by: Somerset County Planning Division, October 2018 Appendix 3-3 EnergyACTIONS Resiliency and Reliability Initiatives: Somerset County Jurisdictions ACTIONS COMPLETED/UNDERWAY BY COMPLETED/UNDERWAY BY ADDITIONAL UTILITY COMPANY LOCAL GOVT. ACTIONS MUNICIPALITY PSE&G JCP&L ACTIONS NEEDED COMPLETED/UNDERWAY ADDL. LOCAL GOVT. ACTIONS NEEDED
1) backup generators have been installed at the Municipal Building, Fire Headquarters (which also acts an emergency shelter) and Police Headquarters. 2) Borough staff constantly look for dead or failing trees that pose a threat to overhead utility wires, which are 1) The installation of all electric utility and removed by either the Borough or appropriate utility Watchung Boro. communication lines underground is a high company. Borough priority 3) emergency generators are currently being installed by the Borough at the DPW garage and East End Firehouse. 4) the Borough requires the installation of utilities underground for any new development.
1) Warren Township has been working with JCP&L to find a suitable location for a new 1) backup generator for the municipal building acquired substation to improve redundancy and installed using FEMA grant funding 2) Ongoing vegetation management by JCP&L 2) backup generators have been provided at all first 1) One of the biggest issues involves privately- and PSE&G to protect power lines from tree responder facilities (police dept., 4 fire companies and owned facilities that serve as designated shelters damage is needed. "Warren Township is at the rescue squad) and need to remain operational during a prolonged the end of the power grid for both JCP&L (85% 3) All WTSA sewage authority treatment plants now outage. The Stonecrest Church which is a of towns) and PSE&G (15%), which means that Warren Twp. have backup generators designated shelter does not have a generator. power restoration to Warren is often at the 4) A Twp. Utility Committee has been established to However, the Township may not spend public funds end of the line, and Warren Township is usually inspect the telephone and utility poles in Warren and to buy a generator for the church. Grants should be one of the last communities to be restored. In report problems using an app developed by Rutgers U. made available to private facilities being used addition, Warren Township's location atop a for communicating this information to Utility companies during emergencies as public shelters. ridge of the Watchung Mountains subjects it to so they can address the problems damage and wide area power outage from high wind events. Solutions are needed to expedite the restoration of power to the Twp.
Source: Completed Somerset County HMP Worksheet 5 - Municipal Energy Resilience, 2018 for Somerset County local jurisdictions Prepared by: Somerset County Planning Division, October 2018 Appendix 3-4 Appendix 4: Energy-Related Mitigation Initiatives by Participating Jurisdictions
DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 Appendix 4
Appendix 5: HMP Focus Group Meetings – Energy Related Highlights
DRAFT Somerset County Energy Resiliency Framework, October 2018 Appendix 5
APPENDIX ERF-5: FOCUS GROUP MEETINGS – ENERGY-RELATED HIGHLIGHTS
A series of questions were used to facilitate discussion at each of the Four Focus Group Meetings. A summary of comments made in response to each of the questions at each meeting was prepared by AECOM, the County’s consultant assisting in the completion of the Countywide Hazard Mitigation Plan update process. Below are excerpts from the comment summary that helped shape the Draft Energy Resiliency Framework, which are organized by focus group meeting and discussion question.
Somerset County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Health Focus Group Meeting
November 28, 2017 (4:30-6:00pm) Somerset County Freeholder Conference Room, Third Floor Somerset County Administration Building 20 Grove Street, Somerville, NJ
Discussion Question 1 – Changes since Sandy: “What are some of the major physical improvements/capital investments and planning/policy/regulatory changes that have taken place recently by both the public and private sectors to mitigate natural hazards, harden infrastructure and make communities more resilient?”
Many things are not being done because they are costly, and responsible parties lack the funding necessary to implement. Some of the most severely impacted people reside in public housing or low-rent apartments in hazard areas. With limited funds available, recovery is slow from even one disaster. It is much more difficult with multiple events, and/or in households with children or special needs individuals. Power outages have a significant impact on the population with oxygen needs. People were calling EOCs asking for generators. During Sandy, OEMs didn’t realize the true scope of the need. A lower than anticipated number of calls coming in for help wasn’t due to lower number of people in need, but rather that people had no power to call in, and/or were finding flooded roadways blocking their paths as they tried to make their way to shelters. Sandy highlighted a need for OEMs to go out to targeted special needs groups and areas. County OEM noted that special needs registration at the County is in place, and municipalities are supposed to pull this information each year to use as a tool for this purpose during response phase. Sandy highlighted a need for MRC / CERT volunteers to practice mobilizing resources, coordination of structure and processes of response. Ways to mitigate could include County taking a more proactive role in oversight of municipal planning activities.
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Special needs individuals living on their own have unique needs post-disaster in terms of response and recovery, particularly limited economic resources. Overall need in county for individual preparedness planning. Top-down planning. Municipal preparedness plans need to be vigorous. Should include and engage residents, employers, in addition to responders and municipal representatives. Actively prepare so it’s in the forefront of people’s minds.
Discussion Question 2 – Universal Accessibility and Mitigation: “What are the major difficulties faced by vulnerable population groups during natural disasters, and what can be cone to reduce their risks as well as improve their access to community public health infrastructure, healthcare, and other essentials for daily living?”
Need for bottom-up, neighborhood level planning. Need for redundant planning – backup ways to get the message out to the general populations and special needs populations. Individual preparedness as a key to overall resiliency. Municipalities and County – look at population to identify needs, such as language barriers. Also, in communities with high numbers of undocumented persons, there is an observed reluctance to get involved or to ask for help during an emergency situation. Reluctance to come forward in any way. Language barriers. Local municipal police, fire, and rescue agencies know where these populations are and can use that knowledge to make improvements in outreach and in the response phase by going to check on impacted persons. Fear of deportation was noted as a major issue- oftentimes, impacted persons who are undocumented refrain from going to a shelter for fear of being deported. Solutions include more of a municipal focus – ways to communicate more effectively, and more regularly, to a broader audience. Ongoing partnership since Sandy, partnering with Spanish speaking churches to offer support and shelter staff that co-run programs, offering a familiar face to the community members.
Discussion Question 4 – Energy Reliability: “What are the top ten critical facilities for which power reliability is essential, and what are some high-priority strategies for ensuring they can continue to operate in the event of prolonged and/or widespread power outages?”
Very significant consequences when critical facilities lose power – impacts can be severe. Need to identify backup power sources Carrier Clinic Shelters – local issue. Many already have backup generators. Sixty percent of all shelters are schools, and most schools don’t have generators, Even though it’s local, because it’s systemic issue, may be inherently a County issue as well due to roll-up of individual issues to the County level. Red Cross estimates of about 250 persons per shelter. Currently not enough shelters if major disaster.
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Issues of County/State/Federal push down of responsibilities on various levels to the municipalities, where resources (staff, financial) are often too limited to implement effectively/efficiently/properly. Top-down of requirements as linked to municipal consequences. Link of impacts – power loss water treatment plant down without power now municipality has a population with no power, no water. Example Manville, air drop of water. o Elevated floodwalls at water treatment facility as a result of Sandy o Need to think of abilities for backup power if regional grid goes down – need to create microgrids to bring power back up for more than a couple of days This plan – we’re looking for the biggest (most important) critical facilities on a regional basis. The next update would focus on more locally-significant critical facilities. o Project idea – solar panels for County facilities, and then look into possibilities perhaps for local shelters at the time of the next plan update. Instillation of solar panels, would require a few components in order to serve shelters – switches, battery storage and only run critical components of shelters
Discussion Question 6 – Community Resiliency: “What are some key adaptation strategies and best practices that Somerset County, its municipalities, residents, businesses and others can implement to become more resilient when faced with the impacts of climate change such as more frequent and severe storms; longer, hotter summers; wet and dry spells; etc.?”
Moving elderly people immediately before/during/after a hazard event often causes long-term health impacts. There is a need to find solutions that will limit or eliminate the need for movement of elderly persons. Using various computer system tools to identify breakpoints in power supply fosters response in that the need for boots on the ground driving from spot to spot to identify problem areas is being eliminated/reduced. Opportunities – municipalities, counties need to have direct dialogue with major utilities to come up with plan Resiliency – lack of public understanding, what is going on with climate change? Cloudy language at various levels of government. Need for more clear and consistent messaging. Local municipalities – resiliency begins and ends at the local level. Municipalities and their residents generally have been observed to align with county messaging and advocacy. County can use this knowledge to set a high bar. Municipal resources limited – higher levels of government trickle down requirements, asking a lot of local officials who don’t have expert knowledge or experience to move forward in the best way. o Possible solution would be for County to consider investing in a regional planner who can support a lot of these functions before a disaster. Invest in a resource that will serve a support function to foster community resiliency in the face of a changing climate. Invest in a resource to assist, or planning initiatives become less effective and meaningful. Give the municipalities a resource they can tap into so they can be successful. Invest in a human resource with the expertise. Shared services.
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If top-down discussions about risk are clear, in telling municipalities where to focus their efforts, more will get done. Current abstract messaging isn’t fostering engagement or municipal buy-in on the great need for these types of initiatives. Need to create culture of preparedness; alignment of local, county, state, federal messaging about the most significant problems and the “government” approach solving the biggest issues. o The “government” message (county/state/federal/local) needs to align. o Misunderstanding of sustainability – i.e., moving to LED lightbulbs is great, but people sometimes focus on a small piece and confuse the main message. o Businesses, small and large, have a key role. Bad disaster –> no customers; no employees. They have a vested interest in participating in resiliency initiatives. o Mitigate what’s being built now, to decrease recovery time in the future. o Need to get engagement beyond focus groups and planning committees – difficult, limited resources, staff wears many hats, public disengagement; businesses not interested in participating. Possible solution: get the message to the freeholders. Success will start at the top with what the freeholders are articulating and advocating. Freeholders and mayors supporting cutting-edge resiliency efforts in local communities shows they care to plan ahead. Will foster implementation and engagement and real momentum from the top down.
Somerset County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Infrastructure Assets Focus Group Meeting
November 30, 2017 (2:30-4:00pm) Somerset County Engineering Conference Room, Second Floor Somerset County Administration Building 20 Grove Street, Somerville, NJ
Discussion Question 1 – Changes since Sandy: “What are some of the major physical improvements/capital investments and planning/policy/regulatory changes that have taken place recently by both the public and private sectors to mitigate natural hazards harden infrastructure and make communities more resilient?”
. Improvements that members of this group are aware of include : o PSEG backup command and control center on Rte. , Bridgewater (regional electric) o SRVSA WWTP pump station improvements at juncture of two trunk lines in the floodplain on the bank of the Raritan in Bridgewater near the Somerville border. During Floyd, trunk line capacity constraints coupled with power outage resulted in raw sewage
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being discharged into the Raritan. Therefore, they are now relocating electric components out of the floodplain so the pump can still function. o BPU, after Sandy, required major utilities to have plans for hardening infrastructure and improving maintenance and oversight. PSEG has an improvement plan that may be part of Jersey Strong projects. Somerville substation upgrade down by South Ridge may have been part of this. o JCP&L is working on smart grid improvements that will enable it to identify breaks so that no boots on the ground will needed to isolate the location of the cause of the outage. Smart grids include IT and circuitry that break grids into smaller sections to minimize the impacts of outages o Grid improvements in Warren were mentioned. . It was suggested that the Jersey Strong list should be obtained, and used to see what projects on list have been completed. . On the local level, the “old Sandy report”, documents may include some creative strategies for using program funds for recovery. After Sandy, recovery funds weren’t administered by USEDA. Rather, by HUD, via CDGBs, so state controlled funds (not USEDA). Therefore, the state plan was very specific regarding how the funding would be invested. It was recommended that we should go back to the state strategies in the post Sandy report and use that as a tool for identifying still-relevant projects for potential inclusion in the hazard mitigation plan update (i.e., gas station back-up power initiative may have been in it; may or may not have been funded). . Idea discussed regarding whether the County could work with the power company to have a microgrid set up in Somerville, given the County complex, the redevelopment of the Landmark Shopping Center and the Somerville landfill, to keep the residential and emergency services portion of Somerville downtown powered up. . BPU authorized pilot microgrid feasibility studies funded through the State Energy Resiliency Bank, which is funded entirely with FEMA funds. However, Somerset County is not eligible(because Somerset did not incur proportionally high enough damages during Sandy, as compared to the nine much harder hit coastal Counties that are eligible). The ERB does not include Societal Benefits Funds as originally planned, constraining access to funding to just the 9 Sandy counties. . ERB dollars were generally distributed evenly amongst the five power providers statewide. Microgrid projects can only move forward if the power company is a willing partner. . Regardless of what is has been completed, the State strategies set forth in that plan/report can be incorporated into the mitigation plan update. Suggestion to Google ‘HUD Sandy Recovery Plan’. The group’s understanding is that there is an initial report and one update (or second phase). . Resiliency of SRVSA system is being improved. The design elevation of trunk lines from Bridgewater into Somerville resulted in the discharge of sewage into the river during severe storms. A new treatment plant is being built to address this problem, which will have a capacity of about 10 million gallons per day. In addition to preventing overflows from happening, this strengthens the resiliency of the system. . Another solution involves reducing the amount of stormwater that is getting into the conveyance system. But this is an ongoing maintenance issue which is sometimes easier to address by expanding treatment plant capacity. Problem is hard to fix – by the time I & I repairs are
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implemented on one end of town, the system is in need of repair at the other end of town, and so- on. It is difficult to keep up, and very costly. Root cause is flooding of the facility and stormwater during periods of wet weather. AECOM will research whether a project that minimizes environmental impacts from sewage overflow (not flood damage to the plant itself) would be an eligible project type under HMGP. . Policy recommendation – the plan should promote resiliency projects.
Discussion Question 2 – Universal Accessibility and Mitigation :”What are the major difficulties faced by vulnerable population groups during natural disasters, and what can be done to reduce their risks as well as improve their access to community public health infrastructure, healthcare, and other essentials for daily living?”
NJTPA is working on a GIS analysis that evaluates transit assets for special needs populations, senior facility locations, fixed route transit service, shuttle bus service, then overlays FRMA’s flood map to see potential disruptions. This planning initiate has no climate component but looks at gapes. “Access Link” routes, if flooded. It is hard to get to the VA facility in Lyons, even when the roads aren’t flooded. Concentration of senior care, extended care facilities, nursing homes – need to move employees, move food, maintain power, move pharmaceuticals. These facilities have their own emergency response plans. The Public Health Focus Group felt that despite these needs, individuals in a group care setting were less at-risk than special needs persons living alone. Group discussion regarding whether local emergency response plans are approved by any entity and, if so, by whom. Regency in Franklin was mentioned. The question, “who is trained to look and know if the ERP is sufficient?” arose. Is there a policy on routine testing and maintenance of generators at critical care facilities so they don’t fail? A potential back-up power solution for hospital and critical care facilities is islanding / microgrids.
Discussion Question 4 – Energy Reliability: “What are the top ten critical facilities for which power reliability is essential, and what are some high-priority strategies for ensuring they can continue to operate in the event of prolonged and/or widespread power outages?”
Atlantic Health and Hunterdon Health have new facilities that should be added. Raritan Valley Community College is not on the list but is used as a shelter Carrier Clinic should be added Comments made by the previous focus group were recounted. Schools used as shelters are without backup power, and that OEM had indicated that backup power is required for the shelter designation, so perhaps it is an issue of how long the shelter can operate on backup power. Group felt that power companies or NJ Chapter of Energy Engineers could provide the frequency of outages of various durations, and that could be turned into a map then GIS intern could put
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the critical facilities over that map to prioritize those in greatest need of secure back-up power systems. Sandy was the longest outage duration that the group collectively could recall. Post-Sandy highlighted differences between DOD diesel fuel and regular diesel; DOD diesel couldn’t be used where needed. Same with some other fuel (i.e., jet fuel deliveries).
Discussion Question 6 – Community Resiliency: “What are some key adaptation strategies and best practices that Somerset County, its municipalities, residents, businesses and others can implement to become more resilient when faced with the impacts of climate change such as more frequent and severe storms; longer, hotter summers; wet and dry spells; etc.?
The HMP Update Climate memo will include a summary of Rutgers’ reports – data from the Climate Adaptation Alliance can be used in the HMP Update (i.e., number of days per year with temps over 90F or below 20F to see the extremes in NJ and how those extremes are changing over time. More frequent and severe weather events Changing rainfall patterns Rutgers Professor Anthony Broccoli’s data was mentioned, which was presented at a recent Climate Change symposium held at Duke Farms, Hillsborough. Mitigation Plan Update will present state and county-level data (won’t be able to drill down to the municipal level yet; that could be done as part of the next update). NJTPA can help, though, with some data they may have ready in time for Somerset’s Passaic River Basin communities. The group felt that a higher level government policy and/or regulatory guidelines are needed to really start identifying some comprehensive and meaningful climate change adaptation measures.
Somerset County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Environmental & Historic Resources Focus Group Meeting
November 30, 2017 (4:30-6:00pm) Somerset County Engineering Conference Room, Second Floor Somerset County Administration Building 20 Grove Street, Somerville, NJ
Discussion Question 1 – Changes since Sandy: “What are some of the major physical improvements/capital investments and planning/policy/regulatory changes that have taken place recently by both the public and private sectors to mitigate natural hazards, harden infrastructure and make communities more resilient?”
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This group is generally not aware of any changes Observation- during Sandy, a Bergen County museum lost its entire collection when the facility was flooded. Most Somerset County historic sites lack any time of response plan that would result in movement of and/or protection of museum collections, antique furniture, records, etc. from floodwaters. Observation – the Park Commission lost most of its records when its North Branch Park Headquarters facility was flooded during Doria. The County has allocated $16 million in grants for historic preservation. One way to protect this public investment is through the hazard mitigation planning process. Elevated homes concerns o encourages some residents to shelter in place when they should be evacuating o wells can still be contaminated by floodwaters o septic systems can still be damaged by floodwaters Sandy has not brought about any known changes in policy regarding well water and/or septic JCP&L tree trimming programs help the County a little bit FEMA grants for generators in public buildings – good for shelters. During Sandy, many generators ran out of fuel after a couple of days and fuel supply stations were without fuel and/or power so generators became inoperable. Since Sandy, the group noted that FEMA will not fund generators unless they are hooked up to natural gas (no movement of liquid fuel – benefits from an operability standpoint, as they can run indefinitely – but also benefits from fuel not being spilled when refueling) Generators at County facilities – the Parks Department has recently put a generator at the Ranger’s office (park rangers coordinate with local police and perform response activities / rescue operations for all county parks property). There is also an issue with a county-owned stable, where generators have been installed for livestock protection (livestock as an investment of significant funds and it makes sense to protect that investment, though it was acknowledged that protection of human life is of greater importance). In both instances they are hooked up to natural gas so they can provide backup power indefinitely. Lesson learned from Sandy – County government buildings were without power for so long that generators ran out of fuel; liquid fuel was unobtainable; and the facilities lost power anyway. Benefits = environmental (spills avoided) + continuity of operations Opportunity: advocate a more planned approach to discourage planting where the vegetation can impact powerlines. Focus more intense reforestation along the rear of a parcel, and where possible, nearest to streams. Or, advocate for low-growing species near the front of the parcels where roads and powerlines are located. Coordination needed with JCPL and PSEG – big line easements are less than ideal. The power companies typically cut to within an inch or two of bare soil. There is an opportunity to improve the ability to slow water, through coordination with JCPL and PSEG regarding restoration work and planting of low-growing species.
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Discussion Question 4 – Energy Reliability: “What are the top ten critical facilities for which power reliability is essential, and what are some high-priority strategies for ensuring they can continue to operate in the event of prolonged and/or widespread power outages?”
County EOC in Hillsborough and 911 Call Center in Somerville are two facilities that are not presently on the top12 list and should be considered for addition. Both may already have backup power / redundant systems so perhaps that is why there weren’t on the 2014 list. Coordination needed with SCOEM to determine whether either/both of these facilities should be added to the list. DPW Facilities - consider adding the 2 county garages Next plan update can focus on the next tier down of local, police fire, rescue. This version to focus on first tier countywide resources. Elderly housing / assisted living – next tier down.
Discussion Question 6 – Community Resiliency: “What are some key adaptation strategies and best practices that Somerset County, its municipalities, residents, businesses and others can implement to become more resilient when faced with the impacts of climate change such as more frequent and severe storms; longer, hotter summers; wet and dry spells; etc.?”
Discourage people from putting solar arrays on undeveloped land, and encourage the installation of solar arrays on space that is presently paved, or where possible, consider putting it on rooftops, windows, over parking lots, etc. Group discussion that it’s not beneficial to be cutting down trees to install solar arrays. It doesn’t make sense to take a pervious surface undeveloped land and transition it to a solar field. A policy change could be one mitigation opportunity. o Right now, lawns are designated as impervious surfaces because of the dense root structure – slow infiltration rate. The policy should clarify that its intent is to encourage solar arrays over paved impervious; not green impervious.
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