Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis∗ Christopher L. Foote Kristopher S. Gerardi FRB Boston FRB Atlanta Paul S. Willen FRB Boston and NBER April 2012 Abstract: We present 12 facts about the mortgage crisis. We argue that the facts refute the popular story that the crisis resulted from finance industry insiders deceiv- ing uninformed mortgage borrowers and investors. Instead, we argue that borrowers and investors made decisions that were rational and logical given their ex post overly optimistic beliefs about house prices. We then show that neither institutional fea- tures of the mortgage market nor financial innovations are any more likely to explain those wrong beliefs than they are to explain the Dutch tulip bubble 400 years ago. Economists should acknowledge the limits of our understanding of asset price bubbles and design policies accordingly. ∗This paper was prepared for the conference, “Rethinking Finance: New Perspectives on the Crisis,” or- ganized by Alan Blinder, Andy Lo and Robert Solow and sponsored by the Russell Sage and Century Founda- tions. Thanks to Alberto Bisin, Ryan Bubb, Scott Frame, Jeff Fuhrer, Andreas Fuster, Anil Kashyap, Andreas Lehnert, and Bob Triest for helpful discussions and comments. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not represent the official positions of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston or Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. Contact info:
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[email protected]. 1 Introduction More than four years after defaults and foreclosures began to rise, economists are still debat- ing the ultimate origins of the U.S.