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Bordering on Brexit: B O N R D Br Exi T R I

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Bordering on Brexit: B O N R D Br Exi T R I BORDERING ON BREXIT: Views from Local Communities in the Central Border Region of Ireland / Northern Ireland B 3 O 1 N 1 R 1 D 2 B 3 R 1 E 1 X 8 I 1 T 1 R 1 I 1 N 1 An initiative of the Irish Central G 2 Border Area Network, working with Queen’s University Belfast BORDERING ON BREXIT Views from Local Communities in the Central Border Region of Ireland / Northern Ireland A report prepared for the Irish Central Border Area Network. By Katy Hayward Centre for International Borders Research Queen’s University Belfast Belfast November 2017 ISBN 9781909131675 Boarding on Brexit Contents Contents Acknowledgements .........................................................7 Executive Summary ..........................................................8 Overview .................................................................................................9 The Central Border Region of Ireland / Northern Ireland ...........................................................................................9 Responding to Brexit .............................................................. 10 The study......................................................................................11 Key Findings ..........................................................................................12 Looking Ahead .....................................................................................17 Section 1: The Central Border Region ..........................18 1.1. Particular history, particular needs ...........................................19 1.1.1. Effects of division and peripherality .......................... 20 1.1.2. Market integration ......................................................... 22 1.2. Cross-border cooperation........................................................23 1.2.1. The origins of cooperation ..........................................23 1.2.2. Added value of cooperation .................................... 25 1.3. Facing Brexit .................................................................................27 Section 2: The Study ..................................................... 29 2.1. Purpose ......................................................................................... 30 2.2. Methods .........................................................................................31 2.2.1. The survey ........................................................................31 Views From Local Communities In The Central Border Region of Ireland / Northern Ireland 3 Contents 2.2.2. The focus groups ........................................................32 2.3. The survey respondents ..........................................................33 2.3.1. Area of residence .........................................................33 2.3.2. Profile of respondents ................................................34 2.3.3. Citizenship ......................................................................36 2.3.4. Brexit vote ......................................................................38 Section 3: The Border ....................................................41 3.1. The Border conundrum .............................................................42 3.2. Legacy of conflict, fragility of peace ....................................44 3.2.1. Psychological and emotional dimensions of the border ..........................................................................................44 3.2.2. Importance of the 1998 Agreement ......................46 3.3. Crossing the border today ......................................................47 3.3.1. Frequency of crossing .................................................47 3.3.2. Purpose of crossing ....................................................48 3.4. Anticipating a ‘harder’ border .................................................51 3.4.1. The impact south of the border ................................51 3.4.2. Ramifications of a ‘harder’ border ..........................53 3.4.3. The optimistic view ..................................................... 55 Section 4: Anticipating Brexit ...................................... 57 4.1. Experience of EU membership .............................................. 58 4.1.1. Effects of EU membership .......................................... 58 4.2. Significance of Brexit ............................................................... 60 4.2.1. Impact on individuals .................................................. 60 4.2.2. Impact on local community ...................................... 62 4 Bordering on Brexit Contents 4.2.3. Effect of change in UK/Ireland relations .............. 66 4.3. The views of Leave voters ..................................................... 68 4.3.1. The Leave-voting respondents................................ 68 4.3.2. Why respondents voted Leave .............................. 69 4.3.3. Leave-voters’ views of the post-Brexit border ....71 Section 5: Looking Ahead .............................................73 5.1. Information on Brexit ..................................................................74 5.1.1. Uncharted territory .........................................................74 5.2. Priorities .......................................................................................78 5.2.1. Political uncertainty ......................................................78 5.2.2. Peace process ..............................................................79 5.2.3. Agriculture ..................................................................... 80 5.2.4. Business and work .......................................................81 5.2.5. Citizenship and migration .........................................84 5.2.6. Future development .................................................. 85 5.2.7. Opportunities ................................................................ 86 5.3. Conclusion .................................................................................. 88 5.3.1. The implications of Brexit for the Central Border Region ........................................................................................ 88 5.3.2. Representing the Central Border Region ........... 89 Appendices ..................................................................... 92 Appendix 1: Information flyer for online survey ........................93 Appendix 2: Questionnaire for online survey ...........................94 Appendix 3: Interview schedule for focus groups .................102 Views From Local Communities In The Central Border Region of Ireland / Northern Ireland 5 Acknowledgements Acknowledgements This report was authored by Dr Katy Hayward (Queen’s University Belfast), with research assistance from Annemiek Teuwen (Radboud Nijmegen University, the Netherlands) and Michael Buttazzoni (University of Victoria, British Columbia). Michael and Annemiek were visiting research associates in 2016 and 2017 respectively in the Centre for International Borders Research at Queen’s University. We would like to thank Professor Hastings Donnan, Director of the Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice, for his endorsement of their visiting positions. Michael’s position was supported as part of the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council-funded Borders in Globalization project, led by Professor Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly. We are grateful to Shane Campbell of ICBAN for his instrumental facilitation of this project, and to Joanne Breen and Andy Hallewell in ICBAN for their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this report. We would like to thank each of the local authorities represented in ICBAN for their support for this report and for publicising the survey. We are grateful to Monaghan Local Enterprise Office for the complimentary use of their facilities for focus group interviews. Finally, sincerest thanks to all 305 respondents to the survey – your full and honest responses to the open-ended questions were invaluable and illuminating. Thank you, especially, to those who shared the survey with others. We also wish to express particular gratitude to each one of the participants of the focus groups in Monaghan and Enniskillen for their frank and open contributions to the sometimes difficult discussions. Although the scope of a report of this nature prevents us from doing justice to all the views gathered in this research exercise, we trust that we have shown respect to them in our presentation of this material. We hope that this is but the beginning of ongoing conversations and information-sharing on this important subject. Views From Local Communities In The Central Border Region of Ireland / Northern Ireland 7 Executive Summary Executive Summary Executive Overview The Central Border Region of Ireland / Northern Ireland The eight Member Councils areas of the Central Border Region include Armagh City, Banbridge and Craigavon; Fermanagh and Omagh; Mid Ulster and the counties of Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Monaghan and Sligo. The Region had a population of approximately 850,000 in 2011. This is a predominantly rural area, characterised by a dispersed population and distance from major urban centres. Approximately one third of the population live in settlements over 1,500 population; and two thirds in smaller settlements and open countryside. The Region accounts for 20% of the land area of the island of Ireland, with a high quality landscapes of coastline, lakes, inland waterways and hills. After generations of severe social, political, and
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