THE ROLE OF IN VIOLENT CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING IN

by Elisabeth King

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Department of Political Science, of Toronto

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While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. Canada The Role of Education in Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding in Rwanda Elisabeth King Doctor of Philosophy, 2008 Graduate Department of Political Science, University of Toronto

ABSTRACT

Schools are an important factor in constructing group identities and attitudes toward the other, yet are understudied by scholars of conflict and peacebuilding. This dissertation comparatively examines how the structure and content of ordinary education contributed to both ethnic conflict and peacebuilding in Rwanda. It suggests specific social-structural and psycho-cultural mechanisms that situate education among the causes of violence, and potentially and more tentatively, sustainable peace. Findings are based upon approximately

100 one-on-one interviews conducted in Rwanda and , and documentary analysis of curriculum and archival material.

I argue that in both the colonial period (1919-64) and under the two (1964-

1994), formal schooling contributed to laying the foundation for violent interethnic conflict.

Access to schooling was unequal and competition took place along ethnic lines, curriculum differentiated, collectivized and stigmatized ethnic groups, and classroom practices were ethnically-based and discouraged critical thinking. I further argue that while some positive strides towards peacebuilding are currently being taken, schools in post- genocide Rwanda (1994-2008) are dangerously replicating past trends. The final chapter examines how these findings extend to such other, quite diverse, cases as ,

Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland and Israel and explores practical implications for efforts to build sustainable peace in Rwanda and elsewhere. This thesis draws education into political science analyses of conflict and peacebuilding and provides detailed empirical findings to better understand the processes of ethnic construction, politicization and the exacerbation and/or mitigation of violent interethnic conflict.

ii For Grammy and Papa, who first introduced me to issues of group identity and reconciliation through Dr. Seuss' The Sneetches, and who today, would have been so proud. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

If I were to individually thank everyone who contributed to this project, the list would span three decades and three continents and be nearly as long as this dissertation. I am truly grateful to all who would appear on that list.

I am most appreciative of the support, enthusiasm, and mentorship of my dissertation committee at the University of Toronto. Few graduate students are so lucky as to leave each dissertation meeting inspired and reinvigorated. Richard Sandbrook, my advisor, provided four years of sound guidance and thoughtful, timely comments. Kathy Bickmore carefully read and commented upon each draft, always reminding me of the bigger picture. Bob Matthews was a constant encouragement, showing a special interest in the potential real-world contribution of this research to building sustainable peace. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Catharine Newbury were thorough and dedicated external examiners; their comments, questions, and advice are particularly helpful for moving this project forward to publication and future research. I am also grateful to the many other faculty members in the Department of Political Science who generously offered their time and advice, including Susan Solomon and David Welch. Administrators Mary-Alice Bailey, Carolynn Branton, and Joan Kallis also helped me make my way through the Ph.D. programme.

Generous funding for this project came from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Ontario Graduate Scholarship, the Canadian Consortium on Human Security, the University of Toronto's Department of Graduate Studies, and the Trudeau Peace and Conflict Centre.

This project would not have been possible without the generosity of the numerous Rwandans in Canada, and especially in Rwanda, who agreed to share their experiences with me. I will always remember the warm welcome and long conversations with the many Rwandans who opened their homes to me, introduced me to their families and friends, took me for my first goat brochette, and helped me make my way through the hills of Rwanda. I promised all participants anonymity and thus cannot thank them by

iv name. I send them all a sincere murakoze. Officials at the Department of Education also kindly helped make this study possible. Research in Rwanda would not have been as smooth, nor nearly as enjoyable, without my Canadian "family" in , Stephanie Bouris, Julian Lee, Danielle Lessard, John and Pat Morris, and Alana Tiemessen.

My research in Belgium was aided by the members of Memoires du Congo who helped me track down missionaries and administrators who had served in Rwanda's colonial period. The conversations that I had with these individuals, to whom I also promised anonymity, were fascinating and greatly enriched my dissertation.

I am also thankful for the ideas and encouragement of my colleagues, whom I am lucky to count as friends, especially Cristina Badescu, James Milner, Katherine Reilly, Ian Spears, Thomas Tieku, Susan Thomson, and Jenn Wallner.

I am particularly grateful for the assistance of Ken and Danuta Kitay and Jo Anne Miike in the research design and data analysis phases of my research. Maude Patry, Sarah Pilon and Florence Ting helped with transcription. Jean-Pierre Rubibi provided excellent Kinyarwanda-French translation. Jean-Damascene Gasanabo and Scott Straus also made particularly important contributions to this research.

My family and friends also helped me along this journey with their ongoing support, encouragement, and pride in my achievements. I have much to thank them for. Thanks, in particular, to my mother, Ann Farrell, for her foresight in providing a French- that eventually permitted me to carry out this research. Thanks to Jen Constant, Jena Garratt, and to my other wonderful University of Western Ontario friends for always cheering me oh. Thanks most especially to my soon-to-be husband, David Noseworthy, who sat down to dinner on innumerable occasions generously asking "tell me more about Rwanda".

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

FRONT MATTER Abstract ii Dedication iii Acknowledgements iv List of Abbreviations viii List of Figures x Note on Spelling xi Map of Rwanda xii

CHAPTERS

0: Introduction 1

1: Education, Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding - Literature Review, Framework and Research Design 9 1.1 Literature Review 1.1a Ethnic Conflict Literature 1.1b Peacebuilding Literature 1.1c Education Literature

1.2 Framework

1.3 Research Design and Methodological Questions 1.3a Qualitative Study 1.3b Case Selection 1.3c Data Collection 1.3d Interviews, Transcripts and Truths

2: Colonial Schooling and the Roots of Violent Interethnic Conflict (1919-1964^ 62 2.1 Historical Overview of the Colonial Period 2.2 The Development of Formal Education in the Colonial Period 2.3 An Assessment of the Role of Schooling (1919-64) 2.3a Research Design 2.3b Findings 2.3c Analysis: The contribution of schooling to violent interethnic conflict

vi 3: Schooling under the Republics and the Roots of Violent Interethnic Conflict (1964-1994) 109

3.1 Historical Overview of the two Republics 3.2 The Development of Formal Education under the two Republics 3.3 An Assessment of the Role of Schooling (1964-1994) 3.3a Research Design 3.3b Findings 3.3c Analysis: The contribution of schooling to violent interethnic conflict

4: Schooling after Genocide 168

4.1 Historical Overview of Post-Genocide Rwanda (1994 - 2008) 4.2 The Development of Formal Education after Genocide 4.3 An Assessment of the Role of Schooling (1994 - 2008) 4.3a Research Design 4.3b Findings 4.3c Analysis: Plus ca change, plus c 'est la mime chosel

5: Conclusion — Education. Violent Interethnic Conflict and Peacebuilding 224

5.1 The Findings 5.2 The Findings in Comparative Perspective 5.2a Education and Violent Conflict 5.2b Education and Peacebuilding 5.3 Implications 5.3a Theoretical implications 5.3b Policy implications 5.4 Research Agenda

Works Cited 261

APPENDICES Discussion Guide 289 Discussion Guide for Teachers 292 Interview List 294 Expert Interview List 300

vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BF Belgian Franc

CAS Complex Adaptive System

CERAI Centre de Venseignement rural et artisanal integre

CERAR Centre de Venseignement rural et artisanal du Rwanda

CNDC National Curriculum Development Centre

DRC Democratic of Congo (formerly )

FHAO Facing History and Ourselves

FARG Fonds d'Assistance aux Rescapes du Genocide

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GER Gross Enrolment Rate

HDI Human Development Index

ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

IDP Internally Displaced Person

MINALOC Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Social Affairs

MINEDUC Ministry of Education

MINEPRISEC Ministry of Primary and Secondary Schooling (now MINEDUC)

MINESUPRES Ministry of and Research

MDR Mouvement Democratique Republicain

MRND Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement

NER Net Enrolment Rate

viii NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NUR National (Butare)

NURC National Unity and Reconciliation Commission

PARMEHUTU Parti du Mouvement et de I'Emancipation

RADER Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais

RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army

RPF

RWF

SCT Self-Categorization Theory

SIT Social Identity Theory

USD Dollar

UN

UNAR Union Nationale Rwandaise

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

ix LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Title Page

1.1 Mechanisms for Violent Interethnic Conflict and Sustainable Peace 40

2.1 Number of Students by Ethnic Group in Central Primary Catholic Schools in 1928 (boys) 87

2.2 Number of Students by Ethnic Group in Central Primary Catholic Schools in 1928 (boys), Normalized for Proportion of Population 87

2.3 Student Enrolment by Ethnic Group at the

Groupe Scolaire (1932-59) 97

3.1 Primary Enrolment (1963/4 to 1993/4) 121

3.2 The Educational Pyramid 136 3.3 Over & Under Representation of Ethnic Enrolment at in Relation to Population 1964-80 (84% Hutu, 15% ) 138

3.4 Over & Under Representation of Ethnic Enrolment at Secondary School in Relation to Population 1964-80 (90% Hutu, 9% Tutsi) 139

3.5 Belief that Hutu and Tutsi are Different Ethnicities by Education 163

3.6 Heard that Tutsi are and/or from Ethiopia by Education 164

3.7 Belief in Rubanda Nyamwinshi (the "Great Majority") by Education 164

x A NOTE ON SPELLING

Following the practice of numerous scholars, I do not pluralize the nouns Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, by adding an "s". Some have alleged that this practice collectivizes Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa individuals. In contrast, this reflects Rwandans' own usage of these terms in English and French.

XI MAP OF RWANDA

; KIGALI '>'.•-'• HA.

Kibunge

Source: CIA, 77?e WorldFactbook (2006).

xii 0. Introduction

When I visited the church at Nyamata, where 10 000 Rwandans sought refuge and were subsequently killed, its entry was draped with a banner reading: Iyo uza kwimenza nanjye ukamenya ntuba waranyishe. A Rwandan man in the courtyard translated for me:

"If you had known me, and known yourself, you would not have killed me." Indeed, understandings of identity and attitudes toward the other are central to explaining the

1994 genocide that claimed between five hundred thousand and one million lives in just three months.1 A significant proportion of the population participated in the killing.2 The victims were predominantly Tutsi; the perpetrators predominantly Hutu.

The first analyses after the made little effort to understand

identity in Rwanda. The Guardian reported that "people were driven by atavistic fury that goes back to the times when human beings moved in packs and ate raw meat."3 The

New York Times similarly wrote about the "age-old animosity between the Tutsi and Hutu

ethnic groups."4 Robert Kaplan's article warning of The Coming Anarchy in Africa was

1 The exact number of deaths is unknown and contested. The widely accepted United Nations estimate is 800 000 dead including Hutu and Tutsi. Des Forges puts the figure of Tutsi civilians killed at 500 000. The Rwandan government puts deaths, both Hutu and Tutsi, at 927 000 to one million. Arthur Asiimwe, "Rwanda Census Puts Genocide Death Toll at 937,000," Reuters 2004, , Leave None to Tell the Story (New York: , 1999), 15-6. For a discussion of these figures, see Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 51. 2 Rwanda's genocide is characterized by mass involvement, but estimates of the number of perpetrators have varied significantly. In 1995, government officials told scholar Mahmood Mamdani that three to four million Rwandans participated in the genocide. In 1997 another official told him that the number was four to five million. In that same year, yet another official told him that 80% of Hutu alive had participated in killing. While there are political reasons that the current Kagame government would keep these estimates high, scholars have subsequently revised figures downwards. Mamdani estimates "hundreds of thousands" of perpetrators. Straus estimates 175 000 to 210 000 perpetrators, meaning 14 to 17% of the active male adult Hutu population. Jones' estimate is much lower at 25 000 or less killers. Bruce Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure (London: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 41, Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001), 7, 266, Straus, The Order of Genocide, 117. 3 Quoted in Tim Allen and John Eade, "The New Politics of Identity," in Poverty and Development into the 21st Century, ed. Tim Allen and Alan Thomas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 499. 4 Quoted in John Cony, "A Formula for Genocide," The American Spectator, September 1998,24-5.

1 circulated as required reading for US diplomats.5 Still others made little effort to comprehend at all. In Out of Africa: A Black Man Confronts Africa, author Keith B.

Richburg remarked, in regards to Rwanda, that "fully evolved human beings in the 20th century don't do things like that."6

Since that time, more reflective analyses have highlighted the significance of the social construction and politicization of ethnicity. Making sense of identity and its manipulation is key to shedding light on the causes of conflict and on ongoing efforts to build peace. Of course, trying to understand the creation and politicization of ethnic identity, in Rwanda, and elsewhere, does not condone violence or exculpate killers.

This dissertation examines schools as an important, yet understudied, factor in developing identity and views of the other. Formal education has long been held up as a harbinger of modernity, a key to economic progress, a contributor to children's intellectual and moral development, a transmitter of culture, and a builder of nationalism.

More recently, this positive view has carried over to education as a force for good in conflict situations, especially in regards to prevention. This is reflected, for example, in the United Nations' Education for All documentation that presents education as one of the best means of averting conflict and overcoming violence.7 In this vein, a representative of the European Union commented:

Basic education is a human right. The European Union believes that education and training are key to a society's development and its fight against poverty. It is a precondition to the success of democracy and good governance, and it is crucial to progress in other related fields, such as health,

5 Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War (New York: Vintage Books, 2000). 6 Quoted in Bill Berkeley, The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 9. 7 See Alan Smith and Tony Vaux, "Education, Conflict and International Development," (London: UK Department for International Development, 2003), 18.

2 gender equality and social welfare. Hence, education plays a fundamental role not only in poverty reduction but also in the promotion of human rights and the prevention of conflicts.8

Education is also increasingly viewed as having a role in peacebuilding and reconciliation after violence. When wars end, the international community rallies to get children back into schools. After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, reopening schools was a top priority and the world cheered the return of three million children, including girls, to classrooms. Schools are also often presumed to play a role in reconciling previously warring parties. As the Director General of UNESCO stated,

"[e]ducation is what will enable us to move from a culture of war, which we unhappily know only too well, to a culture of peace."9 Yet, we have very little evidence about how and what types of formal schooling conduce to these outcomes.

We also know little about schooling and conflict. Usually, when we hear about education and conflict, the causal arrow goes from conflict to education, examining how violence disrupts the provision of education. Only infrequently is the causal arrow reversed to investigate the possible link from education to violent conflict, but this link - especially to ethnic conflict - is increasingly being invoked. Yet, again, we have relatively little knowledge of how this process works.

In the case of Rwanda, in particular, the current government paradoxically blames past schooling for exacerbating conflict, yet prioritizes education expansion and reform as major elements of peacebuilding and development. The contradictory trends of praising and blaming schooling in the peace and conflict arena present important

"Open-Ended Ad Hoc Working Group on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa: Statement by Ambassador Per Norstrom, Deputy Permanent Representative of Sweden on Behalf of the European Union.," (2001). 9 Clive Harber, "Educational Violence and Education for Peace in Africa," Peabody Journal of Education 71, no. 3 (1996), 151.

3 questions: What role (if any) has formal contributed to violent interethnic conflict and/or its mitigation? What are the mechanisms at work?

Rwanda is a particularly good case for this research for several reasons. First, the sheer scope and brutality of the genocide in Rwanda merit investigation. If we are interested in intergroup divisiveness, there is no more extreme case than genocide.

Second, ethnic identities, at least as we know them today in Rwanda, are relatively recent political constructions, and tracing their construction, mobilization and politicization since colonial times is feasible. Finally, as noted above, the Rwandan government has recognized the important role of education and has even blamed the pre-genocide school curriculum for failing the nation.10 It is currently undertaking widespread reform that seeks to deny and eliminate ethnic identity from schools. Research in Rwanda allowed me to study a process as it was unfolding and to explore whether the theory underlying the project is sound.

While Rwanda is now relatively familiar in the general lexicon due to the 1994 genocide, most people know little else of the country. Even Canadian General Romeo

Dallaire, when informed that he would head a UN mission in Rwanda recalls asking,

"[t]hat's somewhere in Africa, isn't it?"11 Rwanda, landlocked in the centre of the continent, just below the equator, is one of the smallest states in Africa. Roughly one fortieth the size of Ontario, it has a population of approximately 8.6 million people,

10 Republic of Rwanda, "Curriculum in the Service of National Development" (paper presented at the National Curriculum Conference, Kigali Institute of Science, Technology and Management, Kigali, May 14-15 2002), 5, MINEPRISEC & MINESUPRES Republic of Rwanda, "Document Final Provisoire: Conference sur la Politique et la Planification de PEducation au Rwanda," in Conference sur la Politique et la Planification de I'Education au Rwanda (Kigali: Ministere de l'Enseignement Primaire et Secondaire & Ministere de l'Enseignement Superieur, de la Recherche Scientifique et de la Culture, 1995), 5, 16, 25, 44, 56. 11 Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2003), 42.

4 roughly 84% Hutu, 15% Tutsi and 1% Twa. While Kigali is its capital, hills, not cities,

are the prime geographic and social points in Rwanda. Indeed, the country is known as

the land of a thousand hills, an apt description in my experience, for the stunningly

beautiful landscape in which I had the opportunity to carry out my research.

It is the key assertion of this thesis that the way formal schooling constructs and

(de)politicizes ethnic difference in Rwanda is important for understanding violent

interethnic conflict and its potential mitigation. With inclusion and exclusion as central

themes throughout, this dissertation puts a special focus on uncovering the mechanisms at

work.

Through an examination of the structure of primary schools, as well as the

historical content they teach and their classroom practices, I argue that schooling in

Rwanda, in both the colonial period (1919-64) and two Republics (1964-1994), contributed

to laying an underlying foundation for violent interethnic conflict. I further argue mat while

some positive strides towards peacebuilding have been made since 1994, schools are

replicating past destructive tendencies in new guises. I do not argue that education is

necessary or sufficient for violent conflict or peacebuilding. It is, however, an important

piece of a complex puzzle that has been largely overlooked by political scientists and

other scholars of ethnic strife.

This dissertation proceeds through five chapters. Chapter 1 queries the literature

on ethnic conflict, peacebuilding, and education to situate the research questions within

existing academic debates. Although no single strand of theoretical or empirical

literature encompassed the entirety of the research questions, these literatures can be

usefully brought together to construct an analytical framework. Separating out

5 underlying and proximate causes of conflict and peacebuilding, as well as social- structural (i.e. discriminatory or inclusive institutions and processes) and psycho-cultural factors (i.e. categorizing, collectivizing and stigmatizing groups), this part of the thesis proposes a framework to hypothesize how education may contribute to creating the underlying conditions conducive to violent interethnic conflict and/or to sustainable peace {dependent variables). By education, I am referring to formal state-led schooling.

I focus on the elementary, or primary, school level because most studies ignore it in favour of studying higher levels of schooling, yet in countries like Rwanda, far more people have access to primary schools. I disaggregate education into two independent variables: educational structure and educational content. By educational structure, I mean access to schooling and (de)segregation. In terms of educational content, I focus on history as a subject. I also examine the content of classroom practices. The framework borrows from complexity theory to help explain complex causality and how neither violent conflict nor peacebuilding can be explained in a linear or monocausal fashion.

The core of the dissertation (chapters 2-4) turns to Rwanda. Research is based upon approximately 100 field interviews conducted in Rwanda (January-April 2006) and

Belgium (September 2006) and documentary analysis of curricula and archival sources.

The study comparatively analyses three periods in Rwandan history: the Belgian colonial period, the two Republics, and post-genocide. Each of these periods represents a different ethnic group in power and a different education system; the first two end in significant violence along ethnic lines. These three chapters each sketch the socio-

6 political history of the period and overview the development of schooling before turning to my findings and arguments.

Chapter 2, a case study of the colonial period, makes the argument that unbalanced access to primary schooling and to educational advancement polarized and politicized ethnicity in Rwanda, thus contributing to planting the roots of violence along

ethnic lines. Chapter 3, exploring the two Republics, similarly argues that formal

schooling contributed to laying the foundation of violent interethnic conflict through its

unequal structure and competition over it. In this period though, divisive classroom practices and history content also negatively separated Rwandans. In both chapters,

Rwanda's education system, while not directly triggering conflict, helped create both the

psycho-cultural and social-structural conditions that make violent conflict more likely.

Chapter 4 analyses the post-genocide period. I argue that while some positive

strides towards peacebuilding are being made, the approach is also replicating negative

past trends. While access to primary education is improving for all, access to higher

levels of education still plays out on an ethnic playing field. Furthermore, the historical

narrative that is making its way into schools excludes the experiences of much of the

population and problematically drives ethnicity underground.

The conclusion reviews the core arguments of this thesis. It also considers

Rwanda in a comparative context, briefly exploring such cases as Nazi Germany, the

Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia), Northern Ireland and Israel to see if, and how, the

arguments developed in this thesis extend to other cases. In addition, the conclusion

fleshes out the theoretical and policy implications of this dissertation and suggests a

future research agenda.

7 The findings of this dissertation may be of interest to several different audiences.

For those interested in Rwanda, this study offers a new angle, highlighting education as a dimension largely ignored in previous analyses. But the relevance of this thesis extends beyond the confines of Rwanda. For those interested in ethnic conflict and peacebuilding more broadly, this thesis adds education as an important, yet overlooked dimension through which a variety of mechanisms interact to help build a base for conflict or sustainable peace. To both literatures, it contributes a focus on the long-term, primarily psycho-cultural processes, often ignored in favour of security, political and economic dimensions. For those interested in identity politics, the following chapters make a scholarly contribution to constructivist analyses of conflict that generally do not take us far enough in understanding the processes of ethnic construction in ways that exacerbate or mitigate violent conflict. In so doing, this thesis attunes scholars to the importance of complexity theory for understanding processes of violent conflict, peacebuilding, and identity construction. For those interested in undertaking field research in violently divided or post-conflict societies, this dissertation offers much reflection on the complexities and nuances of research in these challenging environments. Most important, I hope that this dissertation is of interest to those endeavouring to make a practical contribution to preventing conflict and building sustainable peace in Rwanda and other parts of the world.

8 Chapter 1: Education. Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding - Literature Review. Framework and Research Design

As 21 year-old Claudine, a Rwandan farmer and genocide survivor put it, "a genocide is a poisonous bush that grows not from two or three roots but from a tangle of roots that has moldered underground where no one notices it."12 Theorizing the role of education in creating or mitigating such a tangle, and establishing a research design in order to operationalize it, are the goals of this chapter. The first part explores the literatures that help us theorize the role of formal education in the development of conditions conducive to identity-based violence and/or to sustainable peace. The second part of this chapter brings them together into my own framework. The third part overviews my methodology and highlights particularly challenging issues for conducting research in Rwanda.

1.1 Literature Review

It became clear very early on that no single strand of theoretical or empirical literature encompassed the entirety of my research questions and that a creative blending of several strands of literature was called for. This section thus represents a pragmatic approach to a literature review, drawing on literatures in terms of how they inform the issues of interest here. Conventional studies of violent (ethnic) conflict and their prevention typically draw on two literatures: the civil and ethnic conflict literature, and the peacebuilding literature. This review will thus begin by surveying each in turn. It will then turn to a review of the relevant education literature.

12 Quoted in Jean Hatzfeld, Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak, trans. Linda Coverdale (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 90.

9 1.1a Ethnic Conflict Literature

Ethnicity Defined

Contrary to primordial views of ethnicity which take it as a "remnant of tradition" based on common objective characteristics such as language, race, and religion,13 this research project begins with identity, and more specifically ethnic identity, as socially constructed. According to Manuel Castells, identity is "people's source of meaning and experience" lodged in cultural attributes.14 To say that ethnic identities are constructed is to suggest that "social categories, their membership rules, content, and valuation are the products of human action and speech..."15 In this view, ethnicity is a social, not an individual, phenomenon constructed from a dense web of social interactions.16

Many find Benedict Anderson's reference to an "imagined community" a useful theoretical starting point. Anderson justifies his use of the term imagined "because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their community."17 Therein, a sense of "we-ness" is created. Anderson's explanation also allows for the possibility of using the "imagining" concept for ethnicity.18 A parallel

David Brown, "Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on State and Society," Third World Quarterly 11 (1989), 1. 14 Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, 2nd ed., The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 6. 15 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000), 848. 16 Michael Barnett, "Culture, Strategy, and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo," European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 1 (1999), 9, David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict," in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 6. 17 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 2003), 6. 18 Paris Yeros, ed., Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa: Constructivist Reflections and Contemporary Politics (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 1.

10 consideration is the fact that "ancient" traditions which claim to support a nation or ethnic group are often recent inventions.19

We can understand ethnicity as

a kind of group identification, a sense of belonging to a people, that is experienced 'as a greatly extended form of kinship' [Horowitz, 1985]. This definition of ethnicity is intended to be very broad, acknowledging the importance of subjective perceptions. It encompasses differences along racial lines...lines of geographic origin...as well as linguistic, religious, tribal, or other cultural lines... Ethnicity is not static, but shifting and highly malleable.20

From a constructivist point of view, we can think of identities as "inter-subjective,

socially constructed, conditional, lodged in contingencies that are historically specific,

and discursively produced."21 A common story of the past - and we will examine the role of schools in its creation and dissemination - is a crucial instrument in the

construction and reproduction of collective identities. The markers of identity can

vary from case to case, and the emphasized referents can shift with time.22 As we will

see in Rwanda, although ethnicity is constructed, it is not infinitely malleable. Even

myths, once created, tend to gain a reality about them and can attract powerful

loyalties.

Theories of Ethnic Conflict: Primordialism, Instrumentalism, and Constructivism

The earliest work, reflected for example in the newspaper articles quoted in the

Introduction, blame violence along ethnic lines on "ancient tribal hatreds", contending

that violence is natural and flows directly from objective differences, thus requiring no

Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1. 20 Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), 14. 21 Kevin C. Dunn, "Imagining Mobutu's Zaire: The Production and Consumption of Identity in International Relations," Millenium: Journal of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2001), 236. 22 Jack David Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), 7.

11 further explanation. But calling ethnicities ancient suggests that they are primordial forces, beyond history and human agency. Furthermore, ethnic identities and even tensions endure in many countries without leading to armed conflict. Scholars also recognized that primordial explanations are located at the mass level and that elites needed to take a more important place in their analyses.23 A move was consequently made toward instrumentalism: the existence of ethnic groups is due less to primordial consciousness than to self-consciousness mobilized by leaders and elite groups for political purposes. But instrumentalism problematically assumes that ethnicity can be changed quite easily. A focus solely on elites is tricky too; it ignores the important question of why followers follow.24 Furthermore, by focusing solely on the social uses of ethnicity, instrumentalism ignores its construction.

Unlike primordialists, constructivists do not equate the mere existence of ethnicity with acute ethnic conflict. Constructivism implies that "even if members are hostile to each other now, this need not be (and probably has not been) an eternal condition."

Moreover, since social categories and boundaries may change over time, "members of any two ethnic groups A and B need not think of themselves as A's and B's at all."25 To

See for example Taisier Ali and Robert O. Matthews, eds., Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999), Michael E. Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: Centre for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1996), Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict, Staven Majstorovic, "Ancient Hatreds or Elite Manipulation? Memory and Politics in the Former Yugoslavia," World Affairs 159, no. 4 (1997). 24 On the idea that states vary in the extent of their autonomy, in the extensiveness of their influence over society, and in terms of their ability to get their own way, see Brown, "Ethnic Revival." For a discussion of how all levels of society can use ethnicity to negotiate political participation and representation see Dickson Eyoh, "Community, Citizenship and the Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Africa," in Sacred Spaces and Public Quarrels, ed. P. Zeleza and E. Kalipeni (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1999), 274, 88. For a general discussion of why followers follow, see Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." For reflections on "why do the followers follow?" or even "do they follow?" in Rwanda see Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 15. 25 Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," 849.

12 some extent, constructivism shares with instrumentalism the view that identities can be manipulated and shaped in different contexts and situations; however social

constructivists recognize that once constructed, ethnicity becomes sticky and hard to

change. Constructivism does not provide a single-factor explanation to account for ethnic

conflict. From the constructivist view, while identities are important, violent ethnic

conflict needs to be explained.

Causes of Violent Conflict

In the last decade, the literature on ethnic conflict has become more systematized,

incorporating a variety of causal factors on multiple levels of analysis. The literature can

be broadly classified as following four categorizations. First, some of the literature

examines the causes of conflict at three levels: international, regional and domestic.26

Recent literature has emphasized the importance of adding the local level to analyses as

Second, some scholars distinguish between proximate and underlying causes of

violent ethnic conflict.28 Proximate causes (also known as direct causes) are those that

directly affect the odds of war, or in other words, can trigger war. Underlying causes

(also known as permissive, remote or root causes) are the background conditions required

See Michael E. Brown, "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict," in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), Raymond Copson, "Peace in Africa? The Influence of Regional and International Change," in Conflict Resolution in Africa, ed. Francis Mading Deng and I. William Zartman (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991). Although he is writing about international conflict, see also Jack S. Levy, "Contending Theories of International Conflict," in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, ed. Chester Crocker and Fen Osier Hampson (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996). 27 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). The local level of analysis is becoming more prominent in analyses of Rwanda as well. See for example Lee Ann Fujii, Killing Neighbors: Social Dimensions of Genocide in Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), Straus, The Order of Genocide. 28 See for example Ali and Matthews, eds., Civil Wars in Africa, Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," Lake and Rothchild, "Spreading Fear," Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security 18, no. 4 (1994).

13 for the activation of proximate causes, but are on their own insufficient to cause violent conflict. The genocide literature, useful in analyzing cases such as Rwanda, also importantly recognizes this multi-step process of causation. Ervin Staub, for example, refers to a "continuum of destruction" wherein seemingly small initial conditions build up, combine with further factors, and give way to genocide.29 Similarly, Gregory Stanton lists "the seven stages of genocide" recognizing the gradual accumulation of psychological and operational processes.30 Alex Hinton usefully breaks down the causes of genocide between "genocidal priming" (underlying causes) and "genocidal activation"

(proximate causes).31

Third, the literature classifies the causes of conflict as being of two varieties: social-structural and psycho-cultural. As Marc Ross explains, social-structural conditions

(in some earlier cases, referred to as objective or tangible causes) are based in divergent interests. The principal sources of conflict thus lie in the social, economic, and political organisation of society and in the quality and intensity of ties within and between communities. On the other hand, psycho-cultural factors (others have called them subjective or intangible causes), lie in disputants' dominant images and metaphors. They

"emphasize the role of culturally shared, profound 'we-they' oppositions, the conceptualization of enemies and allies, and deep-seated dispositions about human action

Ervin Staub, The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, and Groups Help and Harm Others (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Psychological and Cultural Origins of Genocide and Other Forms of Group Violence (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 30 H. Gregory Stanton, "The Seven Stages of Genocide" (paper presented at the Yale University Center for International and Area Studies, 1996). 31 Alexander Laban Hinton, Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 282-8.

14 stemming from earliest development." While many earlier analyses relied exclusively on social-structural factors to explain conflict, it is now clear that focusing on these factors, to the detriment of psycho-cultural factors, is insufficient to capture the nuances of conflict. The approaches are complementary; social-structural and psycho-cultural factors interact in the triggering of violent conflict.33 Constructivists recognize the mutual constitution of, on one hand, actors' identities, interests and behaviours and, on the other, social structures.34

Finally, another way to classify the causes of conflict is to do so thematically.

Although different constellations of factors may interact in diverse contexts, the literature has identified clusters of factors that make societies predisposed to conflict. Michael

Brown provides a widely cited list of causes including four main groups: structural factors (i.e. weak states, security concerns), political factors (i.e. discriminatory institutions), economic/social factors (i.e. economic problems), and cultural/perceptual factors (i.e. cultural discrimination, problematic group ).35 Richard Sandbrook suggests four mutually reinforcing symptoms: rising ethnic tensions; an increasingly predatory and incapacitated state; a declining economy and growing poverty; and a deteriorating environment. He argues that the combination of these symptoms produces

Marc Howard Ross, The Management of Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 15. See also Marc Howard Ross, Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 33 For a discussion in regards to Rwanda, see Steve Utterwulghe, "Rwanda's Protracted Social Conflict: Considering the Subjective Perspective in Conflict Resolution Strategies," The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 2, no. 3 (1999). 34 Matthew J. Hoffman, "Constructing a Complex World: The Frontiers of International Relations Theory and Foreign Policy-Making," Asian Journal of Political Science 11, no. 2 (2003), 44. 35 Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict." Some of Brown's categories, such as "problematic group histories," an underlying cultural/perceptual factor, are tautological or could easily become so.

15 fear, insecurity and mistrust, driving people to identity with their primary community, and sparking violence with the onset of a dramatic event.36

Although the thematic classifications reviewed above do not specify the mechanisms by which ethnicity is constructed and politicized in ways that foster or mitigate violence, it is important for our investigation to think about how these elements fit in. Even if the sheer existence of ethnicity cannot explain conflict, as primordialists suggest, ethnicity clearly plays an important role where violence takes place along ethnic lines. While the ethnic conflict literature now generally works from a social constructivist outlook, statements of how specific processes of ethnic construction operate and contribute to conflict (de)escalation are still difficult to find and are rarely integrated into general models of understanding conflict.37

Probing the literature does, however, reveal several psycho-cultural mechanisms involved in identity construction that might lead from ethnicity to violence. These include emphasis on differences between groups, prejudice and a culture of discrimination, negative stereotypes and enemy images, dehumanization, victimization, scapegoating, obedience to authority, and fear. While many of these processes may -

Richard Sandbrook, Closing the Circle: Democratization and Development in Africa (Toronto: Between The Lines, 2000), 51-4. 37 Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," 850. 38 For a discussion of several of these factors, see Hinton, Why Did They Kill, Paul R. Kimmel, "Cultural and Ethnic Issues of Conflict and Peacekeeping," in The Psychology of Peacekeeping, ed. Harvey J. Langholtz (Westport: Praeger, 1998), Staub, The Psychology of Good and Evil, Staub, The Roots of Evil, Straus, The Order of Genocide, Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War." Specifically on negative stereotyping through enemy images see Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet- American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report," The Journal of Social Issues XVII, no. 3 (1961), Heidi Burgess, "Enemy Images: In-Groups and out-Groups," (2003), Janice Gross Stein, "Image, Identity and Conflict Resolution," in Managing Global Chaos: Sources and Responses to International Conflict, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Osier Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996). Specifically on fear, see Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," Lake and Rothchild, "Spreading Fear."

16 and I will argue do - take place in schools, schools are rarely examined among the causes of ethnic conflict.

The four classifications are not mutually exclusive. Each thematic cluster, for example, can be separated into underlying and proximate causes. Alternatively, one can examine a thematic factor, such as politics, at various levels of analysis. Another way to bring together several classifications is to consider how underlying conditions can be social-structural and psycho-cultural. There are many further possibilities. The complex interaction of these many typologies of causes is reflected in the recent move to refer to deadly conflict as "complex humanitarian emergencies", "complex political emergencies" or "complex emergencies."39 In the framework presented below (section 1.2), I endeavour to bring together the causes of conflict into a succinct model, while recognizing the complexity of the causes of violent conflict.

1.1b Peacebuilding Literature

Peacebuilding Defined

Peacebuilding, as originally described in the Agenda for Peace, is "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict." It is "sustained, cooperative work to deal with the underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems [that contribute to conflict]."40 Peacebuilding can be seen as moving from a negative peace, which involves cessation of hostilities, to a positive peace, which goes further to address the underlying

Sandbrook, Closing the Circle, 50-4. 40 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace- Keeping," (United Nations, 1992).

17 root causes of conflict and to work towards social justice. Although conflict is never absent, with positive peace, it does not deteriorate into violence, and structures exist that help transform disagreements into attainable solutions. Despite having been originally

introduced as a post-conflict endeavour, peacebuilding is also now seen to have conflict preventive potential.

The Components of Peacebuilding

Considered as a whole, the peacebuilding literature is in its theoretical infancy and highly normative. While policies and programmes developed in the pursuit of peacebuilding may, and often must, differ depending on context, the peacebuilding

literature has developed a basic framework. The four "pillars" of peacebuilding (others

call them building blocks or architecture) are a general set of challenges with which each

country hoping to build sustainable peace after violent conflict must contend. This set

includes:

• security - "bringing an end to widespread fighting, demobilizing and disarming the warring parties, and creating an atmosphere of trust and confidence"; • new political institutions and processes - to ensure that the "political process is open, inclusive, and able to cope with conflicts in a peaceful manner"; • economic progress - "eliminating abject poverty and gradually easing the economic inequalities that may have been at the heart of the conflict"; • justice and reconciliation - "fostering reconciliation among previously warring groups" and "helping to build an awareness of community."4

There is further consensus that no pillar alone is sufficient, and that the process of

arriving at positive peace is a long and arduous one. Whether certain pillars take priority,

and whether a particular sequence is best for achieving positive peace remain, however,

controversial questions.

41 Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969), 183. 42 Taisier Ali and Robert O. Matthews, eds., Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 6-7.

18 Just as social-structural factors have dominated the ethnic conflict literature, political scientists writing about peacebuilding have tended to prioritize security,

governance and economic factors, indeed social-structural criteria, to the detriment of the

psycho-cultural requirements of peacebuilding, such as reconciliation.43 They frequently

entangle reconciliation with justice, often with an implicit assumption that reconciliation

automatically results from justice. Relatively few examine the concept of

reconciliation,44 and even fewer study practical examples of reconciliatory initiatives

separate from justice, such as education and memorials.

Reconciliation, according to Hizkias Assefa, is an "approach [that] not only tries

to find solutions to the issues underlying conflict but also works to alter the adversaries'

relationships from that of resentment and hostility to friendship and harmony."45 In other

words, reconciliation and conflict resolution are about the transformation of antagonistic

attitudes, and negative to positive relationships. The concept also highlights the

importance of psychological changes on the part of disputants. The literature suggests

many criteria that may be required for reconciliation, varying from acknowledgement,

contrition and forgiveness, to trust, reciprocity and interdependence. It also suggests a

variety of strategies for the psycho-cultural aspects of peacebuilding, such as refraining

Reconciliation can include concrete components, such as repayment, but the overall goal is rebuilding relationships. See Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998). 44 Notable exceptions include Hizkias Assefa, "Reconciliation," in Peace-Buildling: A Field Guide, ed. Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), Eileen Borris and Paul F. Diehl, "Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and the Contribution of International Peacekeeping," in The Psychology of Peacekeeping, ed. Harvey J. Langholtz (Westport: Praeger, 1998), Ho-Won Jeong and Charles Lerche, "Reconciliation: Contexts and Consequences," in Approaches to Peacebuilding, ed. Ho-Won Jeong (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), Kimberly A. Maynard, "Rebuilding Community: Psychosocial Healing, Reintegration, and Reconciliation at the Grassroots Level," in Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance, ed. Krishna Kumar (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997), Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness. 45 Assefa, "Reconciliation," 337.

19 narratives, cognitive dissonance, mutual analysis to break down stereotypes and identities, and mutual rehumanisation.46 In Kinyarwanda, the native language of

Rwanda, reconciliation and forgiveness are linguistically and definitionally merged.47

Education's potential contribution to peacebuilding is particularly important.

Education is specifically mentioned in the list of peacebuilding activities suggested by the

Agenda for Peace; "[Reducing hostile perceptions through educational exchanges and curriculum reform may be essential to forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities."48 Since that time, education has rarely been more than mentioned in the mainstream peacebuilding literature.49

Education is, however, the focus of the oft-forgotten subfield of , focusing sometimes on changing mindsets, other times on cultivating a skill set for nonviolence, and still other times on promoting human rights. Importantly for our investigation, much of the work in the field has to do with education in regions of relatively established tranquility.50 As Salomon writes in his review of the subfield, peace education initiatives in regions of intractable conflict are "the least studied and the

Ronald J. Fisher, "Social-Psychological Processes in Interactive Conflict Analysis and Reconciliation," in Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory & Practice, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001), Jeong and Lerche, "Reconciliation," Maynard, "Rebuilding Community.," Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, Lisa Schirch, "Ritual Reconciliation: Transforming Identity/Reframing Conflict," in Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory & Practice, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001), Donald W. Shriver Jr., "The Long Road to Reconciliation: Some Moral Stepping-Stones," in After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation, ed. Robert L. Rothstein (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), Staub, The Psychology of Good and Evil. 47 Anna Obura, "Peace, Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution: Framework Proposal - Rwanda (Proposal for DflD)," (Kigali: DfID, 2004), 9. 48 Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping," 56. 49 Exceptions are Kenneth Bush, "Commodification, Compartmentalization, and Militarization of Peacebuilding," in Building Sustainable Peace, ed. Tom Keating and Andy W. Knight (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2004), Senator Douglas Roche, "Learning to Build Peace," in Building Sustainable Peace, ed. Tom Keating and Andy W. Knight (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 2004), Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, 2nd edition ed. (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995). There is also a substantial amount of peacebuilding work that examines the reintegration of child soldiers, however, this is a very narrow view of education. 50 As we will see below, an exception is the extensive intergroup contact literature, dealing largely with Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine.

20 least conceptually developed ones..." More macro-level studies are needed on the role of education in peacebuilding in regions of intractable conflict. Better integration of existing studies of education into the peacebuilding literature is also important.

1.1c Education Literature

New Directions in Education, Conflict and Peace

What I have termed the "conflict and education literature", focused around a handful of recent pieces, problematizes the traditionally unquestioned faith in education.

Following from increasing work on education in emergencies and conflict zones, and the recognition in the early 1990s that conflict disrupts the provision of education, attention shifted, by the late 1990s, to education as a potential contributor to conflict itself.

Scholar Lynn Davies effectively summarizes the concern by asking "should we be calling education a social good?"52 This budding literature suggests education is not inevitably a force for good, nor is it necessarily neutral - certain kinds of education can contribute to violent conflict.53 The authors, however, do not contend that schooling inevitably fosters

Gavriel Salomon, "The Nature of Peace Education: Not All Programs Are Created Equal," in Peace Education: The Concept, Principles, and Practices around the World, ed. Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 7. This is a good review of the peace education literature. 52 Lynn Davies, Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos (London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004), 123. [emphasis added] 53 Kenneth D. Bush and Diana Saltarelli, "The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children," (Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2000), Davies, Education and Conflict, Clive Harber, Schooling as Violence: How Schools Harm Pupils and Societies (London, New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004), Wayne Nelles, ed., Comparative Education, Terrorism and Human Security: From Critical to Peace Building? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Jamil Salmi, "Violence, Democracy, and Education: An Analytical Framework," in Human Development Department LCSHD Paper Series (Washington: The World Bank Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office, 2000), Alan Smith, "Education in the 21st Century: Conflict, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation (Plenary Address)" (paper presented at the BAICE, September 2004), Smith and Vaux, "Education, Conflict and International Development.," Sobhi Tawil and Alexandra Harley, "Education and Identity-Based Conflict: Assessing Curriculum Policy for Social and Civic Reconstruction," in Education, Conflict, and Social Cohesion, ed. Sobhi Tawil and Alexandra Harley (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, IBE, 2004), WB, "Reshaping the Future: Education and Post-Conflict Reconstruction," (Washington: The

21 conflict. The key implication is that rather than continually prescribing more education, studies need to be conducted on what kinds of education contribute to conflict, and what kinds foster peace - and indeed, calls for this research are increasingly widespread.54

To be fair, the realization that schools are not always virtuous goes back significantly further, for example to Johan Galtung's work about the structural violence reproduced in schools.55 However, to date, there is very little theorizing in regards to education's role in acute societal conflict. As Davies writes, "[s]tudies within the psychology of education can give us insights into individual conflicts within the school and the aetiology of aggression. Yet we lack a suitable theoretical framework which can explain the macro issues of how education can act to reproduce conflict on a global scale, or conversely how some educational arenas are active in the struggle for peace.. ,"56

Existing theoretical works begin from the belief that education is a key element of socialization. They rest on the premise that formal education can shape understandings, attitudes, values, and the behaviour of individuals. Particularly important, given our questions, is the finding that ethnic attitudes are formed early, and once formed tend to

World Bank, 2005), James Williams, "Civil Conflict, Education, and the Work of Schools: Twelve Propositions," Conflict Resolution Quarterly 21, no. 4 (2004). 54 Scholars and practitioners alike are calling for research in this area. See for example Fay Chung, "Education: A Key to Power and a Tool for Change - a Practitioner's Perspective," in Current Issues in Comparative Education (Teachers College, Columbia University, 2000), Peter Colenso, "Education and Social Cohesion - Developing a Framework for Educational Sector Reform in Sri Lanka" (paper presented at the BAICE, September 2004), Lynn Davies, "Schools and War - Urgent Agendas for Comparative and International Education (BAICE Presidential Address)" (paper presented at the BAICE, September 2004), David Hamburg, "Education for Conflict Resolution," ed. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1995), Anette Isaac, "Extracts From: Education and Peacebuilding - a Preliminary Operational Framework," (Canadian International Development Agency CIDA, undated), Anna Obura, Never Again. Educational Reconstruction in Rwanda (International Institute for Education Planning, 2003). 55 See for example Adam Curie, Paolo Freire, and Johan Gaming, "Dialogue with Audience Participation between Adam Curie, Paolo Freire and Johan Gaming," in Education for Peace: Reflection and Action, ed. Magnus Haavelsrud (Keele: University of Keele, 1974). 56 Davies, Education and Conflict, 19.

22 increase in intensity with time.57 Furthermore, adolescence and early childhood have been found to be critical periods in which significant events can have a greater impact on our understanding of history than later on.58

International and domestic policy-makers have also shown faith in education's socializing ability. For example, prior to armed intervention in Iraq, the US government sent out a tender to solicit a company to "de-baathify" Iraq's schools.59 During the Cold

War, the US considered formal education to be one of the most important methods to spread anti-communist ideology in Afghanistan.60 After the Second World War, textbook exchanges between Germany and England helped minimize the most offensive images on both sides.61 Examples abound supporting Gellner's quip that, "[t]he monopoly of legitimate education is now more important, more central than is the monopoly of legitimate violence."62 At the same time, it is important to remember that schooling is but one part of socialization, and that when it competes with other socializing factors, it can lose out.63 This is too often overlooked in the quest for a panacea.

57 Padilla, Ruiz and Brand (1974) in Bush and Saltarelli, "The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict," 3. 58 Patrick Devine-Wright, "A Theoretical Overview of Memory and Conflict," in The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict, ed. Ed Cairns and Michael D. Roe (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 13. USAID, Request for Proposals M/Op-03-Edu2 Revitalization of Iraqi Schools and Stabilization Education (RISE) (2003), available from http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/pdf/web_education.pdf, Meyrav Wurmser, "Reading, Writing and De-Baathification," The Weekly Standard 8, no. 34 (2003). 60 Jeaniene Spink, "Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction," Journal of Peace Education 2, no. 2 (2005). 61 E. H. Dance, History the Betrayer: A Study in Bias (London: Hutchinson, 1960). 62 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 34. 63 For a discussion of the impact of teachers and textbooks in comparison to influences of family and peers, see Jean-Damascene Gasanabo, "M^moires et Histoire Scolaire: Le Cas du Rwanda de 1962 a 1994" (Universite de Geneve, 2004), 27-30.

23 Variables from the Education, Conflict and Peace Literature

Authors use different dependent variables to examine the peace and conflict role of education at the macro-societal level. For example, some write of "education for peace"64, others of "education for intercultural compatibility" or

"complementarity" 65, and still others about "education for living together".66 The capacity of schooling to erode or reinforce "social cohesion" appear to be the most widely problematized dependent variables, but definitions of social cohesion still vary from author to author.67 The lack of precision in this literature makes dependent variables challenging to measure, and makes findings difficult to compare.

In contrast, literature on education and conflict is clear on the educational elements, or independent variables, that need to be considered in assessing the role of schooling in peace and conflict. First, curriculum and curriculum policy have been much studied. Second, pedagogical practices that transmit a "hidden curriculum" are important. Third, the structure and processes of educational delivery and governance also merit investigation. These three elements are intricately intertwined and influence each other. Case study research in Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine, for example, suggests

Harber, "Educational Violence and Education for Peace in Africa." 65 Nathan Funk and Abdul Aziz Said, "Islam and the West: Narratives of Conflict and Conflict Transformation," International Journal ofPeace Studies 9, no. 1 (2004), 1. 66 John Agio and Mankolo Lethoko, "Curriculum Development and Education for Living Together: Conceptual and Managerial Challenges in Africa " (paper presented at the Curriculum development and education for living together: Conceptual and managerial challenges in Africa, Nairobi, Kenya, 2001). 67 Tawil and Harley suggest social cohesion is "an idea of an awareness of social exclusion and inclusion," but Rutayisire et al. define it as "a state of peace and harmony between different social groups" and Genge uses "the absence of latent conflict ...[and] the existence of trust, reciprocity, associations crosscutting social divisions, and the presence of institutions of conflict management." Cole Genge, Learning for Social Cohesion (2001; available from http://www- unix.oit.umass.edu/~educ870/PostConflict/papers/Learning%20for%20Social%20Cohesion.doc, John Rutayisire, John Kabano, and Jolly Rubagiza, "Redefining Rwanda's Future: The Role of Curriculum in Social Reconstruction," in Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion, ed. Sobhi Tawil and Alexandra Harley (Paris: UNESCO:IBE, 2004), 8, Tawil and Harley, "Education and Identity-Based Conflict," 10-1.

24 that desegregation - a reform in school structure - without significant changes in curriculum and pedagogy is insufficient for peacebuilding.68

First, curriculum's role in the formation and transmission of collective identity, memory, sense of citizenship and shared destiny is particularly important for our investigation. History narratives play a special role in these processes. Scholars from interdisciplinary memory studies have examined the causal role of history and memory as constituent of group and ethnic conflict.69 Indeed, history teaching is especially significant since "history is a process by which certain stories and events are highlighted while others are minimized or ignored."70 Indeed, "actual history" is less important than the "remembered history" transmitted in schools and elsewhere.71 Through history lessons, what psychiatrist Vamik Volkan terms "chosen glories", and especially "chosen traumas", are transmitted to generations that did not directly experience them, and can bring feelings of loss, humiliation, vengeance, hatred, and the urge for defence.72 These lessons learned and emotions fostered via historical narratives can contribute to intergroup conflict.

Joanne Hughes and Caitlin Donnelly, "Is the Policy Sufficient? An Exploration of Integrated Education in Northern Ireland and Bilingual/Binational Education in Israel," in Addressing Ethnic Conflict through Peace Education: International Perspectives, ed. Zvi Bekerman and Claire McGlynn (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 69 See for example Daniel Bar-Tal, "Collective Memory of Physical Violence: Its Contribution to the Culture of Violence," in The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict, ed. Ed Cairns and Michael D. Roe (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Duncan S. A. Bell, "Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity," British Journal of Sociology 54, no. 1 (2003), Ed Cairns and Michael D. Roe, "Introduction: Why Memories in Conflict?" in The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict, ed. Ed Cairns and Michael D. Roe (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK.; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Devine-Wright, "A Theoretical Overview of Memory and Conflict.," Peter Seixas, "Introduction," in Theorizing Historical Consciousness, ed. Peter Seixas (2004). 70 Bush and Saltarelli, "The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict," 12. 71 Funk and Said, "Islam and the West," 8. 72 Vamik Volkan, Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 81-2. See also Natalie Zajde, Souffle Surtous Ces Morts Et Qu'ils Vivent! La Transmission Du Traumatisme Chez Les Enfants Des Survivants De L'extermination Nazie (New York: YIVO, 1993).

25 In assessing the impact of curriculum, most authors suggest the need to consider curriculum's inclusions, omissions, misrepresentations, and accuracy. History curriculum's portrayal of victims, oppressors and enemies is particularly important for how groups develop in-group cohesion and understandings of the other, and thus for inter-group relationships.73 Exclusive use of language and culture in curricula can also result in marginalization by prioritizing and legitimizing one group over others.

On the other hand, curriculum that promotes an ethnically tolerant climate, that

legitimates linguistic and religious tolerance and that focuses on inclusion rather than

difference and exclusion may help bring groups together. Narratives can also contribute

to sustainable peace when they encourage learning about each side's framings; create

alternative narratives including points of convergence; foster mutual affinity between

groups; highlight stories of past cooperation; frame narratives in more nuanced ways; and promote common views of the future.74 These strategies will likely have a more positive

effect on reconciliation than imposing a common, supposedly "neutral" frame.

Attempting to prove one side wrong is also unlikely to work since it is not the facts, but

their emotional significance that matter.

Second, pedagogical processes can also play a role in social conflict and

peacebuilding. Examining educational processes lets us get at the "hidden curriculum",

meaning "the tacit teaching to students of norms, values, and dispositions that goes on

73 See note 38 above. 74 See M. Al-Haj, "National Ethos, Multicultural Education, and the New History Textbooks in Israel," Curriculum Inquiry 35, no. 1 (2005), Funk and Said, "Islam and the West.," Shira Herzog, "Once Upon a Time. In Israel and Palestine," The Globe and Mail, October 1 2005, Marc Howard Ross, "The Political Psychology of Competing Narratives: September 11 and Beyond," in Understanding September 11, ed. Craig Calhoun, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer (New York: The New Press, 2002), Hillel Wahrman, "Is Silencing Conflicts a Peace Education Strategy? The Case of the 'Jewish State' Topic in Israeli Civics Textbooks," in Education of Minorities and Peace Education in Pluralistic Societies, ed. Yaacov Iram (Westport: Praeger, 2003). 75 Ross, "The Political Psychology of Competing Narratives," 317.

26 simply by their living in and coping with the institutional expectations and routines of schools day in and day out for a number of years."76 McCauley finds that practicing small changes in behaviour has more of an impact on students' learning and enacting values than does directly teaching values and attitudes.77

A number of pedagogical practices may negatively affect social conflict.

Authoritarian institutions, hierarchical schools, and highly-controlled, non-democratic classrooms reduce students' opportunities to practice managing conflicts. Pedagogy aimed at memorization and learning by rote, the teaching of single narratives and exclusive points of view, and closed classrooms that restrict discussion and questions can narrow students' thinking, encourage them not to search for alternatives, and can reduce their sense of agency in the classroom and in wider society.78 Schools that promote highly competitive examination procedures and "competitive individualism" can also exacerbate interpersonal and intergroup friction.79 The violent context in which education often takes place is also important, as the numerous incidents in Toronto schools at the time of writing remind us.80

Michael W. Apple, Ideology and Curriculum (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 14. 77 Clark McCauley, "Head-First Versus Feet-First in Peace Education," in Peace Education: The Concept, Principles, and Practices around the World, ed. Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002). 78 Kathy Bickmore, "Peace and Conflict Education," in International Handbook of Education for Citizenship and Democracy (forthcoming), Kathy Bickmore, "Teaching Conflict and Conflict Resolution in School: (Extra-) Curricular Considerations," in How Children Understand War and Peace: A Call for International Peace Education, ed. Amiram Raviv, Louis Oppenheimer, and Daniel Bar-Tal (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1999), Davies, Education and Conflict, Juanita Ross Epp, "Schools, Complicity, and Sources of Violence," in Systemic Violence: How Schools Hurt Children, ed. Juanita Ross Epp and Ailsa M. Watkinson (London: Routledge, 1996), Harber, "Educational Violence and Education for Peace in Africa.," Neil O. Houser, "Negotiating Dissonance and Safety for the Common Good: Social Education in the Elementary Classroom," Theory and Research in Social Education 24, no. 3 (1996). 79 Bickmore, "Peace and Conflict Education," 487, Davies, Education and Conflict, 121-3. 80 Davies, Education and Conflict, 65-9, 111-7, Harber, "Educational Violence and Education for Peace in Africa," Harber, Schooling as Violence. For recent Toronto violence, see Louise Brown, "Girls Candid About Sex Harassment," The Toronto Star, January 28 2008, CBC, School Safety Panel Releases C. W. Jefferys Report.

27 Changes in educational delivery and pedagogy can also improve inter-group relations. While it may seem logical to avoid conflicts such as multiple or opposing narratives in classrooms, a growing number of studies argue that, paradoxically, children must be confronted with conflict and have practice with it in order to be able to peacefully manage conflicts in their wider lives.81 These scholars and practitioners

encourage democratic classrooms with space for questions, multiple points of view and

"inclusive cooperation and open conversation about meaningful issues."82 For classroom

conflict to be productive though, the classroom must be a safe cooperative environment.83

A number of studies show that controversy in safe classrooms promotes "greater liking,

social support and self-esteem among participants" than seeking concurrence.84 A study

of civic education "found that students who participated in classroom discussion of issues

rather than memorizing dates or facts about politics or participating in patriotic rituals had

higher scores on both the anti-authoritarianism measure and on the knowledge test."85 A

similar recent study of 24 countries found that "[s]chools that operate in a participatory

democratic way, foster an open climate for discussion within the classroom and invite

Patricia G. Avery et al., "Teaching an Understanding of War and Peace through Structured Academic Controversies," in How Children Understand War and Peace: A Call for International Peace Education, ed. Amiram Raviv, Louis Oppenheimer, and Daniel Bar-Tal (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999), Patricia G. Avery, John L. Sullivan, and Sandra L. Wood, "Teaching for Tolerance of Diverse Beliefs," Theory into Practice 36, no. 1 (1997), Bickmore, "Peace and Conflict Education.," Bickmore, "Teaching Conflict and Conflict Resolution in School.," Davies, Education and Conflict, David W. Johnson and Roger T. Johnson, "Constructive Conflict in Schools," Journal of Social Issues 50, no. 1 (1994). 82 Bickmore, "Peace and Conflict Education," 447. 83 Houser, "Negotiating Dissonance and Safety for the Common Good," 201, Richard M. Merelman, "The Role of Conflict in Children's Political Learning," in Political Socialization, Citizenship Education, and Democracy, ed. Orit Ichilov (New York: Teachers College Press, 1990), 60. 84 For a review, see Johnson and Johnson, "Constructive Conflict in Schools," 126. 85 Judith Torney-Purta et al, "Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen - Executive Summary," ed. IEA (Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, 2001), Judith Torney-Purta, John Schwille, and Jo-Ann Amadeo, "Mapping the Distinctive and Common Features of Civic Education in Twenty-Four Countries," in Civic Education across Countries: Twenty-Four National Case Studies from the IEA Civic Education Project, ed. Judith Torney-Purta, John Schwille, and Jo-Ann Amadeo (Amsterdam: The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, 1999), 14.

28 students to take part in shaping school life are effective in promoting both civic knowledge and engagement."86 Opening opportunities for students to engage with and to influence social and political conflict, developing critical thinking and analytical skills, and encouraging agency are widely believed to contribute to peacebuilding.87

Finally, the structures of schooling also affect conflict and peacebuilding. Social- structurally, uneven distribution of education reproduces and enhances economic and social divisions.88 Unequal access to education has been raised as a major grievance in many violent conflicts such as in Angola, , Kosovo, and East Timor.89

Psycho-culturally, unequal education contributes to the construction of group identities.90 Unequal distribution or segregation of schooling can also induce feelings of superiority or inferiority among students. As the Supreme Court justices in Brown vs.

Board of Education (1954) wrote in the context of racial segregation of schools in the

United States: "To separate Negro school children from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their

Judith Torney-Purta, John Schwille, and Jo-Ann Amadeo, "Mapping the Distinctive and Common Features of Civic Education in Twenty-Four Countries," 176. "Despite the documented effectiveness of an open and participatory climate in promoting civic knowledge and engagement, this approach is by no means the norm in most countries. About one quarter of the students say that they are often encouraged to voice their opinions during discussions in their classrooms, but an equal proportion say that this rarely or never occurs." See Torney-Purta et al., "Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries,," 8-10. 87 Avery et al., "Teaching an Understanding of War and Peace," Bickmore, "Peace and Conflict Education," Roland Case and Ian Wright, "Taking Seriously the Teaching of Critical Thinking," in The Canadian Anthology of Social Studies: Issues and Strategies for Teachers, ed. Roland Case and Penney Clark (Burnaby: Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University, 1997), Hunter Gehlbach, "Social Perspective Taking: A Facilitating Aptitude for Conflict Resolution, Historical Empathy, and Social Studies Achievement," Theory and Research in Social Education 32, no. 1 (2004), Torney-Purta et al., "Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries." 88 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life (New York: Basic Books, 1976), Davies, Education and Conflict, 41-56. 89 WB, "Reshaping the Future," 9-10. 90 Stephen P. Heyneman and Sanja Todoric-Bebic, "A Renewed Sense for the Purposes of Schooling: Challenges of Education and Social Cohesion in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe and Central Asia," Prospects XXX, no. 2 (2000).

29 status in the community and that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."91

Thus, in order to improve the impact of education on intergroup relations,

educational structures must also be tackled. Equalizing educational opportunity can have

the tangible effects of lifting people away from economic conflict and poverty-related

social exclusion. Equal educational opportunities also affect people in more intangible

ways. Allport's well-known contact hypothesis - rooted in the conviction that certain

kinds of facilitated interaction between individuals of different groups reduce ethnic

prejudice and inter-group tension - requires a cooperative, sustained institutional

environment where groups interact with equal status.92 Overall then, to build peace

educational systems must be reformed, not simply reinstituted.

The theoretical literature also offers theories of causation, although not always

explicitly. Is education a direct contributor to violent conflict and/or peacebuilding?

Does it create certain predispositions? Does it act as an exacerbater or amplifier of wider

societal processes? Bush and Saltarelli, for example, mix how education serves to

"exacerbate intergroup hostility under conditions of ethnic tension", with the "conflict-

maintaining impacts of education", and with cases in which educational policies serve to

Quoted in Walter Stephan, Reducing Prejudice and Stereotyping in Schools (New York: Teachers College, 1999), 50. 92 Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), 267. See also T.F. Pettigrew, "Intergroup Contact Theory," Annual Review of Psychology 49 (1998), Stephan, Reducing Prejudice and Stereotyping in Schools, Nurit Tal-Or, David Boninger, and Faith Gleicher, "Understanding the Conditions and Processes Necessary for Intergroup Contact to Reduce Prejudice," in Peace Education: The Concept, Principles, and Practices around the World, ed. Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002).

30 induce directly taking up arms. Although it is possible that education fulfills all of these causal functions, causation merits further specification.

While education deserves more attention for its role in both fostering conflict

and/or preventing it, scholars do not suggest it is the sole determinant of either. The

structures of ethnic violence are deeply rooted in a complex economic, social, and political context, therefore education alone does not cause ethnic conflict. Contrarily, neither does education alone result in peace. In order to be effective, peacebuilding

education must be supported by changes in other parts of society.94 Despite the fact that

there is no easy causal relationship between education and peacebuilding, as scholar

David Hamburg suggests, it is worth exploring how education can help to avoid conflict

or peacefully resolve it, since the "stakes are so high now that even a modest gain on this goal would be exceedingly valuable."95

The reviewed education-related contributions are often theoretically thin. Very

few comprehensive explanatory frameworks have been developed. While case studies

partially make-up for this, in depth-case studies - especially in parts of the world beyond

Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland that are often more difficult for fieldwork and data

collection - are in short supply and often based on only narrow research designs.

Although this literature is useful for drawing out variables, the processes linking

independent and dependent variables are inadequately developed and the specific

mechanisms at work are underspecified. For example, many studies use document

93 Bush and Saltarelli, "The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict." See p. 9, 34 and 11 respectively [emphasis added]. For a more precise theory of causation based on complexity, see Davies, Education and Conflict. 94 Agio and Lethoko, "Curriculum Development and Education for Living Together," Isaac, "Extracts From: Education and Peacebuilding.," Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, Smith and Vaux, "Education, Conflict and International Development." 95 Hamburg, "Education for Conflict Resolution."[emphasis added]

31 analysis to show how curriculum is one-sided, but do not go further to examine how this is linked to actual societal outcomes. Through triangulation, my research design, specified below, aims to overcome this shortcoming.

1.2 Framework

The material in the foregoing pages leads us to reflect on the role of education in both conflict and peacebuilding, which has heretofore been inadequately contemplated by political scientists. Research on this topic is not yet at the stage of having rival candidate theories to test. And, as George and Bennett note, "the research objective must be adapted to the needs of the research program at its current stage of development."96 This dissertation thus draws on concepts, theories, and mechanisms from the ethnic conflict, peacebuilding, and education literatures and endeavours to integrate them into a

framework, or preliminary theory, that I then examine and apply to three cases in

Rwanda.

The framework that I propose pushes forward our understanding of ethnic

conflict, peacebuilding, and constructivist causes of conflict more generally. First, it

examines the processes by which identities come to be constructed and (de)politicized in ways that exacerbate or mitigate violent conflict. Second, it introduces education as a

key element in these processes and examines specific causal mechanisms. Third, it

recognizes the centrality of both social-structural and psycho-cultural causes, and their

interconnectedness - generally, and in relation to education - thus combining an

ideational focus with the material causes of conflict. This framework also borrows from

96 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 74.

32 complexity theory to help explain complex causality and how neither violent conflict nor peacebuilding can be explained in a linear or monocausal fashion.

Independent Variables

The independent variables of interest to this dissertation centre on the concept of education. By education, I am referring to formal state-led schooling. I am not employing the term more broadly to mean socialization, wherever it may occur, although informal education is important too and would make for an interesting follow-up project.

I focus on the elementary, or primary, school level because most studies ignore it in favour of higher levels of schooling, yet, in the Global South, far more people have access to primary schools. I examine how "ordinary" education contributes to wider conflict and peacebuilding processes; the focus is not upon special activities or classes about peace and conflict resolution.

I disaggregate education into two independent variables: educational content and educational structure. In terms of educational content, I focus first on history curriculum. Curriculum lets us get at "'desired' knowledge, skills, and attitudes" that emphasize "the crucial issue of the authority to define and select legitimate knowledge."97

Although I could include other curricula that are "permeated"98 with implications for conflict and peacebuilding such as civics or geography, that would make this project too large and unmanageable. History curriculum is the most considered by the literature and, as we will see, most contentious in Rwanda. Under educational content, I also include classroom practices and pedagogy. For example, addressing multiple perspectives in the

97 Tawil and Harley, "Education and Identity-Based Conflict," 18-9. 98 Davies, Education and Conflict, 126.

33 classroom in such a way as to facilitate critical thinking skills is considered auricular content. By educational structure, I mean access to schooling and (de)segregation. As explained in the literature review above, examining educational processes and structure help us get at the hidden curriculum.

Both variables are important as there is debate within the literature as to whether a

"head first" approach (which aims to change beliefs in order to then change behaviour), as might occur through history content, or a "feet first" approach (which aims to change behaviour in order to then change beliefs), as might occur through educational structure or through pedagogical practices, has more of an effect on intergroup relations." Indeed, head-first and feet-first approaches are intertwined.100 Sometimes, as we will see in the case studies, it is difficult to clearly separate educational content, practices and structure; they are just analytical categories.

Preliminary Dependent Variables

The dependent variables have to do with deadly conflict and its mitigation at the societal level. Although most of the literature uses the term "ethnic conflict" without pause, some scholars question this usage. Bruce Gilley, for example, argues that the concept tends to homogenize distinct political phenomena, grouping together too many different conflicts that would better be understood using other categorizations.101 John

Mueller argues that the term ethnic conflict implies a Hobbesian all-against-all scenario, whereas in fact most "ethnic conflicts" involve small groups of thugs and bandits.102

99 See McCauley, "Head-First Versus Feet-First in Peace Education." 100 Hughes and Donnelly, "Is the Policy Sufficient?" 101 Bruce Gilley, "Against the Concept of Ethnic Conflict," Third World Quarterly 25, no. 6 (2004). 102 John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic' War," International Security 25, no. 1 (2000).

34 Indeed, the term ethnic conflict can be misleading since it may induce the assumption that groups are doomed to fighting, as suggested by primordialism, rather than searching for causes. The term ethnic conflict, at least as used by constructivists, is not meant to indicate that ethnicity is a sole or primary cause of conflict or to discourage the investigation of other political, economic, and social factors. As such, I do not agree with

Gilley that the term should be wholly abandoned. In Rwanda, death and displacement are firmly along ethnic lines and at least part of the root cause of the conflict lies with the identity of those involved. While respecting the idea of multicausality, this pattern needs to be highlighted and explored. I adopt the variable violent interethnic conflict and consider deaths, rape and sexual violence, internal and external displacements, and the destruction of property as measures.

When I refer to the opposite of violent interethnic conflict, sustainable peace, this is not to suggest that all conflict has been eliminated. Disagreements and struggles are a constant in society, but when a society has achieved sustainable peace, they can be handled without resorting to violence.

Causation

As discussed above, education on its own does not lead to conflict. It is part of a wider and complicated societal system. We cannot say if cause (x type of education), then effect (violence). Nor can we say if cause (x type of education) or cause (y type of education), then effect (violence). Education is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause of conflict or sustainable peace. I borrow from complexity theory since education cannot be fit into a simple causal equation.

35 Complexity theory - a theory of process rather than substance - is a useful way to think about the causal relationships of interest to this project. In his aptly titled article,

Many Damn Things Simultaneously, James Rosenau explains that "the complex adaptive system" (CAS) is at the centre of complexity theory. The CAS is "not a cluster of unrelated activities, but a system; not a simple system, but a complex one; and not a static, unchanging set of arrangements, but a complex adaptive system"104 that is also open to the wider environment. The human body is an example of a CAS. As Gell-Mann notes, mammals, such as humans, are nested in the Earth's CAS; humans also have complex adaptive subsystems, such as the immune system.105 Similarly, schooling is in itself a complex adaptive system. It is also nested within a wider socialization CAS and open to complex adaptive social and political systems.

Calling something a complex system does not just mean that it is complicated,106 although, as I have discovered in this research, education and its impact is certainly a complicated puzzle to decipher. As Rosenau's quote above suggests, complex systems like education have a different range of behaviours than simple systems. The causal connections between the parts of a CAS form a dense, interactive web. In such complex adaptive systems, effects are always multiple, there may be disproportion between cause and effect, initial conditions may matter significantly, the process of arriving from independent to dependent variables is likely non-linear, feedback loops may appear, and

103 Hoffman, "Constructing a Complex World," 53. 104 James Rosenau, "Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World Affairs," in Complexity, Global Politics and National Security, ed. David Alberts and Thomas Czerwinski (Washington DC: Department of National Defense, 1997), 82. 105 Murray Gell-Mann, "The Simple and the Complex," in Complexity, Global Politics and National Security, ed. David Alberts and Thomas Czerwinski (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1997), 5. 106 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, The Upside of Down (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 22.

36 path dependence may be important. Complexity theory also embraces the concepts of

equifinality (the idea that different causal patterns lead to similar outcomes), and contingency (that institutional settings, cultural contexts, time periods, geographic

settings and situational contexts matter and must be specified).108 This approach

endeavours to uncover causal mechanisms that, according to methods specialists George

and Bennett, "provide more detailed and in a sense more fundamental explanations than

general laws do."109 Rather than black box the processes between education and violent

conflict or sustainable peace, this framework puts them front and centre.

Not being able to measure the causal weight of education does not devalue this

investigation. As constructivist theorists Price and Reus-Smit write, "[w]hen different

factors are viewed as mutually constitutive, attempting to measure causal weight of

independent variables seems about as fruitful as trying to argue whether a kneecap,

hamstring or lungs are more important for a runner competing in a marathon."

Constructivists put a special focus on "tracing the process of how it mattered."110 As

Bernstein et al. argue, the "quest for predictive theory rests on a mistaken analogy

between physical and social phenomena."111 They argue that a more useful parallel is to

evolutionary biology which will forward our attempts to "develop theories of process to

Gell-Mann, "The Simple and the Complex.," Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, The Ingenuity Gap: Can We Solve the Problems of the Future? (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2001), 101-20, Homer-Dixon, The Upside of Down, 21-9, Robert Jervis, "Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions," in Complexity, Global Politics and National Security, ed. David Alberts and Thomas Czerwinski (Washington DC: Department of National Defense, 1997), Rosenau, "Many Damn Things Simultaneously." 108 See George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 109 Ibid., 141. They add that "the difference between a law and a mechanism is that between a static correlation ('if X, then Y') and a 'process' ('X leads to Y through steps A,B,C')." 110 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liasons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism," European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 3 (1998), 282. 111 Steven Bernstein et al., "God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World," European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 1 (2000), 44.

37 organize our thinking about the past."112 Indeed, this project embraces process-tracing as a method.

Consistent with complexity theory, education can play a variety of roles in the causal process. Schooling is a reflector of conditions already present in society. For example, when an educational policy is altered, it often reflects a change that has already happened within the government. As Dance writes, textbooks reflect the "commonplaces of historical thinking of a certain place and time..."113 Schooling is also an amplifier, adopting change and amplifying its effect through the socialization of students. Finally, schooling is also an independent cause. By socializing students in certain ways, they become agents of change and actively influence their societies in both positive and negative ways.

Dependent Variables Reconsidered

Since my argument is that education on its own does not lead to conflict, it is not enough to simply stop at violent interethnic conflict as a dependent variable. This would leave a lot to be explained between independent and dependent variables and, if we are truly interested in specifying processes, too much for this early stage in a research agenda. As such, I borrow from the literature which specifies underlying and proximate causes, and hypothesize education as contributing to creating the underlying conditions conducive to violent interethnic conflict. To focus upon the range of underlying conditions, I specify a) the underlying social-structural conditions conducive to violent interethnic conflict and b) the underlying psycho-cultural conditions conducive to violent interethnic conflict as the first set of dependent variables. On the other hand, I

112 Ibid., 50. ,I3 Dance, History the Betrayer, 54.

38 hypothesize that education can contribute to several pillars of peacebuilding - especially the second pillar, political structures, in terms of fair and open schools, and the fourth, in terms of reconciliation. Since peacebuilding is a process, achieving its various elements can be considered underlying conditions for sustainable peace. The second set of dependent variables is thus: a) the underlying social-structural conditions conducive to sustainable peace and b) the underlying psycho-cultural conditions conducive to sustainable peace.

Mechanisms

I propose several mechanisms linking the content and structure of schooling (the independent variables) to the underlying conditions conducive to violent interethnic conflict or to sustainable peace (the dependent variables). They include both social- structural and psycho-cultural mechanisms. Complexity theory encourages us not to ask social-structural or psycho-cultural questions, but to ask both/and questions, and to examine how these two types of mechanisms interact in complex, interesting, and meaningful ways.

Table 1.1 schematically lays out the mechanisms that I hypothesize link the independent and dependent variables. Inclusion and exclusion are central themes throughout. Note that despite the dichotomized format presented, education can simultaneously contribute to creating the underlying conditions for both violent interethnic conflict and sustainable peace. Again, challenges and outcomes need not be framed in either/or terms, but as both/and problems.

39 Table 1.1: Mechanisms for Violence along Ethnic Lines and Sustainable Peace

For violent interethnic For sustainable peace conflict Underlying Discriminatory and Open and inclusive social-structural factors exclusive social institutions institutions and processes and practices Discriminatory and Open and inclusive exclusive social institutions institutions and processes and practices Categorizing groups Collectivizing groups Underlying (corporate view of ethnicity, Psycho-cultural factors essentializing identities) Decategorizing, Stigmatizing groups (moral Recategorizing or Positively superiority of ingroup, Valuing Group Differences devaluation of outgroup to point of dehumanization) Promoting conformity Developing critical thinking

Five Mechanisms for Violent Conflict

1. Discriminatory and Exclusive Institutions and Processes

Discriminatory and exclusive institutions and processes contribute to laying the conditions conducive to violent interethnic conflict. Unequal distribution of educational opportunities along ethnic lines promotes intergroup competition over conflicting interests.

Discriminatory and exclusive institutions also contribute psycho-culturally to laying the roots of conflict, in a two-step process, through some of the mechanisms explained below. In this case, the psycho-cultural factors are intervening variables between discriminatory and exclusive social institutions and practices and the roots of violent interethnic conflict. Since society's institutions shape its social climate, exclusive schools and segregation send the message that it is appropriate to divide up society in certain ways. Exclusive institutions can thus play a part in hardening ingroup-outgroup

40 distinctions (see categorization below). Institutional discrimination also serves to legitimize a sense of ingroup superiority and outgroup inferiority (see stigmatization below) and to increase the likelihood of a group's mistreatment in other ways.

2. Categorizing Groups

Categorizing society into groups is a basic framing activity. Frames are

"schemata of interpretation" that enable individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" occurrences within their life and the wider world.114 As sociologists Benford and

Snow explain, "[b]y rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective."115 Notice that framing is a verb and as such Benford and Snow emphasize that "[t]his denotes an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction."116

Categorizing society can be a product of the need for social identity, "that part of an individual's self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership."117 Social psychologists have helped to explain how and why people satisfy their needs for positive self-identity through membership in a group (ingroup) and differentiation from other groups (outgroup) in ways that can be positively evaluated.

114 Goffinan's original definition, quoted in David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," American Sociological Review 51 (1986), 464. See Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), 614, Ann Swindler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," American Sociological Review 51, no. 3 (1986), 262. 115 Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements," 614. 116 Ibid. 117 Tajfel quoted in Cecilia Cook-Huffman, "Who Do They Say We Are? Framing Social Identity and Gender in Church Conflict," in Social Conflicts and Collective Identities, ed. Patrick G. Coy and Lynne M. Woehrle (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 115.

41 Importantly, findings indicate that social differentiation occurs even without material bases118; simply being assigned to a group is enough to produce a feeling of groupness.119

Contrary to initial findings, and as we will see, the mere existence of ethnic groups need not be problematic. However, the necessity of positive self-identity can lead to competition and conflict in combination with the other mechanisms explained in this framework. As Social Identity theorist Henri Tajfel writes, "the erosion, preservation or creation of differentials [distinctions between various groups on important characteristics] has been...one of the fundamental features of some of the most acute social and industrial conflicts."120 According to genocide scholars such as Stanton, categorization is the first

step in a multi-causal process towards mass violence along ethnic lines.121 Indeed, without the construction and crystallization of ethnic categories, violent interethnic conflict could not take place.

3. Collectivizing Groups

Building on categorizing, another mechanism that helps lay the foundation for violence along ethnic lines is collectivizing groups. Social Identity Theory highlights that

once groups are categorized, they are often assigned a corporate or essentialized

100 identity. In other words, members of a given category are perceived as a collective, possessing various common attributes and being more similar to each other than to members of another group. As Self-Categorization Theory explains, both the self and

118 John C. Turner, "Social Comparison and Social Identity: Some Prospects for Intergroup Behaviour," European Journal of Social Psychology 5, no. 1 (1975). 119 Henri Tajfel et al., "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour," European Journal of Social Psychology 1, no. 2 (1971). 120 Tajfel quoted in Cook-Huffman, "Who Do They Say We Are?" 116. 121 Stanton, "The Seven Stages of Genocide." See also Straus, The Order of Genocide. 122 See Rupert Brown, "Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems, and Future Challenges," European Journal of Social Psychology 30 (2000).

42 others are depersonalized and this produces group behaviour. Through binary, non- overlapping identities, "they" are seen collectively as all the same, entirely different than

"we." Ethnic entrepreneurs often play on these oppositions to mobilize populations to violence.

4. Stigmatizing Groups

Stigmatizing builds upon categorizing and collectivizing groups. Violent interethnic conflict is more likely when ideologies of moral superiority of the ingroup are developed and when the outgroup is devalued, stigmatized, and even dehumanized.

Devaluing and stigmatizing groups can take place through what Van Evera calls

"chauvinistic mythmaking." Chauvinistic mythmaking proceeds by glorifying the

ingroup, whitewashing its faults, and portraying its victimization; it also occurs by

devaluing the outgroup, perhaps by rendering them scapegoats for past crimes and tragedies or charging them with (false) claims of harmful intentions.124 Most of these

actions create "injustice frames" that identify a problem and attribute blame and responsibility.125 Devaluation makes mistreatment more likely and stigmatization

legitimates violence.126 Dehumanization - the denial of the humanity of others - makes violence along ethnic lines easier to carry out.

John C. Turner, "Some Current Issues in Research on Social Identity and Self-Categorization Theories," in Social Identity, ed. Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears, and Bertjan Doosje (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 14. 124 Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," 27. See also Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," 587. 125 Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements," 615. 126 Staub, The Roots of Evil, 60.

43 5. Promoting Conformity

The promotion of conformity can lead students not to develop critical thinking skills to question framings, narratives, myths, and images of the other, and leave them less open to the processes of cognitive dissonance required for peacebuilding. Further, as

Ervin Staub writes, "if a culture inculcates strong respect for authority and places strong value on obedience, it is less likely that individuals will oppose leaders who scapegoat or advocate violence."127 For example, schools that repress open discussion of conflicting perspectives, that present exclusive points of view, and that promote conformity through memorization and learning by rote may contribute to laying the roots for violent interethnic conflict. Repression of open discussion also denies students' the opportunity to practice dealing with conflicts and to develop critical thinking skills, thus leaving students without the tools to creatively and peacefully manage conflict.

Three Mechanisms for Positive Peace

1. Open and Inclusive Institutions and Processes

Open and inclusive institutions and processes help create the conditions for positive peace. Where groups have more equal access to resources, the social-structural conditions for violence are less likely to emerge. In addition, as cited from the European

Union representative in the Introduction, it is widely believed that "[e]ducation and training are key to a society's development and its fight against poverty. It is a precondition to the success of democracy and good governance, and it is crucial to progress in other related fields, such as health, gender equality and social welfare.

Hence, education plays a fundamental role not only in poverty reduction but also in the

127 Ibid., 63.

44 promotion of human rights and the prevention of [violent] conflicts." Since democracy, good governance, health, gender equality, social welfare, and poverty reduction are well-known components of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, inclusive and open educational institutions and processes can spill over to building sustainable peace in these ways as well.

Institutions that foster a sense of belonging and equality for all are also more likely to avoid laying the psycho-cultural roots of conflict (see mechanisms below).

Furthermore, according to Allport's contact hypothesis, contact is intricately linked to changing attitudes, but a supportive institutional environment and equal status between groups are preconditions for producing positive results.129

2. Decategorizing, Recategorizing or Positively Valuing Group Differences

It is a key understanding of constructivism that frames can be transformed and identities can be reconstructed. Goffman, who first elaborated framing theory, refers to a process called "keying" wherein meaningful activities, events, and biographies are redefined in terms of a new framework so that participants come to understand them as something different.130 There are three principal models of reconstructing identities from conflict-conducive, binary, essentialized categories, and from stigmatized groups, to identities that are more conducive to positive peace. Their relative effectiveness is debated. Theoretically, there is no a priori reason to think that one model will better promote peace, but there is reason to think that this would occur through different processes. Which strategy will best foster positive peace depends on the context.

128 "Open-Ended Ad Hoc Working Group on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa." 129 See note 92 above. 130 Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation."

45 First, the decategorisation model urges individuation, moving people to view themselves and others as individuals rather than as "prototypical representatives" of the in- and out-groups.131 Focus on the individual is said to reduce the power of group distinctions and help lead to social cohesion. Second, the recategorisation model, also known as the collective identity approach, urges the creation of a group at a higher level of abstraction that allows members of both groups to think of themselves as one unit, thereby eliminating dangerous social cleavages. Finally, a third model suggests the positive valuation of group distinctiveness. This is the only model in which groups can continue to exist psychologically and thus has the advantage of acknowledging the reality of social groups. This model also suggests diversity as a social value, rather than the assimilation implied in the recategorisation model. Each approach brings its own challenges, which will be elaborated upon in the relevant chapters below.

3. Developing Critical Thinking

Openness and strong critical thinking skills, rather than closure and conformity, can lead students to question unequal institutions, framings, narratives, myths, and images of the other. Critical thinking can also open people to the processes of cognitive dissonance required for peacebuilding. Thus, classrooms that address multiple conflicting perspectives openly and inclusively can help build a foundation for peacebuilding. Practice with managing classroom-type conflicts, such as multiple narratives, can help students manage societal conflicts as well. Critical thinking skills

131 For an overview of the models, see Samuel L. Gaertner et al., "Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Benefits ofRecategorization," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57, no. 2 (1989), Amelie Mummedney and Michael Wenzel, "Social Discrimination and Tolerance in Intergroup Relations: Reactions to Intergroup Difference," Personality and Social Psychology Review 3, no. 2 (1999), Turner, "Some Current Issues."

46 help students discover conflict-management options and can make them more resistant to leaders' calls to violent mobilization.

Fitting the framework together

Since the specification of process is a shortcoming of the literature reviewed, my framework breaks process down as much as possible. My dependent variables are actually intervening variables in a larger causal process leading to violent interethnic conflict or to sustainable peace. Although the core of the dissertation focuses on this part of the process relating to the role of education, it is also important to fit education into the bigger causal picture. This entails an examination of how education interacts with other underlying and proximate causes of violent conflict and sustainable peace.

Building upon the reviewed literature, and in an effort to synthesize it, I suggest that five interacting groups of causes lay the foundations for violence along ethnic lines.

These include: state-level factors such as a weak or predatory state; political factors such as power-struggles, changes to multipartyism, and discriminatory institutions and structural inequalities between society's groups; economic factors such as economic downturns and crises; environmental factors such as scarcities and resource competition; and societal factors such as ethnic or other cleavages and collectivized and stigmatized groups. Each of these clusters also has its own discrete causes, which include not only state-level processes, but international, regional and local dynamics as well. As will be illustrated in the chapters on Rwanda, these five sets of causes act together and begin to spiral as more of them accumulate and interact. Fear and mistrust among groups in society ensues. The ground is then laid for direct causes of conflict to have a strong impact. Direct causes include mobilizational activities by ethnic entrepreneurs, dramatic

47 events (often a rapid worsening of one of the underlying conditions), and critical junctures (largely unpredictable events, unfortunately often identified only in hindsight, such as the downing of the President's plane in Rwanda). This model is not simply linear; consistent with complexity theory, not all factors need to be present, factors can combine in different ways and feedback loops are important.

Fitting education into the bigger peacebuilding process is equally important.

How schooling contributes to sustainable peace, and how its contribution interacts with the pillars of peacebuilding (security, economy, political institutions, and justice and reconciliation) is essential to the success of the larger peacebuilding project.

1.3 Research Design and Methodological Questions

1.3a Qualitative Study

A qualitative study is best suited to discover answers to the questions of interest.

Qualitative approaches are most useful in cases where research delves into complexities and non-linear processes, and where research focuses upon little-known phenomena.132

A qualitative method is also the best match given the constructivist approach adopted. As

Marshall and Rossman opine, one "cannot understand human actions without understanding the meaning the participants attribute to those actions - their thoughts, feelings, beliefs, values, and assumptive worlds."133

1.3b Case Selection

This research unfolds through a case study of Rwanda over various historical periods. Case study research is well-suited to investigating issues with complex

132 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1999), 57. 133 Ibid.

48 causes. King, Keohane and Verba suggest that too often, the term "case study" is ambiguously used. They contend that a case can refer to a single observation, to a single unit, or even to a large domain for analysis.135 I disaggregate the case of Rwanda from the colonial period to the present into three sub-cases. This structured focused comparison allows some controls, yet leaves room for significant variation on the variables.136 I thus break down the case of Rwanda into colonial Rwanda (1919-1964), the Rwandan, or Hutu, Republics (1964-1994) and post-genocide Rwanda (1994-2008).

These three periods, along with the pre-colonial period, are often regarded as the major phases in Rwanda's history. The various periods offer distinctive complexities since different ethnic groups were in power. Furthermore, the first two periods ended in extreme violence along ethnic lines. It was tricky to choose the ending boundary of the first period given the revolution and transfer of power from Belgian/Tutsi to Hutu hands in 1959, independence in 1962, and widespread continuing violence through 1963-4.

While no temporal classifications are entirely satisfactory, since violence continued, and since primary schools were also formally nationalized around this time, 1964 is a reasonable choice.

1.3c Data Collection

This research design is based upon a process-tracing method that "attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism -

134 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 19-23. 135 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 117. 136 "The method and logic of structured, focused comparison is simple and straightforward. The method is 'structured' in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is 'focused' in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined." George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 67.

49 between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable."137 I used multiple methods in order to heighten the accuracy of my findings.

First, in order to delve into how schools have contributed to causing or mitigating violent conflict, I analysed history curriculum.138 While there are many benefits and downfalls to working with the written record, there are a few challenges of particular importance in Rwanda. The first challenge is "selective survival" of documents.139 This is especially significant for policy documents in Rwanda since much of the country's archives, including those at the Ministry of Education, were destroyed in the genocide. In order to counter this challenge, I drew on several additional archives including the White

Fathers' archives at Kabgayi, Rwanda, the colonial administration's archives in Brussels, the Bibliotheque Africaine at the Belgian Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Library of the Royal Museum for Central Africa at Tervuren, Belgium. The second challenge, as

King, Keohane and Verba point out, is that written material does not always make clear by which process the data were produced.140 There is the related dilemma, particularly strong in Rwanda, of public and private transcripts, further discussed below. Finally, there is also a language challenge with some Rwandan documents. Although I speak and read French, which is one of Rwanda's official languages, the primary curriculum from

137 Ibid., 206. 138 A good case can be made for a focus on textbooks. Milligan argues that in parts of the world that experience material poverty, lacking resources and adequate teacher training, "the textbook is the curriculum." Jeffrey Ayala Milligan, "Teaching between the Cross and the Crescent Moon: Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Public Education in the Southern Philippines," Comparative Education Review 47, no. 4 (2003), 478. See also Timothy J. Scrase, Image, Ideology and Inequality: Cultural Domination, Hegemony and Schooling in India (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1993). For a review of the historical importance of textbooks around the world, see Gasanabo, "Memoires et Histoire Scolaire." 139 Janet Johnson and Richard Joslyn, Political Science Research Methods, 2nd ed. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1991). 140 King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 135.

50 the two Republics (1964-1994) are in Kinyarwanda, as are a few policy documents. I hired a Canadian Kinyarwanda-French translator to translate some of this material.

Second, in order to verify my findings and to fill in any gaps, I conducted several elite interviews with MINEDUC (Ministry of Education) officials and Rwandan and

Belgian experts. They had special insight into the thinking behind educational policies and their implementation.

Finally, as I was most interested in learning about the effects of school structure and content, I conducted a series of one-on-one open-ended interviews. Since a random sample would not get at the specific groups in which I was interested, I selected criteria on which to stratify the population and chose characteristics that I expected to affect the dependent variables. I conducted approximately 100 field interviews. In Rwanda, I sought approximately 50% Hutu and 50% Tutsi participants with representatives who attended primary school in each of the three chosen periods. I also tried to vary gender, rural/urban, socio-economic background, and region in which primary school was attended. I sought some participants who had been teachers from each category as well.

Some particularly interesting interviews were those with teachers who had taught in two or all of the eras in question, or Rwandans who were students in one era, and teachers in another. They offered a particularly useful long-range view. Since many teachers and educational administrators during the colonial period were Belgian, I conducted five interviews in Belgium.

All Rwandan interview participants completed primary school, but had not necessarily continued their studies. Since I conducted my interviews in French, usually a second language for Rwandans, most participants had more than average education. All

51 were 16 years of age and older and had thus lived through the genocide. I asked participants to reflect upon their primary school experiences and their wider implications based on my discussion guide (see Appendices 1 and 2). At the time of the interviews, some participants were still students or teachers, but a number were farmers, some worked with NGOs or were civil servants, several were unemployed, and a few were prisoners. I pre-tested the guide with members of the Rwandan community in Toronto to help me judge its appropriateness and potential areas of sensitivity, and to evaluate the flow, logic, vocabulary, and length of time for field interviews.

Understandably, obtaining research ethics approval for such a potentially politically sensitive category of participants was quite complex. The most serious ethics concern was in identifying Hutu and Tutsi to interview since, as will be elaborated in

Chapter 4, the current government of Rwanda discourages identification by ethnic identity and the most recent Rwandan census was the first where ethnicity was not recorded. Nonetheless, it was essential that I spoke with people from both groups in order to fairly answer the research questions. Not knowing the ethnic identity of my interviewees would have risked biased results. Through my pre-testing in Toronto, it became evident that Rwandans were very likely to tell me to what ethnic group they belonged. This was substantiated in Rwanda. When participants did not explicitly tell me their ethnicity, they usually supplanted it with strong clues to allow me to identify them ethnically. In the rare cases that participants did not share their ethnic identity with me, I did not record it.

While I was in the field, the opportunity arose to speak with a few groups of

Rwandans that habitually met with each other. Since this was not part of my research

52 design, and did not offer anonymity to participants, I welcomed this chance to discuss the questions of this thesis, but kept discussions at a more superficial level unless group members themselves changed the tone. The core of my data is from one-on-one interviews. (See Appendices 3 and 4 for complete lists of participants.)

1.3d Interviews, Transcripts and Truths

Making interviews the fundamental part of a research design raises questions

about historical memory and truth. When participants agreed to speak with me, they were giving me a window into their lives. Through approximately 100 interviews, I had the privilege to gain insight into other people's experiences that I could not have

otherwise accessed. By working from only a general framework of open-ended

questions, respondents guided the interviews and expressed their understandings in their

own terms. I used standardized probes and follow-up questions to ask for depth and

detail to ensure that several main topics were covered in each interview, but allowed the

interviews to run their course in an attempt to make Rwandans' own voices central to my

research.

There are many difficulties, however, with making sense of the data collected

through such methods. As Beth Roy puts it in the introduction to her sociological study,

based on first-person accounts, of an event remembered as an intergroup riot in

Bangladesh:

It is true that the stories I heard in that Bangladeshi village were not about 'what happened' (itself a questionable concept). What I heard was how people saw what happened, or, rather, how people remembered what they saw, or, rather, how they talked about what they remembered, or, rather how they talked to me about what they remembered - or, rather, what I heard people say to me about what they remembered.141

141 Beth Roy, Some Trouble with Cows: Making Sense of Social Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 5.

53 In Rwanda, such challenges are critical. Memories of educational experiences are filtered through, among other things, the experiences of economic hardship, ethnic and regional politics, gender, exile, violence, civil war and genocide. While memory distortion, selective telling and biased hearings can be seen as inherent problems in taking first-hand accounts seriously, Roy encourages us to view them as "sources of understanding." She contends that "what sticks in people's memories, what they choose to say and when they choose to remain silent, how they distort what they know to be their experience, and overarching all, what I notice and what I overlook are all intensely informative."142

Indeed, I was often told that in Rwanda, silences speak louder than words. Interviews thus required a very careful reading and humble acknowledgement of these challenges and opportunities.

In addition to questions of historical memory, I was particularly perplexed with the warnings Rwandan interview participants issued in regard to sharing the truth. "The villainous fault of Rwandans is that we are liars"143 cautioned one, while another alerted me that "Rwandans keep things in their hearts, not out in the open." Others told me anecdotes from Rwanda's history wherein family members or the state punished

Rwandans for publicly telling the truth. Indeed more than 20 of my interview participants explicitly or implicitly warned me that Rwandans are liars. There are a variety of possible interpretations. Some participants followed up their warnings with a

statement to the effect that they were telling the truth, perhaps to gain more credibility for their perspective. Others may have been signaling that they were lying. Alternatively, these warnings may reflect a deep and wide mistrust among members in Rwandan

142 Ibid., 6. 143 The quotes in this paragraph are from my anonymous interviews in Rwanda. These and all subsequent quotes that appear in English from French-language interviews and texts are my translations.

54 society. Overall though, there is something to this interesting trend with potentially significant repercussions for the kind of research undertaken here.

The existence of merely one "truth" in any situation is unlikely. As Roy suggests,

"[i]f we take seriously the accounts of those involved, what emerges is a history of differing realities. Not only did people remember differently, or report differently; they actually lived the experience differently."144 Similarly, in his book Domination and the

Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, James Scott argues that both public and hidden transcripts evolve in societies, such as Rwanda, where there are dominant and subordinate groups.

The public transcript is, to put it crudely, the se^f-portrait of dominant elites as they would have themselves be seen...While it is unlikely to be merely a skein of lies and misrepresentations, it is, on the other hand, a highly partisan and partial narrative. It is designed to be impressive, to affirm and naturalize the power of dominant elites, and to conceal or euphemize the dirty linen of their rule.145 He argues that in most cases, due to dominant power relations, it is in the interest of subordinate groups to credibly pass on the public transcript, or narrative, resulting in a discourse systematically skewed towards the dominant elite. He further contends that the majority of archival data conveys the official transcript. However, Scott argues that

"every subordinate group creates, out of its own ordeal, a 'hidden transcript' that represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant."146 As Roy emphasized, there are "a plurality of transcripts" including a public transcript of the elite, a public transcript of the subordinate, a hidden transcript of the elite, and a hidden transcript of the subordinate.

Roy, Some Trouble with Cows, 24. 145 James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 18. 146Ibid., xii.

55 Many with experience in Rwanda argue that there is a "public truth", or discourse, which is significantly different from private truths. Some participants may consider lying

to be conveying the official transcript rather than a hidden one. To others, conveying the

hidden transcript rather than the official version may be deemed lying.

Indeed, several authors have noted that there are certain "truths" in Rwanda that

are commonly understood by Rwandans as not to be openly shared with strangers.147

Rwandans are extremely adept at manipulating what they want foreigners - including

researchers - to know. As one elderly Rwandan Hutu woman told me, "if foreigners

arrive on our hill, we [the government, although she is not part of the government] give

them someone to show them the path that they will follow. So, on this path, we have put

things, educated people, what they need to say, what they need to show, what they need

not to show, what they need not say." She continued:

when whites come, they [the government] do not show the people. They have traced, I would say, a tourism itinerary. They have traced a tourist itinerary. So, if you were to arrive here where I or another person could tell you something, they make the itinerary to show you who you must find, with whom you must speak. And all of the people who come from the outside pass like this. And they leave with an image of I don't know what...But, if they dared, like you, enter into the countryside, a little, a little, a little... [they would find something different].148

I became particularly aware of this "tourist itinerary" as, after over a month of

interviewing in Kigali, I had conducted interviews almost exclusively with Rwandans

who self-identified as Tutsi. This is statistically improbable since Hutu represent about

84% of the population. It is also odd since I was careful to start a variety of networks and

inquire for contacts through a multitude of outlets. I learned that my experience reflects

the fact that urban, educated Rwandans are largely Tutsi. At the same time, I believe it

147 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families (New York: Picador USA, 1998), 23,259-60, Helen M. Hintjens, "When Identity Becomes a Knife: Reflecting on the Genocide in Rwanda," Ethnicities 1, no. 1 (2001). 148 Interview 52, female Hutu, north.

56 gives insight into the "truth of the group" that dominant Rwandans are seeking to portray to foreigners.

I also had particularly easy access to officials in Rwanda. While I deeply appreciated this opportunity, it made me wonder about the importance that the Rwandan government associates to meeting with foreign researchers and to again question the public discourse that such meetings involve.

The post-genocide government, led by President , is praised on many counts, yet keeps society under tight control. Recently, academic researchers and others investigating topics at odds with the government have explicitly been asked to leave

Rwanda. In Rwanda's current authoritarian context, where one can be charged and jailed for divisionism - a vague offense that increasingly seems to involve simply disagreeing with the government149 - interviewees were understandably cautious. It is thus very difficult to distinguish veritable opinion from toeing the government line. As one

Rwandan woman told me, "Rwandans have become liars. We can't say anything because they'll imprison us or kill us."150 The frequent warning that Rwandans are liars may be interpreted as exculpatory; an effort to detach from blame in case one was to get the public transcript wrong.

The theme of public and private transcripts extends backwards in Rwandan history. There is an important Rwandan proverb {ijambo liba ilya babili) stating that

speech is for two people. While of course sayings do not represent all ranges of belief, this proverb suggests that "no knowledge is safe in the presence of a third person" and

See for example HRW, "Rwanda: Parliament Seeks to Abolish Rights Group.," Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship." 150 Interview 52, female Hutu, north.

57 that statements made in public are by definition meaningless. There is even a word in

Kinyarwanda, amalenga, describing knowledge not meant for outsiders.152 According to

Rene Lemarchand, lying and cunning have been historically valued traits in Rwanda.153

All of this, of course, does not mean that Rwandans never tell the truth, or parts of it; it highlights the valid reasons for Rwandans to adhere to public transcripts and this requires

careful consideration.

Another challenge of conducting research in Rwanda is group narratives. While I am

cautious about overgeneralizing and essentializing Hutu and Tutsi categories - we will

see that there are many opinions within each group - one often finds different Hutu and

Tutsi versions of a range of historical events. As an illustration, a Nigerian academic, in

discussions of Rwanda and Burundi, claimed that he could tell the Hutu or Tutsi identity

of a speaker by his/her public positions on certain issues, such as the origin of Hutu and

Tutsi.154 As we will see, the events of 1959 also draw contrary interpretations along

ethnic lines. For example, many Hutu with whom I spoke explained the events as a

"Social Revolution" that overthrew 400 years of injustice. Alternatively, many Tutsi

considered the events Belgian-aided, rather than a . Still others,

mostly Tutsi, explained the events as "genocide." Contrasting narratives about the 1994

genocide have also emerged along ethnic lines. As Susanne Buckley-Zistel writes of her

research in Rwanda, "...while some prefer exclusively to recall the genocide of the Tutsi,

151 Johan Pottier, "Threes a Crowd: Knowledge, Ignorance and Power in the Context of Urban Agriculture in Rwanda," Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 59, no. 4 (1989), 474-5. 152 Hintjens, "When Identity Becomes a Knife," 41. 153 Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 8. 154 Mahmood Mamdani, "From Conquest to Consent as the Basis of State Formation: Reflections on Rwanda," New Left Review (1996), 6, Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda (Kampala: Fountain Publishers Ltd., 2001), 41. For other divergent groups truths, see Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda," 13, 30, Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 1959-1994.

58 others insist that all suffering needs recognition. The disagreement is mainly along

Hutu/Tutsi lines, and illustrates that ethnic group identity is still very significant in

Rwanda."155 As Rene Lemarchand suggests, in his discussion of the difficulty of getting

"hard data" from interviews in Rwanda, there is a challenge in that "the degree to which political convictions and group loyalties, when carried to an extreme, may inhibit the exchange of objective information."156 On the other hand, group narratives can illuminate how groups understand themselves and each other. For peacebuilding though,

Rwandans need to move beyond dichotomized debates.

Given the numerous challenges of research in Rwanda, field methods were incredibly important. Recruitment was through networks, a rough snowball technique whereby I was "recommended" to my participants by my contacts and other participants, indicating my basic trustworthiness. My interviews were one-on-one, as Scott puts it, "the most protected format of spoken communication."157 To make participants comfortable, I reminded them that they could stop the interview at any time, and since the majority of interviews were recorded, I showed participants how to use the recorder, giving them the control to stop and start it. Interviews were conducted in French thereby avoiding the requirement of a translator and the complexities involved. In my introductory interview script, although admittedly not always in practice, I emphasized that I did not work for the Rwandan or Canadian government. I highlighted my student status and emphasized that I was there to learn from the participants, acknowledging that they were important

Susanne Buckley-Zistel, "Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda," Africa 76, no. 2 (2006), 138. 156 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 8. 157 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 162.

59 holders of knowledge and opinions; I only very rarely shared my own knowledge.

Introducing oneself as a university student was well-received in a society where scholarship and opportunities for advancement are so highly valued.159 Upon the advice of several Rwandan researchers, one of whom emphatically told me to "go to the hills" to get at the hidden transcripts, I left Kigali to conduct interviews in and on the hills outlying Ruhengeri and Byumba in the North, Butare and Gitarama in the South, and

Rwamagana in the East. Rwandans were impressed and put somewhat at ease that I travelled by public transit and stayed in modest accommodations with nuns. I did not pay participants, but often met with them over a Fanta (soda) or Primus (beer), and very occasionally over a meal at the mess hall where I was staying. Most important, I promised all participants anonymity - the principal condition under which, according to

Scott, participants will be most likely to share hidden transcripts.160 As we will see in the following chapters, I believe different parts of my interviews reflect both public and hidden narratives. In an effort at triangulation, I checked answers within and across interviews. I also analysed interview answers against archival data and secondary

sources.

Pondering questions of historical memory and truth does not denigrate my

findings; it would have been more problematic to overlook them. These questions serve

to encourage more careful reflection, the use of multiple methods, and insightful

interpretation of data. As we will see, the value of interviews does not lie solely in their

158 This is not to suggest that I did not make mistakes. I sometimes erroneously began my question about the link between education and conflict with "the government of Rwanda claims that...." I changed this as interviews went on since people are less likely to speak out against the government in their very first statement. Some people did go against the government view at the very beginning of the interview, and they often reminded me of my promise of anonymity while doing so. 159 For a similar experience in the region, see Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu in (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 48. 160 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 140.

60 veracity either; divergent transcripts offer valuable social and political commentary. I elaborate on the particular research methods and challenges for each case in greater detail in the chapters that follow.

Using the existing literature as a frame of reference, this chapter elaborated a framework for my project and specified a research design. With these tools, the following chapters turn to Rwanda to examine the complicity of schools in violent interethnic conflict and the ways that schools have tried to build resistance to violence.

61 Chapter 2; Colonial Schooling and the Roots of Violent Interethnic Conflict (1919-1964)

When Europeans first described Rwanda, they called it a prosperous "land flowing with and honey"161 where the people lived in "impressive harmony."162 By

1964 their descriptions had much changed; Rwanda had descended into widespread violence along ethnic lines. Thousands of huts were burned and belongings pillaged, between 10 and 20 thousand Rwandans were killed, over 20 thousand internally displaced, and between 100 and 300 thousand fled the country into exile.163 Peculiarly, unlike violence surrounding decolonization in other parts of Africa, conflict was not

Rwandans against Belgian colonial power, but Hutu Rwandans against Tutsi Rwandans.

This chapter attempts to uncover whether and how formal education during the

Belgian colonial period played a role in the development of this interethnic violence, whether it contributed more to its mitigation, or whether it mattered not at all. First, this chapter presents a survey of Rwanda's colonial history to familiarize readers with the main historical concepts that are central to understanding violence in Rwanda. Second, it discusses the education system during the colonial period and the development of formal schooling. Third, bringing together the first two sections, this chapter argues that unequal access to schooling, as well as some classroom practices, polarized and politicized ethnicity in Rwanda, thus helping to plant the roots of violent interethnic conflict.

The Duke of Mecklenburg (1910) quoted in Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 13. 162 Louis de Lacger, Ruanda: Le Ruanda Ancien (Paris: 1939), 64-6. 163 On the various sources of these discrepant numbers, see Antoine Lema, Africa Divided: The Creation of 'Ethnic Groups' (Land: Lund University Press, 1993), 37-9, Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 167,71-2.

62 2.1 Historical Overview of the Colonial Period

The level of controversy over Rwanda's history, as well as the political uses to which it has constantly been put, make it tricky to write even a brief overview of

Rwanda's past.164 History is contested in most parts of the world, but as Catharine

Newbury writes, in Rwanda, "with an intensity that surpasses the normal cliches, there is

no single history; rather there are competing 'histories'."165 Rene Lemarchand notes that

in researching Rwanda, one finds "a mixture of fact and fiction designed to offer each

community retrospective validation of its own interpretation of the genesis of ethnic

conflict."166 Interpretations of histories change according to the group in power and its

ability to decide upon, in Scott's terminology, the public transcript. The challenges of

historical perspective, accuracy, and manipulation return many times in subsequent

chapters. Thankfully, my job is not to come up with a "true" , but to

make sense of my research questions in light of the complexity and contestation over

Rwanda's past.

When I speak to people who are not familiar with the case of Rwanda, they frequently

ask the seemingly simple question: "what exactly are Hutu and Tutsi?" Little do they

know they have put their finger on the crux of the matter! Until recently, it had been

accepted practice to begin the telling of Rwanda's history as successive waves of

For more on the challenges of Rwandan historiography see Jean-Pierre Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History, trans. Scott Straus (New York: Zone Books, 2003), Rene Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), Ian Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), 5-6, 198, Malkki, Purity and Exile, Catharine Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda," Africa Today 45, no. 1 (1998), , L'evolution Du Royaume Rwanda Des Origines A 1900 (Brussels: Acad&nie des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, 1962). 165 Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda." 166 Lemarchand (1996) quoted in Hintjens, "When Identity Becomes a Knife," 50.

63 migration. The original inhabitants, the Twa, were said to comprise about 1% of the population. They were deemed of pygmoid origin, and labeled hunters and potters. The

Hutu, accounting for about 84% of Rwanda's population, were said to have emigrated from Central Africa several thousand years ago. They were believed to be agriculturalists, clearing the land as they moved. The last to arrive, a not insignificant detail, were the Tutsi pastoralists, accounting for about 15% of the population, said to have come with their cows from Ethiopia, sometime after the fifteenth century.

Although there is some controversy as to whether Tutsi arrival was a process of peaceful integration or more violent conquest, and whether it was sudden or more gradual,168 pre-colonial Rwanda is often described as a centralized kingdom in which

Hutu, Tutsi and Twa lived in relatively peaceful co-existence. All groups spoke the same language, shared a culture and religion, respected the same mwami (king), and lived intermingled on the same hills. The demarcation between groups was much less rigid than it would later become. First, there was much internal differentiation among members of each group169 and similarities across groups; the average Hutu and average

Tutsi, for example, were equally poorly-off. There were also some intermarriages and

See original statements, for example, in de Lacger, Ruanda, 36-59, Pere Roger Heremans, Introduction A L'histoire Du Rwanda, 1st ed. (Kigali: Editions Rwandaises, 1971), 3-47, Alexis Kagame, Histoire Du Rwanda (Leverville: Bibliotheque de l'Etoile, 1958), 7-11, Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 18-22. For a discussion of the current revisions and controversy, see CCM, "Peuplement Du Rwanda: Enjeux Et Persepctives," in Cahiers du Centre de Gestion des Conflits (Butare: Centre for Conflict Management, National University of Rwanda, 2002). 168 On the first debate, see Lema, Africa Divided, 44-5. On the second debate, see Vansina, L 'evolution Du Royaume Rwanda. 169 "The elite that we now call Tutsi encompassed a number of competing lineages who had arrived in Rwanda at different times over a period of centuries and who had different interests as well as varied backgrounds. In the same way, the masses that are now known as Hutu included both peoples long resident within Rwanda and those who had just arrived from Zaire or ." Alison Des Forges, "The Ideology of Genocide," Issue: A Journal of Opinion 23, no. 2 (1995), 44. 170 Hintjens, "When Identity Becomes a Knife," 30, Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 1959-1994 (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1997), 50. Prunier puts the average income in the 1950s of a Tutsi family at 4439 Belgian Francs (BF), a Hutu family at 4249 BF and a Twa family at 1446

64 extra-marital affairs resulting in group mixing. Second, although relatively rare, there were provisions for social mobility whereby a Hutu who rose through economic ranks could become Tutsi (kwihutura) and a Tutsi whose position declined could become Hutu

(gucupira).112 Some authors even suggest that one could be Hutu in one relationship yet

Tutsi in another.173 Third, there was a trinity of chiefs on each hill: a chief of the pastures

(always Tutsi), a chief of the land (often Hutu) and a chief of the men (usually Tutsi), leaving space for both Tutsi and Hutu leadership, and the ability for peasants to maneuver between chiefs. Finally, clans, which were often a more important identity than ethnicity, encompassed Hutu, Tutsi and Twa.174 Newbury argues that prior to colonialism, the terms Hutu and Tutsi were even unknown to some populations outside central Rwanda.175

Most important, for our questions, there is no evidence of systematic political violence between Hutu and Tutsi prior to 1959.

BF. There is a debate in literature on Rwanda in regards to the homogeneity of Rwandan society. Early writers such as Pages (1933), de Lacger (1939) and Kagame (1943, 47, 52, 54) took the groups as more static, while D'Hertefelt (1862, 1971), Newbury (1975, 80) and Vidal (1967, 69, 73, 85) see them as more internally differentiated. For this debate, see Lema, Africa Divided. 171 According to Diamond, about one quarter of all Rwandans have both Hutu and Tutsi among their great grandparents. Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Penguin Group, 2005), 318. Even colonial powers noticed this mixing in their 1926 report. See Danielle De Lame, A Hill among a Thousand: Transformations and Ruptures in Rural Rwanda, trans. Helen Arnold (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 101-2. In contrast, Pottier claims that intermarriages were quite rare. See Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 117. 172 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 101. Newbury argues that in Kinyaga, where she conducted extensive fieldwork, social mobility was common and that ethnicity was not a prime social category until King Rwabugiri's administration (1860) made Hutu and Tutsi meaningful labels. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression. 173 Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa, 79, 190. At the same time, Lemarchand importantly notes that "the very fact that a Hutu who successfully made his way up the social ladder should ipso facto be assimilated into the Tutsi caste, and henceforth regarded as a Tutsi, shows that as a group the Hutu were inevitably destined to remain in an inferior position." Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 39. 174 Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa, 189, Lema, Africa Divided, 49, Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda." 175Lema, Africa Divided, 46, Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda," 74. See also Vidal (1971), who showed that the political use of ethnic designations is actually very recent in De Lame, A Hill among a Thousand, 8.

65 This does not mean, however, that there was no difference between Hutu, Tutsi and

Twa, or that they were total inventions by the colonial powers as some have later come to claim. During the pre-colonial period, there were socio-political and socio-economic distinctions between the groups. For example, all kings were Tutsi, as were all army commanders and warriors.176 As mentioned above, despite the three-chief system, the highest placed chief was usually a Tutsi.177 The corpse of a Tutsi even had more value than that of a Hutu or a Twa.178 Groups were also involved in complex patron-client relationships, called ubuhake, in which richer Tutsi most often held the patron position with poorer Hutu as clients, and ubureetwa, in which labour prestation was imposed on

Hutu only.179 Although relationships were complex and provided a degree of integration,

Tutsi, especially those of a certain class, held social and political advantages.

Consistent with the constructivist approach to ethnicity, the content of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa has changed over time. As Jean-Pierre Chretien put it, "[t]o be Tutsi or to be

Hutu, in Rwanda and Burundi, did not have the same sense in 1994, at the time of the genocide, in 1894, when the whites arrived, in 1794, when the former kingdoms were almost at their apogee, and in 1594, when the kingdoms came into being."180

Consistently though, Hutu and Tutsi have been developed through bipolarity; "no Hutu without Tutsi." How identities shape in relation to power, and then come to be ideas held by people themselves, is crucial to understanding the ongoing construction of ethnicity.

176 Jean Jacques Maquet, "Le Probleme de la Domination Tutsi," Zaire VI, no. 10 (1952), 1014. 177 Chief positions were largely monopolized by Tutsi of only two clans: Abanyiginya and Abega. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 24. 178 Lema, Africa Divided, 52-3. 179 Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 75-6, 82, 133-4, 40-1, Catharine Newbury, "Ubureetwa and Thangata: Catalysts to Peasant Political Consciousness in Rwanda and Malawi," Canadian Journal of African Studies 14, no. 1 (1980). 180 Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa, 83. See also Mahmood Mamdani, "From Conquest to Consent as the Basis of State Formation: Reflections on Rwanda," New Left Review (1996), Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers.

66 Many scholars of Rwanda emphasize the particular role that the colonial state played in changing and reinforcing ethnic identities.181 When Europeans first arrived in Rwanda in 1894, they were impressed with the politically centralized kingdom they found and were particularly taken with the Tutsi who appeared to be effective rulers. Having no explanation for how Africans, whom they were coming to "civilize", could develop such a well-functioning state, they devised what came to be known as the Hamitic hypothesis.

Championed first by John Hanning Speke, and later by countless others drawing on theories of racial superiority in vogue in Europe, Tutsi were said to be whites in black skin; foreigners from Ethiopia.182

Such a view was espoused during the German colonial period (1896-1916) as well as under Belgian rule (1919-62).183 Johannes-Michael van der Burgt, Dutch missionary in Burundi, wrote of the Tutsi in 1903: "Did we not see Caucasian crania, admirably

Greek profiles, beside quite pronounced Semitic and even Jewish countenances, and even true beauties with bronze-red faces in the center of Rwanda and Burundi?"184 The

Belgian Minister of the Colonies report (1925) stated:

The Mututsi of good race has nothing of the negro, apart from his colour. He is usually very tall, 1.80m at least, often 1.90m or more. He is very thin, a characteristic which tends to be even more noticeable as he gets older. His features are very fine: a high brow, thin nose and fine lips framing beautiful shining teeth. Batutsi women are usually lighter-skinned than their husbands, very slender and pretty in their youth, although they tend to thicken with age...Gifted with a vivacious intelligence, the Tutsi displays a refinement of feelings which is rare among primitive people. He is a natural-born leader, capable of extreme self-control and of calculated goodwill.

Lema, Africa Divided, Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 34, 73, passim. 182 Some theories of Tutsi origin were very bizarre. Different authors place them from India, from the Garden of Eden, and as last survivors from the lost continent of Atlantis. As late as the 1970s, a former French ambassador to Rwanda talked about Tutsi Magi who had come from Tibet. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 8. Significantly, all of these theories placed Tutsi as foreigners to Rwanda. 183 During the colonial period, Ruanda-Urundi was jointly administered; they became separate states only at independence. Several interviewees in Belgium made the point that Rwanda was not a "colony" but rather a mandate territory of the League of Nations and a trusteeship under the UN. 184 Johannes-Michael van der Burgt, Dutch missionary in Burundi (1903) quoted in Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa, 72.

67 In contrast, it wrote of Hutu as having,

...very typical Bantu features...They are generally short and thick-set with a big head, a jovial expression, a wide nose and enormous lips. They are extroverts who like to laugh and lead a simple life. It described the Twa as a

[mjember of a worn out and quickly disappearing race...the Mutwa presents a number of well- defined somatic characteristics: he is small, chunky, muscular, and very hairy; particularly on the chest. With a monkey-like flat face and a huge nose, he is quite similar to the apes whom he chases in the forest.185

As such, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa came to be seen as "races" by the colonial powers, missionaries and early historians.186 The morphological comments on height and noses,

as well as the aptitudes attributed to each group, return in subsequent chapters since they

left an imprint on Rwandans' self-understandings until at least the 1994 genocide. A

testament to the durability of the Hamitic hypothesis is the most recent CIA World

Factbook wherein Rwanda's population is listed as comprising "Hutu (Bantu), Tutsi

Quoted in Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 6. For more descriptions of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in colonial Rwanda, see Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa, 70-3, Pierre Daye, Le Congo Beige (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer & Cie, 1927), R. Delvaux, "Races De L' Afrique Centrale: Ruanda-Urundi," L'universitaire coloniale II, no. 2 (1930), Fernand Huberty, "Main-d'CEuvre Indigene et Employeurs au Ruanda-Urundi," Bulletin de I 'Association des Diplomes de I'Ecole Speciale des Conducteurs-Geologues du Borniage VI, no. 3 (1936), A Jamoulle, "Notre Territoire A Mandate: Le Ruanda-Urundi," Congo: Revue Generate de la Colonie Beige VIII, no. t. 1,3 (1927), Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 18-9,42-3, Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 6-11. For more on the Hamitic hypothesis from an analytical point of view, see Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa, 282-3, Mamdani, "From Conquest to Consent," 6-8, Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 79-87. 186 Early historians, several of whom were also missionaries, considered Rwanda to definitely comprise of races, and use "les races du Rwanda" as subtitles in their work. See Mgr Leon Classe, "Un Pays De Trois Races," Grands Lacs 51e annee, no. 5-6 (numero special) (1935), de Lacger, Ruanda, 36, Kagame, Histoire Du Rwanda, 7, Rev. Pere Pages, "Un Royaume Hamite au Centre de l'Afrique" (Brussels : Institut Royal Colonial Beige, 1930), 3. Alternative views also emerged, however, that considered Hutu and Tutsi as classes (see Maquet, "Le Probleme de la Domination Tutsi"), castes (see Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 5-6, Maquet, "Le Probleme de la Domination Tutsi"), political identities (Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers), and socio-economic groups (current public transcript). Classifications are complex though. Even those that call Hutu, Tutsi and Twa races slip into calling them ethnicities (see de Lacger, Ruanda, Pages, "Un Royaume Hamite au Centre de PAfrique") and de Lacger claims that the three ethnic groups are more or less social classes (37); Maquet associates castes with classes (see Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 6). Generally, however, from being seen as races, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa slipped into being considered ethnicities sometime during the First Republic (1962-73).

68 (Hamitic), and Twa (Pygmy)." What is most important here is that in the early colonial period, Tutsi were decisively accepted as superior foreigners - a label that brought short-term benefits, but proved disastrous in the longer term. Note also that the focus here is on Hutu and Tutsi, to the exclusion of the Twa who were marginalized by both.188 The main lines of violence were Hutu and Tutsi and they are thus the focus of this project.

Relying on their Hamitic understanding and indirect rule strategies which were said to respect the "customary situation", the Germans, and more significantly the

Belgians, who administered Rwanda after World War I, helped the Tutsi solidify rule in the country. As one early colonial official stated, "there is little point in altering the bases of the political institutions under the cover of egalitarian principles: we find the Watuzi

[sic] established since ancient time, intelligent and capable, we will respect that

1RQ situation." As Pierre Ryckmans famously stated in Dominer pour Servir, Tutsi were

considered "destined to rule."190

Through Tutsi on the ground, the Germans further centralized Rwanda and brought

the last outlying areas, the northern kingdoms still ruled by Hutu, under central

domination. When the Belgians took control, they lessened the powers of the rnwami and

centralized those of chiefs. The Belgians also helped increase Tutsi power with a

significant move in 1926 to place one Tutsi chief in each locale, abolishing the

"complicated" trinity of chiefs and diminishing Hutu political power191. While these

187 Central Intelligence Agency CIA, The World Fact Book (2006), available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/. 188 A follow-up study should be conducted that includes the educational experiences of Twa. 189 Quoted in Lema, Africa Divided, 58. 190 Pierre Ryckmans, Dominer Pour Servir (Brussels: Librarie Albert Dewit, 1931), 20. 191 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi. See p. 44, 48 on customary rule. See p. 73 on the abolition of the trinity of chiefs.

69 changes solidified the position of high-ranking Tutsi, a reformulated corvee obligation, ubureetwa, was specifically imposed upon the Hutu, making a social division between even the petit Tutsi and the average Hutu.192 In 1933, the Belgians conducted a census that crystallized ethnic identity by having each person formally declare an ethnicity and restrained possibilities for intergroup mobility.193 Further extending Tutsi favouritism, the Belgian colonial administration prioritized Tutsi in terms of educational and occupational opportunities - an issue more thoroughly examined below. Overall, the state helped concretize Hutu and Tutsi into distinct, internally homogeneous, and non- overlapping groups. Equally important, the groups were ranked. Newbury calls Hutu under the Belgians "second class citizens,"194 Gourevitch deems the situation "dual colonialism"195 and Lemarchand concludes that the conditions of the Hutu under the

Belgian mandate were worse than at any other period in the past.196

The played a significant role alongside the state in transforming and crystallizing Hutu and Tutsi identities and the cleavage between them.197 This will become further evident in discussions of education below. When the first Catholic

Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 97-8. 193 Most cite identity cards being issued in 1933 and the consequent "freezing" of identities. See for example Hintjens, "When Identity Becomes a Knife.," Anne Mackintosh, "Rwanda: Beyond 'Ethnic Conflict'," Development in Practice 7, no. 4 (1997), Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda." Some authors cite the issue date as 1931 or 1932. For example, see James Gasana, "Remember Rwanda?" World Watch (2002). There are very different accounts of how identity cards were produced and distributed. Some claim that the colonial administrators counted cows and that those with 10 or more cows were deemed Tutsi. National Museum of Rwanda, Kigali Memorial Centre (2004; available from http://www.kigalimemorialcentre.org/). Some authors who previously cited this method have now changed their opinion for the reasons elaborated in Nigel Eltringham, Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda (London: Pluto Press, 2004). My own interviews with Belgian colonial administrators suggest that identity cards may not have been issued to all parts of Rwanda until the First Republic - a potentially important avenue for future research. 194 Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda." 195 Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 54. 196 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 123. 197 When I refer to the church, I am referring to the Catholic Church as it dominated religion and education in Rwanda. Protestants, and to a lesser extent Muslims, also played religious and educational roles in Rwanda.

70 expeditionary force visited Rwanda, it described the country as one with the rest of the population "absolutely enslaved" to the Tutsi.198 Missionaries saw this as a promising

situation where they would be welcomed by the general population and indeed by 1910, they had already converted about 4 500 Rwandans, mostly Hutu.199 In fact, Rwanda became the most Christianized country in Africa with already 500 000 converts by 1955 and 700 000 by I960,200 accounting for between one fifth and one quarter of the total population. Soon though, church leaders too came to support the Hamitic hypothesis,

indirect rule strategies, and the coalescence of Tutsi rule. Father Classe, who later

became Vicar Apostolic of Rwanda, stated: "Generally speaking, we have no chiefs who

are better qualified, more intelligent, more active, more capable of appreciating progress

and more fully accepted by the people than the Tutsi."201

While Europeans contributed to further hardening group lines through a variety of

policies, Rwandans came to view themselves and each other through much the same

lenses. As Claudine Vidal explains, few things separated poor Hutu and Tutsi other than

the knowledge of different ethnic belonging.202 Indeed, the differentiation within groups

that had marked the pre-colonial period gradually made way for more corporate group

identities.203 As I will further explore below, this occurred with social-structural

exclusions that produced bipolarity and stereotypes. As Prunier writes,

.. .the Hutu, deprived of all political power and materially exploited by both the whites and the Tutsi, were told by everyone that they were inferiors who deserved their fate and also came to believe it. As a consequence they began to hate all Tutsi, even those who were just as poor as they, since all

198 Quoted in Linden, Church and Revolution, 33. '""Ibid., 79. 200 Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa, 272. 201 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 73. 202 Quoted in Mbonimana, Gamaliel, "Christianization Indirecte et Cristallisation des Clivages Ethniques au Rwanda (1925-1931) ." Universite Catholique de Louvain, 1978, 157. 203 Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda."

71 Tutsi were members of the 'superior race', something which was to translate itself into the post- Second World War vocabulary as 'feudal exploiters'.20

Tutsi also came to see themselves through the eyes of the Europeans; they saw advantages in the European portrayal of Tutsi, and bought into it.205

Intergroup pressure began to mount significantly during the early 1950s. In preliminary efforts to diffuse it, the colonial administration held elections in 1953 and

1956. The elections, however, did not bring about substantial change since only the lowest positions were directly elected, and Tutsi returned Tutsi to power through indirect elections for the highest positions. The patronage relationships of ubuhake were abolished in 1954, but this too was disappointing for Hutu as it did not produce meaningful change. In preparation for a UN visit, the Conseil Superieur du Pays, of

"overwhelmingly" Tutsi membership, issued Mise au Point (Statement of Views) lobbying for a quick transfer of power to the current authorities - themselves. In contrast, the Hutu "counter-elite" demanded democracy before independence, expecting the majority Hutu to thus take power.206 They issued Notes on the Social Aspect of the

Racial Native Problem in Rwanda., better known as the Hutu Manifesto. The fact that the

"social aspect" was described as a "racial" and "native" one is a tribute, however unfortunate, to the success of the Hamitic hypothesis. As Mamdani describes it,

"branded with a subject identity - 'Hutu' - the counter-elite emerging from the ranks of the socially oppressed held it up as a badge of pride."207 The Manifesto was the first direct declaration of social fractures along ethnic lines. In a response foreshadowing the current Rwandan government's unity strategy, UNAR, a loyalist Tutsi-dominated party,

204 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 39. 205 Linden, Church and Revolution, 4. 206 See Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 81,132,49-50, Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 115. 207 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 117.

72 called on the "Children of Rwanda" to "unite our strengths" and insisted that "there are no Tutsi, Hutu, Twa. We are all brothers! We are all descendents of Kinyarwanda!"208

The call was not heeded and political parties were developed largely along ethnic lines.

The muyaga, as Rwandans call it - a "strong but variable wind, with unpredictable destructive gusts"209 - swept through Rwanda in November 1959. As one will recall from the introduction to this chapter, the destruction it wrought was significant. Starting from an attack by a group of young Tutsi militants on a popular Hutu leader, reprisals spread throughout the country resulting in about 200 deaths.210 Violence began against members of the Tutsi aristocracy that held administrative posts, but then spread, with corporatist propaganda, to all Tutsi. The so-called "Social Revolution" or "Hutu Revolution" of

1959 involved a Belgian-aided abolition of the Tutsi ; the removal of Tutsi from positions of power and their replacement with Hutu; and the beginnings of widespread violence against Tutsi. Hutu generally de-emphasize violence and describe the events of 1959 as a rightful majority overcoming 400 years of political and economic injustice. In fact, there is a well-known Rwandan phrase for these events, rubanda nyamwinshi, literally referring to the right of the indigenous majority to come to power.211 In contrast, Tutsi often focus on violence - sometimes calling it genocide - and describe the events of 1959 as externally-driven by the Belgians. The revolution of 1959 thus provides an illustration of divergent transcripts along ethnic lines. Rather than overcome racialized identities, the revolution, and its subsequent interpretations,

208 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 161. 209 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 41. 210 For a detailed description of this encounter and the difficulty of establishing the numbers killed, see Lema, Africa Divided, Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi. 211 Mamdani calls this "Rwanda nyamwinshi," whereas Straus cites "rubanda nyamwishi." Rwandan interviewees told me that to their knowledge, rubanda nyamwinshi is the correct term. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 34, Straus, The Order of Genocide, 133.

73 solidified them. Significantly, for the first time in Rwandan history, violence occurred along Hutu and Tutsi lines.

Communal elections were held in 1960 and , the pro-Hutu party, won 70.4% of seats. Thus in charge of a majority of communal positions, Hutu leaders launched a coup January 28, 1961 in Gitarama, again largely supported by the Belgians.

They elected Gregoire Kayibanda president of the Republic. Rwanda became formally independent from Belgium, and separate from Burundi, in 1962. The revolution, surrounding events, and subsequent repression induced over 20 thousand internal displacements, and between 100 and 300 thousand escapes into exile - mostly Tutsi.212

Independence, however, did not bring an end to Rwanda's struggles. Some of the

Tutsi who had gone into exile undertook armed raids to return to Rwanda. Known as the

"inyenzF or cockroaches (both a derogatory term and one reflecting the stealth of their nighttime tactics), Tutsi exiles launched more than 10 raids during 1963 and 1964. From their initial attacks on specific individuals and families, the inyenzi eventually moved to a more corporate view of ethnicity, inflicting harm on all Hutu officials. The attacks resulted in increasingly harsh repression of the Tutsi population within Rwanda. As one

PARMEHUTU propagandist announced: "We are expected to defend ourselves. The only way to go about [it] is to paralyze the Tutsi. How? They must be killed."213 Many of my interviewees recall huts burning during this period as one of their first experiences of political awareness. Between 10 and 14 thousand Tutsi were killed, often in massacres.214 Bertrand Russell called it "the most terrible and systematic genocide since

212 For more details, see Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 80-5, Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 115-6. 213 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 223-4. 214 Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 64-5, Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 129-30.

74 the genocide of Jews by Hitler." Genocide or not, a question much debated in

Rwanda, with different narratives depending on the group in power, thousands and thousands were dead and hundreds of thousands were in exile at the end of 1964. This violent interethnic conflict needs further explanation.

2.2 The Development of Formal Education in the Colonial Period

Prior to European arrival, Rwandan education took place at home in the nuclear family and was based on transmitting values and language. Much of this occurred through storytelling, singing, dancing and poetry. At the turn of the twentieth century, this began to change when the White Fathers - so named for their white cassocks - asked permission from the mwami to establish a school at the royal court. Mistrustful of the missionaries, and perhaps already sensing a threat to his power, the mwami gave them a

site at Save, five hours away and infamous for banditry.216 He, and other Rwandans, held

strong superstitions against formal schooling, including a myth that missionaries would

steal children and put them through a tunnel to Europe.217 Alternative rumours spread that children taken into school were destined for Mother Death, to whom the mwami had promised many Rwandan lives.218 In fact, the court and the country's chiefs considered

those who went to missionary schools as rebels or traitors.219

215 Quoted in Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 224. The Vatican also called it the most systematic genocide since the Jewish genocide. See Ian Linden, Christianisme et Pouvoirs au Rwanda (1900-1990), trans. Paulette Gerard (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1999), 363. 216 Susan J. Hoben, School, Work, and Equity: Educational Reform in Rwanda (Boston: African Studies Center, 1989), 10. 217 Pierre Erny, L 'Ecole Coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962) (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001), 22. 218 Linden, Church and Revolution, 35. 219 Erny, L 'Ecole Coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962), 22.

75 Despite this disapproval, by 1905 there were 10 schools in Rwanda and by 1913, the number had risen to 40 schools, all primary, teaching over 2000 children.220

Unappealing to the highest classes, pupils were from the poorest rungs of the population.

Most schoolchildren were impoverished and patronless Hutu who saw possibilities of clientship and protection in the White Fathers. Over the years, Tutsi disdain for mission schools softened slightly and the Germans established a non-religious school in Kigali for

"notable" Tutsi youth. Overall however, Germany had neither the time nor the means to leave a significant institutional imprint on Rwanda.

The core of our story really begins with the League of Nations mandate which gave Belgium the right to exercise control over all educational institutions. Within their first few years in Rwanda, Belgian authorities opened several official non-religious schools, first at the royal court in Nyanza, then in four other dispersed regions of the country221. According to the Belgian Administration, these five schools, in operation until 1929, were "strictly reserved for sons of chiefs and for notables of the Tutsi race."222

This training enabled graduates to take up envied jobs in the public and private sectors.

Meanwhile, mission schools grew at great pace. In 1926, the Belgian administration gave Catholic missions a monopoly on education, offering subsidies in exchange for some state controls. This resulted in three types of schools: state schools, founded, funded, and administered by the Belgians as above; ecoles libres subsidises, the great majority of schools, run by missionaries but following the curricular outlines,

220 Erny cites 2650 students in 1913. Ibid., 24. Ngendahimana cites 2000 students in 1915. Precise numbers are tricky to pin down during this period. See Aloys Ngendahimana, "Etude sur la Participation de la Masse Populaire dans PEducation Scolaire au Rwanda 1900-1972: Contribution a la Comprehension de l'Evolution du Systeme Scolaire Rwandais" (Masters, Institut Pedagogique National, 1981), 2. 221 Cyangugu, Ruhengeri, Gatsibo, and Rukira. 222 "Rapport Presente par le Gouvernement Beige au Conseil de la Societe" des Nations," (1929), 62.

76 methods, infrastructural standards, and inspection of the colonial administration; and ecoles libres des missions nationales run by missions without the help or control of government.223 Through the institutions of Catholicism, educational influences on

Rwanda's colonial mission schools came from far beyond its geographic borders; educational decisions were made in Dar-es-Salaam, Bujumbura, Algiers, Leopoldville,

Brussels, and Rome.224

From approximately 2000 students by 1915, more than 20 000 Rwandan children were to be found in classrooms by 1925, and this number grew to over 87 000 by 1935.225 It is through the ecoles libres subsidises that the colonial administration acquitted itself of almost all moral obligations to educate Rwandans, and missionaries largely instrumentalized schools in the pursuit of religious conversion. Father Lavigerie, founder of the White Fathers, had for decades propounded the principle that evangelization of

Africans would best succeed through proselytization of chiefs. He argued that:

In a violent society, subdivided in multiple tribes that live in a patriarchal state, what is most important, is to win the spirit of the chiefs...We will attach ourselves to them in a special way, knowing that by winning over just one chief, we will do more for the advancement of the Mission than in winning over, in isolation, hundreds of poor Blacks. Once the chiefs are converted, the rest will follow.226 The church, like the state, saw the chiefs as solely Tutsi.

223 See J Van Hove, "L' (Euvre d'6ducation au Congo Beige et au Ruanda-Urundi," in Encyclopedic Du Congo Beige (Brussels: Editions Bieleveld, 1953). 224 Erny, L 'Ecole Coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962), 15. 225 Ngendahimana, "Etude sur la Participation de la Masse Populaire," 2, "Rapport sur PAdministration Beige du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Annee 1925," (Brussels: 1926), E Rubbens, Rapport sur I 'Administration Beige du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Annee 1935 (Brussels: Etablissements G£n£raux d'Imprimerie, 1936). The 1925 Administrative report puts the number of students in subsidized primary Catholic schools at 17 475. It states that there were also many students in non-subsidized schools. I thus estimate this number to be at least 20 000, consistent with Ngendahimana. The 1935 report puts 22 645 students in subsidized primary Catholic schools and 64 659 in non-subsidized Catholic schools, totaling 87 304. Ngendahimana estimates 88 000 students in 1935. Ngendahimana, "Etude sur la Participation de la Masse Populaire," 2. 226 Quoted in Mbonimana, "Christianisation Indirecte", 136.

77 As discussed above, although the royal court and chiefs were at first resistant to missionary efforts, their coldness successively melted away. The first major sign of royal change came in 1924 with mwami Musinga's note:

Through this present letter I announce to you that the Bapadri are my friends as they have always been. So if they wish to build schools to teach the people of Rwanda, give them land and help them. I am happy under the rule of Bulamatari and for that reason I want there to be Europeans of no other nationality in my kingdom. And you will tell your sub-chiefs what I have told you. It is I, the king ofRwanda.227

The most significant change came in 1931, when mwami Musinga was deposed for mwami Rudahigwa initiating what is known as "the tornado" of Catholicism. Rudahigwa became the first Catholic Rwandan king. Consequently, conversion to Catholicism became important for all who aspired to political and administrative postings. Chiefs quickly realized that, if not converted, their children would be held back from opportunity. A rush towards schools ensued as it became imperative to be, in addition to

Tutsi, both Catholic and formally educated in order to achieve upward mobility. The poorest children, often Hutu, who had originally seen hope and possibility in schooling, were disappointed with their continued misery and fell back from school attendance. It

should be mentioned here, for chronology's sake, that the elite and influential Groupe

Scolaire, to which we will later return, was founded at Astrida (now Butare) around this time.

It is rather difficult to picture the schools with which this chapter is concerned.

One former colonial administrator explained that "[i]n that time, schools were largely a roof to protect from rains and the sun. A roof of straw, mud walls, an open floor, so it was cool inside. And the benches were tree trunks laid on the ground."228 Another

explained that since not all classes had blackboards, students sometimes drew lessons in

227 Quoted in Linden, Church and Revolution, 157. 228 Interview 93.

78 the dirt, or with a piece of straw on their leg. Children attended primary schools during the day only, often making a long trek home. In contrast, secondary schools were boarding schools, described as "internship", and remain largely so to this day.

Major educational policies in 1938 and 1948 aimed to better adapt education to the contingencies of African life and to repudiate assimilation to European ways.230 As mentioned above, the lowest classes were disappointed that schooling was not providing the upward mobility that they presumed it would. The 1938 initiative thus made selection for higher levels of primary school more stringent, with the goal of better matching the indigenous Rwandan with the social role that was reserved for him. As Flemish missionary A. Maus wrote in 1940, "[t]he danger is never to teach too little, but to teach too much... It is our duty to stop the young student as soon as he is sufficiently educated for his environment."231 As we will see below, the criterion upon which scholarly promotion occurred grew increasingly contested.

Indeed, politics and schooling had always been entangled in Rwanda. As Rwanda underwent political changes, schooling was not unexpectedly in the limelight. As introduced above, in 1957, prominent Hutu graduates from Catholic seminaries published

Interview 94. 230 For details, see Van Hove, "L' CEuvre d'Education au Congo Beige et au Ruanda-Urundi." The 1950s were then marked by two external studies conducted on education in Rwanda. First, in 1954, the Coulon- Deheyn-Renson Report concluded that Catholic education was a failure - cheap, but incompetent - and that mission schools must urgently be replaced by neutral schools. Missionary responses were brutal and engendered the "cold war on schooling." The FURLEAC mission in 1958, commissioned by the Belgian administration, emphasized the increasingly familiar theme of African pedagogy and the need to adapt education even more to local particularities. Given the political turmoil in which Rwanda was embroiled in the 1950s, this advice had little impact. See Deheyn, Coulon, Renson, "La Reforme de PEnseignement au Congo Beige, Rapport Presente" au Ministre A. Buisseret, Congo Beige et Ministere des Colonies," (1954), M. Dubuisson-Brouha, E Natalis, and J. Paulus, "Le Probleme de PEnseignement dans le Ruanda- Urundi: Rapport d'une Mission d'Etude," (Liege: Fondation de l'Universite de Liege pour les Recherches Scientifiques au Congo Beige et au Ruanda-Urundi, 1958), Francois Duyckaerts, "L' Enseignement dans le Ruanda-Urundi: les Conclusions d'une Mission Universitaire," Annates de la Faculte de Droit de Liege, no. 1 (1959). 231 Quoted in Erny, L 'Ecole Coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962), 124.

79 the Hutu Manifesto - a pivotal document in Rwandan history. Among its many complaints, the Manifesto denounced the "hamitisation" of schooling and the administration's indirect support, through schools, for the Tutsi monopoly. The

Manifesto announced that, "[w]e want schooling to be particularly watched over", so that the "...Bahutu are not the springboard of a monopoly that eternally keeps them in unbearable social and political inferiority."232 In particular, it demanded that leaders

"respect the proportions", meaning that if there were not enough spots in school for all, places should be allocated in proportion to ethnic representation (recognized by identity booklets) in the population. The writers claimed that they did not wish to "Bantu-ize" what was previously "Hamitized." They also pointed to the need to better oversee the distribution of scholarships, a great majority of which were funded by the Hutu taxpayers. Overall, this text expressed the thoughts of the future leaders of Rwanda and foreshadowed changes that would take place during the First Republic.

When, in 1959, Rwandans organized themselves into political parties, all parties made educational demands. The Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), a largely Tutsi party supportive of the monarchy, admitted to an ethnic problem in schools, blaming it on the whites who used schooling to divide and rule. The Rassemblement Democratique

Rwandais (RADER), the reform wing of Tutsi, also made recommendations for education, emphasizing free primary education for all. PARMEHUTU, grown out of the authors of the Hutu Manifesto, consecrated a whole chapter of its party policy to the democratization of education. PARMEHUTU supported education for all students in areas served by a school and the suppression of boarding (internship) since it had always

232 Maximilien Niyonzima, Gregoire Kayibanda, et al, "Le Manifeste des Bahutus," in Rwanda Politique 1958-1960, ed. F. Nkundabagenzi (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d'lnformation Socio-Politique, 1957). 233 Ibid.

80 been awarded through favouritism. It also advocated several years of free study for the children of Rwandans who had been restrained by corvee obligations, likely meaning

Hutu, since they were the ones subjected to ubureetwa. Significantly, they also announced that all school registration cards would henceforth denote Hutu, Tutsi or Twa

"in the goal of informing all those that are combating racial discrimination in schooling."234 All of the parties were primarily concerned with the quantity and distribution of education, rather than its substantive content.

When, in 1962, Belgium handed over educational responsibilities to Rwanda's

First Republic, its last Resident General, Jean-Paul Harroy, remarked of the education dilemmas in Rwanda: "This topic, for me, is at the same time a jigsaw puzzle and a viper's nest."235

2.3 An Assessment of the Role of Schooling (1919-64)

When put together, what picture does this jigsaw puzzle of education reveal about the role of schooling in the conflict that engulfed Rwanda? Did this viper's nest poison the relationships among Rwandans? The causes of this period of conflict in Rwanda are,

of course, multiple. This section argues that education, through the mechanisms that

evolved, needs be added to the list in the form of an underlying cause.

This section begins with an overview of some of the challenges of researching this

period in Rwanda. It then turns to present my findings. First, it discusses access to

education, analyzing ethnic enrolment in primary schools, selection processes for higher

schooling, and the explanations for Tutsi over-representation in both. Second, it surveys

the content of schooling and the creation of divisions between people in colonial Rwanda.

234 Erny, L 'Ecole Coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962), 203. See also 202,204. 235 Quoted in Ibid., 230.

81 This section argues that unequal distribution of schooling, as well as some classroom practices, contributed to laying both the social-structural and psycho-cultural roots of violent interethnic conflict. It also argues that history lessons helped provide a foundation for violent interethnic conflict, although this did not happen at the primary level.

2.3a Research Design

Findings are based on 20 interviews and a number of informal conversations with people having direct experience with schooling during the colonial period. Interviews included Rwandans that were students and teachers during the colonial period, as well as

Belgian colonial administrators and missionaries with roles in colonial schooling.236 I further spoke with several experts and a group of elderly Rwandans that comprise a

Kigali-based amateur historical society. During my time in Rwanda, I also had informal conversations with a number of Rwandans with insight and experience into schooling during the colonial period. Primary documents, collected largely from the archives in

Brussels, Belgium, and from the White Father's archives at Kabgayi, Rwanda, complemented the interview data.

It is part of the public transcript of the First (Kayibanda, 1962-73) and Second

(Habyarimana, 1973-94) Republics - both Hutu-led - that education was discriminatory and favoured the Tutsi during the colonial period. The Hutu Manifesto and the political

236 Finding such individuals was not an easy task as average life expectancy in Rwanda today is just 47 years and was even lower in the past. Students who completed all of their primary schooling in the colonial period must be, at a very minimum, 57 years old, and on average, considerably older given Rwandan schooling customs. (This would mean that they were seven years old in 1956 and did six years of primary school with no repetition from 56-62; both conditions are unlikely as children usually started school at up to age 12 and repeated at least one year. Such a calculation also presumes that the 57-year old only finished primary school in the very last years of the colonial period.) Foreigners that served during the colonial period in Rwanda are now in their eighties. The two missionaries that I met collectively spent over 100 years in Rwanda!

82 party platforms of the early 1960s highlight such a view. This opinion is also stated, for example, in a 1966 manifesto by PARMEHUTU that condemned the church for its past neglect of the Hutu masses in education and linked this neglect to the absence of competent administrative agents. PARMEHUTU's party newspaper argued that "the church has never stopped discriminating against the Hutu. Its policy has never changed."237 A 1979 issue of a government magazine, Education et Culture, equally argued that colonial education favoured the Tutsi. One article states that "the personal sympathy underpinning racial segregation was common currency in the education system of this time" and that "school authorities practiced a discriminatory policy in their schools, preferentially admitting Tutsi students and treating them with benevolence."238

This public transcript leads me to consider that had I conducted these interviews sometime between the 1960s and 1994, the answers I would have received from

Rwandans, at least the superficial ones, would have been substantially different.

In contrast, it now seems to be part of the public transcript of the predominantly

Tutsi Kagame government (1994-present), to downplay and qualify the discriminatory nature of schooling in the colonial period. The public transcript today emphasizes that only sons of chiefs were favoured for schooling during the colonial period, not all Tutsi.

Consistent with the Kagame government's revisions to the meaning of ethnicity itself, it insists that preferential access to schools was along socio-economic lines rather than

Quoted in Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 259. 238 "Risultats de l'Enseignement au Rwanda Colonial," Education et Culture 4, no. Special Reforme (1979), 24-5, MINEPRISEC, "Des Disparities Ethniques et Regionales dans l'Enseignement Secondaire Rwandais," ed. Ministere de l'Enseignement Primaire et Secondaire (Kigali: Republique Rwandaise, 1986), 1.

83 ethnic ones. Untangling the public transcripts from private experience and transcripts had to be at the forefront of my mind in interpreting my findings.

It is also important to remember that despite my focus on formal education, familial socialization always proceeded in tandem with formal schooling, offering an alternative, complementary, or sometimes radically opposed perspective to that of formal teaching. As discussed in Chapter 1, it is impossible to untangle the relative weights of family-based education and formal schooling in terms of influence upon a child, and indeed, the relative influence of each may vary from individual to individual.

Nonetheless, there are important reasons to believe that school is particularly influential in the Rwandan case. European-style education is exceptionally highly valued in

Rwanda, where ideas about it are matched with expectations for social advancement.

Given this great respect for formal schooling, one may consider Rwandans as being pre- socialized to be socialized by schooling.240 Also, to the extent that students lived in residence at schools, albeit at the secondary level rather than the primary level focused upon here, the influence of schools would have been maximized. In Canada, for example, the teaching of aboriginal children at residential schools has been seen as a major means of weaning the children away fromthei r own cultures.

239 Interview 69. 240 Alison des Forges, for example, traces historical representations of Hutu and Tutsi relations in schoolbooks and notes that "even the majority of Hutu swallowed this distorted account of the past, so great was their respect for European style education. Thus people of both groups learned to think of the Tutsi as winners and the Hutu as losers in every great contest of the Rwandan past." Quoted in Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda," 20. This respect for formal education is consistent with my own experience as a student researcher, often commended for being so young and completing a PhD. Rwandans frequently asked me about university opportunities for them in Canada, another demonstration of their esteem for formal education. This is consistent with another researcher's experience. See Malkki, Purity and Exile, 48. Rwandan's high opinion of education is generally tied, as in other parts of the world, to the social and material benefits it is thought to bring. On this, see Dubuisson-Brouha, Natalis, and Paulus, "Le Probleme de l'Enseignement dans le Ruanda-Urundi," 34, Ngendahimana, "Etude sur la Participation de la Masse Populaire," 39.

84 2.3b Findings

Structure: Access to Primary School

There is strong quantitative evidence that in the early colonial period, Tutsi were

significantly more numerous than Hutu in primary schools. Archival documents fromth e

colonial administration show the five state primary schools as being exclusively for "sons

of chiefs and notables of the Tutsi race."241 By 1929, there were 677 Tutsi students in

these schools. As a group of Rwandan amateur historians explained to me, "[w]e can see

here that the future elite of the country was already separated, divided and discriminated

from the beginning."242

Around the same period, there was approximately 20 times the number of students

in subsidized Catholic primary schools than in state schools243, and likely even more in

non-subsidized Catholic schools. The mere fact of establishing these schools brought

Rwandans together. Rwanda was a highly dispersed country, not a villagized one;

according to the colonial administrators with whom I spoke, upon their arrival in Rwanda

population dispersal stood out to them as a striking feature.244 When the church set up a

mission post, it established a centre-point of a community. "So you see", one Rwandan

opined, "where we welcomed a primary school, they established a dispensary, and social

cohesion came. You see, because people shared..."245 By independence, approximately

250 000 Rwandan children attended primary schools.246

"Rapport Presente par le Gouvemement Beige au Conseil de la Societe des Nations," 62. Interview 69, group. "Rapport Pr&ente" par le Gouvemement Beige au Conseil de la Societe des Nations," 65. Interview 75, male Belgian, south; Interview 93. Interview 63, male Hutu, north. Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 13-4.

85 The sheer number of students schooled in a relatively short amount of time is impressive and another possible contributor to peacebuilding. Schooling is known to play a role in economic development - one of the pillars of peacebuilding - and is also recognized as a human right. I certainly do not intend to vilify education with the

analysis that follows. One can imagine the backlash Belgium would have suffered had it not developed education systems in the territories under its administration. However, this thesis highlights that certain kinds of schooling have significant peace and conflict

implications that have often been overlooked.

Other than in the state schools, which were closed in 1929-30, Hutu children were

admitted to schools alongside Tutsi, just not in equal numbers. In Catholic primary

schools for which ethnic data is available, Tutsi students were significantly more

numerous than Hutu. Contrary to some analyses that date discrimination against the Hutu

in mission schools to the late 1800s,247 this was unlikely to have always been the case,

since, as discussed above, Hutu were the first to be attracted to mission schools.

However, by the time of the Belgian administration, church-run schools were also

predominantly attended by Tutsi. Data from the 1927-8 report of the National Secretariat

on Catholic Education in Rwanda, presented in 2.1 below, shows an ethnic majority of

Tutsi in several central primary Catholic schools.

Bush and Saltarelli, "The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict," 10.

86 Figure 2.1: Number of Students by Ethnic Group in Central Primary Catholic Schools in 1928 fbovsY248

250-| 200- 150- • Hutu 100- B Tutsi 50- • 0- •_ —-i • i • Kans i Kigali Mibirizi Muramba Rwamagana Save

The numbers illustrate a minority Tutsi group, accounting for only about 15% of the general population, in several cases occupying as many, or even more, school places than

Hutu.249 When figures are normalized for proportion of population, Tutsi represent, in all cases, far more than a natural population distribution would suggest.250

Figure 2.2: Number of Students by Ethnic Group in Central Primary Catholic Schools in 1928 (boys). Normalized for Proportion of Population

100% i 80% - 60% - • Hutu 40% - msd—1 D Tutsi 20% - • 0%- • 1 1 Kans i Kigali Mibirizi Muramba Rwamagana Save

While it might be explainable that Tutsi accounted for more students in central mission schools, especially if their parents held colonial posts, reports also show a significant

L. Deprimoz, Missionary-Inspector on behalf of the Secretariat National de PEnseignement Catholique (SNEC), Rapport sur les Ecoles du Vicariat du Ruanda en 1928 (Annee scolaire 1927-1928), cited in Mbonimana,"Christianisation Indirecte", 143. 249 While not providing precise figures, the report also identifies a Tutsi majority in the central primary school in Zaza, "discrimination in favour of Tutsi" in the Rulindo central primary school, and "no discrimination" at the Kabgayi central primary school. A definition of "discrimination" is problematically not provided. See Gamaliel Mbonimana, "Christianisation Indirecte", 143. 250 Tutsi were, at this time, estimated to be 15% of the national population. Figure 2 is calculated with this in mind. However, Tutsi represented more or less than 15% in some regions, so while this figure is illustrative, it is not an exact representation.

87 Hutu-Tutsi gap in branch, or "bush" schools, at least around Kabgayi, where the figures have been reported and are available.251

My interviewees, who attended school largely during the 1940s and 50s, all remember Hutu and Tutsi, at least in Catholic primary school, "going to school together, in class seated on the same benches, playing together..."252 Nonetheless, school enrolment remained ethnically unbalanced throughout the colonial period. While colonial reports from the 1930s onward do not tally students ethnically, a United Nations

(UN) mission that visited Rwanda in the late 1940s noted that although Hutu were a net majority in the early years of primary school - a difference from just a few decades earlier - they were still a small minority by the end.253 One research team found that in

1956, Tutsi accounted for 16.59% of the population and 32.1% of primary school spots and that Hutu comprised 82.74% of the population and 67.7% of primary school places.

They found that Twa represented 0.67% of Rwandans but held only 0.2% of primary

school positions.254 Another researcher found that in 1962, in the town of Butare, 46% of

Tutsi and only 13% of Hutu had had more than five years of education; 17% of Tutsi and

55% of Hutu could not read.255

Caution is necessary in regard to the accuracy of figures throughout this

dissertation. Formal enrolment and actual attendance are two different things. For

example, when one group of researchers went to visit Rwandan bush schools, it found

them empty at various times.256 A study of Congo and Ruanda-Urundi similarly found up

251 Mbonimana, "Christianisation Indirecte", 143. 252 Interview 69, group. 253 Emy, L'Ecole ColonialeauRwanda (1900-1962), 141. 254 Theodor Hanf, Education et Developpement au Rwanda: Problemes, Apories, Perspectives, Materialien Zu Entwicklung Und Pol'itik 7 (Munchen: Weltforum Verlag, 1974), 140. 255 D'Hertefelt cited in Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 99. 256 Coulon, "La Reforme de PEnseignement au Congo Beige," 80.

88 to 50% of students absent on a given day. The warning is also warranted in regard to ethnic tallies. A few Rwandan interviewees told me that some rich or prominent Hutu grew up, and were educated, as Tutsi. Again, class and ethnicity in Rwanda are complicatedly intertwined. Some children may have been recorded as Tutsi either by having their documents formally changed, or more informally through patronage networks. This, however, would not have been widespread enough to change the trends.

At the same time, that these privileged Hutu could not gain access to schools and other opportunities as Hutu is meaningful in itself for understanding how difference was categorized and Hutu were stigmatized.

In addition to an ethnic divide in schools, there was also a gender divide. The

1929 colonial government report shows that only about 25% of the primary school population was girls.258 A colonial account from 1939-44 reports girls at only about 10% of the primary school population.259 Interviewees all recall there being very few girls in schools.

Opinions varied with regard to whether differential ethnic opportunities should best be described as active discrimination, or as an unintentional "situation of fact" reflecting societal conditions. These different transcripts, falling largely along ethnic lines, were also tied to participants' analyses of education's contribution to conflict between groups. Those that saw differential ethnic opportunities as active discrimination were more inclined to see education as an important contributor to conflict, whereas those

Buisseret, "L'Enseignement au Congo Beige et au Ruanda-Urundi," in Rapport de la Mission Senatoriale au Congo et dans les Territories Sous Tutelle Beige (1947), 84. 258 13 801 Rwandan children are reported to be in subsidized Catholic primary schools: 9 983 boys; 3 818 girls. See "Rapport Presents par le Gouvernement Beige au Conseil de la Soci&e des Nations," 65. Buisseret, "L'Enseignement au Congo Beige et au Ruanda-Urundi," 85.

89 that saw them as merely "situations of fact" opined that education had less influence on violent interethnic conflict.

Some participants clearly noted that the ethnic tallies above point to the colonial administration and the Catholic Church, that actively discriminated against Hutu in favour of Tutsi. As one participant explained, "[t]hey used the children of the people who had influence... They wanted influence. So to get influence, to get an influential person, you try to befriend him. So that's what the church did." A Tutsi himself, he added, "[a]nd by then, the people that were ruling, most of them were Tutsi.. ."260

Colonial documents, especially from the 1920s and 1930s, substantiate such a view. Monsignor Classe, Rwanda's Vicar Apostolic, who applied Lavigerie's conviction of conversion through chiefs to Rwanda as early as German rule, substituted chiefs in general for Tutsi chiefs, thus adding a new ethnic angle to the policy. In various letters to his missionaries, Classe expounded this idea arguing that "we must absolutely work to destroy the idea of the governing group that we are the men of the Bahutu,"262 that "the school of the Batutsi, here, must have the pace on that of the Bahutu,"263 and that "it is by the conversion of the Batutsi that we will definitively gain the conversion of Rwanda."264

These convictions, which became known as the Classe doctrine, would prove to have far- reaching ramifications. Again, one sees the harmony between church and state. In 1928,

Monsignor Classe told his missionaries: "You must choose the Batutsi because the government will probably refuse Bahutu teachers... In the government the positions in every branch of the administration, even the unimportant ones, will be reserved

260 Interview 91. 261 Mbonimana, "Christianisation Indirecte", 136. 262 Erny, L 'Ecole Coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962), 39. 263 Ibid., 101. 264 Quoted in Mbonimana, "Christianisation Indirecte", 140.

90 henceforth for young Batutsi."265 Hutu were not entirely left out, but Classe relegated them to education that prepared them for more menial positions in mines and other sites of manual labour.

There are additionally charges that some Tutsi were also instrumental in keeping

Hutu out of schools. As one book on Rwandan education recounts,

A Hutu father, by bleeding himself, had painfully saved, in 1958, the required sum to send his son to higher education at the seminary. His shebuja (Tutsi patron), who always knew everything in detail, came the evening before the child's departure. Inspection. Reproach : 'My cows are badly cared for. This merits a fine'. And he set the exact sum that had been saved for school fees.. .The son did not go study at the seminary. But soon afterwards, with his father in November 1959, he set fire to the shebuja's hut.267 Since schooling became important for access to positions of power, it makes sense that

Tutsi would want to actively hold on to these channels amidst a changing environment.

Charges of active discrimination were more common, but not solely, from Hutu participants. While some Hutu did not find they were discriminated against, as by the

1940s Catholic primary schools were generally open to them, they pointed to stories they had heard about their ancestors' hardships in accessing school. Such memories take on a meaning of their own, as discussed in the mechanisms section of the framework above.

Anthropologist Lisa Malkki, in her interviews with Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania, similarly found that exclusion from education had become a "mythico-history" in itself.268 Other Hutu with whom I spoke recounted their own difficulties in accessing secondary schools.

265 Mgr Leon Classe, "Instructions Pastorales: 1922-1932," (Kabgayi: Vicariat apostolique, undated), Linden, Church and Revolution, 163. 266 Quoted in Mbonimana, "Christianisation Indirecte", 141. 267 Quoted in Erny, L 'Ecole Coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962), 232. 268 Malkki defines a mythico-history as ".. .not only a description of the past, not even merely an evaluation of the past, but a subversive recasting and reinterpretation of it in fundamentally moral terms. In this sense, it cannot be accurately described as either history or myth. It was what can be called a mythico-history." Malkki, Purity and Exile, 54, 132.

91 On the other hand, several of the Rwandans with whom I spoke, who had been

students in Rwanda's colonial primary Catholic schools, explained that the situation leading to more Tutsi being in schools was merely one of social "fact", rather than one

indicating a specific policy of favouritism. Significantly, these responses came from

Tutsi and colonial officials, not from Hutu. Although schooling was free, and the church

even provided scholastic materials, these participants explained the Hutu-Tutsi

discrepancy as one related to socio-economics; that status and ethnicity were linked.

One, for example, explained that Tutsi held power though land and cattle thus providing

them with a status that enabled them to send their children to school.269 Another participant similarly opined that Tutsi went to school because they had servants to do

their chores, whereas Hutu needed to keep their children at home to do house- and field-

work.270 Furthermore, Hutu that were in school had to help their families work in the

evenings, so were less likely to succeed and stay in school than Tutsi.271 Tutsi also more

often had electricity than Hutu, who could then not study after 6 pm when it gets dark in

Rwanda.272 Several studies argue that the over-representation of Tutsi has historical

parallels worldwide. For example, "in ancient Greece, only the children of free men had

access to education, in the middle-ages the children of lords were more favoured, the

better-off children in the countries called capitalist are more numerous in superior

schools."273

269 Interview 51, male Hutu, north. 270 Interivew 35, female Tutsi, south; Interview 47, male Hutu, north; Interview 94. 271 Ngendahimana, "Etude sur la Participation de la Masse Populaire," 44. 272 Interview 75, male Belgian, south. 273 Ngendahimana, "Etude sur la Participation de la Masse Populaire," 45. Twa were also severely under- represented in schools. Several participants do not recall their being any Twa in their classes. The same kinds of justifications were deployed by both Hutu and Tutsi participants vis-a-vis the relative lack of girls in schools. Although boys were by far more numerous in schools, participants contended that this was not because of a policy of favouritism on behalf of government or churches, but because parents did not send

92 A couple of the colonial officials with whom I spoke pointed to their training at the Colonial University in Antwerp, which focused explicitly on respecting customary authorities and governing indirectly. While neither admitting nor denying a preference for Tutsi in education, they seemingly justified a Tutsi-focus, arguing that when they arrived in the country Tutsi were in charge and their policies respected this.274

In addition to these more social explanations for the structure of education in

Rwanda, some have invoked intellectual explanations for the over-representation of Tutsi in schools. One colonial study of the education sector in Rwanda claimed that black children lacked curiosity, the ability to elaborate and abstract, and that "the Blacks of

Ruanda-Urundi are stuck in a age" that held them back from attending or succeeding at school. The study was explicit, however, that these comments did not apply to Tutsi whom they found inculcated with a code of honour, initiative, self- confidence, and a sense of responsibility, and who were much more numerous in schools. It was recognized that the upbringing of higher classes would have made their adaptation to schools easier,276 complicating and again intertwining ethnicity and class.

Two of the former colonial officials also explained that Tutsi simply had a reputation of being more intelligent, or at least more skilful than Hutu, and that even Hutu preferred to be ruled by Tutsi.277

In sum, some of the Tutsi participants contended that, while Tutsi were more numerous in schools, this discrepancy was not a result of unfair policy, but due to wider girls to school. Custom saw girls in the home beside their mothers, and some worried that men would hesitate to marry educated girls as they would be less easily dominated or may aspire to a higher standard of living. See Dubuisson-Brouha, Natalis, and Paulus, "Le Probleme de l'Enseignement dans le Ruanda- Urundi," 88. 274 Interview 93; Interview 94. 275 Dubuisson-Brouha, Natalis, and Paulus, "Le Probleme de l'Enseignement dans le Ruanda-Urundi." 276 Erny, L 'Ecole Coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962), 220. 277 Interview 93; Interview 94.

93 societal conditions. Therefore, it did not contribute to interethnic conflict. This is perhaps expected as their group benefited from the exclusivity of education. Although there was some crossover, Hutu often shared a different interpretation than Tutsi and

Belgian interviewees in regard to the intentionality of the exclusivity of schools.

In sum, state schools in Rwanda were exclusive and divisive. Catholic schools, especially under the leadership of Monsignor Classe in the first decades of colonialism, displayed similar tendencies. On the other hand, by the 1940s when they began school, participants generally felt that Catholic primary schools were, despite past problems, in principle and in practice open to all, causing no problems among Rwandans. During this later period, the problems arose, according to Rwandan interviewees, in terms of selection for higher levels of schooling.

Structure: Promotion Past Primary School

Educational inequality along ethnic lines deepened in Rwanda at the end of primary school. Preliminary selections were conducted at the end of the fifth grade for promotion to the sixth. An external report of Rwandan education commissioned by the colonial administration reveals that in 1958, there were 17 712 students in the fifth year of primary, but only 3 342 in the sixth year, after the selection process.278 The authors remarked on most Rwandans being sent back to the hills after several years of primary school as "posing one of the sharpest current social problems in Ruanda-Urundi."279

Even more stringent selections were made at the end of the sixth grade. Although the focus of this project is primary schooling, the selection experience at the end of primary school is crucially important. During much of the colonial period, there were

278 Dubuisson-Brouha, Natalis, and Paulus, "Le Probldme de PEnseignement dans le Ruanda-Urundi," 36. 279 Ibid.

94 only three secondary schools in Rwanda: a minor seminary at Kabgayi, the Groupe

Scolaire at Astrida, to which we will return shortly, and a teacher's school (ecole normale) at Zaza. All secondary schools were boarding schools and taught in French.

Less than 10%, and according to some less than 5%, of those finishing the sixth grade, were granted places in secondary schools.280 One can imagine the impact of such competition in a country with great respect for education, and the social mobility it is presumed to bring. In many countries, Western-style education was a symbol of

"modernity" and seemed to promise a new lifestyle, yet education reinforced "traditional" state power.281 Belgium has been widely criticized as having wanted to curb the development of an indigenous elite. In contrast, one of my Belgian interviewees accused

Kayibanda after 1959 of explicit efforts to stall the development of a Rwandan elite for fear that it might eventually challenge him.282

More significant for the questions of interest to this dissertation, the competition for secondary school positions often took place on an ethnic playing field. Almost all interviewees mentioned the Groupe Scolaire in particular as a site of discrimination in favour of the Tutsi. Rwandans also hold it up as the best and most elite school of the period. It similarly appears to have become a symbol among academics who, somewhat erroneously, use it as a singular example of Rwandan education during the colonial

According to Erny, in 1961-2 on the eve of independence, still only 726 students were in Rwanda's secondary schools, 660 of which were boys. These figures represent 4-5% of sixth year primary school students according to the the Dubsuisson-Brouha, Natalis and Paulus report numbers cited above. A government report, however, cites 2 715 in secondary schools in 1960-1 and Hoben cites 4000 students in secondary schools in 1962-3.Erny, L'Ecole Coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962), 227, Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 14, MINEPRISEC, "Des Disparity Ethniques et Regionales dans PEnseignement Secondaire Rwandais," 13. 281 Bruce Fuller, Growing up Modern: The Western State Builds Third-World Schools, Critical Social Thought (New York: Routledge, 1990). 282 Interview 75, male Belgian, south.

95 period. Most sources agree that the seminary was the only option for Hutu students who wished to pursue post-primary education.

The Nyanza state primary school, which, as seen above, was reserved for Tutsi, closed in 1930 and its 342 Tutsi students were transferred to Astrida (now Butare).283

The Brothers of Charity of Ghent opened the Groupe Scolaire as a secondary school in

1932, at which time the school became technically open to all. Its recruitment rules

(1946) included: proving good intelligence, good health, being between 14 and 16 years of age (and a minimum height of 1.4m),284 holding irreproachable morality, and succeeding in a competition where 25 students from Rwanda and 25 from Burundi would be selected. Significantly, these rules did not apply to "legitimate sons of chiefs" (read:

Tutsi chiefs) who could be recruited by the Groupe Scolaire without an exam as long as they were of the right age and had finished primary school.285 Indeed, since its inception, a special focus was put on recruiting sons of Tutsi chiefs and tailoring a curriculum to the required tasks and skills of future chiefs. Despite the ostensibly open competition for

Groupe Scolaire admission, Tutsi represented a very strong majority throughout the colonial period. Enrolment records, illustrated in the table below, attest to this.

Paul Crokaert, Rapport Presente par le Gouvernement Beige au Conseil de la Societe des Nations Au Sujet De L'administration Du Ruanda-Urundi Pendant L'annee 1930 (Brussels: Etablissements Emile Bruylant, 1931). 284 Some contend that this is further evidence of discrimination since Tutsi are generally taller than Hutu. See Bush and Saltarelli, "The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict," 10. A colonial interview participant with direct experience with the Groupe Scolaire in the 1950s did not remember the admission criteria based on height and denied that there was discrimination based on this stereotype. Interview 75, male Belgian, south. 285 Mbonimana, "Christianisation Indirecte", 146.

96 Table 2.3: Student Enrolment bv Ethnic Group at the Groupe Scolaire (1932-59V

Year Tutsi Hutu Congolese Rwanda Burundi 1932 45 94s 14 1933 21 0 0 0 0 1934 26 13* 0 1935 41 11* 0 1945 46 0 0 3 0 1946 44 1 0 8 0 1947 44 2 0 10 0 1948 85 2 0 11 2 1949 85 5 0 9 0 1953 68 3 0 16 0 1954 63 3 0 16 3

The school was divided into several streams: agronomy, secretariat, medical assistance, veterinary assistance, and administration, sometimes referred to as the "chiefs-candidate stream."287 Interviewees who spoke about the Groupe Scolaire all indicated that the administrative stream was comprised exclusively of Tutsi. Some said that this stream was exclusively for Tutsi sons of chiefs. Others argued that while Hutu were not restricted from applying, they knew that they were restricted from government jobs and thus following this stream would have been purposeless.288 As noted above, the post-genocide government's narrative usually says that only one stream - administration

- was reserved for Tutsi, thereby hinting (or even explicitly arguing) that Hutu comprised an important part of the rest of the school. Figures do not, however, support this assertion since only about one sixth of students were enrolled in the "chiefs-candidate" section289 and Tutsi represented a great majority of the overall student body (see Figure 2.3 above).

286 For figures, see Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 138. Enrolment numbers are reported for the years in which they were available. * indicates that territorial origins are unavailable. 287 P. Wigny, Rapport Annuel du Ruanda-Urundi, 1940 (Brussels: Etablissements G^neraux d'lmprimerie, 1941). 288 Interview 75, male Belgian, south; Interview 91. 289 Around 1940, only 11 students out of 68 were enrolled in the chiefs-candidate stream. Wigny, Rapport Annuel du Ruanda-Urundi, 1940.

97 It also seems to be part of the current public transcript to emphasize preference for sons of chiefs, thereby restricting allegations of favouritism to a certain class of Tutsi rather than Tutsi more generally. This seems possible according to the admission criteria above, although I was unable to find precise numbers.

While Hutu were in the minority at the Groupe Scolaire, they often found places at the seminaries; the Catholic missionaries with whom I spoke emphasized the non­ discriminatory nature of their church. Accession to mission-run higher levels of education was formally open to all who wished to write the entrance exam, and officially granted to those that best succeeded.290 All Hutu interviewees that had attended secondary school were indeed educated at the seminaries. In the early years of the colonial period, when Tutsi shunned the Catholic missionaries and their schools, Hutu dominated the seminaries as they did the primary schools. Linden aptly titles his chapter describing the period as one of "Hutu Church and Tutsi Court."291 Several interviewees told me about a growing Groupe Scolaire/Seminary divide that took place along ethnic lines: "The seminarists were jealous of what the Groupe Scolaire had, of the priorities; and at the Groupe Scolaire, they hated the seminarists."292

The seminaries were at first an outlet for the grievances of Hutu, but became increasingly dominated by Tutsi, causing acrimony among Hutu seminarists. As one colonial administrator told me, while higher schooling was in principle for those with the best examination results, he heard rumours of political nominations and a "political filter"

290 The first Rwandan bishop argued that "scholarly selection, which the Hutu Manifesto claims is biased in favour of the Tutsi, is in reality done according to age and school results, independent of all racial, social and economic considerations." See Mgr Aloy Bigirumwami, "Les Problemes Sociaux et Ethniques au Rwanda," Temoignages Chretiens (edition beige) 5, no. 9 (1958). 291 Linden, Church and Revolution, Chapter 4. 292 Interview 75, male Belgian, south.

98 restraining Hutu access in some cases. In 1956, although Tutsi constituted 16.59% of the population, they held 60.9% of secondary school places; Hutu represented 82.74% of

Rwandans but held just 39.1% of secondary spots.294 These figures illustrate a marked decline from the ratio of Hutu to Tutsi at primary school, cited above. Suggestively, a

UN report from the 1950s opined that ethnic tensions in Rwanda could be reduced by making admission rules easier to allow more Hutu to move to high school.295 Tensions were further exacerbated by the fact that Hutu and Tutsi came face to face in the seminaries, yet Tutsi had far greater opportunities for social mobility upon graduation.

A poignant example of this lack of opportunity, even for educated Hutu, is the story of Anastase Makuza, the first Rwandan with a university degree. Makuza, a Hutu, graduated from Rwanda's Nyakibanda seminary and from the Congo Centre

Universitaire of Kisantu. Upon his return to Rwanda in 1955 to seek employment, he was turned down by the mwami, the Institut pour la Recherche en Afrique Centrale at

Astrida and the Director of Schooling in Bujumbura. He ended up with a typist job in

Kibuye, and was promoted a few years later to administrative assistant in Cyangugu and

Kigali. As Lemarchand writes, "by then, however, Makuza was already a potential revolutionary." He widens his analysis to say that, "like other educated Hutu, he derived a burning sense of grievance from the monopoly exercised by the Tutsi caste over all sectors of the administration and the economy; to break the hold of this monopoly became a central objective of the Hutu intellectuals on the eve of the revolution."296

Indeed, those that led the revolution of 1959 had a seminary background and they

293 Interview 93. 2 Hanf, Education et Developpement au Rwanda, 140. 295 Emy, L'Ecole Coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962), 141. 296 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 139.

99 emphasized lack of education and social mobility for Hutu as one of their primary grievances. On the other hand, a few of my interviewees (Belgian and Tutsi) argued that these claims were just "politics", intended to mobilize the Hutu population, since the most vocal Hutu all had good access to secondary schools. These different opinions are another illustration of ethnically-based narratives.

Advancement past primary school was highly competitive in Rwanda and a source of social strife. Proportionally to their minority status in the population, many more Tutsi found places in secondary school than Hutu. Tutsi were also the majority in the most elite secondary school in the country. The school that one attends in a divided

907 society is a cultural marker, and Tutsi had the upper hand in Rwanda. Some Hutu were able to find places in the seminary, although their encounters with the frustration of social mobility were merely advanced to the end of secondary school, rather than the end of primary school.

Content

In the early years of colonialism, the content of schooling differed by ethnic group. Records indicate that in many Catholic schools that had both Hutu and Tutsi students, the two groups were taught in different streams starting in the late 1920s.298 For example, Tutsi were taught in French so as to prepare them for basic administrative positions, whereas Hutu were taught in the local language.299 Similarly, French was

297 Davies, Education and Conflict, 76. 298 Mbonimana, "Christianisation Indirecte", 142. At the same time, in some schools, there were not enough Tutsi to constitute a separate section. For example, my interviewees from northern Rwanda recall there being few, if any, Tutsi students in their schools. Interview 47, male Hutu, north; Interview 48 male Hutu, north. 299 Erny,L'Ecole Coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962), 102, Linden, Church and Revolution, 163, Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 90.

100 required in state schools, which were reserved for Tutsi. Speaking French was a direct route to the colonial powers, especially since secondary school was taught in French.

According to scholar Pierre Erny, Tutsi were also given arithmetic classes, which were

replaced with singing classes for Hutu. Natural sciences were obligatory for Tutsi, but

optional for Hutu. Tutsi could be taught without religious instruction, whereas Hutu were

educated with the goal of eventual baptism. Sometimes special classes were given for

Tutsi on days or times when Hutu were absent.301 Other authors found evidence of extra

subsidies and more qualified teachers in several areas where Tutsi were dominant.302 Not

surprisingly, school inspectors during this period noted "little progress" among Hutu.303

Such segregation certainly reinforces ethnic categorization and contributes to

collectivizing difference, since all members of one group have certain entitlements that

all members of the other do not, merely by being members of that group. Hutu were also

stigmatized as many Tutsi saw themselves as deserving the greater opportunities they

were given. These streams did not last throughout the entire colonial period, however,

ending by the 1940s.

The lessons taught at mixed ethnic schools in the late colonial period are also

important. While many ignore it, some scholars do include schooling in their analysis of

the causes of conflict in Rwanda, albeit only in passing. They mention the content of

history lessons, and contend that it contributed to the construction and propagation of a

racial ideology that divided Rwanda's population.304 Bush and Saltarelli cite the example

300 Inspection Generate de l'Enseignement, "Instructions pour les Inspecteurs Provinciaux Relatives aux Programmes a Suivre dans les Differentes Ecoles et a leur Interpretation," (1929). 301 Interview 52, female Hutu, north. See also Erny, L 'Ecole Coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962), 102. 302 Linden, Church and Revolution, 163. 303 Ibid. 304 See Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa, 285-6, Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 57-8, Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 88, Rutayisire, Kabano, and Rubagiza, "Redefining Rwanda's Future," 17.

101 of stereotyping in colonial textbooks of both the German and Belgian colonial administrations that emphasized the physical differences between Hutu and Tutsi, linking physical traits to intellectual capacities according to racist doctrines of the time.305 Father

Pages, the author of Un Royaume Hamite au Centre de I'Afrique (1930), the first written record of Rwanda's "Hamitic" court history, personally lectured in Gisenyi schools;

scholar Ian Linden reported that Pages' students could self-identify as superior Hamites

and inferior Bantu.306 As one journalist reported, "with every schoolchild reared in the

doctrine of racial superiority and inferiority, the idea of a collective national identity was

steadily laid to waste, and on either side of the Hutu-Tutsi divide there developed mutually exclusionary discourses based on the competing claims of entitlement and

injury."307 Given the predominance of the Hamitic hypothesis in political and historic

analyses of Rwanda's colonial period, I too expected to find it to have played a prominent

role in schooling and to have laid a basis for divisions in Rwanda.

I found, however, that participants - both Hutu and Tutsi - explained that

Rwandan history and politics were not taught at primary school during the colonial period. The missionaries with whom I spoke, although defensive after much criticism in

this regard, agreed. All Rwandan participants recalled some teaching of basic European

history, but only a few mentions, if any, of Rwandan history. One remembered a teacher

who explained the difference between Hutu and Tutsi, pointing to the physical

characteristics of the students, although doubted that this was part of a formal

curriculum.308 Another recalled learning a few short stories about Rwanda's royal

305 Bush and Saltarelli, "The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict," 10. 306 Linden, Church and Revolution, 165. 307 Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 57-8. 308 Interview 68, male Hutu, north.

102 family. Yet another remembered a few lessons about the importance of obeying the king, and about whites colonizing Rwanda.310 While a recent report from Rwanda's

Institute for Research and Dialogue on Peace maintains that the theory of successive waves of migration, for example, was taught since the 1940s, including in the sixth year of primary school, participants did not remember this.311 Some of these inconsistencies might be due to historical memory. Alternatively, these discrepancies are perhaps accurate representations since there was no homogeneous national teaching program and each church prepared its own curricula.312 What is notable is that no one, except the first participant, remembers any history teaching linked to ethnicity or Hamitic theories of

Tutsi superiority.

In contrast, at secondary schools, there is evidence that a divisive history was taught, helping children become aware of their ethnicity and politicizing it. A textbook used in the Groupe Scolaire administrative stream, for example, explains the three ethnic groups and their characteristics and physical traits. In one myth, "the atavistic stupidity of the Bahutu" is highlighted in contrast to the "sage and prudent" Tutsi.313 In another section, the text details ubuhake relationships of clientship and how the "backward Bantu populations" were mystified by the Tutsi's cows and the Tutsi's high psychological and

Interview 33, female Tutsi, south. 310 Interview 52, female Hutu, north. 311 IRDP. "Histoire et Conflits au Rwanda." Kigali: Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace, 2005.The citations that support the report's assertion are similarly inconclusive, relying on books that could have hypothetically, but not definitely, been used in primary schools such as Alexis Kagame's 1943 court history, and on specific curriculum from the 1980s. In 1995, the government's review of colonial education says that Rwandan history was not part of the formal curriculum. Republic of Rwanda, "Conference sur la Politique et la Planification de PEducation au Rwanda."

312 Erny, L 'Ecole Coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962), 226. 313 Georges Sandrapt, Cours de Droit Coutumier (Section des Candidats-Chefs) (Groupe Scolaire d'Astrida, 1939), 139-40.

103 political qualities. The two ethnic groups are presented as clearly separate, and as essentialized. In the Astrida graduates' newspaper, one Groupe Scolaire teacher wrote after World War II of how

the Hamitic people at base have nothing in common with Negroes...Especially in Ruanda- Urundi.. .Physically, these [Hamitic] races are superb; despite the inevitable race mixings that are a result of prolonged contact with Negroes, the preponderance of the Caucasian type has remained deeply marked among the Batutsi...Their elevated height...the fineness of their traits, and their intelligent expression all contribute to their being worthy of the title that explorers gave them: aristocratic Negroes.315 These types of representations, taught in a Tutsi-dominated environment, encouraged categorizing and collectivizing Hutu and Tutsi and promoted images of Tutsi superiority over the Hutu. Filtering into wider society, they could also have contributed to "cohesion of oppression" among Hutu.316 Such a text was not substantially different than one used in seminaries, such as Pages' Un Royawne Hamite. Pages similarly details the three races/ethnic groups of Rwanda, their physical and personal characteristics, and suggests as "incontestable" that Tutsi are Hamites from Ethiopia. Several colonial interview participants mentioned Pages and de Lacger as definitive authorities, an indication of how history books were uncritically accepted. While, as we saw above, very few students made it to secondary schools, an interesting complementary study to this one focusing on primary schools would delve deeper into these secondary-level history books.

While history teaching in primary schools did not generally involve ethnic histories, this does not mean ethnicity was not present in the classroom. Half of the interviewees (2/5 Hutu, 3/5 Tutsi) remember their primary school teachers asking their ethnicity in class. While several claimed already to have known their ethnic identity and

314 Ibid., 148-9. 315 Quoted in Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa, 232-3. 316 Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression. 317 Pages, "Un Royaume Hamite au Centre de l'Afrique," 5,28-32.

104 that of their classmates, such an activity categorizes students and sends them the implicit message that it is appropriate that they be divided in this way. All but one of the participants, however, date the beginning of this practice to only the end of the 1950s or

1960. This coincides with the time when Hutu were beginning to take power in the country and makes sense, given that PARMEHUTU advocated noting ethnicity on school registration cards, as we saw above.

Through both levels of schooling, we can also examine how widespread colonial pedagogical practices, such as teaching by rote and memorization, contributed to the development of conformity among Rwandan youth, which made them potentially more susceptible to mobilization for violent conflict. Teaching in Rwanda has generally been of a learn-by-heart variety, and in some places, pupils were banished to the fields if they were unable to perfectly recall the lesson. One Belgian, formerly involved with

Rwanda's schools, recalls that his students knew the courses and texts better than he,

"down to the last comma", but had great difficulty putting their learnings into practice.318

Most interview participants agreed that they were never welcome to ask questions or disagree with the teachers - "no, you had to listen, swallow the information, and respond to the questions posed by the teacher"319 - although a couple dissented. Most participants opined that inculcating obedience to authority was a central part of their school experience. Indeed, missionaries often teach their students and followers to respect authorities and one's station in life and through much of Rwanda's colonial period the church emphasized submission.320 That secondary schools were boarding schools would

318 Interview 75, male Belgian, south. 319 Interview 39, female Tutsi, south. 320 For a reflection on the Church's selective teachings during the colonial period, see Walter Aelvoet, "Rwanda et Burundi," Vivctnte Afrique, no. 218 (1962).

105 have enhanced the impact of this hidden curriculum. Although these pedagogical practices cannot explain violent mobilization on their own - conformity has been widespread in teaching in Africa and around the world321 - conformity can be an important part of the underlying story.

2.3c Analysis: The contribution of schooling to violent interethnic conflict

The findings are clear that Tutsi children were numerically superior to Hutu children in primary schools during most of the colonial period. Tutsi alone were admitted to state schools. Hutu and Tutsi were admitted to Catholic primary schools, but Tutsi remained over-represented, whether due to discrimination or social conditions. It is also clear that ethnicity was an important criterion in admission to secondary schools and that

Tutsi had more opportunities open to them. This kind of inequality in itself is a form of structural violence. Moreover, for our questions, this structure of the education system contributed to laying both the social-structural and psycho-cultural conditions that make societies more prone to conflict.

Differential opportunities for schooling contributed to the underlying social structural conditions conducive to violent interethnic conflict. To reiterate, social- structural causes of conflict are based in the social, political and economic interests of society, and in the form and strength of the ties between communities. None of my interview participants felt that uneven access to schools directly contributed to conflict.

Since many of them attended schools in periods of social calm, they did not immediately see the link between schooling and conflict. They did, however, see the possibility that

321 Even today, a study of 28 countries found that only approximately one quarter of students are encouraged to voice their opinions in class. See Torney-Purta et al., "Citizenship and Education in Twenty- Eight Countries," 8-10.

106 differential access to schooling along ethnic lines contributed to the underlying grievances and dispositions that led to the events surrounding Rwanda's revolution and independence.

While discriminatory and exclusive access to school contributed to laying the underlying social-structural causes of violence in Rwanda, it was also a factor in developing the underlying psycho-cultural causes of violent interethnic conflict.

Differential access to schools and to different learning streams are in themselves markers of difference. This kind of categorization is one of the first mechanisms necessary for violence along ethnic lines. Furthermore, by granting and denying opportunities by ethnic criteria, schooling helped construct binary identities and to stigmatize Hutu as inferior to Tutsi. As Mamdani writes, "[i]f your inclusion or exclusion from a regime of rights or entitlements is based on your race or ethnicity, as defined by law, then this becomes a central defining fact for you the individual and your group."322 Exclusion was particularly significant for those Hutu who were left out of state schools or the higher education selections at the end of Catholic primary school. It also appears to have been particularly important for Hutu who graduated from the seminaries and met what Linden calls "an ethnic ceiling on their ambitions."323 Hutu graduates of higher education were frustrated at the gap between their expectations of social mobility and the realities of

Tutsi power. It was eventually this Hutu "counter-elite" that wrote the Hutu Manifesto and began the revolution that led to violence in Rwanda. Tutsi also developed ideas of entitlement and superiority based on their inclusion.

Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 21. Linden, Church and Revolution, 7.

107 Overall, the structure of schooling in Rwanda, contributed, through several mechanisms, including discriminatory and exclusive institutions, and via categorizing collectivizing and stigmatizing groups, to laying both the social-structural and psycho- cultural conditions conducive to violent interethnic conflict.

While one might have predicted school lessons to have had a similarly negative influence on intergroup relations, I found that at least for history classes, this was not the case. Rwandan history was not taught in primary school. Secondary school history lessons contributed to categorizing, collectivizing and stigmatizing Rwandans by ethnic

group, although secondary schools are beyond the focus here.

The primary classroom practices of streaming students into different subjects and

classes by ethnic group contributed to negative intergroup relationships, social-

structurally and psycho-culturally, in the same ways as access to school and promotions

above. Promoting conformity and obedience and failing to develop the critical thinking

skills that may have helped students peacefully manage conflicts may have also

contributed to deteriorating intergroup relations.

Of course, education on its own did not lead to the multiple episodes of violence

that broke out in Rwanda between 1959 and 1964. Schooling is just one factor - often

overlooked - that combined with a constellation of other factors propitious to violent

conflict along ethnic lines. In the colonial period, the structure of schools - especially

access to primary schools and opportunities for promotion past primary - was the

principal schooling problem for positive intergroup relations. In the next chapter, we will

see that the content of primary schooling becomes more problematic for building positive

relationships amongst Rwandans.

108 Chapter 3: Schooling under the Republics and the Roots of Violent Interethnic Conflict (1964-1994)

The story of violent interethnic conflict in Rwanda unfortunately does not end with our last chapter. The most drastic kind of interethnic conflict - genocide - overtook

Rwanda in 1994. Beginning in April, between 500 000 and one million Rwandans were horrifically killed by fellow Rwandans in just 100 days.324 Consistent with the definition of genocide - the intent and actions to eliminate a group - approximately 75% of

Rwanda's resident Tutsi population was exterminated. Indeed, the victims were mostly

Tutsi and their "Hutu accomplices", the perpetrators mostly Hutu. The killings crossed boundaries that are difficult to comprehend: neighbours killed neighbours, co-workers killed co-workers, even families were sometimes torn apart along victim-perpetrator

lines. One Rwandan teacher whom I met left his profession after his former students tried to kill him.

While scholars now generally agree that the killings were organized by elites who

feared a loss of power, the genocide was carried out through the participation of a great

number of ordinary Rwandans.325 Since the genocide, academics, human rights workers, politicians, and ordinary Rwandans have endeavoured to uncover the causes of this

atrocity. Debates have ranged from racist ideology326 to environmental scarcity,327 and

See footnote 1 (Introduction) for a discussion of these figures. 325 See footnote 2 (Introduction). 326 See for example: Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, Peter \J\in, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (Bloomfield, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1998). 327 See for example: Diamond, Collapse, Gasana, "Remember Rwanda?" For an alternate argument, see Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Rwanda," (Washington DC: Project on Environment, Population and Security, 1995).

109 from media mobilization to the role of the international community. This chapter examines the subtle and complex role of education as another piece of the puzzle.

First, this chapter presents a brief survey of post-independence Rwanda through its First and Second Republics. Second, it reviews major educational policies and programs implemented between 1964 and 1994. Third, it presents my findings and makes the argument that formal schooling contributed to laying the foundation of violent interethnic conflict, through its unequal structure and competition over places, its divisive classroom practices, and its representation of Rwandans as racially separate in its history curriculum.

3.1 Historical Overview of the two Republics

Both change and continuity marked Rwandan independence. The last chapter left off with Gregoire Kayibanda being elected the first post-independence president. This inaugurated Rwanda's First Republic that would last from 1962 until 1973. A Hutu, he oriented his government and policies to represent the Hutu masses and equated fulfilling the interests of the demographic majority to democracy. Kayibanda chased, imprisoned or assassinated all former Tutsi leaders and opposition Hutu who would not join

PARMEHUTU.330 PARMEHUTU became a single party government and Rwanda -

See for example School of Journalism and Communication Carleton University, The Media and the Rwandan Genocide (2003), available from http://www.carleton.ca/mediagenocide/, Frank Chalk, "Hate Radio in Rwanda," in The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, ed. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick USA: Transaction Publishers, 2000), Allan Thompson, ed., The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2007). 329 See for example Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (London and New York: Verso, 2004), Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2000)., 330 Peter Uvin, "Development, Aid and Conflict: Reflections from the Case of Rwanda," (Helsinki: UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNUAVTDER), 1996), 8.

110 reminiscent of the colonial period but in reverse - was dominated by Hutu. Quotas were imposed to restrict Tutsi places in schools and civil service.

But much did not change with independence. One monoethnic power replaced another without any meaningful transformation in the style of government or the roles of its major players.331 Lemarchand describes Kayibanda's leadership as a "presidential mwami-ship" wherein Kayibanda, like the kings of old, had a religious character which commanded deference, and was "inaccessible, inviolate, and unaccountable", and the

"fount of all legitimate authority."332 Lemarchand calls the political organization of the country a "redefinition of chieftancy," in which the prefects and burgomasters of the First

Republic much resembled the chiefs and subchiefs of the colonial era. He assesses the culture as "neo-traditional," borrowing and adapting many of the symbols of colonial and pre-colonial Tutsi culture.333

Much like during the colonial period, white foreigners continued to earn the best salaries and to enjoy luxuries such as foreign education, cars, brick homes and telephones. Tens of thousands of Tutsi remained in Rwanda, often comparatively well educated and thus staffing the bureaucracy and enjoying relative wealth.334 The lives of most Hutu did not change either; "they were as poor and powerless after 1962 as they had been before."335 Fissures among Hutu also remained; Kayibanda's government favoured

Hutu from the president's home region of Gitarama, in the south-centre of Rwanda.

331 See De Lame, A Hill among a Thousand, 59-60, Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 265-79, Uvin, Aiding Violence, 20. 332 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 270-2. 333 Ibid., 272-4, 65-9, 78. 334 Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 15, Uvin, Aiding Violence, 20. 335 Uvin, Aiding Violence, 20.

Ill Lemarchand borrows from Marx to describe the overall impact as "a partial, merely political revolution, which leaves the pillars of the building standing."336

History and ideology also underwent inversion without wholesale transformation.

Interpretations of history, which, as we saw in the last chapter, had been central to the politics and the self-understanding of Rwandans, remained the same, except that their meanings were turned upside down.337 Whereas Tutsi had been seen as foreigners and thus superior and better suited to rule, through the eyes of the colonial power, now Tutsi were considered foreign invaders by the rulers of independent Rwanda. The country was thus presented as belonging to the Hutu, "its true inhabitants." Hutu and Tutsi identities were further solidified; Kayibanda described Rwanda as "two nations in one state."338

Throughout the Kayibanda years, the majority of the population experienced a psychological letdown as the expectations of the revolution went largely unfulfilled. As

Hoben writes, "a growing suspicion that Hutu government, having won the battle to overturn Tutsi domination, might yet be losing the war" played a part in the downfall of the First Republic.339 Key complainants were Hutu graduates of primary schools who felt entitled to employment yet found themselves unemployed. Power struggles developed within PARMEHUTU and corruption and nepotism grew, although less so than in other

African countries. Criticism of the Kayibanda government spread at the end of the

1960s.

Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 286. 337 See Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa, 305, Pierre Erny, Rwanda 1994: Cles pour Comprendre le Calvaire d'un Peuple (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994), 58, Hintjens, "When Identity Becomes a Knife," 31, Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 284-5, Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 40, Uvin, Aiding Violence, 26. 338 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 169. 339 Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 15.

112 In early 1973, anonymous self-appointed "Public Safety" committees expelled

Tutsi students from Rwandan schools. They acted in response to the 1972 Tutsi violence against Hutu in Burundi, in an effort to unite Hutu, in objection to Kayibanda's southern favouritism, and in disappointment that the gains of the revolution had not borne fruit for

Hutu pupils.340 Targets included high schools, the National University of Rwanda

(NUR), and especially the seminaries, still perceived as "havens of Tutsi ascendancy." In cities, students were checked for signs of Tutsi morphology - carryover notions from the colonial era - such as long noses and fingers; in the countryside backgrounds were well- known.341 Children of mixed marriages and "cheaters" (abaguze ubwoko) who had changed their identity to gain admittance into schools were particularly targeted. Tutsi were attacked with impunity. Many fled, and approximately 500 to 600 people were left dead.342

A coup brought General Juvenal Habyarimana to power in July 1973 and ushered in the Second Republic. Welcomed as a protector of all Rwandans, Habyarimana replaced the institutions of the First Republic with the "Committee for Peace and

National Unity" and later (1976) with the National Republican Movement for

Development (MRND), a single party of which all Rwandans were members. In contrast to Kayibanda, Habyarimana seemed to accept Tutsi as an "ethnicity" meant to stay in

Rwanda, rather than a foreign "race", although this tolerance did not extend to Tutsi in exile.343 Systematic harassment of Tutsi was uncommon and some of my interview

340 See Emy, Rwanda 1994, 69, Linden, Christianisme et Pouvoirs au Rwanda (1900-1990), 372-5, Linden, Church and Revolution, 234, 85-6, Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 147. 341Linden, Christianisme et Pouvoirs au Rwanda (1900-1990), 375. 342Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 147. For a personal account of these events, see Marie Beatrice Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan in Zaire (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 11-3. 343 Ibid., 148.

113 participants claimed that ethnic tension between the two groups had significantly

subsided by the 1980s.344 Lemarchand, writing in 1974, suggested that "the prospects of

a Hutu-Tutsi rapprochement, both within and outside Rwanda, have never been brighter

since independence."345

Although we tend to rethink everything that occurred during the Habyarimana

period in light of its genocidal outcome, during much of the Second Republic, Rwanda

was considered a model developing country and a darling of the international aid

community.346 The Habyarimana government was particularly adroit at legitimating

itself internally and internationally through reminders of the social revolution and through

development ideology.347 Habyarimana was masterful at promoting the "myth of

apolitical development"348: that the state's sole goal was pursuing economic growth. His

actions diverted attention from "dirty politics", legitimated the state's intrusions in social

and political life, and deflected attention from continuing differential treatment of groups.

They were not entirely smoke and mirrors; it is widely agreed that Rwanda at this time

experienced social and economic improvement in all important areas349 - including

education.

All was not rosy under Habyarimana, however. His government, best described

as an "autocratic military dictatorship", killed many of the power holders of the First

Some Hutu even charged President Habyarimana with favouring Tutsi. See Villia Jefremovas, "Contested Identities: Power and the Fictions of Ethnicity, Ethnography and History in Rwanda," Anthropologic!* 39, no. 1/2 (1997). 345 Quoted in Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 140. 346 By the end of the 1980s, Rwanda had the highest density of technical "aid workers" per square km in Africa. See Uvin, Aiding Violence, 40. Per capita, Rwanda had been the largest recipient of Canadian aid in sub-Saharan Africa. See Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 216. Howard Adelman, "Canadian Policy in Rwanda," in The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, ed. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick USA: Transaction Publishers, 2000). 347Uvin, "Development, Aid and Conflict," 8-9. 348 Paul Nelson quoted in Uvin, Aiding Violence, 45. 349 See for example Diamond, Collapse, 315, Erny, Rwanda 1994, 76-9, Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 144-5, Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 83, Uvin, Aiding Violence, 47-8.

114 Republic. Elections returning the President to power with more than 98% of the vote were a mere charade, and criticism was harshly repressed.350 Importantly for our investigation, Habyarimana also maintained ethnic divisions. He aimed to concretize the gains of the revolution by formalizing Kayibanda's quotas for education and jobs, uniting

Hutu by reserving most opportunities for them. Habyarimana also divided Hutu along regional lines by giving preference to his northwestern home region, which he felt had been marginalized. While Tutsi were allowed limited participation in the state, they were kept away from the army and local politics.351

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Rwanda encountered trouble on several fronts.

Economically, GDP per capita fell from $355 in 1983 to $260 by 1990.352 At the same time, Rwanda was implementing structural adjustment that devalued the Rwandan franc to 67% of its original value amid 19.2% inflation in 1991,353 with another devaluation of

15% in 1992.354 The adjustments were most harshly felt by the poorest segments of the population, reinforcing class divisions. The population in Rwanda more than doubled during the Habyarimana years, from 3 million in 1970 to more than 7.4 million by 1991.

Population density grew to average more than 400 inhabitants per square kilometer.355

Politically, the Habyarimana government began facing internal critiques of corruption and a loss of legitimacy. Grievances were mainly along class and regional

350 Uvin, "Development, Aid and Conflict," 8. 351 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 75. 352Erny, Rwanda 1994, 81, Uvin, Aiding Violence, 54. 353 Michel Chossudovsky and Pierre Galand, "The Use of Rwanda's External Debt (1990-1994): The Responsibility of Donors and Creditors," in Global Research (Montreal: Centre for Research on Globalization, 2004). 354 Kurt Schuler, "Tables of Modern Monetary Systems: Rwanda." 355 Linden cites 400-700 inhabitants per square km. Newbury and Newbury cite over 400 per square km. Linden, Christianisme et Pouvoirs au Rwanda (1900-1990), 394, Catharine Newbury and , "Identity, Genocide and Reconstruction in Rwanda," in Les Racines de la Violence dans la Region des Grands Lacs (Brussels: European Parliament, 1995), 8.

115 lines amongst Hutu factions. Then, the government faced an armed invasion launched on October 1, 1990 by Tutsi exiles from Uganda (the Rwandan Patriotic Front - RPF - led by Paul Kagame). This kicked off a civil war that lasted approximately three years.

Under pressure from the international community, which tied its continued aid to democratic reform, the Habyarimana government initiated multipartyism in June 1991 amidst civil war. A flood of parties emerged, which soon devolved into regional and ethnic politics, most parties splitting into moderate and "" wings.357 In

August 1993, the Habyarimana government and the RPF came to a negotiated settlement in Arusha, Tanzania. The accords set out a power-sharing agreement for a broad-based transitional government, with rules for the respect of law and human rights; for the integration of the two armies; for the non-conditional repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced Rwandans; and for a neutral international force.358

Hutu Power claimed that the provisions were too favourable to Tutsi and that the RPF

"had won at the conference table what it had yet to win on the battlefield."359 The now- standard explanations of genocide in Rwanda locate many of the causes in these 1980s and early 1990s events.

On April 6 1994, Habyarimana's airplane was shot down while approaching the

Kigali airport and the genocide was set in motion. Within a few hours, Habyarimana's closest associates began killing off their opposition and targeting Tutsi more generally.

The United Nations downsized its peacekeeping contingent that had been present to

356 Newbury and Newbury, "Identity, Genocide and Reconstruction in Rwanda," 7. 357 "Hutu Power" refers to an ideological movement that cut across party lines and embodied ethnic solidarity and ethnic extremism. 358 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 123-5. 359 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 210. See also Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 125- 6.

116 support the implementation of the and, with a limited mandate, stood by as genocide more efficient than Nazi death camps engulfed Rwanda.360 While the incidents and grievances described go some way towards explaining genocide in Rwanda, they tell us little of the deeper underlying processes. This chapter ponders how formal schooling fits into this evolution.

3.2 The Development of Formal Education under the two Republics

From 1959 until 1966, Rwandan schooling was gradually brought under national control through several laws and policies. With such a gradual nationalization, it is difficult to pinpoint the definitive temporal borders of schooling under the colonial period versus under the First Republic. In the fall of 1959, the would-be governing party,

PARMEHUTU, issued an Educational Manifesto that introduced the first national commitment for expanding primary education to universal levels.361 It also decreed that all national educational reports henceforth needed to indicate the "racial" proportion of

Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in schools,362 and introduced ethnic quotas for promotion past primary school. The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, issued January 28 1961, further pronounced primary education to be obligatory and free. Consistent with the constitution, the Loi Scolaire, which formally nationalized schools on August 27 1966, proclaimed that "primary school is free and obligatory for all children living on Rwandan territory, without distinction of race, clan, colour, sex, or religion."363

Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 251-5. 361 These included that two schools would be built in each community each year and that all students within a 6 km radius of a school must begin schooling at age six and remain in school until age 15. 362 Ngendahimana, "Etude sur la Participation de la Masse Populaire," 58. 363 Jean Bosco Karangwa, "Etude sur la Realisation des Directives de FUNESCO dans PEnseignement Primaire Rwandais Reforme" (maitrise, Universite Nationale du Rwanda, Campus Universitaire de Ruhengeri, 1988), 42.

117 Throughout this period from the late 1950s to mid 1960s, Rwandans began replacing Belgians as school principals and administrators. While one of my interviewees, a White Father who in the colonial period was a school principal, experienced this process as a peaceful and cooperative transition,364 nationalization of schools brought great controversy between church and state. The Loi Scolaire centralized

Rwanda's education system under state control. As we saw in the last chapter, schooling had heretofore been largely in ecclesiastical hands. Its key provisions in regard to the new relationship between church and state included:

(i) all school buildings constructed with state subsidies prior to the promulgation of the law on national education are ipso facto regarded as property of the state (art. 19); (ii) the hiring and firing of the lay and religious personnel of all subsidised private schools is supervised and controlled by the state (art. 54, 55); (iii) the admission, promotion and expulsion of students are no longer subject to exclusive control of the school authorities (art. 47, 49, 51); (iv) the choice of textbooks and the content of the curriculum are no longer subject to the sole jurisdiction of the school authorities (art 22)365

The church deemed this law unconstitutional. In return, PARMEHUTU circulated a manifesto charging ecclesiastical authorities with continued Tutsi favoritism, with promoting Hutu-Tutsi divisions, and with trying to discredit the government.366 The two sides were somewhat ethnically polarized - the Hutu government versus a mostly Tutsi clergy.

Neither independence nor the Loi Scolaire, however, significantly changed the educational system inherited from the Belgians. The newly-independent government took over primary schools serving about 250 000 students, secondary schools serving just

4 000, and only one post-secondary institution, the major seminary in Nyakibanda, with

Interview 74, male Belgian, north. Quoted in Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 258. Ibid., 259.

118 the National University (NUR) to be added shortly thereafter in 1963. The physical school structures, teachers, teaching methods and curriculum marked important continuities from the colonial period through the First Republic.368 Primary schooling remained two cycles over six years: a first cycle of three or four years focused on and a second cycle of two or three years for more general training. As in the colonial period, the first cycle was taught in Kinyarwanda, and the second in French, where available. At the end of the sixth year, students wrote a national exam for admission to secondary school. Primary schools continued to be of three types: official, subsidized and private, although near the end of the Kayibanda regime the meaning of private changed from religious to secular parents' schools. While its role was constrained, the church remained one of the three most important institutions for life training, alongside the family and the State369 and retained its control of most secondary education.370 It also regained much of its role in primary schools in the 1980s when budget shortages plagued the government.371 Educational challenges also remained similar: inadequate financial resources, a shortage of qualified teachers, a lack of pedagogical materials, an insufficient number of schools, and a high drop-out rate.

On the other hand, the Kayibanda regime did make some changes to schooling policies and practices in post-independence Rwanda. Most importantly, it made a political commitment to quantitatively expanding educational opportunities, as

367 Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 13-4. Accurate numbers are tricky to find, as will be further discussed below (see p. 132 and footnote 387). Ngendahimana puts the number of students in primary schools closer to 200 000 and secondary school textbooks from the 1980s put the number at 217 000 (1961- 2). See Ngendahimana, "Etude sur la Participation de la Masse Populaire," MINEPRISEC, "Histoire du Rwanda, Heme Partie," (Kigali: Republic of Rwanda, Direction G6n£rale des Etudes et Recherches Pedagogiques, 1989). 368 See for example Karangwa, "Etude sur la Realisation des Directives de l'UNESCO," 39. 369 Ngendahimana, "Etude sur la Participation de la Masse Populaire," 68. 370 Linden, Christianisme etPouvoirs au Rwanda (1900-1990), 364. 371 Ibid., 388.

119 demonstrated above in policies to universalize schooling. Having made the Hutu majority's lack of education one of their central criticisms of the colonial regime, improving this situation had to be at the forefront of the newly independent government's political agenda. Failing to do so would risk a loss of credibility for the First Republic.372

The population embraced this quantitative commitment and primary school registration grew quickly, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Double shifts - where one teacher taught some students in the morning and a different group of students in the afternoon - were introduced in the first cycle to accommodate the influx. The rate of population growth, however, surpassed the rate of increase of school places. As such, while the number of students in schools climbed, as illustrated below, the gross enrolment373 rate declined for much of the period.374

372 Hanf, Education et Developpement au Rwanda, 140. This commitment to the expansion of education was also based, in part, on the goals and recommendations of the First African Ministers of Education Conference held in Addis-Ababa in 1962. 373 Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) is the total number of pupils enrolled, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for primary education. Net Enrolment Rate (NER) is the total number of pupils in the theoretical age group enrolled in school expressed as a percentage of the total population in that age group. 74 Hanf, Education et Developpement au Rwanda, 30.

120 Figure 3.1: Primary Enrolment (1963/4 to 1993/4}375

1,100,000

1,000,000

900,000 a 800,000 700,000 c» 600,000 Si 500,000

S 400,000 s 300,000

200,000

100,000

Furthermore, while enrolment at primary school increased, opportunities for post­ primary education did not grow in tandem.376 As under the colonial regime, Rwandans

continued through the First Republic to see schooling as intricately tied to social mobility

and to access to wage employment away from the hills. This resulted in frustration, which leaders feared might lead to social unrest. In 1970, in a preliminary effort to

address this dissatisfaction, the Kayibanda government instituted a network of Centres

d'Enseignement Rural et Artisanal au Rwanda (CERAR) for boys and a few similar programs for girls. CERAR taught a two-year post-primary program to train farmers

375 Figures for 59/60 and 61/2 are from Obura, Never Again, 40. Figures for 62/3 through 71/2 are from Hanf, Education et Developpement au Rwanda, 30. Figures for 60/1, 79/80, 81/2, and 84/5 (calculated by adding all grades together) are from Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 34, 37. Figures for 89/90 are from Republic of Rwanda, "La Scolarisation Feminine," ed. Direction de la Promotion Feminine (undated), 9. 376 While the number of secondary schools did increase, from 24 in 1960 to 60 in 1972, with a fast-growing population, still only a very limited percentage of the population were accepted into secondary schools. See MINEPRISEC, "Histoire du Rwanda, Iiere Partie," (Kigali: Republic of Rwanda, Direction Generate des Etudes etRecherches Pedagogiques, 1987), 149.

121 "capable of being agents of development, to improve the living conditions on the hills and to permit each to meet his/her potential."377 Rwandans generally misunderstood these programs, still envisioning them as a way to salaried jobs.378

Resentment also began to grow in relation to growing disparity between the official rhetoric of social justice and the reality of its implementation. Primary school teachers earned on average about 750 Rwandan francs (RWF) per month (at the time about 7.50 USD), whereas the minister of finance earned approximately 172 times as much.379 Charges of continued Tutsi favouritism, and colonial carry-over of opportunities for educated Tutsi also grew among the Rwandan population.380 This culminated in the 1973 Tutsi expulsions from administrative and educational positions discussed in the previous section.

In addition to the government's quantitative focus on education, a few qualitative changes were also made. Rwandan history was introduced to secondary schools, although allotted only 45 minutes per week and with no texts until the late 1960s. It was also incorporated into primary schools through a course called causeries.3Sl Overall, the

First Republic can be accurately summarized by its quantitative focus; significant qualitative changes to education had to wait for the Second Republic.

When Habyarimana took control of Rwanda, he made clear that education was central to the Second Republic's goals. Over the next several decades, he consistently

Ngendahimana, "Etude sur la Participation de la Masse Populaire," 66. Ibid. Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 238. See Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 15, Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 260. Gasanabo, "Memoires et Histoire Scolaire," 75-7.

122 presented education as the "keystone of the general development of Rwanda." The government backed up its words with action, continuing to spend significantly on education. At this time, it was common for African countries to spend one fifth to one sixth of their national budget on education. Rwanda, spending approximately one quarter of its national budget on schooling, ranked among the top three or four spenders in

Africa. Most of the education budget - 70% in the mid-1980s - was spent on primary schooling. According to a World Bank survey, only two (Djibouti and Yemen) out of seventy developing countries spent a higher proportion of their education budget on primary education.384 Also demonstrating the significance of education under the Second

Republic, the Head of the Ministry of Education, at least in the mid-1980s, was the most important political figure after the president.385

The Second Republic focused on qualitative changes to education in Rwanda, in addition to supporting growing primary school enrolment (see Figure 3.1 above). Two major changes were introduced in the mid-1970s, ratified in 1977, and formally implemented as part of the 1979 Reforms. The 1985 Education Act formalized and refined many of these policies.

First, in response to colonial era imbalances and to charges of continued Tutsi over-representation in higher levels of education, Habyarimana's government introduced a complex quota system. Primary school remained ostensibly open to all regardless of

382 Ministere de l'Education Nationale, "Discours d'Ouverture de son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre de PEducation Nationale, Militant Mutemberezi Pierre-Claver," Education et Culture, no. 4 (Speciale Reforme) (1979), 40. 383 Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 57. Education was the single largest budget item (26.9%) in the mid 1980s when Hoben conducted her study. The second most significant ministry budget, the Ministry of Finance and Economy, was significantly lesser at 16.6% (34-5). For 1963-74, see Hanf, Education et Developpement au Rwanda, 20. For 1968-1989, see Jean Baptiste Musabimana, Le Cout de 1'Efficacite et de I'Equite: L 'Education au Rwanda (Kigali: undated), 28. 384 Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 35. 385 Ibid., 57.

123 class, ethnicity, gender or geographic origin. The quotas formalized Kayibanda's practice of allocating secondary and post-secondary school spots according to ethnicity.

Charging the First Republic with using education for regional and familial patronage386 and thus creating regional inequality, Habyarimana added the criteria of rural/urban and regional origin of students to quotas. As Tutsi represented between 9 and 15% of the

Rwandan population, they were to be granted only 9 to 15% of positions in schools.387

The north, especially Gisenyi and Ruhengeri - not coincidentally Habyariman's home region - was favoured at the expense of formerly advantaged regions in the south, such as

Butare, Gikongoro and Gitarama.388 This quota policy did not take socioeconomic class distinctions into account.389 The policy included the following criteria for secondary school admission:

• school records and national examination scores, to which all other elements are subordinated; • ethnic equilibrium, based on quotas established on the basis of the proportion of each ethnic group's representation in the entire population of the country; • a regional balance that corrects the accumulated disequilibrium of opportunities for schooling in certain regions to the detriment of others and permits equitable distribution of admissions to secondary school in all prefectures; • sexual balance, based on demographic distribution of males and females; and • the rectification of anomalies by a correction of 5% of school places reserved for distribution by the ministry.3

386 MTNEPRISEC, "Des Disparites Ethniques et Regionales dans PEnseignement Secondaire Rwandais." See MINEPRISEC, "Histoire du Rwanda, Heme Partie," 154. 387 Many sources put the quota figure at 9% for Tutsi. See for example: Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa, 309, Catharine Newbury, "Rwanda: Recent Debates over Governance and Rural Development," in Governance and Politics in Africa, ed. Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (Boulder & Longon: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 198, Obura, Never Again, 44, Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 60, "The Road out of Hell," The Economist (2004). Hoben says the Tutsi allocation was 10%, Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 98. Mamdani and Linden put it at 10-15%, Linden, Christianisme et Pouvoirs au Rwanda (1900-1990), Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 139. In 1972, Kayibanda's PARMEHUTU government declared the quotas to be at 84% Hutu, 15% Tutsi, 1% Twa. Cited in Hanf, Education et Developpement au Rwanda, 140. See also the cautions on figures p. 132 and footnote 367. 388 Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 105. 389 Ibid., 103. 390 MINEPRISEC 1986, quoted in and translated in Ibid., 104 [emphasis in original].

124 As we will see in the next section, my own interviewees, as well as those interviewed by others,391 doubt that records and exams trumped other criteria for admission to secondary school.

The second major part of Habyarimana's package of educational reforms aimed to

"ruralise education" and to make each educational cycle a "terminal cycle."392 83.8% of youth exiting primary school returned to their traditional rural setting, and yet were ill- prepared and unwilling to do so.393 A 1988 World Bank study found that out of 39 sub-

Saharan African countries, Rwanda accepted the lowest proportion of primary school graduates into secondary school.394

Habyarimana's government claimed that the First Republic's system still reflected the colonial era, in which the goal of schooling had been to provide support staff for

Belgian administrators.395 The reforms thus aimed to better match Rwandan schooling with Rwandan "realities" and to "orient youth education onto the path traced by the

Manifesto of the MRND."396 The government said it aimed to inculcate Rwanda's youth with a rich national culture and to encourage the participation of all in the development of the country.397 This kind of programming was relatively common in Africa at the time, illustrated, for example, by Nyerere's "Education for Self-Reliance" policies in

391 See for example Ibid., 104. The reforms were based, in part, on findings of a 1974 study commissioned by Rwanda and UNESCO, and carried out by Hanf and colleagues on behalf of the German government. See Hanf, Education et Developpement au Rwanda. 393 Karangwa, "Etude sur la Realisation des Directives de PUNESCO," 46, Ministere de l'Education Nationale, "La Riforme Scolaire," Education et Culture 4, no. Special Reforme (1979), 49. 394 Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 48. 395 Ministere de l'Education Nationale, "Discours d'Ouverture de son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre de l'Education Nationale, Militant Mutemberezi Pierre-Claver," 40. 396 Ministere de l'Education Nationale, "La Reforme Scolaire," 50. 397 Ibid.

125 Tanzania.398 In Rwanda, the reforms added two additional years to primary school for practical training (retrenched in 1991), changed the language of instruction at all levels of primary schools to Kinyarwanda, universalized mixed-gender schools at the primary level, expanded post-primary rural training programs,399 and took steps to increase secondary enrolment from 8% of primary school entrants to 10%.400 Primary school teaching of history as its own subject began in 1979 and teacher's manuals were created by 1982.401 While recognizing that "schooling is not a magic wand to liberate the country from poverty, misery, ignorance and other constraints of under-development", the Habyarimana regime emphasized schooling as a "pillar" of Rwanda's "overall system of development."402

Despite the government's efforts to reframe school goals, Rwandans retained an instrumental view of education. They were interested in schooling to promote their children's access to material and economic success, not to have them trained to return to the hills. As one popular magazine wrote:

We generally consider school to be an institution that must deliver a diploma and that the diploma leads to a remunerated position, as much as possible of the State. This belief is general throughout countries, but it is even more accentuated in an agricultural country, precisely because school seems to be the only way to escape the poverty of the rural world.403

398 Joel Samoff, "'Modernizing' a Socialist Vision: ," in Education and Social Transition in the Third World, ed. Martin Carnoy and Joel Samoff (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 229-30. 399 Centre de I'enseignement rural et artisanal integre (CERAI), the girls-only Section familiale (SF), and the boys-only Centres de I'enseignement rural et artisanal du Rwanda (CERAR). 400 See for example Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, Karangwa, "Etude sur la Realisation des Directives de l'UNESCO," Ministere de l'Education Nationale, "La ReTorme Scolaire." 401 Gasanabo, "Memoires et Histoire Scolaire," 77-8. Teachers faced several years of teaching history without curricular guidance. 402 Ministere de l'Education Nationale, "La Reforme Scolaire," 50. For excerpts of relevant government reports and speeches, see also Karangwa, "Etude sur la Realisation des Directives de l'UNESCO," 54, 56, Gaspard Simpenzwe, Epitome de I'Enseignement Libre Subsidie au Rwanda (Kigali: Regie de l'lmprimerie Scolaire, 1988), 32. 403 Quoted in Ngendahimana, "Etude sur la Participation de la Masse Populaire," 64-5.

126 Students and parents alike were committed to schooling - illustrated, for example, in their collaboration to build schools.404 They were frequently disappointed by their failure to win the prize of secondary and post-secondary education or employment in the formal sector. Unsurprisingly, promotion past primary, discussed with my findings below, also remained extremely competitive, as it had been during the colonial period.

Similar to during the colonial period, a day at school under the First and Second

Republic was not easy for Rwandan children. As one interview participant explained,

Me, when I studied at primary school, there were no benches. There was nothing. We had to sit on pieces of wood. Not all had pens. You had to bring little mats that you weaved yourself that you put on the wood and sat on, to write on your knee. Imagine doing that for eight years. You're little, you write like that, it is really very uncomfortable. And you had to make a long trip to get to school. And the day started I think at seven in the morning, we went home at noon and came back at two to stay until five.405

Another explained that classrooms were overflowing, often with up to sixty students.406

Primary students still often traveled great distances to school and back, and secondary students remained primarily in boarding schools.

Rwanda was a favourite of the international donor community, especially under

Habyarimana, for significantly expanding primary school enrolments and achieving gender parity in primary schools by 1990.407 What remains to be examined is the impact of these efforts on the relationships among Rwandans. Did schooling during this period contribute to creating the underlying conditions for violent interethnic conflict, as I contended it did during the colonial period? Or did these changes contribute, however unsuccessfully in the end, to building a foundation for positive peace among Rwandans?

404 Ibid., 63. 405 Interview 24, female Tutsi, Kigali. 406 Interview 55, male Hutu, north. For student teacher ratios in the 1960s and 1970s, see Hanf, Education et Developpement au Rwanda, 31. For figures from the 1980s, see Musabimana, Le Cout de I'Efficacite et de I'Equite, 44-5. 407 See Republic of Rwanda, "La Scolarisation Feminine," 9. In 1962/3 girls represented 35.9% of the student population; in 1989/90 they represented 49.7%.

127 3.3 An Assessment of the Role of Schooling (1964-1994)

This section argues that formal schooling under the Hutu Republics created some of the mechanisms that became underlying causes of genocide in Rwanda. First, this section details the research methods relevant to this chapter. Second, it presents my findings, focusing first on the structure of schooling, then on its content. Third, in the analysis section, it argues that access to schooling, classroom practices, and the content of history classes contributed to laying both the social-structural and psycho-cultural roots of violent interethnic conflict.

3.3a Research Design

The findings of this chapter are based on 49 interviews in Rwanda with participants who had had experience with the Rwandan primary school system between

1964 and 1994 and who represented a good cross-section of Rwandan society. 40 participants had been primary school students and/or teachers under the First and/or

Second Republics. I additionally conducted 9 "expert" interviews with government representatives from the Ministry of Education, faculty from the National University of

Rwanda, and Rwandan researchers from two national research centres. I also talked less formally with many Rwandans about their experiences in mini-buses, at local cabarets where people often assemble for drinks, and at the nuns' centre d'accueil where I often stayed.

To analyse my interview findings, I prepared a spreadsheet with a variety of questions and possible answers, and systematically recorded participants' opinions based on transcriptions of my recorded interviews. Since I allowed Rwandans to lead

128 discussions as much as possible, this kind of systematic data analysis was imperfect;

some topics were not broached by all participants and topics were not addressed in a rigid

order as they would have been with a standardized questionnaire. Despite these

shortcomings, I was able to systematically treat the data. I then prepared pivot tables that

allowed permutations of the data to search for trends.408 Because Rwandans' experiences

can best be expressed by Rwandans, I include many quotations from my interviews in

this chapter.

As discussed in the last two chapters, analysis of these findings was complicated

by Rwanda's political reality. That schooling contributed to genocide is part of the

current post-genocide government's public transcript. Given the repressive political

context, it would be least risky for participants to agree with the government and thus

claim a relationship between education and conflict, even if this were not their veritable judgment. As one participant warned, "You know, it is hard to answer your

questions...Each government has to defend its raison-d'etre."409 Another felt

uncomfortable answering my questions about history in a relatively secluded restaurant,

suggesting that we could talk about them in the dark corner of the garden.410 Despite my

best efforts in designing this research, it remains difficult to untangle interviewees' toeing

the government line from genuine opinion. At the research stage, I judged it paramount

to speak with participants one-on-one, and to seek detailed experiences, and at the

analysis stage, to examine similarities in detail. Analysis is also complicated, especially

408 As explained in Part 4.2 above, I considered the First and Second Republics together as one period. I checked to see if any different trends appeared for students having been educated under Kayibanda or alternatively under Habyarimana, but I found no important differences. Most participants had all, or at least some, of their upper years of primary under Habyarimana. 409 Interview 37, male Tutsi, south. 410 Interview 15, male Hutu, north. I declined this offer.

129 in the case of Tutsi, by victimhood. Indeed, participants themselves warned me about different "transcripts." One cautioned, "maybe I will tell you this and another [from the other ethnic group] will tell you another story. That is the problem of Rwanda."411

While endeavouring to note group transcripts, I also paid particular attention to findings where Hutu and Tutsi agreed.

In preparing this chapter, I had access to a variety of primary materials including, most importantly, curricular guidelines for Rwanda's primary history classes. These materials were largely in Kinyarwanda, so I hired a Canadian Kinyarwanda-French translator. He first translated all of the tables of contents, followed by selected excerpts based on themes raised in pre-interviews with the Rwandan community in Toronto. The same themes also arose as most important to participants in Rwanda. The translation of the entire written curriculum would have been useful but far too costly. Secondary school textbooks, to which I also had access, represented more detailed versions of the primary material and were readable in French. My chief purpose in analyzing these documents was the verification of interview data. I also examined the curricular importance, or "centrality", of lessons highlighted in interviews and sought to understand how "relevant", or linked, each lesson was to others and to an overall historical picture.412

Since the documents were only partially translated a quantitative analysis was inappropriate. Since they had undergone two translations - from Kinyarwanda to French and from French to English - a sociolinguistic or discourse analysis would also have been inaccurate. I qualitatively analyzed the documents.

411 Interview 37, male Tutsi, south. 412 For a good discussion of these techniques in the case of Israeli textbooks, see Wahrman, "Is Silencing Conflicts a Peace Education Strategy?"

130 I also drew on government reports and secondary sources, and a warning on figures is warranted. Since figures are vested with such political significance, errors in accuracy are expected.413 The 1956 census conducted by the Belgians, prior to the outflow of Tutsi exiles, put Tutsi in Rwanda at about 16.59% of the population, Hutu at

82.74% and Twa at 0.68%.414 In the 1978 and 1991 censuses under the Hutu Republics,

Tutsi were reported as 9.5% and 8.4% respectively.415 Obura suggests that Tutsi were likely "substantially under represented" in the 1978 and 1991 figures.416 The government may have under-reported the Tutsi population to minimize their importance.

Alternatively, some Tutsi may have self-registered as Hutu to avoid discrimination; thus an estimate of their number is difficult.417 A variety of authors continue to use the originally popular 84% Hutu, 15% Tutsi, 1% Twa figures throughout the Hutu Republics.

The most recent census, conducted post-genocide in 2002, while not counting the population ethnically, produced a figure of over 937 000 genocide victims, which would mean that there were more Tutsi in the country than the earlier censuses indicated.418

However, this number may have been over-reported to politically justify regime policies.

Successive Rwandan governments have been very good at controlling the dissemination of information in ways that suit their policies and programs. I also found a great number of discrepancies between schooling figures presented in secondary sources, even amongst

See King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 63. 4,4 Filip Reyntjens, Pouvoir Et Droit Au Rwanda: Droit Public Et Evolution Politique, 1916-1973 (Tervuren: Musee Royale de l'Afrique Centrale, 1985), 28. Reyntjens warns, however, that in the count, Tutsi were considered to be those with 15 or more heads of cattle. Some Hutu would have had this many cows, and some Tutsi may not have had this many or any. 415 For the first figure, see Newbury, "Rwanda," 198. For the second, see Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 15. 416 Obura, Never Again, 44. 417 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 15. 418 This figure, calculated by Rwanda's Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports, includes Tutsi and moderate Hutu. They predict the number to rise to over a million through more revelations at gacaca courts. See Asiimwe, "Rwanda Census Puts Genocide Death Toll at 937,000."

131 those that purported to use government figures, a good number of mathematical errors, and some questionable calculations. I highlight discrepancies and questions rather than guess based on inadequate evidence.

3.3b Findings

The vast majority of the Rwandans with whom I spoke said they believed that education played a role in the genocide that engulfed Rwanda in 1994.419 Of the thirty- nine opinions that I gathered from average Rwandans, only five opined that education did not play a role in violent interethnic conflict. While males and females of both ethnic groups, from all parts of the country, suggested that schooling played some role in genocide, all five of those who expressive negative perspectives on this question were

Hutu from northern Rwanda. This could reflect different experiences; the north was historically the last Hutu holdout against Rwandan centralization under the Tutsi, and many northern participants did not recall any Tutsi students in their classes. It could alternatively reflect a greater willingness of these participants to contradict the opinion of the central government, or reflect less knowledge of the government transcript, as the north is somewhat less penetrated by the centre than other regions of the country. All nine of the experts with whom I spoke agreed that schooling contributed to genocide in

Rwanda. A better understanding of the ways in which this occurred, and the mechanisms at play is essential. It is also important to uncover any peacebuilding that took place in tandem.

4191 could also examine the role of schooling in the violent conflict from 1990-3, but I focus on genocide as the most extreme form of violence along ethnic lines. I only address the civil war indirectly.

132 Structure: Access to Primary School

As we saw above, by law proclaimed at independence, primary school was ostensibly open to all regardless of gender, ethnicity, and geographic origin. All interview participants had attended primary school and most took this experience for granted, none raising primary school access as a negative part of their school experience or as a contributor to violence. Gross enrolment rates in primary school rose from 46% in

1973 to 68% in 1987, falling slightly to 65% in 1990.420 A few participants suggested that the mere act of bringing children together into non-segregated mixed schools may be considered peacebuilding, although others pointed out that this was not unusual in that

Hutu and Tutsi lived intermingled on the same hills, played in their communities, sat together in church, worked adjoining fields and interacted at market.

On the other hand, when specifically asked, most (15/22) shared the perspective that access to primary school was not equal for all Rwandans. Tutsi were significantly more likely to share this opinion (10/12 Tutsi, 4/8 Hutu, 1/2 unidentified).

Several participants opined that poor children had less access to education.

Despite schooling being declared free, parents still had to pay indirect costs including uniforms and school material, and had to make up for lost hands around the home. In addition, by 1988 school fees were reintroduced.421 A 1991 report by the Rwandan government found that the total cost of primary school amounted to over 18 USD per

420 Figures for 1973 and 1990 are from Obura, Never Again, 40. The 1987 figure is from Republic of Rwanda, "Travail Preparatoire a la Mise en Place d'un Programme ee Prise en Charge des Frais de Scolarite des Enfants Issus de Families Pauvres au Rwanda," ed. Ministere du Plan (Kigali: R6publique Rwandaise, 1991), 5. 421 Republic of Rwanda, "Travail Preparatoire a la Mise en Place d'un Programme ee Prise en Charge des Frais de Scolarite des Enfants Issus de Families Pauvres au Rwanda," 9.

133 child per year. For many this was an unbearable sum considering the average

Rwandan family had six children. The currency devaluation and inflation that accompanied Structural Adjustment Policies also made fees more harshly felt.

Drop-out rates are also linked to poverty. Primary school drop-out rates ranged from 7.8% to 10.9% between 1986 and 1990. The report found that over 50% of drop­ outs were caused by poverty, school fees and/or the cost of uniforms.423 Another study found that primary schools were biased towards urban populations and that urban

students stayed in school longer than rural-based students.424 Hoben suggests that this is because schools were closer to urban students, but this could also be tied into a poverty

analysis. A number of participants explained that some parents simply did not want their

children, especially girls, in schools; the 1991 government report also mentioned parental

ignorance as a cause of drop-outs.

Some Tutsi participants felt that their access to primary school had not been equal

to that of Hutu students. They recalled a preference for Hutu by Hutu teachers,425 that

Tutsi had to sit at the back of the classroom, and/or that some Tutsi were tormented at primary school and consequently dropped out. 1989/90 figures from MINEPRISEC

found that Tutsi represented 7.4% in the first grade of primary schools, while Hutu

Ibid., 9-17. The report puts the annual cost of primary school at 3 119 RWF per year. This includes 300 RWF for school fees, 500-1500 RWF for a uniform, 150 RWF for collective insurance, 5962 RWF over six years for material and 2248 RWF over six years for manuals. The figure presumes that one child needs two uniforms per year. Material and text costs rise with each year in primary school, and drop out rates are significantly higher in the second cycle (grades 4-6) of primary. They are highest in the sixth year which is also most expensive. See Musabimana, Le Cout de VEJficacite et de I'Equite, 33, Ngendahimana, "Etude sur la Participation de la Masse Populaire," 60. Exchange rate derived from Schuler, "Tables of Modern Monetary Systems: Rwanda." 423 MINEPRISEC, "Des Disparites Ethniques et Regionales dans PEnseignement Secondaire Rwandais," 1- 2. For 1982-88 drop-out rates, see Musabimana, Le Cout de I'Efficacite et de I'Equite, 33. For 1968/9 figures, see Ngendahimana, "Etude sur la Participation de la Masse Populaire," 60. For 1966-72 rates, see Hanf, Education et Developpement au Rwanda, 37. 424 Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 106. 425 Only one interviewee, of unidentified ethnicity, suggested a Tutsi preference by Tutsi teachers.

134 represented 91.4%. Based on the 1978 census which considered the population to be

about 90% Hutu, 9.5% Tutsi and less than 1% Twa, Hutu were thus slightly over- represented in primary schools. On the other hand, considering grades one to six

collectively, Tutsi represented 9.4% and Hutu represented 89.9% of students in primary

schools.426 In contrast to those who claimed that Tutsi were often driven away from

primary school, a greater percentage of Tutsi continued with primary school than Hutu.

That Tutsi continued to succeed over Hutu may have contributed to grievances among

Hutu and left space for governments to scapegoat Tutsi. On the whole, while primary

school was legally open to all, various discrepancies in access still arose.

Structure: Promotion Past Primary School

When answering the general question of how education might have contributed to

conflict, the majority of participants specified the problem of access to secondary school.

Hutu and Tutsi, male and female, and Rwandans from all regions of the country raised

this factor. Almost all (29/30) of the perspectives that I gathered suggested that access to

secondary school was unequal.

As discussed above, and in the previous chapter, access to higher levels of

education in Rwanda is intricately tied to perceptions of social mobility and,

problematically, there are only very few secondary school positions. Rwanda's school

system remains pyramidal with exceptionally narrow top layers, as illustrated in Figure

3.2. One can imagine the competition involved in trying to reach the summit. Different

sources put the number of primary school students accepted into secondary school

MINEPRISEC figures in Obura, Never Again, AA.

135 between 6% and 9.2%. There were additional spots in post-primary farmer-training programs428 but enrolment in them progressively declined as students and parents realized that they were a "social cul-de-sac"429 and would not lead to salaried jobs.

Figure 3.2: The Educational Pyramid430

Secondary 6 Secondary 5 1 Secondary 4 1 Secondary 3 H Secondary 2 & CERAI ^^H^ Secondary 1 & CERAI ^^^^^^B^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^J ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^J Primary 1 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H

Participants gave a variety of reasons for unequal access to secondary schools. A number of participants (9/15 Hutu, 9/12 Tutsi, lA unidentified) mentioned that entrance exams were marked with ethnic identity and ethnic equilibrium policies in mind. Many

427 A Rwandan government report notes a 6% gross rate of enrolment at the secondary level in 1987. Republic of Rwanda, "Travail Preparatoire a la Mise en Place d'un Programme ee Prise en Charge des Frais de Scolarite des Enfants Issus de Families Pauvres au Rwanda," 4. Hoben says 8% of primary school graduates went on to secondary school in the mid-1980s and notes that this represents well under 2.5% of children of the relevant age. Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 48. Obura puts the 1990 figure at 9.2%. Obura, Never Again, 41. Some imply that these rates pertain to the percentage of primary school graduates moving on to secondary school, but my own calculations show that these numbers represent the number of primary school entrants that move on to secondary school. 8 Obura suggests that for 1991, CERAR/CERAI programs had spots for about 20% of those "transitioning" from primary school. Obura, Never Again, 41. Hoben includes CERAR/CERAI admissions along with secondary spots in her 8-9% advancement figure. Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 37. 429 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, "La Participation Populaire Au Rwanda De La Revolution Au Genocide (1959- 1994)" (Universite de Quebec a Montreal, 2002), 556. 430 Source: Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 36-7.

136 of these participants went further and suggested that Tutsi had less access to higher education than Hutu (5/12 Tutsi, 5/15 Hutu). Only one suggested that Hutu had less access than Tutsi. Witness these representative statements:

To go to secondary school, they would say that you need perhaps 80% [on the exam], but for Tutsi it was 90%, so as to diminish the number of Tutsi that could enter secondary school.431

It was to share places at secondary school. They needed, I don't remember very well the percentage, but I think it was Tutsi 2%, with 98% for the Hutu, 1% for the Twa. Something like that.432

[When the list of those accepted was posted in the commune] What? I am not on the list? That is not possible. And then I saw all of the [Hutu] students that were always [ranked] behind me in class had succeeded. Then I asked myself, what happened? What happened? I cried for almost a week. I was at home when the others were at school.433 The quotas were justified on the basis that, due to financial constraints, the secondary school pie was of limited size, and had to be divided proportionally to the Rwandan population in each ethnicity and region. As one interview participant told me, "the holders of power have to behave in a certain way to raise literacy as soon as there is too much demand and not enough capacity to receive people."434 Since Tutsi represented 9 -

15% of the Rwandan population over the course of the Hutu Republics, they were to be allocated only that many promotions past primary school. However, some authors contend that quotas were rather loosely applied and figures support this assertion. The numbers, illustrated below in Figure 3.3, show that if Tutsi constituted the high estimate of 15% of the population, Tutsi remained over-represented for much of the First

Republic, then became slightly under-represented in the Second Republic. Figure 3.4, on the other hand, is based on the low estimate of Tutsi constituting only 9% of the population. In that case, their over-representation declined over the Hutu Republics and

1 Interview 5, male Hutu, south. 2 Interview 24, female Tutsi, Kigali. 3 Interview 25, female Tutsi, Kigali. 4 Interview 63, male Hutu, north.

137 only once, in 1973, did they become under-represented in secondary schools. The lowest points on Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 represent the 1973 persecutions of Tutsi.

Figure 3.3: Over & Under Representation of Ethnic Enrolment at Secondary School in Relation to Population 1964-80 (84% Hutu. 15% TutsD435

150%

100%

50%

-50%

-100%

%<%* %.% %.% %"%. %,% %.•%• %.% ^'fev'^^'&v-fev'k'fev'^'fesO 00 »> *> •*> *> ^> 60 ^> svO ^ ^ & 9 s e e e % ^ ^ ^F ^ e > s s -Hutu —Tutsi

435 Source: Mugesera in Republic of Rwanda, ed., The Teaching of History of Rwanda: A Participatory Approach (for Secondary Schools in Rwanda, a Reference Book for the Teacher) (Kigali: National Curriculum Development Centre, 2006), 185-6.

138 Figure 3.4: Over & Under Representation of Ethnic Enrolment at Secondary School in Relation to Population 1964-80 (90% Hutu. 9% Tutsi)436

350%

300%

250%

200%

\ 150%

100%

50%

-50% X % % \ x % X X \ % % X X X \ \ \ % X -Hutu -'* Tutsi

In either case, Tutsi had been historically over-represented in secondary schools in relation to the population. As their advantage declined, this must have been difficult for them. Several Rwandans with whom I spoke, as well as other scholars, also made allegations of a "reverse meritocracy" whereby the Tutsi with the lowest exam scores were accepted over the best Tutsi performers.437 Tutsi may also have felt more deprived because school exclusion was part of the narrative of Tutsi exiles. In one publication they wrote that "Tutsi don't study" and that since 1975 no public school was supposed to welcome Tutsi. In another, they alleged that "the installation of the ethnic equilibrium policy is a cultural genocide that constitutes the civil death of Tutsi.

436 Source: Mugesera in Ibid. 437 Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 66, Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 106. 438 Impuruza Dec 1989 and Le Patriote Feb 1989 respectively, quoted in Eustache Munyantwali, "La Politique d'Equilibre dans PEnseignement," in Les Relations Interethniques au Rwanda a la Lumiere de

139 In response to reduced access to public secondary schooling, some Tutsi parents turned to the creation of private schools, although these were considered second-rate in comparison to public schools.439 Munyantwali notes, without supplying details, that Hutu were significantly under-represented in private secondary schools.440 Muhimpundu argues that many private schools were known as "Tutsi schools" and thus contributed more to divisions than to building cross-ethnic cohesion.441

Several Tutsi who did find spaces in public secondary school felt that their ethnic identity restricted their access to certain streams of study. Interestingly, they identified primary teaching as a subject towards which Tutsi were streamed; primary teaching required fewer years of study than other streams, graduating teachers were sent to rural outposts whereas positions in cities were most desirable, and primary teachers in Rwanda are often looked down upon. A Government of Rwanda report suggested that women, rather than men, were also streamed towards primary teaching for the same reasons.442

Tertiary education was also regulated with quotas in addition to academic criteria.

A few participants raised the issue of scholarships for university education in Rwanda and abroad, suggesting that most such opportunities were reserved for Hutu. This also came up in several casual conversations that I had with Rwandans, including Hutu, though I could not find figures. In regard to admissions, however, in the 1960s, close to

90% of students at the National University of Rwanda were Tutsi.443 From 1981-7, Tutsi

['Agression d'Octobre 1990: Genese, Soubassements et Perspectives, ed. Francois-Xavier Bangamwabo, et al. (Ruhengeri: Editions Universitaires du Rwanda, 1991), 306. 439 Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 52-6. 440 Munyantwali, "La Politique d'Equilibre dans l'Enseignement," 304. 441 F61icite Muhimpundu, Education et Citoyennete au Rwanda (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002), 200. 442 Republic of Rwanda, "La Scolarisation Feminine," 23. 443 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 260.

140 represented, on average, 14% of students at the NUR. Even by 1987-8, Tutsi were slightly over-represented at NUR, significantly over-represented at the Grand Seminaires, and overall over-represented in the seven tertiary institutions of the country.445 While

Tutsi felt perhaps relatively deprived, figures put forth during the Hutu Republics do not show them to have been absolutely deprived Indeed, while Hutu were gaining from quotas, Tutsi could still be presented as having too much.

Another way in which participants felt access to be unequal was regionally; this was the second quota component under the Habyarimana regime. Ten participants expressed that region of origin was a restrictive factor in secondary school admission.

The vast majority of these perspectives (8/10) were voiced by Hutu - probably because while the ethnic dimension of the quota policies was felt most strongly by Tutsi, the regional dimension was most felt by Hutu.

The equilibrium policy wasn't really centred on ethnicity, but regionalism.. .And for that we found a lot, a lot of the population of young people from the region of the north, the region of the President of the Republic [gaining admittance to schools].446

They would say 'Gitarama you have 20 [spots]. During the First Republic you had a lot of students'....Then [during the Second Republic] they would say 'Gitarama, leave it'. For those that succeeded, they would take 60% from the north and 40% [from the south].447

Participants from all regions observed that those from the south had the least access, but one participant felt that northern Hutu were most disadvantaged since Tutsi from the north were still allocated places, yet were relatively rare in the population.448

Anthropologist Danielle De Lame suggests that rural-based Tutsi were also particularly

Republic of Rwanda, ed., The Teaching of History of Rwanda, 189. 445 Munyantwali, "La Politique d'Equilibre dans PEnseignement," 304. 446 Interview 43, male Hutu, south. 447 Interview 42, female Hutu, south. 448 In a footnote, Mamdani deals with the complicated question of overlapping ethnic and regional identities and quotas. He writes that, "the southern Tutsi, though they comprise the vast majority of the Tutsi within the country, would have access to only 4 % of the posts, whereas their counterparts in the north, a much smaller group, would have access to 6% of the posts. The 10% figure was said to represent the relative size of the Tutsi/Twa population in the country." Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 139.

141 hard-hit. In the complications of overlapping ethnicity and region, those from the south sometimes felt themselves considered Tutsi - and thus to be disadvantaged - whether Tutsi or not.

Most participants did not raise gender issues as a factor in access to secondary school. A few suggested that females had less access, citing parental needs, beliefs, or lack of funds as the reason. Some female participants, on the contrary, noted that girls were accepted to secondary school with lower grades than boys, and Rwandan government documents support this.450

Several interview participants (5 Hutu, 3 Tutsi, 1 unidentified), most from the north (6) agreed that richer Rwandans were better able to navigate the political and academic systems and gain admittance to higher levels of schooling.

It was the friendso f the well-placed that got access.451

Often enough, Tutsi gave money to change their ethnicity. So we were Tutsi, but we wrote Hutu on the identity card. We gave maybe a cow to become a friend, and then they gave a Hutu card in return.452

The children of the ministers did the exams before.. .They had the exams before they were given!453

The experts also frequently raised this factor.454 As expressed in one of the quotes above,

Rwandans sometimes had their ethnic identity cards changed. Other times, children from cities such as Kigali and Butare applied to secondary school as if they lived on their parents' home hills, thus increasing their chances and having "rural" spots occupied by urban students.455 In the community in which she worked, De Lame found that since all secondary schools were boarding schools and the poorest students were often sent very

449 De Lame, A Hill among a Thousand, 62. 450 Republic of Rwanda, "La Scolarisation Feminine," 20. 451 Interview 46, male Hutu, north. 452 Interview 37, male Tutsi, south. 453 Interview 11, female Tutsi, Kigali. 454 See also De Lame, A Hill among a Thousand, 63, Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 107. 455 Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 106.

142 far from home, they frequently dropped out after one year of secondary, leaving non­ quota spots vacant from the second year onwards to be filled through patronage.456 While the quotas restricted access, political clientship left room for maneuvering. Some authors suggest that there is a "fourth ethnic group" in Rwanda, who have education, "European savoir faire" and the ability to circumvent restrictions.457 Overall, many groups raised promotion past primary school as unfair, with ethnicity, region and class standing out as important dimensions.

Content and Practices

Some classroom practices were also described as problematic for the relationship among Rwandans. Most Rwandans with whom I spoke (32/37) remembered having to stand up according to ethnic identity in class.

I myself I did it [as a teacher], I did it to students. I asked 'Hutu go there, Tutsi go there'. If you go to the ministry and ask for our files, they are there! It [ethnicity] is well marked for each person!458

Author: Some people have told me that teachers counted students by ethnicity. Well, we had to. Wouldn't you? One group had been previously disadvantaged. For example, the Batwa weren't going to schools so we had to count to make sure they were going. The same, Hutu had been disadvantaged for 400 years. Tutsi had been the leaders and gaining benefits. 1959 was to try to stop the injustice. Then, we had to count to ensure that previous injustices didn't recur.459 I further discussed the impact of this practice with some of my interview participants.

This does not necessarily mean that others did not share these feelings, only that they did not point them out, and that I did not ask. Some Tutsi explained that this experience

456 De Lame, A Hill among a Thousand, 62. 457 Ibid., 97. See also Destexhe in Uvin, Aiding Violence, 128. 458' Intervie^ w 3, female Tutsi, Kigali. 459 Interview 47, male Hutu, north.

143 made them fearful (4), was tied to humiliation, teasing or harassment (5), and invoked

feelings of inferiority (3).460

Some Hutu (1) and some Tutsi (4) explained that ethnically labeling students brought negative attention to the minority, and several (4) recalled it being paired with an

exercise wherein the teacher explained the physical traits of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa.

Especially the problem [conflict] came when we did the 'census' at the beginning of the year. During that period, there were misunderstandings...People didn't have confidence in others. We came to understand that we are different and that we cannot trust the other.461

So the teachers would teach.. .and speak about those different ethnic groups. They were Twa and Hutu and what. And then came, that period came... 'Who is Hutu? Who is Tutsi?' Like that. And I think from there, it contributed [to conflict] because you know, teaching that period, that ideology of differences to the children, it contributed to children understanding or knowing that there is a difference between those different people. If you say in a group of Mutwa those are Tutsi or those are Hutu maybe they will say 'Ah, maybe I'm not the same as her or the same as this one. Maybe I'm different? Maybe I have to get these privileges because I belong to this group'.462

Interestingly, several interview participants (4 Hutu, 4 Tutsi, and 1 non-identified)

told me that they did not know their ethnic identity when asked in class. Although it was

recognized that this consciousness could also come through family socialization and/or

the wider community, a number of participants identified primary school as the site

where they first concretely learned their ethnic belonging.

Well, me when I was at primary, I didn't know.. .they would ask us you are of what ethnicity? You are of what ethnicity? You belong to what ethnicity? Like me, personally, my parents were devout Catholics; they did not teach me that. But when I arrived at school, they asked me, you are from what ethnicity? I was little, I didn't know, so I went to ask Papa, so he told me, you belong to this ethnicity, and I went to tell them. Because at school they said that Tutsi had a refined nose.. .Hutu had a big nose. So me, since I have a big nose, I am Hutu. But when I asked my parents, they told me that I am not Hutu, I am Tutsi. So at that moment I was frustrated because the majority were Hutu and I was on the side of the Tutsi...It's like that that I learned that I was Tutsi, but I didn't know.463

Women were more likely than men to share these thoughts; I interviewed more Tutsi women than men, but this could also reflect a heightened gendered experience or a greater willingness of women to share their emotions with me. 461 Interview 37, male Tutsi, south. 462 Interview 26, male unidentified ethnicity, north. 463 Interview 3, female Tutsi, Kigali.

144 We knew who we were when we were at school and so, when we knew nothing, they took us home to ask our parents who we were. So, when we arrived at home, we asked 'Papa, they told Hutu to stand up. So and so stood up, me too I stood up, they said so and so, yes a Hutu, but that me I am not a Hutu'.464

They asked us [our ethnicity] but sometimes we were mistaken, we went in such a group because you see your friendthere. . .We didn't know exactly to which group we belonged.465

Only a few (4), all Hutu males from northern Rwanda, explained that they had never had this experience of having to stand up by ethnic identity in the classroom. As one explained, some northern classes had no Tutsi students, so this exercise would have proven useless.

I asked some participants if they knew the ethnic identity of their classmates during primary school. Most knew all (8/12) or at least some (2/12) of their peers' ethnicities; only a very few (2/12) contended that they were ignorant of this information.

Most participants also knew the ethnic identity of their teachers (13/17) or at least some of them (3/17). Some gained this knowledge through students having to stand up by ethnicity in class or having learned the classic physical descriptors in schools, but others learned this information in their communities. I am not contending that schools are the only place where Rwandan children learned ethnicity, just that it is an important site and, given the age of primary school children, sometimes the first place. Furthermore, since schools are seen by Rwandans as official and respected, this categorization is legitimated.

I also spoke with some of the participants about pedagogical practices in the classroom. All of those with whom I discussed the issue (8) explained that only one view of history was taught, rather than multiple perspectives. Most (10/11) said that they were not allowed to question or disagree with the teacher. Schools cultivated a "spirit of submission" consistent with the church and wider society's doctrine of submission to the

464 Interview 7, male Tutsi, south. 465 Interview 38, male Hutu, south.

145 government. Participants described class as consisting of copying notes (3) and having to memorize them (7). Several teachers shared that they had to teach the mandated curriculum exactly as it appeared, even if they disagreed with its content or approach.

One former teacher told me, "I had a colleague who wanted to expose this, who wanted to raise the issue that history was biased and not correct. But we were scared."467 We will see below, however, that some interviewees called teachers' strict adherence to mandated plans into question, recalling history lessons that do not appear in the curriculum.

Many participants (24) emphasized that children played together regardless of ethnicity during breaks outside of the classroom.

Children of different ethnic groups played together even though teachers, even myself, had to write ethnicity on the files. But at recess, there were no differences. The children liked each other, they were friends. To have friends we did not make cliques with ethnicity. That is to say that children played together. There were no problems... Apparently".468 Some opined as above, that for ethnic groups to play together was not unusual and that play thus cannot really be considered a unique peacebuilding contribution of schooling.

On the other hand, some parents restricted who their children could play with for ethnic or class reasons and a few participants mentioned that schools thus brought some children together. Others (2 Hutu, 5 Tutsi) recognised that while children played together, some

Tutsi students experienced teasing along ethnic lines. A few Tutsi students recalled being physically and verbally harassed at recess or on their walk home from school. Even among those who reported that all children played together, a number of participants (8) recollected break-time problems arising when violence began to take place in the country.

Schools are not vacuums and outside influences filter into schools.

466 Muhimpundu, Education et Citoyennete au Rwanda, 168-9. 467 Interview 1, male Tutsi, Kigali. 468 Interview 45, female Hutu, south.

146 Content: History Lessons

Many Rwandans (26/40), representing a good cross-section of the population, mentioned that history lessons were one of the ways that education contributed to conflict in Rwanda. Both Hutu and Tutsi interview participants explained how the history taught highlighted historical divisions and enmity between Hutu and Tutsi. Several participants also highlighted that learning during primary school had a special impact because children are at a particularly impressionable age. That they independently raised this issue is telling. At the same time, it is difficult to make sense of this finding since this is clearly a claim of the current government and there can be significant punishments for straying from the public transcript.

Until the early 1980s, history was incorporated into other subjects at primary school.

After Habyarimana's 1979 reforms, history in itself was taught beginning in grade four, through to the end of primary school. The first primary history curriculum was elaborated in the early 1980s.469 Prior to the development of curriculum, teachers had to find and develop their own material470 - based on high school experiences for those that had had them, on personal research, or on learning within their communities. No student textbooks for primary school history existed during the period under study in this chapter.

469 MINEPRISEC, Amateka: Umwaka Wa 5 (Kigali: 1983), MINEPRISEC, Amateka: Umwaka Wa 6 (Kigali: 1985), Ministry of Education Republic of Rwanda, Science, Technology and Scientific Research, Ubumenyi Bw'isi, Amateka, Uburere Mboneragihugu: Umwaka Wa 8 (Kigali: 1982), Ministry of Education Republic of Rwanda, Science, Technology and Scientific Research, Ubumenyi Bw'isi, Uburere Mboneragihugu, Amateka: Umwaka Wa 4 (Kigali: 1982). All teachers after 1971 were recommended to read Heremans' Introduction a I'Histoire du Rwanda. I also had access to Ministere de l'Education Nationale Republique Rwandaise, Histoire lere Annee Du Tronc Commun, ed. Direction Generate des Etudes et Recherches Pedagogiques (Kigali: Bureau P6dagogique de l'Enseignement Secondaire, 1977), MINEPRISEC, "Histoire du Rwanda, Iiere Partie," MINEPRISEC, "Histoire du Rwanda, Heme Partie." These texts were destined for history students and history teachers at the secondary level. Here I focus on the primary school curriculum. 470 In comparative perspective, Rwanda developed its national education curriculum more slowly than other countries, leaving teachers without adequate material for quite some time. See Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 28.

147 I had access to teacher training material from high schools, but many primary school teachers never went to secondary school so while these are interesting, they are not universally applicable.471 Also, teachers could have taught things differently than the formal curriculum suggests; a few participants noted that some teachers were more

"extremist" than others. On the other hand, in poor countries where teachers lack training, textbooks and written curriculum are often very strictly adhered to and several

teacher participants noted having to faithfully follow the curriculum.472

Interview participants consistently highlighted their learning about three historical

events as problematic for developing positive relationships among Rwandans: lessons

concerning the arrival of Rwanda's populations, ubuhake patron-client relations, and the

1959 revolution.

History Lessons: The arrival of Rwanda's populations

Of the 32 participants that I asked, all recalled learning about "the arrival of

Rwanda's populations" at primary school. The specific details of the narrative that they

remembered learning were consistent with each other's answers and with the primary

school curriculum (1982,1983,1985).

Ahh, well, at primary school they told us that it was the Twa that came before, hunting. So, the second were the Hutu, cultivating. And the Tutsi, they told us that they were Nilotic people that came with herds of cows. So, they told us that they came from Ethiopia, eh? So they said that Rwanda was for Hutu. They are Rwandan. The others, it is for them to stay in Ethiopia.474

We learned that the first people were the Twa. And that they had the activity of making pots. And that the second people were Hutu, that had the activity of cultivating. And that the last people were the Tutsi that had pastoral activity. That is what we learned. And, we learned that when the Hutu arrived they had Kings. And when the Tutsi arrived, they started a system of slavery.475

In 1965, of 5 441 primary school teachers, only 1 341 had secondary training and the required degree. MINEPRISEC, "Histoire du Rwanda, Heme Partie," 149. 472 Milligan, "Teaching between the Cross and the Crescent Moon," 478-9. 473 Texts refer to singular "arrival," although the narrative involves multiple sequential "arrivals." 474 Interview 5, male Hutu, south. 475 Interview 14, female Tutsi, Kigali.

148 While both Hutu and Tutsi participants' historical narratives showed remarkable consistency, Tutsi interview participants were more likely than Hutu participants to mention that they learned Tutsi were last to arrive, that Tutsi colonized and subjected the

Hutu to 400 years of oppression, that Tutsi took over the country, that Tutsi had less of a right to the country than others, and that Tutsi were from Ethiopia. Hutu were more likely than Tutsi to mention the Tutsi monarchy. This is not unusual; people experience things differently and are likely to remember elements that were most difficult or traumatizing for them. These slight discrepancies also offer insight into transcripts of each side.

The sixth grade curriculum document (1985) explored "ancient" (pre-colonial)

Rwanda and dedicated a full chapter/section to "how Rwanda was inhabited." This narrative was very consistent with participants' recollections. The order of arrival - that

Twa were first, Hutu second, and Tutsi "last to arrive in Rwanda" - was repeated several times. Further, the first sample exam question provided for teachers involved identifying the chronological order of arrival of groups in Rwanda.476 This text also detailed the occupations of each group - Twa were hunters and potters, Hutu farmers, and Tutsi pastoralists - and the regions from whence they came - Hutu from Central Africa, Tutsi from Sudan or Ethiopia. It noted that Hutu had family links to other Bantu and that Tutsi were related to Tutsi in Burundi, Hima in Uganda and Tanzania, and Massai in Kenya.477

There was no reference to common Hutu and Tutsi heritage. In contrast to participants' recollections, the curriculum described interaction between Hutu and Tutsi upon Tutsi arrival as "friends" who "intermarried", and claimed that Hutu agreed to be Tutsi's

476 MINEPRISEC, Umwaka Wa 6,137,39. 477Ibid, 135, 37.

149 subjects and to work with them to conquer other Hutu and Tutsi lands. It did not make any explicit claims about entitlement to the country. The secondary school textbook

(1987) went further. It critiqued the "Hamitic myth" - that Tutsi were whites in black skin - calling it "false and stained with racial prejudice,"479 but accepted that Tutsi were from Abyssinia/Ethiopia. These discrepancies could stem from multiple sources; most students' experiences predate these texts and rely on their teachers' lessons; teachers may have strayed from the texts; students may have interpreted the lessons in their own ways, or participants' opinions may reflect the current government's transcript rather than actual recollections.

History Lessons: Ubuhake

Of the 22 participants with whom I spoke about schools lessons on ubuhake, variously translated as vassalage or cattle-clientship, all remembered having learned a similar narrative.

Ubuhake, so...the Tutsi minority race possessed cows...The majority of Hutu were cultivators. So, they worked. They had to go get manure, to get milk. So, since authority came from Tutsi during that time, even before the arrival of the whites...the Hutu had to come to get cows. They were like...I don't want to use the word slavc.but servant. They had to spend years and years to get a cow. They worked hard during those years for the Tutsi to finally get a cow...So it was hard to work years and years to get only one cow. This was not good. I can say that it was very painful. It was what incited, for them, the hate towards the Tutsi race. We are conscious of this.480

Tutsi were richer so they could dominate over us. So the Hutu went to do ubuhake. So we went to be servants for a cow. We spent 4 or 5 years. If you made a mistake when they had given you a cow, they took it back. Yes! That's what we learned at school! But our parents also lived this.4

Note the clear ethnically-based references to "we" and "they" in the citations above. Participants (12) emphasized that Tutsi had cattle and that Hutu worked for Tutsi

Ibid., 137. MINEPRISEC, "Histoire du Rwanda, Iiere Partie," 18. Interview 3, female Tutsi, Kigali. Interview 42, female Hutu, south.

150 (11). Many (6 Hutu, 6 Tutsi, 1 unidentified) also highlighted that the relationship, which constituted virtual slavery, disadvantaged Hutu.

The fifth grade history curriculum (1983) introduced this narrative of ubuhake.

This lesson was repeated, almost verbatim, in the eighth grade curriculum (1982). While most of the text's messages were consistent with interviewees' remarks, highlighting for example "that ubuhake included many bad things,"482 the official lesson on ubuhake notably never mentioned Hutu or Tutsi. It defines the practice as "conventions between a person that wanted a cow and protection and a person who was very rich"483 without defining the positions ethnically. Only two (of 14) interview participants explained the practice this way, while the rest described it as a relationship between Hutu and Tutsi, consistent with several references in the secondary school textbooks.484 We cannot know whether this discrepancy occurred between official curriculum and teacher implementation, or between lessons and students' understanding, or whether it developed later with political awareness. Some teachers, as explained above, felt that they were in no way allowed to deviate from the mandated curriculum, while other participants reminded me that teachers played an important role in the selective transmission of knowledge. The official primary school material explains only the negative aspects of this relationship rather than emphasizing the relationship of exchange highlighted by today's government. Indeed, my focus on cattle ubuhake, to the detriment of land contracts, such as ubureetwa corvee labour discussed in Chapter 2, may have been

482 MINEPRISEC, Umwaka Wa 5,155. 483 Ibid. 484 MINEPRISEC, "Histoire du Rwanda, Here Partie," 96, MINEPRISEC, "Histoire du Rwanda, Heme Partie," 70.

151 unintentionally driven by the prominence of ubuhake in the current government's discourse.485

History Lessons: The Revolution of 1959

Of the 19 people with whom I spoke about how history lessons conveyed the events of 1959, all recalled learning a very consistent narrative across ethnic, gender, and regional lines. Well, the Tutsi exploited the Hutu, and the Hutu couldn't evolve [the same word as Rwandans use for the modern, educated class], so they had a revolution. It was so that the Hutu could evolve and everything.486

The period of 1959 was presented as Hutu didn't want ubuhake any more, didn't want the king, the mwami, because the king was oppressive, and they revolted against the Tutsi. So the power of the mwami, the power of the Tutsi, was presented as an oppressive power, from which the Hutu had to free themselves. Yes. That is what we learned at school. And then, the oppressors left, and went to many of the countries in the area, and the good ones were left. The Hutu that had vanquished the bad ones.487

16 of 19 (7 Tutsi, 7 Hutu, 2 unidentified) specified that the events of 1959 were a

"Revolution." 12 participants recollected learning that this revolution overthrew the

Tutsi monarchy and Rwanda became a Republic. 12 recalled learning that the majority took power in the spirit of liberation, justice and democracy, and 8 remembered learning that the revolution overthrew feudalism and ubuhake. A few interview participants recalled learning that Tutsi went into exile and were killed during this period. All of these details appear in the curriculum documents.

The Revolution of 1959 was probably the history lesson that participants could recall in most detail. This is not surprising, since it received more attention in official curriculum than the two issues above; there were four full primary school lessons on

1959 ("The Hutu Manifesto"; "The Reasons that Provoked the Revolution of 1959";

485 See Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, 111. 486 Interview 15, male Hutu, north. 487 Interview 24, female Tutsi, Kigali.

152 "Towards the Revolution of 1959"; and "The Revolution of 1959 and its Consequences").

Another lesson on "Independent Rwanda" was also related to this narrative. These five lessons appeared in the fifth (1983) and eighth grade (1982) curriculum documents, which indicates the centrality of this narrative. Hutu and Tutsi were highlighted as different throughout this chapter. Further, Tutsi were stigmatized for wanting to continue practices of "injustice and oppression" in Rwanda.488

Hutu and Tutsi were not, however, always portrayed in the official texts as collectivized. In several paragraphs, the text referred to "some Tutsi", who came from

"important families", and the "children of these Tutsi,"489 as having special privileges - thus differentiating between "important" and "average" Tutsi. On the other hand, this curriculum did say that Tutsi held most state jobs, and that only Tutsi owned properties and pastures490 (without making any distinctions among them). The narrative also collectivized the Hutu population, stating for example that: "Hutu too wanted a role to play in government."491 By not including the grievances of poorer Tutsi, the text also collectivized Tutsi. Again, secondary school texts elaborate on details, sometimes distinguishing amongst Tutsi, but other times collectivizing them.492

While conformity and obedience as classroom practices were discussed above, obedience to authority also arose in the primary school history curriculum document, but participants did not raise it in interviews. Grade four material (1982) included a lengthy

chapter on the MRND (Habyarimna's party to which all Rwandans belonged) and

488 MINEPRISEC, Umwaka Wa 5,157. 489 Ibid., 159. 490 Ibid., 157. 491 Ibid., 160. 492 It notes that a few progressive Tutsi shared a sentiment of change with Hutu. On the other hand, it collectivizes Tutsi noting that the Hutu Manifesto was to overcome the political, economic, social and cultural monopoly of the Tutsi group. See MINEPRISEC, "Histoire du Rwanda, Heme Partie," 109-10.

153 structures of authority and hierarchy in the prefecture. It detailed the ideology, goals, flag and hierarchy of the MRND, including the roles of prefects, assistant prefects, communes, directors of work, judges and prosecutors. Thus the very first history lessons to which students were expected to be exposed dealt with authority.

Not all lessons that participants recollected appeared in the official curriculum documents that I analysed. Nine participants (3 Hutu, 5 Tutsi, 1 unidentified) raised the story of the wicked Queen Kanjogera, without any prompting.

I will give you an example. They told us that there was a mother, the queen. Well, to show us that Tutsi were very bad, the teacher told us that there was a queen called Kanjogera. So the teacher told us that each morning when she went to stand up, she placed her sword [on the body of a Hutu child] and pressed herself to standing [thereby impaling the child]. To show that she was mean.493

Each time she [Kanjogera] stood up, they said that she had to kill a child.494

This story clearly portrays Kanjogera as an evil Tutsi; participants who spoke of

Kanjogera remembered this lesson as stigmatizing all Tutsi as wicked.

In her book, Extraordinary Evil: A Brief History of Genocide, Barbara Coloroso recounts, "[o]n a recent trip to Rwanda, a young woman showed me a worksheet she had completed when she was a child at primary school in the 1960s. One of the math problems read, "[i]f you have ten cockroaches in your town and you kill four of them, how many do you have left to kill?"495 As noted earlier, Tutsi exiles that attempted to return to Rwanda after the 1959 Revolution were deemed cockroaches, and the term later expanded to refer to all Tutsi, including during the genocide. Coloroso refers to a similarly stereotypical and discriminatory question posed in an early 1930s German math class: "[i]f three Jews robbed a bank, and each got a part of the loot proportionate to their

Interview 5, male Hutu, south. Interview 8, female mixed ethnicity, north. Barbara Coloroso, Extraordinary Evil: A Brief History of Genocide (Toronto: Penguin Group, 2007), 58.

154 ages...how much would each get? Mamdani recounts that in late 1980s and early

1990s Afghanistan, grade four math students were asked "[t]he speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second. If a Russian is at a distance of 3200 meters from a mujahid, and that mujahid aims at the Russian's head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet to strike the Russian in the forehead."497 As these examples from mathematics suggest, and as noted in Chapter 1, it is not only the content of history classes that can affect intergroup relationships. While the Rwandan woman in Coloroso's

story may have had such a worksheet since many schools continued to create their own curricula into the First Republic, none of my interviewees shared similar stories or evidence of this type of overtly anti-Tutsi teaching with me.

What is omitted from the curriculum is as important as what is in it. A few participants noted that Rwandan primary schools did not adequately teach love of the

other. In her book, Muhimpundu analyses civic education during the Hutu Republics and

argues that the notion of a common good was not developed. Instead, lessons focused on

the responsibilities of the state and on the need for students to respect officials by simple

virtue of their positions.498

In hindsight, I did not inquire enough in interviews about history lessons that may

have been supportive of peacebuilding. Participants did not raise such memories on their

own; perhaps in part because the now-prevalent transcripts do not do so either, but likely

also because, given the genocide, these memories are not dominant. A review of the

curriculum documents, however, does evidence a few lessons that could be interpreted in

Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Three Leaves Press, 2004), 137. 498 Muhimpundu, Education et Citoyennete au Rwanda, 154-6.

155 this way. In the sixth grade curriculum document (1985), for example, all sections except the one on Rwanda's original inhabitation talked about "Rwandans" collectively, rather than as Hutu and Tutsi. The sixth grade material also included a lesson on friendship amongst Rwandans. The fourth grade material (1982) focused on the MRND, a party to which all Rwandans officially belonged, and national symbols such as the flag and the anthem. Lessons were in Kinyarwanda, the mother tongue of all Rwandans.

I wondered about other sources of historical information and narratives in

Rwanda, and their consistency or divergence from the above lessons taught in school.

Family, church and popular media such as radio and newspapers emerged as other important socializing influences. Most interviewees (9/13) agreed that their church, some churches, or at least churches in the pre-genocide period conveyed the same lessons as their schools. This is not surprising given that the church still often controlled schools after colonialism, and given the church's purported role in the genocide.499 All (13/13) participants with whom I discussed the media opined that it presented views that were consistent with the school lessons above. Some (4) mentioned that these narratives arose particularly in the media around national holidays. Most (8) argued that media references to the arrival of the populations, ubuhake, and 1959 were particularly prominent in the pre-genocide years. I will return to this connection in the conclusion.

Findings in regards to families' influences on participants' historical understandings and identities are particularly complicated. The primary curriculum asked students to go home to ask their parents about ubuhake and 1959.500 Most of those I asked (8/12) agreed that their families, or at least some families, taught the same

499 See for example Tharcisse Gatwa, Rwanda, Eglises: Victimes ou Coupables? (Lome: Editions Haho, 2001). 500 MINEPRISEC, Umwaka Wa 5, 155, 63.

156 historical lessons as did schools. I usually broached this subject very late in the interview, by which time participants had usually voiced the belief that schooling had been an underlying cause of conflict in Rwanda. It was thus difficult for people to answer that their own families had taught lessons consistent with schools. In future research, I would seek answers to the question of other socializing influences in a different manner.

3.3c Analysis: The contribution of schooling to violent interethnic conflict

As stated above, the great majority of the Rwandans with whom I spoke believed that schooling contributed to Rwanda's 1994 genocide. Based on the findings presented,

I argue that the structure of the education system, as well as classroom practices and the history curriculum, contributed to violent interethnic conflict by producing the

ingredients of both social-structural and psycho-cultural roots of violence.

First, the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 suggests that exclusive institutions can promote conflict between groups and competition over scarce resources. Furthermore, it has been emphasized that schooling in Rwanda is tied to images of upward mobility. As

such, demand for it engenders much competition. While access to primary school was most difficult for poorer Rwandans, I did not encounter charges of this playing out

ethnically and thus contributing to interethnic conflict. While a few Tutsi participants

claimed differential treatment, much like in the late colonial period, most participants'

concern emerged in regard to promotion past primary school. Under the First Republic,

for example, De Lame was told that "the simple fact of having some education, plus political activism, sufficed to make a person an assistant to the burgomaster, able to

obtain grants for land previously belonging to the Tutsi for friends and family

157 members." By 1979 when primary schools taught exclusively in Kinyarwanda, restricting access to secondary school was also tantamount to restricting access to French, an international language of commerce and opportunity.502 Exclusion was extremely consequential, and ethnically-based exclusion was particularly consequential for violent interethnic conflict.

It is exceptionally difficult to judge the quotas implemented by the First and

Second Republics in the hindsight of genocide. Based on my argument in the last chapter that Tutsi were significantly advantaged in access to secondary schools during the colonial period, the rationale for the Republics' quotas is understandable. Indeed, many countries, including Canada, support affirmative action in an effort to redress past discrimination and to ameliorate equality of opportunities in education and employment.

The quotas may also be regarded in a positive light, as ensuring minority rights, and some

Tutsi did consider the quotas as positive guarantees of a minimum number of higher

education spots. Consultants who visited Rwanda under Habyarimana "noted with approval that access to schooling appears unusually equitable", dismissing possible problems.503

While many participants judged Tutsi to have been discriminated against, Tutsi

still managed to occupy important positions in the country, especially in private business504 and at many points in time they still occupied more positions in upper grades

of primary school and in secondary school than their representation in the population would suggest. Indeed, while Hutu gained from educational changes, including quotas,

501 De Lame, A Hill among a Thousand, 59. 502 Ibid., 62,93. 503 Daniere and Meyer (1981) and Le Thanh Khoi (1985) cited in Hoben, School, Work, and Equity, 104. 504 See Emy, Rwanda 1994, 85, Linden, Christianisme etPouvoirs au Rwanda (1900-1990), 364,72.

158 Tutsi could still be perceived as having too much, thereby fostering social-structural grievances amongst Hutu. The governments of the First and Second Republics blamed

Tutsi for Rwanda's problems, invoking psycho-cultural stigmatization as well. The situation in Malaysia is similar. The Malay majority controls the government and has instituted strict affirmative action programs, but since ethnic Chinese can draw on historic cultural capital, they remain well-placed in education and in the economy, provoking anti-Chinese sentiments.505

On the other hand, Tutsi felt a great loss from the entitlement they had felt during the colonial period. Prospect Theory tells us that people display "reference dependence", meaning that they are more sensitive to losses relative to where they start, as well as "loss aversion", meaning that people overvalue losses relative to comparative gains.506 As noted, some Hutu also felt they had received the short end of the stick due the continued

Tutsi over-representation in schools. Tutsi feelings of loss, as well as Hutu feelings of entitlement, likely strengthened ingroup solidarity and outgroup derogation on both sides, hardening, essentializing, and polarizing groups. Many Hutu also felt the regional

dimensions of the quotas, thus differentiating among Hutu. Yet, several Hutu participants

from the South suggested that they were being treated as Tutsi, again making Hutu and

Tutsi a central dividing line of identity and entitlement. Even amongst those who understood the original rationale, some scholars lamented that quotas went on for so long

C/V7 or that ethnic identity was not erased altogether.

505 Chua, World on Fire, 35-6, Harold A. Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 26,158-64. 506 See Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory," in Handbook of War Studies Ii, ed. Manus I Midlarsky (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000). 507 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 17.

159 By controlling promotion past primary school, the state controls the production of a middle class and molds society. Some argue that Rwandans with "squelched aspirations" were the most easily mobilizable for genocide and similar arguments have been made in other contexts, such as Sierra Leone.508 Similarly, in his doctoral dissertation inquiring into the causes of popular mobilization, Kimonyo finds that higher levels of schooling (especially primary and CERAI) where they had not resulted in heightened life chances and choices, accentuated feelings of frustration and revolt. He suggests that this population understood the political game and saw benefits in radical political change.509 Straus' recent work makes clear that genocidaires did not have less than average education, in contrast to some authors' claims that ignorance explains the willingness to join genocidal activity.510 Thus my findings suggest that some of those with more education and also some who were denied access to more education each may have had reason to feel frustrated and to blame unfairness on the privileges of the "other."

Society's institutions contribute to its social climate. Differential access served as a constant reminder of differences, keeping ethnic distinctions prominent and hardening ingroup/outgroup distinctions. Restricting access to schooling also promoted collectivization, with ethnicity, and sometimes region, as one's central defining feature, regardless of individual merit.511 The fact that Tutsi often remained (or were reported to be) over-represented in schools and in the high status positions that schooling was presumed to ensure allowed the Hutu governments to divert attention away from their

Willame 1995 and Kabirigi 1994 cited in Uvin, Aiding Violence, 137. Kimonyo, "La Participation Populaire Au Rwanda De La Revolution Au Genocide (1959-1994)," 556. Straus, The Order of Genocide, 107-8. Regional provenance was also an important criterion under the Second Republic.

160 own privileges to scapegoat Tutsi and to blame them for the country's troubles.

Stigmatizating and scapegoating are also mechanisms underlying violent interethnic conflict. In sum, the structure of schooling in Rwanda, contributed to laying both the social-structural and psycho-cultural conditions conducive to violent interethnic conflict.

Consider next the contribution of school content, including both classroom practices and history curriculum. The classroom practice of asking and, in some cases, even teaching, students their ethnicity also accentuates differences and collectivizes ethnic groups. Some students also experienced stigmatization based on these practices.

Uvin argues that having children ethnically registered also contributed more directly to violent interethnic conflict, as it served as a tool of discrimination in crises.513 General

Romeo Dallaire also noted the direct utility of this identification practice in carrying out violence.514 As we saw in Chapter 1, many also consider other classroom practices, such as adherence to a single and exclusionary narrative, the failure to develop critical thinking, and the promotion of conformity to be underlying mechanisms for gaining broad participation in violence.

History curriculum also contributed to the foundation for violence in Rwanda.

History lessons portrayed a past rife with historical divisions between Hutu and Tutsi. In lessons, the two groups were usually distinct, essentialized collectivities. European and

Rwandan historiography, on which curriculum is based, never simultaneously valued both Hutu and Tutsi.515 In contrast to interview remarks, curriculum (developed in the early to mid-1980s) portrayed divisions and enmity less than expected. Interview

512 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 239, Uvin, Aiding Violence, 137. 513 Uvin, "Development, Aid and Conflict," 10. 514 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 198. 515 Gasanabo, "Memoires et Histoire Scolaire," 257.

161 participants did, however, recall Tutsi being portrayed as the source of past injustices.

Since history teaching began before the development of written curriculum, these

discrepancies are likely. On the other hand, these memories narrated in 2006 interviews would have been inevitably coloured by subsequent events. Since history teaching began

only in grade four, and drop-out rates were high, history lessons would have impacted

relatively few Rwandans. Nonetheless, the categorizing, collectivizing and stigmatizing

that these Rwandans experienced through history lessons are important mechanisms

underlying violent interethnic conflict.

An additional reason I find my interpretation of the role of school curriculum in

Rwanda plausible comes from new interview data with Rwandan genocide perpetrators.

Based on the survey data he collected for his book, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power,

and War in Rwanda, Scott Straus kindly generated extra cross tabulations on the relationship

between education and the beliefs and motivations of Rwandan genocidaires. Cross

tabulations, presented in the tables below, reveal that perpetrators with four or more years of

primary education were more likely than those with less than four years of schooling to

believe that Hutu and Tutsi were different ubwoko (usually translated as ethnicity). More

educated perpetrators were nearly twice as likely as those with no, or only, early years of

primary schooling to have heard that Tutsi were Hamites and/or from Ethiopia.

Genocidaires with four or more years of primary schooling were also more likely than those

with less education to believe this was true. Perpetrators with higher levels of primary

education were also significantly more likely than those with early years of primary

schooling or less to have heard of and understood the idea of rubanda

nyamwinshi (the great majority, understood as the Hutu majority). All of these

162 relationships are statistically significant at the p < .05 level, as indicated by significance of the chi square noted in the tables below. As Straus writes, "the relationship from various regression analyses [and cross tabulations] clearly shows this relationship: the better educated respondents demonstrate greater awareness, understanding, and belief in racist ideology than the less-educated respondents."516

Readers will recall that during the Second Republic when most of the interviewed perpetrators would have been schooled,517 Rwandan history was taught in the upper years of primary school, grades 4 to 6 (or 8 depending on the period). It is thus highly plausible that part of the reason for the results explained here is school lessons. For example, this chapter reviewed how schooling exposed children, through classroom practices and content, to the idea that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are different ethnicities. It also explored how history classes familiarized participants with the Hamitic hypothesis.

Table 3.5; Belief that Hutu and Tutsi are Different Ethnicities by Education

Oyrs 1-3 yrs 4-8 yrs No 45.9% 58.1% 25.8% Yes 54.1% 41.9% 74.2% N 61 31 89

Chi square: 12.5 Degrees of Freedom: 2 Significance of chi square: 0.002 Question posed: "In 1994, did you think and were different 'amoko'?"518

Straus, The Order of Genocide, 134. Straus also included perpetrators with post-primary education. I dropped these cases since they are beyond the focus of this dissertation, and since there were too few cases for meaningful analysis. 517 Their median age is 34. Straus, The Order of Genocide, 104. 518 Straus, The Order of Genocide, 130.

163 Table 3.6; Heard that Tutsi are Hamites and/or from Ethiopia by Education

Oyrs 1-3 yrs 4-8 yrs No 74.6% 82.8% 52.7% Yes, but did not 15.9% 17.2% 31.2% believe or had no interest Yes, and believed it 9.5% 0% 16.1% was true N 63 29 93

Chi square: 14.1 Degrees of Freedom: 4 Significance of chi square: 0.007 Question posed: "Before 1994, had you heard Tutsis were Hamites who came fromth e Horn of Africa?"

Table 3.7: Belief in Rubanda Nvamwinshi (the "Great Majority") by Education

Oyrs 1-3 yrs 4-8 yrs No 44.3% 48.5% 28.4% Yes, but meaning 34.4% 27.3% 28.4% unknown or different from extremist propaganda Yes, and meaning 21.3% 24.2% 43.2% similar to extremist propaganda N 61 33 88

Chi square: 10.5 Degrees of Freedom: 4 Significance of chi square: 0.03 Question posed: "Before 1994, had you hard the term 'rubanda nyamwishi?'"520

Narratives, such as those taught in history lessons, provide "emotionally significant

connections" over time, so that the past may be evoked in order to respond to the

experiences and fears of the present and future.521 Representations of the past can be

Straus, The Order of Genocide, 132. 520 Straus, The Order of Genocide, 133. 521 Ross, "The Political Psychology of Competing Narratives," 306. See also: Barnett, "Culture, Strategy, and Foreign Policy Change," 8,14, Volkan, Blood Lines, 81-2.

164 seen as "umbilical cord[s] to the present and future," securely connecting people, even over generations.

We talked about the pre-colonial period, of the way that Hutu were treated, the frustrations. All of this, it reinvigorated, it revived hate, and it was slowly forged like this from the years just after independence until just before 1994. So the genocide was not a fluke,i t was long long prepared.523

When we spoke about the period from 59 to 62 in history class, in 68 [when I was in school] this wasn't really history, but current news. We had scars.524 History lessons divided Rwandans, collectivized them and sometimes scapegoated Tutsi.

My findings show that, under the Hutu Republics, history in Rwanda was taught as if it were a justification for the actions of the government of the day.

My findings also suggest that the combined impacts of the structure of schooling

(i.e. access to schooling) and its content (i.e. history lessons and classroom practices) were far more powerful than either one might have been alone.525

You know, they took it personally, not as a history. You know? So the way the teacher could teach a history, was not really a history, but hatred history. You know, what they [Hutu and Tutsi] did. The kingdom belongs to Tutsi and they did this and they, you know. And the Hutu, they were slaves the Hutu, to the Tutsi.. .And then they were seeing the teacher getting angry. Hating those Tutsi who were there [in the classroom]. You know, at that time they were asking the Tutsi to stand up as if those Tutsi at the present are the ones who did that. And so on and so on. And it's so embarrassing and so frightening.526

Teaching about historical differences while highlighting current differences must accentuate the impact of school experiences on students. Many participants (22) - including roughly equal numbers of Hutu and Tutsi, men and women, and representatives from different areas of the country - independently raised the idea that schooling helped them to learn their ethnic identity and to distinguish it from other identities. In so doing, their comments often connected school structure with curriculum content elements.

Barnett, "Culture, Strategy, and Foreign Policy Change," 14. Interview 84. Interview 87. This argument is supported by Harber, Schooling as Violence. See also Davies, Education and Conflict. Interview 3, female Tutsi, Kigali.

165 A few people with whom I spoke judged schooling to have directly contributed to violent conflict in Rwanda. One participant suggested that highly educated people are so respected in Rwanda that when one sees a doctor or university professor leading genocide,527 one may be more likely to follow.528 Another interviewee highlighted that primary school teachers, especially head teachers and school inspectors represented the most local strata of authority in this deeply hierarchical society. He then suggested that information and surveillance by teachers was integral to carrying out the genocide.529

Another, similarly, suggested that teachers helped identify Hutu and Tutsi to authorities and were even genocidaires themselves.530 Future research could follow up on these potentially more direct roles of schooling in genocide.

Future research into the violence that may occur at schools is also warranted.

Chapter 1 noted that the violent context in which education often takes place can reflect and exacerbate intergroup friction in wider society and model behaviour for students.

Research, especially on internship at the secondary level, may reveal more overt conflict between ethnic groups at school. A few participants shared stories of dorm room pranks and attacks by Hutu students on Tutsi students, such as wetting down Tutsi mattresses or throwing them in the trash to try to intimidate or drive them away.

This chapter makes the case that formal schooling during the Hutu Republics, through its content and structure, produced social-structural and psycho-cultural mechanisms that served as underlying causes of the genocide that overtook Rwanda in

527 See Michael Chege, "Africa's Murderous Professors," The National Interest n46 (1996). 528 Toronto pre-interview. 529 Interview 84. 530 Interview 13, male Tutsi, Kigali.

166 1994. The post-genocide government thus faced an enormous challenge. The next chapter assesses the Kagame regime's successes and failures at reforming post-genocide education to improve intergroup relations in Rwanda.

167 Chapter 4: Schooling after Genocide

Among Rwanda's national heroes are a group of children who, when confronted by an attacker in their school and ordered to separate into Hutu and Tutsi groups, refused, insisting they were all Rwandan. All were subsequently murdered.531 This event took place several years after the genocide devastated Rwanda. It points to schools, and to children, as positive influences in Rwanda's post-genocide effort at reconciliation.

However, as suggested in the previous chapters, the role of schools in Rwanda is much more complicated than this inspiring scenario might suggest. This chapter examines the complex role of schools after Rwanda's genocide and how they may contribute to the underlying roots of violence or peacebuilding. First, this chapter briefly reviews Rwanda's recent post-genocide history and its current political context. Second, it examines educational developments in Rwanda since the genocide ended in July 1994.

Third, this chapter turns to my findings on the role of schooling in post-genocide

Rwanda. It presents a mixed picture for the peace or conflict contribution of present-day education. It argues, on one hand, that some positive strides towards peacebuilding have been taken, especially in terms of fair access to primary school and classroom practices at the primary level that do not differentiate Rwandans. On the other hand, it argues that ethnic trends in access to post-primary education are worrisome and are differentiating, collectivizing, and stigmatizing Rwandans with new identities (survivor, perpetrator) that parallel their former ethnic groups. In terms of content, it further argues that a single,

For more detail on this 1997 event that took place at Inyange Secondary School in Gisenyi, see Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You. For more on Rwanda's Heroes Day, see Ignatius Ssuuna and Robert Mukombozi, "Embrace Heroism, Kagame Implores," The New Times, February 2 2007.

168 homogenizing narrative is taught in schools, promoting conformity and excluding the experiences of many Rwandans

4.1 Historical Overview of Post-Genocide Rwanda (1994 - 2008)

Rwanda's genocide lasted approximately 100 days and ended with a military victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in July 1994. The new government inherited a country in shambles. Of a pre-genocide population of about seven million, between five hundred thousand and one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were dead.

Fearing reprisals, about two million Hutu had fled to neighbouring states, the largest concentration ending up in dismal conditions in Goma, Zaire;532 most returned en masse in 1996. About one million Rwandans were internally displaced by violence.

Approximately half a million Tutsi returned from life in surrounding countries, many exiled since 1959. The country's economy and infrastructure were destroyed, including, as we will see in the next section, its education system. GDP per capita fell to an average of $80 per year, with about 95% of the population living on less than $60 per year.533

Many psychologists and medical practitioners assessed Rwandans as a deeply traumatized population; 80% of children interviewed by UNICEF, for example, experienced a death in their family, 91% thought they would die, 36% saw other children participating in violence, and 16% had, at some point, hidden under dead bodies.534 The

UN High Commission for Refugees figures reported in Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 312. World Bank figures reported in Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 270. Reported in Obura, Never Again, 50.

169 Human Development Index (HDI) ranked Rwanda 174 out of 175 countries in 1994; only war-torn Sierra Leone might have been a worse place on earth to live.535

The RPF made quick progress on political stability. Despite the challenges, it managed to establish basic order and a new government took office July 19, 1994. It appeared committed to many of the principles of the Arusha Accords, including most centrally, power sharing. , a Hutu RPF member became President,

Faustin Twagiramunga, a Hutu from the Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MDR party) became Prime Minister, and Paul Kagame, a Tutsi commander of the RPF, became

Vice-President and Minister of Defence. This transitional government, due to last five years, named itself the Government of National Unity. The first post-genocide local elections were held in March 1999. In July of that year, the transitional period was extended an additional four years until July 20, 2003. Paul Kagame assumed the presidency in March 2000 after increasing conflict led to Bizimungu's resignation. In

2003, a new constitution was passed by referendum and Kagame, who still holds power today, was re-elected.536 Since the genocide, Rwanda's leaders have made a strong political commitment to women's participation in government and Rwanda now holds the world's record for women parliamentarians at 49%.537 According to the 2007 Ibrahim

The HDI ranks nations according to their citizens' quality of life. Measures are life expectancy; adult literacy and enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary level; and income. See UNDP, "Human Development Index 1997," (United Nations Development Programme, 1997). 536 Kagame was re-elected with a large voter turnout and 95% of the popular vote. The European Union Observation Mission noted that the elections were flawed in multiple ways and that Rwandans were under "heavy pressure" to re-elect Kagame. See Ingrid Samset and Orrvar Dalby, "Rwanda: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2003," ed. NORDEM (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2003), 44-5. 537 See IPU, "Women in National Parliaments," (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2007). The global average, as well as the sub-Saharan African average, is nearly 18%. Canada is tied for 48th position with 21% of women parliamentarians.

170 Governance Index, Rwanda is the most improved sub-Saharan African nation in terms of governance performance over the past five years.538

In addition to these political initiatives, the new government soon implemented a variety of policies to address other challenges of Rwanda's post-violence context. In terms of security and justice, it quickly moved to arrest and imprison suspected genocide perpetrators and 10 000 Rwandans found themselves in jails by November 1994.539 This number peaked at 130 000 several years later.540 While the international community introduced the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), in 2002 the government revived gacaca, a traditional model of dispute resolution, literally meaning

"judgment on the grass", to relieve prison congestion and to foster restorative justice and reconciliation.541 Throughout this time, the government managed to uphold basic security and to stave off large-scale violence on Rwandan soil, despite incursions from

Hutu extremists based in the Congo (DRC).

The government also worked on social relations. The RPF blames the genocide on "bad governance of previous regimes" and "a genocide ideology that showed itself before and after the massacres." It promotes a return to an allegedly harmonious pre- colonial golden age, blaming the colonial powers for divisions among Rwandans.542

Rwanda came 18th on the list of 48 and had improved by 18 places over five years. See Robert Rotberg, Ibrahim Index of African Governance (Boston: Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2007), "Rwanda "Most Improved' in Africa," BBC News, Tuesday September 25 2007. 539 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 365. 540 Alana Tiemessen, "After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda," African Studies Quarterly 8, no. 1 (2004), 58. 541 See Ibid. 542 of Rwanda, "Rwanda Genocide Ideology and Strategies for Its Eradication," (Kigali: 2006), iii. For renditions of this narrative, see Lemarchand, Burundi, 19-20, MINECOFIN, "Rwanda Vision 2020," (Kigali: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2000), NURC, "3rd National Summit Report on Unity and Reconciliation," ed. National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Republic of Rwanda, 2004), NURC, "Report on the Evaluation of National Unity and Reconciliation, 23 November 2001," ed. National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Republic of Rwanda, 2002), Office of the President of the Republic, "The Unity of Rwandans: Before the Colonial Period and under the Colonial Rule and under the

171 Therefore, in terms of reconciliation, the government banned ethnicity by removing its mention in identity cards and discouraging public use of "ethnicist ideology."543

Relatedly, by the fall of 1994, the RPF prioritized the rewriting of history books,544 and as we shall see, placed a moratorium on teaching history in Rwanda's schools. It also engaged in commemorative genocide projects and recognized the first annual mourning week starting April 7,1995. In 1998, it established the National Unity and Reconciliation

Commission (NURC) with a mandate to rebuild the unity of Rwandans, to "monitor the adherence of the population to policies of national unity" and to research "the real causes of the genocide."545 It also implemented ingando solidarity camps to educate certain segments of the Rwandan population on what it means to be Rwandan.546 Unlike the

Former Yugoslavia that around this time fractured into ethnic enclaves, Rwandans continue to live intermingled throughout the country.

In economic terms, Rwanda has averaged 7% growth rates since 1994.547 It has also made significant strides in terms of infrastructure and attracting private investment.

In 2000, Rwanda's government introduced Vision 2020, a comprehensive framework for

First Republic," (Republic of Rwanda, 1999), PRI, "From Camp to Hill, the Reintegration of Released Prisoners," in Research Report on the Gacaca (Kigali & Paris: Penal Reform International, 2004), Republic of Rwanda, "Conference sur la Politique et la Planification de l'Education au Rwanda," Anasthase Shyaka, "The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development, Exit Strategies," (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, undated). 543 See Michael C. Dorf, "Can Ethnic Hatred Be Eliminated by Eliminating Ethnicity? The Rwanda Experiment," FindLaw's Legal Commentary, Wednesday April 14 2004, Mark Lacey, "A Decade after Massacres, Rwanda Outlaws Ethnicity," New York Times 2004, Government of Rwanda, "The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda," (2003), art. 13, 33. 544 Des Forges, "The Ideology of Genocide," 47, Jefremovas, "Contested Identities.," Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, 127. 545 NURC, "The Process of Decentralization and Democratization in Rwanda: Opinion Survey," ed. National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Republic of Rwanda, 2004), 19-20. 546 See Elisabeth King and Susan Thomson, "Social Cohesion as Political Exclusion? Ingando Camps and the Policy of National Unity in Post-Genocide Rwanda" (paper presented at the Ethnicity and Democratic Governance Network Conference, Montreal, October 2007), Chi Mgbako, "Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda," Harvard Human Rights Journal 18 (2005). 547 Evelyn Leopold, "New Multilateral Push Aims to Cut African Poverty," Reuters South Africa, September 15 2007.

172 Rwanda's economic development based on the UN Millennium Development Goals and in 2002 it introduced Rwanda's Poverty Reduction Strategy as a roadmap for reaching these goals.548 In 2007, it joined the . Since the genocide,

Rwanda's HDI rating has risen to twentieth from the bottom549. Poverty rates have decreased from about 77% in 1995 to 57% in 2006,550 an achievement rendered more impressive in light of population growth.

Rwanda's government demonstrated much initiative in addressing the "pillars" of peacebuilding discussed in Chapter 1. Indeed, I was able to conduct my research in relative safety in all parts of Rwanda. Rwandans were very welcoming and willing to meet with me - all of which would have been substantially more difficult a decade ago.

This image of stability and progress dominates international reporting. At the time of writing, two newspaper articles particularly caught my attention. The first, in

Toronto's Globe and Mail, was entitled A Picture and A Thousand Words. The photograph showed two Rwandan men hugging and smiling. The byline read "[t]he man on the right killed the sister of the man on the left. Today, they're best friends."551 The second, appearing in the New York Times was entitled Africa Land of Hope. Award- winning journalist Nicolas Kristof presented Rwanda as a positive model of economic

548 MINECOFIN, "Rwanda Vision 2020," Government of Rwanda, "Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Prsp)," (International Monetary Fund, 2002). 549 UNDP, "Human Development Index 2006," (United Nations Development Programme, 2006). Although Rwanda has made progress in health and education, this will take some time to appear given the measures of the HDI. According to the UNDP, the rise in Rwanda's ranking is partly due to the decrease in ranking of several other countries that have fallen into conflict. See UNDP, "Turning Vision 2020 into Reality: From Recovery to Sustainable Human Development," (Kigali: United Nations Development Programme, 2007), 7. 550 UNDP, "Turning Vision 2020 into Reality," 6. The report uses a national poverty line of 0.44 USD per day. 551 Debra Black, "A Picture and a Thousand Words," The Toronto Star, August 26 2007.

173 development and was so optimistic about Rwanda's future that he offered "an investment tip: Buy real estate in.. .Rwanda."552

But the foregoing is a very partial story. While there are inspiring people and stories in Rwanda, they cannot be generalized into an exclusive image of stability, reconciliation and hope, as is too often done. Much as I highlighted the continuity between colonial and post-colonial regimes in the last chapter, "there is a striking continuity from the pre-genocide to the post-genocide regime in Rwanda."553 Several authors argue that positive assessments of post-genocide Rwanda stem from the guilt of the international community at having failed to stop the genocide, and the consequent international acceptance of reality being "what Rwanda's political leaders, as moral guardians, tell the world...it is."554 Indeed, the RPF has successfully presented itself as the representative of genocide victims and as such, not open to challenge.555 The Kigali regime uses what Reyntjens calls a "genocide credit" to silence critique.556 It is also extremely adept at presenting an "easy-to-grasp, seemingly uncontested narrative" that

NGOs, the press, and newcomer academics seem happy to swallow. The Kagame regime further makes meaningful investigation of some topics in Rwanda very difficult with the potential of expulsion or punishment.557 A couple of NGOs with whom I am in regular contact asked that I not report their most recent comments for fear of their work being

552 Nicholas Kristof, "Africa: Land of Hope," New York Times, July 5 2007. 553 Filip Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship," African Affairs 103 (2004), 208. See also Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 367. 554 Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, 207. 555 Ibid., 176, Claudine Vidal, "Les Commemorations du Genocide au Rwanda," Les Temps Modernes 613 (2001), 43. 556 Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, 199. 557 For more on the themes of this paragraph, see Ibid, Filip Reyntjens, "Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: Problematising 'Liberation' and 'Democratisation'," Third World Quarterly 27, no. 6 (2006), Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years On."

174 discontinued by the government. Such a fate has recently come to bear on several human rights organizations and the author of the most recent UNDP report.558

When one examines Rwanda's post-genocide record without RPF lenses, or what

Pottier calls their effective "spin-doctor[ing],"559 the picture changes quite dramatically.

First, there is increasing concentration of power around a small group of former Tutsi exiles from Uganda. A 2002 report by the International Crisis Group includes an illustrative list of political affiliations of the main Rwandan leaders - 24 of 36 ministry portfolios were held by RPF members, as were 11 of 12 provincial leadership positions,

13 of 15 diplomatic missions, and eight of nine top security service positions. Both of the country's largest institutions for tertiary education were also headed by RPF members at the time of the report.560 At the time of writing in 2007, list-servs maintained by the

Rwandan diaspora, and including significant Tutsi membership, were circulating lists of government positions by ethnic group and showing strong Tutsi dominance.561

Second, paired with what Reyntjens calls this "new "562 (little house), reinvoking the term used to describe Habyarimana's closest associates, Rwanda is currently much closer to authoritarianism and dictatorship than to democracy. Under a

"facade of pluralism", the Rwandan government arrests or sends its opponents into exile,

558 HRW, "Rwanda: Parliament Seeks to Abolish Rights Group," (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004), Julianne Kippenberg, "Rwanda: Still in Our Human Rights Blind Spot," The Observer, July 25 2004, James Munyaneza, "Rwanda: I Didn't Read UN Report before Launch - Musoni," New Times, August 24 2007. 559 Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, 52. 560 International Crisis Group ICG, "Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary Political Liberalisation," in Africa Report (Nairobi and Brussels: 2002), 34-9. 561 Rwanda-1, Liste Non Exhaustive Des Dirigeants Actuels Rwandais: Un Vrai Fiasco: Message 122704 (2007), Rwanda-1, Rwanda: Liste Nominative Non Exhaustive Des Dirigeants Monoethniques: Message 123145 (2007). 562 Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years On," 187.

175 and keeps civil society and the press under tight control. It defends these actions with the institution of a vague offense called "divisionism", of which one can be charged and jailed. Meant to eradicate "genocide ideology", it increasingly seems to mean simply disagreeing with the government.564

Third, the RPF has committed vast human rights abuses. Reports indicate that the

RPF committed widespread killings during the civil war (1990-3) and during the genocide.565 Since 1994, the RPF has engaged in killing and other violations of human rights in two wars in the Congo (1996-7,1998-2003) and in massacres in Rwanda such as at the Kibeho IDP camp in April 1995.566 Human rights organizations further condemn the RPF's day-to-day infringements upon human rights including the unfairness of gacaca and poor prison conditions.567 In contrast to its strong emphasis on justice for

Hutu perpetrators of genocide, the RPF downplays or ignores its own violations and thus reigns with relative impunity.568

Fourth, even with economic progress and a rising HDI rating, the vast majority of

Rwandans still live on subsistence agriculture in very difficult conditions. Despite

See ICG, "Rwanda at the End of the Transition." For recent updates on the lack of press freedoms, see AI, " Report 2007: Rwanda," (Amnesty International, 2007), Anonymous, "Media Group Fears for Press Freedom in Rwanda," Independent Online, September 13 2007, Reporters sans Frontieres, "Four Ministers Threaten Independent Media in Comments on State TV and Radio," (Paris: Reporters sans Frontieres, 2007), Robert Mukombozi, "Rwanda: Govt Officials Warn Journalists," The Monitor, September 13 2001. 564 Government of Rwanda, "The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda." See especially articles 9, 54, 179. Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years On," Senate of Rwanda, "Rwanda Genocide Ideology." 565 See Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, chapter "The Rwandan Patriotic Front," Eltringham, Accounting for Horror, 100-46. 566 For more on the Congo Wars, see Eltringham, Accounting for Horror, 118-46, Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda. For more on Kibeho, see Jennie E. Burnet, "Genocide Lives in Us: Amplified Silence and the Politics of Memory in Rwanda" (North Carolina, 2005), 175-204. 567 AI, "Amnesty International Report 2007," Freedom House International, "Freedom in the World: Country Report: Rwanda," (2006), HRW, "World Report 2007: Rwanda," (2007). When I visited Kigali's Central Prison - built for 2500 - in April 2006, it still housed over 5700 inmates. 568 While some RPF/A soldiers have been arrested and tried for human rights abuses, their number is small, and most remain outside of the jurisdiction of the ICTR. See Eltringham, Accounting for Horror, 144-6, Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 362.

176 receiving $55 per capita in foreign aid, more than most sub-Saharan African countries, over half of the population lives below the poverty line.569 The original copy of the 2007

UNDP report (thereafter rejected by the Rwandan government) found marked and growing inequality amongst Rwandans.570

Finally, there are deep and multiple cleavages in Rwanda that are hidden by stories such as the one of the student heroes at the beginning of the chapter and that of the two best friends, formerly victim and killer, presented above. Just as the meaning and content of Hutu and Tutsi changed over time through pre-colonialism, colonialism and independence, they changed again through genocide. Starting in April 1994, to be a Tutsi was to be a target. To be a Hutu was to be a perpetrator, coerced into action by extremist

Hutu, or threatened with death for failure to do so. Post-genocide efforts at outlawing ethnicity also transformed these categories. In some ways, as we will see below, these categories were put underground, invested with new implications, but not erased. People have found new ways to use these old categories. To the government, "survivors" refer to Tutsi, "perpetrators" to Hutu; "old case load refugees" refer to mainly Tutsi that fled

Rwanda pre-genocide, "new case load refugees" denote Hutu that left during and after genocide. Staff at one international agency that I visited used "trees" (Tutsi) and

"bushes" (Hutu) as code words. Some researchers ask people if they are a "T" or an "H."

One taxi driver, presumably Hutu, described himself to me as "of those not liked in

Rwanda." Ordinary Rwandans also still understand each other in ethnic terms. Most of my interview participants shared their ethnic identity with me or gave me strong clues to

569 UNDP, "Turning Vision 2020 into Reality," 1,3. Current poverty rates are 56.9% based on 0.44 USD per day. 570 See Munyaneza, "Rwanda.," UNDP, "Turning Vision 2020 into Reality: Addendum - Corrigendum," (Kigali: United Nations Development Programme, 2007), UNDP, "Turning Vision 2020 into Reality."

177 ensure that I understood it, and also referred to others ethnically. It is a valid concern that researchers continue to use these terms and thus keep them alive. However, the fact that my participants identified themselves and others as Hutu or Tutsi without me having to ask indicates that these categories remain salient identity markers for people themselves.

People's lives are, at the same time, complex and do not fit into watertight categories. There remain categories that cut across ethnicity, such as rural/subsistence vs. urban/market economy, and religion; clans and extended families often include Hutu and

Tutsi as well. On the other hand, the post-genocide period has also brought new societal schisms. For example, there are important differences between Tutsi that grew up outside of Rwanda and those that spent their lives in the country. There have been public denunciations by Ibuka, the largest survivor organization, that the (mostly foreign Tutsi) government is ill-representing their interests.571 Tutsi that stayed in Rwanda are sometimes suspected by new arrivals as having been genocide collaborators572 - how else could they be alive? Tutsi from different countries of exile also find themselves to be markedly different; growing up in Uganda or Zaire or Burundi makes for distinctive experiences, and language learned in exile has created new cleavages. Hutu also have vastly different experiences of exile - be it the relatively ordered refugee camps in

Tanzania or the repressive suffering of Goma, for example. Innocent Hutu are frequently grouped in with the guilty, perhaps due to an accused family member. Life is particularly difficult for those of mixed ethnic parentage, often refused acceptance by all sides. In some ways, while the Rwandan government has strived for unity in homogeneity, in an

571 See Vidal, "Les Commemorations," 44. 572 Nat J. Colletta and Michelle L. Cullen, Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000), 44, Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 206.

178 all encompassing "Rwandaness" not to be disaggregated, it has, in fact, to confront unprecedented diversity.

The current government is a firm believer in the "makeability of things."

Consistent with many scholars who have called Rwandans particularly obedient to authority,574 the current government is working on a presumption that it can tell

Rwandans what to do and that they will do it; that it can engineer a new reality relatively easily. This plays out in many forums and is important for the forthcoming analysis of education. The logic of the Kagame regime seems to go as follows: "tell them to reconcile and the population will do so. Teach them a new history and they will embrace it. Notify them that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa no longer exist and it will be so." While on the surface, ordinary Rwandans may appear to embrace these initiatives, my interviews revealed deep-seated disagreement. As one Rwandan woman told me, "when one goes in the street he says 'hello, hello, all is well' (smiling), but he does not dare reveal his real opinion or else they will imprison or kill us."575

From what looked to be a promising start after the genocide, the political situation in Rwanda has progressively deteriorated. Many expatriate aid workers and scholars with experience in the region share a dismal prognosis of Rwanda and many are particularly concerned about the possibility of renewed violence. As one NGO worker told me, "the thought from those that have been here a long time is that the same thing that happened in

1994 will happen again [with]in 20 years."576 Reyntjens provided a similar warning:

"For someone like the present author, who warned against massive violence during the

573 Interview 21, female Tutsi, Kigali. 574 Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 23,318, Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 57. 575 Interview 52, female Hutu, north. 576 Interview 86.

179 years leading up to 1994, it is frustrating to wonder whether, in two, five or ten years from now, the international community, again after the facts, will have to explain why

Rwanda has descended into hell once more."577 Might education be able to help mitigate against such an outcome?

4.2 The Development of Formal Education after Genocide

Rwanda's school system was severely affected by the violence that engulfed the country. The last normal year of schooling was 1990 and schools closed completely during the 1994 genocide. Much of the educational infrastructure was destroyed.

Schools themselves were often sites of mass atrocities.578 About 75% of teachers were killed, fled the country, or were imprisoned on charges of genocide.579

Students in Rwanda's post-genocide schools also faced a multitude of challenges.

A very high proportion of children had witnessed a death in the immediate family. More than 1.2 million children were left orphaned, representing 16% of the entire population, or nearly one third of all children. Over 100 000 children lived in child-headed households. Some children returned from a life in exile, while others fled the country with their parents to refugee camps, to return a few years later with often horrific

577 Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years On," 210. 578 For illustrations, see Michael Caton-Jones, "Shooting Dogs," (2005). This film, based on reality, is set at a European-run secondary school that becomes the site of massacres. Witness also the Murambi genocide memorial, a school turned killing-ground. See National Museum of Rwanda, Murambi Genocide Memorial Center (undated), available from http://www.museum.gov.rw/2_museums/murambi/genocide_memorial/pages_html/page_intro.htm. 579 Republic of Rwanda, "Study of the Education Sector in Rwanda," (Kigali: Rwandeses Republic, Ministry of Education; UNESCO & UNDP, 1997), 13. 580 Paul Geltman and Eric Stover, "Genocide and the Plight of Rwanda's Children: Letter from Kigali," Journal of the American Medical Association 277, no. 4 (1997). See also Obura, Never Again, 50, Anna Obura, "Planning a Systemic Response to the Needs of Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children in Rwanda: Draft Report," (Kigali: MINEDUC, 2005), ix, 19.

180 experiences. They brought with them different languages and varied education backgrounds. As one Rwandan student told me, "[i]t was very serious. We were mixed because we had people that came from other countries. From Tanzania, from Burundi, from Congo. Some spoke Swahili, others English, others French. All in one classroom!"582 Many of the Rwandans with whom I had conversations spoke of trauma.583 "It was terrible. There were those that had lost their parents, others that didn't know where there parents had gone. There was a lot of famine and a lot of problems with

school fees. No stability. And we were still scared that war would return to the

country."584 Or as a teenage boy told me in a strangely casual tone, "I was a bit

traumatized. I saw a lot of machete-ing and such."585 Overall, the new Rwandan

government inherited an education system in trouble.

The new government made schooling a top priority. Explicitly blaming the past

education system, and the curriculum in particular, for the "self-destruction of the

country", it focused its efforts not only on reconstruction, but on innovation.586 Education

was quickly assigned a dual role in post-genocide Rwanda, as part of both the

development and national unity agendas.

In terms of development, education is considered "the only factor that is likely to

support the sustained modernization and diversification of modes of cultivations and

For a heart-wrenching account of life in exile for a Rwandan Hutu woman in the DRC, see Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 582 Interview 33, female Tutsi, Kigali. 583 25 participants raised the issue of child trauma (17 Hutu, 17 Tutsi, 4 unknown) and only 1 (Hutu) denied traumatism amongst the school population. Some of the participants included themselves in their explanations of trauma and a few raised the fact that teachers were as traumatized as students. 20 participants (4 Hutu, 8 Tutsi, 1 mixed, 7 unknown) with whom I spoke also discussed the fact that in the post-genocide period, students speak different languages, with a particular concentration of diversity in Kigali. 584 Interview 34, female unidentified ethnicity, south. 585 Interview 32, male Tutsi, Kigali. 586 Republic of Rwanda, "Curriculum in the Service of National Development," 5, Republic of Rwanda, "Conference sur la Politique et la Planification de PEducation au Rwanda," 5,16,25,44, 56.

181 systems of production."587 This emphasis on the developmental potential of schooling is somewhat similar to Habyarimana's approach reviewed in the last chapter. Schooling is also presented as a crucial step for achieving Vision 2020 and the goal of Rwanda becoming a knowledge-based economy.588

At the same time, schooling is assigned a pivotal role in the wider unity and reconciliation package. According to the government, school in the "new Rwanda" is aimed at "training citizens free of any type of discrimination, exclusion and favouritism and thus contributing to the promotion of peace, Rwandese and universal values of justice, solidarity, tolerance and respect for the rights and duties of human beings."589 It is charged with the "detoxification" of youth and with the recreation of "recently eroded

Rwandan values."590 Education is also considered a "structure to neutralize the ideology of genocide."591 The government is targeting formal schooling, non-formal education, non-school based education such as ingando, and popular education, such as radio programmes, in the national unity agenda.

Youth are invested with great hope and responsibility for Rwanda's future and many

Rwandans with whom I spoke raised this issue with me. As a representative of the

National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, explained, this is because 67 per cent of the population are youth below 25 years. So that's a big part of our population... I don't know, maybe I'm biased, but I always believe that it's easier to transform the youth than it is may be to transform someone who is 50 years. Because the very old, older aged, these are the people who have lived through our history. The wounds are still fresh; they have lived throughout these problems.592 This was a common view amongst those with whom I spoke.

587 Republic of Rwanda, "Study of the Education Sector in Rwanda," ii. 588 MINECOFIN, "Rwanda Vision 2020," 13. The report emphasizes Information Technology and a number of interview participants also raised its importance. 589 Republic of Rwanda, "Study of the Education Sector in Rwanda," 23. 590 Republic of Rwanda, "Conference sur la Politique et la Planification de PEducation au Rwanda," 12. 591 Senate of Rwanda, "Rwanda Genocide Ideology," 219. 592 Interview 90.

182 Me I see that we are on the right road, the righttrack . If the big [those with power and status] and we the old, we do not get mixed up in these affairs, [if] we don't teach children, our own children, and even at school we don't talk about it [ethnicity] anymore, I hope that the next generation will be better.593

The policy of the current government is that newborns learn that they are all the same. We are counting on those that are currently being born! It is hard for the old, and it is also hard for the young because they are being born amongst the contaminated.594 All together, these are huge aspirations for children and an education system.

Paradoxically, despite being blamed for exacerbating intergroup relations in the past, the Kagame government locates tremendous hopes and plans in both formal and informal education. Decision-makers may not know of other ways to collectively plan to change society, especially ones that allow the government to maintain its ethnically disproportionate power.

In many ways, Rwanda's expectations for education have been matched by inputs.

A large quantity of resources was, and continues to be, directed towards education. In

1996, budget allocations to the several ministries responsible for education (later consolidated into one Ministry of Education) represented 15% of the government's ordinary budget and subsequently rose to over 20% in 1997 and 1998. More than 60% of these budgets were allocated to primary schooling.595 Today, education is the single largest expenditure in the national budget, double that of health care.596 In post-genocide

Rwanda, the UK's Department for International Development is the government's largest bilateral partner and is providing significant ongoing support for education.597

593 Interview 3, female Tutsi, Kigali. 594 Interview 37, male Tutsi, south. This participant suggested that Rwanda's future would be better if the children born today could be raised elsewhere (not among "the contaminated"), then brought back to Rwanda. 595 MINEDUC, "Consultation Sectorielle sur l'Education au Rwanda," ed. Ministere de l'Education (Republique du Rwanda, 1998), 39, Republic of Rwanda, "Study of the Education Sector in Rwanda," iv. 596 UNDP, "Turning Vision 2020 into Reality," 23. 597 Sam Kanyarukiga et al., "Evaluation of DfID Country Programmes: Country Study Rwanda 2000- 2005," (Department for International Development (DfID), 2006), xi. About five percent of all British aid to Africa goes to Rwanda, totaling approximately 168 million pounds between 2000 and 2005.

183 After the genocide, the new government maintained the basic structure of education at six years of primary, six years of secondary (or two to three years at technical centres), and four years of tertiary education. It built upon this base with a clear three-point plan; the first focus was on access. The government reopened primary schools by mid-September 1994. It organized exams in several languages for promotion past primary by March 1995 at the same time as it reopened most private secondary schools. Public secondary schools and the National University (NUR) reopened by April

1995, just a year after the genocide had begun. Following its Education for All commitments,598 the government aimed to rapidly expand primary-school intake via

(re)building schools, more equitably distributing schools across the country, attracting more teachers, and promoting education.599 The 2003 Constitution made explicit that

"[e]very person has the " and declared primary schooling "compulsory" and "free in public schools."600 The desperate situation of the Rwandan population was illustrated in that the abolition of 300 RWF school fees, about 52 cents US, raised the net primary enrolment rate about 6% in just one year.601 At the same time, student uniforms also became optional, and a free textbook distribution program to schools began.602 As we will see in the next section, the government made remarkable progress towards their first goal of access to schooling.

The second focus of the three-point plan was improvement of the quality of teaching and learning. When I talked to participants about the improvements they would

598 UNESCO, "Dakar Framework for Action," (Dakar: World Education Forum, 2000), UNESCO, "Jomtien Declaration: World Declaration on Education for All," (Jomtien: 1990). 599 Republic of Rwanda, "Conference sur la Politique et la Planification de l'Education au Rwanda," 18, Republic of Rwanda, "Study of the Education Sector in Rwanda," x. 600 Government of Rwanda, "The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda," art. 40. 601 Obura, "Peace, Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution," 13. 602 Obura, "Planning a Systemic Response," 7, 26. Making uniforms optional had been suggested before but was not widely adopted. Many parents and students alike see status in uniforms and want them.

184 like to see in Rwandan schools, the most-mentioned answer had to do with the quality of schools. Participants explained that classrooms are too full; that the quality of rural schools lags far behind those in urban areas - indeed that school quality varies enormously; that teachers need to be better trained and better paid; and that schools require more material and better infrastructure.603 Many classes consist of only a blackboard and children do not have textbooks. Some "schools", especially in the east of the country, do not have physical structures, and I was frequently told about children being schooled outside in the shade of trees.604

The third area of intervention was the amelioration of the management of primary education. The consolidation of the multiple ministries responsible for education and subsequent efforts at decentralization are examples.605 The government is still working on all three goals, but has the most to do on these latter two.

The government also worked on curriculum. Rwanda's government suspended history teaching from schools in 1994 in recognition of the divisive role that history played in Rwanda and of its mobilizational use in the lead-up to genocide. This suspension was not unusual for a post-violence environment, but the formality of the moratorium was somewhat unique.606 The government placed the rewriting of history amongst its priorities and suggested the need to "publish a manual of Rwanda's history

For similar concerns, see Republic of Rwanda, "Study of the Education Sector in Rwanda," 69. Likewise, in a Rwandan survey of households, 49.6% said they were dissatisfied with educational provision. 91.2% of these said the reason was lack of books, material and furniture. See Republic of Rwanda, "Curriculum in the Service of National Development," 6. 604 NURC, "Children's Summit Report " (paper presented at the Children's Summit, Intercontinental Hotel Kigali, April 29-30 2004), 19. 605 Kanyarukiga et al, "Evaluation of DfID Country Programmes," 3, MINEDUC, "Consultation Sectorielle sur PEducation au Rwanda," 14-7, Republic of Rwanda, "Study of the Education Sector in Rwanda," iii-xi, 31. 606 Judy Barsalou, "Unite or Divide? The Challenges of Teaching History in Societies Emerging from Violent Conflict" (paper presented at the USIP Grant Program Roundtable, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, November 21 2005).

185 that will permit to rehabilitate certain historical truths that had been sacrificed for the sake of ideological manipulation."607 History curriculum has remained on the agenda for the National Curriculum Development Centre since it was established in 1996. In 1999 the government suggested that history should be taught in schools for two hours each week but did not offer substantial guidelines, or any textbooks or teaching material and

"thus a virtual moratorium on the teaching of history was maintained."608 Two current initiatives, discussed below, are beginning to move Rwanda away from the moratorium.

The new government also changed the language policies of Rwanda's schools.

As we saw in previous chapters, prior to 1994, French and Kinyarwanda had been the mediums of instruction. The post-1994 government is aiming for a trilingual society, adding English as a third official language and dedicating approximately 45% of the primary school week to learning languages.609 The first three years of primary school are taught in Kinyarwanda, with English or French as subjects. In the latter three years, the language of instruction is French in about 95% of Rwanda's primary schools, with

English as a subject.610 Some schools in Kigali and some private schools teach in English with French as a subject. Higher education occurs in both French and English. The inclusion of English reflects the importance of Rwandan English speakers, especially from Uganda, and is said to be for the improvement of relations with Rwanda's neighbours and for better international commerce, trade, and education opportunities.

Language, however, has become a very sensitive political issue at risk of dividing the

607 Republic of Rwanda, "Conference sur la Politique et la Planification de PEducation au Rwanda," 48. 608 Harvey M. Weinstein, Sarah Warshauer Freedman, and Holly Hughson, "School Voices: Challenges Facing Education Systems after Identity-Based Conflicts," Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 2, no. 1 (2007), 55-6. 609 Republic of Rwanda, "Curriculum in the Service of National Development," 27. 610 Kanyarukiga et al., "Evaluation of DfID Country Programmes," 35.

186 society into Anglophone and Francophone Rwandans or of replicating "historical language divides related to power and ethnicity."611

Similarly to its approach to ethnicity in the wider Rwandan context, the post- genocide government has outlawed ethnic identity from schools. Students are no longer asked their ethnicities in class. The government also repealed the law instituting secondary school quotas, thus officially banning "all forms of discrimination and favouritism" and instituting a meritocracy.612 It also created the National Examination

Council to ensure fair standards. At the 1995 Policy and Planning meeting for the education sector, participants asked the international community to "never again make reference... to the ethnicisation of Rwandans" and asked UNESCO to help them to "ban, in all international media, the division of the Rwandan people through ethnicisation."613

The 2007 UNDP report commends the education sector as "in many ways, an example of what well-planned, coordinated and targeted investments can achieve in terms of human and economic development."614 But how does Rwandan schooling fare through the lens of peace and conflict management?

4.3 An Assessment of the Role of Schooling (1994 - 2008)

This section argues that while the current Rwandan government's educational policies have made some important strides towards peacebuilding, especially in terms of primary school structure, they are also replicating numerous negative tendencies in new guises. First, this section reviews relevant research methods. Second, it presents my

611 Ibid., 4, John Rutayisire, "Education for Social and Political Reconstruction - the Rwandan Experience from 1994 to 2004" (paper presented at the BAICE, September 2004), 13. 612 Republic of Rwanda, "Conference sur la Politique et la Planification de PEducation au Rwanda," 21. 613 Ibid., 51. 614 UNDP, "Turning Vision 2020 into Reality," 22.

187 findings beginning with those relating to the structure of education, then focusing on the content of Rwandan primary schools. Third, it draws some conclusions.

4.3a Research Design

To prepare this chapter, I coded 65 interviews. 40 participants were students and/or teachers in post-genocide primary schools. I included 10 interviews with experts.

I also included discussions with 15 citizens that I had interviewed in other capacities for earlier chapters, and that also offered their opinions as parents on the issues of post- genocide education. The interviews were fairly evenly split between Hutu and Tutsi, men and women, and participants with different socio-economic backgrounds. Participants played a variety of roles in the genocide and had been in many different places in 1994. I spoke with people from diverse parts of Rwanda, although more than half of the participants were based in Kigali. These interviews were complemented by a number of less formal conversations with Rwandans and other scholars, and by investigation of a variety of primary documents.

To analyse my findings, I again prepared spreadsheets and pivot tables to mine the data for the trends that I discuss below in the findings of this chapter. Again, analysis was complicated. First, while I tried to cover the same set of issues with all participants,

I let interviews take their own course. For example, with one participant, an orphan from the north of the country, most of our conversation focused upon school funding. We did not get around to talking about the teaching of history or ethnicity, and I did not get the impression that those were issues of primary concern for her. Coding is thus imperfect, but faithful to my experience and that of Rwandans. Furthermore, it is particularly

188 challenging to discuss and assess ongoing projects such as access to schools, school practices, and history teaching since objectives and methods are in flux.

Second, participant demographics were complicated, making cross-tabulation very difficult. For example, Tutsi were over-represented in my interviews in the upper- income demographic, among experts, in private schools, and in Kigali. Similarly, all participants from the north were Hutu, most represented modest average backgrounds and all had experience with public schools. As one foreign expert put it, "wealth, class and ethnic group are fascinatingly intertwined in Rwanda."615 While true, this is also an over- generalization, and it may be possible to find more diversity in future work.

Third, as in past chapters, the current political context affected interviews and the free expression of ideas. While successive Rwandan governments have been adept at manipulating foreign press and scholarship, as discussed in part 4.1 of this chapter, the

RPF is a master in this skill. Indeed, this realization made me see in new light some of the choices I made in Chapter 3. The arrival of the populations, pre-colonial harmony, ubuhake clientelism and the 1959 Revolution - historical issues upon which Rwandans,

and thus I, focused in the last chapter - are all dominant parts of the RPF narrative that became clearer in studying current renditions of history. The current public transcript

also includes the message that pre-genocide education failed the nation and this is used as justification for new educational initiatives.

Interview 85.

189 4.3b Findings

Structure: Access to Primary School

All participants with whom I discussed access to primary school (29) felt that admittance was equal for all Rwandans. In fact, several participants highlighted that parents could be punished for failing to send their children to school.616 Promisingly, no participants claimed discrimination or inequality on ethnic grounds.

The government has had great success at raising the enrolment rates at schools. From

a primary Net Enrolment Rate (NER) of 65.3% in 1997 and a rate of 73.3% in 2001,

NER rose to approximately 93% in 2004 and may be as high as 97% today, although provincial disparities in registration are significant.617 The 2007 Education for All

Monitoring Report states that NER in Sub-Saharan Africa averages 65%, putting Rwanda

admirably well above average.618 Gender parity has also been achieved in Rwanda's primary enrolment, although fewer girls complete primary school than boys.619 This

achievement is particularly significant as less than 30% of the 39 sub-Saharan African

countries studied by UNESCO have achieved gender parity in primary education.620

While access to schools is greatly improved over previous periods, a good number (6

Hutu, 4 Tutsi, 1 unknown) opined that primary school has hidden costs and mentioned

Parents that fail to send their children to school can be fined between 500 and 5000 RWF (approximately 1 to 10 USD). Obura, "Planning a Systemic Response," 7. 617 For 1997 numbers, see Republic of Rwanda, "Study of the Education Sector in Rwanda," 64, note incorrect numbers on p.vi. For 2001 and 2004 figures, see Kanyarukiga et al., "Evaluation of DfID Country Programmes," 34, UNDP, "Turning Vision 2020 into Reality," 23. For 2007 figures, see Gasheegu Muramila, "Primary School Enrollment Rises," New Times, September 30 2007. On provincial disparities, see Obura, "Planning a Systemic Response," 23. 618 UNESCO, "Factsheet: Sub-Saharan Africa - Education for All Global Monitoring Report," (2007). 619 UNDP, "Turning Vision 2020 into Reality," 24. 620 UNESCO, "Factsheet: Sub-Saharan Africa."

190 serious attendance problems (5 Hutu, 6 Tutsi, 1 unknown), especially for the poor, orphans, and children head of households.621

It is too expensive. For example, here our students pay 2000 francs [about 4 USD for chalk and classroom material] to come to this school. But many don't find it.622

[Parents need to pay] school fees, uniforms, exercise books, pens, PTA [Parent-Teacher Association] money. Schools ask for contributions for guards salaries, for windows. So actually going to school is really expensive. Some schools absolutely insist on uniforms. It is about 5000 francs [about 10 USD] for uniform and books.623

Actual attendance is probably much lower than the NER would suggest, drop-out rates remain high at approximately 15 to 20%, and repetition rates are above 20%.624 While access is much improved, experts agree that targeting the most marginal populations is a significant challenge. Importantly, access to primary school does not play out on ethnic lines.

Structure: Promotion Past Primary School

Participants also noted a great improvement in equality of access to secondary school in comparison with past periods. The number of secondary school spots is still far below demand; the most recent figures put secondary NER at 10% nationally and 7.9% in rural areas, with a Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) of just over 15%.625 These are very low rates, even by Sub-Saharan African standards where average secondary school GER

For more "challenges remaining for a fee-free system of education," see Obura, "Planning a Systemic Response," 55-6. Indeed, when I spoke with Rwandans about the improvements they would like to see to their primary education system, 22 participants (10 Hutu, 8 Tutsi, 2 mixed, 2 unknown) raised questions of access, especially for these vulnerable populations. 622 Interview 3, female Tutsi, Kigali. 623 Interview 86. 624 Kanyarukiga et al., "Evaluation of DfID Country Programmes," 34, Obura, "Planning a Systemic Response," 22, 26. 625 Kanyarukiga et al., "Evaluation of DfiD Country Programmes," 25. Figures vary from report to report. See MINECOFIN, "Rwanda Vision 2020," 25, Muramila, "Primary School Enrollment Rises.," Republic of Rwanda, "Study of the Education Sector in Rwanda," vii, 124. There are also great provincial disparities, where Kigali town, for example reaches nearly 50% NER, see Obura, "Planning a Systemic Response," 25.

191 hovers around 30%. Only about 25% of Rwanda's grade six candidates pass the exams at the end of primary school.627 However, of the 26 participants with whom I discussed promotion to secondary school, representing a cross-section of Rwandans, all suggested that, in contrast to the past, access is now based on merit.

When we correct [the exams], we write the number of the child, without even writing the child. We correct the child without knowing his name, and after we put the list [of those that passed] without even knowing the name.628

It is really positive. Because the person is appreciated by merit, not only her origin. Although there is the problem of rich/poor. But it's only based on success. And that is really encouraging for all sides.629

Now, if a parent comes from a place, to come and beg a Minister to allow his child to go to school. Now it's no longer the case. We mark exams, and it is the national council [that] sends you to the schools you are supposed to go to...The Minister does not have the right now to allocate schools like before.630 A number of participants also mentioned that there are now more tertiary opportunities than there were in the past.

Several participants, however, raised obstacles said to impair equitable access.

First, finances again emerged as an impediment to access for Rwandans. Many of the

Rwandans with whom I spoke (9 Hutu, 5 Tutsi, 1 mixed, 1 unknown) emphasized the high cost of secondary schooling and 11 participants (8 Hutu, 2 Tutsi, 1 mixed) bemoaned the high cost of university.

Second, several introduced the fact that scholarships, under the Fonds d'Assistance aux Rescapes du Genocide (FARG), exist for genocide survivors. Created in 1998, FARG is a programme for needy survivors to help offset school fees (especially secondary level), healthcare and housing. Approximately 5% of the national budget is

UNESCO, "Factsheet: Sub-Saharan Africa." Obura, "Planning a Systemic Response," 33. Interview 2, male Tutsi, Kigali. Interview 1, male Tutsi, Kigali. Interview 78.

192 directed towards FARG. At the 2006 Children Summit that brought together selected children from across the country, FARG was raised by the student speakers as one of the most pressing obstacles to unity and reconciliation.632 Similarly, of the 35 Rwandans with whom I discussed FARG, only 10 felt that it was not a problem for the relationship amongst Rwandans. Some (14) believed that it was both a problem and not, while 11 deemed FARG definitively problematic for intergroup relations. Opinions fell roughly along ethnic lines. The great majority of those that highlighted its difficulty were Hutu

(8/11); none self-identified as Tutsi. Contrarily, most that denied FARG was a problem were Tutsi (6/10) while fewer were Hutu (3/10).

In more detailed conversation about the problematic aspects of this funding, 13 participants explained that recipients of FARG are equated with Tutsi (7 Hutu, 4 Tutsi, 1 mixed, 1 unknown).

So, for example, excuse me for using the correct word, if we take a Hutu child, he is not involved [in FARG]. But, since the government is paying for he who was touched [by genocide] and his family is not capable of paying for his school fees, he is jealous, because he sees another, a Tutsi, and the government is paying for him. It makes that one start saying, 'oh so FARG is for Tutsi children'. He doesn't connect it to those that lost people.633

I am a child alone in the world. No father, no mother, no brothers, no sisters. I am alone. I am not able to be helped by the FARG because it is for children with Tutsi fathers and Tutsi mothers. But me, my mother was Tutsi, my father no.634

If I have no parents because of the war. The other has no parents because of genocide. He [the former] should also be helped, but the Hutu is not helped.635 In law, rescape is defined as "persons that escaped genocide and massacres perpetrated in

Rwanda between October 1st 1990 and December 31 1994" and the fund is intended for

631 Susanne Buckley-Zistel, "Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda," Africa 76, no. 2 (2006), 139. 632 Personal notes from attendance. 633 Interview 32, male Tutsi, Kigali. 634 Interview 60, female of mixed ethnicity, north. 635 Interview 61, female Hutu, south.

193 the very "needy, especially orphans, widows and the handicapped." The definition is not reserved solely for Tutsi, although "massacres" - a term used for killings of Hutu - is not included in the acronym. However, I met no Hutu recipients of FARG, a leading expert with whom I spoke was not aware of any Hutu beneficiaries, and FARG receivers have been used as a proxy for Tutsi in some research.

Participants told me that FARG recipients are readily identified by their classmates (6 Hutu, 6 Tutsi, 2 unknown). Many also opined that FARG causes jealousy of the receivers (7 Hutu, 6 Tutsi, 1 mixed). A number of participants suggested that the mode of distribution, often calling recipients to the front of the class to be given books and pens, is particularly problematic in heightening both awareness of beneficiaries and jealousy (1 Hutu, 4 Tutsi, 1 unknown).

In class we say, FARG children, go out to get books, uniforms, pens and notebooks. It is communicated at school. All of the FARG children leave, and the Hutu and kids with parents in prison are left.637

In reality, we have to help children from the genocide that don't have parents, or at least help them cure their trauma. But the way the help comes, it is not really a good way to help them. When we call [FARG survivor] students to the front of the class, right in front of the other students, the children that are still sitting start to become very jealous. Jealous.638 At the time of writing, a Parliamentary report charged some schools with singling out survivors by having them wear different uniforms than the other students. The government judged this to be an example of "genocide ideology." Some school officials argued that the uniforms FARG recipients are wearing are simply newer than those of most students and are the same as those of richer children, although this too sends important messages about survivors' status to students. The report also notes that survivors are being ridiculed in person, through notes, and in graffiti. Some pamphlets

636 Heidy Rombouts, Victim Organisations and the Politics of Reparation: A Case Study on Rwanda (Antwerp & Oxford: Intersentia, 2004), 372. 637 Interview 36, female Hutu, south. 638 Interview 9, male Tutsi, Kigali.

194 are alleged to include violent messages such as: "Tutsi are snakes, we are fed up with them, and we will kill them."639 This is obviously a very worrisome development. While

I did not ask students about this kind of experience directly, it is strange that it arose so vehemently in the report and never in my interviews. My conversations with Rwandan students and teachers suggested more subtle intergroup (survivor - non-survivor) conflict.

For example, much contention centered around the fact that many Rwandans are equally in need, yet are not eligible for FARG (7 Hutu, 2 Tutsi, 1 mixed, 1 unknown).

Indeed, some charged the government with misdistribution of FARG funds (3 Hutu, 1

Tutsi, 1 mixed) to old caseload refugees, or through bribery,640 although recent government efforts, including decentralization, aim to address this concern. While some explained that a scholarship called MINALOC is available to all Rwandans (5 Hutu, 3

Tutsi, 1 mixed, 2 unknown), they also lamented that it allocates substantially fewer funds

(6 Hutu, 1 Tutsi, 1 mixed, 2 unknown). Some expressed concern that genocide survivors were ranked above other types of survivors.

We need to pay for the child survivors of genocide. But there are also others, because our country is amongst the poorest in the world. There are many children who are not survivors of genocide but who really suffer, that have really difficult conditions...MINALOC helps poor children, but they don't help them like they do survivors. That is a problem. For example, here in our school, there are a lot of survivors who come from the city, who have good lives, who have mothers that work for example. While there are other children [not survivors] who live in the country that live miserably.641

The government is trying to make a right, but people they are hiding it, and they put in people [to FARG] who are not orphans, who are not genocide survivors.642

Anonymous, "Rwanda 'Still Teaching Genocide'," BBC News, January 17 2008, Anonymous, "Rwanda: Use All Diplomatic Means to Curb Genocide Ideology," The New Times, December 18 2007, James Buyinza, "Rwanda: Damning Revelations," The New Times, December 12 2007, James Buyinza, "Rwanda: MPs Grill Education Ministers," The New Times, December 19 2007, Geoffrey Mutagoma, "Genocide Hatred Lingers in Rwanda Schools," BBC News, February 19 2008, Florence Mutesi and James Buyinza, "Rwanda: Shocked MPs Condemn Genocide Ideology in Secondary Schools," The New Times, December 13 2007. 640 Burnet, "Genocide Lives in Us," 219. 641 Interview 31, male of mixed ethnicity, south. 642 Interview 19, male Tutsi, Kigali.

195 There are orphans of genocide, AIDS orphans, even those whose mothers were raped during the genocide and are dying now. But some are saying how can they help the ones [former] and leave the others [latter]? They tell us 'if we're not fromth e genocide, we're not orphans'.

On the other hand, 18 participants, representing roughly equally Hutu and Tutsi, men and women, different regions and different educational backgrounds, argued that

FARG is needed, often adding that Rwandans understand this.

Me, I support the FARG, because it there is no FARG, the orphans cannot study. They cannot stay at home while others study. Them, they will think of divisionism. They will think that those that killed their parents, it is them that are killing them [metaphorically].644

Because a survivor has no support, no funding to support that person, no land, nothing. And then you see the poor is a poor, but with the mom and dad, and family and relatives. You can't just compare those together.645

Poverty, you can do something to get out of it. The paths are open, the paths are many.. .But the children of genocide, what can we do? It is not a situation that is reversible.646 Another access issue is the distribution of secondary spots. Students can be sent all over Rwanda for secondary school. As a teacher explained, "a child from Kigali [in the centre of the country], we send him to Cyangugu, right near the Congo."647 Students who receive the highest grades on their exams are given priority in choosing secondary schools and usually prefer schools closest to their homes. This seems fair, but as one

NGO worker explained,

[i]f you have good points on the exam, it is very likely that you were from a good public school. But if you pass, with worse points, they will send you to a secondary school anywhere in the country. This results in lots of school fees and travel costs...The poorer schools have worse teachers, students do worse, and get sent to geographically poor schools, and because the poor can't afford it [those places become available for others - richer students often not allocated through exams].648

Several students raised this concern over equitable access to secondary schools.

643 Interview 67, female Tutsi, Kigali. The same concerns were raised by participants in NURC's national consultations. The government replied that FARG as a way of "discriminating Rwandan people" is "groundless indeed." NURC, "Report on the Evaluation of National Unity and Reconciliation, 23 November 2001,"7,16. 644 Interview 30, female Tutsi, Kigali. 645 Interview 26, male unidentified ethnicity, Kigali. 646 Interview 45, female Hutu, south. 647 Interview 2, male Tutsi, Kigali. 648 Interview 86.

196 Finally, there are increasingly loud complaints that tertiary education in Rwanda, as well as scholarships for overseas education, is dominated by Tutsi. In the research for his 1997 book, Prunier estimated 95% of academic staff and 80% of students at the NUR to be Tutsi. Reyntjens also estimated that over 80% of students were Tutsi and several interview participants expressed concern about Tutsi dominance in tertiary education and other positions of power in the country.649 The charges are serious enough to warrant

President Kagame devoting a good amount of time to denying them in his Opening

Remarks at the 2006 Development Partners Meeting.650 It is difficult to know the proportions of Hutu and Tutsi students in schools with any certainty since, in line with

the banning of ethnicity, such records are no longer kept. Such charges are worrisome be

they true or merely perception amongst Rwandans.

Content: Practices

As in previous chapters, classroom practices can also influence relations between

Rwandans. As discussed above, in the post-genocide period there is much diversity in

Rwandan classrooms. Of the 37 participants with whom I discussed the issue, 29 knew

the "status" - such as returnee, survivor or child of a perpetrator - of all of their

classmates, and six knew some of their classmates' backgrounds. Only two (Hutu)

denied having this knowledge.

I discussed the possibility of problems between students of varying experiences

with 31 participants. Some (4 Hutu, 2 Tutsi, 1 mixed, 3 unknown) said there were no

Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 369, Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years On," 188. Personal communication with attendee.

197 problems whatsoever. More (5 Hutu, 10 Tutsi, 1 mixed, 3 unknown) opined that there were problems between diverse students in the aftermath of war.

For now [its okay], but 99, 2000, the children would get mad. They would say 'we shouldn't forgive!' Really it was very serious. For example, as a teacher, a student could bother you, and you could see that it was a child of a genocidaire. But you couldn't do anything. And when you were in front of that child, seeing that you were Tutsi, he could say 'oh, its one of those Tutsi'.. .But slowly as the years have passed, the children are beginning to understand.651 A couple (2 Tutsi) asserted that problems continue to this day. Overall, Tutsi were much more likely to judge classroom relationships difficult than their Hutu classmates. It seems that the quality of relations between students of different backgrounds fluctuates with the wider political context. A number of Rwandans (2 Hutu, 5 Tutsi, 1 mixed) noted that genocide mourning week and the current gacaca trials heighten tensions in classrooms and in schoolyards. On the other hand, of the 16 people with whom I discussed this issue, 14 said that students of different experiences, backgrounds, languages and ethnicities routinely play together and the remaining two opined that they sometimes do so. A few participants suggested that this was not the case directly after the war, but is now the norm.

There's no problem between students. We played together, ate, all that. It's because we were children. If we were adults, we would have separated.652 I spoke with 43 participants about whether students are still asked their ethnic identity in class, as in the previous period. All commended the government for banning this practice. The government has passed a measure that renders categorization of students and teachers by ethnicity illegal.653

Of course, this does not mean that students are unaware of their ethnicities - most readily identified themselves ethnically. They also frequently made comments that

651 Interview 11, female Tutsi, Kigali. 652 Interview 67, female Tutsi, Kigali. 653 Obura, Never Again, 88.

198 indicated they were well aware of others' ethnicities. In fact, 26 out of 35 (10/15 Hutu;

15/16 Tutsi; 1/4 unknown) said that students know each others' ethnicities, at least by a certain age. Most participants (3/4 Hutu; 6/8 Tutsi) with whom I spoke also said that students know their teachers' ethnicity. The students claimed to know ethnicities primarily based on the situation of the individual - based on role and location during the genocide, as well as on language.

You ask if you have a father, no, you know it's a Tutsi. If you see scars, surely you know. Or someone says they don't have a father, nor a mother, no sisters, and they tell you their whole story. Where they were, what they saw, like that. You get ideas and it [ethnicity] comes out very easily.654

We don't know [in the abstract], but we do know based on money. We are survivors of genocide. The others don't have papers that say that [for FARG]. It's like that that we can differentiate between us.655

Do you think that one with an imprisoned father isn't known as a Hutu? That a child that is paid by FARG isn't recognized as a survivor?656 While some school practices, such as FARG, tend to highlight ethnic status, this is indirect, and no classroom practices explicitly differentiate students ethnically.

I conferred about the language of education with several participants. Rwandans were often proud of the trilingual policy, but were generally disappointed with the quality of language training in their schools. Aptitude in a language other than Kinyarwanda is very important for opportunities in Rwanda and a number of Rwandans raised the improvement of language training as one of their key priorities. Many (11) also raised the disjuncture in the country between French and English speakers and were concerned that this divide could replace or be superimposed upon the Hutu-Tutsi cleavage.657

Interview 56, female Hutu, Kigali. 655 Interview 67, female Tutsi, Kigali. 656 Interview 68, male Hutu, North. 657 A recent student council election at the tertiary-level Kigali Institute for Science and Technology was plagued by Anglophone-Francophone conflict. See Innocent Gahigana, "Phone Wrangles Stall KIST Guild Race," The New Times, June 25 2007.

199 I also discussed pedagogy with some participants. In contrast to past periods, children usually told me that they were free to ask questions in class. The new civics curriculum, discussed in the history section below, recognizes "active learning" in the preface and through suggested classroom activities throughout. Practically though, in the few classes that I observed, the teacher spent most time writing on the board with students copying, although, sometimes a student would be asked to come to the board.

Experts in the country are vocal about the need to develop critical thinking rather than the conformity and blind obedience they sometimes attribute to the past.

Today the consensus is starting to come on how to teach. 'Here are the facts, here is what happened, and here are the diverse interpretations that people make. Can we talk about this?'658

Because it was easy to manipulate a poor man by promising him property, or an illiterate person, each in the sense that it's not knowing how to read and write, but also not knowing about what is happening in national life... But educate them so that they can have a critical mind...Because if you look at the Holocaust, I imagine the Germans were educated, so even educated people can be manipulated but probably if you have critical analysis, if you can critically analyze events, if someone tells you this, you will think twice. You will ask "but what is his interest? Or high [government] interest? What do I get from that?659

Critical thinking is widely embraced, at least in theory, and may well develop as teacher- student ratios are reduced and as the quality of teacher training improves.660 For now though, pedagogy in Rwanda much resembles that of earlier periods.

The implementation of pedagogical changes depends on teachers. As noted above, 75% of teachers were killed, exiled, or imprisoned in 1994, prompting important challenges for installing a post-genocide teaching force. Many teachers have since returned, some Rwandans that were longtime exiles have been added to the teaching cadre, and there are now eleven pedagogical institutes conducting teacher training for

658 Interview 79. 659 Interview 90. 660 Most recently, 88% of primary school teachers have the basic national qualifications - significantly up from 1994. The student-teacher ratio in primary school is still constantly rising;th e ratio was 69:1 in 2005. See UNDP, "Turning Vision 2020 into Reality," 23-4.

200 new and un- or under-qualified teachers. As Njoroge comments, teachers need new kinds of training since they are charged with becoming positive agents of change in post- genocide Rwanda, yet "teachers are among those accused of committing genocide in

Rwanda in 1994."662 Njoroge describes some innovative techniques being implemented at the Kigali Institute of Education (KIE), Rwanda's most elite teacher training institution, to "reconstruct the teacher's psyche."663 Several experienced teachers with whom I spoke mentioned much more basic post-genocide pedagogical training. It is a challenge, however, even for those receiving the most innovative instruction, that teachers are being trained in an increasingly repressive context at odds with some of the values that they may be learning, such as openness to talking about the past that Njoroge notes is encouraged at KIE.664

Content: History Lessons

Turning to history content, the Rwandans with whom I spoke (50) believed that the moratorium on history is still in place since no formal "history class" has yet been introduced. However, two recent initiatives - one at primary, and one at the secondary level - have reintroduced select history into Rwanda's schools. First, in 2004, with funding from UNICEF, Rwanda introduced a civics textbook, A Guide to Civic

Education, into primary classrooms. This text, available in French and English, includes several historical modules currently being taught in Rwanda's schools and foreshadows how more general history texts and curriculum are likely to develop. The units on

661 Republic of Rwanda, "Education Sector Policy," (Kigali: MINEDUC, 2002), 9. 662 George K. Njoroge, "The Reconstruction of the Teacher's Psyche in Rwanda: The Theory and Practice of Peace Education at the Kigali Institute of Education," in Addressing Ethnic Conflict through Peace Education: International Perspectives, ed. Zvi Bekerman and Claire McGlynn (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 663 Ibid. 664 Ibid.

201 National Unity in Rwanda and Genocide and Reconciliation are telling. They discuss the existence of national unity in Rwanda prior to colonialism and how divisions in Rwanda were part of a colonial divide and rule strategy. The units overview "the institutionalization of lies and crime", "loss of cultural identity", "mismanagement of resources", "ethnic ideology" and "social inequality" during the colonial period and after independence. In explaining the "Rwandan genocide,"665 the text dates the first manifestations of hate, injustice and divisions to the "massacre of Tutsi of 1959." It also mentions the 1963 and 1973 killings of Tutsi. The text discusses the development of the by the government of the Second Republic with a mission to murder Tutsi, to pillage and burn their homes, and to massacre their families as RPF spies. It contends that the genocide of 1994, in which "more than one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu" were massacred in 90 days, had been meticulously planned for a long time. The text reviews some of the torturous killing methods. It says that genocide was the work of military and paramilitary groups, politicians and the media. The authors mention that

Hutu judged as traitors for hiding Tutsi were forced to kill them or were killed. It also describes the consequences of genocide, asserts "empathy with refugee problems", and promotes "unity and reconciliation."666

There is also a second initiative to reintroduce history in Rwanda. The American

NGO Facing History and Ourselves (FHAO), the University of California at Berkeley's

School of Education and Human Rights Center, the National University of Rwanda, and

6651 accidentally witnessed an informal debate at the Ministry of Education on the decision to call this the "Rwandan genocide" as opposed to the "Genocide of the Tutsi." The decision to call it the Rwandan genocide is more inclusive than reference only to the genocide of the Tutsi, which is the dominant language in the Senate's Genocide Ideology Report. 666 Jeanne D'arc Baranyizigiye and et al., A Guide to Civic Education: Life Skills for Rwanda Primary Schools, Upper Primary Level - P4 - P5 - P6 (Kigali: National Curriculum Development Centre, 2004), 29- 38.

202 the Rwandan Ministry of Education collaborated to create a pedagogical guide for teaching history in Rwanda's secondary schools.667 Facing History specializes in teaching methods for controversial history in divided societies. They encourage reflection, dialogue, multiple points of view and engaging critical learners. The guide is broken down into modules with diverse research presented such that teachers and students can engage in conversation and critical analysis over four periods of Rwanda's history: the pre-colonial period, colonialism (1897-1962), postcolonial Rwanda (1962-

1990) and later postcolonial Rwanda (1990-1994).668 Although their final product, released in early 2006, is neither a textbook nor curriculum, and is destined only for

Rwanda's secondary schools to which most Rwandans do not have access, it serves as a significant starting point for the reintroduction of history to Rwandan schoolchildren.

The model is meant to be expanded upon by Rwandans. Facing History has importantly paired its launch with training for 250 high school history teachers in Rwanda. While it might be expected that these learnings trickle down to primary schools through teachers with secondary education, whether and how this initiative will translate into wider history teaching remains uncertain.

Indeed, while the FHAO initiative offers a promising approach to history teaching, and I do not wish to minimize its importance, its implementation is thus far relatively limited and its future is uncertain. In contrast, the textbook material introduced

667 Republic of Rwanda, ed., The Teaching of History of Rwanda. 668 The guide presents one theme for each of the periods. The pre-colonial period examines "Clans," the colonialism section focuses upon the "Mortehan Reform," the postcolonial Rwanda theme is "Regional and Ethnic Segregation," and the later postcolonial chapter deals with " and Genocide Ideology." The choice of themes and their method of selection are curious in that they are not the most contentious issues in Rwandan history and attributing such importance to some of the themes, such as "clans" and "education policy and genocide ideology," supports the current government narrative. The periodisation of the past, with the colonial period as the pivotal moment also reflects the centrality of the colonial period to the RPF's narrative. On more broadly, see Eltringham, Accounting for Horror, 159.

203 through civics class is already in place country-wide and the narrative is consistent with wider societal trends, providing strong hints at what we might expect in terms of future history curriculum. In terms of a historical narrative, Pottier argues "the die appears cast."669 There have been harsh government responses to divergent versions of history.670

At one academic conference, in response to a diversity of perspectives expressed, the government of Rwanda announced that "there is one version of history and we know it!"671 The recent Senate report on Genocide Ideology similarly expresses that "the policy of remembrance should offer an unambiguous answer."672 The civics curriculum marginalizes some viewpoints and presents an oversimplified "correct" narrative.

Likewise, a "politically-correct" history is being disseminated through gacaca, public addresses, commemorations, and ingando re-education camps and is being absorbed by Rwandan school children. For example, 15 participants (6 Hutu, 8 Tutsi, 1 unknown) mentioned genocide memorial week as an important source of their historical knowledge. Some schools have formed 'unity and reconciliation' or human rights clubs that incorporate this history. Indeed, the NGO Never Again organized an essay contest with over 3000 participants from Rwandan secondary schools and . It asked participants to answer the question: "Based on the history of Rwanda, what can we the youth do so that genocide should never happen again?" While they expected to receive a multitude of creative ideas, they tellingly received a single narrative. As Hodgkin writes,

Every essay divides the history of Rwanda into pre-colonialism, colonialism and post-colonialism: 'When the white men arrived in Rwanda, they found a land that was under the rule of the king, sharing unity and patriotism.' (Nyirantezimana, 2004, 9). Then, 'after the arrival of the white men, the situation changed -

669 Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, 128. 670 Charles Mugabo, "Do Not Distort Rwanda's History," New Times, August 30 2007, Charles Mugabo, "If All Could Emulate Archbishop Emmanuel Kolini," New Times, September 30 2007, Charles Mugabo, "Rusesabagina's Ill-Conceived Agenda," New Times, September 26 2007. 671 Interview 98. 672 Senate of Rwanda, "Rwanda Genocide Ideology," 200.

204 the youth were taught segregation based on ethnicity, regions and other ideologies' (Kayigema, 2004, 19)/73

Indeed, children have sources for history other than history curriculum. Participants (36), about equally Hutu and Tutsi, men and women, discussed the fact that at least some (15) or all (21) Rwandan children learn history at home since Rwandan children ask questions about their family history. Some teachers also chose to address historical questions in recent years despite the moratorium and lack of material.

Disagreement arose among participants in terms of how they wanted Rwanda's history taught. Indeed, reintroducing history teaching after mass violence involves a series of interlinked questions. In terms of content: Is it possible or desirable to construct a single "true" historical narrative? What will it say about the history that was used by ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize the population to genocide? How will it portray the genocide itself? Process is equally contentious. Who will write the new history curriculum for Rwanda? Will it be considered legitimate? Should certain truths be tempered in the goals of reconciliation and peacebuilding? Answering these questions takes on particular difficulty in light of the political context explored in section 4.1 above.

Many of the Rwandan interview participants wanted history rewritten into one

"true" history.

My idea is that we find a group of researchers, that we put together, that they study the real history of the country. Even if it takes years, we'll teach the history that is true.674

The Kigali-based Institute for Research and Dialogue on Peace similarly found a great number of Rwandans that desired an "objective and true history" and Obura's interviews revealed that children felt that "school can and should give unbiased and objective

673 Marian Hodgkin, "Reconciliation in Rwanda: Education, History and the State," (Never Again Rwanda International, undated). For other discussions of the government of Rwanda's single historical narrative, see Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda. 674 Interview 4, female Tutsi, Kigali.

205 explanations on social relations and on the history of Rwanda." Scholar Nigel

Eltringham argues that Belgium is responsible for the expectation that one true history is attainable.676 To some, this approach is in line with the current government's civics initiative, although to others, the civics narrative does not tell the "truth".

Moreover, some of the Rwandans with whom I spoke (8/25; 5/13 Hutu, 3/12

Tutsi) opined that they wished to avoid teaching any elements of their country's history that caused controversy in the past, or had the potential to do so now.

I want to wait until we will write a history that does not divide people. The primordial objective is to bring people together.677 This might include representations of ethnicity, pre-colonial and colonial relations between Hutu and Tutsi, the events of 1959 and other past episodes of violence.

Freedman et ah, in their study of the education sector involving school administrators, teachers, parents and students, found that 38% of participants, roughly equally Hutu and

Tutsi, felt that encouraging contentious discussion might bring new conflicts.678 The

Senate's Genocide Ideology report similarly contends that "forgetting does not conflict with remembrance and cannot be viewed only as a denial of the past; it can also be viewed as necessary and legitimate for the survival of our community, our nation."

Contrarily, most Rwandans with whom I spoke felt that omissions, or tempering the truth, were dangerous. Many made a strong case for the need to teach controversial elements of history (8/13 Hutu, 9/12 Tutsi).

675IRDP, "Histoire et Conflits au Rwanda,", 176, Obura, "Peace, Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution," 16. 676 Eltringham, Accounting for Horror, 151. 677 Interview 37, male Tutsi, south. 678 Sarah Warshauer Freedman et al., "Confronting the Past in Rwandan Schools," in My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, ed. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 261. 679 Senate of Rwanda, "Rwanda Genocide Ideology," 202.

206 I am not in favour with the suppression of history teaching. But if our history is atrocious, it is our history, we still need to teach it.680 Barring that from history [1959 and other contentious events] - no. They have to stay.681

Interestingly, much like those who wanted to avoid controversy, the most common reason given by individuals who supported talking about the potentially conflictual elements of the past was that it would prevent a recurrence of violence.

As such, many felt that students should be taught all parts of history, but with critical analysis, an issue also discussed above. When I asked one Rwandan man, for

example, whether certain controversial parts of history should be left out, he replied "No!

Well, we can say that ubuhake was there, that monarchy was there, and we can say what was good about the monarchy, and what was not good about the monarchy so that we

draw a path to follow in the future."682

The details of historical representations are contentious. How genocide is represented is particularly delicate. Of the 28 Rwandans with whom I discussed teaching

about genocide in Rwanda's schools, all except one agreed that this was necessary.

Victims and survivors deserve respect and acknowledgement. Recognizing and

commemorating victims and crimes are crucial steps in reconciliation and part of a

transitional justice process. Learning about the causes and consequences of genocide

may also be important for its future prevention.683

However, many Hutu feel left out of mourning and fear further delegitimization

by being left out of history curriculum too. In response to my question about current

post-genocide lessons regarding war and genocide, one participant replied, "we learn how

680 Interview 14, female Tutsi, Kigali. 681 Interview 10, male Tutsi, Kigali. 682 Interview 63, male Hutu, north. 683 Ervin Staub, Laurie Anne Pearlman, and Vachel W Miller, "Healing the Roots of Genocide in Rwanda," Peace Review 15, no. 3 (2003), 287, 90.

207 it developed. For most times we learn about genocide. We don't say about the war."

One Rwandan Hutu woman told me, "the other history that we must teach, for example, I lost three quarters of my family during the war.. .But we don't have any right to say that we lost people."685 Vidal makes a similar argument in reference to commemorations, arguing that Hutu survivors have had their right to publicly suffer and mourn

"confiscated." But the Senate report on Genocide Ideology condemns as revisionist attempts to "vaguely acknowledg[e] genocide but, in the same breath, [try] to justify it through counter accusations in order to cleanse the real culprits of any responsibility."687

At the time of writing, Rwanda's education system was mired in controversy following a Parliamentary report finding that some of the 32 secondary schools the committee visited had a "genocide ideology" rating of as high as 97%. Journalists are unclear as to what this means and readers will recall the nebulous definitions of genocide ideology. Some newspapers have suggested that teachers are using old textbooks that are

"distorting history" and some note that poems that promote hatred and division have been found in school libraries.688 While old texts could be used to promote intergroup discord, they could alternatively be used as pedagogical tools for discussion, debate over different points of view and the uses of history, and to develop critical thinking. The newspaper reports do not give enough information to assess their use and I have been as of yet unable to obtain a copy of the report. Teachers may indeed be using old books since children are asking historical questions and they do not have substantial new material.

684 Interview 62, male Hutu, north. 685 Interview 52, female Hutu, north. 686 Vidal, "Les Commemorations," esp 22, 46. 687 Senate of Rwanda, "Rwanda Genocide Ideology," 18. 688 Anonymous, "Rwanda 'Still Teaching Genocide'," Anonymous, "Rwanda: Use All Diplomatic Means to Curb Genocide Ideology.," Buyinza, "Rwanda: Damning Revelations.," Buyinza, "Rwanda: MPs Grill Education Ministers," Mutagoma, "Genocide Hatred Lingers in Rwanda Schools," Mutesi and Buyinza, "Rwanda: Shocked MPs Condemn Genocide Ideology in Secondary Schools."

208 Paradoxically, at around the same time as this scathing government report, Kagame was abroad touting schools' success in "building shared purpose" amongst Rwandans.689

Intricately related to these questions of history are questions of ethnicity.

According to all with whom I discussed the question (43), Rwandan schoolchildren now learn "Rwandaness." However, it is very difficult to decipher what "Rwandaness" means for ethnicity in Rwanda today and in Rwanda's history lessons. The civics textbook talks about Rwandans collectively and offers no guidance as to how children should deal with past and lingering ethnicities, other than perhaps showing by example that they should avoid and ignore them.

Just over half of the Rwandans with whom I spoke (27/47; 10/20 Hutu, 11/21

Tutsi, 2/2 mixed, 4/4 unknown) opined that "Rwandaness" means that ethnicities do not exist. The explanations given for this position varied greatly. A couple of participants refused to show any recognition of the terms ethnicity, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. The most educated individuals explained that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are not ethnicities, but may be other types of categories. Others argued that differences were a fabrication of the colonial power and thus untrue. Yet others clarified that one cannot tell a Hutu from a

Tutsi.

Interestingly, participants often prefaced these explanations with "we are told that" or "our government says that" indicating that this may be the government line rather than genuine opinion. "The government gave the order to put Rwandans together" explained one individual.690 The vast majority of Rwandans with whom I spoke (38/42;

15/17 Hutu, 18/20 Tutsi, 1/1 mixed, 4/4 unknown) argued that ethnicities had to at least

689 Felly Kimenyi, "Rwanda: Kagame Gets Award from U.S. University," The New Times, February 12 2008. 690 Interview 37, male Tutsi, south.

209 be erased - or as several put it "eradicated" - from Rwandan schools, although it was not clear whether they meant identifying children ethnically, mentioning Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in history lessons, or something else. Most Rwandan participants maintained, similarly to their government, that emphasizing homogeneity of Rwandans can help bring unity and peace to their country.691 The argument follows that "the ideas of Hutu and Tutsi are not compatible with those of citizenship."692

Indeed, 6 participants (2 Hutu, 3 Tutsi, 1 unknown), mostly students (5, 1 teacher), and most from Kigali (5, 1 South) told me that they could be jailed for simply saying their ethnicity.

But if you speak of that [ethnicity], they put you in jail. Yep. If they catch you, you have to go directly to jail.. .So today you hide that, because if they hear you say it, they can punish you.

But you shouldn't talk about ethnicity. If you speak of that, they put you in prison! Author: I would like some precision. You think they'll put you in jail if you do what? If you speak of your ethnicity. Author: How did you learn that? They teach it in class, they talk about it on benches, and it's talked about on the radio! Author: Is it just not good to say it, or they can put you in jail? In jail! It is really bad to talk about that because war will restart again.694 When I asked experts and government officials about this, they denied that this was the case. On the other hand, several experts did not think it ridiculous that students had this understanding. As one explained, the government "has created a phobia of speaking

691 A few qualified their answer saying that while diversity would probably work best in the long run, homogeneity needed to be emphasized for stability in the interim. For more on this issue, see Freedman et al., "Confronting the Past in Rwandan Schools." 692 NURC, "3rd National Summit Report on Unity and Reconciliation," 34. Similarly, the recent Senate report states that "[t]he quest for an assimilating and an all inclusive national identity means the regression, even better, the disappearance of divisive identitarism." The report includes a graph illustrating the "Strategic Management of Identities" wherein Hutu and Tutsi identities are presented as a negative curve and Rwandan identity is superimposed as an equal positive curve. The process is assumed to be linear and that Hutu and Tutsi identities, in the end, do not coexist with Rwandan identity. See Senate of Rwanda, "Rwanda Genocide Ideology," 268, 83. 693 Interview 33, female Tutsi, Kigali. 694 Interview 56, female Hutu, Kigali.

210 about ethnicity. On my introductory tour of Kigali, the guide commended the coincidental location of a prison, within eye sight of a primary school, to remind children what can happen to them. Participants had widely heard about schools being closed and teachers imprisoned for the vague offense of divisionism.696 Regardless of whether or not students would actually be sent to jail for uttering their ethnicities, it is worth inquiring more into students' fears and how schools contribute to them.

Indeed, 12 participants (4 Hutu, 5 Tutsi, 2 mixed, 1 unknown), mostly students, told me, or strongly implied that ethnicity caused the genocide.

If we keep teaching and talking about that [ethnicity], there will be another genocide; another war can be born.697

[We shouldn't talk about ethnicity] because it is bad and it will bring war and is bad for the development of the country.698

Most could also state other causes for violence including ignorance, misunderstanding, and bad leadership, but, they still tended to equate the existence of ethnicity with violent conflict. This presumption is not consistent with constructivism and complicates the possibility of a pluralist solution for peacebuilding. Fear of ethnicity on the part of students in particular, rather than the general population, suggests that these understandings are coming, at least in part, from schools.

Meanwhile, as we have seen, ethnicities are not disappearing in Rwanda. The same participants that claimed that ethnicity did not exist could readily point to Hutu and

Tutsi in their classrooms or in the street.

695 Interview 87. 696 16 participants mentioned that they learned on the radio that divisionist teachers had been jailed. Indeed, a Rwandan high school was recently closed down on vague charges of teaching "genocide ideology." See Bonny Mukombozi, "School in Genocide Ideology Scandal," New Times, August 31 2007, Sarah Mumvaneza, "Imprison That Teacher," New Times, September 1 2007. 697 Interview 53, female Hutu, north. 698 Interview 59, female Hutu, north.

211 It's that there are physical traits upon which you can say that this one is Hutu and that one is Tutsi. For example, when one has a big nose. Me, for example, you can easily tell than I am Hutu because I do not have very refined traits...but a poor, unhappy Tutsi risks appearing to be a poor Hutu...It's very difficult today. But, despite everything, children can usually tell from first sight, yes, he is this, she is that [ethnicity].699

Others explained (6 Hutu, 1 Tutsi) that different ethnicities are "a fact", and a good number (4 Hutu, 6 Tutsi) made clear that ethnicities cannot be erased.

That is the policy [that ethnicities do not exist], but the daily reality is that we know that ethnicity cannot be erased like that, all in one shot. It still exists in our hearts. Everyone knows who is there and when you are sitting there and you see a Hutu, you know it is a Hutu. There are conversations you can't have in the presence of a Hutu. There are conversations that Hutu can't have in the presence of a Tutsi.700

Since colonialism, and perhaps even pre-colonialism, Hutu and Tutsi have been psycho- cultural identities with changing meanings, but complicatedly often linked with social- structural status. Consistent with the peacebuilding literature, numerous Rwandans (7

Hutu, 15 Tutsi, 2 mixed, 2 unknown) reminded me that reconciliation and the construction of new forms of identity take time.

Finally, the legitimacy of new curriculum also arose as a recurrent concern. Some

Rwandans (predominantly Hutu) with whom I spoke commented that "each government sings its own song" or that "each government has to defend its raison-d'etre."

So now they say that the past history is false. So they've hired people to remake history. But what's to say that the current researchers are not attached to the government and current politics? There's a question! To say, I don't know if ever this government leaves if another won't just as quickly suppress it [their new version of history].701

Longman and Rutagengwa likewise found that 49.2% of interviewees agreed or strongly agreed that: "Whoever is in power rewrites Rwandan history to serve their own interests."

Only 21.7% disagreed or strongly disagreed.702 The Institute for Research and Dialogue on Peace argues that only professional historians have the critical distance necessary for

Interview 15, male Hutu, north. 700 Interview 24, female Tutsi, Kigali. 701 Interview 55, male Hutu, north. 702 Timothy Longman and Theoneste Rutagengwa, "Memory, Identity and Community in Rwanda," in My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, ed. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 170.

212 "moving from an ideologised history to a social history, without falling into the trap of an official history created by and for the political regime in power."703 Peacebuilding theory suggests that outsiders may also have an important role to play - and have thus far been catalytic in encouraging the reintroduction of history in Rwanda704 - but many tasks remain in the hands of Rwandans.

4.3c Analysis: Plus ca change, plus c 'est la meme chose?

Is education in Rwanda likely to be an underlying cause of future interethnic conflict, or is it moving Rwandans in a more positive peacebuilding direction? The above findings suggest that the picture is mixed, but dominantly worrisome. A discussion of school content dominates this section, not because it is more important than school structure, but because content is currently changing and it is valuable to discuss and evaluate the changes as they are unfolding.

Despite the challenging post-genocide context, the government of Rwanda has done a good job at ensuring access to primary education. Equitable access to educational opportunities helps improve the relationship amongst Rwandans. While the poorest students still have trouble accessing school, this does not play out on ethnic lines.

Regardless, "the political consequence of excluding some children is to build up resentment in the next generation and to create a new category of the excluded or discriminated against."705 Promisingly, the government is trying to target the most

703IRDP, "Histoire et Conflits au Rwanda," 176. 704 Elizabeth A. Cole and Judy Barsalou, "Unite or Divide? The Challenges of Teaching History in Socities Emerging from Violent Conflict," in Special Report (Washington DC: United States Institue for Peace, 2006), 7. For a discussion of the complex role of outsiders in education in Rwanda, see Elisabeth King, "Educating for Conflict or Peace: Challenges and Dilemmas in Post-Conflict Rwanda," International Journal 60, no. 4 (2005). 705 Obura, "Peace, Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution," 24.

213 marginalized populations and the successful inclusion of these Rwandans into schools would further contribute to peacebuilding.

Classroom practices in Rwanda today are ostensibly inclusive. Ethnicity is not discussed at school and children are neither categorized nor collectivized into groups.

Children share an overarching "student" identity. Students of different ethnic backgrounds routinely play together, with trouble arising only when wider political events filter into their consciousness.

At the same time, the trend towards language-based schools, with a few that teach the upper years of primary in English, and most that specialize in French, warrants monitoring. Njoroge warns that "[t]he English and French languages become new labeling tools among Rwandans perpetuating the "US" versus "THEM" dichotomy..."706

He suggests that teacher-learners at the Kigali Institute for Education, where he conducted his research, define themselves not as Rwandan, but as Francophones and

Anglophones. He reports that each identity is invested with collectivized characteristics, such as the stereotype that French-speaking students work harder than English-speaking ones.707 That language, class, and ethnicity often intersect - with richer Tutsi being most competent in English - and that schools are divided in this way, may lead to problematic intergroup relations.

At higher levels of schooling, (the perception of) too much preference for Tutsi

survivors in funding secondary school and university is creating a "moral hierarchy" along ethnic lines.708 Some are identified as "survivors" (Tutsi) and others feel

Njoroge, "The Reconstruction of the Teacher's Psyche in Rwanda," 222.[ emphasis in original] Ibid. See Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, 126.

214 stigmatized as "perpetrators" (Hutu). Indeed, although ethnic blindness sounds fair, important inequalities are hiding behind the government's ban on ethnicity.

Regarding history teaching, the government of Rwanda is facing an exceptionally difficult task in light of the recognition of divergent ethnic transcripts discussed in

Chapter 1 and the argument developed in Chapters 2 and 3 that past history lessons were part of a foundation for violent interethnic conflict. The reality of packed classrooms and underequipped teachers and schools - one that became vivid when I was in charge of 60 third graders for just 15 minutes! - must be kept in mind in elaborating plans for history teaching.

A first take at the evidence might point to a positive assessment of current history teaching since Rwandans are being included in a unity and reconciliation programme rather than excluded, and are being taught a history of harmony and a vision for a shared future. We saw in section 4.1 that many international governments and NGOs are positively assessing the Rwandan government's efforts at bringing Rwandans together.

At the same time as teaching inclusiveness, however, the way history is beginning to be introduced into schools involves great exclusion and coercion. This is, to borrow

Ross' term, a "paradox of inclusiveness."709 The narrative emerging from the civics initiative is streamlining history and "Rwandaness" into a simple, singular, homogenizing narrative. The process through which the history curriculum is being generated lacks genuine dialogue and consensus and Rwandans experience censorship and self- censorship. Pedagogically, the language of critical thinking and multilingualism is

embraced, although in practice, both have a long way to go. Intending to promote national unity and to maintain political power, the Rwandan government is founding

709 Ross, Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict, 318.

215 history on selective episodes that exclude many Rwandans and is failing to address and

challenge the social cleavages and exclusion that have characterized Rwanda's past. This

conformity and exclusion could help lay the foundations for future violent interethnic

conflict.

For example, in the civics text, there is no mention of the RPA/RPF's crimes, thus

excluding the experiences of many Rwandans that suffered at their hands during the war

preceding the genocide, during the genocide, and since. The government is, in Van

Evera's terminology (see Chapter 1), conducting "chauvinistic mythmaking" by

glorifying the Tutsi ingroup, portraying its victimization, and whitewashing its faults. It

is also implicitly devaluing the Hutu outgroup. Several Hutu Rwandans explained that by

failing to recognize their pain and to acknowledge their mourning, it is difficult for them

to relate to and to embrace the suffering of Tutsi Rwandans. As one Hutu participant at

the first National Unity and Reconciliation Summit voiced: "we do not say it loud

enough, but the question of Hutu memory is a prerequisite so that people can sit together

and sincerely discuss the real problems of this country."711

A second example of the exclusion engendered by a singular homogenizing

narrative deals with pre-colonial history. In the civics and mainstream narrative, the pre-

colonial period is presented as a harmonious golden age, ruptured by the divide and rule

strategies of the colonial powers. However, as we saw in Chapter 2, this is factually

incorrect according to leading scholars and, moreover, inconsistent with the transmitted

memories of the population. There were a range of socio-political divisions in pre-

710 For a critique of the narrative taught at ingando re-education camps, see PRI, "From Camp to Hill." For an example of how contentious critiques of the narrative are, see the response to the PRI study in IRDP, "Histoire et Conflits au Rwanda," 178-9. 711 Quoted in Vidal, "Les Commemorations," 46.

216 colonial Rwanda - including Hutu and Tutsi - that were hardened, but not created, by colonial rule. That Tutsi held positions of power in pre-colonial Rwanda is whitewashed to further legitimate their appeals of recent victimization. In what Buckley-Zistel calls a

"chosen amnesia", "tensions between Hutu and Tutsi are eclipsed from the discourse."712

The historical narrative taught in schools is not, however, as destructive as it could be for the relationship amongst Rwandans. The civics text includes, for example, the fact that some Hutu tried to help Tutsi and it unites Rwandans against the international community.

While the Rwandan voices included above debated the alternative strategies of analyzing or silencing conflicting stories, scholars of Rwanda increasingly agree with the education scholars reviewed in Chapter 1, that silencing conflict in favour of a single, exclusionary narrative is problematic for intergroup relations.713 While the FHAO initiative illustrates the potential to analyze, deconstruct, and critically assess competing histories, the dominant of the two, the civics initiative, favours conformity and closure by silencing conflicting stories in a univocal narrative. The Rwandan government's ban on ethnicity is another example of conflict avoidance, making students fear ethnicity, rather than deal with it. This is dangerous since the earlier students are taught to manage conflict, the more likely they are to build upon and use these skills during the rest of their

712 Buckley-Zistel, "Remembering to Forget," 131. 713 Buckley-Zistel argues that "this introduction of closure through enforced unity brings the danger of a new antagonism and resentment since differences are being eradicated and legitimate grievances silenced." Pottier argues that "reconciliation will not be possible without a nuanced, shared understanding of history" and Mamdani contends that "it is not possible to think of reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda without a prior reconciliation with history." Susanne Buckley-Zistel, "Dividing and Uniting: The Use of Citizenship Discourses in Conflict and Reconciliation in Rwanda," Global Society 20, no. 1 (2006), 111, Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 267', Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, 126.

217 lives. Suppressing debate about history - the meta-conflict about the conflict, as

Lemarchand calls it - is dangerously exclusive.715 Avoiding conflicting narratives also inhibits the development of critical thinking skills that are important for conflict management. The reductionist view of history, and tendency towards top-down teaching, are reminiscent of the pre-genocide situation.

As we saw in Chapter 1, scholars working on history in divided societies suggest that narratives can help establish positive peace when they encourage critical analysis, learning about each side's framings, create alternative narratives including points of convergence, foster mutual affinity between groups and stories of past cooperation, frame narratives in more nuanced ways, encourage cross-cutting ties and promote common views of the future. The historical narratives taught in schools are not living up to their potential to make a positive difference in Rwanda. As Elizabeth Cole writes, "even when one party to the conflict clearly is more responsible for promoting or creating the structural conditions that led to violence, history education can make a positive contribution by acknowledging that all parties participated in the violence and pointing out the relative roles of different groups."716 How to get a nuanced narrative in Rwanda is somewhat more complicated than in some other divided societies such as Northern

Ireland or the Former Yugoslavia. A common idea is to bring the multiple sides to the table to debate; Mamdani suggests allowing interpretations to "compete in the marketplace of ideas."717 In some schoolbooks in Israel and Palestine, for example, the

714 Avery et al., "Teaching an Understanding of War and Peace," 117-8, Merelman, "The Role of Conflict in Children's Political Learning". 715 Lemarchand, Burundi, 17. 716 Elizabeth A. Cole and Judy Barsalou, "Unite or Divide? The Challenges of Teaching History in Societies Emerging from Violent Conflict," (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 4. 717 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 278-9.

218 narratives of each side are printed side by side to open space for discussion, and these types of initiatives are being positively evaluated by many peacebuilders.718 In Rwanda, however, with ethnic identification strongly discouraged and oftentimes considered illegal, Hutu and Tutsi sides of history cannot be publicly discussed.

Furthermore, rather than simply relying on youth to absorb a single government narrative, young people could be importantly involved in the process of recording and creating history. Children have been involved in peacebuilding to various degrees in other contexts, such as the South African and Sierra Leonean Truth Commissions.719

Initiatives such as Rwanda's Children Summit have the potential for meaningful expansion.

The interplay of history, school practices, and ethnicity also merits investigation.

Chapter 1 reviewed several options for managing group identities in multicommunal contexts - decategorisation/personalisation, recategorisation/collective identity, and positive valuation of group distinctiveness. While the range of opinions that I gathered in interviews does not trace perfectly upon these options, most Rwandans and the government favour recategorisation to a collective Rwandaness. As one Rwandan expert told me, "[difference was constructed! By school, by religion, by, etc...Could we not construct something more securitizing? We can construct it! We can construct something else!"720 These ideas are consistent with constructivist assumptions. Indeed, constructivists assert that "who is we can change" .

718 Tony Gallagher, "Balancing Difference and the Common Good: Lessons from a Post-Conflict Society" (paper presented at the BAICE, September 2004). For an example of this technique in the UK, see Peter Lee, "Understanding History," in Theorizing Historical Consciousness, ed. Peter Seixas (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004). 719 Constance Morill, "Reconciliation and the Gacaca: The Perceptions and Peace-Building Potential of Rwandan Youth Detainees," The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 6, no. 1 (2004), 34. 720 Interview 80.

219 Given the data discussed above, it is worth inquiring whether other social peacebuilding strategies might work better than trying to erase groups. While ethnicities are constructed, they become very sticky. Indeed, some participants (11 Hutu, 13 Tutsi, 1 mixed) argued that people can at the same time embrace "Rwandaness" and maintain different ethnicities, so long as ethnic group is not a basis of discrimination. Some (1

Hutu, 4 Tutsi) suggested the positive valuation of group distinctiveness. Unlike in

Rwandan history where only one group has been valued, this would involve positive and simultaneous appreciation of Hutu and Tutsi. As one Rwandan put it, "[w]e need to explain that there are differences, and that these differences should make the country's richness, because each ethnicity has something to bring to this country."721 Whether participants favoured "erasing" ethnicity, accepting groups but minimizing their importance, or valuing ethnic diversity, it is somewhat promising that opinions did not fall clearly along ethnic lines.722

Indeed, there are reasons to believe that in Rwanda, the recategorization approach to an all-inclusive and conforming "Rwandanness" may not be successful. First, as

Buckley-Zistel explains in her study of citizenship in Rwanda, the "Rwandanness" policy is reaching unity without reconciliation by commanding individuals to unite. There is a difference, as many of my interview participants pointed out, between parroting unity and reconciliation and living it.

721 Interview 68, male Hutu, north. 722 Opinions, however, did fall roughly on socio-economic lines. Those of higher socio-economic stratums (and higher education levels) felt that ethnicities could be kept so long as they are not used for discrimination. Those of lower, average, incomes much more frequently held that ethnicities had to be erased. 7231 was told a similar story in relation to HIV/AIDS. While the Rwandan government celebrates the fact that there are many HIV/AIDS clubs in Rwanda's schools, this does not necessarily mean that students understand the disease or welcome the afflicted. In one school in eastern Rwanda, the student president of the HIV/AIDS club refused to sit beside an HIV-positive guest speaker. Interview 86.

220 Reconciliation is not practiced. It's in books, in history, but not practiced.

We say that we have reconciliation and unity, we sing it in the radios, in the ingandos, everywhere, and in the radio we hear this, but in practice it is lacking. That's the problem.725 Genuine reconciliation cannot be coerced. Denying ethnicity may merely be suppressing the difficult intergroup dialogue that Rwandans require to work through reconciliation to peacebuilding. By making ethnicity taboo, or even illegal, the government is driving it underground. Indeed, by forbidding ethnicity, the government may be making it more interesting to Rwandan youth. Furthermore, consistent with the predictions of SIT and

SCT, many Rwandans find meaning in sub-national groups. Arguments that focus upon the nonexistence of ethnic groups are of little use since it is not their objective existence, but the fact that people believe in them, that matters. Yugoslavia learned these lessons when its efforts at erasing ethnonational identities between the two World Wars failed, and the post-World War II government opted to recognize different identities.

Second, even though ethnicity is constructed, it is not infinitely malleable. As

Majstorovic explains, myth and memory impose constraints on identity transformation.

"Identity is not produced upon a blank slate, and ethnic groups do not suffer from historical Alzheimer's disease. There is historical clay that needs to be reshaped, and the shape of the clay in a previous epoch is a constraining factor to the political elites in a subsequent historical juncture."726 Even myths, once created, tend to gain a reality about them and can attract powerful loyalties, as evidenced in Rwanda's genocide. This is all the more true since ethnic violence has caused immense death and suffering and ethnic differences can thus not easily be wished away.

Interview 36, female Hutu, south. Interview 64, male Hutu, north. Majstorovic, "Ancient Hatreds or Elite Manipulation?" 173.

221 Third, the emphasis on youth's ability to achieve the recategorisation model goals, although understandably hopeful, is overly optimistic. It is commonly acknowledged that

"chosen traumas" are easily absorbed by the children of a group and passed on through generations, even to those who did not experience them first hand. When scholar Kate

Adie interviewed a Serb village librarian regarding a recent conflict in his town, for example "[i]n his explanation of what happened the day before, he went back to 1943 at least..."727 That this will be done for generations to come with the Rwandan genocide is not unlikely.

Fourth, further specifying the aims of history teaching and the ban on ethnicity is warranted. Is the goal social cohesion, promoting democracy, peace and reconciliation, tolerance, national identity formation, state building, and/or civic consciousness?728 The government of Rwanda calls their goal "unity and reconciliation" but this is a tricky assertion. There may be no alternative to emphasizing peace and broader Rwandan identity, and downplaying difference, in a state in which a group of select Tutsi hold, and wish to maintain, disproportionate power. Lemarchand calls ethnic amnesia a "rational choice" in order to maintain ethnic hegemony.729

Finally, there are important links between school structure and what is being taught. Eliminating references to ethnic identities and teaching Rwandaness are unlikely to make an impact if ethnicity is still perceived to be a source of discrimination for access to funding and to upper levels of schooling. Similarly, embracing the rhetoric of critical

Quoted in Davies, Education and Conflict, 81. 728 See Barsalou, "Unite or Divide?" 729 These comments are in reference to Burundi, but equally applicable to Rwanda. Lemarchand, Burundi, 30-2.

222 thinking will do little if a singular narrative is taught. Again, the structure of schooling and its content are mutually reinforcing.

I have sketched a rather critical picture of Rwanda in this chapter. Some would contend that my analysis is too critical. In examining processes of peacebuilding, which I have argued are long-term, 14 years is a relatively short amount of time in which to judge progress. By suggesting a negative prognosis, I, of course, in no way wish it upon

Rwanda. However, there are dangerous parallels with the past that need to be addressed if Rwanda's schools are to help the country move towards a more constructive and peaceful future.

223 Chapter 5: Conclusion — Education. Violent Interethnic Conflict and Peacebuilding

This conclusion first revisits the answers to the questions of this thesis: Has formal education in Rwanda played a role in violent interethnic conflict and/or its mitigation and, if so, what are the mechanisms at work? Second, it examines whether and how the arguments extend to other such cases as Germany, Bosnia, Northern Ireland and Israel, and what we can learn from these other cases. Third, it elaborates on the theoretical and policy implications of the core arguments. Finally, it suggests avenues for further research.

5.1 The findings

This thesis set out to clarify the subtle and complex relationship between education, on the one hand, and respectively violent interethnic conflict and peacebuilding, on the other. Based on the reviewed literature and resultant framework, I argued that schooling can contribute to the underlying causes of both violent interethnic conflict and peacebuilding. I suggested that certain mechanisms account for situating schooling on a causal path to one outcome or the other, or even to both simultaneously.

Whereas many studies examine either the content of schooling (i.e. history lessons, classroom practices) or its structure (i.e. access, segregation), this study focused on both elements and their interaction. It also argued that schooling contributes to conflict and/or peacebuilding in both social-structural and psycho-cultural ways, recognizing the interconnectedness of interests and identities.

In the case of Rwanda over three historical periods, I found more evidence that schooling had contributed to underlying violent interethnic conflict than it had to peacebuilding. Chapters 2 and 3 argued that education contributed some of the

224 underlying predispositions that make a society more prone to violence along ethnic lines.

Chapter 4 argued that, worrisomely, some of the mechanisms that underlay interethnic conflict in the past remain evident in present-day Rwanda.

I found that during the early parts of the colonial period (1919-64), primary schools discriminated in favour of Tutsi, as did advancement past the primary level. In the later colonial period, when Rwanda's primary schools ostensibly opened to all, Hutu remained underrepresented. Furthermore, access to secondary school remained limited for Hutu throughout Belgian rule. This dissertation argued that discriminatory and exclusive schooling constitute underlying causes of violent interethnic conflict; this pattern instigates social-structural mechanisms in the form of competition over interests and access to social mobility, and psycho-cultural mechanisms by reinforcing group categories, essentializing students as Hutu and Tutsi, and stigmatizing Hutu as inferior to Tutsi.

Under the Hutu Republics (1964-1994), the situation was similar, but reversed in favour of Hutu. While primary schools were open to all, quotas restricted access to secondary schools and favoured Hutu advancement. Tutsi lost a good part of their historical numerical advantage and felt a great loss. In reality though, Tutsi maintained much of the social capital they had built during the colonial period and retained certain advantages in schooling throughout the Hutu Republics. Again, policies vis-a-vis school access promoted competition between Hutu and Tutsi. Differential access and entitlement heightened awareness of Hutu and Tutsi categories as prime identities and promoted a dualistic "us versus them" view of society. The policies stigmatized Tutsi as a group needing to be knocked down from their previously unfair position of privilege

225 and Tutsi's continued advantage allowed governments to persist in scapegoating them for

Rwanda's problems.

In addition, the content of schooling and classroom practices during the Hutu

Republics were probably even more important than the structure of schooling in dividing

Hutu and Tutsi. Lessons emphasized the different origins of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa and their continuing differences. They essentialized Hutu and Tutsi groups presenting them as unchanging and internally homogeneous. Some history lessons presented Hutu as historical victims of Tutsi and blamed Tutsi for many of Rwanda's then-current problems. History was taught as a single narrative not to be questioned and critical thinking was therefore not nurtured. Although history was only taught beginning in

grade four, and due to drop-out rates impacted relatively few students, the importance of history should not be underestimated. As we saw, history is of great social and political

significance in Rwanda and schooling is an important source of historical information.

Classroom practices under the Hutu Republics, as well as in the late colonial phase starting in about 1959, also differentiated Rwandans into identity groups; teachers

asked students to publicly identify themselves by ethnicity. This practice highlighted

ethnicity as an important and legitimate way to divide up society; a number of

interviewees even claimed to have learned their ethnicity this way.

The transition from the Hutu Republics to post-genocide Rwanda was marked by

both continuity and change in much the same way as the transition from colonialism to

the independent Republics. In post-genocide Rwanda (1994-2008), primary schools are

open to all and have admirably high enrolment rates. Promotion to secondary school and

university is seemingly merit-based, regardless of ethnicity - a now illegal public

226 identification - but scholarships for (Tutsi) survivors of genocide make many Rwandan

students see opportunities for advancement as ethnically restricted. This type of

exclusive practice can foster the roots of violent interethnic conflict through competition

over interests, as well as by highlighting binary differences between students and

stigmatizing other students (Hutu) as less deserving than survivors (Tutsi).

While today's teachers do not differentiate students ethnically, they continue, as

in the previous period, to teach a univocal historical narrative. This narrative promotes

outward conformity, but inward frustration, among many Rwandans who feel excluded

from the story of their nation. Since ethnicity is banned, students and teachers do not talk

about it, but my findings suggest that this may be more problematic than positive;

students and teachers still understand important parts of their lives in ethnic terms but are

fearful to express themselves. Teaching conformity can be problematic for the

relationship amongst Rwandans since it both represses diversity of many kinds and

removes the opportunity to practice, or model, critical open-minded thinking. Overall,

many mechanisms recognized by the ethnic conflict literature as laying the foundation for

interethnic violence occurred, and continue to be manifest, in Rwanda's schools.

On the other hand, this dissertation argued that schooling that is open and

inclusive can help build positive peace. Schools that foster critical thinking may also

contribute to peacebuilding. Education that moves away from binary group

categorization, collectivization, and stigmatization of group differences towards new

understandings of the other and the self - which, as we will see below, can take various

forms - can help build the foundations for peace. While we saw little evidence of these

227 mechanisms in operation in Rwanda, findings valuably suggest peacebuilding lessons from what is not working.

Indeed, the literature on peacebuilding leaves open several questions about how best to achieve the pillars of sustainable peace. For example, is it better for peacebuilding to silence conflicting narratives to contain conflict or to embrace their diversity and nuance? Should schools talk about violence, its causes and consequences in its aftermath, or should they remain silent? How should schools deal with ethnicity after violence

along ethnic lines? Should they endeavour to decategorise, recategorise, or positively value group differences? The education literature, as well as my findings, helps us get at

answers to these questions. They are considered in the section on policy implications below.

Contrary to the primordialist viewpoint presented in the Introduction, the preceding

chapters demonstrate that ancient tribal hatreds are a hugely inadequate explanation for violence along ethnic lines in Rwanda. This dissertation, however, does not try to replace

one faulty monocausal explanation with another. It argues that schooling is just one

factor - often overlooked - that interacts with a constellation of other factors propitious

to violent interethnic conflict. As a Rwandan Protestant Church worker and genocide

survivor, put it,

whenever people look at the Rwandan tragedy, they always ask you to narrow down the problem into a simple equation, easy to grasp in one hearing. Failure to do so is often taken either as hiding something or simply complicating a matter that in itself should be easy to understand. The truth, however, is always like the elephant in the blind men's story. Asked to identify what the elephant is, the blind men come up with different answers depending on what part of the elephant they had touched. The one who touched the side thought the elephant was a big wall, the one who touched the leg took it for a big tree, the one who touched the tusk thought an elephant was just a dry branch, while the one who touched the large trunk said it was a long, soft hose. But the truth was just there in the middle - as big as an elephant!730

730 Eltringham, Accounting for Horror, xiv-xv.

228 Education is part of a complex societal system - just one part of the "elephant" - but an important part that must not be left out in seeking a comprehensive understanding of intergroup violence and its mitigation. As Homer-Dixon writes, "after all, it is hard to identify any cause of violence that is, by itself, either necessary or sufficient; the causes of specific instances of violence are always interacting sets of factors, and the particular combination of factors can vary greatly from case to case."731

5.2 The Findings in Comparative Perspective

Political scientists are interested in the generalizability of their claims. In other words, is education's underlying role in violent interethnic conflict and peacebuilding, particularly through the mechanisms identified, just a Rwandan phenomenon, or can the theory developed in this case help make sense of other cases?

5.2a Education and Violent Conflict

While each case has its own historical particularities, formal schooling appears to have played a role in such other varied cases of violent interethnic conflict as Nazi

Germany and the former Yugoslavia. This judgment encourages further confidence in the arguments advanced in this dissertation. Much of the research is richly descriptive rather than analytical, but similar mechanisms to those identified in the theory and empirical chapters of this dissertation emerge elsewhere. As was the case in Rwanda, the structure of schools and their content both matter and interact.

731 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 7.

229 One of the clearest cases of education serving violent political goals is Nazi

Germany (1933-1945).732 When the National Socialist Workers (Nazi) Party took power in January 1933, re-modeling education was a top priority. The propaganda minister likened education to a "kneading machine" turning humans into a "coherent mass" that could be "utilized and manipulated for the political aims of the state."733 Based on his writings in Mein Kempf, Hitler's educational goal was to "burn the racial sense and racial feeling into the instinct and the intellect, the heart and the brain of youth entrusted to it

[school]."734

Under the Nazi regime, the structure of schools was rapidly changed and increasingly radicalized along Jewish/Aryan lines. In April 1933, legislation limited the number of non-Aryans to be admitted to high schools to 1.5%.735 Later the same month, all Jewish civil servants, including teachers, were discharged, and remaining teachers were instructed to join a Nazi fighting organization, to attend school in uniform when possible, and to live in camps. Near the end of 1937, Hebrew teaching in secondary schools was banned and by March 1938 all levels of Jewish religious instruction were prohibited. In November 1938, the system was completely segregated by a total ban on

Jews in public schools.736 I will argue below that this kind of worsening in the structure

Unless otherwise indicated, the information on the structure of schools in Nazi Germany is drawn from Herbert Hirsch, Genocide and the Politics of Memory: Studying Death to Preserve Life (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), Erika Mann, School for Barbarians (New York: Modern Age Books, 1938), Gregory Wegner, Anti-Semitism and Schooling under the Third Reich, Studies in the (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2002), Gregor Athalwin Ziemer, Education for Death, the Making of the Nazi (New York: Octagon Books, 1972). 733 Quoted in Gilmer W. Blackburn, Education in the Third Reich: A Study of Race and History in Nazi Textbooks (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), preface. 734 Quoted in Wegner, Anti-Semitism and Schooling under the Third Reich, 16. 735 This refers to high schools leading to university. Note that only approximately 1% of the German population was Jewish. Like in Rwanda, quotas may have been hard felt without necessarily being numerically unrepresentative. 736 Wegner, Anti-Semitism and Schooling under the Third Reich, 18-20.

230 of schooling should be a warning sign to the international community of possible future violence.

Earlier chapters argued that discriminatory and exclusive social institutions contribute to underlying violent interethnic conflict, both in themselves as social- structural factors, and through psycho-cultural processes of categorizing, collectivizing, and stigmatizing groups. These mechanisms also manifested in Nazi Germany.

Classroom practices and the auricular content of schools tell more of the story of education's role in intergroup relations. In Nazi Germany, drawing on a foundation of economic and religious anti-Semitism already present in society and schools, the government revised curricula to make race the common thread across all subjects.737

Students were taught to categorize the population into Jews and Aryans. Much like in colonial Rwanda, they were taught that a racial difference caused the behavioural and cultural inferiority of Jews and the superiority of Aryans. Students were also taught to essentialize and to collectivize Jews. Aryan Germans and Jews were further presented as opposite, binary identities; as Wegner writes, "[w]ithout the dark Jew there would never have been the radiant figure of the Nordic Teuton."738 Most prominently, Jews were explicitly stigmatized and rendered scapegoats for all that was wrong with Germany and the world. In history texts, Jews were presented as a historic and contemporary threat to

Germany and were dehumanized as "parasites." German faults were whitewashed, omitting any discussion, for example, of concentration camps or the Night of Broken

Glass when thousands of Jewish businesses and synagogues were destroyed, and Jews were imprisoned and killed. Categorizing difference paired with collectivizing and

737 Unless otherwise indicated, the information on the content of education in Nazi Germany is drawn from Blackburn, Education in the Third Reich, Wegner, Anti-Semitism and Schooling under the Third Reich. 738 Wegner, Anti-Semitism and Schooling under the Third Reich, 3.

231 stigmatizing groups have been highlighted throughout as mechanisms by which education can help lay the groundwork for violence. These processes were generally more overt in

Nazi Germany than in Rwanda, reflecting the socio-political climate, and also perhaps the fact that by 1938, Jews were not in classrooms to object.

In the German case, education content also went further than in Rwanda.

Rwanda's schools generally stopped at "injustice frames" that identify a problem and attribute blame. Nazi schools often suggested "prognostic frames", those that articulate solutions and delineate strategies to deal with injustice, as well as "motivational frames" that provide a rationale for collective action. Schools suggested an urgent need to "solve" problems, implied that the regime should legitimately address the "Jewish question" in a more extreme fashion, and prepared children for violence both in lessons and through the inculcation of obedience and militaristic pride.

Before segregation in 1938, many classroom practices were discriminatory against Jews. Much like Tutsi in some Rwandan classrooms between 1964 and 1994,

Jewish students were called to the front of the class as "living examples of Racial

Science" to illustrate the physical features of Judaism.739 Throughout the Nazi regime, critical thought was disallowed, classroom discussion was unacceptable, and students were made to conform and submit to authority. Teachers were not referred to as such, but as "Erzieher", which "suggests] an iron disciplinarian who does not instruct, but commands, and whose orders are backed up with force if necessary."740 Teaching for both boys and girls was exceptionally militaristic, with emphasis on salutes, , ranking, the inculcation of fear, and the promotion of a desire to fight and die

739 Mann, School for Barbarians, 102. 740 Ziemer, Education for Death, the Making of the Nazi, 15.

232 for the Fuehrer. Boys and girls were separated into education for different state (war) goals: boys as soldiers, girls as "breeders." As the Nazi educational manual made clear,

"[t]he fundamental principle to keep in mind is that we are not striving to inculcate as much knowledge as possible into the minds of our students. If students have learned to submit to authority, if they have developed a willingness to fit into that particular niche chosen for them by the Party, then their education has been successful."741 Teaching that develops strong conformity and fails to develop critical thinking has also been suggested as a facilitator of violent interethnic conflict. The Nazi German case supports these mechanisms and suggests that an exploration of the social psychological impact of role playing in schools, within the highly militaristic structure, might also be useful in the future development of this dissertation's analytical framework.742

This case provides preliminary support that the findings in Rwanda - that particular mechanisms, present in schools, can underlie violent interethnic conflict - extend to Nazi Germany. As Hirsch suggests, the "extreme case" of the Holocaust

"teaches valuable negative lessons by providing examples of more overt practices that operate at a subtler level in less authoritarian settings."743 Situating education as an underlying cause, as in Rwanda, Wegner suggests that "Nazi education cannot be held directly responsible for Auschwitz. The grave responsibility for Nazi schools lies in

741 Quoted in Ibid., 20-1. 742 This could begin with consideration of the 1971 Stanford Prison experiment wherein university students assigned to guard and prisoner roles quickly adapted to their assignments to the point of highly dangerous behaviour. See Philip G Zimbardo et al., "The Psychology of Imprisonment: Privation, Power, and Pathology," in Doing Unto Others, ed. Zick Rubin (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974). 743 Hirsch, Genocide and the Politics of Memory, 111.

233 creating the ideological justification for what eventually became the Nazi policy of mass murder."744

After such a quintessential example of the possible negative role of education in

Nazi Germany, the case of the Former Yugoslavia (SFRY), especially the Bosnian republic ripped apart by violence between 1992 and 1995, is an interesting comparator.

Based on initial readings, Yugoslavia appeared to offer an example of a case of violent interethnic conflict in which education contributed more to its mitigation than to violence.

As Pupavac writes, "the promotion of good relations between different peoples of

Yugoslavia was integral to school curriculum before the wars [of the

1990s]....Yugoslavia was considered by the UN to lead the field in multicultural education and was involved in drafting the education articles in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child."745 However, an exploration of this case with an eye to the mechanisms identified in this thesis suggests a more complicated story. While contributing in some ways to mitigating conflict, especially through inclusive access, to which Pupavac may have been referring, the SFRY's education system between 1945 and

1992 also contributed in significant ways, especially through content, to the foundation for interethnic violence.

After World War II, leader Josip Tito attributed much importance to education's role in the reconstruction, modernization, and economic development of the six

Wegner, Anti-Semitism and Schooling under the Third Reich, 185-6. Wegner also notes that more research is needed into the impact of Nazi educational materials on non-Jews and Jews, at the time, and long term. 745 Vanessa Pupavac, "From Statehood to Childhood: Regeneration and Changing Approaches to International Order," in Regeneration of War-Torn Societies, ed. Michael Pugh (Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000), 148.

234 constituent republics of Yugoslavia. Tito also "recognized the political role education could play in terms of uniting people who had been through the brutality of World War II as both allies and opponents who then had to live together in the same country."747 From a relatively centralized school structure, responsibility for education was consistently devolved to the republics, particularly after the Constitution of 1974, although the structure and content in each republic, including Bosnia, remained similar.

Considered a foundation for equalization, a key goal of the socialist state, there was a concerted effort towards access to education for all peoples (including Serb, Croat and Muslim groups), although this commitment did not extend to some marginalized populations such as the Roma. In an effort to build "brotherhood and unity" - Tito's key slogan - education was provided in three official languages and nine "nationality" languages representing the country's national minorities. Even small ethnic groups were thus guaranteed access to education in their own language and culture. There was also some . Open and inclusive institutions and processes such as these are considered to help lay the foundation for positive peace.

Yet, examination of the content of education in Yugoslavia through peace and conflict lenses suggest that the education system also worked to divide Yugoslavians.

After the failed attempt of interwar (1918-39) Yugoslav education to "quell ethnic, nationalist or cultural difference", by the 1970s, Tito's approach was described as

746 The information on the structure of education in Yugoslavia is drawn from Jaco Cilliers, "Transforming Post-Accord Education Systems: Local Reflections from Bosnia-Herzegovina," in Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post-Accord Peace Building, ed. Siobhan McEvoy-Levy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), Wolfgang Hopken, "History Education and Yugoslav (Dis)- Integration," in Oil on Fire? Textbooks, Ethnic Stereotypes and Violence in South-Eastern Europe, ed. Wolfgang Hopken (Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1996), Valery Perry, "Reading, Writing and Reconciliation: Educational Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina," (Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues, 2003). 747 Perry, "Reading, Writing and Reconciliation," 19.

235 producing "a remarkable respect for ethnic individuality in education." However, this case illustrates the difficulty of walking the fine line between recognizing ethnic difference (brotherhood) and building a common identity and purpose (unity).749 History lessons attest to this challenge. Idealising history, texts promoted the idea that South

Slavic peoples longed for a common state. Many potentially controversial topics were ignored under Tito, especially the role of Tito's Partisans during and after World War II in the ethnic cleansing of Germans and Italians after the Communist victory; in the mass executions of class enemies without trials; and in the brutal suppression of the Kosovar

Albanian uprising in 1944-5. Particularly sensitive issues in Bosnian history also received scant attention, such as the position of the Bosnian Muslims during the Ottoman

Empire; Serbian domination during the Yugoslav Kingdom; and the level of Bosnian

Croat participation in fascist forces during World War II.750 Schools also failed to address the "national question" of antagonisms between peoples in Yugoslavia, purporting that enmities were simply "bourgeoisie class conflicts" that no longer existed in the socialist state. Faults were whitewashed on all sides and memories of conflict suppressed. Hopken contends that this "unbalanced and selective history" produced a

"vacuum, which later on could be filled with historical myths and prejudices, when during the years of increasing national antagonisms in the late 1980s and 1990s the

'official' views on history more and more faded away with the party's decreasing legitimacy and ability for control."751 As we saw in earlier chapters, the question of

748 Quoted in Wayne Nelles, "Bosnian Education for Security and Peacebuilding?" International Peacekeeping 13, no. 2 (2006), 230. See also Hopken, "History Education and Yugoslav (Dis)- Integration," 101. 749 Unless otherwise indicated, the information on the content of education in SFRY is drawn from Hopken, "History Education and Yugoslav (Disintegration.," Perry, "Reading, Writing and Reconciliation." ""Interview 101. 751 Hopken, "History Education and Yugoslav (Dis)-Integration," 105.

236 whether to address or avoid controversial histories is a debate in present-day Rwanda, with the government tending - probably dangerously - in Tito's direction towards avoiding open discussion of conflicts.

The way Yugoslavia dealt with ethnicity, and its outcome, are also instructive for evaluating educational trends in present-day Rwanda. Both brotherhood/diversity and unity were simultaneously promoted. "Cultural expressions deemed as 'safe' were allowed", but much like those deemed "divisionist" in today's Rwanda, "potentially destabilizing political and nationalist sentiments were suppressed as part of Tito's heavy- handed approach to managing ethnic relations."752 The line between "safe" and

"nationalist" (or "divisionist") can become blurred. Furthermore, as Hopken argues in regards to the 'brotherhood and unity' slogan, "[d]espite, or better: (sic) because of its prominent place in the textbooks, repeated time and again in all sorts of educational materials, it obviously degenerated into a cliche and empty phrase."753 Children in

Rwanda can similarly parrot "unity and reconciliation", but the meaning invested in the phrase is debatable.

The education system in Yugoslavia became further decentralized and nationally politicized as the economic and political context worsened in the early 1990s. In Bosnia, nationalist politicians of the three main groups reformed curriculum and nationalist- oriented content similarly came to the fore in the other republics. Each side's history was quickly presented as one of victimhood - of "suffering, of deprivation and endangering, caused always by the other nation."754 This transformation of education reminds us of education's role as a reflector of wider society and highlights its potential to be an early

752 Perry, "Reading, Writing and Reconciliation," 20. 753 Hopken, "History Education and Yugoslav (Dis)-Integration," 105, see also 11. 754 Ibid., 117. See also Perry, "Reading, Writing and Reconciliation," 22.

237 warning sign of impending violence. Recent research on Serbia suggests that the nationalistic, victim-oriented changes in the school's historical narrative preceded major political change, such as Milosevic's assumption of power, suggesting education as having helped infuse national consciousness and a sense of threat to facilitate political change. Making a case for the need to embrace controversy and conflicting stories,

Hopken argues that national instrumentalization of history would have been much more difficult "if the topic [a variety of controversial historical events] had been touched upon in a reasonable manner in school during the Tito era."756 This case provides further support that the mechanisms underscored as conducive to violent interethnic conflict in

Rwanda are also relevant to other cases.

Classroom practices in Yugoslavia aimed at promoting conformity, memorization, and the reception of information rather than critical thinking can be included amongst the factors underlying violent interethnic conflict. These practices were not rare, nor different than Rwanda or Nazi Germany, but such an education "simply produced a set of codes, necessary for behaving in conformity with the existing political system and avoiding conflicts, but nothing like an identification with the system" . Hopken notes that in Yugoslavia, "the textbooks did not provide the students with any competences for behaviour [to deal with conflict and diversity]"758; school did not provide the critical and analytical thinking tools to deal with possible conflicts in nonviolent ways. While this lacuna does not always lead to violence - indeed it is present in most parts of the world - it can combine with other school influences, as well as broader political, social, economic

755 Tamara Pavasovic, "Reconstructing Ethnic Identity in Post-Communist Serbia: Ethno-Nationalist Socialization through Textbooks (1974-2002)," in ASN Convention (2006). 756 Hopken, "History Education and Yugoslav (Dis)-Integration," 110. 757 Ibid., 104. 758 Ibid., 105.

238 and environmental factors to set societies on a path to intergroup violence. Overall, this examination of SFRY points to the nuanced and complex role that education can play, contributing to peacebuilding and conflict simultaneously.

Very few studies systematically examine the role of education in societal-level conflict. Such studies are needed in many settings. For example, research in South

Africa suggests that "education was used to make basic tenets of apartheid normal and acceptable."759 Studies on Sri Lanka argue that exclusion of Tamils and Sihala-only language policies in schools contributed to violent interethnic conflict.760 This dissertation's findings reinforce the value of further developing research on education and intergroup violence.

5.2b Education and Peacebuilding

Education and peacebuilding is a much more researched subject than education's role in intergroup societal conflict. Considerable research on the former has been undertaken in such diverse places as Northern Ireland, South Africa and Israel. Although too much of this research remains normative, empirical research suggests that the findings of this dissertation are not unique to Rwanda.

Recent research supports the argument that open and inclusive schools and educational practices contribute to peacebuilding by reducing conflicts around divergent interests, as well as by inhibiting the development of conflict-conducive psycho-cultural mechanisms. In comparative research on the impact of segregated and integrated schooling in Northern Ireland on political identities and attitudes, Hayes, McAllister and

759 Davies, Education and Conflict, 82. 760 See Lai Perera, Swarna Wijetunge, and A.S. Balasooriya, "Education Reform and Political Violence in Sri Lanka," in Education, Conflict, and Social Cohesion, ed. Sobhi Tawil and Alexandra Harley (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, IBE, 2004), WB, "Reshaping the Future," 10.

239 Dowds found that integrated schooling "has positive long-term benefits in promoting a less sectarian stance on national identity and constitutional preferences."761 Another recent study in Northern Ireland provides empirical evidence that the segregated education system serves to reinforce separate, exclusionary and confrontational Catholic and Protestant identities, while "integrated education tempers the edges of unionism and nationalism."762 Holtman et al. similarly found that in South Africa's school system, desegregated since the end of apartheid, increased contact among individuals of different racial groups in schools and outside improved students' attitudes towards outgroups.763

Holtman et al's study also reminds us, however, that the quality of contact matters. This reinforces the argument of Allport's contact hypothesis - that facilitated interaction between individuals of different groups reduces ethnic prejudice and intergroup tension - works best under certain conditions.764 Contact on unequal footing, for example, can threaten attitudinal change and heighten prejudice, raising anxiety and threats. These findings parallel my analysis of present-day Rwanda in which I argue that relatively equal access to primary schools may be contributing to positive peace, but that the (perceived) inequalities relating to financing, and particularly to FARG scholarships for genocide survivors, undermine progress towards peacebuilding.

The experience of other countries also has much to suggest for recasting the content of schooling in the aim of peacebuilding. My interviews in Rwanda indicated that while most Rwandans want schools to address conflict and genocide, some are

761 Bernadette C Hayes, Ian McAllister, and Lizanne Dowds, "Integrated Education, Intergroup Relations, and Political Identities in Northern Ireland," Social Problems 54, no. 4 (2007). 762 See John O'Farrell, "Segregated Education in the Dock," New Statesman 19, no. 900 (2006). 763 Z Holtman et al., "Prejudice and Social Contact in South Africa: A Study of Integrated Schools Ten Years after Apartheid," South African Journal of Psychology 35, no. 3 (2005). 764 See Tal-Or, Boninger, and Gleicher, "Understanding the Conditions."

240 reluctant for their children to confront these potentially divisive topics. Dealing with post-violence history is a politically-charged topic worldwide. In Cambodia, like in

Rwanda, where the legitimacy of the post-genocide regime was tied to narratives about past violence, the Vietnamese-backed PRK (People's Republic of Kampuchea) put the genocide and other Khmer Rouge crimes front and centre in curriculum. Later, following

UN-backed elections in Cambodia, most of the references to the Khmer Rouge period were removed from schools in favour of a reconciliation discourse and the reintegration of some Khmer Rouge officials.765 To my knowledge, there is no study of the effect of these discrepant strategies on intergroup relations. In post-Holocaust Germany, serious talk about the past was also avoided; it was possible to do so since victims were dead or had fled the country.766

My research in Rwanda suggests that silencing conflicting stories about violence is problematic for peacebuilding; doing so legitimates a wholly state-sanctioned story and is extremely exclusionary. Such silencing preceded and helped underlie violence in both the colonial period and the Hutu Republics, although schools played a lesser role in this process in the former than in the latter since Rwandan history was not taught in colonial primary schools. As we saw in Chapter 4, Rwandans today, especially Hutu, consistently told me that they felt that their stories were left out of "history." Failure to embrace nuance and diverse narratives also limits critical thinking.

Alexander Laban Hinton, "Truth, Representation, and the Politics of Memory after the Cambodian Genocide," in People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power and Moral Order in Cambodia Today, ed. Alexandra Kent and David Chandler (Washington DC: NAIS Press, forthcoming). 766 Edith Marko, "My Truth, Your Truth - Our Truth? The Role of Truth Commissions and History Teaching for Reconciliation," (MIRICO: Human and Minority Rights in the Life Cycle of Ethnic Conflicts, 2007), 10.

241 Hughes and Donnelly came to similar conclusions in their comparison of integrated education in Northern Ireland and bilingual/binational education in Israel. The schools that they studied in Israel tackle divisions and discuss them. "[T[here is a common belief that only by focusing on the distinctiveness of the two [Arab and Jewish

Israeli] national identities and the differences between them are the school aims achievable."767 In contrast, in Northern Ireland, "teachers and parents in the integrated schools are reluctant to deal with divisive issues, either amongst themselves, or in their relations with children." Instead, they endeavour to make the school a "neutral" space.768

Teachers and parents interviewed in Northern Ireland were much less positive about the effectiveness of integrated schools than those interviewed in Israel. The research suggests that the Israeli approach of embracing the diversity and nuance of contrasting narratives may facilitate new learning about the outgroup and challenge negative stereotypes. In contrast, similar to my analysis of Rwanda, Hughes and Donnelly were less convinced that the schools in Northern Ireland are generating "more tolerant and less prejudiced individuals."769

Debates about different identity strategies are closely related to questions of conformity vs. addressing controversy and diversity of opinion. We saw in Chapter 1 that according to social-psychological studies, there is no theoretical a priori reason that one strategy - be it decategorisation, recategorisation, or the positive valuation of group distinctiveness - will work better than others. Social psychological and complexity theories suggested that context is paramount. At the same time, however, Social Identity

Theory and Self-Categorization Theory highlighted the salience and important meaning

767 Hughes and Donnelly, "Is the Policy Sufficient?" 128. 768 Ibid., 127. 769 Ibid., 131.

242 attributed to being a member of a group. While not identifying a clear path to peacebuilding, my research in Rwanda suggested that efforts to negate and erase ethnic identity are unlikely to work, at least in the short and medium term.

Recent studies support my analysis. Marc Ross' recent work, based in part on research in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland and South Africa, finds that "paradoxically,

[finding common ground] successfully often requires that these differences be acknowledged and explored rather than swept under the rug."770 Ross adds that "it is rarely the case in divided societies that people are willing to give up their group-based identities." He suggests that "making space for multiple identities is likely to be more productive than simply promoting a new one and extinguishing an existing one."771 We saw above that this also holds in the case of interwar Yugoslavia. Hughes and

Donnelly's analysis of Northern Ireland comes to similar conclusions too. In integrated schools in Northern Ireland, there is "anxiety about highlighting any aspect of group distinctiveness" such that "the use of the terms 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' is considered somewhat taboo because it could draw attention to differences that the schools actively seek to suppress." They suggest that "this lack of openness is pervasive in the school and has helped generate an environment of mutual suspicion,"772 especially in contrast to bicultural/binational schools in Israel where groups are openly discussed. Guatemala provides another interesting case. Guatemala's move from a "monocultural" school model that denied multiculturalism and prohibited the use of indigenous languages to an

Ross, Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict, 47. Ibid., 319. Hughes and Donnelly, "Is the Policy Sufficient?" 127-8.

243 increasing "interculturalism" , at least in theory if not yet in practice, also values diversity and recognizes that identities have meaning that is difficult to deny.

The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) suggests a more complicated picture774: that a balance is needed between different identity strategies. In BiH, as we saw above, three parallel school systems were developed during the war for the three "constituent peoples" (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs). The children of different groups are still not taught together today. While there are some common lessons, the three groups follow separate curriculum and learn about different histories, languages and cultures. "Critics argue that this reinforced bigotry, while proponents argued that segregation was necessary to preserve cultural identity and traditions."775 In contrast to Rwanda, the

Bosnian strategy takes the importance of groups seriously and does not presume they are erasable; however, it prioritizes intragroup cohesion, fostering separation and alienation from other groups. The Bosnian educational approach does not embrace diversity as a positive value not does it endeavour to build bridges between groups; the "us" in BiH is still very exclusive. The combined experiences of Rwanda and BiH offer illustrations of the difficult navigation between supporting ethnic distinctiveness and developing a common identity.

Finally, Chapter 4 illustrated some of the tensions in present-day Rwanda between the educational recommendations of the international community and the preferences of the national government. Since 1995 in Bosnia, for example, international forces have

773 See Manuel de Jesus Salazar Tetzaguic and Katherine Grigsby, "Curriculum Change and Social Cohesion in Multicultural Guatemala," in Education, Conflict, and Social Cohesion, ed. Sobhi Tawil and Alexandra Harley (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, IBE, 2004). 774 Mentions of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) refer to after the civil war (1995). I use Yugoslavia or SFRY to refer to pre-1995, even when the focus in on the republic that later became BiH. 775 Nelles, "Bosnian Education for Security and Peacebuilding?" 234.

244 dominated educational reform and have met with significant local resistance. In his discussion with Bosnian students and teachers, Cilliers found that "it was felt that the majority of the efforts designed to transform the education system in the country were being dominated and initiated by international actors and agencies. This resulted in apathy and lack of participation by local educators and young people. It also prevented local capacity in peace-building skills from developing within the country."776 In contrast, American efforts in post-war Germany to employ indirect influence in the education system, rather than direct control, were important for the relationship between the Allies and the new German government as well as for German national development, although Americans did not achieve all of their educational goals.777 These other cases support my analysis that the catalytic and supporting role of the international community in Rwanda must be balanced with national and local ownership over educational initiatives.

This brief examination of comparative cases suggests that the findings of this dissertation are not unique to Rwanda. The role of education in ethnic conflict is neither a Rwandan nor an African problem, but extends to other continents, cultures, and levels of socio-economic development. Rwanda also has much to teach to, and learn from, other post-conflict societies regarding the development of education for peacebuilding.

5.3 Implications

As the Introduction proposed, there are multiple ways to read this dissertation.

The implications are both theoretical and practical, as they relate to the study of Rwanda,

776 Cilliers, "Transforming Post-Accord Education Systems," 185. 777 James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

245 ethnic conflict, peacebuilding, and education, as well as to the conduct of research in violently divided societies.

5.3a Theoretical implications

Most broadly, this thesis attunes scholars to the importance of checking the "blind

spots" in current studies of violent conflict. Most analyses focus upon the most visible causes, deemed to have the largest impact upon intergroup relations. This dissertation proposes that missing less obvious contributors to violent conflict - such as education - can mean overlooking important parts of the picture. On the other hand, scholars should be careful not to demonize education, as has recently been done to madrasahs.778 A review of the literature paired with analysis of schooling in Rwanda proposed that specific social-structural and psycho-cultural mechanisms shape schooling's role in

fomenting violent interethnic conflict, or alternatively peacebuilding.

The findings of this dissertation build upon the work of constructivists who focus

on the construction and politicization of ethnicity and on the importance of ideas and

identities in shaping politics. Constructivist studies are often weak, however, in

specifying the processes of how identities are constructed in ways that contribute to, or

help mitigate, violence along ethnic lines. The foregoing chapters thus move forward

their analyses by illustrating that the ways Rwandans understand their identities and those

of others - too often as binary identities, with collectivized groups and stigmatization of

the outgroup - were produced in part through schools.

Furthermore, while constructivist approaches recognize that intersubjective, social

processes shape identities, they also recognize that identity becomes sticky. Findings

778 See Alexander Evans, "Understanding Madrasahs," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 (2006).

246 from Rwanda and elsewhere suggest that identities may be somewhat stickier than constructivist theory suggests. The findings of this thesis thus pose important questions to constructivist theorists about when and how the "we" can change.

This dissertation also suggests a number of specific implications for peacebuilding scholars that I examine as practical implications below. Theoretically, it attunes scholars to the importance of focusing on the psycho-cultural dimensions of peacebuilding - including ideas, identities, relationships, history, memory, and understandings - that, while linked to social-structural components, have been relatively neglected in the political science peacebuilding literature.

For education scholars, this dissertation provides important insight into what goes on inside of education. It also synthesizes multiple dimensions of education, usually explored in isolation, into a comprehensive framework. It also presses forward overview studies that have dominated the field of "education, conflict, and peacebuilding", such as

Bush and Saltarelli's The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict, with a depth of empirical data that was heretofore lacking from Rwanda.

Overall, this dissertation demonstrates why scholars need to embrace more complex forms of causation in studying peace and conflict than is the general trend. My findings suggest that constructivists would also do well to embrace complexity theory in their studies of the processes of identity construction. As we saw in Chapter 1, complexity theory is a process-oriented theory of how diverse systems, made up of multiple interconnected elements, adapt and change. Complexity theorists embrace multicausality, non-linearity, equifinality, contingency (that institutional settings, cultural

247 contexts, time periods, geographic settings and situational contexts matter and must be specified) and the power of small changes.

The findings of this dissertation suggest that complexity theory is an important way to understand the role of education in both conflict awdpeacebuilding processes. We have seen that one cannot make the claim that if a certain type of education did not occur, conflict would have been avoided. Nor can one claim that certain types of education alone can lead to sustainable peace. While schooling can help set societies on paths towards intergroup violence and/or sustainable peace, many different causal paths can lead to the same outcome. Furthermore, neither societal deterioration into violent conflict, nor peacebuilding, is a linear process.

Findings also support complexity theory's insight into multicausality, causal interconnectivity, and feedback. All three Rwandan cases highlighted the interconnectedness and feedback between social-structural and psycho-cultural mechanisms. For example, differential and uneven group access to education, a social- structural mechanism, reinforced categorical differences between groups and stigmatized one group as less deserving. The psycho-cultural stigmatization in turn legitimized differential access. The cases also illustrated the importance of examining multiple factors simultaneously - access to education, classroom practices and history lessons interacted to impact intergroup relations. As we saw in Chapter 3, teaching about Hutu and Tutsi categories, and the past oppression of Hutu by Tutsi went in tandem with the classroom practice of having students self-identify ethnically, and quotas that ethnically restrained promotion past primary school. Participants felt that access, classroom

248 practices, and history classes thus worked together to reinforce each other and to erode intergroup relations.

The value of embracing complexity was also underscored by the fact that schooling is both an effect and a cause. Education can be an effect when it reflects changes that have already happened within the government. For example, when leaders of a different ethnic group have taken power in Rwanda, they have changed ethnic power structures within the government and schools. Hutu leaders of the First Republic replaced pre-independence Tutsi dominance by instituting quotas for the civil service and higher education. Education can also be an amplifier of societal changes. When a government becomes more radical, for example, such as the current government's trend towards continual strengthening of divisionism and genocide ideology laws, these tendencies filter into schools. Ideas and fear surrounding divisionism are amplified through schoolchildren, witnessed in their statements about jail time for stating one's ethnicity. Schooling can in addition be a cause when it socializes students and students then become independent agents of change.

The emphasis in complexity theory on small changes, the butterfly analogy that a flap of wings in can cause a tornado in Central America, is important; small changes in education could potentially have a disproportionate impact - positive and/or negative.779 Future research may seek out potential thresholds and tipping points.

This thesis also illustrates the importance of complexity theorists' insight into multiple interacting systems. Children's experiences of schooling interact with their experiences in the family, the community, and the church in Rwanda, and education interacts with broader social, economic, political and environmental forces. For example,

779 Davies, Education and Conflict, 204.

249 in Chapter 3 we saw that history lessons from school were also sometimes taught in the community, in the church, and in media, thereby heightening their salience. In Chapter 4 we saw that banning ethnicity from schools and societal discourse is inadequate for reconciliation when the broader political, economic, and justice systems make Rwandans feel insecure because of their ethnic identity. We also saw how education's complex system is open to the wider Rwandan environment when, for example, students witnessed an increase in recess-time trouble between groups in the early 1990s as violence began to take place in the countryside.

Hence, this thesis illustrates that complexity theory can usefully help scholars in their quest to understand the construction and power of ideas and identities, and violent conflict and peacebuilding processes. Future refinements of this dissertation's framework could more thoroughly use complexity theory's tools in making sense of the contributions of education to interethnic violence and peacebuilding.

Finally, this thesis offers a variety of lessons to scholars interested in conducting research, especially interviews, in post-conflict and/or authoritarian contexts such as

Rwanda. The most important methodological implication, woven throughout all of the chapters, has to do with the public and private transcripts and group narratives that complement, intermingle with, or even overshadow, participants' sentiments and experiences. In a coercive setting like Rwanda, participants have good reason to tell researchers the partisan and partial public narrative supported by their government, rather than share personal, potentially contra-governmental private narratives. Narratives that researchers receive may also fall along ethnic lines (i.e. Hutu and Tutsi) or sub-ethnic lines (i.e. Tutsi survivors, Tutsi returning from exile), and researchers face the tricky task

250 of untangling group loyalties from veritable opinion. This thesis illustrates that the value of interview data is not found only in the veracity of participants' comments; what people choose to say, not to say, and lie about, for example, is highly valuable for illuminating the social and political context in which one is conducting research. This thesis thus highlights multiple challenges of carrying out research in a setting like Rwanda that may be of use to other scholars.

5.3b Policy implications

The findings of this dissertation also suggest important policy implications. First, while the importance of education in the Global South has been recognized by governments, including Canada's, as a key to economic progress, and as a human right, it must also be recognized as significantly linked to conflict prevention and human security around the world.780 This is especially important given the high proportion of children in the Global South, paired with the increasing emphasis on universal primary education.781

With nearly 49% of Rwanda's population under the age of 14,782 and increasing school enrolment, the education system is likely to become an even larger influence on the general population in the future. Similar trends hold throughout sub-Saharan Africa, where 43% of the population is under 15 years of age, and extend to many other parts of the world such as Pakistan (40%), Afghanistan (45%) and East Timor (45%).783 With rising school enrolments and more than half of out-of-school youth currently living in

Elisabeth King, "The Human Security Impact of Education in Rwanda," in CCHS Human Security Fellowship Policy iJn'e/XCanadian Consortium on Human Security, 2006). 781 UNDP, "Millennium Development Goals: 2007 Progress Chart," (2007), UNESCO, "Dakar Framework for Action." 782 Republic of Rwanda, "Study of the Education Sector in Rwanda," 4. 783 PRB, "2007 World Population Data Sheet," (Washington DC: Population Reference Bureau, 2007).

251 conflict-affected fragile states, more children in states most prone to violence are likely to find themselves affected by the content and structure of schooling. Designing schooling in ways that help build peace is thus crucial.

Second, thinking about education in the ways suggested by this dissertation opens the possibility for schooling to be tackled through a 3-D (defence, diplomacy and development), or whole-of-government, approach. Since 2005, the Canadian government has been trying to facilitate the coordination of efforts of departments responsible for security (Department of National Defence - DND), political and economic affairs

(Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada - DFAIT), and development and humanitarian assistance (Canadian International Development Agency - CIDA), but have met with relatively little success. Many other governments have also considered the utility of a whole-of-government approach.786 While meeting such initiatives with caution, so that peacebuilding and/or development initiatives not be subsumed by a security agenda,787 education could be an issue of coordinated effort seen as simultaneously important for conflict prevention (DND), economic progress (DFAIT) and development (CIDA). I do not wish to divert attention and money away from education as a human right; however, certain types of schooling could usefully

simultaneously be considered potential security concerns. Using a whole-of-government

approach to education could serve as a model on how to apply this method to other matters.

784 Janice Dolan, "Last in Line, Last in School: How Donors Are Failing Children in Conflict-Affected Fragile States," ed. Save the Children (London: Save the Children International, 2007). 785 See Taylor Owen and Patrick Travers, "3D Vision: Can Canada Reconcile Its Defence, Diplomacy, and Development Objectives in Afghanistan?" The Walrus (2007). 786 OECD, "Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States," in DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2006). 787 For more on this issue, see Necla Tschirgi, "Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing?" (New York: International Peace Academy, 2003).

252 Third, education should be more systematically included as an indicator for early warning lists and conflict risk assessments.788 As Canada's human security policy makes clear, "the most effective and efficient approach to reducing human insecurity is to prevent the emergence of violent conflict."789 Early prevention also costs less than later intervention, in both economic, and most importantly, human terms. Education that displays the negative mechanisms discussed in this dissertation can be seen as an early warning sign of possible impending violence. As we saw in Chapter 1 and throughout, education is not only an independent cause, but also a reflector of changes already occurred in political circles, as well as an amplifier of those changes. Evidence of conflict-conducive school structure is easiest to identify through discriminatory and exclusive school institutions and practices. As we saw above, changes in school structures in 1930s Germany or late 1980s Yugoslavia could have been a warning sign to the international community of worsening intergroup relations. While pinpointing content that tends towards violence along ethnic lines is difficult, it is not impossible. For example, exclusive and mutually incompatible narratives can provide evidence of categorizing, collectivizing, stigmatizing and developing conformity that can underlie intergroup violence. Contrarily, initiatives such as reopening schools to children, as in post-Taliban Afghanistan, or a mass change to remove mutually offensive sections in textbooks, such as in post-World War II England and Germany, offer signs that positive change is in the air.

See, for example, Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, "Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies," Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 5 (1998), Jennifer Leaning, "Identifying Precursors," in Will Genocide Ever End? ed. Carol Rittner, John K. Roth, and James M. Smith (Aegis/Paragon House, 2002). 789 Foreign Affairs Canada, Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security (2004), available from http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/freedom_from_fear-en.asp.

253 Fourth, the analysis in the foregoing chapters also puts forth, with considerable humility, some practical lessons for peacebuilding. Most generally, the findings of this thesis suggest that peacebuilders interested in education must focus on both the structure and content of schools. We saw that who has access to schools, classroom practices, and historical narratives interact to influence the way that Rwandans understand their interests and identities.

Equalizing access to schools for all groups is important for peacebuilding. In terms of content, the findings in Rwanda show that students, teachers and parents generally want schools to address the causes and consequences of violence. Findings also indicate that promoting conformity via a univocal narrative that excludes the experiences of much of the population is problematic for peacebuilding. It appears that promoting critical thinking, for example by embracing conflicting narratives with an effort to draw out nuances and similarities, may be more fruitful. On the issue of ethnicity, my research in Rwanda suggests that endeavouring to recategorise Rwandans as solely Rwandan without ethnic identities is driving those ethnicities underground and promoting fear, rather than erasing them. Peacebuilders may do better to find other strategies, at least for the time being, that help Rwandans make space for both ethnic identities and a broader, all-inclusive Rwandaness. Some of these recommendations may need modification with time. All of the Rwandans with whom I spoke were of an age to have lived through the genocide and only 14 years have passed since this atrocity.

Subsequent generations, which are more detached from direct experiences of violence, may require that matters be treated in different ways. Germans, for example, have recognized the need to adapt education as generations grow further and further away from

254 that of direct perpetrators and victims of the Holocaust. These lessons for peacebuilding thus require constant reassessment.

5.4 Research Agenda

The findings of this dissertation open many promising avenues for future research. Here, I elaborate on three interesting and important projects that could build upon the research of this dissertation.

First, in this dissertation, education was clearly situated as an underlying cause of both violence along ethnic lines and peacebuilding. While it was not the task of this dissertation to comprehensively examine the multiplicity of causes of violence in

Rwanda, Chapters 2, 3, and 4, examined the wider social, political and economic context in Rwanda in the colonial period, Hutu Republics, and current period respectively. In the first two cases, we saw how a variety of state-level, political, economic, environmental, and social factors - identified in Chapter 1 as the foundations for violence along ethnic lines - interacted to produce a base for violence.

Next steps in a research agenda should include considering how schooling can interact with more proximate causes. A prime example is the link between schooling

(underlying cause) and mobilization by ethnic entrepreneurs (proximate cause). Since people are not automatons, many argue that mobilization works best when messages are framed to resonate with previous learning and experience. Mobilization of Rwandans to genocide in

1994 by ethnic entrepreneurs frequently involved threats of Tutsi infiltration and a return to

Tutsi monarchy and Hutu exclusion. Entrepreneurs called on an essentialized Hutu

790 Gregory Wegner, "The Power of Selective Tradition," in Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States, ed. Laura Hein and Mark Selden (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 240.

255 solidarity. These appeals were resonant with school lessons that predate 1994. For example, the May 1991 issue of the extremist magazine, wrote that: "[t]he Tutsi found us in

Rwanda; they oppressed us; and we put up with this. But now that we have left serfdom and they want to reinstall the morning chicotte [whip], I think that no Hutu will be able to support this. The war Gahutu leads is just. It is a battle for the republic."791 Leon

Mugesera's infamous 1992 speech referred to a conversation in which he warned a member of the Liberal Party (PL) that, "your home is in Ethiopia, that we are going to send you back there quickly, by the Nyabarongo [River]." As Des Forges explains, "for the audience, 'member of the PL' could not have meant anything other than Tutsi, and the mention of transportation by the Nyabarongo had to be understood as killing the people in question and dumping the bodies in the river, a usual practice in past massacres of

Tutsi. [The Nyabarongo feeds into the rivers of the Nile watershed and hence is supposed to permit passage to Ethiopia]."792

Other authors put more emphasis on face-to-face coercion than on the media,793 but still cite similar statements. In response to a question about what was said to oblige others to join in violence, Straus quotes one perpetrator-leader saying, "[t]hat they [the

Tutsi] killed Habyarimana, our parent, that no one could stay [home] without joining the attacks; that the Tutsis were fighting to retake the country as it was before 1959 [i.e. before the revolution] that they [the Tutsi] killed all the Hutus in Byumba [where the RPF held territory]..."794 Again, familiarity with school lessons likely made some of these threats more resonant.

791 Quoted in Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa, 324. 792 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story. 793 Straus, The Order of Genocide, esp 148.

256 Still others argue that genocidal manipulation is more successful where "structural violence" or experiences of exclusion characterize past experience.795 For example, during the colonial period, social inequalities had been growing and festering in Rwanda, provoked in part by the increase in power for Tutsi chiefs796 and, as Chapter 2 argued, by restrictions on schooling and social advancement for Hutu. The experience of having been excluded from schools, or having felt discriminated against, gives ethnic entrepreneurs material to work with.

Hinton explains that "genocidal regimes.. .co-opt pre-existing knowledge, dressing it up in new ideological guises that maintain familiar and compelling resonances while legitimating new structures of domination and violence against victim groups."797

Schooling that systematically excludes a group of students, and that fosters the categorization of difference alongside collectivization and stigmatization, may allow calls for mobilization

7054 by elites to be more resonant with lived experience, and thus more effective. These hypotheses merit further investigation.

Future research should also examine how school reforms interact with other contributors to peacebuilding. Educational changes must be accompanied by other security, political, and economic reforms in society. They must also be accompanied by other efforts at social reconciliation, as well as an end to impunity and efforts at justice.

In present day Rwanda, for example, equitable ethnic access to primary schools has been

795 Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." 796 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 125. 797 Hinton, Why Did They Kill? 29. 798 Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements.," Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.," Mayer Zald, "Culture, Ideology and Strategic Framing," in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, ed. D. McAdam, J.D. McCarthy, and M. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also Marie Eve Desrosiers, "Elite Strategies behind Popular Mobilization: Selection, Opposing, Simplifying" (paper presented at the International Studies Association, San Diego, March 2006).

257 achieved. However, the impact of this development is limited when paired with what many find to be discriminatory access to higher levels of schooling, as well as discrimination in wider society. Similarly, banning ethnicity from school and societal discourse is inadequate for helping Rwandans reconcile and reconceptualise their identities if their feelings of security, access to political power, opportunities for economic advancement and right to justice are constrained ethnically. Although political discourse reinforces the messages conveyed in schools, the narratives were produced through an exclusive process and many Rwandans, both Hutu, and Tutsi genocide survivors, feel left out from their creation and from the state more generally. Much as violence along ethnic lines is produced only from a constellation of factors, peacebuilding requires progress on multiple pillars at once.

A future research agenda should include further developing the trajectories through which schooling as an underlying cause interacts with other underlying and proximate causes of violence, as well as how education works with other societal changes towards peacebuilding. This could fruitfully include a more thorough exploration of the ways that formal education in schools interacts with informal education, such as radio programming, popular songs, or ingando re-education camps.

A second future direction is to further develop research on the psycho-cultural dimensions of peacebuilding that this dissertation has highlighted as important and often

overlooked. This thesis analysed and evaluated post-violence educational strategies in

Rwanda and in this conclusion, suggested preliminary lessons from other countries.

Serious comparative evaluation of post-violence strategies of social inclusion remained unaddressed in this thesis and is reflective of wider gaps in the literature. A future project

258 could examine, classify, and compare different approaches to accommodating ethnic identity and divergent narratives in the aftermath of killing along ethnic lines. A structured-focused comparison could be conducted of Rwanda and Burundi as ideal types of divergent approaches. While the two countries share enormous similarities and are both confronting challenges of how to deal with ethnicity and history, Rwanda and

Burundi are pursuing very different strategies. Comparative analysis of these two cases could offer practical lessons to each other and theory-building lessons to the literatures on identity and peacebuilding.

Finally, just as this dissertation analysed a domain - education - only infrequently considered through peace and conflict lenses, a future research agenda could examine other areas through these lenses. For example, it is increasingly recognized that development projects intended to have a neutral or positive peacebuilding effect often do more harm than good, while development projects without explicit peacebuilding goals sometimes have positive effects on relationships in divided societies.799 Scholars and practitioners alike have begun to embrace the policy of "do no harm" and to design and conduct peace and conflict impact assessments (PCIA) for development projects.800

While the symbiotic relationship between development, conflict and peacebuilding is increasingly recognized, specific mechanisms through which development conduces to peace or conflict remain under-theorized. Tracing the causal effects of specific projects on wider contexts is especially difficult. Furthermore, in

799 Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace-or War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), Bush, "Commodification, Compartmentalization, and Militarization of Peacebuilding.," Tschirgi, "Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development.," Uvin, Aiding Violence. 800 Kenneth Bush, "A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones," ed. The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative & The Evaluation Unit (Ottawa: IDRC, 1998), Mark Hoffman, "PCIA Methodology: Evolving Art Form or Practical Dead End?" in Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001).

259 practice, there remain relatively few efforts to "mainstream" peacebuilding in development programmes. The methods and findings developed in this dissertation to analyse the role of education could help refine the tools to analyse other areas. Future work on the impact of education could also draw on studies of other sectors and more systematically make use of the questions and tools from peace and conflict impact assessments.

Drawing on evidence from three periods in Rwanda's history, the foregoing chapters examined the role of formal primary schooling in both intergroup violence and peacebuilding in Rwanda. This dissertation argued, contrary to common assumptions, that schooling can help set societies on paths to violence along ethnic lines as well as, more tentatively, to sustainable peace. Schools remain understudied by political scientists and others interested in conflict and peacebuilding, yet offer an important window into social-structural roots of conflict, as well as psycho-cultural processes of identity construction and (de)politicization in ways that exacerbate or mitigate violent conflict. As an Ethiopian proverb reminds us, "when spider webs unite, they can halt even a lion." While education alone brings neither intergroup violence nor lasting peace, seemingly small initiatives - educational spiderwebs - deserve more attention for then- potential role in violent interethnic conflict and in building sustainable peace.

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288 Appendix 1; Discussion Guide

Informed Consent

My name is Elisabeth King, and I am a university student from the University of Toronto in Canada. I am talking with a number of people who have gone to school at different times over the last 80 years about the primary school system in Rwanda. I am investigating the impact of education on how Rwandans think about different groups. This can help us understand how the education system worked in the past and how it might best be rebuilt. This is my research project for my university degree. I do not work for the government of Rwanda.

I am trying to learn from Rwandans like yourself, and really value your opinion. I know that some of my questions might make you think of difficult memories. I would like to know your perspective, but you can choose at any time to stop this interview or not to answer some of my questions if you feel uncomfortable or it is too difficult for you to talk about certain things. I will not tell anyone that you have spoken to me. Nobody except for me will know what you have told me. My questions will take between 1 and 1.5 hours to answer. Do you agree to participate in my study?

I would like your permission to audio-tape our discussion. I do not take notes quickly and audio-taping will give me a chance to review your comments. I will label the tape with a code that only I will understand so your interview will be anonymous. Your name will not be on it. Do you agree to be audio-taped?

These are my coordinates both in Rwanda while I will be here and in Canada, should you wish to contact me. I have also included the contact information for my thesis supervisor.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

Discussion Guide*

Introduction / Demographics First, please tell me a little about yourself... (Probes/follow-up questions: where did you grow up? What do you do now?)

Primary School Background When did you attend primary school? Where did you go to primary school? What was a day like at your school? What did you do when you completed primary school? (Work? Further education?) Education & Conflict What are your thoughts on how the education system might have affected what happened in 1994? (depending when the participant was schooled, 1959-64?)

Educational content

289 Please tell me about what you remember learning in primary school, especially in terms of history...

(Probes/follow-up questions: What do you remember learning about the arrival of populations in Rwanda? About ubuhakel About Belgian colonialism? About the 1959 period? About independent Rwanda?)

Did your primary school teach you that there is only one (correct) point of view, or did primary school teach you that there are many different points of view? (especially of history)

Educational Structure Did all groups of people in your community have equal access to education? (Probes/follow-up questions: primary schools, secondary schools, universities, classes, books, writing material)

Tell me about the classrooms in primary school. What did you do on the breaks/recess? (Probes/follow-up questions: Did members of different groups sit together in class, or were they separate? Did they play together? Walk home together? Did the school encourage this, or was it of your own choice?)

Tell me about your classmates. (Probes/follow-up questions: Were you aware of your classmate's ubwoko/ethnicity**! Do you think they were aware of yours? How did they know? Did your teachers in primary school contribute to the awareness? How were you and your classmates referred to in school by your primary school teachers ... as members of an ethnicity, or everyone as Rwandans (or Africans)?

Teachers Please tell me about your teachers from primary school.

(Probes/follow-up questions: Did you know the ethnicity of your teachers? How would you find out? Did your teachers belong to any one ethnicity, or was it a mix? Which teachers taught which subjects? Do you think a teacher's attitude toward a student was influenced by the ethnicity of that student? Please describe/ elaborate. Were your primary school teachers strict? (If yes:) Give examples. Were they more tolerant with any one group in school than another? Which group(s) were they more tolerant with? (also probe for more friendly, more willing to work with students, etc.) Were you comfortable disagreeing with your teachers? Why, why not?)

External (Outside School) Influences Can you think of any examples where the teachings at school were contradictory to the opinions expressed by your family or community, or was the message mostly the same?

Can you think of any examples where the teachings at school were contradictory to the opinions expressed at church, or was the message mostly the same?

Can you think of any examples when the radio or newspaper expressed a different message than the one that you learned at school, or was the message mostly the same?

290 How have the events in the 1990s (war, genocide) affected your understanding of the earlier events that you have discussed with me?

Education & Conflict (2) What are your thoughts on how primary education might have affected trust between Rwandans of different ethnic groups?

What are your thoughts on how primary education might have affected how the different ethnic groups work together? (play together? Help each other?)

Education & Peacebuilding

Do you think that equalizing access to schools will help improve the relationship between Rwandans?

Do you think that changing what is taught in schools might help improve the relationship between Rwandans? If yes, what do you think needs to be changed?

Do you hope the primary education system is the same and/or different for your children or grandchildren? How in particular?

Finish - Is there anything that you would like to add? - Any questions?

* Please note that this is a comprehensive discussion guide, not a questionnaire. Consequently, some parts may be redundant, all questions may not have been asked, and topics were often broached in different orders. By working with a guide rather than a strict questionnaire, participants guided the discussion and I followed-up as appropriate.

** I always waited for participants to bring up the issue of ethnicity before I asked about it.

291 Appendix 2; Discussion Guide for Teachers

Same informed consent process

Introduction / Demographics First, please tell me a little about yourself... (Probes/follow-up questions: you went to primary school in Rwanda? Have you always lived in...? What do you do now?)

Teaching Background Please tell me about your teaching experience... (Probes/follow-up questions: When did you start teaching primary school? Where do you teach? Always in the same place? What grades and subjects do you teach? What is a day like at your school? Where did you go to primary school? When? What other kind of training did you have to do to become a teacher?)

Education & Conflict What are your thoughts on how the education system might have affected what happened in 1994? (depending when the participant was schooled, 1959-64?)

Educational content How do you decide what to teach your students... (especially in terms of history)

Please tell me about the history curriculum that you teach... What about when you were a student? (Probes/follow-up questions: What do you teach about the arrival of populations in Rwanda? About ubuhakel About Belgian colonialism? About the 1959 period? About independent Rwanda?; How has what you teach changed or stayed the same over time?)

When you were a student, did your primary school teach you that there is only one (correct) point of view, or did primary school teach you that there are many different points of view? (especially of history) What about when you teach your students?

Educational Structure Do all groups of children in your community have equal access to education? What about when you were a student? (Probes/follow-up questions: primary schools, secondary schools, universities, classes, books, writing material)

Tell me about the classrooms in your school. How are they set up? (Probes/follow-up questions: Did members of different groups sit together in class, or were they separate? Did they play together? Walk home together? Did the school encourage this, or was it of your own choice?)

What do the children do on the breaks/recess?

Tell me about your students. (Probes/follow-up questions: Are you aware of your students' ethnicities! Do you think they are aware of yours? How do they know? Do students know their classmates' ethnicities?)

292 External (Outside School) Influences Can you think of any examples where the teachings at school were contradictory to the opinions expressed by your family or community, or was the message mostly the same?

Can you think of any examples where the teachings at school were contradictory to the opinions expressed at church, or was the message mostly the same?

Can you think of any examples when the radio or newspaper expressed a different message than the one that you learned at school, or was the message mostly the same?

How have the events in the 1990s (war, genocide) affected your understanding of the earlier events that you have discussed with me?

Education & Conflict (2) What are your thoughts on how primary education might have affected trust between Rwandans of different ethnic groups?

What are your thoughts on how primary education might have affected how the different ethnic groups work together? (Play together? Help each other?)

Education & Peacebuilding

Do you think that equalizing access to schools (as the gov't of Rwanda is currently trying to do) will help improve the relationship between Rwandans?

Do you think that changing what is taught in schools might help improve the relationship between Rwandans? If yes, what do you think needs to be changed?

Do you hope the primary education system is the same and/or different for your children or grandchildren? How in particular?

Finish - Is there anything that you would like to add? - Any questions?

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TO i A < Number Gender Ethnicity Region Primary school student Primary school teacher Parent Interview Interview 1994- 1994- 1994- date Language 1919-64 1964-94 2008 1919-64 1964-94 2008 2008 Group Pa rticipants in Rwanda 69 M K X 27/03/2006 F 70 M/F K X 14/03/2006 F 71 M/F K X 14/03/2006 F 72 M/F S X

Participa nts in Belg ium 73 M B K X 19/09/2006 F 74 M B N X 26/09/2006 F 75 M B S X 26/09/2006 F

297 Interview List Codes

Gender M = male F = female

Ethnicity H=Hutu T = Tutsi U = unknown M = mixed (Note that some participants that self-identified as Hutu or Tutsi, could in reality have mixed parents, but they did not self identify this way. Mixed indicates those that explicitly told me that one parent was Hutu and that the other was Tutsi). B = Belgian, White Father or colonial administrator responsible for education

Region Indicates where participants went to primary school; or if they are only a teacher, where they are a teacher. This means, for example, that the interview could have taken place in Kigali, yet the participant could be noted as coming from the north or south. N = north (including Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Byumba and surrounding hills) K = Kigali S = south (including Gitarama, Butare, Cyangugu, Gikongoro and surrounding hills). Although geographically, Gitarama is in the centre of the country, participants considered themselves from the south in terms of regional access to schools. Furthermore, Gitarama is now in the "Southern Province". If two regions are indicated, the first indicates where the participants was a student, the second where the participant was/is a teacher.

Primary school student Indicates the period during which the participant went to primary school. 1919-64 1964-94 1994-2008 If no box is checked, the participant went to primary school outside of Rwanda.

Teacher at primary school Indicates the period during which the participant was a teacher at primary school. 1919-64 1964-94 1994-2008 If no box is checked, the participant was never a primary school teacher in Rwanda.

Parent Indicates that this participant spoke to me in his/her capacity as a parent about present- day schooling. 1994-2008

298 Interview date Indicates the date of the interview with the author in the day/month/year format. Interview language Indicates the language in which the interview was conducted. F = French E = English All interview comments have been translated into English by the author in the text of the dissertation.

299 Appendix 4; Expert Interview List

Details Interview Number Date

Interviews in Rwanda Julie Fournier, Canadian Embassy Representative 76 19/01/2006 Anonymous, National Curriculum Development Centre 77 20/01/2006 Anonymous, Ministry of Education 78 02/02/2006 Anonymous, Rwandan Researcher 79 06/02/2006 Anonymous, Professor, National University of Rwanda 80 14/02/2006 Anonymous, Professor, National University of Rwanda 81 14/02/2006 Anonymous, Professor, National University of Rwanda 82 14/02/2006 Anonymous, Professor, National University of Rwanda 83 14/02/2006 Anonymous, Professor, National University of Rwanda 84 15/02/2006 Anonymous, Representative of Foreign Donor Government 85 20/02/2006 Anonymous, Foreign Grassroots NGO Representative 86 09/03/2006 Anonymous, Catholic Church 87 17/03/2006 Anonymous, Rwandan Researcher 88 13/03/2006 Anonymous, Rwandan Researcher 89 28/03/2006 Anonymous, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 90 29/03/2006 Anonymous, Professor, National University of Rwanda 91 31/03/2006 Anonymous, Rwandan Researcher 92 04/04/2006

Interviews in Belgium Anonymous, Belgian Colonial Administrator in Rwanda 93 20/09/2006 Anonymous, Belgian Colonial Administrator in Rwanda 94 27/09/2006 Danielle De Lame, Scholar, National Museum at Tervuren 95 25/09/2006 Filip Reyntjens, Professor, University of Antwerp 96 19/09/2006

Interviews in North America Howard Adelman, Professor, York University 97 17/05/2007 Alison Des Forges, Human Rights Watch 98 18/10/2007 Sarah Freedman, Professor, University of California at Berkeley 99 30/06/2005 Karen Murphy, Facing History and Ourselves 100 20/08/2007 Djordje Stefanovic, PhD Candidate, University of Toronto 101 19/11/2007 Scott Straus, Professor, University of Wisconsin 102 03/08/2007 Harvey Weinstein, Professor, University of California at Berkeley 103 23/02/2006

300