MASTER'S THESIS M-1454 KINSOLVING, Lucien Lee THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN DEMILITARIZED ZONES: THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RECORD.

The American University, M.A., 1968 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN DEMILITARIZED ZONES; THg w "3E

by Lucien Lee Kinsolving

Submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Signatures of Committee: , ^ Chairman: A* ))'VttUUX

Date: / { /à / ean of /

Date: féf

September, 196 7 AMERICAN üNtVERSm ItRRARY The American University Washington, D. C. Mt'K Ü 5 îà68

J5:7 ,2/ PREFACE

MATTERS OF FORM

Aside from the first chapter, this study is based primarily on UN Security Council Official Records. It, therefore, follows these Records in several matters of form. The reader will note, for example, that citations of para­ graphs from the Official Records, including those of the Council meetings, are generally carried in the body of the text, as is common UN practice. The reader will note fur­ ther that the term "Demilitarized Zone," used in the text of the basic anaistice agreement, is used interchangeably in this study as in the UN records with the plural form "Demilitarized Zones" because the Zone actually consisted of three clearly-separate sectors. Furthermore, in the UN Official Records quoted from, the words "Demilitarized Zone" or "Zones" are frequently shown without capitalization and, in such cases, are so shown in this study. TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I, BACKGROUND: THE ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION OF

PALESTINE AND SYRIA AFTER WORLD WAR I . . . . 1

II. THE CREATION OF THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN

DEMILITARIZED ZONES ...... 15

III. THE LAKE HÜLEH CRISIS OF 1 9 5 1 . 24

IV. THE BANAT YA^QUB CRISIS OF 1953 ...... 50

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LATER 1950 » S ...... 72

VI. THE TAWAFIQ INCIDENT OF 1960 84

VII. DEVELOPMENTS PROM 1962 TO 1967: FIVE CASES . .. 91

The Lake Tiberias Clash of 1962 ...... 91

The Chief of Staff’s Report of August, 1963 . 94

The Israeli-Syrian Clash of November, 1964 . 99

UN Reporting and Discussions Concerning the

Demilitarized Zones in 1966 ...... 103

The 1967 MAC Meetings ...... 106

VIII. CONCLUSION ...... Ill

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 115

APPENDIX A. Excerpts from Israeli-Syrian General

Armistice Agreement ...... 121

APPENDIX B. Dr. Bunche's "Authoritative Comment" of

June 26, 1949 ...... 124

APPENDIX C. Official Map Attached to Israeli-Syrian

General Armistice Agreement...... 125 CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND: THE ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION OF PALESTINE AND SYRIA AFTER WORLD WAR I

The origins of the Israeli-Syrian Demilitarized Zones, which were strung out along the former Palestlne- Syrian international frontier, must be traced back to the creation of the latter right after the First World War. During the course of the war, the Allies determined to partition the Turkish Empire among themselves. The British and French, in particular, made plans to take over control in one form or another of many of the principal Arab areas of that empire, including the general area of Palestine and Syria. A basic secret treaty, in this re­ spect, was the Anglo-French exchange of letters of May 9, 15, and 16, 1916, commonly known as the Sykes-Picot Treaty.^ French predominance in the general area of present-day Lebanon and Syria was acknowledged, as well as in the Mosul area of Mesopotamia. The much-sought-after area of Pales­ tine, as far north as a line running east from a point north of Acre across the northern end of the Sea of Galilee to a point just south of Deraa, was to be under an inter­ national administration. The end of the war, however, found the premises of this agreement considerably changed. The Russians had left 2 the picture. The British, practically unaided, had cap­ tured all of the Arab areas covered by the treaty, and the British Army or its Arab allies under Amir Feisal were garrisoning the area. The latter did not want Syria to be placed under a French mandate. Therefore, French Prime Minister Clemenceau found it necessary to commence bargain­ ing with the British over the division of the spoils from a weak initial position insofar as the Near East was con­ cerned. The British insisted on revising the Sykes-Picot agreement so as to acquire purely British control over the area of Palestine (which British Prime Minister Lloyd George and his Foreign Secretary Cur mon defined as the Biblical "from Dan to Beersheba") as well as the Mosul area. Lloyd George obtained Clonenceau*s verbal agreement to this change at a meeting in London in December, 1918. In ex­ change, Prime Minister Clemenceau obtained badly-needed British support for a French mandate in Syria. The question of the location of the boundary between the British mandate for Palestine and the French mandate for Syria was now becoming an increasingly controversial issue. Since the Balfour Declaration of 1917 had offered a national home for the Jews in Palestine, Jewish Zionist organizations were actively urging the British Government to obtain the largest feasible boundaries for what was to become the Palestine mandate, including possession of the 3 northern headwaters of the Jordan River, and even access to the Litani River in Lebanon. However, the Sykes-Picot Treaty had allocated to the French sphere northern Galilee with Safad, Hula, and the upper Jordan River Valley; and, despite Clemenceau’s commitment to Lloyd George, the French were seeking to limit the British mandate to the south of this line as much as feasible. Therefore, as the Israeli authority Frischwasser-Ra’anan notes: "As early as June 1919 the Zionist leaders had decided that . . . a systematic campaign would be needed to realize Jewish territorial 2 aspirations." Accordingly, Lord Samuel, soon to be British High Commissioner of Palestine, emphasized to the British delegates to the Peace Conference the importance of obtain­ ing a boundary which would give the Palestine mandate 3 "access to water power and water supply." This statement was echoed in a basic policy memorandum by Lord Balfour written on August 11, 1919, in which he stated: . . . Palestine must be made available for the largest number of Jewish immigrants. It is there­ fore eminently desirable that it should obtain the command of the water-power which naturally belongs to it, whether by extending its borders to the north, or by treaty with the mandatory of Syria, to whom the southwaurd flowing waters of Hamon could not in any event be of much value.4 Thus, the British Government was reflecting Zionist con­ cerns • Meanwhile, however, the British were reaching the conclusion that it was also time to try to propitiate their 4 French allies, who suspected the British of stalling on handing over the main part of Syria. Accordingly, «although no agreement had been reached in negotiations for a final boundary, on September 13, Prime Minister Lloyd George handed Prime Minister Clemenceau an aide-memoire in which he stated that the British Army would evaicuate Syria and Cilicia so that, as a paragraph of the note stated, "the territories occupied by British troops will then be Pales­ tine, defined in accordance with its ancient boundaries of Dan to Beersheba."^ Clemenceau agreed to this proposal for the replace­ ment of British troops by French troops or civilian authori­ ties in this main area of Syria but only "on the distinct understanding that • • • the French Government was not com­ mitted to the acceptance of any other part of the arrange­ ments."^ This position was later confirmed in tnriting by the French, who again rested their demand for their version of the southern boundaries of Syria on the Sykes-Picot line. Lloyd George replied on October 18 that he held the French to the agreement "as modified by the Prime Ministers in 1918"; i.e., in their Deceadser, 1918, meeting. Negotia­ tions including further compromise proposals continued, with the British, under strong Zionist pressure, holding out for at least the "Dan to Beersheba" boundary. In January, Clemenceau*s cabinet was replaced by that of 5 Millerand, who in February sent a mission to a conference in London to try to settle the issue. On February 17, the French envoy, Berthelot, held a meeting with Lloyd George , and his Foreign Secretary Curzon in which Lloyd George pointed out that: The waters of Palestine were essential to its existence; without those waters, Palestine would be a wilderness • • • • On the other hand, those same waters were of no use to any one holding Syria. They could in effect only be used for the purpose of bargaining or for the purpose of obtaining conces­ sions from Palestine. While this excerpt was published officially in 1958 by the British Government, as Item Mo. 12 of Volume VII of the Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919-1939 (First 7 Series), it had previously been published in 1938 in Lloyd O George’s memoirs of the Peace Conference. During the United Nations Security Council debate on the Banat Ya’qub case in 1953, the representative of Israel was to quote this excerpt to argue that the intent of the powers had been to fix the frontier "with the deliberate purpose of ensuring that the northern waters of the Jordan should be unreservedly available for Palestine, and not subject to Syria’s control." Berthelot acknowledged that "the British claim to the waters of the Jordan might appear to be more admissible than any claim to the Litani, but contended that "the his­ torical frontiers of Palestine were iinknown." Thereupon, at the next session, on February 18, Lloyd George laid 6 emphasis on an authoritative hook by a Scottish theological professor, George Adam Smith, entitled. The Historical 9 Geography of the Holy Land, to back up his Dan-to-Beersheba contention. He suggested that Curzon and Berthelot meet to 10 examine the subject. At the next session, on February 21, Berthelot re­ ported back that he had studied the "authoritative work on Palestine" which Lloyd George had loaned him. Berthelot further stated that while "the historic boundaries of Palestine had never extended beyond Dan and Beersheba," he would recommend that these should now be recognized as the boundaries. He also acknowledged that "what was a legiti­ mate demand was that the Palestinians should have the use of the waters to the south of Dan." He and Lloyd George rejected a claim sent in a letter by the American Supreme Court Justice Brandeis for a greater area for Palestine. Lloyd George then referred the question of settling the "exact boundaries" to the British and French Foreign Minis­ tries.^^ Subsequently, at a meeting of the Allied Supreme Council at the San Remo Conference on April 25, the agree­ ment between Berthelot and Lloyd George to assign Syria as a mandate to France and Palestine as a mandate to Great 12 Britain was finalized. Lloyd George again used the phrase "from Dan to Beersheba" as the basis of the 7 boundaries of Palestine. However, the actual "agreement" contained in the British notes of this meeting read as fol­ lows : The high contracting parties agree . . . to en­ trust the administration of Palestine within such boundaries as may be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a mandatory. There is no more feference in the notes of this con­ ference to actual boundaries, on which agreement had obvi­ ously not yet been reached. According to Frischwasser-Ra ' anan ' s highly-informative book, The Frontiers of a Nation, the French "on June 21, 1920, put forward a proposal which, for the first time, de- paucted from the Sykes-Picot line.” The French proposed that: Palestine's northern boundary should be a line dravm from Ras en-Naqura • • • to a point on the Jordan just north of Metulla and Banias-Dan, and then to the northern shore of Lake Hula, and running from there along the Jordan and the Sea of Galilee to the Yarmuk.^^ No document, so dated, from the French concerning boundaries is contained in Volume XIII of the Documents on British Foreign Policy which covers this period. However, passing reference is made in documents in this volume to continued negotiations on the issue throughout that summer. Item No. 322 of Volume XIII consists of an Instruction of September 30, from Foreign Minister Curzon to his negotiator Vansit- tart in Paris, telling the latter to continue to "press for a readjustment which would give to Palestine a fuller control 8 over the head-waters of the Jordan” as well as railway rights in the Yarmxik Valley.In a further instruction from Curzon to Vansittart, of October 16, given as Item No. 324,^^ he reiterated the importance of these desiderata. Re was still receiving Zionist objections to the boundaries proposed by the French, as evidenced by Dr. Vei^mann's let­ ter to him of October 30, given as Item 331 in Volume XIII. In this letter. Dr. Weizmann stated that the proposed drain­ age of Lake Huleh would depend on the regulation of the waters of the Upper Jordan. Weizmann also noted that ”it is clear that Lake Tiberias forms a natural storage reser­ voir .... The eastern shore must, consequently, be in­ cluded in Palestine.” On November 8, Curzon replied to Dr. Weizmann pessimistically on the prospects for obtaining further concessions from the French on the boundaries for 17 northeastern Palestine. The following day, however, Curzon instructed Vansittart that the British "are not pre­ pared to conclude any arrangement which does not contain due provision for the future utilization by Palestine of the 18 waters of the Yarmuk and the Litani." The negotiations seemed to have reached an impasse. The break came In a meeting of the French and British Prime Ministers in London on December 4, in which, according to one British official account, the French stated that "pro­ vided the needs of Syria were met, they were quite ready to 9 share in a liberal spirit the waters of the Upper Jordan

and Yarmuk and their tributaries." The British had noted,

however, that by arguing their case on George Adam Smith’s

Atlas of the Historical Geography of the Holy Land, in par­

ticular on Plate 34 ("Palestine under David and Solomon"),

they could not argue for the inclusion of areas east of the 19 Jordan and north of the Yarmuk.

On the basis of the French proposal, a final agree- 20 ment was signed in Paris on December 23, 1920. Insofar

as it concerned the Palestinlan-Syrian border (as distin­

guished from the Palestinian-Lebanese border), this line

ran just north of Metulla and then just south of Banias.

From there, it turned southward and ran just east of the

Jordan River until it reached the Sea of Galilee. Thence,

it passed across the center of the Lake to the point where

the Jordan River again emerges from the Lake. It followed

the Jordan River a short distance down to the Yarmuk, and

then followed that river eastward. Finally, Article 8 of

the Agreement provided that:

Experts nominated respectively by the Administra­ tions of Syria and Palestine shall examine in common within six months • . . the employment, for the pur- - poses of irrigation and the production of hydroelectric power, of the waters of the Upper Jordan and the Yarmuk and their tributaries after satisfaction of the needs of the tributaries under the French mandate.

In connection with this examination, the French Government will give its representatives the most liberal instructions for the employment of the surplus of these waters for the benefit of Palestine. 10 The actual boundary was to be set up by an Anglo- French boundary commission. This commission was given the authority to make local revisions of the boundary. This they did. In their final report submitted on February 3, 1922, and finally signed by the British and French Govern- 21 ments on March 7, 1923. This final boundary Is what is referred to as the Syrlan-Palestlnlan border In the annex describing the Armistice Demarcation Line in the Israeli- Syrian General Armistice Agreement of 1949. The 1923 boundary leaves In Syria both the village of Banyas and the source of the Banyas River, a main tribu­ tary of the headwaters of the Jordan River. From there It runs south paralleling the Banias and then the Jordan Rivers, In some places no more than fifty meters east of the RiverV down to a point just east of, but ten meters north of, the Sea of Galilee, whence it runs eastward and southeastwaurd following the configuration of the Laüee. However, here the boundary agreement has the following pro­ vision: From the mouth of the Jordan to the sulphur springs at Massifer, where Is placed cairn 61, the frontier follows a line on the shore parallel to and at 10 metres from the edge of Lake Tiberias, follow­ ing any alteration of level consequent on the raising of its waters owing to the construction of a dam on the Jordan south of LaJce Tiberias. On the shores of the southeastern quarter of the Lake, the strip of Palestinian territory was broader, and nowhere 11 touched the Lake. It was evident that it was the intention of the British and French to give complete sovereignty over the Lake to the Palestinian mandate. From the area of the Lake, the boundary turns east to Include a long"ffnger" up the Yarmuk valley, including, at Its eastern tip, El Hamma. This extension was occasioned not only by the fact that the El Hamma lands belonged to InhaJsltants living in Palestine, but also to the original intention to facilitate British maintenance, relocation, or reconstruction of the railway line running east through the Yarmuk valley. According to Frlschwasser-Ra ’ anan, there was probably also an intent to construct a canal from the 22 Yarmuk River at El Hamma into Lake Tiberias. Frlschwasser-Ra ' anan concludes : Any proposal for quite minor changes along the Palestinian-Syriaa frontier immediately involved an alteration in the delicate balance of Franco-Brltish Imperial positions, and the consequences, therefore, were likely to involve everything from Kirkuk to the Rhine and from the Channel to Gambia. This was shown quite clearly in the protracted negotiations from 1919 to 1920 . . . these frontiers were not intended so much to shape the physical outline of a new national unit as to delimit the spheres of influence In the Middle East of the British and French Empires.^^ In any case, the description of the particular trac­ ing of this frontier (including repeated references simply to numbered "cairns" as markers) was destined to have a complicating effect on United Nations Security Council actions in the future. Furthermore, the somewhat casual 12 surveying and marking of It on the ground, reflected In In­ adequate detail in tracing It on too small-scale maps, was destined to plague a later generation of officers serving as military arbitrators in the UN Truce Supervision Organi­ zation. 13 FOOTNOTES— CHAPTER I

^Texts in Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919- 1939. First Ser les (London ; Her kajesbys Stationery O:^jg'ice, 1^52), Vol. IV, pp. 244-247. (Hereinafter referred to as Documents.) 2 H. F. Frlschwasser-Ra'anan. The Frontiers of a Nation (London: Batchworth Press, l§tS), pp. Iiâ-1T4T ^Documents, op. cit., Item No. 197, p. 285. Note: The messages and memoranda given in these remaurkably com­ prehensive Documents are published as complete individual items. The value oi these paurticular items to the study is so great that the writer has Introduced them numerically into the text so that the reader can follow the sequence. ^Documents. op. clt.. Item No. 242, p. 347, ^Documents (1947), Vol. I, op. clt.. Item No. 57, Appendix B, p. 700. 6 Documents, Vol. IV, op. clt., Item No. 314, p. 452. ^Documents (1958), Vol. VII, op. clt., Item No. 12, pp. lOA-'mr. — Q David Lloyd George, The Truth ^out the Peace Treaties (London: Victor Goïïancz, Ltd., pp. 11*^8-1179. Q George Adam Smith, The Historical Geography of the Holy Land (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 18^4). ^^Docuraents, Vol. VII, op. clt., Item No. 13, p. 115. ^^Ibld., Item No. 20, pp. 184-185. ^^Docuraents (1958), Vol. VIII, op. clt., Item No. 16, pp. 172-TTT------^^Frlschwasser-Ra'anan, op. clt., pp. 132-133. ^^Dociaanents, fl963). Vol. XIII, op. cit., Item No. 322, pp. 349-&^2. ^^Ibid., Item 324, p. 355. ^^Ibld.. Item 331, pp. 373-376. 14 ^^Ibld.. Item Ho. 333, p. 381. ^^Ibid.. Item No. 334, p. 382. ^^Ibld.. Item No. 354, pp. 418-420. ^^Publlshed as Cmd. 1195 on March 17, 1921. 21 Agreement between His Majesty's Government and the French Government respecting the Boundary Line between Syria and Palestine from the Mediterranean to El Hamm#, Cmd. 1910. ^^Ibid.. p. 138. ^^Ibid.. p. 146. CHAPTER II

THE CREATION OF THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN DEMILITARIZED ZONES

The next development, leading ultimately to the creation of the Demilitarized Zones was the United Nations General Assembly's Palestine Partition Resolution, 181 (II), of November 29, 1947. This resolution recommended the adoption and Implementation of the Plan of Partition which allocated the entire aurea of Eastern Galilee, "bounded . . . on the east by the frontiers of Syria," to the new Jewish State, Including specifically "the whole of the Huleh Basin" and "Lake Tiberias." Later, the State of Israel, although it had as a consequence of the Arab­ ler aeli War of 1948 elsewhere expanded beyond the 1947 resolution's partition boundaries, could point to the fact that the Huleh Valley was originally thus constituted as a part of the Jewish State's basic core as a legitlmatizatlon of Israeli sovereignty of the entire Huleh and Upper Jordan River Valley up to the Anglo-French boundary. In May, 1948, the "formal" stage of the Arab-Israell War started, during the course of which the Syrian Army in­ vaded the Huleh-Lake Tiberias Valley. The Arab armies did not succeed in destroying the new State of Israel, and eventually one by one, through the mediation of the United 16 Nations, they signed individual armistice agreements with Israel. In all four of these agreements, a key permanent role was provided for the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the military ob­ servers assigned to his staff on loan from countries neu­ tral in the Arab-Israell clash. Syria was the last of the four Arab states to sign a General Armistice Agreement with Israel, on July 20, 1949,^ consistent with the reputation Syria was later to maintain as the most-mllltantly anti- Israeli Arab State. The Syrians had been able to hold out against the Israeli Army partly because of the military ad­ vantage the Syrians had started with by being in possession of the high ground overlooking the Upper Jordan River Valley for most of the distance between Banias and the southern end of Lake Tiberias. Starting from this advantage, the Syrian Army was still holding, at the time of the effective cease-fire of 1948, three pockets of the territory In the Huleh-Tiberias Valley inside the area of the former mandate of Palestine. These were: a small area in the north; a large area in the center of the line bordering on the eastern shore of the then-existent Lake Huleh and including a considerable section of territory west of the Upper Jordan River; and a triangle-shaped between the southeast shore of Lake Tiberias and the Yarmuk River. The map officially in­ corporated in the Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement 17 Indicates where the cease-fire lines or "truce lines" lay. The practical importance of these lines has now become pri­ marily historical: they show what areas of Palestine the Syrian Army was holding. It should be noted that Bin Gev, which had to be supplied by the Israelis from across the Lake, remained in Israeli hands; and that one small sliver of Syrian territory in the north was in Israeli hands. This military advance, which Syria had accomplished, soon was transformed into an important prestige issue for the latter. In the negotiations between the UN, the Israelis, auid the Syriauas, the Israeli demand that the Syrians evacuate the three areas west of the Palestinian- Syrian boundary and the Syrian refusal to do so soon became the most intractable issue. In view of the concern shown by the Zionists, in 1919 and 1920, over control of the head­ waters of the Jordan River, it should be obvious why the Israelis were determined to get the Syrians out: the cen­ tral of the three areas placed the Syrians athwart the Jordan River, and the southern area made the Syriains a de facto riparian on Lake Tiberias. The unhindered exploita­ tion of these two bodies of water would, the Israelis felt, be essential to Israel's development. However, the Syrian Army, with its amour propre at stake, remained adamant in refusing to give back to Israel what the Syrians had con­ quered or liberated. 18 After protracted negotiations, UN Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche worked out a compromise whereby the three Syrian-held areas would be constituted as a "Demilitarized Zone" (later generally referred to as "Zones" because there were three separate areas). As part of this compromise, the Bin Gev area was tossed into the bag of the Southern Demilitarized Zone. (Here it should be noted that the Nuqeib area, a square-shaped piece of ground constituting the northern tip of the Southern Demilitarized Zone, having been devastated by the fighting and temporarily abandoned by Its Arab population, was not occupied by the Israelis.) Into the Northern Demilitarized Zone, there was incorporated the small sliver of Syrian territory held by the Israeli forces east of the old Franco-British boundary. Except for this sliver and the Bin Gev area, the western border of these Zones was the Armistice Demarcation Line which else­ where ran along the old international boundary between Syria and Palestine. Article V of the General Armistice Agreement, covering the establishment of the Demilitarized Zone, and pertinent excerpts from Article VII, covering the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, are given in the appendix to this study. A reading of these texts indicates that, while giv­ ing the full Mixed Armistice Commission certain powers, the General Armistice Agreement also gave some specific powers 19 to the Chairman personally. Article V provided that the Chairman "shall be responsible for the full implementation of this article" (5c); it also empowered him to confirm that there had been a flagrant violation in the Zone (5b), to authorize return of the civilians to the Zone (5e), and to authorize the employment of locally-recruited civilian police in the Zone ( 5e ). Article VII gave the full Commis­ sion the power to supervise the execution of the provisions of the Agreement 91), to take action on claims or complaints relating to the application of the Agreement (7), and to give authoritative interpretation of the provisions of the Agreement when their meaning is at issue, except for the preamble and Articles I and II. Thus, in the text of the Agreement, there was considerable vagueness as to the dis­ tinction between the powers of the Chairman acting in his own capacity and those of the full Commission, particularly insofar as they applied to the Demilitarized Zones. (It should be noted that the "Chairman" so provided for would be the UN Truce Supervision Organization Chief of Staff or his designee.) In fact. Article V was so imprecise that some sort of further clarification was deemed necessary by both of the adversary parties. Therefore, at the Armistice Con­ ference where the Agreement was being negotiated, an "ex­ planatory note" was drafted by Dr. Bunche on June 26, 1949 20 (text in Appendix)y which was made part of the Summary Record of the meeting of July 3 of the Israeli-Syrian Armistice Commission. At this time, according to later testimony by the UH Truce Supervision Organization Chief of Staff, General William Riley, both delegations agreed to consider it "as an authoritative comment should any diffi- 2 culty in the interpretation of the article arise." In discussing this document before the UN Security Council in 1951, General Riley pointed up its importance as follows : In the course of the negotiations, Mr. Bunche and Mr. Vigier necessarily sent many unilateral appeals, suggestions, proposals, and explanations. In my view, and Mr. Bunche assures me that he shares this view, none of these communications other than the explanatory note of 26 June can be said to have any official standing as a basis for interpreting Article V of the Agreement, since it was this note alone which the parties themselves accepted for this purpose. Subsequent to the negotiation of the armistice agree­ ments, critics have castigated them for being too vague and imprecise. While impreciseness is often considered a diplo­ matic sin, this attitude may be more applicable to Western than to non-Western diplomatic conditions. The wording devised in these Agreements, the UN negotiators believed, was the best that could be negotiated to save face for both parties and bridge the gap between them at least long enough to effect a permanent cease-fire. In particular, with reference to Article V of the Israeli-Syrian Agreement, Dr. 21

Bunche, in a telegram of June 25, 1949, to his negotiator Henri Vigier in Damascus, stated: The provision for the Demilitarized Zone in the light of all circumstances is the most that can be reasonably expected in an armistice agreement by either party. Questions of permanent boundaries, territorial sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the like must be dealt with in the ultimate peace settlement and not in the armistice agreement. This telegram, transmitted by Mr. Vigier to the Israelis and Syrians, was later made public during the 1951 3 UN Security Council debate. It should also be noted that the armistice agree­ ments were drawn up under the assumption, particularly on the part of Israel and the UN, that they would be transi- 4 tory arrangements leading to a peace settlement. Instead, within a month, the Syrlaui Government, which had signed this Agreement with them, was violently overthrown. Similar upheavals took place in the other Arab countries against governments or rulers who had signed armistice agreements with Israel, and Arab political leaders found it politically unacceptable to continue to negotiate directly with Israel. They could, however, safely agree to continue to be bound by the armistice agreements and to participate in meetings presided over by a UN Chairman whose presence served, at least politically and psychologically, to "insulate" them from the Israelis and thus save face for Arab governments 22 domestically. As the Israeli Foreign Mlnlstery*s Legal Adviser commented In 1951: Apart from their functions under the Armistice Agreements these Four Mixed Armistice Commissions have assumed a useful role by virtue of the fact that they were the only meeting place for Jews and Arabs at which day-to-day matters could be dis­ cussed. 5 23 CHAPTER II— FOOTNOTES

^United Nations Security Council Ctfflclal Records. Fourth Year, Special Supplement Wo. 2, S/i65!5/Aev.l. ^UN Security Council, Official Records. 542d Meeting, April 25, 1951, paras. 98 and 99. ^Ibld.. para. 97. ^Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. &9. ^Shabtal Rosenne, Israel ' s Armistice Agreements with the Arab States (Tel Aviv: ïnternational Eaw Association, CHAPTER III

THE LAKE HULEH CRISIS OF 1951

From July, 1949, until 1951, the Israeli-Syrlan armistice line remained free of any major incidents. Al­ though sporadic minor incidents did occur, the Chief of Staff of HNTSO, General Riley, testified before the Security Council that the General Armistice Agreement "for almost two years • • • has worked well" (542d Meeting, para. 104}• The Mixed Armistice Commission (commonly referred to in UN parlance as "ISHAC" or "the MAC") continued to meet regu­ larly to discuss problems face-to-face, and the number of UN military observers assigned to it was phased down to half a dozen. In accordance with the General Armistice Agreement, the parties had drawn up their own agreed-upon rules of procedure. In the process of rulings issuing from their weekly meetings, they and the UN Chairman had started the creation of a sort of "MAC jurisprudence." Then, on February 8, 1951, there occurred the Israeli action which led to the first great crisis of the MAC, to a prolonged UN Security Council hearing, to a major Security Council resolution, and ultimately to the Israeli boycott of regular MAC meetings. The Israeli action was the drain­ age of Lake Huleh marshes, a project which inevitably affected the course of the Jordan River inside the Central 25 Demilitarized Zone. This raised the question of the status of land ownership in the Demilitarized Zone, and thence the power of the adversaury parties and UN bodies over the De­ militarized Zones. The Syrian and subsequent UN reactions spotlighted the fact that the establishment and continued existence of the Demilitarized Zones could constitute an Achilles Heel for the vital Israeli development of its share of the Jordaua River waters. For years, the Jewish settlers in Palestine had planned to drain the malarial Lake Huleh and its swamps, for which the Jewish-owned Palestine Land Development Company had obtained a concession in 1934. In addition to ridding the area of malaria, the project would develop and irrigate potentially—fertile land thus drained. At first glance, the establishment of the Armistice Demarcation Line and the Central Demilitarized Zone appeared not to affect the project, since the Huleh Lake and swamps remained in Israeli territory outside of, although adjacent to, the Central Demilitarized Zone. Accordingly, at the end of 1950, the Israelis decided to embark on the project. However, when the execution of the project was started in January, 1951, it became apparent that two opera­ tions essential to it would have to be carried out inside the Central Demilitarized Zone: the building of an access road for equipment, and the deepening and straightening of 26 the bed of the Jordan River at the southern outlet of the Lake, an operation essential to the drainage. The road was planned to pass through Arab-owned land. More importantly, the dredging for the drainage affected seven acres of Arab- c%med land. As General Riley later reported to the Security Council, "the Israelis offered practically any price to the owners for compensation and for expropriation; no price has been acceptable to the Arab land-owners."^ At this point, the Syrians moved to oppose the Israeli project, and on February 14, filed a complaint in the full Mixed Armistice Commission charging that the carry­ ing out of the project would remove a natural military obstacle, in contravention of Article II, Paragraph 1 of the Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, and also that the Israeli work prevented many Arab residents from resuming normal civilian life in the Zone. In his later report to the Secretary General for the Security Council dated March 12 (S/2049, distributed March 21),^ General Riley stated that . . . under the terms of Article V of the Israel- Syrian General Armistice Agreement the Syrian dele­ gation is required to address its complaint concerning the Demilitarized Zone to the ChaULrman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, rather than to the Commission itself, since he believed that, in such a case, the Chairman alone has the jurisdic­ tion. However, he noted, the Israelis raised no objection 27 to this procedure and, accordingly, neither did General Riley at the time. Thus, a formal meeting of the Commis­ sion ensued in which both delegations agreed mutually to ask for the formal opinion of the Chief of Staff as to whether or not the work contravened Article IX of the General Armistice Agreement, which provided that "no mili­ tary or political advantage should be gained under the truce." General Riley's opinion was delivered to the parties on March 7, in a memorandum (incorporated in S/2049) which constituted one of the basic documents in the history of the status of the Demilitarized Zones. He stated that "in draining Lake Huleh, the Israelis will not enjoy any mili­ tary advantage not equally applicable to the Syrians." He then moved on to the issue of the construction of a dam by the Israelis at the south end of Lake Huleh for the purpose of lessening the flow of water into the Jordan River during the dredging of the latter. This operation. General Riley ruled, caused some flooding of Arab-owned lands, was "an obstacle to the return to normal civilian life of the in­ habitants" of the Zone, and thus violated the General Armistice Agreement. General Riley in his memorandum then tackled the problem of Israeli expropriation of Arab lands in the Zone for the access road and met it head on. He noted that the 28 Israelis had attempted expropriation by contending that they were using a Palestine Mandate Government Ordinance of 1938 which would apply in an area in which Israel exercised sovereignty. However, he ruled, "it does not follow that the rights granted under the Mandate Government still hold good." He continued: The demilitarized zone created by the Armistice Agreement was defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of both parties while providing for the gradual restoration of normal civilian life in the area of the demlll'fcyTzed zone, fihe Chaim'an of the Mixed Armistice Commission was charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the provisions of the Armistice Agreement with respect to the de­ militarized zone were implemented. It follows that neither psurty to the Armistice Agreement therefore enjoys rights of sovereignty within the demilitarized zone. Any laws, regulations or ordinances in force prior to the Armistice Agreement which affected any auceas included in the demilitarized zone are null and void. Therefore, the concessionaires do not enjoy the right to expropriate lands or buildings, to occupy lands temporarily or to force the owners of lands to accept compensation. There is no law of expropriation within the demilitarized zone. Any occupancy of lands either temporary or perma­ nent, without the full consent of the landowners, is a hindrance to the restoration of normal civilian life in the demilitarized zone, and a violation of article V, paragraph 2, of the Armistice Agreement. "B. Until such time as a mutual agreement is reached between the Governments of Syria and Israel, with respect to the work now being conducted in the demilitarized zone in connexion [sic] with the drainage of the Lake Huleh marshes, the Palestine Land Development Company or any successors are, in the opinion of the Chief of Staff, not justified in continuing such work. "C. In the opinion of the Chief of Staff, the Palestine Land Development Company, Limited, should be instructed forthwith to cease all operations 29 within the demilitarized zone, until such time as a mutual agreement is arranged through the Chairman between Syria and Israel for continuing this project. "(Signed) W. E. Riley, Major-General, USMC.", [Note: The United Nations Chief of Staff now believes that his memorandum should have stated that any laws, regulations or ordinances in force prior to the Armistice Agreement which affected any areas included in the demilitarized zone "are held in abeyance" instead of "are null and void".J At the meeting of ISMAC on March 7, at which the memorandum was presented, the Israeli delegate contended that General Riley had gone beyond the scope of the request submitted to him and charged him with "assuming prerogatives” in the Demilitarized Zone which were not given him under the General Armistice Agreement. The Israelis particularly objected to his denial of Israeli sovereignty in the Zone. The Syrian delegate supported General Riley aund asked for a vote on its complaint (in which, of course, the Chief of Staff or his deputy as Chairman could, if he chose, cast the deciding vote). The voting was, however, postponed for twenty-four hours. The following day, the Israelis informed General Riley that the questions raised in his memorandum "called for careful consideration” and that the Israeli delegation would not attend the scheduled meeting. Under­ standably, they foresaw that the vote would go against them if the Chairman cast his vote. They then ignored a March 10 request by the ISMAC Chairman that the Israelis stop 30 work on Arab-owned lands until action had been taken by the Commission. Following a renewed request by the Chairman to stop this work, the Israelis adopted a new position and stated that the issue should not have been discussed by the Com­ mission, but only between the Israelis and the Chairman, referring to his powers outside the Commission. The Is­ raelis, thereupon, formally "informed” the Chairman of the project, and asked him to arrange for a meeting between the Israelis and the owners of the land affected. The Chairman attempted to do so on March 15, but was interrupted by the first outbreak of firing in this clash; in the words of the 3 report of March 27, to the UN Secretary General of the Acting Chief of Staff, Colonel de Bidder of Belgium, "Arab civilians in the demilitarized zone opened fire" on an Israeli bulldozer. The Israelis complained about firing by "armed Syrians,” and sent police reinforcements into the Zone. The Chairman again Immediately requested the Israelis to stop the drainage works in the Zone. The latter agreed to do so until March 23. Following a meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission on March 19, at which the Syrians again insisted that the drainage works in the Zone be stopped and the Israelis stated that the matter was not under the jurisdiction of the Commission, the Chairman re­ quested the Israelis to cease work until he had reported to 31 the Commission on the completion of his investigation* Al­ though the Israelis had proposed a resolution at the MAC meeting to the effect that the Chairman, rather than the Commission, did have powers under Article V to "deal with the matters raised," the Israelis refused to ccsnply with this request and resumed the work on March 25. Firing thereupon broke out again, which during the ensuing weeks spread all up and down the Israeli-Syrian armistice line. During the course of the fighting, the Israelis evacuated the inhabitants of Arab villages of Baqqara and Ghanname in the Central Demilitarized Zone and of Samra in the Southern Demilitaurized Zone, the villages being largely destroyed during the fighting. A strong Israeli police patrol also attempted to occupy El Hamma but was repulsed by Arab fire with severe losses, whereupon Israeli aircraft bombed El Hamma. On April 6, the Syrians called for a meeting of the UN Security Council. When the Council held its first meeting on this issue on April 17 (its 541st Meeting), the representative of Syria relied heavily on UNTSO reports for his recitation of events and his legal argumentation. The representative of Syria emphasized the authority of the Chief of Staff as Chairmam of the MAC. He summed up six reasons for Syria's opposition to the drainage project, as follows (in condensed form): 32 1. The military advantage Israel would gain by the removal of the "natural barrier" of Lake Huleh. 2. The prospect that the Arab inhabitants of the Zones would be driven out by such operations. 3* The need for additional Syrian military expendi­ ture to cope with an expanded front. 4. The disadvantageous effect on down-stream Arab land irrigation. 5. Syria's right as a signatory to the General Armistice Agreement to be consulted on such a project. 6. Past Syrian occupation of the Demilitarized Zones. He stated: "When a final peace settle­ ment has been concluded, Syria will certainly insist that this territory be returned to its control." (para. 49.) The reply of the representative of Israel, Mr. Eban, to the Syrian complaint, delivered at the next meeting of the Council on April 25 (its 542d Meeting) was to constitute a classic Israeli statement of its position on the Demili­ tarized Zones. Reviewing the importance of the Upper Jordan River and the Huleh Basin to Israel, he argued from logic that Israel would never have signed an armistice agreement which it understood would have deprived it of sovereignty over this area, or would have subjected it to any limitation on its non-military activities in the Zone. In particular, with reference to the idea that the Zone would never become a "wasteland," the Israelis understood that there was "no question" of making their right to carry out development plans, such as the Huleh drainage 33 "conditional upon the good graces of Syria or of subjecting it to the veto of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Com­ mission." (para. 26.) Hr. Eban then addressed himself squarely to the Chief of Staff's Memorandum of March 7, as incorporated in S/2047, amd recapitulated point by point Israel's objec­ tions to it in what became a kernel of the classic state­ ment, as follows (in condensed form): 1. The expression of opinion on such legal and political matters, including sovereignty, exceeded the express auid limited powers of the UN representatives as defined in the Armistice Agreement. 2. None of the political and legal doctrines ex­ pressed are supported by the text of the Armistice Agreement, and restrictions on sovereignty cannot be presumed without spe­ cific provisions. 3. Since Dr. Bunche's letter of 1949 stated that questions of sovereignty in the Zone cannot be raised, they cannot now be raised in this con­ text. 4. The doctrine that the Huleh concession is in abeyance overlooks the legal principle of duly acquired private rights. 5. Demilitarization does not remove an area from a state's normal jurisdiction and control, or invest the area with any "peculiar or particu­ lar legal status in international law." Thus demilitarization is distinguished from a no­ man's land. "For example, it was never sug­ gested by any jurist that the demilitarization of the Rhineland under the Treaty of Versailles between the two world wars affected the sover­ eignty of that area." Although Syriaua troops did occupy parts of the Zone, military occupa­ tion does not give rise to sovereignty ; and in any case Bin Gev, in the Zone, was never oc­ cupied by the Syrians but remained administered 34 throughout as an Integral part of Israel. 6. Under the "established practice of the Armistice Agreement," Israeli civil authority has oper­ ated in the Zone for the past two years, including levying taxes and operating public services. The Mixed Armistice Commission specifically determined that Israel could es­ tablish new villages in the Zone. The past acceptance of these arrangements cannot be reconciled with holding Israeli laws in abey­ ance in the Zone. 7. "The contention that previous laws in the demili­ tarized zone are in abeyance conflicts with the objective of the Agreement looking towards the restoration of normal civilian life in the area." 8. "Finally, the Chief of Staff's legal theories would in their application lead the practical life of the area into a reductio ad absurdum, for if there is no Syrian or ïsraêT sover­ eignty in the area, and since Mr. Bunche's authoritative letter excluded any theory that the United Nations has administrative powers, the conclusion is that the demilitarized zone is a vacuum, a kind of no-man's-land, a vacuum which is precisely what Mr. Bunche's letter said it must not be. It would follow that the residents of that area have no civic obliga­ tions to any government, cannot be brought before any court in the event of crime, and constitute an island of anarchy within the area. This conflicts with the basic legal principle that legislation must retain its force until superseded by the legislation of a new sovereign in the area." (para. 56.) He then again objected to the "suggestion" in the Riley Memorandum that work in the Zone be "suspended until Syriaui agreement is received for its resumption." This arrangement, he said "would confer sovereignty upon Syria in a matter of completely non-Syrian concern." The re­ mainder of his speech consisted of a defense of Israeli 35 activities in the area during the recent clashes, including the explanation that the villages of Baqqara and Ghanname were removed from the Zone for their own safety, and fur­ ther insistence that, despite UNTSO reports, the Chairman of ISHAC had authorized, in fact, at one point the resump­ tion of the drainage work. The next speaker was General Riley, who had been summoned by the Security Council. General Riley indicated that he would welcome any clarification and guidance by the Council on issues such as the administrative authority in the Zone. He pointed out that "the underlying issue in this dispute concerns the extent to which either party is or is not free to undertake civilian activities in the de­ militaurized zone." In order to assist the Security Council in its deliberations, he inserted, in the record, not only the text of Dr. Bunche's explamatory note of June 26, 1949, but also a further statement which had just been prepaured by Dr. Bunche as his "personal view" of the general purpose and nature of the Zone. This further statement did not answer the specific questions at issue, but it did contain some helpful legal background. Following are some excerpts from this statement (all in para. 97) : The purpose of the Zone was . . . to separate and keep separated for the duration of the armistice the armed forces of the two paurties in order to eliminate as fully as 36 possible friction and troublesome incidents between them. This was to be, in effect, a sort of "buffer zone," pending final peaceful settlement of the dis­ pute. It was recognized that the gradual restoration of civilian life in the demilitaurized zone could neither be automatic nor left to the discretion of the con­ flicting parties. [The Chairman was to be] the responsible agent guiding this process . . . although he was not called upon to directly administer the area. Since what was being negotiated was an armistice agreement amd not a peace treaty, "the question of terri­ torial sovereignty . . . was scrupulously avoided." The statement then quoted the excerpt from the tele­ graphic message sent by Dr. Bunche to Mr. Vigier and trans­ mitted to the parties during the negotiations in June, 1949 (see Chapter II). The last paragraph of this statement prepared by Dr. Bunche for General Riley to read contained the following sentence: The provisions of the Armistice Agreement and my communications to the governments in connexion [sic] therewith, do not establish, aiffirm, confirm or deny the rights, claims or position of either party with regard to the question of territorial sovereignty either in the demilitarized zone or elsewhere. The next meeting, the 544b, was held on May 2, with General Riley again present and available for direct ques­ tioning. He first submitted to detailed questioning by the representative of the United States primarily on the fac­ tual situation. It was then the turn of the representative of the United Kingdom, who focused on obtaining General 37 Riley's explanation of his own powers as he saw them. General Riley explained that while, according to Dr. Bunche ' s note of June 26, 1949, each settlement in the Zone was responsible for its own affairs and he could not di­ rectly administer them, when disputes between them arose the Chief of Staff would exercise a "power of adjudication" (paras. 79-80). The representative of the United Kingdom then asked if either party could bring "any matter" before the Commission. General Riley stated that this was not the case, adding "I feel that the Chairman . . . performs a dual role. X look upon him as the agent acting for Syria within the demilitarized zone and looking into complaints of Arabs who have returned to that zone." However, while stressing the powers of the Chairmam acting alone in this respect. General Riley continued to call attention to each party's right of raising any question of the interpretation of the General Armistice Agreement in accordatnce with Arti­ cle VII, paragraph 8. The representative of the United Kingdom concluded that "it is not quite clear" what the powers of the Chairman are. In reply to this representa­ tive's last question. General Riley stated that the Chair­ man cannot authorize work which involves expropriation of land; he can only lend "his good offices." At the end of the session, the representative of Israel closely crossexamined General Riley, seeking to 38 emphasize the limitations on the Chief of Staff's or Chair­ man's police powers and the degree of police powers already exercised by Israel in the Zone and accepted in actual practice. General Riley stuck to the position that Israeli police when in the Zone "should be considered as local police." When Hr. Eban asked if the Chairman had any police under his direct command, General Riley held out that "both local and Israel police” come or should come under his general supervision. In response to Mr. Eban's question as to whether he would concern himself with "daily command,” General Riley held out "only when necessary." The next meeting, the 545b on May 8, was devoted largely to the current fighting rather than the status of the Demilitarized Zone, and produced a simple cease-fire resolution by the passage of S/2130. However, the repre­ sentative of Syria also took the opportunity to correct what he termed "distortions" of the statement he made on April 17 about Syrian claims to the Demilitarized Zone. He now added that Syria had no desire "at the present time to occupy any part of the demilitarized zone," and that "the destiny of this area is to be established in the provisions of the eventual peace treaty.” (paras. 80-83.) Me then summed up Syria's demands for a solution, as follows (paras. 94-100): 1. Stoppage of the drainage work pending "an 39 understanding • • • between the signatories of the armistice agreement, and pending the free consent of the owners of the land" in the Zone. 2. The return of the Arab inhabitants to their homes in the Zone. 3. Payment by Israel of adequate indemnity to those Arad>s for property losses. 4. "Withdrawal of all military and para-military forces from the demilitarized zone, together with policemen not locally recruited." (Here the representative of Syria specified that the Arabs in the zone are indigenous Palestinians and cannot be interpreted as being Syrian para-military forces.) 5. Restricting policing of villages in the Zone to locally-recruited police. 6. Confirmation by the Security Council of the powers of the UN Chief of Staff and the Mixed Armistice Commission. The last two meetings of the Council on this dispute (the 546b, on May 16, and the 547b, on May 18) were devoted to discussing a draft resolution. At the 546b Meeting, the representative of the United States gave general support to General Riley's position, without, however, specifically endorsing all the legal positions the latter had taken in such statements as his March 7 Memorandum. The representa­ tive of the United States did stress the responsibility of the Chairman, "and not Israel or Syria," for the general supervision of the administration of the Zone. (para. 18.) The representative of the United Kingdom went somewhat fur­ ther and stated flatly that "as long as the Armistice con­ tinues in force, neither Government exercizes sovereignty 40 in the demilitarized zone" (para. 29). The representative of Turkey, who was co-sponsoring a draft resolution with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, pre­ ferred that the question of sovereignty be "left open." He felt that, despite the statement of Dr. Bunche, the purpose was to create a buffer zone. That was not the only purpose; the representative of Turkey ascribed its creation more to the conflicting territorial claims of the two parties. The last meeting was consumed by comments by the representatives of Israel and Syria on the draft resolution just referred to (S/2151/Rev. 1, dated May 16), and to vot­ ing on it. The draft resolution in the preamble "noted" that the Chief of Staff, in a memorandum of March 7, had requested the Israelis to stop the work in the Demilitarized Zone "until such time as an agreement is arranged through the Chairman." The draft resolution did not specifically endorse the contents of this memorandum and, furthermore, it also merely "noted" the other reports by the Chief of Staff and his statement before the Security Council. The draft resolution, however, did contain as its first opera­ tional provision the sentence: "Endorses the requests of the Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission on this matter and calls upon the Government of Israel to comply with them." 41 Next, taüclng up the jurisdictional question, the draft resolution "noted" the provision for interpretation in Article VII, paragraph 8, of the Armistice Agreement, and continued as follows: Calls upon the Governments of Israel and Syria to bring before the Mixed Armistice Commission or its Chairman, whichever has the pertinent responsibility under the Armistice Agreement, their complaints and to abide by the decisions resulting therefrom • • • • Thus, in approving this draft resolution, the Council would itself decline to interpret Article V as to who had what jurisdiction, referring this question back to the parties. The draft resolution attempted to strengthen the existing MAC framework by stating that it: Considers that it is inconsistent with the objec­ tives and intent of the Armistice Agreement to refuse to participate in meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission or to fail to respect requests of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission as they relate to his obligations under article V, and calls upon the parties to be represented at all meetings called by the Chairman of the Commission and to respect such requests • • . • The resolution also incorporated the four paragraphs of Dr. Bunche's "authoritative comment," calling on the parties to "give effect" to it. Following routine cease-fire provisions, the resolu­ tion provided as follows : a) Decides that Arab civilians who have been re­ moved from the demilitarized zone by the Government of Israel should be permitted to return forthwith to their homes and that the Mixed Armistice Commission 42 should supervise their return and rehabilitation in a manner to be determined by the Commission; and b) Holds that no action involving the transfer of persons across international frontiers, armistice lines or within the demilitarized zone should be undertaken without prior decision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission • • • . The remaining operative paragraphs emphasized the importance of freedom of movement for and cooperation with UN military observers, reiterated the authority of the Chief of Staff, called on him to report on compliance with the resolutions, and requested the Secretary General to provide him with additional personnel. Israel was not satisfied with this draft resolution. Its representative stated that Israel would have preferred, if the Huleh concession, as originally granted, could no longer be upheld, that the Chief of Staff or the Chairman be given the duty of laying down "fair conditions for the protection of the interests of the affected landowners .... All parties would then be required to accept that award" (para. 63). In a later paragraph, however, the same representative expressed concern over the extent of execu­ tive power which the resolution confirmed for the Chief of Staff or Chairman. At the conclusion of the session (May 18), the draft resolution was adopted by ten votes in favor, with one ab­ stention— that of the Soviet Union. 43 The debate and resolution left unauiswered two ques­ tions of the interpretation of the General Armistice Agree­ ment with respect to the Demilitarized Zones: (1) the extent of the powers of Chairman acting alone vis-4-vis those of the Mixed Armistice Commission as a whole; and (2) the extent of the powers of the Chairman acting alone vis-à- vis those of each of the parties in the respective Israeli- held and Arab-held areas. In fact, no meeting of ISMAC for the purpose of making an interpretation of the provisions of the Agreement giving these powers was to be held. Following the Security Council resolution, General Riley, who had returned to his post, in a telegram of May 28 to the UN Secretary General (distributed as S/2173j May 29), submitted his first interim report on steps taken to give effect to the resolution. He stated that both parties appeared willing to obey it, but that differences of opinion had arisen over interpreting the "intent" of the resolution. Israel contended that the point at issue was "safeguarding

the legitimate rights and interests of the Aral) owners of land in the demilitarized zone affected by the Huleh opera­ tions." Israel denied that the Security Council "envisaged indefinite suspension of work on the project”; whereas Syria contended that its complaint to the Council not only concerned Arab land interests but "was also intended to prevent the creation of military or political advantages in 44 the area.” General Riley reported that he, in general, agreed with Israel on this issue (para. 5). He noted that the Security Council resolution that the drainage project in the Zone was to be stopped only "until such time as an agreement is reached through the Chairman." After checking who owned what lands, he announced that, as of June 11, the Israelis could resume work on lands not belonging to Arabs in the Zone (telegram of June 26, distributed as S/2213 on June 27). He thus acted on the basis that this matter was one of those that came under his own powers, not those of the full Commission, and that the "agreement" in this case meant one between himself and the Israelis. The Syrians at once protested to the Security Council (5/2191 of June 11 and S/2193 of June 12) that the intent of the resolution had been to "stop all drainage work" in the Zone. In an ensuing interim report of August 16 (S/2300), General Riley noted that the Israelis also objected to his ruling, arguing that he could have authorized work on Arab lands as well. In the same report, he recorded the begin­ ning of the semi-permanent paralysis of ISMAC plenary meet­ ings. The Syrians refused to participate in a regular formal meeting of the Commission unless the Syrian complaint relating to matters in the Demilitarized Zone was to be discussed. The Israelis, on the other hand, refused to attend formal meetings if such items were to be discussed. 45 claiming that they came under the competence of the Chair­ man (who the Israelis would thus deal with bilaterally on this issue, acknowledging some but not all of his claimed jurisdiction when he was acting "outside" the Commission). In a later interim report, dated November 6 (S/2389), General Riley stated that "a resumption of the meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission has so far proved impossible," owing to the impasse on the agenda. In paragraph 4 of this report. General Riley pointed out that "the continuing paralysis of the Mixed Armistice Commission has imposed on the Chief of Staff heavier duties,” and that the responsi­ bility "for ensuring full implementation" of Article V had become much greater for him "since he has to work without benefit of direction from the Commission." The parties dis­ agreed on the interpretation of provisions of Article V, including those covering his powers. However, he continued: . . . neither party has requested an interpreta­ tion by the Mixed Armistice Commission in the manner established by Article VII of the Agreement and the Chairman has had to rely on his own interpretation, knowing that in many cases it would probably be found unacceptaüsle by one party or both and that his requests were likely to meet with refusal on the grounds that he was exceeding his powers or act­ ing in some manner contrary to the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. What General Riley did not add here was the commonly- accepted reason why neither party would seek a meeting of

the full Commission to vote an interpretation of Article V under the provisions of Article VII, paragraph 8. Each 46 party knew th&t the Chairman, confronted with diametrically opposing interpretations by the two delegations, would cast the deciding vote if he chose to exercise it; and each party was afraid that this deciding vote might be cast in a context which would prejudice that party's basic jurisdic­ tional claims, in such a case definitively. Neither party could be sure which positions the UN legal staff would ad­ vise the Chairman to take in the event of many possible interpretative resolutions that might be put forth by either party. Continuing report S/2389, General Riley stated that, by dealing bilaterally with the Israeli Government, he had made some progress on returning the Arab villagers of Baqqara and Ghanname to the Demilitarized Zone. The Syrians, however, continued to allege that the Israelis were pressuring and mistreating these villagers. General Riley also continued to deal bilaterally with the Israeli authorities on the problem of Israeli national police in the Zone. In this respect, he noted that his powers were limited to "authorizing employment" of such police but that he could not directly command or administer them. He agreed that the Israeli police should have freedom of move­ ment in the Zone except that, "in the absence of arrange­ ments authorized by the Chairman, Israel police must not enter the area of an Arab village and vice versa" (para. 16) 47 This report also noted that General Riley had agreed with the Israelis that the Arab road-block barring their access to El Hamma would have to be removed. However, ten­ sion among the entirely Arab inhabitants of El Hamma was still so high that General Riley evidently did not feel it would be feasible to press this issue yet. He agreed with the Israelis that they had a "right" of free access and freedom of movement in the Zone, but that "the automatic exercize [sic] of that right was, under present circum­ stances, quite a different thing," and should not be in­ sisted on if it contributed to further tension. In fact, the El Hamma enclave remained under purely Arab control. In the last of his general reports (S/2833, dated October 30, 1952, and distributed November 4, 1952), General Riley reviewed the developments of the past twelve months. Four emergency meetings of ISMAC had been held during this period, but no "regular" meetings because of the Israeli- Syrian dispute over putting the Demilitaurized Zone on the agenda. General Riley reported (para. 47) that "during two of the emergency meetings the Chairmaun, without success, requested either or both parties to bring their differences regarding interpretation of the General Armistice Agreement before the Mixed Armistice Commission." He also reported that many Arabs who had fled from the Zone in 1951 still had not returned to it, partly because the Israelis refused 48 to let them return unless these Arabs agreed to have no further Intercourse with Syria; that some Araüüs had re­ cently left the Zone for Syria; and that others were con­ templating doing so. General Riley reported that there had been no prog­ ress in two issues, obtaining compensation for the departed Arabs from the Southern Demilitarized Zone whose homes had been destroyed in 1951, and working out agreed arrangements for police in the Zone. As he stated in paragraph 58: With the exception of Nuqelb, El Hamma, and Shaunalne, Israel police, acting under orders from police head­ quarters outside the Demilitarized Zone, exercize [sic] control over practically the entire Demilitarized Zone . . . Israeli authorities . . . have not agreed to remove their non-local police from the Demilitarized Zone. This last report by General Riley produced a lengthy and angry letter from the Syrian Foreign Minister to the UN Secretary General, dated February 28, 1963 (distributed as S/2956 on March 12), the general gist of which was that the tone of the report should have been more severely critical of Israel. The letter also claimed that Syria had requested an ISMAC meeting under Article VII, paragraph 8, to Inter­ pret the General Armistice Agreement, on at least one occa­ sion In 1951, but that Israel had refused to attend It. The sharpness of the Syrian letter reflected the deteriorat­ ing diplomatic relations between the Syrians and General Riley, who resigned In June, 1953. 49 CHAPTER III— FOOTNOTES

^United Nations Security Council Official Records, 544th Meeting, May 2, 1951, para. 102. 2 Note the usual slight transmission gap between the date such reports were written from the field and the date they were published as Security Council documents. 3 United Nations Security Council Official Records, S/2067, dis-krlbuted April 4 , 1951. CHAPTER IV

THE BANAT YA'QUB DISPUTE

Soon after Generaly Riley's successor, General Vagn Bennlke of Denmark, took over as Chief of Staff of UNTSO, the Israeli action occurred which was to lead to the next Security Council meeting on a problem Involving the Demili­ tarized Zones. On September 2, 1953, the Israelis commenced digging a canal between the Jordan River at Banat Ya'qub and Lake Tiberias in order to divert a large proportion of the River Into the Laüce. The off-take point of the canal on the west bank of the River at Banat Ya'qub was Inside the Central Demilitarized Zone. The Israelis formally In­ formed the Acting Chairman of ISMAC of their digging ac­ tivity on September 2, just after they had started It, and he concurred with the project as outlined to him. During the next few days, however, he became aware that the Impor­ tance of the whole project was greater than he had antici­ pated. Accordingly, on September 9, he informed the Israelis that he had put the matter In the hands of the Chief of Staff. The letter's handling of the matter Is set forth In an exchange of correspondence with the Israeli Foreign Minister, distributed as Security Council document S/3122 on October 23, 1953. 51 After personally Investigating the project, General Bennike, on September 23, issued a decision in which, by virtue of his powers under Article V, paragraph 5 (c), he requested the Israeli Government to cease the work on the basis that: (1) it would interfere with normal civilian life in the Demilitarized Zone, particularly by lowering waters of the Jordan River on which some Arabs depend; and (2) it would alter a natural military obstacle and thus alter the value to the other party of the Zone, which had been "defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two Parties in such manner as to minimize the possibility of friction and incident" (S/3122, Annex I). The Israelis immediately auid formally objected in a letter of reply, dated September 24. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Hr. Sharett, denied that Arab-owned property in the Zone would be adversely affected and pointed to UN en­ dorsement of the Huleh drainage project as a precedent. He then went on to deny that Syria vfould have any right under the Armistice Agreement to object to the work. In particu­ lar, he challenged any right by Syria to raise the question of military advantage. Mr. Sharett wrote that . . . as clearly indicated in Article II, Par. 1 of the Armistice Agreement, the principle that no military advantage must accrue to either party was valid only during the truce period which preceded the conclusion of the armistice. The paurties "are not entitled to invoke that principle," 52 under any provision of the Armistice Agreement; otherwise, claimed Hr. Sharett, Syria might raise objections to proj­ ects "anywhere in Israel" [S/3122, Annex II, para. 7(f)3. Hr. Sharett also objected to Syria's having raised the question of water for Buteiha Farm (downstream in Syria) as "irrelevant in the context of the Armistice Agreement." Mr. Sharett stated that . . . the Armistice Agreement provides for the restoration of civilian life— and by implication for the protection of private rights— only within the Demilitarized Zone, and not outside it, either in Syria or Israel. Israeli undertakings to assure a certain amount of water for Buteiha Farm were made not on the basis of any obliga­ tions arising from the Armistice Agreement, but ^ gratia (Annex II, para. 8). Mr. Sharett, therefore, stated that the "Government of Israel fails to see the justification" for General Bennike*s conclusion, and that Israel "regards the freedom of development work within the Demilitarized Zone as an integral and essential part of the restoration of normal civilian life provided for in the Armistice Agreement” (para. 9). He suggested further discussions and offered to submit the issue to the UN Security Council. In closing, he reiterated a statement delivered by Mr. Eban at the 547a meeting of the Security Council stressing the limitations on the Chairman's powers and denying that the latter can 53 "operate by mandatory requests directed to the very Govern­ ments which have defined his functions and which are pre­ sumably, therefore, in a position to know what powers they have conceded to him." General Bennike replied formally, in a letter of October 20, noting that the matter was indeed in the process of being raised in the UN Security Council. He contested Sharett's assertion that the "sole concern" of the UN repre­ sentatives had been to protect private property rights in the Zone. General Bennike stated that "the provisions of Article V include . . . also the protection of acquired rights to the water of the river Jordan which flows in the Demilitarized Zone." He contrasted the Huleh drainage scheme, which did not diminish the quantity of water flow­ ing in the River, with the projected diversion canal which would "alter the flow of the Jordan permanently" and, un­ less definite obligations were entered into, could affect those dependent on the waters of the River (Annex III, para. 4). With specific reference to Buteiha Farm, he quoted the following provision of the Franco-British boundary agreement of 1923: "Any existing rights over the use of the waters of the Jordan by the inhad)itants of Syria shall be maintained unimpaired." With reference to the Israeli conception of the powers and functions of the Chairman, General Bennike 54 pointed out that, if it were left to "either Party to de­ cide whether the Chairman acts in conformity or not with the functions conferred upon him by both Parties, " the result would be "anarchy" in the Zone. If there is a dif­ ference in the Interpretation of the Agreement, the remedy lies in the interpretation provided for under Article VII, paragraph 8. Meanwhile, on October 12, Syria had formally called the attention of the Security Council to the Israeli action (S/3106), stating that Israel had started works "to change the bed of the river,” divert it into a new channel, and thus make it flow through territory controlled by Israel. This, continued the Syrian note, violated the Armistice Agreement, in particulair Article V. The note asserted that, since administration of the Zone is "the responsibility of local authorities under the Chairman,” the Israelis do not have the authority to undertake "any works in any sector of the Demilitarized Zone." The note emphasized that "the effect of the works is to deprive the riparian inhabitants along the Jordan of the water they need to irrigate their land," in contravention of Article V concerning the Zone. The note also stated that the River provides water for irrigation of land in Syrian territory, which had been ad­ versely affected. The complaint called attention to the fact that the Israelis had refused to comply with the Chief 55 of Staff's request to halt the operations. Four days later, in another communication to the Security Council (5/3108/ Rev. 1), the Syrians, substantially restating the language of S/3106, specifically requested that the question be taken up by the ON Security Council. In the meantime, the United States was putting pres­ sure on Israel to comply with General Bennike's order. On October 23, in response to a question about deferment of an allocation of United States financial aid to Israel, a Department of State spokesman replied: It was deferred because it seemed to us that the state of Israel should respect General Bennike's decision and that, as long as the state of Israel was acting in defiance of that decision, it was questionable at least as to whether we should make the allocation. I might add that we recognize that there was a right of appeal from General Bennike*s decision to the Security Council, but we felt that pending the exercize [sic] of that appeal it would have been better that the work be suspended unless General Bennike agreed that it could go on without prejudice to the interests which he thought were jeopardized on the part of Syria.^ Following procedural discussions, the first substan­ tive Security Council meeting on the Syrian complaint, the 63lst, was held on October 27. At the beginning of the meeting, the representative of Israel, Mr. Eban, announced that his Government was . . . willing to arrange for a temporary suspen­ sion of the project to facilitate the Security Council's consideration of this question. He added that this action was "without prejudice to the 56 merits of the case itself." The Council, at the close of the meeting, unanimously passed a resolution (presented as S/3128) which stated that it "notes with satisfaction" the Israeli commitment and requested the Chief of Staff to keep the Security Council informed. In Washington, United States Secretary of State Dulles the following day announced that he had recommended to the President that aid be resumed 2 to Israel on the basis of Mr. Bban's commitment. On October 30, General Bennike confirmed to the Security Coun­ cil that Israel had stopped the work on October 28. On October 30, at its 633rd meeting, the Security Coun­ cil embarked on its discussion of the main issue with a speech by the representative of Syria, Mr. Zeineddine, who reiterated the Syrian charges in the letter of complaint and reviewed the history of the dispute, the Article V issue and the Zone. On the military side, he claimed that, if Israel diverted the River, the barrier that it consti­ tutes would be removed and combat forces could cross the dry bed easily; whereas the new canal in Israel, while it would still be a military obstacle, would be outside of the De­ militarized Zone and completely controlled by Israel. Supporting the stand taken by General Bennike, the repre­ sentative of Syria denounced the proposed project and asserted, "the Jordan between the lakes of Huleh amd Tiberias is an international river by any definition we like" (para. 65). 57 In a summation, Mr, Zeineddine gave equal importance to the fact that the Israeli works were in violation of the Armistice Agreement and in defiance of a decision of the Chief of Staff, In discussing the letter's role, Mr. Zeineddine emphasized his powers, stating (paras. 40-41): The Chairman of the Commission also has special attributes and powers of his own, distinct from presiding over the Commission and casting the decid­ ing vote .... The distinct responsibility of the Chairman, separate from that of the Commission, covers a wide ground and range of questions. In conclusion, he urged the Security Council to uphold this "local international authority." In his reply, the representative of Israel took pains to assert that "the River Jordan does not touch the territory of Syria at any single point. At no point does the Syrian border come up to the banks of the River Jordan." He explained (para. 84) that this point was important since . . . behind the specific project lies an issue of principle . . . whether Israel's access to the only meagre source of natural power and surplus water available to it shall be submitted to the mercy of a neighboring state implacably opposed to cooperation with Israel and bent upon our economic downfall. Such a proposition would constitute "an illegitimate Syrian veto." He contended that, in the 1951 discussions on the Huleh case, the UN had "developed a specific, detailed jurisprudence" on these matters which should be applied consistently to the Banat Ya'qub project. He stated that the "alleged Syrian right of veto" had also been decisively 58 settled in the jurisprudence of the UN by a rejection of the view that Syrian consent was required. He quoted General Riley's statements to the effect that the Chief of Staff was not concerned with the water project, but only with protecting the rights of Arab landholders. He con­ tinued (para. 114): If Syria's objections to work in the demilitarized zone leading to the drainage of marshes outside the zone were rejected in 1951, then equally they cannot be accepted now with regard to work in the demili­ tarized zone leading to power and irrigation develop­ ment outside the zone. If the drainage project was subject only to the reservations of private rights in 1951, then another project in the same area cannot be subject to more far-reaching reservations today. Mr. Eban reiterated Israel's denial that any Arab- owned land in the Demilitaurized Zone would be substantially affected. In this connection, he referred to the concern expressed in paragraph 7(d) of General Bennike's letter of October 20 (Annex III of S/3122) that prejudice to existing water rights would aurise "unless definite obligations are entered into" to protect them. Mr. Eban stated that Israel was willing to enter into such obligations aund even put them into a "formal instrument" which could be "invoked internationally by the paurties concerned" (para. 125). At the next meeting of the Council on this dispute, the 636tti on November 10, the representative of Syria empha­ sized the difference between the simple drainage in the Huleh case and the diversion at Bauiat Ya'qub, which would 59 take waters out of the bed outside of the Demilitarized Zone and Into Israel proper, affecting downstream users. Continuing his denunciation of the project as a unilateral exploitation of a river in whose waters Syria had an inter­ est, he stated (para. 69): "Syria's consent is necessary to any project, whether that consent is based on the armis­ tice agreement or on more general reasons deriving from our rights under the Agreement itself." Pursuing the issue of "Syria's right to consent and the so-called Syrian veto," he stated that "the question is by no means a question of veto. It is a right of consent and agreement of two parties to an international contract." He charged that Israel was attempting unilaterally to alter the Armistice Agreement, and was defying the Chief of Staff, who was "the pivot on which the whole local international machinery works to keep the armistice." He concluded this section of his speech by asserting that "the authority of the United Nations Chief of Staff should be kept intact." Mr. Zeineddine then turned to the status of the Demilitarized Zone, and gave a re-statement in strict terms of the specific conditions governing its establishment according to Article V (paras. 102-114). Despite the length of this speech, Mr. Zeineddine did not go deeply into the legal issues of the extent of Syria's "veto power" over the Zone or the provision for 60 Interpretation of the Agreement under Article VII; nor did he attempt to define the limits of the powers of the Chief of Staff or Chairman acting alone vis-d-vis the Syrians. At the next meeting on this dispute, the 639tt on November 18, the representative of Lebanon gave a lengthy discourse in support of Syria. He emphasized the effect of the lack of any sovereignty held by any party over the Zone as being a principal reason why Israel could not undertake "a modification of its conditions as radical as that which is planned," since it would establish a "de facto situation which prejudges, in favour of one of the two parties, the question of sovereignty over the zone" (para. 48). The representative of Israel, in his rebuttal, again focused on what he termed the Syrian claim of a "right of veto." By way of background, he emphasized the historic and geographic "non-Syrian character" of the Jordan River. In so doing, he quoted from the memorandum of conversation recorded in Lloyd George's memoirs on the essential nature of the Jordan waters for Palestine, as described in Chapter I of this study. Hr. Eban also pointed to the Franco- British boundary agreement of 1923, which he contended (para. 68) removed the international boundary of Syria from the Jordan River (although he also asserted in paragraph 83 that "as a matter of juridical principle Israel can not be 61 deemed bound by treaties or agreements which Its own Govern­ ment has not signed.") Reviewing the text of this agreement, Mr. Eban stated (para. 8 4 ) that "it fixes the Syrian frontier with the most meticulous detail in such roaumner as to avoid touching the River Jordan at any point in Syria." Mr. Eban continued (para. 86) that "the picture is therefore clear. The River Jordan is an entirely Palestinian river and the two lakes are Palestinian lakes."

At the next meeting on this subject, the 645t& on December 3, UNTSO Chief of Staff General Bennike was present at the Council meeting to answer some detailed questions about the land under irrigation in the area under discus­

sion. Another meeting, the 6 4 6 aon December 1 1 , produced another speech from the representative of Lebanon reiterat­ ing that the work in the Zone could not be resumed without a mutual agreement between Israel and Syria. To allow it to be resumed, he argued would give de facto recognition to the unilateral annexation of the Zone by Israel, as well as "to further, or at least condone, the expansionist ambi­ tions of Israel with regard to the waters."

At length, on December 16 at the 648tb meeting, a joint draft resolution was introduced by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The first two operative paragraphs of the draft noted and endorsed the Chief of 62 Staff's request to the Israelis to cease work as long as an agreement is not reached* The next several paragraphs re­ iterated the importance of adhering to various provisions of the Armistice Agreement, operative paragraph 5, in par­ ticular, reminding the parties again of the provision for interpretation in Article VII, Operative paragraph 7 called upon the Chief of Staff to "maintain the demili­ tarized character of the zone as defined in paragraph 5 of Article V," Operative paragraph 9, the most important, read as follows: Requests ^ d authorizes the Chief of Staff to ex- plore possibilities of reconciling the interests involved in this dispute including rights in the demilitarized zone and full satisfaction of existing irrigation rights at all seasons, and to take such steps as he may deem appropriate to effect a recon­ ciliation, having in view the development of the natural resources affected in a just and orderly manner for the general welfare* In a relatively terse statement introducing the draft at this meeting, the representative of the United States emphasized the authority of the Chief of Staff, saying: • • • • The Chief of Staff as the authority responsible for the general supervision of the demilitarized zone is the proper authority to determine whether the project in question meets these conditions* Any unilateral action, from whatever side, which is not consistent with the authority of the Chief of Staff threatens the effective operation and enforcement of the Armis­ tice Agreement* Similarly, no government should, in our opinion, exercize Isic] a veto power over legitimate projects in the demilitarized zone* 63 This draft resolution makes clear, in our opinion : (a) That the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, as Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, is the responsible authority with respect to questions af­ fecting the demilitarized zone under Article V of the Armistice Agreement; (b) That the issues raised by the Jordan River diversion project should be decided by the Chief of Staff in accordance with his authority under the Armistice Agreement; and (c) That, in these and other questions concern­ ing the status of the demilitarized zone, an im­ portant consideration should be the just and orderly development of the natural resources affected, with due regsurd for the general welfare and the interests of the parties and individuals concerned. The representative of the United Kingdom, in a con­ siderably longer statement, admonished Israel for its defiance of General Bennike*s request, and stated (para. 1 0 ) ; • • • the Security Council is faced not with the question whether the canal is a good or useful project, but solely with the failure by one party • • • to comply with a request on the part of the Chairmam of the Mixed Armistice Commission - the only authority, after all, in the circumstances unhappily prevailing in this area, which stands for some sort of order and which is, indeed, probably the only barrier against complete chaos. However, turning next to "the arguments put forward to show that the work could not proceed without the consent of the Government of Syria" (i.e., the so-called veto power), he commented, "I and my delegation have not been convinced by them" (para. 14). In conclusion, he remarked 64 that he did not venture to claim that these proposals would be acceptable in their entirety to either Syria or Israel. The representative of France took a line generally similar to that of the other co-sponsors, but in passing added the following interesting statement: "I do not even discard the possibility of a partition of those Demiliteirized Zones .... In the opinion of my Government, such a par­ tition would be highly desirable” (para. 29). In the next meeting on this case, the 649tt on Decem­ ber 17, the representative of Israel focused attention on the call for "agreement" in the first operative paragraph. He stressed his contention, drawing again on the Lake Huleh dispute, that the "agreement to be arranged is with the Chief of Staff and not with the Government of Syria." In commenting on operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, he again argued that Article V of the Armistice Agreement "makes it abundantly clear that the United Nations authority in matters affecting the demilitarized zone is not the Mixed Armistice Commission but the Chief of Staff" (para. 32). He also expressed concern at the lack of "precision and clarity" in operative paragraph 9, authorizing action by the Chief of Staff. On December 18, at the 650tb meeting, the representa­ tive of Lebanon, objecting to the Anglo-American-French draft resolution, submitted a counter-draft which 65 essentially boiled down to the provision "Requests sind Authorizes the Chief of Staff to endeavor to bring about an agreement between the parties concerned." By this last phrase, the draft resolution obviously meant both Israel and Syria, thus attempting to preserve the latter*s "veto power" in this matter. At the opening of the next meeting on the question, the 651st on December 21, the representative of the United States on behalf of the three co-sponsors of the Anglo- American-French draft suggested that, in order to dispel doubts raised by some members of the Council that the three- power draft resolution could "change" the Armistice Agree­ ment, a new paragraph could be added to the draft reading as follows: Nothing in this resolution shall be deemed to supersede the Armistice Agreement or to change the legal status of the demilitarized zone therein. Accordingly, the resolution became S/3151/Rev. 1. The representative of the Soviet Union, nevertheless, proceeded to attack the draft resolution as a whole and, in particular, operative paragraph 9, which he contended . . . completely ignores what in our opinion is an exceedingly important condition for the settle­ ment of any question connected with the aims and purposes of the demilitarized zone - the condition that any particular measures can be carried out only with the agreement of both parties. He also criticized the vagueness of such terminology in the draft as "the general welfare" and "interests involved." 66 The representative of Lebanon next attacked the draft again, likewise considering operative paragraph 9 not acceptable. He also termed operative paragraph 7 "com­ pletely unacceptable," since it would stress the idea that the Demilitarized Zone had no special character except its demilitarization. He contended that Syria has rights and claims in the Zones and that, therefore, the phraseology should read "maintain the status of the Demilitarized Zone as defined in the General Armistice Agreement, and parti­ cularly in Article V" (pcura. 42). The representative of Syria also attacked the draft, echoing the criticisms made by the representatives of the Lebanon and the Soviet Union. During the next few days, the members of the Council continued to try, outside of the formal meetings, to reach agreement on a draft. However, on December 29, the repre­ sentative of Denmark reported at a Council meeting that efforts to find a text acceptable to all, or almost all, members of the Council had been in vain. The representa­ tive of the Soviet Union stated that he still objected to the Anglo-American-French draft resolution. Thereupon, the three Western powers re-drafted their draft resolution, which they presented on January 20 (S/3151/ Rev. 2). In their new draft, the original operative para­ graph 7 was simply dropped on the grounds that it was "highly controversial." Furthermore, the main operative 67 paragraph (formerly 9) was re-drafted in the revised draft as a new operative paragraph 8, as follows: Requests ^ d authorizes the Chief of Staff to explore possibili'bies of reconciling the Israel and Syriam interests involved in the dispute over the diversion of Jordan waters at Banat Ya'qub, includ­ ing full satisfaction of existing irrigation rights at all seasons, while safeguarding the rights of individuals in the demilitarized zone, and to take such steps in accordance with the Armistice Agree­ ment as he may deem appropriate to effect a reconcilia­ tion. The representative of Lebanon, however, objected strongly to the new phraseology of the main operative paura- graph. He felt that the words "Israeli interests" and "Syrian interests" might mean "almost anything," and could still leave the matter outside the Armistice Agreement. Lebanon also objected to the new main operative paragraph's phrase "including full satisfaction of existing water rights," which might make Syria's rights subject to a limited interpretation by a UN body while leaving Israel free to proceed with its own extensive irrigation plans (para. 69). Finally, the representative of Lebanon stated that the new main operative paragraph would simply give "too much power" to the Chief of Staff. The representative of the Soviet Union then followed and made it clear that he was opposed to a number of para­ graphs in the revised draft. He again attacked the new main operative paragraph in particular (para. 97 of the Official Records) because it did not make as a basic 68 condition for a settlement on a question in the Demilitar­ ized Zone "that no action can be taken without the consent of Syria and IsraelV--i,e., he was referring to what Hr. Eban termed the Syrian veto power. The representative of the Soviet Union also reiterated his opposition to giving "such wide powers" to the Chief of Staff. The debate was resumed and reached a climax the fol­ lowing day, January 22, at the 656tb meeting. The represen­ tative of New Zealand supported the Anglo-American-French draft, noting (para. 7) that . . . while we should like to see such projects carried forward on a cooperative basis, we should not wish to see them held up if one party were to refuse, for political reasons, to agree to amything being done at all in the demilitarized zone by the other . . . we cannot accept the view that any development project encroaching on the demilitaurized zone must commamd the agreement of both parties Ki.e., be subject to the Syrian "veto”). This produced a riposte by the representative of Lebanon, who asserted (paura. 27) that . . . if it is not right for either state to veto the development projects planned by the other state . . . it is equally true that neither state has any right to go ahead with any unilateral changes affecting treaties with respect to the Zone. Thus, he sug­ gested, the bogey veto is counter-balanced by the word "uni­ lateral" for Israeli action. In conclusion, the represen­ tative of Lebanon felt that account should be taken of five 69 "fundamental principles," which he summed up as follows (condensed from paragraph 39): First, the Palestinian Arab refugees have a prior right to the waters ; Second, fundamental alterations in the status of the Demilitarized Zone would affect the military situation and Syria's rights, and might prejudice Syria's rights in a final settlement; Third, this case is entirely different from the Huleh case; Fourth, there is no hope for a regional cooperative development scheme if Israel can go ahead with its scheme; and Fifth, "Israel has no sovereignty over the Zone which is not also enjoyed by Syria." The representative of the Soviet Union then reiter­ ated his objections to the Anglo-American-French draft. He pointed to the emphasis on unanimity in voting "to the ex­ tent possible" in Article VII, paragraph 4, of the Armistice Agreement, and to the Article VIII provision for revision "by mutual consent." He, therefore, proposed that opera­ tive paragraph 8 of the revised Western draft should include a phrase such as "with the mutual consent of both parties." He made it clear that if operative paragraph 8 remained in the draft (para. 79), he would veto it. The representative of the United Kingdom vainly reminded him that in any MAC vote, if the parties cannot agree,the Chairman, in any case, retains the power to cast the deciding vote as part of his many necessary powers under the Agreement, and that such 70 phrases as those just proposed could not deprive him of what authority he has. The draft resolution was then (January 22) put to a vote, and the representative of the Soviet Union vetoed it, with Lebanon also voting against it. This was the first application of a Soviet veto in connection with disputes in the Arab-Xsraeli conflict. The Security Council thereupon abandoned the attempt to promote a formal settlement of the Banat Ya'qub diversion controversy. The Bennike suspension order as endorsed by the Council in its resolution of October 27, therefore, re­ mained in effect. Although the Israelis did not give up their position that they had the right to ceurry out the diversion project, they abided by the suspension order. The Soviet Union inexpensively acquired considerable political capital in the Arab world by its exercise of this veto on behalf of an Arab state. The Israelis believed that the casting of this veto was motivated purely by this Soviet political aim. They felt that henceforth the Soviet Union could be expected thus to veto any draft resolution on the Arab-Israeli dispute which the Arabs requested them to veto, and that they could no longer receive impartial treatment in the form of a Security Council resolution. This conclusion reinforced the Israeli resistance to UN control over Israeli vital interests, not only through the 71 ultimate sanction of the Security Council but also by UNTSO and the MAC machinery.

CHAPTER IV— FOOTNOTES

^This statement was published as Department of State Press Release 594 and printed in the United States Depart­ ment of state, Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, No. 749 (November 2, 1953), pp. 589-?901 2 This statement was issued as Department of State Press Release 604, October 28, and printed in the United States Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, No. 751 (November 16, 1953), pp. 674-6^5. CHAPTER V

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LATER 1950'S

During the period from 1954 to 1959, the Demilitar­ ized Zones seldom attracted the attention of the Security Council. The Israelis continued to refrain from carrying out their project to divert Jordan waters from the Demili­ tarized Zone. General Burns, in his book Between Arab and Israeli, explains this continued Israeli restraint as fol­ lows: "This economic sanction of the U.S. Government, in fact, continued to operate throughout 1955 and 1956 to pre­ vent the Israelis from taking matters into their o%m hands. The United States did not, however, confine its efforts to this implicit sanction. The President's emissary, Eric Johnston, headed four missions to the Near East to attempt to work out an agreement for allocating the Jordan waters among the riparians. He failed, however, to obtain Arab agreement at the political level, as distinct from the tech­ nical level, to his plan, which would have permitted the Israelis to carry out their off-take from Banat Ya'qub while another diversion from the primarily "Arab" Yaurmuk tributary would have chainneled excess winter flood waters for seasonal storage into Lake Tiberias through the Southern Demilitarized Zone. Eventually, the Israelis concentrated their project to divert Jordan waters on Lake Tiberias, 73 through an off-take point on the western side of the Lake and, thus, clearly outside of the disputed Demilitarized Zone. It was obvious throughout this entire period, how­ ever, that Lake Tiberias would continue to constitute a most important reservoir for Israel's water project. Ac­ cordingly, the Israelis strenuously resisted any action which would detract from Israel's assertion of sovereignty over the Lake. A series of shotting Incidents between the Israelis on the Lake and Syrian positions on land back of the northeast quarter of the Leüce culminated In an Israeli attack on a Syrian village in the area on December 11, 1955. During the ensuing UN Security Council debate, the Israeli representative asserted complete Israeli sovereignty over 2 Lake Tiberias in strong terms and vigorously opposed the contention of the representative of Syria that Israel does not have sovereignty over the LaJce. The debate did not, however, deal with questions pertaining to the Demilitarized Zones. Meanwhile, regular meetings of ISMAC having remained suspended, the controversies over the various jurisdictions over the Demilitarized Zones continued, and both adversary parties continued to exchange correspondence with the UNTSO Chief of Staff. Some of the exchange of correspondence between Syria and General Bennike in 1954 was published in the form of mimeographed Security Council documents, al­ though not printed in the Quarterly Supplemants of the 74 Official Records» The Syrians, seeking to maintain as much control as possible over Arab interests in the Demilitar­ ized Zones, claimed that there was matter concerning the implementation of the Armistice Agreement which the full Commission was precluded from dealing with. General Ben­ nike, however, replied that it was obvious that some cases, such as those concerning military advances into the Zones, were the responsibility of the Chairman himself amd that he had some powers distinct from those of the Commission. When urgent action was necessary, he had to make a prelimi­ nary or provisional decision as to what powers he personally could exercise in the matter. His own interpretation could theoretically be reversed by the Commission. (As he did not point out, this would, of course, have necessitated Israel and Syria agreeing jointly on an interpretation dif­ ferent from his.) General Edson Burns of Canada, who replaced General Bennike as Chief of Staff of UNTSO in August of 1954, made a basic report to the Security Council in January, 1955, on the whole subject of the Demilitarized Zones. This report, which was circulated by the UN Secretary General as docu­ ment S/3343 of January 11, included annexes setting forth recent Israeli and Syrian views. The report has become somewhat of a classic and has been quoted from liberally in subsequent reports to the Security Council. 75 The Syrian Aide-Memoire of December 15, 1954, given as Annex A to this report, noted that Israel continued to boycott meetings of the Commission "whenever it is called upon to examine incidents or complaints about the Demili­ tarized Zones on the pretext that the Mixed Armistice Com­ mission is not competent to examine such incidents and com­ plaints." The Syricuis reiterated that this was a wrong interpretation of the General Armistice Agreement and that the Israeli attitude paralyzed the Mixed Armistice Commis­ sion. Citing provisions of the Armistice Agreement, such as those in Article VII which give the full Commission jurisdiction over execution of the Agreement without except­ ing the provisions of Article V concerning the Zones, the Aide-Memoire concluded as follows: 1. The Chairman of the MAC is responsible for ensuring the full implementation of Article V. 2. The MAC is responsible for supervising that implementation. 3. The MAC is empowered to receive and examine all complaints and claims connected with the GAA, both those relating to Article V and the demilitarized zones and other com­ plaints and claims. The Aide-Memoire also objected to the fact that the regular Israeli police in the Zones still remained under direct Israeli national control instead of being "on a local basis" as provided by the General Armistice Agreement, 76 and to the fact that, as far as the original Arab inhabi­ tants were concerned the gradual restoration of normal civilian life in the Zones had not taken place. The Aide- Memoire pointed out that Arab villages had not been rebuilt and that restrictions were imposed on the freedom of move­ ment of the Arab civilian population within the Zones. It also alleged that "since 1953 the Israelis have stationed regular units of the Israel aurmy, known as frontier guards, in the Demilitarized Zone," and set up "heavy weapons (mortars and artillery}" in the Zone. General Burns transmitted the Syrian Aide-Memoire to the Israelis for comment, and the Israeli reply of December 27, signed by Foreign Minister Sharett, was included as Appendix B of the Burns report. The Israelis reiterated their contention, based on the naming of the Chairman only rather than the full Commission in Article V, paragraph 5(c), that "though the formal recognition of sovereignty over the Zone was deferred pending final settlement . . . exclusion of Syria from the Demilitarized Zone was complete and definite"; and that, therefore, Syria has no "locus standi" in the Zone. Israel also contended that there is no dis­ tinction between the Chairman's jurisdiction over civilian matters and his competence with regaurd to military aspects of Article V. The Israeli statement continued that the Chairman had taken up and settled numerous civilian aund 77 military questions concerning the Zones directly with Israel* Israel remained adamantly opposed to "attempts by Syria to create for herself a position that would entitle her to intervene in the territory outside her boundaries"; therefore, Israel will not attend meetings of the MAC "at which Syria seeks to intervene in questions affecting the Zone." The Israeli statement then moved on to make counter­ claims against Syria regarding military encroachments, noting that "certain sections of the Zone, such as El Hamma and Tewfiq, have for all practical purposes been subjected to Syrian domination," thus constituting an "illegal sepa­ ration from the rest of the Zone." The Israeli statement also pointed to Syrian military control over the east bank of the Jordan River in the Central Demilitarized Zone. Confronted with these opposing views, General Burns summed them up for the UN. He acknowledged the validity of the Syrian complaint on Israeli police, reporting "police from the State of Israel, acting under orders from police headquarters outside the Demilitarized Zone, dominate the zone." Reviewing the conflict on MAC Jurisdiction over the Zone, General Burns concluded by quoting, with at least implicit approval, the statement of the ISMAC Chairman after an emergency meeting held December 12 which Israel had not attended on the usual Jurisdictional grounds that the 78 incident in question occurred in the Zone. The Chairman stated : I voted in favour of the Syrian draft resolution because, unless a different interpretation of the functions of the Armistice Commission is given at a special meeting attended by both parties, I consider that the incident dealt with in the Syrian complaint is within the purview of the Commission and that the results of the investigation and this debate justify my vote. There is, in fact, a sharing of attribu­ tions, recognized by the Security Council in its resolution of 18 May 1951, between the Commission and the Chairman. The Commission has never adopted a stand and the Chairman has not received, in conse­ quence, any directives. In the meantime, it pertains to the Chairman's duties to take a decision on the distribution of competence, subject to the general reservation made at the beginning of this statement. General Burns' report then reviewed, inter alia, the plight of the Arabs remaining in Baqqaira and Ghanname in the Central Demilitarized Zone, and in Nuqeib. He reported that he had been negotiating separately with the Israelis and the Syrians in order to attempt to improve the lot of these villagers. In his general conclusion, General Burns found the disagreement between the parties so insoluble, and the powers of the Chairman so limited by both the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the wishes of the parties, that he suggested as follows (para. 54): An alternative solution, if the two Parties agreed to it, would be a provisional arrangement for the division of the Demilitarized Zone into areas within which either Israel or Syria would have administra­ tive responsibility. Inhabitants of such areas would 79 trade and traffic with the contiguous portion of the state having administrative authority over them. General Burns' proposal suggests that this idea had already been discussed before, presumably after the con­ flicts starting in 1951 had cast doubt on the viability of the Demilitarized Zone concept. A Syrian reply to General Burns' report was sent on March 28, 1955, and subsequently published as S/3343/Add. 1 on April 4. The Syrians complained that General Burns had given proportionately too much space to quotes from the Israeli comment. However, the Syrian letter did not strongly attack General Burns' suggestion for a partition of the Zone. In another section of this letter, the Syrians took up the issue of interpretation of the Armistice Agree­ ment under Article VII, paragraph 8. The Syrian letter stated that Syria had on several occasions requested that the MAC hold a special meeting to interpret provisions of the Agreement, including Article V, but that the Israelis "had evaded the issue by denying the MAC the right to inter­ pret the provisions." In such a case, the MAC Chairman could have agreed with Syria to hold a special "rump" MAC meeting in which Syria and the Chairman, in Israel's absence, could have deliberated on and voted an interpretation opposing the Israeli interpretation; however, the testimony and reports 80 by Chiefs of Staff suggest that UNTSO avoided this course because, in such a case, the Israelis would simply not have accepted the ruling and no constructive purpose would have been achieved. The arguments between the parties on the issue of the Zone continued through 1955 and 1956 but, in October of 1956, one definite change took place. On October 30, during the Israeli attack on Egypt, the Israelis summarily expelled the inhabitants of Baqqara and Ghanname from the Zone; and they elected to go to Syria, where most of them had wanted to go for some time anyway. This was the prin­ cipal effect of the Suez crisis of 1956 on the Zone. In 1957, a third series of Security Council meetings was held on a Demilitarized Zone matter. On March 26, the Syrians complained to the Chairman of ISMAC that the Israelis were building a bridge across the Jordan River at the outlet of Lake Huleh in the Central Demilitarized Zone, in an area where the Israelis occupied both sides of the River. Informed of the Syrian complaint, the Israeli dele­ gation refused to consider it. Thereupon, the Acting Chief of Staff ( Colonel Byron Leaury of the United States ), acting on the basis of his own responsibility under Article V, paragraph 5(c), succeeded in making his own investigation and reporting to the UN on April 20 (distributed to the Security Council as S/3815 of April 23, 1957). The 81 Israelis had informed him that the bridge was necessary for transporting earth-moving equipment to the eastern shore of Lake Huleh. Col. Leary found (para. 13 of his report) that the bridge had not been built on Arab-owned lands, and added that he was satisfied that the bridge had been erected in connection with the Huleh project. Since he felt he had no right to make an "assumption" that Israel would use the bridge for military purposes, he ruled that he "would not be justified in asking for its removal." In a letter of May 13 to the Security Council (8/ 3827), Syria appealed to the Council to reverse Col. Leary's decision, alleging that his conclusions were not in accordance with the "facts" or with "a strict application" of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. In a series of three meetings (the 780tt on May 23, and the 781st and 782d on May 28), the Council declined to do so. At the last of these three meetings, the represen­ tative of the United States reaffirmed his Government's support for the authority of the Chief of Staff vis-d-vis both the Israelis and the Syrians. The representative of Syria, after a lengthy denunciation of Israeli actions and contentions regarding the Zone, insisted that the bridge had a military value which could not be overlooked. Toward the conclusion of his speech, turning to the role of the Chief of Staff, the representative of Syria made it plain 82 that he was challenging the authority asserted by the latter in making his decision not to oppose the building of the bridge. As the representative of Syria stated (para. 179),

# e * the strengthening of the powers of the Acting Chief of Staff and the attributions of the observers does not mean, as far as we are concerned, that they have exclusive responsibility for the supervision of the demilitarized zone, if such a position were to be entertained, the Mixed Armistice Commission, which is the most important instrument of the aurmistice machinery and which is entitled to supervise the implementation of all of the provi­ sions of the General Armistice Agreement, would become useless. While no formal resolution was passed or vote taken, toward the end of the debate the representative of the United States, speaking as the President of the Council, stated that "all members of the Council appear to agree that the authority of the Chief of Staff ought to be re­ spected." He then continued (para. 200): Some members of the Council made it clear that they did not agree with the decision of the Acting Chief of Staff on the right of Israel to build the bridge. However, the majority have pointed out that the Chief of Staff is the proper authority for en­ suring full implementation of the provisions of Article V and have supported his decision. Since the report of the Chief of Staff had contained a number of references to problems in the Zone on matters such as fortifications and restrictions on freedom of move­ ment on UN military observers, the Council informally requested a supplementary report from the Acting Chief of Staff on conditions in the Zone. 83 In this supplementary report, submitted June 27 and distributed on July 1 as S/3844, Col. Leary reported that certain minefields laid by Israel in the Zone during the 1956 crisis had been removed, but that the Israelis con­ tinued to refuse to dismantle some fortifications in the Zone which they claimed were necessary to protect settlers. The report also stated that, since June, 1956, the movement of UN observers in the Zone had been subjected to restric­ tions, particularly by Israel, and stressed that such restrictions by either party seriously hampered or pre­ vented investigations by UNTSO observers in ISMAC. As a subsequent report to the Council by the Secretary General stated (S/3844/Add. 1 of August 7, 1957), "It was apparent that the position of the Israel Government in this matter is closely linked to her claim of sovereignty over the demilitarized zone."

CHAPTER V— FOOTNOTES

B. L. M. Burns, Between and Israeli (London: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1962), pp. 1Ü-1Ï5. 2 United Nations Security Council, Official Records, 7071* Meeting, December 16, 1955, and 713rd Meeting, January 17, 1956. CHAPTER VI

THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON TAWAFIQ IN 1960

The Israeli attack on Tawafiq, an Arak-held village

in the Southern Demilitarized Zone, on the night of January 31-Pebruary 1, 1960, resulted in no Security Coun­ cil hearing but in one of the lengthiest (fifty-one pages in mimeographed form) published UNTSO reports on the situa­ tion in the Southern Demilitarized Zone (S/4270, distributed February 25, 1960, which is the only source for this entire chapter). By way of background, the report gave a candid review of "the progressive extension of Israeli cultivation towards the East" and consequent "Arab opposition to what they consider as encroachments on their lands" (para. 8). The historical sections of the report recounted the following; the land in question west of Tawafiq consisted of narrow parallel strips, either Jewish-owned, Arab-owned, or mixed. By the time of the establishment of the Oemili- taurized Zone, the Israelis had established a kibbutz at Tel Katzir neauc the shore of Lake Tiberias, which resulted in "depriving Arab farmers in the Demilitaucized Zone of all access to the lake and of land between the kibbutz and the lake." There was no logical dividing line between the lands cultivated by Tel Katzir and Tawafiq, and Israeli cultivation "progressed" in the direction of Tawafiq. When 85 the resulting Incidents led to serious friction, Israeli armored cars entered the Zone (illegally) to protect the Israeli farmers, and the Syrians opened fire from the heights across the international frontier (also illegally). The ending of regular plenary sessions of MAC meet­ ings made it more difficult for UNTSO to deal with the problem. The first serious incident occurred on November 6, 1957, when an Israeli was killed while attempting to dig a drainage ditch through a fenced area of Tawafiq. Despite the Israeli position on jurisdiction in the Demilitarized Zone, the Israelis actually attended a plenary MAC meeting after this incident on November 14, which produced an agreed-upon joint communique affirming in general terms the need for peaceful solutions and compliance with the Armis­ tice Agreement. Then, in October, 1958, the Israelis started another drainage ditch 350 meters west of Tawafiq. The inhabitants of Tawafiq protested that "the new ditch cut across Arab lands, that the Israelis would cultivate up to it, and that such cultivation would be a further stage in the Israeli progress toward the East." However, on the basis of an UNTSO survey, the UNTSO Chief of Staff (now General Von Horn of Sweden) on November 4 issued "findings" that the digging of the ditch was legitimate "on the assump­ tion that it is, as explained, only a drainage ditch and 86 will not be considered also as a limit up to which Israelis could extend their cultivation." Nevertheless, during 1959, Israeli cultivation con­ tinued to expand eastward toward the drainage ditch. Firing broke out on December 24, and an Israeli policeman was killed. The Arabs, who had hitherto been cultivating east of the ditch, now wanted to cultivate west of it in what had up until then then been a de facto "no-man*s-land." On January 16, an Israeli tractor started plowing a new parcel of land close to the ditch. The Arabs interpreted this as a breach of the status quo and started cultivating west of the ditch. It became clear to UNTSO that the lack of a defined delimitation of respective cultivation areas was leading up to a clash. Accordingly, on January 20, the Chief of Staff took the unprecedented step of unilaterally drawing on a large- scale map a dividing line marking the limits of the Arab use of lands to the west of Tawafiq, specifically including some land west of the ditch; and he specified: I find that an ec[uitable solution of the present difficulties is that the present eastern limits of Israeli cultivation should be, subject to some reservations, the limits of Arab use of lands to the west of Tawafiq. In addition, he specified that the Arabs will "not use the land right up to the fields cultivated by the Israelis," but would leave a buffer zone between them of approximately 87 ten meters. The findings also provided that "an arrange­ ment might later be made which would replace this narrow buffer zone by the marking of cultivation lines on the ground." Finally, it was, of course, specified that these findings, which were characterized as "practical," were to have no bearing on the validity of legal claims in a final settlement. These findings were delivered to the parties on January 20. The following day, the Commander of the First Army of the United Arab Republic (i.e., the senior Syrian officer with whom UNTSO dealt at that time) replied, criticizing some aspects of the Chief of Staff's line and requesting the study of a new line which would give the Arabs a larger share. As General Von Horn reported this letter, "the find­ ings, however, were to be respected." On the other hand, his report stated: "From the very beginning, it appeared that the Government of Israel, without expressly rejecting the Chief of Staff's findings, ignored them." Competitive cultivation in the area by both sides was resumed, leading to armed intervention from both sides. The Israelis com­ plained, in particular, about firing from Syrian troops allegedly occupying Tawafiq. On January 31, firing from Syrian military positions on the heights both inside the Zone and in Syria proper became particularly heavy, and am Israeli was killed. 88 Fatalities in such clashes are apt to produce a strong Israeli reaction. This case was no exception. In the early hours of February 1, Israeli troops attacked Tawafiq, leveled it, and withdrew. Meanwhile, beginning on January 30, the Chief of Staff had been appealing to the two parties not only to co­ operate in achieving a cease-fire in the area but also to agree to attend a meeting of the MAC. The Syrians promptly agreed. However, the Israelis continued a series of ex­ changes of debating letters with the Chief of Staff in which the Israelis: (1) reiterated that they would not attend a MAC meeting unless the agenda would exclude issues pertaining to the administration of the Demilitarized Zone; and (2) in discussions of the powers of the Chairman alone, stressed the "authoritative comment" of Dr. Bunche that the Chairman "will not assume responsibility for direct adminis­ tration of the Zone." This statement could be construed as challenging the authority of the Chairman (or Chief of Staff) to promulgate unilaterally his "practical" line de­ limiting cultivation. In reply, the Chief of Staff stood on the powers given him by Article V of the Armistice Agreement. As General Von Horn continued his attempts to organ­ ize a MAC meeting, the Israelis stated that they would agree to an agenda to discuss preventing shooting "from 89 across the International Boundary into the Demilitaurized Zone," but in any case insisted that they be given assur­ ance that "if the Syrians attempt at the meeting to raise questions pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone . . . the Chairman will have your instructions to rule them out of order." The Chief of Staff explained in reply that it was impossible to give the requested "assurance" that the Chairman would rule out of order questions in which Israel considered that the Syrians had no say— a phrase which might cover mauiy possibilities. He felt that the conduct of the discussion should be left with the Chairman. After General Von Horn informed the Syrians of the Israeli pre-conditions, the Syrians refused to accept them, pointing out that "in order to ensure the tranquillity of the area, problems of the Demilitarized Zone had to be dis­ cussed." At length, UNTSO agreed with the Syrians and convened a "rump" meeting of ISMAC on February 16, with the Israelis refusing to attend. The Chairman of ISMAC, there­ upon, voted in favor of a Syrian resolution condemning Israel for the attack on Tawafiq. Thereafter, tension in the Tawafiq area abated for the next two or three years. Although the Israelis did not formally accept the Chief of Staff's line of January 20, 1960, a later UNTSO report noted that, following these findings, "the number of incidents greatly decreased in the 90 area" (S/5401, August 25, 1963). The Israelis may be assumed to have achieved an important territorial objective in con­ solidating a solid stretch of Israeli-controlled territory along all of the lake front of the Southern Demilitarized Zone except Nuqeib, thus reinforcing their claim of sover­ eignty over the entire Lake. CHAPTER VII

DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1962 TO 1967: FIVE CASES

I. THE LAKE TIBERIAS CLASH OF 1962

On the night of March 16-17, 1962, following ex­ changes of gunfire between Israeli patrol boats in Lake Tiberias and Syrian military positions near the eastern shore of the Lake, the Israelis launched a heavy attack northwards from Ein Gev against the Syrians. The osten­ sible Israeli objective was to destroy the Syrian positions such as el-Koursi, just inside Syria proper. However, the UNTSO report on the clash (S/5102, March 26, 1962) did not indicate how far north the Israeli attacking force pene­ trated before encountering the Syrians and withdrawing. The Israelis alleged that in the course of the raid they overran Syrian military positions inside the northern tip of the Southern Demilitarized Zone. If this had been sup­ ported by the UN investigation, the subsequent Security Council resolution condemning Israel could have been some­ what "balanced" by adding criticism of Syria for maintain­ ing such military positions illegally. The Israeli raid, although triggered by firing from Syria on Israeli patrol boats, may have been motivated also by a decision to absorb into Israeli-controlled territory 92 the Nuqeib area of the Demilitarized Zone, the last area in which the Arab community was a facto territorial riparian of Lake Tiberias. Such an absorption would have completed Israeli control of the actual short-front (although the ten- meter strip along the northeast shore was not physically occupied), amd thus have continued to reinforce Israel's assertion of sovereignty over the Lake. At the first Security Council meeting on the inci­ dent (the 999t* meeting on March 28), the representative of Israel stated that "the objective of the Israeli action was a Syrian position encroaching into the Demilitarized Zone outside the Syrian frontier," and that "this position . . . had been involved in the attacks on Israel vessels on the lake" (para. 81). The Lake itself, the representative of Israel had again made a point of asserting, "in its entirety forms part of Israel territory. Syrian territory at no point touches, or ever did touch, the shore of Lake Tiberias" (para. 59). At the next meeting, the lOOOa» on April 3, the repre­ sentative of Syria flatly denied that there were any Syrian military positions in the Demilitarized Zone (paras. 48 and 49). He asked that the question be put to the Chief of Staff, General Von Horn, who had been brought to New York for the meeting. The latter gave his reply to this and other questions in a written statement distributed at the 93 next meeting, the 1001st on April 4, and was included in the verbatim record of that meeting. The question-and- answer sequence in the record on this issue read as follows : 1. Question from the representative of Syria: Was any Syrianpost or fortified position occupied or destroyed in the fighting of 16-17 March 1962? [lOOOb meeting, peura. 48]. Answer : On the basis of reports by United Nations military observers who visited the demili­ tarized zone on three occasions since 17 March, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission reported he was satisfied there were none. No for­ tified position was seen as "existing or destroyed.” General Von Horn was, of course, referring only to the area around Nuqeib covered by the investigation. His other written replies consisted primarily of a review of the long-standing controversy over the Demilitarized Zones and recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of UNTSO. In the latter recommendations, he emphasized free­ dom of mobility for UNTSO observers as well as the need for "face-to-face" meetings between the parties in the MAC. At the next meeting (the 1002d on April 5), the rep­ resentative of Israel sharply attacked General Von Horn's statement about the lack of a Syrian fortified position in the area assaulted by Israel, and reiterated the Israeli charge made in the 999» meeting. Paragraphs 77 through 85 of this speech on April 5 as given in the Official Records were devoted to a denial of Von Horn's statement. 94 At the final meeting on this clash on April 9, the Council passed a resolution which reaffirmed the 1956 reso­ lution condemning Israel for its retaliatory raid against Syria, and included the usual calls on the parties to obey the letter of the Armistice Agreement and to reactivate MAC meetings•

II. THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S REPORT OF AUGUST, 1963

In August of 1963, an incident involving the killing of Israeli farmers near the Israeli-Syrian border, culminat­ ing a series of increasingly-severe firing incidents in and near the Southern Demilitarized Zone, again caused a UN Security Council meeting. Although the incident which led to the meeting occurred inside Israel proper just west of the Central Demilitarized Zone, the ensuing UNTSO report (S/5401, distributed August 24, 1963) and Security Council discussions focused on clashes all along the Armistice line and in the Demilitarized Zone. This was the first pub­ lished report by a new Chief of Staff of UNTSO, General Bull of Norway. At the beginning of his report (para. 3), General Bull reported interesting developments in the Southern De­ militarized Zone since those reported in S/4270 of February, 1960, as follows^ 95 During a meeting in Damascus on 9 February 1961 between my predecessor and the Syrian authorities, the latter expressed their interest in a status quo regarding the use of land in the demilitarized zone. The suggestion regarding such a status quo was com­ municated to the Israel authorities #or their con­ sideration. Both parties have since expressed their willingness, in principle, to have the limits regard­ ing the use of land in areas of the southern sector of the demilitarized zone (hereinafter called southern demilitarized zone) established and marked on the ground. There are, however, conflicting views as to the date on which such status quo should be based and also what parcels should be included. Annex I to this report contained a chronological summeury of recent complaints lodged by Syria concerning agricultural activity by Israel in the Southern Demilitar­ ized Zone, recent complaints by Israel concerning firing by Syrians into the Ha On fields there, and UN investigation reports. These complaints made constant references to Israelis "ploughing land not previously cultivated," thus "violating the status quo," implying that there might be some sort of general acceptance of a "status quo” line of previous Israeli cultivation. In this connection, the chronological summary referred to the "Haynes-Dobson line," which was explained in a footnote as being an overlay on UNTSO maps produced by two UN military observers setting forth an unofficial UNTSO version of Israeli cultivation in the Ha On-Samra fields as it was in the winter of 1960-1961. (This, in other words, would have been a northward exten­ sion of the Chief of Staff's line of January, 1960.) The 96 use to which the Haynes-Dobson line was put was shown in paragraph 13 of this annex, in which UNTSO reported that areas in which disputed Israeli cultivation activity was taking place "eure west of the Haynes-Dobson line. There is no violation of the status quo as we understand it." At this point, the report contained another important footnote, reading as follows: The Syrian view is that the status quo referred to areas under cultivation at the time of an agree­ ment between the then Chief of Staff of UNTSO and the then Commanding General, First UAR Army, on 8/9 February 1961, and, according to Syria, no fields other than those under cultivation at the time of the agreement should be cultivated now. Syria has indicated that, in her view, Israel should refrain from cultivating fields which were previously un­ cultivated, or not cultivated recently. At the end of pauragraph 29 of this Annex I, the report commented, "the point is now being reached where exact measurements of the various fields in the Southern Demilitarized Zone are required." Obviously, UNTSO had been carrying on major diplomatic activity in attempting to negotiate these arrangements. Annex II of this report gave a similar chronology of recent incidents in the Central Demilitarized Zone. It was evident that similair problems of alleged violations of the cultivation status quo were facing UNTSO there, although not yet in such sharply-defined conflicting claims. The issue also arose as to where the western boundary of the Central Demilitarized Zone lay on the ground. 97 On the basis of these reports, General Bull in the principal section of his report made a series of proposals of measures which should be taken in the area. In para­ graph 44, he noted the constructive effect of General Von Horn * s "findings" of January 20, 1960, fixing cultivation limits. General Bull reported new developments amplifying this effort as follows: Efforts have since been undertaken by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in cooperation with the parties to materialize on the ground the eastern limits of permissible Israel use of land in that area in order to avoid any misunderstanding due to the difficulty for the parties and the United Nations military observers in the observation posts to ascertain with precision the said limits. The work of ploughing a furrow to that effect was begun, but was interrupted as a result of a divergence of interpretation concerning the status quo for a par­ ticular parcel. I Intend to seek the cooperation of the parties to resume the materialization on the ground of the limits of the use of land in that area as well as in other parts of the southern and central sectors of the demilitaurized zone. I believe that such materialization on the ground would greatly alle­ viate tension resulting from agricultural activities. In the next paragraph, 45, General Bull raised an Issue which was related and equally controversial; namely, the marking on the ground of the Armistice Demarcation Line "and of the former international frontier, where the Armis­ tice Demarcation Line follows the boundary line." As General Bull pointed out, . . . in many places there are doubts as to the exact location of the line and this has been and remains a source of incidents . . . however, the parties have not yet agreed on how to proceed with 98 a general survey of the lines, nor on the inclusion in the survey of the western limits of the demili- tsurized zone. General Bull added the standard call for the resumption of plenary meetings of ISMAC. The Security Council held a series of meetings on this incident beginning August 23. During the course of the 1059tt meeting on August 28, the representative of Syria, Mr, Tarazi (who had been legal adviser to the Syrian dele­ gation in the negotiations which led to the signing of the Armistice Agreement), reviewed in detail the paralysis of the plenary meetings of the MAC (paras. 38-45). Taking up the jurisdictional issue, he firmly spelled out the Syrian position on the MAC’S jurisdiction over the Zone. After quoting paragraph 1 of Article VII of the Agreement, he stated : From a reading of this paragraph it is clear be­ yond the shadow of a doubt that no provision of the Armistice Agreement is outside the competence of the Mixed Commission, since the signatories to the Armis­ tice Agreement have provided for "the execution of the provisions of this agreement." It does not say "the execution of certain provisions of this Agree­ ment "; nor is it said that any particular provision or the provisions of Articles IV, V, or VI of the Armistice Agreement are outside the field of compe­ tence and jurisdiction of the Mixed Commission. Later, (para. 63) he proposed "to apply to the Inter­ national Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on that point." This proposal was not taken up by the Security Council. 99 After considerable further debate, a draft resolu­ tion (S/5407, August 29), which inter alia supported General Bull's recommendations, but which also implied that the murderers of the Israeli farmers came from Syria, was vetoed by the Soviet Union on the grounds that it was "one­ sided" and "anti-Arab."

III. THE ISRAELI-SYRIAM CLASH OF NOVEMBER, 1964

The next Security Council meeting in which the De­ militarized Zone was raised was in November, 1964. The shooting incident of November 13 between Israel and Syria, which led to these hearings, did not occur in the Demili­ tarized Zone; however, the pattern was typical of incidents in the Zone in that an Israeli armored car crossed what Syria claimed to be the Armistice Demarcation Line, un­ marked on the ground, whereupon the Syrians opened fire, and there ensued an escalation of exchanges of fire on the ground and an Israeli air strike. In the UNTSO Chief of Staff’s report on the incident (S/6061, distributed November 24), he pointed out that the problem arose in an area where the Armistice Demaurcation Line had not been surveyed or properly marked on the ground, and that, while an encroachment by an Israeli bulldozer into Syrian territory "would appear to be confirmed," 100 nevertheless, the 1:50,000 map annexed to the General Armistice Agreement "was not of a scale to permit defini­ tive judgments in a matter of metres." Accordingly, General Bull recommended that, since neither of the two parties would accept the results of a unilateral survey conducted by the other party, they might accept "a team of independent foreign experts" to make a "continuation of a survey partly completed in 1963" by a Canadiaui team. General Bull did not, however, suggest how much of the Armistice Demarcation line should be surveyed. General Bull criticized Israel for having refused to attend meetings of the MAC, "even for discussing under Article VII, paragraph 8, the question of the competence of the MAC under Article V." He balanced this criticism by stating that "the prevailing atmosphere of tension between the two countries is also a consequence of Syria's stead­ fast refusal to end its conflict with Israel." During the course of the ensuing Security Council debate, the representative of Syria, Mr. Asha, who had been reviewing at length the history of the Israeli attitude regarding the Demilitarized Zone, commented on General Bull's survey suggestion as follows (1168A meeting, Decem­ ber 3) : Thirdly, my Government does not object to the marking of any section of the northern demarcation 101 line, provided that such marking is also carried out along the entire demarcation line to include the three sectors of the demilitarized zone. CS/PV. 1168, p. 26.] The representative of the United States, however, in a speech almost immediately following, stated: "Upon the success of limited surveys depends the possibility of more general ones. The former is at present a necessity, the latter is desirable in the future." The representative of Israel, following him as the next speaker, objected to the Syrian proposal to survey "the whole of the Israel-Syrian border," saying, "this is a ramified and complicated prob­ lem." The Syrian proposal would, of course, by attempting to have the Armistice Demarcation Line surveyed where it constitutes the western boundary of the Demilitarized Zones, have emphasized the letter's separateness from Israel, a matter which it was in Israel's national interest to de- emphasize. The Syrian proposal would also have distracted attention from the ^ facto division along established cul­ tivation lines deep inside the Zones themselves. A "pro-Arab" draft resolution introduced by Morocco which simply condemned Israel for its air strike was de­ feated on December 17 (1179tt meeting), as being "unbalanced" in its apportionment of blame under the circumstances (Syria had acknowledged firing the first shot). Thereafter, attention was focused on the Anglo-American draft (S/6113, December 17), which called for specific constructive steps 102 based on General Bull's reporting. Xn addition to the usual urging that both parties participate in MAC meetings, the draft called on both parties to "cooperate promptly in the work begun in 1963, of survey and demarcation as sug­ gested in paragraph 45 of document S/4501, commencing in the area of Tel El-Qadi and proceeding thereafter to com­ pletion ," as recommended in Chiefs of Staff's reports of 1963 and 1964. At the last meeting held on this complaint (the 1182d, of December 21), the representative of Morocco sub­ mitted amendments to this Anglo-American draft resolution which would have injected a note of blame only of Israel for the November 13 incident, and would also have provided that the survey be carried out "along the entire Armistice Demarcation Line, including the area of Tel El-Qadi and the three sectors of the demilitarized zone." The majority of the members of the Security Council refused to go along with these changes, which thereupon failed to be adopted. The Arabs having made it clear that they would not go along with the Anglo-American draft, the latter was vetoed by the Soviet Union. In last parting shots, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom pointed out that their draft did not provide for confining the survey and demarcation to the Tel El-Qadi area, and that it could clearly thereafter "continue" (to use the word of the 103 representative of the United Kingdom), or proceed to "com­ pletion" (to use the word of the representative of the United States). Despite the evident consensus that a sur­ vey and demarcation should be carried out, UNTSO was unable to carry out any further work of this sort in the climate of tension and hostility prevailing between the parties.

IV. UN REPORTING AND DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE DEMILITARIZED ZONES IN 1966

The next Security Council document focusing on the Demilitarized Zones, S/7434, was distributed July 27, 1966, by the UN Secretary General reporting on efforts to relieve tension along the line between Israel and Syria. Paragraph 5 described the endless efforts by UNTSO to dissuade the Israelis from cultivating in the Southern Demilitarized Zone a field "the limits of which had not yet been agreed upon"; and Syrian statements that, if the Israelis insisted on cultivating disputed land, the Syrians would send farmers into land "which they had agreed not to cultivate pending results of the efforts of the Chief of Staff." The report was inconclusive, but did indicate that UNTSO was still con­ tinuing its attempts to establish agreed-upon ^ facto cul­ tivation division lines in the Southern Demilitarized Zone in particular. 104 The problem of the Zone was next raised during the Security Council deliberations which started October 14 as the result of Israel's complaint against Syria stemming from a fatal mine demolition on the Israeli side of the Armistice Demarcation Line, allegedly planted by terrorists based in Syria. In his first reply speech at the meeting on October 17, the representative of Syria quoted from the Secretaury General's report, S/7434, and focused, inter alia, on Israel's non—participation in meetings of ISMA.C. On October 20, the Israeli delegate restated Israel's posi­ tion that the Syrians had caused the difficulty by "attempts to place on the agenda questions over which the Commission had no competence." However, he said, Israel remains will­ ing to discuss in the MAC "incidents." He restated the Israeli desire for "informal meetings," and added, "we are willing to join in a sincere effort to overcome the present impasse about formal meetings, and will be happy to discuss this with General Bull and the Secretary General" (S/PV. 1309, pp. 83-85). This was, however, as far as he would go. At the next meeting, the 13l0tb held on the morning of October 28, the representative of Jordan picked up the issue of the Demilitarized Zones and formally requested a status report on them as well as on the issue of "who is cooperating and who is not" with the MAC (S/PV.1310, p. 32). In the 1312tb meeting that afternoon, he pressed for the 105 reports and was firmly supported by the representative of the Soviet Union. The request was acted upon by the Secre­ tary General, who was able to present by November 1 the first report on the inability of ISMAC to function and the attitudes of the parties thereto (S/7572). The report took as a point of departure the "classic" S/3343 report of

General Burns. It also pointed out the importcunce of the issue of the MAC'S jurisdiction over the Demilitarized

Zones by stating that over a period of two years an average of 94 per cent of the Syrian complaints and 70 per cent of the Israeli complaints related to the Zones (para. 7). The report ended without making any specific recommendations as to how to enable ISMAC to resume tripartite meetings.

The second report, on the "present status" of the

Zone, was produced the next day (S/7573, November 2). The first half of it recapitulated the difficulties encountered by UNTSO over the years in seeking to persuade both parties to dismantle their illegal fortifications in their respec­ tive parts of the Zones. The second half recapitulated the history of the attempt to implement Article V, paragraph 5, particularly with respect to the land cultivation problem, but contributed little new to published knowledge on the problem beyond a brief statement listing cultivation in areas such as that east of former Lake Huleh by both Arabs and Israelis of plots of land "which they do not own." 106

At the next Council meeting following the publica­ tion of these reports, the 1317tb on November 3, the repre­ sentative of Syria made the most of the implicit criticism of Israel contained in them, particularly the letter's re­ fusal to participate in ISMAC meetings. The representative of Syria specifically pointed to the provision for a defini­ tive interpretation under Article VII, However, no resolu­ tion came out of this series of Council meetings since efforts to achieve a consensus resolution acceptable to all parties failed.

V. THE 1967 MAC MEETINGS

At the beginning of 1967, tension along the Israeli-

Syrian Armistice Line again rose to a high pitch following a fatal casualty from a mine explosion at the Israeli vil­ lage of Dishon near the northern section of the line.

While the focus of Israeli reaction was on Arab terrorist raiders who were allegedly operating into Israel from bases in Syria, the problems of delimiting land cultivation also continued, according to UN officials, to be a major cause of incidents. On January 15, the situation and the mili­

tary build-up had become alarming enough for UN Secretary

General Thant to issue a special call to the two parties to

restrain their forces. He also appealed to them to

. . . accept without delay or pre-conditions the proposal of the Chief of Staff for an immediate 107

emergency or extraordinary session of the Israel- Syria Mixed Armistice Commission on an agreed agenda, with a view to reaching an understanding on the problems of cultivation in the area which have given rise to the incidents of recent weeks."

This appeal he also distributed to the Security Council as

S/7683.

Both parties answered on the following day that they would attend such a meeting. The Israelis may have been motivated by a belief that their unwillingness to attend such meetings in the past had become a political lieibility for them since it was raised so frequently in the debates in the Security Council on Israeli-Syrian clashes. Three plenary sessions of an emergency MAC meeting were then held, on January 25 and 29 and February 2, the first such meetings in nearly ten years. The third session ended without any agreement except an understanding that UNTSO would attempt to arrange another session as soon as feas­ ible. In fact, the fourth session was never held. The relations between the parties were marked by an increasing flow of charges and counter-charges, which took the form of some twenty Israeli and Syrian communications to the

Security Council during the three-month period from January

15 to April 15. The Security Council record is not clear what was responsible for the last failure to achieve any resolution of disputes through an ISMAC meeting. Two documents amid the 108 flow of conflicting Israeli and Syrian versions do give some idea of what went on. In a letter to the Security

Council of February 23 (S/7784), Syria charged that, prior to the first of the meetings of ISMAC in January, Israel sought to "doom" the meetings to failure by coupling the announcement of the acceptance of the meeting in Israeli news media with reiteration of the Israeli position that the Demilitarized Zone "does not fall within the competence of the MAC" and that Israel has "refused to consider Syria as a party when dealing with the problems of the demilitar­ ized zone." The Syrian letter stated that the Israeli delegate at the opening session stated that Israel entered the talks "without prejudice" to its position on the status of the Demilitarized Zone and the functions of ISMAC in that Zone. Since the area in dispute fell within the De­ militarized Zone itself, Syria pointed out, "the contradic­ tions in this stand are so obvious." Furthermore, the letter continued, the Israeli delegation "strayed from the agenda." Israeli charges made outside the meeting about saboteurs allegedly coming from Syria also constituted

"provocation" designed to jeopardize the meeting.

The Israeli reply letter to the Security Council on

March 8 (S/7811) stated that at the meetings Israel sub­ mitted "concrete proposals for practical arrangements" on the cultivation problem but that Syria submitted none; that 109 then Syria put forward "pre-conditions to be met before it will discuss the matters on the agreed agenda"; that the

Syrians would not desist from "deviations from the agreed agenda"; and that the Syrians were conducting a misleading propaganda campaign through the series of communications to the Security Council and meanwhile continuing to foment acts of violence, particularly by sponsoring terrorist sabotage raids.

In retrospect, it is arguable that neither Israel nor Syria wanted to hold the MAC meeting within the frame­ work proposed by the UN. Both parties felt compelled to make public statements to reassure the militant elements of their own political structures that they were not giving up any positions. The Israelis probably felt it was necessary to attend the meetings so as to improve Israel * s public image in the international arena. The Syrians, who had long capitalized politically on Israel's refusal to attend meetings, probably had continued to call for such meetings in reliance on the assumption that the Israelis would not agree to attend. Under the circumstances, the fact that three sessions were actually held constitutes a tribute to the patience of the UN officials involved.

Thereafter, the sitüatiôn.continued to deteriorate, until on April 7 an incident in the Southern Demilitarized 110 Zone escalated from a ground battle Into an aerial dogfight

in which several Syrian aircraft were shot down.

One of the last entries in the Security Council

records on the Israeli-Syrian dispute before the large-

scale fighting erupted in June was a note by the UN Secre­

tary General to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7877, May 8),

expressing regret that the gap between the positions of the

paurties on the resumption of MAC meetings had widened so much that it would not be possible "for the time being to

expect any fruitful convening of such a meeting." He sup­

ported the Chief of Staff's continuing efforts to avert

incidents and, in particular, advised the latter to under­

take "separate discussions with each of the parties with a

view to achieving an understanding on practical arrangements

for cultivation problems along the Armistice Demarcation

Line." Furthermore, he specified: "You may well find it

advisable and helpful to put before the parties your own

ideas about what could be a reasonable, just and practical

cultivation arrangement." This last paragraph calls to mind

the executive action taken by General Von Horn in drawing

the Chief of Staff's line of January 20, 1960.

In any event, the issue became academic a month later

when the Israeli Defense Forces, in the course of a general

battle all along the Israeli-Syrian line, occupied all of

the remaining Arab-held sections of the Demilitarized Zone

and re-established a front line inside Syria. CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement broke down in 1967 for reasons far transcending the dispute over the Demilitarized Zones. These reasons were the revival of

Arab irredentism, taking the form of sabotage raids into

Israel backed by a militant Syria, which was, in turn, sup­ ported by the United Arab Command commitments in the con­ text of an armaments race. Although it was the dispute over the Demilitarized Zones which had led to the suspen­ sion of regular MAC meetings and which contributed heavily to the high tension between Israel and Syria from April 7 onwards in 196 7, there is no reason to believe that, even

if ISMAC meetings had been regularly carried out on a face- to-face basis and the jurisdictional issue ruled on, the

MAC could have prevented the explosion of June, 1967. The fact that the Hashemite Kingdom .of Jordan—Israel Mixed

Armistice Commission was meeting frequently up through May,

1967, did not prevent the involvement of Jordan, so disas­

trous to the latter, in the June, 1967, hostilities.

Nevertheless, the Demilitarized Zones were an ingen­

ious experiment, and there aure some lessons of general

applicability for peace-keeping operations which can be

drawn from the eighteen—year UNTSO and ISMAC attempt to 112 keep the peace in the Zones. The vague phrasing of the articles of the Agreement, which were to cause so much argument over the years, was the inevitable result of the face-saving compromises which the UN officials had to work out in order to achieve a cease-fire. In so doing, they succeeded in saving faces on both sides to such a degree that a general cease-fire on this Israeli-Syrian line, ex­ cept for sporadic local clashes, was achieved for eighteen years. This is the proof of the pudding. It is, therefore, difficult to criticize the drafters of the Armistice Agree­ ment, many of whom labored under the assumption that it was a preliminary stage before a peace conference. Any such interim armistice agreement is apt to have provisions on the interpretation of which the parties cannot agree, either because what they consider to be vital national interests are at stake or because of the climate of hostilities be­ tween the parties. In such a case where a permament third- party truce supervisor is created, his executive action in implementing or giving preliminary interpretations of the agreement becomes an indispensable element; and he, in turn, when making rulings which often inescapably conflict with the national interests of the parties, must rely, in par­ ticular, on the effective support of the responsible perma­ nent members of the UN Security Council. It is for this reason that the United States has consistently and firmly 113 backed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO whenever he has made a formal public ruling.

Such moves as General Von Horn's drawing his "prac­ tical line" for cultivation division in January, 1960, are examples of decisions which can only be made unilaterally, not negotiated. It may be argued that the Chiefs of Staff should have made more such unilateral decisions, dividing up more areas of the Zones into two ^ facto agglomerations of cultivation, Israeli and Arab, and indicating the divid­ ing lines on the ground as well as on maps, invoking the prestige of the UN executive machinery's impartiality.

The precedent set by the United States in suspending allocations of aid to Israel when the latter refused to comply with the Chief of Staff's order in 1953 should have enabled the letter's successors to feel that they could con­ tinue to count on the firmest support in the case of both

Israel and those Arab states with whom the United States had close economic and/or political relations. At the same time, the Chief of Staff can make it easier for the respon­ sible members of the Security Council to give him this sup­ port if his public reports are candid and clearly indicate where possible which party is at fault. The Chief of Staff may feel that such candidness must be limited by his need to preserve a diplomatic relationship with the party at fault— that is, to keep UNTSO viable. This is merely a 114 further example of the importance of the decisions which the Chief of Staff must make under this kind of a system. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Documents

British Documents on Foreign Policy. 1919-1939. First Series: London: Her Majesty* s sitationery Ojéfice. Vol. I, 1947; Vol. IV, 1952; Vol. VII, 1958; Vol. VIII, 1958; Vol. XIII, 1963.

United States Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXIX, No. 749, November 2, 19^j, pp. 58^-5907 Vol. XXIX, No. 751, November 16, 1953, pp. 674-675.

2» Memoirs

Burns, E. L. M, Between Arab and Israeli. London: George C. Harrap & do., Ltd., 1962.

Eytan, Walter. The First Ten Years. New York: Simon & Schus ter, 19^8.

Lloyd George, David. The Truth ^out the Peace Treaties. London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd"., 1 9 ^ . von Horn, Carl. Soldiering for Peace. New York: David McKay Co•, 1967.

_3. United Nations Security Council Official Records

Security Council Meetings :

1951: 541st, April 17 542d, April 25 544tb, May 2 545tb, May 8 546ÜI, May 16 547th, May 18

1953: 631st, October 27 633rd, October 30 636tb, November 10 6391*, November 18 6451*, December 3 117 646tt, December 11 648tb, December 16 649tb, December 17 650t*, December 18 651st, December 21 6S2d, December 22 653rd, December 22 654tb, December 29

1954; 655Ü», January 21 656!*, January 22

1955: 707ÜI, December 16 and 19

1956: 713tb, January 17

1957; 780tb, May 23 781st, May 28 782d, May 28

1962: 999tb, March 28 lOOOtt, April 3 1001st, April 4 1002d, April 5

1963: 1059tb, August 28

1964: PV. 1168», December 3 PV. 1179», December 17 PV. 1182d, December 21

1966: PV. 1309, October 20 PV. 1310, October 28 PV. 1312, October 28 PV, 1317, November 3

Reports by the Acting Mediator, Secretary General, and UN Truce Supervision Organization Chief of Staff or Acting Chief of Staff during the period 1949-1967. (These reports were first distributed officially in mimeo­ graphed form and subsequently printed in the quarterly Supplement of the Security Council Official Records for the period in which they were issued.}

Special Supplement No. 2* S/1353/Rev. 1, July 20, 1949 (containing israelT-Syrian General Armistice Agree­ ment) 118 s/2049, March 12, 1951 S/2067, March 27, 1951 S/2173, May 29, 1951 S/2191, June 11, 1951 S/2193, June 12, 1951 S/2213, June 26, 1951 S/2300, August 16, 1951 S/2389, November 6, 1951 S/2833, October 30, 1952 S/2956, February 28, 1953 S/3122, October 23, 1953 S/3106, October 12, 1953 S/3108/Rev. 1, October 16, 1953 S/3343, January 11, 1955 S/3343/Add. 1, March 28, 1955 S/3815, April 20, 1957 S/3827, May 13, 1957 S/3844, June 27, 1957 S/3844/Add. 1, August 7, 1957 S/4270, February 25, 1960 S/5102, March 26, 1962 S/4501, August 24, 1963 S/6061, November 24, 1964 S/7434, July 26, 1966 S/7572, November 1, 1966 S/7573, November 2, 1966 S/7683, January 15, 1967

Report of the Security Council. Issued annually for the — ‘^e r T o H s “ lïï4§ t” Î 9 ^ ----

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

_1. Books Brook, David. Preface to Peace. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 196*57

Prischwasser-Ra'anan, H. P. The Frontiers of a Nation. London; Batchworth Press, 1955.

Howard, Heurry. The Petition of Turkey. 1913-1923. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 19^1. 119

Rosenne, Shsbtai. Israel * s Armistice Agreements with the Arab States. Tel Aviv: International Law Association, T55T.

Smith, George Adam. The Historical Geography of the Holy Land. London: Hodder & Stoughton, l8§4.

Stevens, Georgianna. The Jordan River Valley. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956.

Temperley, H. W. V. (ed.). A History of the Peace Confer- ence of Paris. London:"* Hodder & Stoughton, 1^24. VoTT VI.

Wainhouse, David (ed.). International Peace Observation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1^66.

2 * Periodicals Hurewitz, J- C. "The Israeli-Syrian Crisis in the Light of the Arab-Israel Armistice System," International Organization, Vol. V, No. 3 (1951), pp. 4È9-479.

Khoury, Fred. "Friction and Conflict on the Israeli-Syrian Front," Middle East Journal, Vol. 17, Nos. 1 and 2 (Winter-Spring, 1^63), pp. 14-34. "The Policy of Retaliation in Arab-Israeli Rela­ tions," Middle East Journal, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Autumn, 1966): ppr"575'-53T7------APPENDIXES APPENDIX A

EXCERPTS PROM ISRAELI-SYRIAN GENERAL

ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

Article V

1. It is emphasized that the following arrange­ ments for the Armistice Demarcation Line between the Israeli and Syrian armed forces and for the De­ militarized Zone are not to be interpreted as having einy relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements affecting the two Parties to this Agreement.

2. In pursuance of the spirit of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, the Armis­ tice Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone have been defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two Parties in such manner as to minimize the possibility of friction and incident, while providing for the gradual restoration of normal civilian life in the area of the Demilitarized Zone, without prejudice to the ultimate settlement.

3. The Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as delineated on the map attached to this Agreement as annex I. The Armistice Demarcation Line shall fol­ low a line midway between the existing truce lines, as certified by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for the Israeli and Syrian forces. Where the existing truce lines run along the inter­ national boundary between Syria and Palestine, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall follow the boundary line. 4. The armed forces of the two Parties shall nowhere advance beyond the Armistice Demarcation Line. 5. (a) Where the Armistice Demarcation Line does not correspond to the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the area between the Armistice Demarcation Line and the boundary, pending final territorial settlement between the Parties, shall be established as a Demilitarized Zone from 122 which the armed forces of both Parties shall be totally excluded, and in which no activities by military or para-military forces shall be permitted. This provision applies to the Ein Gev and Dardara sectors which shall form part of the Demiliteurized Zone.

(b) Any advance by the armed forces, mili­ tary or para-military, of either Party into any part of the Demilitarized Zone, when confirmed by the United Nations representatives referred to in the following sub-paragraph, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this Agreement.

(c) The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article VII of this Agree­ ment and United Nations observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this article.

(d) The withdrawal of such armed forces as are now found in the Demilitarized Zone shall be in accordance with the schedule of withdrawal annexed to this Agreement (annex II).

(e) The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be empowered to authorize the re­ turn of civilians to villages and settlements in the Demilitarized Zone and the.employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internal security purposes, and shall be guided in this regard by the schedule of withdrawal referred to in sub-paragraph (d) of this article.

6. On each side of the Demilitarized Zone there shall be areas, as defined in annex III to this Agreement, in which defensive forces only shall be maintained, in accordance with the definition of defensive forces set forth in annex IV to this Agreement.

Article VII

1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each 123

Party to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organisation designated by him following consulta­ tion with both Parties to this Agreement.

4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the prin­ ciple of unanimity. In the Absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting.

6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ observers, who may be from among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman.

7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or com­ plaints by means of its observation and investiga­ tion machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settle­ ment.

8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a par­ ticular provision of this Agreement, other than the preamble and article I and II, is at issue, the Commission * s interpretation shall prevail. Vhie Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Par­ ties modifications in the provisions of this Agree­ ment. APPENDIX B

DR. BUNŒE'S "AUTHORITATIVE COMMENT" OF

JUNE 26, 1949*

The question of civil administration in villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone is provided for, within the framework of an armistice agreement, in sub-paragraphs 5(b) and 5(f) of the draft article. Such civil administration, including policing, will be on a local basis, without raising general ques­ tions of administration, jurisdiction, citizenship and sovereignty.

Where Israeli civilians return to or remain in an Israeli village or settlement, the civil administra­ tion auid policing of that village or settlement will be by Israelis. Similarly, where Arab civiliems return to or remain in an Arab village, a local Arab administration and police unit will be author­ ized.

As civilian life is gradually restored, adminis­ tration will take shape on a local basis under the general supervision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, in consultation and co-operation with the local communities, will be in a position to authorize all necessary arrangements for the restoration and pro­ tection of civilian life. He will not assume respon­ sibility for direct administration of the zone.

As inserted in Official Record of 542d Meeting of United Nations SecurityCouncil. APPENDIX C

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