The Choices That Minorities Make: Strategies of Negotiation with the Majority in Postwar Bosnia- Herzegovina1
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Chapter 11 The Choices that Minorities Make: Strategies of Negotiation with the Majority in Postwar Bosnia- Herzegovina1 Paula M. Pickering2 College of William and Mary If I, or other minorities, stayed among ourselves, we wouldn’t be able to survive. Really, only Muslims can help me survive.3 This paper investigates how urban minorities in chiefly Bosniak areas of Bosnia negotiate with members of the majority group. Based on intensive interviews, participant observation, and analysis of surveys, it also explores the factors that facilitate everyday interaction. It finds that urban minorities reach out to ordinary members of the majority in the workplace, where there are opportunities for repeated interaction with “others” as professionals, allowance for individualism, and few expectations for the forming of intimate ties with “others.” It is in this is the type of context that minorities can engage in mutual help and downplay essentialist identifications, which helps build bridging links to “others.” Minorities rarely approach more distant local voluntary organizations, except in cases where they seek expert knowledge for mediated interaction with majority authorities. This exploratory study challenges the assumptions of some students of civil society and suggests increased assistance for mixed workplaces. The Puzzle Even in the wake of a war fought largely along ethnic lines and the continued rule of ethno- nationalists, significant numbers of ethnic minorities continue to reside in the region of Bosnia that is now chiefly Bosniak.4 Using intensive interviews, participant observation, and analysis of 1 Chapter in Dimitris Keridis, Ellen Elias-Bursac, and Nicholas Yatromanolakis, eds., New Approaches to Balkan Studies, volume 2 of the IFPA-Kokkalis Series on Southeast European Policy, Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2003, pp. 255-309. 2 This paper was first prepared for delivery at the Socrates Kokkalis Graduate Student Workshop on Southeastern Europe, Harvard University, 9-10 February 2001. I give special thanks to the Bosnians who shared their opinions and experiences with me, and thanks also to Audrey Budding, Sladjana Danković, Bob Donia, John Fine, Zvi Gitelman, Khristina Haddad, Elissa Helms, Claudio Holzner, M. Kent Jennings, G. Patrick Lynch, and Kathy Cramer Walsh for advice during my research process. This paper is based on work supported in part by a U.S. Institute of Peace Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar grant, a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship, and a Social Science Research Council International Field Dissertation Research Fellowship. 3 Vera, Catholic respondent who stayed and continues to stay, in Sarajevo, December 1998. All names of respondents and informants are pseudonyms. See exhibit A for background data on respondents and informants. 4 Peoples who before the war called themselves “Bosnian Muslims” now generally call themselves “Bosniaks,” following a 1993 vote by the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals to return to what they termed the old name— Bosniak—for the Bosnian Muslim nation (Filandra 1998, 384). To respect the respondents and informants, the 1 Chapter 11: Choices Minorities Make surveys, I investigate the strategies these minorities use for negotiating their relationship with members of the majority group. I also explore the factors that facilitate everyday inter-ethnic interaction. Given the international community's involvement in re-building plural post-conflict societies across the globe, sound strategies for assisting multi-ethnicity should be grounded in a thorough understanding of how ordinary, non-elite minorities negotiate with ethnic “others.” Ultimately, information on how minorities negotiate with ethnic “others” should provide information on what kind of institutions, under which circumstances, facilitate inter-ethnic interaction. To set the stage for this paper, the context for minority choice is presented below, followed by a comparison of previous literature on possible negotiation approaches for minorities and on factors facilitating inter-ethnic interaction. It then offers alternative hypotheses for pathways to assist inter-ethnic cooperation and describes my multi-method investigation. Drawing on data from interviews and participant observation, the paper describes the minority strategies encountered in the field and discusses factors that bolster minorities’ negotiation with ordinary persons who are Bosniaks. Context The political system that the international community has imposed on Bosnia complicates minority choices, since it contains contradictory provisions for ethnic separation and multi- ethnicity. First, Bosnia’s postwar political system appears modeled on consociationalism. Students of consociationalism advocate that a state recognize its major ethnic groups,5 isolate them at the mass level, and constrain inter-ethnic contact to the elite level in order to transform ethnic groups into constructive elements of stable democracy (Lipjhart 1968-9; Nordlinger 1972; Burg and Berbaum 1989). Accordingly, the Bosnian political system institutionalizes ethnic cleavages—Bosniak, Serb, and Croat—in a grand coalition (tri-ethnic collective presidency), ethnic-based federalism, mutual veto, and ethnic keys. The internationally recognized state of Bosnia names Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as constituent nations (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995). Of the two political entities into which Bosnia is divided, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina grants constituent nation status only to Bosniaks and Croats, while Republika Srpska confers constituent nation status only on Serbs.6 At the time of my research, most of those nationalist leaders who conducted the war remained in power, implementing policies aimed at ethnic separatism and thwarting multi-ethnic governance at the national level (Cox 1998, 7).7 Despite endorsing these provisions for ethnic separation, the international community has also intervened to implement integrative measures that encourage inter-ethnic cooperation, such as promoting refugee return and diverse police forces, as well as imposing a unified currency and customs regime. The dire state of the economy, which features unemployment rates ranging from 33 percent in the Federation to 47 percent in the Republika Srpska (Bukvic 1998), demoralizes all citizens of Bosnia, especially minorities and members of other marginalized groups. discussion uses the terms (“Bosniak” or “Bosnian Muslim”) that they themselves use. Otherwise, the term “Bosniak” is used in this paper. I found that minorities rarely used the term “Bosniak,” and instead used “Muslim.” 5 This paper uses Smith’s definition (1991, 21) of an ethnic group as a group possessing a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, at least one differentiating element of common culture, an association with a specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. 6 See U.S. Department of State 1994, and Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992. 7 As Burg and Shoup have pointed out, the Dayton constitution lacks incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation, instead encouraging political conflict along ethnic lines (1999, 367-73). 2 Chapter 11: Choices Minorities Make For this paper, minorities are defined as persons who belonged to ethnic groups that were smaller than the majority group in their original, prewar municipality.8 Thus, in chiefly Bosniak Bosnia, minorities are Serbs, Croats, and persons from mixed marriages. Roughly two-thirds of Serbs, Croats, and mixed persons who lived in Bosniak-dominated areas before the war fled or were forced to flee during and immediately after the war. Postwar estimates of minorities now residing in the Bosniak-majority area range from 10 percent (UNHCR 1997) to 22 percent (Medjunarodni Forum Bosna 1999).9 International authorities seek to increase this percentage by promoting refugee return. Previous Literature—Minority Strategies Most literature on ethnic politics considers either the strategies that the minority group takes toward the state or the policies that the state employs in attempting to manage ethnicity. I contend, however, that the inter-ethnic negotiation strategies of individuals who are minorities are important, because they are indications of their attitudes toward the state and society and their future there and/or their reaction to constraints on and opportunities for inter-ethnic cooperation that the Bosnian state and society provide. The actions of ordinary persons do not always match the dictates of minority group leaders. Based on theoretical literature on ethnic relations (McGarry and O’Leary 1993), migration (Hugo 1981; Wahlbeck 1999), regional literature (Woodward 1995, Laitin 1998) and my fieldwork, I suggest that Bosnian minority strategies are confined to one or a combination of several of the options on the following continuum: Å----------------------------Continuum of Bosnian minorities’ strategies of negotiation-------------------------------Æ assimilation integration selective engagement manipulation of identifications anonymity voice circulation exit communalism violence Minority individuals who employ strategies at the left end of the continuum express a willingness to incorporate themselves into the Bosniak-dominant society. At the left extreme, assimilation is a process in which minority individuals surrender their ethnic identities and ultimately become incorporated into the dominant society and cultural group (Barth 1964, 31). Assimilation