A U renewNIVERSITY SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1971

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AIR rcvicwU N I VE R S ITY THE PROFESSIONAl JOURNAL O F THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

R elationship Between Japan and the United States . His Excellency Nobuhiko Ushiba Ambassador of Japan to the United States

T he Synergy of the Triad...... Gen. John C. Meyer, USAF

A ir Force Training and Our National Economy . . . Lt. Gen. George B. Simler, USAF

Squadron Officer School, J unior Officers, and You...... 34 Col. Arthur R. Moore, Jr.. USAF

T he Presidential Decision on the Cambodian Ope r at io n ...... 45 Col. Russell H. Smith, USAF

U rban Insurgency in Latin America...... 54 Charles A. Russell Maj. Robert E. Hildner, USAF

Military Affairs Abroad NATO’s T hird Dim e n s io n ...... 65 Marshall E. Wilcher

Books and Ideas W hat Was Past Was Prologue...... 69 Dr. Russell F. YVeigley

100 A ir c r af t on Parade...... 77 Royal D. Frey

T he Contributors...... 87

AddresB manuscripts to Editor, Air University the cover Review Division, Bldg 1211, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112. Printcd by Government Printing Office. A free world partner "under the American nuclear Address subscriptions to Superintendent of umbrella*’ is the picturc of Japan depicted in Documenta, GPO, Washington DC 20402: yeariy this issue by His Excellency Nobuhiko Ushiba, $4.50 domestic, $5.75 foreign; single copy 75£. Japan’s Ambassador to the United States, while For back isaues. mail check or money order to General John C. Meyer, USAF Vice Chief of Staff. Book Department, DMSB, Bldg 1450, Maxwell describcs the Triad of forces required to sustain AFB, AL 36112: domestic 75C» foreign 90?. “ sufficicnt strategie strength.” Other contributors diseu8S the U.S. commitincnts in tNATO and else* where in the world and the security measures being Vol. XXII No. 6 SeptemberOctober 1971 takcn to rnakc our defenscs viable and credible. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES Impact on the Asian-Pacific Region

His Excel l ency Nobuhiko Ushiba Ambassador of Japan to the United States HE JAPAN of today is a nation that economic and political policies for the 1970s, has renounced military force as an in- and their implications for the Japan-U.S. re- strument of national policy, apart from lationship. T the inherent right of self-defense. Japan isSeen through Japanese eyes, the basic secu- constitutionally prohibited from maintaining a rity equation in the western Pacific is a nu- war-making potential. This commitment, clear triangle composed of the United States, which dates from the Occupation under Gen- the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic eral of the Army Douglas MacArthur, has the of China. Japan lies directly within this trian- deep support of the vast majority of the Japa- gle, as do divided Korea and the Republic of nese people. China on Taiwan. Avoidance of nuclear war Yet there is a seeming paradox to this kind in this area depends, obviously, on the stabil- of defense posture in a world where the sur- ity of this triangular power balance. vival of civilization depends on the precarious Moreover, Japan is a small archipelago, no balance of enormous arsenais. The paradox larger in area than Califórnia. Its population seems even stranger when one realizes that of over 100 million is crowded into Coastal Japan has now emerged as the third-ranking patches of land that are highlv vulnerable tar- world power, in terms of national output, and gets to intermediate-range missiles from the may within a decade or so surpass the Soviet Asian mainland, or to missiles launched from Union, to stand second only to the United submarines. States. Yet this vulnerable Japan, extremely poor If at this point Japan is entitled to be con- in natural resources, depends on world trade sidered a “ superpower,” then it is only fair to for the survival of its industries. Japan’s trade ask what role a nonmilitary superpower can lifelines pass through areas of potential con- play in the world of the 1970s. This is a ques- flict among the triangular powrers— the Sea of tion I should like to explore, since it has great Japan, Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, bearing on Japanese-American relations and the Straits of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean, on the future stability of the Asian-Pacific re- as well as across the Pacific. gion. As U.S. Commander in Chief, President In this strategic environment it is under- Nixon, said to my Prime Minister some six- standable that the Japanese outlook on na- teen months ago: tional security is quite different from that of a The Pacific and Asia is the area of the greatest continent-size nuclear-armed power. Recog- promise and also of the greatest peril. Whether nizing that their options are limited, the Japa- Asia and the Pacific become an area of peace nese people have adopted three operating as- or an area of devastation, for Asia and the sumptions on which they base their security world, will depend on what happens between planning. the United States and Japan more than • The first of these assumptions is that between any other nations in the world. Japan does not have the potential to influence In covering my topic I shall touch first on militarily the present nuclear equation in the the strategic environment in which Japan Asian Pacific. That is, the acquisition of nu- finds itself and explain certain assumptions clear weapons by Japan would add nothing to about Asian-Pacific security which are widely the stability of the existing nuclear triangle. shared among the Japanese people. Against Indeed, it could have an opposite, destabiliz- this background, I shall then dlscuss the ing effect, leading to an intensified arms race objectives and strategies of Japanese defense, in the area. Therefore, for practical as well as 3 The four-legged “ self-elevating ocean engineering platform” is used for geological examination of the sea bottom for the projected bridge that will connect Honshu and Shikoku islands.

constitutional reasons Japan has renounced nuclear weapons for its own use.

• The second widely held Japanese as- sumption is that the existing nuclear power balance in Asia will remain stable as long as the United States maintains a military pres- ence— and credible nuclear deterrent— in the western Pacific. That is, we Japanese do not interpret the Nixon Doctrine as a formula for the withdrawal of American power from the Asian Pacific. We assume that the nuclear power balance— and the securitv of Japan from nuclear war— will continue to rest on the American deterrent. It is for this reason that my government favors continuing in force the Japan-U.S. Securitv Treaty, which places Japan under the American nuclear um- brella and provides the United States with forward military bases on Japanese soil. Recognizing all these dangers, the Japanese people nonetheless assume that the most im- Even with the triangle intact, nuclear war portant factor in avoiding nuclear conflict in in Asia is still, of course, possible. The border Asia is and will continue to be the U.S. deter- conflict between China and the Soviet Union rent as a visible presence in the area. Precipi- could escalate out of control, though this tous withdrawal of the United States from the seems a remote possibility in light of the re- wrestern Pacific would, we believe, have very straint both sides have exhibited throughout unsettling consequences and would drastically the period of the dispute. alter the strategic equation in which Japan A possibility with more dangerous and far- finds itself. reaching consequences would be armed Chinese intervention in her peripheral coun- • The third widely held Japanese as- tries as a rerun of the 1950 intervention in sumption is that the most likely threats to the Korea. Again it is safe to assume that, in the stability and security of the Asian Pacific are light of historical experience, the countries nonnuclear, in the form of subversion, indirect concerned will exercise reasonable restraint to aggression, or clandestine provocation of prevent miscalculation on the other side. It is “wars of national liberation.” also verv much to be hoped that the Indo- These are the most ambiguous threats to china conflict will continue to wind down and the peace, and the most difficult to counter, as will in due course lend itself to settlement we have seen in various parts of South and through negotiation. Southeast Asia, from Burma to Indochina. A disciplined and determined guerrüla force, well supplied or even reinforced by a hostile neighbor, is an elusive and persistent enemy for anv government to face. sibility for its own security. Where appropri- As the American experience in Vietnam has ate, the United States may provide material demonstrated, even the direct intervention of assistance, but the human will and effort to a powerful ally cannot by itself insure the suc- survive can come only from those whose free- cess of a government under guerrilla siege. dom and well-being are at stake. The essential ingredients for internai stability The concept is wholly consistent with the include a government that not only possesses Japanese outlook. The most likely threats to adequate security forces but also enjoys suffi- Asian peace and stability— the threats of sub- cient popular support to be able to isolate the version and “ national liberation” wars— will guerrillas from the mainstream of the popula- diminish only as the nations of this area stabi- tion and thus control them. We may speculate lize themselves economically and politically. that success of the “ Vietnamization” program This will, of course, take substantial outside now under way vvill depend on both these help. Assistance in economic and social devel- factors— not simplv on the combat effective- opment is the one field of activity where the ness of the South Vietnamese armed forces Japanese people believe they can make their but also on the ability of the South Vietnam- most valuable contribution to peace-building ese government to maintain broad public sup- in the Asian-Pacific. port and confidence. This is the fundamental challenge through- out the developing world, the challenge of building a viable nation-state, with the eco- ^\gainst this background, let nomic, political, and other resources to meet us now explore Japanese policies for the 1970s popular aspirations. Where this has not been in the areas of national defense and Interna- accomplished, or where it is happening too tional economics and politics. slowly, the country is fertile ground for inter- The Self-Defense Forces that Japan main- nai or externai subversion. tains operate within the three parameters: One of the most important provisions of the that our military capabilities are constitution- Nixon Doctrine, as I understand it, deals with ally limited to self-defense; that we reject nu- this self-help principie. The doctrine reaffirms clear armaments on both practical and consti- American treatv commitments and the role of tutional grounds; and that our ultimate secu- the U.S. deterrent where massive or nuclear rity rests on the U.S. deterrent, under Ja- aggression is threatened. In cases of small- pan-U.S. mutual security arrangements. scale conventional aggression, however, or in- The mission of the Japanese Self-Defense ternai subversion, the doctrine indicates that Forces is to defend the Japanese people and the local government must accept full respon- territory from direct or indirect aggression— 6 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

or, more basically, to be strong enough to clear levei, within the framework of its mutual deter any such aggression. T o accomplish this security arrangements with the United States. mission, Japan is currently spending about Equally important, this defense posture will eight-tenths of one percent of its gross na- permit Japan to concentrate its energies and tional product ( gnp) to provide a compact, resources during this decade on those aspects modern, all-volunteer defense establishment. of peace-building which the Japanese people Beginning in 1972, the Fourth Self-Defense feel best equipped to perform: promoting eco- Build-up Program will double these expendi- nomic devclopment and political stability in tures to $16 billion over a five-year period, or the developing areas of Asia. This may be an average $3 billion a year. viewed as planned peace-building: a construc- The emphasis, under the new plan, will be tive assault on the gravest threats to peace and on qualitative rather than quantitative im- stability in the region— poverty, malnutrition, provements. For example, there will be vir- disease, hunger, inadequate education, under- tually no increase in the current numerical developed industry and trade, and the other strength of the ground forces, which will re- conditions which promote internai discontent main at 180,000 men. However, army mobil- and invite externai intervention and subver- ity will be increased with armored personnel sion. carriers, tanks, and helicopters. The maritime forces, or navy, will acquire high-speed rock- et-armed hydrofoils, destroyers, and subma- rines for Coastal defense. The air forces will third-ranking world eco- replace their present F-86s with about a nomic power, with global trading interests hundred F4EJ Phantom jets and will reach a and a vital stake in world stability, Japan has planned strength of 900 aircraft, including the obligation to invest its economic strength 180 F-104J jets. in international development. This obligation This will not give Japan, by 1976, a war- has special significance in developing Asia, making potential or the capacity to conduct where Japan is the onlv modern industrial military operations beyond its own territories. power. Thus, in the future as in the past, It will insure Japan’s capacity to defend the Japan will devote a substantial portion of its home islands— and American bases on those development assistance to east and southeast islands, including Okinawa— from any plausi- Asian countries. ble levei of conventional attack. Total Japanese aid to all developing coun- I cannot emphasize too strongly the depth tries has quadrupled, from about $300 million of this commitment, among the Japanese peo- in 1964 to $1.25 billion in 1969. Aid leveis ple, to an exclusively self-defense military ca- will continue to increase until we reach, by pability. It is a commitment rooted in memo- 1975, an annual levei of aid equivalent to one ries of the last war, formalized in our Consti- percent of Japan’s gnp. Since our gnp is grow- tution, and reinforced by awareness of our ing at well over ten percent a year, this will vulnerabilitv in the present nuclear confronta- mean approximately $4 billion in foreign aid tion. in 1975— about the same as total American Yet I believe it is apparent that a compe- foreign aid today. tent and sophisticated Japanese self-defense Plans also call for continuing improvements capability is an important contribution to re- in the qualitv of Japanese foreign aid. The gional stability, in the sense called for in the proportion of outright grants will increase, Nixon Doctrine. Japan clearly accepts full re- and loan terms will become more favorable. sponsibility for its own security at the nonnu- Greater emphasis is already being placed on The first Japanese F-4EJ jet fighter, produced at McDonnell Douglas Corporation, St. Louis

the kinds of aid and technical assistance opment contracts, and training programs, which contribute fundamentally to nation- Japanese companies are expanding domestic building and social modernization and, there- processing, manufacturing, and commerce as fore, to political stability and regional security. well as international trade throughout non- The levei of Japanese aid channeled Gommunist Asia. Japanese business leaders, through multilateral agencies is also growing. together with their counterparts in other Pa- For example, Japan was one of the organizers cific nations, are contemplating setting up a of the Asian Development Bank and is its multinational private investment Corporation principal source of capital. The Bank is an for Asia, to provide venture capital and tech- increasingly important instrument for prein- nical and managerial assistance to local entre- vestment assistance to Asian countries in agri- preneurs in Asian countries. culture, fisheries, transportation, and Commu- There are, of course, political implications nications. Similarly, Japan is a vigorous pro- to economic activities on such a large scale, moter of regional consultation and coopera- and we Japanese are acquiring some sensitiv- tion on economic development through such ity in this regard. Nearly all the developing institutions as the Asian and Pacific Council countries of Asia have recent memories of co- and periodic Asian ministerial conferences on lonialism— Japanese as well as Western— and development. are jealous of their economic as well as politi- Japan's private sector has a vital partner- cal independence. We are learning the impor- ship role in this national effort. Through di- tance of a genuinely cooperative approach to rect investment, joint ventures, resource-devel- our Asian partners, whether at government-

Continued on page 13 Japanese Self-Defense Forces

Japan maintains compact, modem, nonnuclear, all- volunteer defense forces, for its own security and as its contribution to peace-building in the Asian- Pacific. An aircrew scrambles one of the 180 F-104s that will constitute about one-fifth of the planned strength of the air forces. ... A formation of them in flight, maintaining deterrent readiness ... The destroyer Amatsukaze, defender of its island nation . . . Nike Ajax protective missiles

JaparYs Asian Development Bank

To diminish the vulnerability of Asian nations to aggression or subversion, Japan assists in their economic and social development. In the Republic of China— aluminum rolls are unloaded at the Taiwan Aluminum Corporation, which is undertaking an expansion program with the Bank’s assistance. . . . In Ceylon— the Uda Walawe dam is a Bank-financed project. . . . In the Republic of Korea— the Seoul-Inchon expressway, 29.9 kilometers of four-lane limited-access highway, was financed by the Bank. . . . In the Philippines— a Bank staff member conducts a seminar in technical training of Filipino personnel to handle the water management project in Bulacan. . . . In Malaysia— workers at a palm plantation that feeds into two palm oil mills in Bukit Mendi and Bukit Goh areas of the State of Pahang, the first two stages being financed by the Bank ... In Singapore— industrial packing material in production under a subloan from the Development Bank of Singapore, borrowed from Asian Development Bank JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 13

to-government leveis or in private-sector deal- inodel for Japanese modernization. The forms ings. And out of our hard-earned experience of our development have remained uniquely we hope will emerge the channels for more Japanese, but our debt to America is consider- effective regional cooperation in all areas of able. common concern. As our relationship has matured, we have Some degree of political consultation is tak- become each other’s best overseas customers, ing place. In May 1970, for example, leaders building a two-way trade that has quadrupled of non-Communist Asia met in Djakarta to every ten years and now exceeds $10 billion explore ways in which the States in the region annually, both ways. American private invest- could together contribute to a just and dura- ment in Japan has reached over $1 billion, ble peace settlement in Indochina. The efforts and the ties between our two economies are begun there have yet to bear any fruit, but the daily growing stronger through technological habit of Asian political consultation is begin- exchanges and joint ventures as well as trade, ning to form. This is a healthy sign for the investment, and tourism. future, and it is a development which Japan In so close and dynamic a relationship, oc- will continue to encourage, in the interests of casional frictions are bound to occur. The re- planned peace-building. cent list of differences includes the question of regulating Japanese (and other Asian) textile exports to the United States, as well as Ameri- 1” his brief summary of Japanese can complaints about Japanese protectionism objectives and policies gives some idea of the and Japanese complaints— to a lesser degree constructive role a nonmilitary superpower can but still real— about American protectionism. play in the turbulent world of the 1970s. It I do not mean to suggest that such problems will not be a decisive role in the maintenance are trivial, but it is important for us to re- of today’s precarious peace. It can be a very member that they are “ normal.” That is to constructive role in making peace less precar- say, it is as natural for trading partners as for ious in the future. marriage partners to have disagreements and Whether the world has any future will be to need time and patience to work them out. determined primarily by the two nuclear- Excessive passion, in either case, is a hin- armed superpowers, and especially by the drance to reasoned negotiations. United States, whose steadfastness has been What we must never lose sight of is the instrumental for a quarter-century in the pre- basic identitv of interests that has made Japan vention of general war. Japan, operating in and the United States partners in the first nonmilitary spheres, hopes to make its princi- place. These interests include the mutually pal contribution by helping to remove the beneficiai nature of our economic relationship, most obvious causes of lesser wars, aggressions, the complementary and mutually reinforc- and threats to the peace. ing nature of our security relationship, These policies have implications for Japa- and, above all, the identitv of our political nese-American relations. Japan and the United States are allies, not merely by treaty objectives: of a more peaceful and better-or- but, more fundamentallv, in spirit. Both our dered international system in which freedom peoples are deeply committed to political de- can fiourish. mocracy, and both have grown strong In the words of poet Archibald MacLeish, through the free-enterprise system. In many “ We are all riders on this planet earth to- important respects, especially in this postwar gether. ” Among all those riders, Japan and period, the United States has provided a the United States have developed a special

Continued on page 16 Technical Assistance to Developing Nations

Japan shares advanced technical know-how with its friends. In Ceylon— an agricultural testing center . . . and a training center for upgrading the time-honored methods of fishing . . . In índia— teaching the Japanese language, in order to facilitate international cooperation ... In Kenya— instruction in scientific fishing techniques for eastern África

16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

rclationship with great potential consequences aims to the United Nations General Assembly for the kind of world we want our children to in these words: inherit. President Nixon gave eloquent ex- World history has shown us that countries pression to this a little over a year ago when with great economic power were tempted to he said: possess commensurate military forces. I should Peace requires partnership, . . . the new like, however, to make it clear that my coun- partnership concept has been welcomed in try will use its economic power for the con- Asia. We have developed an historie new struetion of world peace, and we have no basis for Japanese-American friendship and intention whatever to use any major portion cooperation, which is the linchpin for peace of our economic power for military purposes. in the Pacific. It is the firm conviction of us, the Japanese people, based upon our invaluable historical Japan accepts its share of this common bur- experience, that only through the defense of den and is charting a new coursc never before freedom, adherence to peace and the promo- attempted by a major world power. In Octo- tion of the prosperity and peace of the world, ber 1970 my Prime Minister described our will it be possible for us to ensure the security and prosperity of our own country.

Washington, D.C. THE SYNERGY OF THE TRIAD

G eneral John C. M eyer

TRATEGIC deterrence is the most important job of the armed forces. Without it, all other Service missions could be meaningless. Yet, to be eflective, strategic deterrence re- quircs positive actions by the military Services and the public support which makes those ac- tions possible. It also requires some understanding between the potential adversaries, to ensure that neither miscalculates the capabilities or intentions of the other. Over the past twenty-five years the United States has been 17 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW very successful in meeting those requirements. that balance is and the important role of the But there is an irony in that success. The Air Force. And finally, they should under- interest of many people in this vital peace- stand where we are going with our strategic keeping role seems to have jaded. There are forces and how we hope to get there. those who would falsely reason that because I am sure I do not need to spend much there has not been a world war for about a time developing how the strategic balance of generation there is no need to do anything forces contributes to world stability and to our more to prevent such a war in the future. Or national security. We need only look back to they may even argue that our present strategic 1962 for an excellent example of how that forces can now be unilaterally reduced. That balance works. kind of logic, while pleasant to contemplate, It was nine o’clock at night on Monday the just does not fit the real world. fifteenth of October. Couriers were delivering With an issue as vital to the nation as stra- reconnaissance photography to the President’s tegic deterrence, I believe all Americans most trusted executives. Twelve hours later, should understand just what the real world is the U-2 photography of Cuba was laid out in — and what it is likely to be. They should front of President Kennedy. The evidence of know what the current strategic balance is missiles was absolute. By 11:45 that morning and why we are concerned about it. They the President had ordered an increase in re- should know what the United States’ part of connaissance coverage: he had to know how THE SYNERCY OF THE TRIAD 19

ist the intermediate-range ballistic missilc advantage in bombers. The President an- ir b m ) deployment wasgrowing. nounced the quarantine of Cuba. At that time we had almost 400 land-based By Sunday, Moscow radio was reporting nd ea-based ballistic missiles that could that the Russians would dismantle and return trike the Soviet Union; they had 38 intercon- their missiles to the Soviet Union. The Soviets Uiental ballistic missiles ( ic b m ’s ). They also had been deterred, and the crisis had passed. |ad submarines that had to surface to launch The Cuban crisis put our system and our ihort-range missiles. If all of them had been in purposes to the test; it is now also rich in tunch position, they would have totaled lessons on how deterrence works. Here are ivver than a hundred missiles. In strategic two of them: ombers configured to strike the enemy in his The first deals with reconnaissance and sur- omeland, we had 1600; the Soviets had just veillance. Photography was absolutely essen- ewer than 200 lon^-range aircraft. Another tial, for without it we would have been hard ictor was our general purpose forces— our pressed to know what was going on at our ir, ground, and sea forces. doorstep. And, more important from a politi- By Monday the 22d of October the Presi- cal perspective, we would have had trouble lent had charted the nation‘s course. We had substantiating the Soviet missile buildup in three-to-one advantage in missiles, counting Cuba to our own government and to the 11 the Soviet submarines, and an eight-to-one United Nations. High-resolution photography

The Soviets have over 900 operational SS-lls today, each with multiple re-entry vehicles. 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW turns out to be far more convincing than any ployed force of about 2250 ballistic missià number of verbal assertions. launchers on land or at sea. The second lesson of Cuba had to do with In addition to those ballistic missiles, tl | leading from strength. By having the balance Soviets maintain a force of bombers and aer | of strategic strength, we were able to domi- al refueling tankers. Their strategic air foro i nate the play in terms that the Soviets could consist of around 200 Bear and Bison lonj easily understand. There was no question range bombers and tankers and over 7C | about our having sufficient strategic strength, Badger and Blinder médium bombers. Whi | and they were deterred. this fleet has declined slightly in size in recei j Now, if someone asks me today how much years, its use in strategic training exercises h; is “ sufficient strategic strength,” I am going to actually increased. have to admit that I am not sure. In my And lest one think that the Soviets have lo opinion it is a question that might best be interest in bombers, let me add that they ai ansvvered in hindsight, and of course then it testing a new swing-wing strategic bombe could be too late. In 1962 a superiority of ten prototype. It is considerably larger than oi to one in effective ballistic missiles and of al- swing-wing FB-111 and could be operation; most that ratio in bombers on alert was at in 1973. least sufficient. But that was 1962. I do not mean to go through a complet Today we have a different situation and a description of the Communist military fora different game plan. The Soviets now have that weigh on the balance of power. I hav nearly 1500 operational land-based ic b m’s , not mentioned Soviet ballistic missile defense with others under construction, including either deployed or in development. I have nc some new? silos unlike any we have seen be- talked about their operational Mach 3 intem fore. When current construction is completed, ceptor, the Foxbat. I have skipped over thei- about 300 will be SS-9s or SS-9-type missiles, technologically advanced and growing ant:i with their large payload and versatile applica- submarine forces. And I have not touched o> tions. These are the missiles that can carry a Chinese nuclear capabilities. But I have de: single warhead yielding up to 25 megatons or scribed enough to give a feel for the other sid three warheads yielding 5 megatons each. Just of the balance. It is massive military power b wrhere the Soviets will stop in missile deploy- any standard, and it is still growing. ment is still an open question. My second point concerns our side of th Recently we observed Soviet testing of mul- strategic military balance and our strategy | tiple re-entry vehicles on an SS-11 variant. The strategy is clearly one of deterrence, bu They have over 900 SS-1 ls operational today. the question of deterrence cannot reallv b| The thought that each of those silos could separated from that of what happens if i accommodate an SS-11 with multiple re-entry fails. The questions are closely related, and vehicles is cause for serious concern. the military forces that would be involved ard The Soviets also have at least 17 Polaris- the same. type submarines operational, each carrying 16 The idea is to exhibit sufficient militar, missiles. That adds up to 272 more ballistic strength to convince any would-be attacke missiles, not to mention about another 90 on that he will be worse off if he attacks us. Oi older submarines. The total Soviet operational course “ sufficient” has to be interpreteis ballistic missile threat today, then, is 1857 mis- through the eyes of the would-be attackeri siles— and still growing. The estimate for and that is subject to considerable uncer'. 1973, when current construction is completed tainty. Still, our job is to make sure that n(L on silos and another 15 submarines, is a de- enemy miscalculates our ability to survive ar| ttack and still have sufficient force to retal- Russian Aircraft ie and do unacceptable damage to him. The Ballistic missiles have not supplanted manned aircraft leans to this end are reconnaissance and sur- in the Soviet arsenal. It includes long-range bombers, ;illance combined with the Triad of strategic médium bombers, and fighters, represented ( top to bottom) >rces. by the Bison, the Blinder, and the MiG-23 Foxbat. : Our surveillance and warning program is lie aggregate of many diverse inputs and in- iicators, but for the present purpose I will mit my discussion to those systems that ■ould pro\ide warning of actual missile at- ick. The first of these is the Ballistic Missile ,arly Warning System— or bmews. It has een operational since 1964 and consists of iree radar sites. The bmews would provide bout a 15-minute warning of a mass ic bm |ttack. It also indicates launch areas and pajector%- impact points. Of course the bmews is not foolproof— nd I would emphasize that no system is. The He w s has gaps in its coverage. It looks to íe north and cannot “ see” the “ long way round’ : missiles that could come at us from íe south. Its capability is also limited against epressed-trajectory missiles that could come under the radar coverage. But the utility of the bmews is supple- nented by another network of radar coverage íat blankets much of the Soviet Union and ’hina. It is called over-the-horizon radar. It, oo, gives warning of a mass missile attack nd provides more warning time. We have leen operating the over-the-horizon radar as a est system since earlv 1966. In more than iree years of testing and operation, the sys- em has detected and reported a large number »f iCBM-type launches. It gives us great con- idence that there would be only a very re- note chance of missing a salvo of as few as five nissiles. Although this over-the-horizon radar does lot provide the same detailed information as ime w s, it makes a signifkant contribution to varning. It fills the gaps in the bmews and >rovides earlier warning. Of course we would ike even earlier warning, together with more 22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW detailed information. I will describe what vve of business. For example, as the Soviets coii arc doing about that later. tinue their high-priority programs in antisutl marine warfare, we can still deter an attacl Then there are the advantages associatei with each type of system. Well over 95 pen N o w , let me turn to the Triad cent of the land-based ic bm's are constantl of strategic offensive forces. These forces have on alert, 30 minutes from their targets. The been described in detail in many sources, but are reliable and accurate. Today we hav I would like to re-emphasize the important 1054 of these missiles: 54 Titans and 1000 o contribution that the Triad makes. This the Minuteman. three-pronged approach consists of Air Force Last year we completed our developmen land-based missiles and long-range bombers fiight-test program on the Minuteman III together with Navy missile-carrying subma- and these are just beginning to enter the in rines. The point I want to make is that this ventory. The Minuteman III has such addec combination of forces significantly increases advantages as a multiple independent re-entr our confidence in continuing to deter attack. vehicle capability. By 1975 we plan to have : The most obvious reason for greater confi- Minuteman force that will be just abou dence is the added reliability of multiple inde- evenly divided between Minuteman I Is anc pendent approaches. An unforeseen vulnera- lí Is. ‘ | bility in any one system would not put us out The manned bomber is an entirelv/ differen

U.S. Aircraft

The current fleet of B-52s will yield to the FB-111, entering the inventory (below). The B-l (right) in development, will exceed by speed and versatilit) what it may lack in size compared with the B-52 THE SYNERCY OF THE TRIAD 23

\ dnd of deterrent force. It can be launched like one-third of the force would be on alert. nd then recalled without ever penetrating The third part of the Triad consists of mis- 1 nemy airspace. It can be rerouted en route. sile-carrying submarines. They offer yet a dif- . t can be on airborne alert outside our conti- ferent type of targeting problem to the Soviets. íental limits and out of range of enemy defen- The fieet includes 41 ballistic missile subma- es. When ordered to attack, the manned rines, each of which carries 16 missiles. About jjttomber can strike a series of targets with a half of those submarines are in firing position |i'arietv of weapons. It can also be reused. at any one time; the rest are en route, being Today, we have close to 450 operational serviced, or in overhaul. ^jombers. Nearly all of them are B-52s, al- These three systems, operating in concert, IJhough a few FB -11 ls are entering the inven- complicate an enemy’s defense problems and orv. The B-52s have the versatility to carry limit his offensive strategies. For one thing, ree-fall bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and de- they put a strain on his resources. He must :oys; the F B -llls will onlv carry free-fall divide those resources between offensive and jombs until a new air-to-surface missile now defensive forces. Those that go to defense n development becomes operational. The must then be further divided among antibal- íumber of these bombers, and their support- listic missile systems, antiaircraft systems, and ng tankers, that are on alert can be varied in antisubmarine warfare systems. He must also esponse to international tensions. In the ab- spread out his top-grade scientists, engineers, ence of any abnormal tensions, something and managers. The resulting dilution in de- fenses is tantamount to increased capabilities for our strategic offensive forces. At the same time, resources used for defense are no longer available for offensive systems. Then too, and perhaps most important of all, our combination of strategic forces pre- sents an enemy strategist with an extremely severe problem in timing. A simultaneous sur- prise attack on all elemcnts of the Triad is virtually impossible, and a strike on any one element gives warning to the others. Thus— and this is a point worth emphasizing— the advantage of a first-strike surprise attack is largely foreclosed bv the Triad of strategic forces. T o quote the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admirai Thomas H. Moorer, “ . . . each of these force categories is of . . . criticai significance; for each strategic force has its own inherent strengths. . . In effect, then, there is synergy in the Triad which adds value bcyond costs. And while the total value of the Triad cannot be measured in strictly quantitative terms, it has been suffi- cient in the aggregatc to deter attack. But there is no guarantee that what has been sufficient will continue to be. As a result, 24 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

I am concerned about where we are going At the same time we have to be sure we covew and how we will get there. And that is the all the important bets, both strategic and taci third area I want to cover. tical. And that is what we are trying to do. One very important development progran for continued deterrence is the satellite early warning system. With this system we expect l I would start with a sobering get greatly improved overall warning capabil observation: the Soviets have built a strategic ity against enemy missile launches, and wj military force of about the sanie stature as our will get it for both land-launched ic bm’s ant own. But parity does not seem to be their submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Thi objective. The pace of their weapon develop- kind of warning will benefit all the stratega ment and deployment is sufficient to cause forces in the Triad by providing more of tha concern. To this can be added the growing valuable commodity, time. And it will give u importance of the Chinese Communist nu- even more time to get the manned-bombe clear threat. They could have an icbm capa- force into the air— even in the face of subma bility as early as 1973— two years from now. rine-launched ballistic missiles. Yet we see our own strategic forces remain- We are also working on the development o ing relatively constant numericallv. That is a a new bomber, the B -l. This new aircraft L real cause for concern. It makes me very un- being designed to penetrate the more sophisti easy to consider the possibility of a preponder- cated air defenses being developed by the So ance of military force on their side of the viets and still get its weapons on target. It wil balance. It could lead to the prospect of psy- be significantly smaller than the B-52, both ir chological blackmail. actual size and, perhaps more important, in it- One way of avoiding that kind of problem radar reflectivity. This means it will be able tc is to keep pace quantitatively and qualita- get to its targets with less chance of detection tively. I am certainly encouraged bv the Presi- The B-l will be able to carry almost doublt denta 20 May 1971 announcement that the the load of a B-52 while flying lower, faster quantitative pace may be slowed through the and farther. And, of course, it will continue tc Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ( salt). offer all of those advantages peculiar to the With respect to quality— and here I mean manned bomber: it can be launched, recalled. technological quality— we cannot afford to and reused; it can be rerouted en route; it can wait for someone else’s technological break- be on airborne alert; and each sortie can throughs and their associated surprises. strike many widely dispersed targets with a O f course, the Soviets recognize this situa- variety of weapons. tion as well as we do. This year they are We are also flight-testing a versatile short- expected to spend the equivalent of more than range attack missile to add new nuclear capa- $16 billion on military and space research and bilities to our present bombers, as well as the development. The comparable U.S. figure is B-l. This new missile is called the short-range about $10 billion. In terms of people, the So- attack missile ( sram ) . It can get to its target viets are adding 230,000 engineers everv year on a high arching ballistic path, or it can hug while we add 35,000. Further, they are keep- the earth in an all-low-altitude attack. In ei- ing all of theirs employed on priority research ther mode, the sram will substantially in- and development projects. crease the enemy’s air and missile defense Since we cannot meet the Soviet technolog- problems. ical challenge on a dollar-for-dollar basis, we These new svstems, as well as others in de- have to be very selective in our r &d program. velopment, should keep the strategic balance THE SYNERGY OF THE TRIAD 25

rom tilting against us, at least in a qualitative of attention. Even more important, I reiterate, jpnse. They will do this by being able to pene- is the strength of the Triad of strategic forces ijate the newer and more effective defenses in the reinforcing effect provided by each of ’jiat are evolving. And they will protect us the different types of forces. That is, there is a jlgainst technological surprise. synergistic relationship between bombers and In this business, though, we have to face land-based and sea-based missiles. It is the íe fact that no one is ever reallv sure. We kind of relationship that assures real deter- now we could do more in system develop- rence, since an attack on one gives warning to íent, and we know we could move faster on the others. jme of the systems now in development. But But deterrence, once achieved, does not re also know that either of those alternatives continue indefinitely. It has to be maintained 'ould cost more money— money we do not and modernized if it is to stay efTective. For ow have. At the same time, we see the Soviets that we need new systems capable of deterring oing more and moving faster. In that con- any enemy in the future. We think we have lext, we have to be sure that we continue to those new systems “ on track,” but it is going ave sufficient strategic forces, but it is a risky to take a lot of work and support to keep usiness at best. them on track. One way to get that support is to make sure that all of us in the Air Force and in the other Services— as well as the pub-

n this articl e I have focused on the pri- lic at large— understand the inherent strength lary element of our military power— nuclear of the interlocking parts of the Triad and why eterrence. The role of the Air Force in our that strength is in fact the real measure of lational strategy of nuclear deterrence is a strategic deterrence. rery vital role and one that gets a good deal Hq United States Air Force AIR FORCE TRAINING AND OUR NATIONAL ECONOMY

Lie u t e n an t General George B. Siml e r

E in the Air Force have for many years looked at our contribution to national effectiveness in purely military terms. It is our mission to provide air power when and where required to support national policy. W However, to hold this important viewpoint in isolation from another equally iniportant contribution is to be shortsighted. Today we are in an era of massive social change, particularly changes in the attitudes of the nation toward priorities for national defense versus the need to AIR FORCE TRAIN1NG AND OUR ECONOMY 27

fvote resources to solve internai problems. It nation’s good, then it is our responsibility to av well be a svmptom of a more dangerous insure that, within the constraints of opera- adercurrent of opinion that the military serv- tional military exigencies, those airmen are es are somehow siphoning off the money prepared to earn a living— and a good living. hich should be going into the Solutions of While we may properly argue today that jmestic problems. In other words, the mili- the Department of Defense performs a socio- j-\ Services are portrayed as users o f our so- logical role, that has not always been the etv’s manpower and wealth rather than case.4 The skills required of a military man rwiders of a productive Service to the na- were, for many years, only marginally related bn. Military manpower is decreasing, and to civilian labor requirements. Prior to World inds for defense in the national budget are War I the armed forces were considered as an úng reduced. The number of persons serving institution apart from the civilian flow of life. the Air Force dropped from 856,000 in There was little manpower movement be- une 1964 to 791,000 in June 1970 and tween the military and civilian sectors. Mili- ipped to 757,000 in Julv 1971.1 tary training focused on combat skills for The funding plans for the armed forces which few civilian counterparts existed. íovv a similar trend. The administration’s re- When our first major world war necessi- uest for funds for the military in fy 1972— tated the induction of many civilians into the 78.7 billion— represented only 32.1 percent military, it became quickly apparent that ' the total federal budget, the lowest percent- some consideration of skills and aptitudes was je since 1950.2 More than $20 billion of necessary in the military classification process. ás is programmed for military pav, and an The range of these military occupations was iditional $3.7 billion is being requested to limited and provided little assistance to the rovide pay increases and other changes in postwar adjustment problems of veterans seek- ipport of the all-volunteer force. Conse- ing civilian employment. This divergence in aently, procurement of new hardware and occupational structures wras due in large meas- laintenance of existing vveapon svstems are ure to the lack of technological growth in the rrious management problems. military compared to that in civilian organiza- The fact is generally overlooked that the tions. The automobile and truck carne into rmed Services play an important sociological the forces, and a few' airplanes were reluc- )le in the sphere of education and training. tantly accepted. But the embryonic military vhile we train airmen to perform the tasks specialists of the early 1920s had difficulty in ecessary to operate a modern Air Force, we achieving maturity. A bclief in the perma- re at the same time teaching skills that make nence of future world peace permeated the na- íese airmen more useful citizens when they tion and so reduced the size of the armed rturn to the civilian world. This year more forces that technological and educational tan 160,000 airmen and officers will leave growth was largely stymied. le Air Force. Many of them will return to World War II taught the nation how to :hool, although not so many as we sometimes convert civilian skills to military occupations ke to think. A study conducted in 1967 during a crisis. The military recognized that towed that only 15 percent of the airmen previous education and experience were re- deased from the service went to school.3 The lated to the capability of the armed forces to st entered the job market. These airmen mobilize rapidly. And manpower planners ^ho leave the Air Force will have to compete quickly became aware of the reliance that 3r jobs in today’s highly competitive job mar- both the military and civilian sectors would et. If we are to contribute optimally to the have to place on highly trained personnel. 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Since World War II, developments in nu- to the scope of this training. The Air Forc clear capabilities, advancements in electronics, recruits new personnel at a rate of aboi and other technological changes have created 100,000 a year. If our force is to remain cor demands by the armed forces for greater tech- stant, that means we release roughly 100,00 nical skills. These military requirements mir- a year. O f the basic trainees who enter the Ai rored a civilian society which already was mo- Force, about 80 percent go to one of our tecfc bilizing its energy and expertise to increase the nical schools for job training. The remaininl output of better trained and educated man- 15 percent go to duty bases where they receiv power. And the emphasis on education in the training while on the job. In all, the Ai civilian society— 60 percent of the 1968 high Force’s primary training organization, Ai school graduating class entered college— has Training Command, conducts some 3751 led to a questioning, articulate, and capable courses in subject areas ranging from electror, military work force. A commonality of need ics and missile propulsion and guidance to inlj was created in both military and civilian or- telligence, photography, and security polia i ganizations for the high talent manpower pool Approximately 10,700 instructors and 400, that education has provided. It is this com- classrooms are used. monality of need that has enhanced the All this training is vital to the proper func armed forces as a national resource. tioning of the U.S. Air Force and is equall While we are managing the military hard- relevant to the social structure of society i ware required to defend our nation, we are those who receive skill training in the Ai concurrently providing vocational and techni- Force put that same training to productive us cal training to young men and women of the in a civilian job. Successful job placement i Air Force. In the early sixties the U.S. De- related to skill training, demand for the skil partment of Labor conducted a survey of capability for cross-training into a comparabl adult formal training. Training in the armed civilian skill, and willingness of the ex-servicc forces was shown to be the most important man to locate in an area where his skill can b labor source for three occupations— airplane utilized. It is an established fact that the Ai mechanics, bakers, and dental technicians— Force is providing vocational and technic£ and an important secondary source for eleven training on a scale and at a skill levei neceí others.5 The age distribution of the sample sary to equip men to find jobs in the civilia suggested that the military training of the world. This vocational and technical trainina World War II and the Korean War time pe- with its associated pay and personal benefifc riods was being measured. Another studv dis- is unmatched. And we would anticipate tha' closed that 30 percent of a small group of within certain limits, there will be a continu ex-Air Force electronics technicians were em- ing demand for those skills. ployed in comparable civilian electronics Despite the recent downtrend in the ecor occupations.6 Analysis of the Dictionary of omv and the present high unemploymer Occupational Titles ( dot) indicates that more rates, the Department of Labor is predictin than 90 percent of the Air Force career spe- that the number of jobs in the economy wi cialties have equivalent or comparable civilian continue to increase, reaching more than 10 skills. The Air Force rate, incidentally, com- million by 1980.7 The service-producing ir pares favorably with the 11 to 14 percent av- dustries over the next 10 years are expected t erage of non-DOT specialties found to exist grow rapidly and to employ 59.5 million b throughout the military establishment. 1980, an increase of 35 percent above th By comparing these figures with the total 1968 levei. The goods-producing industrif output of the Air Force, we can get an idea as will also increase in the years ahead, althoug

30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW at a slower rate than the Service industries. vidual. By contrast, technical skill traininj Employment in goods-producing industries is and experience in the military appear to b expected to increase to about 30 million in readily transferred to civilian jobs. 1980, 10 percent above the 1968 levei. Other Another obvious benefit the Air Force af occupational workers are in such areas as the fords lies in the accreditation of its courses professional and technical fields, management, Many of the courses oflered by the militar clerical, sales, and others. Requirements for meet the requirement for accreditation o workers in these areas will be increasing as service experience by the American Cound well— in some specialties at rates up to 50 on Education. Many airmen who leave th percent. While job growth is significant, an- service and go back to school find that thei other key indicator of job outlook is the need training can be used for college credit, thu for replacements. More jobs will be created in shortening the time until they leave schoc the years ahead through normal attrition, and become a part of the national labor force such as retirements, than from employment Another example of this is the medicai schoc growth. at Shcppard af b, Texas, whose new physi Thus the future looks bright for the military cian s assistant training program is recognizeí man with a civilian-applicable skill who sepa- by the American Medicai Association ant rates in the years ahead, provided hc is willing Midwestern University. The graduates can b to settle in a geographic area where his talents licensed in several States, where they will mak can be utilized. But the question still has not a real contribution to the national need fo been answered: Does a man use his military medicai Services. skills after separating from the Service? A survev of 858 former Air Force members was conducted bv an af it student in an effort to answer this question.8 In his analysis, he ^4ore than 90 percent of th divided the respondents into two groups by hundreds of skills in which the Air Forc military skill: those in technical areas and trains thousands of men yearly have direc those with “ military Services” skills. The sec- counterparts in the civilian community, an ond group consistcd primarily of individuais most of these men will return to the civilia trained in skills that were usually found only economy and enter the labor market. Thos in the military, such as individuais trained to who return to school may find they have th fill out specialized forms. These former Air bonus of accreditation for the training the Force members generallv characterized their have received in the Air Force. military experience as contributing positively Thus the Air Force, through its traininj tow^ard their civilian employment experiences. can be considered one of the nation's grea About 80 percent of the officers surveyed re- resources, and we must continue to foster thi ported that their military experiences had resource in several ways. First, as long as re helped them. And almost 70 percent of the tention is a problem, we must demonstrat enlisted men with technical skills said that our training role during recruitment. Since ! their military experience aided them. Almost large number of men who enter the Air Forc half of the enlisted men who worked in the do so to learn a skill. we must make absolutel military Services skill areas reported that their certain that the quality of our training is ex training helped them in their civilian employ- ceptional. This is particularly important as w ment. It seemed that active Service in purely face the confiict of paying tax dollars for up military occupational specialties without tech- employment compensation on one hand whil nical training was of less benefit to the indi- on the other hand job and vocational trainin}

AIR FORCE TRAINING AND OUR ECONOMY 33

opportunities are available in the military Finally, we must keep in mind that we are Services. training today for the labor force of the fu- Second, we must utilize those skills our per- ture. When a man enters the Air Force today, sonnel had prior to military Service. When a the chances are good that whenever he leaves man possesses a skill before he enters the Serv- the Air Force he will enter the civil job mar- ice, chances are he will use that skill when he ket. We must make certain that the skill he leaves, despite whatever job he may have held learns in the Air Force is not out of date when in the Air Force. An officer will probably re- he leaves. Thus the Air Force has a responsi- turn to the field he studied in college. Unless bility to utilize only the most modern of tech- the Air Force utilizes preservice abilities and niques in its training as well as its day-to-day skills, it is not making the best possible use of operation. the nation’s human resources. The Air Force not only provides for the Third, the Air Force must continue to pro- physical security of the nation; through its vide an opportunity for achievement, responsi- training programs it contributes a great deal bility, and personal success to those who need more. W e feel that Air Force education and it and have the ambition to avail themselves training are among the most powerful incen- of the opportunities provided by military Serv- tives we can offer to young people who will ice. Both technical training and military train- consider Air Force Service. It is through these ing lend themselves to this purpose, for both training and education programs that we instill a high degree of personal and team dis- demonstrate to the public our concern for So- cipline. A technician must be precise and lutions to sociological problems while provid- must follow technical data, while his military ing adequate air power for national defense. training teaches him respect for authority and adherence to procedures. Hq Air Training Command

Notes

1. Armed Forces Journal, 15 February 1971, p. 25. 4. lbid., p. 48. 2. lbid., p. 24. 5. lbid., p. 11. 3. Robert Brookt Richardson, "An Examination of the Trans- 6. lbid., p. 12. ferability of Certain Military Skills and Experience to Civilian 7. U.S. Department of Labor, Burcau of Labor Statistics, Employ. Occupations," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell Unversity, September 1967, ment Outlook, Bulletin 1650-117. p. 145. 8. Richardson, op. cit. SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOL, JUNIOR OFFICERS, AND YOU

C olonel Arthur R. M oore, Jr . f HAT is the matter with today’s jun- many of the same mistakes that 50,000 other ior officers? Why do thev keep push- sos students made before them, but they are ing against the System? Why is there also doing some of the same things correctly. Wa “ generation gap” in the U.S. Air ThisForce? is not to say that our curriculum and What are we teaching these kids? These are methodology have been standing still. The re- questions all commanders are asking or being quirements of the Air Force have changed in asked today. the last two decades, and the school has Squadron Officer School ( s o s ) is in a changed to meet those new requirements. unique position to seek answers to these ques- During this calendar year, for example, our tions. Why? Because junior officers are our management curriculum has been completely business, our only business. W e educate, eval- revised to insure that our graduates are pre- uate, and attempt to challenge about 2400 pared to use today’s techniques on today’s officers each year— officers vvhom you send to problems. We give our students a chance to us, and who return to you 14 weeks later. As study and work with such management tech- supervisors, you and I both feel a need and a niques as svstems analysis, probabilities and responsibility to understand these officers. statistics, and network analysis. We teach the Therefore, in these few pages, I intend to ad- Air Force concept of managing men, money, dress some of these more provocative ques- and materiel, and we challenge the students to tions in hopes of making the Air Force a bet- demonstrate their understanding by partici- ter place for you and for the junior officers of pating in case studies of Air Force problems. your command. The management-techniques case study in T o begin, what is the matter with junior particular gives the students a chance to inte- officers todav? After observing several thou- grate the techniques they have studied so as to sand students at sos, I must say simply— noth- “ game” a weapon system decision. The stu- ing. Nothing is the matter with today’s new dents can compare their results with the ac- breed. They are the best educated, most eager tual Air Force decision, since the case study is and dynamic group of men any air force has based on an existing weapon system. had anytime, anywhere. sos classes nave in- Some things have remained the same over cluded pilots who have earned the Medal of the years. We still attempt to make every Honor, blue suit scientlsts who have probed graduate a more effective communicator by the edges of the unknown, missilemen who requiring him to write and speak in “ real operate svstems you and I thought only Buck world” Service situations. Every student must Rogers could operate not too many years ago, complete nine writing assignments directly re- women of the Air Force eager to secure a lated to the needs of the Air Force— letters, place in todav’s and tomorrow's Air Force sec- oer’s , message rewrites, etc. We teach a stand- ond to none, and officers from everv career ardized approach to the art of writing which field and every major command in the Air stresses clarity, conciseness, and directness. Force. Some students improve greatly, some improve These officers are being taught some of the only slightly, and some need to improve very same problem-solving techniques that were little; but they are all more effective writers taught at the Squadron Officer Course (s o c ) when they leave. So too are the students more < predecessor to so s) 18 years ago. They are effective speakers when they leave. The speech being challenged mentally and physically by a program, which emphasizes formal and infor- number of the field leadership exercises that mal briefings, prepares the sos student to op- you mav remember if you attended the soc of eratc effectively in the day-to-day working en- the early fifties. Today’s students are making vironment of the briefing scene. Group discus- 35 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW sions and logical-thinking exercises are still cast a spotlight on the military. Fully 10 per- other means of improving communicative cent of our curriculum is devoted to examin- skills, and these are heavily emphasized at sos. ing the world, the nation, and the military Through the annual surveys, commanders of system. sos is the only opportunity 75 percent our alumni have reported that sos graduates of our students will have to learn the why, write better, speak better, and are more effec- what, and how of national power, interna- tive communicators than junior officers who tional relations, and ideological conflict. Our have not taken the sos course. Improved graduates have a better understanding of the effectiveness in communication seems to be world and their role in it. Our curriculum the most readily discernible characteristic of does not certify the sos graduate as an expert the sos graduate. in international relations, but he is able to It was once believed that leadership traits explain to others, and to himself, why the Air are inborn, but now we know that leadership Force and the nation are involved in the can be taught and learned. We use small arena of international politics. groups of 12 to 14 men in seminar workshops In summary, the graduate of sos is a more so that each man can see, feel, and try the effective communicator, a somewhat im- principies, attributes, and techniques of lead- proved leader, a trained manager, and a more ership which we teach. Each student’s leader- knowledgeable military officer. You have sent ship ability is described to him by both his us a fine young officer, and we have returned peers and the faculty so that he can better to you a better-informed, more capable man. understand his potential and his limitations. Perhaps that statement suggests my answer to We encourage the students to try new leader- two of my original questions: “ What is the ship techniques. Some succeed, some fail, but matter with today’s junior officers?'’ and all learn from their efforts. Human relations, “ What are we teaching these kids?’- We at the foundation of leadership, is taught from Squadron Officer School are convinced that the lecture platform, in the seminar rooms, there is nothing the matter with today’s and on the athletic field. Some of our students officers or with what we are teaching them. are effective leaders when they arrive at sos; Having told you what we do to make him most are more effective leaders when they more effective, I would like to consider what leave. A small percentage of our students find sênior officers generally can do to make our that other people are just not responsive to junior officers more effective. their style of leadership. These students are also given descriptive feedback about their leadership efforts, which gives them a better idea of their abilities and shortcomings. Diffi- I t has been popular during re- culties which he encounters at sos, early in his cent years to characterize the differences be- career, can motivate the officer either to mas- tween generations as a gap. The very word ter the techniques of leadership or, in some “ gap’’ makes one envision a clear break, a exceptional cases, to look for another career. bottomless chasm across which we must build In either case the Air Force, the country, and bridges to communicate. the individual will benefit by the experience. I believe that there is no such thing as a It is a much-needed benefit. “ generation gap.’’ Yet, I also believe that I The world has changed rapidly and signifi- am different from the junior officers I encoun- cantly during the last twenty years. A verita- ter. They do push against the system, they ble explosion of information has increased the wear different clothes, they demand a chal- visibility of international affairs, and it has lenging task, and they think more of the fu- SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOL 37 ture than of the past. They are different from Air Force junior officers three times a year, it me now, but they are not so different from seemed logical that sos could provide useful what I vvas when I was their age. I wore information on the career motivation of junior different clothes, I pressed the limits of the officers. In order to tap the talent and experi- system, I demanded a challenging task, and I ence of each class, I asked the school staff to thought more of the future than the past. develop the Career Motivation Program. The Stop and think about yourself when you program, which began in June 1969, contin- were a junior officer. If you’re from my year ues in-being today. group, you participated in a war and were The sos Career Motivation Program con- present at the beginning of our Air Force. We sists of a council of faculty members which had challenging tasks, and we had boring studies each class, using questionnaires and ones. We surely looked and acted different seminar discussions. The results to date have than our seniors. We groused about an army benefitted sos and the Air Force. The data that was rooted in the past and couldn’t see collected here have been provided to the Mili- the future as clearlv as we. Thus it seems that tary Personnel Center and members of the junior offkers are not such strange animais as staff at Headquarters usaf. we previously believed. They are reallv a mir- The survey results indicate that sos students ror that lets us look back into our past, and, are career-oriented and satisfied with their believe me, we are a lens that lets them look jobs; that they like Air Force people and into the future. Though we and they see enjoy the travei opportunities which the Air through the glass but darkly, I hope that by Force provides. The survey results also show telling of some things we have observed at that junior officers are dissatisfied with poor Squadron Officer School, I may help clarify leadership, bureaucratic inflexibility, and as- your image of the junior officer and also his signment uncertainty. The seminar discussions image of you. provided further support of these conclusions General James Ferguson, former Com- and allowed the students to further define mander of the Air Force Systems Command, areas of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. once said, particularly for the benefit of other During the Career Motivation Seminars the general officers and colonels, that students have indicated that their jobs allowed them to be Creative, make decisions, and meet . . . if our junior officers have a problem, challenges. Both they and their wives are then we have a problem. And it may very pleased with Air Force life in general and well be our predominant problem: in a very meaningful sense, these young officers are with Air Force people in particular. Our stu- our responsibility, and we have a strong dents tell us that they desire better leadership, obligation to the Air Force for their training a better rating system, and more career pro- and development. Because, sooner than we gression visibilitv. These results support to like to think, they are going to be the Air some degree the contention of Dr. David Force. . . . To develop this new Air Force Whitsett, management consultant and provoc- generation, then, requires that we communi- ative lecturer in the management area, who cate very seriously with those who are junior contends that the Air Force must provide in- to us. We’ve got to find out what they’re teresting, challenging, and satisfying jobs if it thinking and feeling— and why. desires to retain and motivate its junior At sos, we have tried to find out what officers. The students consider the quality of they re thinking, and we have asked them their jobs— not security, pay, or fringe benefits “Why?” — to be of prime importance. They are quick Since we get an excellent cross section of to point out, however, that the latter items

40 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

what eíTective writing and speaking should be, nates I’m trying to help them?” We havç and then we let them applv what we have found some techniques very effective. I hope taught them. We compare their performance they can work for you. against an unwavering standard of excellence. Here at sos we work hard at learning every- We know some students have more ability thing we can about our students. They turn than others, and we know some may never in an autobiography the first day they arrive reach the highest levei of communicative abil- here at the school. We read these autobiogra- ity. We have found that by demanding excel- phies to evaluate each student’s writing abil- lence from all our students, everv student im- ity, and, more important, to learn as much as proves— the best improve a little, the average we can about his background. We memorize improve much more, and the weak improve all the students’ names so that when we first the most. meet we can address them by name. The Our students— your junior officers— don’t work involved is worth it when on the first rebel against the criticism we give their ef- day of class a student freezes in the hall as a forts; they welcome it. Students have com- faculty member passes him and says, “ Good plained that they have not been critiqued morning, Dave.” It is only a small gesture, enough, rather than too much. We have but it helps us let the students know that we found that students oftentimes grade their respect them as individuais. writing and speaking assignments lower than Learning the names of hundreds of students the instructor would have. How do we man- is only half the problem; we also try to make age to convince the student to seek out criti- their wives feel welcome, too. We insist that cism and develop the ability to criticize him- our section commanders be married because self? It’s relatively simple. We let him know their wives play an important role in bringing we are trying to help him be a more effective the wives of students into the school activities. officer. We don't criticize only what the stu- Every section, wing, and division at sos makes dent did wrong; we tell him what he did sure that the student wives are welcomed, right, and how hc can correct his mistakes. considered, and challenged during their brief We have found over the years that our stu- stay at sos. During the first weeks of school dents are constantlv searching for an honest, the wives attend formal and informal recep- constructive evaluation of their ability. Often tions and coffees. Members of the faculty pre- they tell us that this is the first time during pare a two-hour presentation on sos activities their career that someone tried to help them so that the wives can better understand what improve. their husbands are going to be doing during I personally feel that many of you have the next 14 weeks. Throughout the course, tried to help junior officers improve, but per- evenings are set aside to brief the wives on the haps because of the manner in which advice Air Force medicai, personnel, and promotion or criticism was offered, it was not recognized Systems. Most of the wives report that this is or accepted. xAsk yourself, “ Have I made cer- the first time thev have received this kind of tain my subordinates understood that I was briefing. The wives also plan and conduct trying to make them a better officer, pilot, luncheons, with the assistance of wives of the missileman, etc.?” You can't assume that your faculty. The wives in every section make col- subordinates know this, but you can assume orful outfits to wear to sports functions, where that, if they know you care about them as they join in the evaluation process by “critiqu- individuais, they will outperform any stan- ing” their husbands, the other team, and the dards you have set. You are probably asking referees. yourself, “ How can I convince my subordi- We believe that an officers wife can be the Seminars giie students an opportunity for discussion of practical approaches to problem situations. . . . They learn a systematic approach to problem solving. . . . Polifka Auditorium, scene of lectures by as- signed faculty and renowned guests, takes on an air of relaxed informality during a break. 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Students discuss various Solutions to a prob- lem that arises in task George’s Gorge of Project X. . . . How to cross the missing span with limited equipment and time calls for ingenuity during task Space Bridge. . . . The execution of one solution to task River Cry reveals its degree of practicality. SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOL 43

Mastery of effective techniques for unarmed combat is one of SOS graduates’ accomplishments.

deciding factor in hls decision to make the Air One other thing we have found is that Force a career. We try to let the girls know young oíTicers respect the U.S. Air Force and we care, and I believe they do care when on desire to learn more about its history. We graduation dav they leave with a smile on have a program to tell them some of the their faces and tears in their eyes. If we can things their chosen Service has done. One of establish close bonds in 14 weeks, I am sure the most popular voluntary programs in our that you and your wives can do much more curriculum is the lunch-hour film series, dur- during the years an officer is under your com- ing which we show the students what hap- mand. With all the emphasis on an all-volun- pened at Ploesti, Korea, and Vietnam. We teer force, we sometimes forget that perhaps show films about great military leaders, hop- the most important thing we can do to keep ing that our students can learn from their our people costs us nothing except time. successes and failures. We are proud of our Air 44 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

Force, and we let it show. We are also proud lem. The latter course sometimes takes longer of our heritage, and we let that show too. The and does not solve the problem as efficiently fact that young officers are interested in our as the former, but it helps the man become heritage can be best understood when you see more effective, and in today’s Air Force any a student gazing at a “ wall of heroes!' that has other course is second-best. on it the picture and story of every usaf It is not easy to turn away from a situation Medal of Honor winner. These officers admire where you know exactly what should be done. you for what you have done. There is no It is not easy here at sos in the seminar room “ generation gap” when a 25-year-old student or on the athletic field; and I know from watches a 25-year-old film showing a 25- personal experience that it is more difficult in year-old pilot strapping on a “ jug” (P -47). an operational situation where you are respon- These men are standing now where you stood sible for accomplishing the mission. Remem- then, and they want and need your help to ber, your job is similar to that of an instructor stand some dav where you stand now. pilot who must constantly expose himself to a Give your people help by teaching them to student pilot’s mistakes if that student is ever help themselves. Don’t tell them exactly how going to learn to fly. everything is to be done. Let them try to solve The most effective leaders in the history of their own problems. When you give a man a the Air Force have made their subordinates task, don't answer his questions on how to do lead. You and I are where we are today be- it. Instead, ask him questions that will enable cause our seniors gave us opportunities to suc- him to find the right answer. We have found ceed or to fail. Give your young officers these that if we tell a man what to do, he learns same opportunities. You won’t be disap- how well we understand the problem. On the pointed and they will welcome the challenge. other hand, if we ask probing questions, the man learns how well he understands the prob- Squadron Officer School THE PRESIDENTIAL \ DECISION ON THE y, CAMBODIAN 4 ' OPERATION h B J / L /A Case Study in Crisis Management

COLONEL RUSSELL H . S m ITH N THE N IG H T of 30 April 1970, What lay behind these charges? Had the President Nixon announced over na- President in fact broken faith with the nation tionwide television hls decision to in some fantastic efifort to achieve a military commit American forces to ground combat in victory, whatever the cost? What events led to neutral Cambodia. Corning as a complete the crisis situation which faced the President surprise to most Americans, including such as he wrestled with his diíTicult decision? And seasoned and knowledgeable observers of the what motivation could cause a skilled politi- Washington scene as Stevvart Alsop,1 this de- cian to risk doing irreparable damage to him- cision appeared to many to be a breach of self and to his political party during an elec- faith bv a President who only ten days earlier tion year? Attempts to answer these and simi- had announced plans to withdraw 150,000 lar questions form the basis of this article on men from the unpopular Vietnam war. Edi- political-militarv crisis management. torial comment vvas prompt and generally bit- On 18 March 1970 one of the longest tight- ter. The New York Times accused the Presi- rope acts of history ended when Prince Noro- dent of . . escalating a war from which he dom Sihanouk was ousted as Chief of State of had promised to disengage.” 2 And the Wash- the ostensibly neutral nation of Cambodia. Si- ington Post leveled at the Chief Executive hanouk's ouster carne as he was leaving Mos- charges of . . artful dissembling . . . suspect cow for Peking to continue his appeals for evidence, specious argument and excessive help in persuading North Vietnamese and rhetoric.” 3 Viet Cong troops to withdraw from Cam- Nor was opposition to the President’s move bodia. The coup, as a result of which the confined to editorial comment. College cam- Premier, General Lon Nol, became the de puses throughout the nation erupted in violent facto head of the Cambodian government, cli- protest, culminating in the tragic slaying of maxed two weeks of demonstrations against four students at Kent State College in Ohio the presence of an estimated 35,000 to 60,000 bv National Guardsmen called out to preserve Communist troops, located principally in order. Congressional reaction was bitter and areas of eastern Cambodia adjacent to South unrestrained, the chief complaint being that Vietnam. Congress had not been consulted before the On 23 March Prince Sihanouk announced President initiated the Cambodian operation. over Peking radio his intention to form a na- Writing in the June issue of Fortune maga- tional liberation army to “ freev Cambodia. zine, editor Max Ways expressed the deeply Tw o days later, pledging support to Sihanouk, felt misgivings of many Nixon supporters over the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong broke the apparent rent in the fabric of American diplomatic relations with Phnom Penh. Si- society caused by the President’s action: multaneouslv, the Russians warned that any Cambodia pullecl the plug. It may ulti- change in C-ambodia‘s neutralist policy would mately be shown that Nixon had excellent have very grave consequences and accused the military reasons for sending U.S. units into United States of seeking to extend the South- Cambodia. But Cambodia was not his main east Asian war to Cambodia. problem. The condition of the U.S. was During the following weeks sporadic fight- his main problem. When he encased his ing occurred throughout most of Cambodia announcement on Cambodia in the kind of o o between Communist forces and the poorly simplistic and emotional language most likely trained and inadequately equipped Cambo- to inflame antiwar dissidents. including the moderates, he invited a greater cost in Ameri- dian army of some 35,000 men. On 14 April, can unity than could possibly be balanced with the situation steadily dcteriorating, Lon by any success in Indochina.4 Nol asked that friendly governments supply PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ON CAMBODIA 47

ms to Cambodia. Despite captured arms within South Vietnam. But as the strength of pplied from South Vietnam, during the the South Vietnamese Army grew with U.S. next two weeks Communist pressure contin- military and logistic aid, the Communists tued throughout the embattled nation. On 29 found it necessary to move their supply points April, with U.S. air and logistic support, and assembly areas across the border to the iSouth Vietnamese forces attacked Communist sanctuary of adjacent Cambodian territory. forces just across the border in the “ parrot’s The bulk of the Communist installations were ibeak” area of Cambodia. located in the “ fishhook” and “ parrot’s beak” salients. The latter area is only some 35 miles from Saigon. From the relative security of Elements of these sanctuaries, the North Vietnamese and the Crisis Viet Cong forces were able to mount periodic forays across the border into the III Corps The situation which faced the President area of South Vietnam. and his advisers during the final days of April Following Sihanouk’s ouster, the Cambo- was thus one of mounting crisis. Sihanouk’s dian government denied use of the port of ouster had come as a complete surprise to the Sihanoukville to the Communist forces.8 Thus President.5 His efforts to disengage American forced to depend exclusively for replacement forces through the process of “ Vietnamizing” and resupply on the long overland route from the war were proceeding on schedule. Al- North Vietnam down through Laos to their though Communist use of Cambodian sanctu- sanctuaries, the Communists immediately aries had been a persistent militarv problem, began moving to ensure the safety of this Sihanouk, prodded by increasing pressure supply route by effectively consolidating and from his people, had seemed, prior to his expanding their separate pockets of strength ouster, determined to force a reduction of the throughout eastern Cambodia. As the Presi- Communist presence in his country.6 The dent pointed out in his report on 30 June, strife and turmoil that followed the March “The prospect suddenlv loomed of Cambo- coup in Cambodia thus created an entirely dia\s becoming virtually one large base area for new situation and threatened the precarious attack anywhere into South Vietnam along stability of all of Indochina. In addition to the 600 miles of the Cambodian frontier.” 9 militarv considerations, the resulting crisis In addition to posing an increased threat to contained elements of domestic and interna- Vietnamization efforts in South Vietnam, the tional political importance. Communist expansion in eastern Cambodia threatened the very existence of the Lon Nol military factors regime in Cambodia. If the Lon Nol govern- ment fell to Communist pressure, according to Communist use of sanctuaries in support of military experts in Saigon, the immediate out- “wars of national liberation” has become a come would be the reopening of Cambodian familiar tactic in the years since World W ar II. In fact, as one military' analyst notes, “ Al- supply routes, including the port of Sihanouk- most all the successful or viciously stubborn ville, to the Communists, as well as unob- insurgencies of this century have depended on structed access to the vastly enlarged border some form of sanctuary strategy.” 7 During the sanctuaries.10 Thus even the restoration of a early phases of the Vietnamese conflict, the government under the deposed Sihanouk \'iet Cong were strong enough to maintain clearly precluded re-establishment of the sta- widespread supply caches and assembly areas tus quo. 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

domestic political factors of surprise resulting from prior consultation. Although purely military considerations A nation engaged in overt hostilities pre- seemed clearly to indicate the advisability of sumably retains a certain degree of freedom in taking some action against the Communist the actions deemed necessary to protect its forces in Cambodia, political considerations forces. Yet any action taken which widens the springing from the troubled domestic scene area of conflict or threatens to cause addi- tional powers to join in combat is certainly a counseled caution. Apparentlv satisfied with matter of international concern. It goes with- the progress of Vietnamization, the President out saying that if the new combatant should on 20 April 1970 had announced plans to be a nuclear power, the concern would mount withdraw 150,000 more American fighting exponentially. men from Vietnam by midsummer of 1971. The nation’s campuses, following sporadic flare-ups during the late winter and early spring, seemed to be returning to a measure of Resolution of the Crisis calm. Throughout the land, many citizens Any effort to reconstruct in detail the viewed with satisfaction the President’s appar- thought processes by which the President and ent success in “ winding down” the war, as the his advisers arrived at their decisions on the weekly casualty figures continued to decline. Cambodian affair is hampered by a lack of The domestic political climate was thus ob- first-person accounts. Most of the principais viouslv not one favorable to any increase in have been naturally reluctant to divulge their American military commitment in Southeast attitudes and advice given to the President. Asia. A stubborn inflation and a worrisome He has revealed some of the options he was unemployment rate, both widely attributed at considering during the last ten days of April, least indirectly to the Vietnamese involve- both in his prepared statements on the deci- ment, were of considerable concern to the ad- sion and in answer to questions at press con- ministration, the Congress, and the public at ferences. But the most extensive descriptions large. The President’s policy advisers were op- of the deliberations have appeared in a very timistic that the natioms economic ills could limited number of accounts compiled after the be cured, but part of the prescription was the fact from discussions with the principais or admonition that the patient remain calm and members of their staffs. Until recently, at unperturbed. A major divisive event was least, the most exhaustive and detailed of clearly not desirable. these appears to be the article prepared by David R. Maxey for the August 11 issue of International political factors Look magazine. The ensuing discussion of the Any nation contemplating the use of military President’s crisis decision is based on informa- force in a crisis situation cannot fail to con- tion gleaned from all the aforementioned sider the international repercussions of its pro- sources. posed action. Adroit handling of the situation In assessing the military considerations, the in the United Nations and other international President naturally leaned heavily on the ad- forums during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 vice of his military advisers, principally the has been generally credited with winning Joint Chiefs of Staff ( j c s ) and the members widespread approval for the U.S. position. of the National Security Council ( nsc). In his Yet the advisability of seeking prior approval televised speech to the nation on 30 April, the for one’s contemplated actions must be care- President stated that his decision had been fully weighed against the loss of the element reached after “ . . . full consultation with the PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ON CAMBODIA 49

National Security Council, Ambassador [to the nsc meeting, the President ordered de- South Vietnam] Bunker, General Abrams tailed planning for a South Vietnamese strike [commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam] and against sanctuaries in the “ parrot’s beak’ area . . . [his] other advisers . . . 11 Accordin g of Cambodia, 35 miles west of Saigon.17 to the President, the existing miütary situation The possibility of using U.S. forces in con- permitted three options: ( 1) to “ do nothing,” junction with the South Vietnamese strike, (2) “ to provide massive military assistance to originally proposed at the 22 April nsc meet- Cambodia,” or (3) “ to go to the heart of the ing, apparently continued to weigh heavily on trouble” by “ cleaning out major North Viet- the Presidentas mind. Besides the Communist namese and Viet Cong occupied sanctuaries forces in the “ parrofs beak” area, another of which serve as bases for attacks on both Cam- their major concentrations was in the “ fish- bodia and -American and South Vietnamese hook” area. Reportedly, it contained vast forces in South Vietnam.” x2 Maxey reports caches of materiel and supplies and was also that the nsc meeting of 22 April convinced headquarters for the entire Communist opera- the President that the expansion of the Cam- tion, the Central Office for South Vietnam bodian sanctuaries “ gave the enemy an in- ( cosvn ) . The military advantages of a success- creased capabilitv of inflicting casualties on ful two-pronged thrust to overrun both areas U.S. troops in South Vietnam at almost any simultaneously were obvious. In addition to levei thev chose” and, further, that the “ poor the expectation of capturing much greater State of training” of the Cambodian army quantities of weapons and supplies and the would preclude the effective use of a “ massive hope of disrupting the enemy command and infusion of U.S. arms aid even if the Adminis- control structure, the “ fishhook” operation tration wanted to send it.” 13 would deny the enemy the capability of With the feasibility of the first two options mounting a flanking attack against the single thus placed in serious doubt, attention was South Vietnamese thrust into the “ parrot’s focused on means of accomplishing the third beak.” But American forces occupied the area option— a military move from South Vietnam adjacent to the “ fishhook.” Considerations of against the sanctuaries. According to Maxey’s timing and tactical warning clearly precluded account, the nsc consensus at the 22 April any major realignment of forces to permit the meeting was in favor of a South Vietnamese South Vietnamese to conduct both operations. operation with U.S. air support.14 Limited It was therefore clear that if a thrust against operations against Cambodian sanctuaries had the “ fishhook” were to be conducted in con- occasionallv been reported over the preceding junction with the “ parrot’s beak” operation, it two years, with at least tacit Cambodian would have to be performed by U.S. ground approvalV And on 29 March a battalion- forces. size strike against the sanctuaries by South Aside from purely military considerations, a Vietnamese rangers, supported by American decision to use U.S. ground forces was under- helicopter gunships, had been reported by the stood by all concerned to pose far graver do- New York Times}'’ Thus there was ample mestic political issues than would a purely Vi- precedent for at least a South Vietnamese in- etnamese operation. Even as military planning cursion against the sanctuaries. It is also prob- commenced for a U.S. operation against the able that a South Vietnamese operation, even “ fishhook,” acting on the President’s orders one with U.S. air and logistic support, would Dr. Henry Kissinger discussed with a “ sênior have proved much more palatable domesti- senator probable Congressional reaction to cally than an operation calling for the em- such a move. In addition, Kissinger is re- ployment of U.S. ground forces. Following ported to have discussed public reaction with 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW certain members of his staff, who generally subsequent statements the President assumed felt that full responsibility for his decision and all its . . . incursions, particularly if they involved consequences. American troops, would be a serious escala- tion of the war, that the domestic response would be explosive, and that the expected Analysis of the Decision results, in terms of enemy supplies captured, would not be worth the risk.18 Objections to the President’s decision gen- erally fali into the same categories of analysis Extended discussion of the proposed “ fish- as did the considerations which led to the de- hook” operation, centering on the domestic cision: military objections, domestic political uproar that it was expected to evoke, took objections, and international political objec- place at another nsc meeting on 26 April. At tions. the conclusion of this meeting the President had apparently still not reached a decision.19 military objections On the following day the President had Dr. Kissinger check with another senator to assess Criticism of the President’s move based on Congressional reaction. One adviser is re- purely military considerations quicklv ap- ported to have warned the President that an peared from a number of sources. Most of the American incursion into Cambodia would critics flatly rejected the President’s contention cause the campuses to “ go up in flames.” T o that the move had been necessitated by the this the President reportedly replied, “ If I de- Communists’ expansion of their sanctuary cide to do it, it will be because I have decided areas. A Newsweek writer considered the dan- to pay the price.” 20 ger “ at most, remote.” 23 A number of com- Although international political considera- mentators pounced on the apparent disparity tions in this instance appear to have been less between the President's statement on 20 April criticai than in most crises, the probable reac- that things were going so well that he could tions of the Soviet Union, Communist China, withdraw 150,000 troops and the requirement and our own allies were discussed by the Pres- ten davs later to expand the American effort. ident and Dr. Kissinger. Additionally, the pos- Writing in the New Republic, Hans Morgen- sibility of U.S. action in Cambodia was the thau opined that the requirement to use U.S. subject of discussion by Japanese and U.S. forces proved that Vietnamization was a academicians at a meeting attended by Dr. failure.21 Almost to a man, the critics averred Kissinger on the evening of 27 April.21 that far from being a response to Communist The weight assigned the facts and opinions activities, the move was merely the result of gathered from this wide spectrum of sources the President’s acceding to demands long ex- remains locked in the heart and mind of pressed by the military that they be allowed to Richard M. Nixon. By the morning of 28 April “ clean out*’ the sanctuaries. Sihanouk‘s ouster he had reached his fateful decision, which was and the subsequent turmoil merely served as duly conveved to his closest advisers.22 Plan- the pretext for the long-sought “ military ning for the execution of the operation, for victory.” 25 the method of its announcement, and for From the administration’s point of view, measures to increase public acceptance occu- subsequent events proved most of the criticism pied the President and his advisers up to the to be completely invalid. The operation was moment he appeared before the nation's tele- seen as an almost unparalleled military suc- vision viewers on 30 April. True to the pledge cess. In particular, the performance of the made to a dissenting aide, in his speech and South Vietnamese in most instances exceeded PRESJDENTIAL DECISION ON CAMB0D1A 51

;the most optimistic expectations of their dent had formally announced the existence of [American advisers. At the conclusion of the this body, created for the express purpose of joperation on 30 June, President Nixon was crlsis management, in his Report to the Con- iable to report to the nation that complete suc- gress of 18 February 1970. He outlined the cess had been achieved in securing the aims of function of the group as follows: saving allied lives, assuring the withdrawal of . . . This group drafts contingency plans for American forces on schedule, enabling Viet- possible crises, integrating the political and namization to continue as planned, and en- military requirements of crisis action. . . . hancing the prospects of peace.26 While no one can anticipate exactly the tim- ing and course of a possible crisis, the wsag’s planning helps insure that we have asked the domestic political objections right questions in advance, and thought If most of the military objections seemed laid through the implications of various responses.30 to rest by the claimed success of the operation, From all accounts, in the Cambodian crisis several of the domestic political objections wsag functioned precisely in this manner proved more deep-seated and enduring. One undcr the direction of Dr. Kissinger, drawing of the immediate effects of the President’s de- up contingency plans at the President’s direc- cision was to focus renewed attention on the tion. Their function w'as limited exclusively to Constitutional question of the extent of the planning. When questioned at a news confer- Presidentas authority in committing American ence on 8 May about the influence of others forces to combat without Consulting Congress. upon his decision, the President made his posi- The New Yorker editorialized that “ the war tion quite clear: lin Cambodia was not an emergency. There . . . after hearing all of their advice, I made wras time enough to present the matter to the decision. Decisions, of course, are not Congress for a swift decision.” 27 When subse- made by vote in the National Security Council quently questioned on his reasons for failing to or in the Cabinet. They are made by the consult Congress prior to his decision, the President with the advice of those. and I made President justified his action on the require- this decision. I take the responsibility for it. ment to protect American fighting men's lives. I believe it was the right decision. I believe He then observed that the Senate had spent it will work out. If it doesmt, then I am to seven weeks debating the Cooper-Church blame. They are not.31 amendment before final action; the need for Notwithstanding the President’s avowal quick action and strategic surprise, in his that he had fullv appreciated the extent and view, precluded prior official notification of the degree of public reaction to his decision, Congress.28 many critics of the decision doubted that this A second broad area of criticism of the was the case. Newsweek commented that President centered on the use (or misuse) he “ . . . the President had gambled his own for- made of his advisers in arriving at his deci- tunes— and those of his party and his nation sion. Writing in the New York Times, Robert — on tactics that were perilously unsure of Semple charged: “ The careful decision-mak- success." i2 Republican leadcrs were gloomily ing process of the N. S. C. on which the Presi- predicting the destruction of their party, while dent has normally relied was largely bypassed, Democrats fumed and vowed vengeance. as were lower-echelon experts in the Cabinet Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson departments. ’ Several critics commented confessed that the degree of reaction had been on the prominent role played by the Washing- more intense than he pcrsonally had ton Special Actions Group (wsag). The Presi- expected.33 But Secretary of State William 52 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

Rogers reported that a White House poli tensive outside support, a determined Com- showed that the American public supported munist effort to capture virtually all of Cam- the President’s action three to one.34 It is bodia. perhaps significant that in the 3 November Any answer to charges of indifference to elections the Republican Party seemed to suf- the fate of Cambodia must be sought within fer none of the drastic reversals forecast by the framework of the Nixon Doctrine. For it some political analysts six months earlier. is within the context of that doctrine that the entire American policy in Southeast Asia is international political objections being pursued. As Vietnamization steadily progresses, the U.S. presence in Southeast If certain domestic political objections to the Asia will steadily decline. At his news confer- President’s decision remain unresolved, much ence of 13 May, Secretary of State Rogers more so is it the case with international politi- expressed the U.S. position very clearly when cal objections. One common objection was he said, . . the United States has no inten- that the Cambodian adventure would surely tion of getting involved in Cambodia with wreck any chance for a negotiated peace. American troops in support of the present Against this objection, Under Secretarv government of Cambodia or any other gov- Richardson proposed the contrary view that ernment of Cambodia.” 37 weakening the Communists’ logistic base In his report to the nation on the Cambo- would provide them with an inducement to dian operation, President Nixon discussed at negotiate that was previously lacking.35 some length the future of Cambodia. He One of the most recurrent objections was noted, first, that in accordance with his for- the charge that the President’s action failed to eign policy guidelines laid down on Guam, consider the fate of the Cambodians. Several the Cambodians would be expected to exert critics noted the long-standing enmity between maximum efforts in their own self-defense. the Cambodians and their Thai and Vietnam- Second, he pointed out that we encourage re- ese neighbors. An editorial in the New Repub- gional associations for mutual defense. And lic somberly observed that “ the prospects for finallv, he specified that we will assist nations Cambodia seem to be either perpetuai inter- and regional organizations only when our par- nai strife . . . or Cambodia being partitioned ticipation can make a difference.33 Time between Thailand and Vietnam, the fate the magazine summarized the situation succinctly Cambodians have always dreaded.” 36 That in noting that Cambodia was . . destined traditional Cambodian-Vietnamese enmitv / to become the first test for the Nixon Doc- did result in excesses on both sides both before trine, which encourages Asians to solve Asia’s and during the operation cannot be denied. problems.” 39 Nor is it at all certain that the Lon Nol gov- ernment could successfully resist, without ex- Air War College

Notes

1. Stewart Alsop. “ The Timing of the Cambie,” Newsweek, Vol. 5. "President Nixon'» White Paper on Cambodia,” U.S. News & 75, May 11. 1970, p. 112. World Report, Vol. 69. July 13, 1970, p. 83. 2. "Military Hallucination—Again," editorial. New York Times, 6. Stanley Karnow, “ Cambodia May Pose Dilemma for Nixon s May 1. 1970, p. 34. Asian Policy," Washington Post, March 13, 1970. p. A19. 3. “Vietnam: Mr. Nixon's Quick Fix . . .“ editorial, Washington 7. Colonel R. D. Hcinl, Jr., “ The Problem of Guerrilla Sane Pose, May 2, 1970, p. A12. tuaries," Armed Forces Journal. Vol. 107, April 18, 1970, p. 12. 4. Max Ways, “ The Preaident Nceds Our Help Because We 8. Colonel R. D. Hcinl, Jr., "W hy Cambodia Action Is Vital," Need H is." Fortune, Vol. 81, Junc 1970, p. 58. Armed Forces Journal, Vol. 107, May 16. 1970, p. 18. PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ON CAMBODIA 53

9. “ Presidem Nixon'» White Paper on Cambodia." p. 83. 27. “ Note» and Commctil»,” New Yorker, Vol. 46. May 16. 1970, 10. “ If Cambodia Falis to Reds—Why Nixon Acted,“ U.S. News S: p. 32. World Report. Vol. 68. May 11, 1970, p. 16. 28. “ Congrcss, Vietnam, Mideast—The President’» Appraisal," 11. “ The President'» Speech," Armed Forces Journal. Special U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 69, July 13, 1970, pp. 20, 21. ssue, Vol. 107. May 1, 1970. p. S. 29. Robcrt B. Semple. Jr.. “ How Nixon Made tlic Fatciul 12. Ibid., p. 6. Cambodia Decisiun," New York Times, May 10, 1970, p. E2. 13. David R. Maxey, “ How Nixon Decided to Invade Cambodia," 30. President Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: P>ok. Vol. 34, August 11. 1970, p. 23. A New Slrategy jor P eacc, A Rcport to the Congrcs», Washington, 14. Ibid. CPO, 1970, pp. 22-23. 15. Stanley Karnow, “ A Second Indochina W ar?" Washington 31. “President Nixon's News Conlcrence of May 8,” Department Pau. March 22, 1970. p. Bl. of State Bulletin, Vol. 62, May 25, 1970, p. 645. 16. “ The War Overflows,” New York Times, March 29. 1970, 32. “ Nixon's Gamble: Operation Total Victory?” p. 23. p. E5. 33. “ Under Secretary Richardson Interviewed on ‘ Issues and 17. Maxey, p. 23. Answers,' " Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 62, June 1, 1970. 18. Ibid., p. 24. 34. "Secretary Rogers Discusse» Cambodia Action in Interview for 19. Ibid. Televiaion,” Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 62, May 25, 1970, 20. Ibid. p. 649. 21. Ibid. 35. “ Under Secretary Richardson Interviewed on ‘ Issues and 22. Ibid.. p. 25. Answers,’ ” p. 682. 23. "Nixon's Gamble: Operation Total Victory?" Newsweek, 36. “ My War. My Way,” New Republic, Vol. 162, June 13, Vol. 75, May 11, 1970, p. 23. 1970, p. 6. 24. Hans J. Morgenthau, “ Saving Face in Indochina: 1—Mr. 37. “ Secretary Rogers’ News Conference of 13 May." Department Nixon’s Gamble," New Republic, Vol. 162, May 23. 1970. p. 16. of State Bulletin, Vol. 62. June 1, 1970, p. 676. 25. Franz Schurmann, “ Cambodia: Nixon's Trap," Nation, Vol. 38. “ President Nixon’ » White Paper on Cambolia,” p. 86. 210. June 1. 1970, p. 651. 39. “ Cambodia: Struggle for Survival," Time, Vol. 96. July 13, 26. "President Nixon’» White Paper on Cambodia." p. 11. 1970, p. 22. URBAN INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA Its Implications for the Future

C harles A. R ussel l Major Robert E. H il dner

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national total.5 In some countries (Argentina, of the literate citizenry, and the vast majority Brazil, and Uruguav) one or two cities alone of the student population.8 Educated primar- account for 42 to 47 percent of the total ily in the law, humanities, and medicine, the population.6 Within highly urbanized nations students frequently have difficulty integrating such as these, rural-based insurgency stands into a society that needs technicians, engã- relatively little chance of success, simply be- neers, and skilled artisans. These students, the cause the countryside lacks the population product of a university System still strongly base to support it. Whether would-be insur- influenced by Marxist economic and political gents follow the precepts of Mao, wherein doctrine, form a highly articulate and volatile guerrillas supposedly merge with the peas- group. When their political radicalism and de- antry, or support the Castro-Guevara-Debray sire for needed social change are coupled with thesis, in which a mobile guerrilla “ foco" re- frequent governmental lethargy and inactiv- jects close ties with any peasant group,7 both ity, they become ideal targets for recruitment schools of insurgency theory look ultimately to into revolutionary groups. Often students see the rural populace as a prime source of re- organizations like the Tupamaros in Uruguav, cruits and logistic* support. In the sparsely the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard ( vpr) in populated Latin American countryside, assist- Brazil, the Armed Forces of National Libera- ance of this type simply is not available. The tion ( faln) in Venezuela, and the Liberation plaintive comments of Guevara in his now Armed Forces in Argentina as the only effec- famous diary, covering the 1966-67 Cuban- tive media for initiating change and eliminat- backed insurgent effort in Bolivia, testify ing governments they consider corrupt and in- clearly to the criticai nature of this support. effective. In this same context, as is evident from the As the students are mainly from an urban experiences of insurgent leaders in many Latin background (at the University of Buenos Aires American countries, including Guatemala, 76 percent of the students are from the city of Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colotnbia, the Buenos Aires),9 they are able to function very rural population is sparse and primarily In- effectively within an urban terrorist environ- dian in ethnic background. Innately conserva- ment. Familiar with the city and its customs, tive and extremely suspicious of any influences they meld easily into metropolitan-based in- from outside the local communitv, these In- surgent groups; their effective integration into dian peasants are often an extremely diílicult a rural guerrilla organization is substantiallv group for the guerrillas to influence and moti- more difficult. In this connection, the com- vate. The sudden appearance of numerous ments of guerrilla leaders are informative. armed strangers in their midst frequentlv leads Guevara States in his diary that the city-bred to peasant notification of local authorities. insurgents joining his forces in Bolivia had to Thus, the ultimate result of efforts to influ- overcome not only the difficult physical ad- ence these peasants is often the arrival of gov- justments required for survival in the bush but ernmental counterinsurgency forces rather also wide cultural, linguistic, and even class than the creation of support for the insurgent differences betvveen themselves and the peas- cadre. antry. Similar problems plagued urban-edu- Closely correlated with the urbanization cated members of the faln in Venezuela, the trend is a concentration of radical student and Movement of the Revolutionary Left ( mir ) in intellectual elements within most metropolitan Peru, and the Rebel Armed Forces ( far) in centers. Latin American cities, traditionally Guatemala. the focus of education and intellectual activ- In addition to functioning more effectively ity, today contain the major universities, most in an urban than in a rural situation, the URBAN INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA 57

students and young intcllcctuals who form the normally must obtain additional weapons cadre of most metropolitan insurgent groups from an enemy killed in combat, or through find innumerable other advantages in an shipments smuggled into the country from urban environment. Among the more signifi- abroad, the cities offer his urban counterpart cant are easy access to innumerable opportunitics to obtain weapons. — terrorist targets: foreign embassies, diplo- When these cannot be purchased openly or matic personnel, local government and police through the black market, the urban guerrilla oficiais, business firms, etc. Recent operations can attack police stations, armories, gun clubs, of the Uruguayan Tupamaros and the Bra- and similar lucrative targets. zilian vpr illustrate the relative ease with — iníelligence. In the criticai field of intelli- which diplomats can be kidnapped or as- gence collection, the student-manned urban saulted and foreign businesses destroyed. In terrorist organization also is at a substantial contrast to rural guerrillas who may have little advantage over the rural guerrilla. Composed impact upon the central government for some primarily of individuais from middle- or time, kidnapping a diplomat or destroying a sometimes upper-class families, student groups foreign business immediately focuses world at- generally have personal or family connections tention on the insurgents and their demands. extending into manv echelons of national gov- Of equal importance is the fact that such acts ernment. Through these associations and those embarrass the government and undermine of friends and supporters, they are often able public confidence in its ability to provide pro- to obtain quite accurate information on gov- tection for its citizens and for the important ernmental countering operations.11 income-producing tourist trade. While urbanization and the ready availabil- ity of a radicalized student force in metropoli- — funds to support insurgent operations. tan areas have been important factors in the Readily available for robberies and assaults movement of insurgent cadres from the coun- are banks and foreign business firms. In at- tryside to the cities, also significant has been tacks on these targets the Tupamaro forces the failure of guerrilla theoreticians to make alone have netted more than six million those tactical and strategic modifications nec- dollars.10 In contrast, the rural guerrilla fre- essary to take advantage of this development. quently has to obtain financing through long In general, this failure is attributable to an and often insecure channels. apparent inability on the part of the Cas- — food. Whereas the rural guerrilla often troites (Guevara-Debray) and the Maoists to has to live off the land, as Guevara did in understand that experiences wholly valid in Bolivia, the food source for an urban insur- one geographical and demographic situation gent is often as close as the nearest local mar- may be totally inx alid in another. Thus. both ket place. the Cuban and Chinese Communist strategies —medicai supplies and Services. For the were predicated upon the development of a rural insurgent, medicai supplies are always in rural guerrilla movement in a denselv popu- short supply. For the urban terrorist, pharma- lated countryside.12 By insisting on the devel- ceuticals are readily available for purchase or opment of rural insurgencies and dogmaticallv theft, and sometimes medicai students at local applying their experiences to nations with an universities provide skilled surgical assistance underpopulated countryside, the Communists when needed. have experienced a series of resounding fail- — arms. Even in such basic areas as arms ures ranging from the disastrous Cuban-led procurement, the urban guerrilla has a signifi- guerrilla “ invasion” of northern Argentina in cant advantage. Whereas the rural insurgent 1963 to the breakup of the Cuban-backed 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Venezuelan and Guatemalan insurgencies, the The answer to both questions seems to be yes. failure of the 1965 Maoist and Castroite effort Based upon Cuban revolutionary doctrine, in Peru, and the Cuban fiasco in Bolivia which has undergone relativelv little change which resulted in Guevara’s death. in recent years, guerrilla warfare remains the In connection with these failures, it is inter- accepted médium for achieving rapid and esting to note that, despite vigorous indorse- lasting social change within the hemisphere. ment of rural-based insurgencies bv the Com- While heretofore those aspects of this doctrine munist strategists of both China and Cuba, concerned with insurgency have stressed the these two povvers split decisively on the overall primacy of rural over urban operations, this strategy for implementing such operations. Se- position has changed significantly within the verely criticizing the inadequate preparations past two years. Quite probably this change made by Castroites in both Peru and Bolivia, was generated by a variety of influences, the Chinese have chided the Cubans for fail- prominent among which must have been ( 1) ing first to create several secure base areas to the dismal record of Cuban-supported rural support guerrilla operations (a concept inte- insurgent operations over the past ten years; gral to Maoist guerrilla philosophy and ex- ( 2 ) the contrasting success of urban terrorism pressly rejected by Castro, Guevara, and De- carried out by radical revolutionary groups; bray); for failing to give the peasantry suffi- and (3) the recent ascent to power, via the cient political indoctrination; and for failing electoral process, of the Allende government to create an effective insurgent support appa- in Chile. With the success of Allende’s via ratus through a united front of the peasants, pacifica, which had been a frequent target for workers, and poorer bourgeoisie.13 Cuban criticism, and the failure of its own Convinced that their philosophical ap- rural guerrilla strategy, the Castro regime proach was sound, hovvever, the Cubans de- seems to have reassessed its position of sup- voted little effort to a study of these factors or porting only rural insurgent operations. the basic geographic and demographic situa- One of the first indicators of this reassess- tion in which an insurgency was to be created. ment was Cuban endorsement of the urban Rather they continued to insist on the pri- terror tactics of the far in Guatemala, tactics macy of their concept of rural over urban which in 1968 resulted in the death or insurgency and the fact that cities were the wounding of several oíficers assigned to the deathbed of revolution and could never be its U.S. Military Advisory Group and later the focal point.14 Nevertheless, as is clear to any assassination of U.S. Ambassador John Gor- observer of the Latin American scene, the op- don Mein. This endorsement of urban terror- posite is true: rural insurgency has steadily ism accelerated in 1970 with the publication declined, while its urban counterpart contin- of Carlos Marighella’s “ Mini-Manual of the ues to grow in scope and intensity. Urban Guerrilla" in the January-February issue of Tricontinental.15 As the official organ of the executive secretariat of the Organiza- tion of Solidarity of the Peoples of África, W it h available evidence indi- Asia and Latin America ( ospaaal), an orga- cating a continued increase in city-based ter- nization headquartered in Havana and domi- rorism in Latin America, can this trend be nated by Cuba, Tricontinental purveys the expected to continue well into the 197Os? If “ official” Cuban line of insurgent strategy and so, will it require a change in current counter- warfare. Marighella, a dissident former mem- insurgency techniques, which are now focused ber of the Brazilian Communist Party and largely on operations against rural guerrillas? founder of the urban terrorist National Liber- URBAN INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA 59

àting Action ( al n), was vvell known for his in trying to take credit for successes of the Dpposition to the Cuban thesis of rural guer- Tupamaros and other urban insurgent groups, -illa warfare. Accordingly, the printing of Cuba has strongly supported these groups Marighella?s “Mini-Manual” in Tricontinen- throughout 1970 and so far in 1971. In the tal constitutes a substantial change in Cuban pages of Tricontinental as well as those of thinking as well as an official public blessing Granma and Verde Olivo (organs of the )and endorsement of the new tactics. Further, Cuban Communist Party and Army respec- jince the “ Mini-Manual” novv serves as the tively), the Castro regime has continued to lurban terrorists equivalent of Guevara’s “ re- praise the efforts of such varied urban insur- vered” text on rural guerrilla warfare, its pub- gent groups as the Armed Commandos of ilication in Tricontinental carries an even Liberation in Puerto Rico, the urban-oriented jgreater significance. sector of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Without batting an ideological eye, Cuba Guatemala, the Popular Revolutionary Van- continued its endorsement of urban terror tac- guard in Brazil, and the Argentine Revolu- tics on through the remainder of 1970 and tionary Movement. When Cuban assistance into 1971. While still paying some lip Service and support (which easilv could include train- to the few largely inactive, sputtering, and ing and funding) to these and similar groups ineffective rural insurgencies (in portions of are combined with the natural advantages al- Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia), the press ready possessed by most urban insurgent kept the emphasis on the importance of urban groups, it would appear more than likelv that terrorism. Following publication of Marighel- this form of guerrilla warfare will continue to la’s “ Mini-Manual,” the next issue of Tricon- expand in scope and intensity well into the tinental (March-April 1970) contained a 15- 1970s. page article on the Tupamaros in Uruguay.16 While urban terrorism unquestionably poses Although strongly endorsing the efforts of this a verv real and current problem for several group, the author endeavors to show that Latin American governments, the less evident their operations are simplv an offshoot or but equallv effective technique of peaceful urban adaptation of the Guevara-Debrav the- penetration by Communists into a nation’s so- sis of a rural guerrilla “ foco.” Despite the fact cial and governmental structure should not be that the two concepts are in no way similar ignored. The recent electoral success of the and notwithstanding express rejection by the Communist-Socialist front in Chile has done Tupamaros of the Guevara-Debrav viewpoint, much to restore life to this technique, which the author still tries to meld the two in order recently had been under severe criticism by to show that the Tupamaros are acting in the more activist revolutionaries of Cuban and accordance with Cuban guerrilla theorv. Chinese Communist persuasion. Strongly en- Thus, although Cuba has now strongly en- dorsed by the “ orthodox” Moscow-oriented dorsed the utility of urban terrorism as a Communist parties of Latin America, this less major element in guerrilla warfare, the Castro spectacular method of operation may over the govemment is not yet fullv prepared to admit long run pose an equal or greater danger to that its past support for rural-based guerrilla Latin American democracy than the current operations was a serious error. Instead, it emphasis on urban terrorism. would rather show urban insurgency as As the shift from rural to urban-based in- merelv an expansion on the basic strategy of surgency continues, it will have a significant guerrilla warfare alreadv* laid down bv/ Gue- impact on current counterinsurgency strategy vara and Debray in their “ foco” concept. and tactics. Virtually all current counterinsur- While using such semantic sleight of hand gency doctrine is formulated on the premise 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW that counterinsurgent forces will be fighting a W hile these tactics and tech- rural-based guerrilla movement whose basic niques are valid and have proven effective in strategy follows the Maoist dictum of first tak- dealing with rural-based insurgencies, it takes ing the countryside and then engulfing the little imagination to see they are almost totally, cities. The counterinsurgent strategy devel- ineffective against urban insurgents who are oped to meet this threat involves the employ- so enmeshed in the population that it is vir- ment of conventional military forces to deny tually impossible to identify, isolate, and neu- the guerrillas access to their externai sources tralize them. Conventional military forces, of supply, to expel their arined forces from a then, even those trained in specialized coun- selected geographic area, and to establish mili- terinsurgency techniques, are ineffective in tary control over that area. Additional aspects that situation because they cannot deny the of this strategy include eliminating the infra- guerrilla terrain, they cannot isolate him from structure or underground organization within the population, and they cannot force him the area which has supported the guerrilla into a position where they can employ their and then, through a combined program of most effective weapon— superior firepower. pacification, civic action, and psychological Those adjunctive programs designed to win warfare, winning the support of the populace “ the hearts and minds” of the people are simi- for the counterinsurgent cause so they will ac- larlv of limited effectiveness because the need tively participate in continued denial of the for popular support is not as criticai to the area to the insurgent. An integral and central urban insurgent as it is to the rural-based part of this overall strategy is clearing and guerrilla. Since the urban guerrilla does not holding successive amounts of terrain and a depend on the population at large to anv continuing effort by the counterinsurgent great extent for food, arms, medicai supplies, forces to draw the guerrillas into a position money, or intelligence, its support is not a vvhere they must engage in conventional mili- prerequisite for success. In fact, the urban in- tary action. Conventional military action al- surgent may well be able to operate effectiveh lows the superior firepovver of the counterin- even if the bulk of the urban population op- surgent armed forces to be brought to bear poses him, since it is as difficult for the popu with maximum effectiveness, thus insuring the lation in anv given urban area to determine destruction of the military forces of the guer- who is guerrilla as it is for the counterinsur- rilla movement. gent forces. This has been evident in the in- Conventional counterinsurgency tactics and ábil ity of various Latin American nations tc techniques, such as search and destroy and locate and rescue the victims of guerrilla kid- cordon and search operations, air interdiction nappings, despite the victim's and his captors: and air mobility, isolation of the guerrilla continued presence in the urban environment from the population through the establish- Operational effectiveness in the absence ol ment of fortified villages or hamlets, and other widespread popular support is illustrated b\ similar programs— all have been developed in the Tupamaros in Uruguay, who draw theii response to insurgency that is primarily rural- support primarily from intellectual, student based. Even those programs designed to iden- and upper-middle-class groups rather thar tifv and neutralize the insurgent infrastruc- from the middle and lower classes which con- ture, such as the Phung Hoang program in stitute the bulk of the urban population. Vietnam, are of secondary importance in rela- If, then, regular military forces employint tion to the main goals of destroying the insur- traditional counterinsurgency tactics and tech gents’ armed forces and winning the support niques designed to combat rural guerrillas ar< of the people.17 either ineffective or cannot profitablv be em URBAN INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA 61

£>loyed against an urban insurgency, the bur- identify and isolate. T o attack him success- den of combating the urban guerrilla move- fully requires a successful attack on his under- ment falis on the local metropolitan police ground structure. Thus the counterinsurgent ind those internai security or paramilitary must depend on his intelligence to tell him rorces which are responsible to some degree who the insurgent is, where he Ls l o c a t e d , a n d or the exercise of the police function. In ef- what his plans, intentions, and capabilities fect, counterinsurgency becomes a police are. problem, not a military problem. Unfortu- All this information, essential for the suc- natelv, most urban pohce departments, not onlv cessful neutralization of the urban insurgent in Latin America but in most major cities movement, becomes available only through a throughout the underdeveloped world, are un- comprehensive and sophisticated intelligence prepared to cope vvith urban insurgency of program that penetrates the insurgent organi- any significant proportions. Small in numbers, zation at every levei. Most police departments often underpaid, ill-equipped, and poorlv and internai security agencies often lack, trained, the police are nearly overwhelmed bv among other things, both the training and ex- the task of maintaining a semblance of law perience necessary for the conduct of a suc- and order in urban areas swollen beyond ca- cessful intelligence program simply because, pacity by the influx of a rootless peasantry until faced with the task of combating an escaping from the grinding poverty of the urban insurgency, there was little need for countryside. Such police departments have them to have any more than a rudimentary neither the capability nor the resources needed knowledge of intelligence techniques and to carry out a successful counterinsurgency methodologv. Until now, police departments program. and internai security agencies needed only In combating an urban insurgency, regard- low-level informants who could provide infor- less of whether it emanates from the left or mation related almost exclusively to criminal right of the political spectrum, the role of in- matters or to surveillance of relatively overt telligence is paramount. The success of any political opposition groups. This is no longer urban counterinsurgency program is tied di- the case. T o counter urban insurgency effec- rectly to success of the intelligence elTort be- tively requires a massive intelligence effort, the cause the urban insurgent holds no terrain most important aspect of which is the use of and maintains no formally constituted con- reliable, carefully selected, and well-trained ventional military forces. His organization is informants who can and wül penetrate the essentially covert and clandestine and nor- urban guerrilla movement and provide the in- mally is highly compartmentalized as a secu- formation necessary for its neutralization. The rity measure whereby each person's knowledge training required to identify, assess, recruit, of the underground structure is restricted to train, manage, and utilize such informants far that which is necessary for him to perform his exceeds even the most sophisticated intelli- function. This is designed to prevent a roll-up gence training normally given such depart- of the entire organization if a member is cap- ments and agencies. tured and turns informant or if any element If Latin American countries are going to be of the organization is penetrated by security faced with increasing or intensified urban in- forces. The urban guerrilla, able to move with surgency in the coming decade, there must be relative freedom, capable of plausibly explain- a major change in the type of counterinsur- ing his presence in virtually any part of the gency training and assistance given them. city, and possessing a natural and legitimate Rather than concentrate on improving the cover for his activities, is extremely difficult to quality and size of their conventional military 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW forces and gearing training in counterinsur- The importance and effectiveness of “ pro- gency tactics and techniques to cope with ru- fessionalizing” the police and establishing a ral-based insurgency, emphasis and priority unified police command were demonstrated must be placed on improving the quality and during the Venezuelan insurgency of effectiveness of their urban police departments 1958-1963. The government was hampered and those other internai security agencies in its attempts to cope with urban insurgency which vvill bear the brunt of the urban coun- in Caracas because the city was made up of terinsurgency effort. Th e size of the police and several political subdivisions, each with its internai security forces must be increased sig- own police. In addition, national police re- nificantly; salaries must be kept comparable sponsibility was divided among three agencies to civilian pay so as to attract qualified per- — the Policia Técnica Judicial ( pt j ), the Di- sonnel; equipment, particularly Communica­ rección General de Policia ( digepol ), and the tions equipment, must be modernized, mobil- Policia de Trânsito (Traffic Police). In both ity vastlv improved, and inexpensive but the pt j and digepol , the overriding considera- efficient information storage and retrieval Sys- tion in personnel selection was political lovalty tems developed. and party standing. The situation improved Training should be greatly expanded, par- significantly with the replacement of the offi- ticularly in those areas of direct usefulness in cers in charge of the police academy and the countering urban insurgency, such as intelli- personnel section of the municipal police in the gence, counterintelligence, crowd and riot latter part of 1962 and the establishment of a control, and psychological warfare. Serious unified police command for the Caracas met- consideration should also be given to stream- ropolitan area in mid-1963. The former head lining police organization and simplifying of the armed forces intelligence Service was command and control over all elements en- placed in charge of the new command, and a gaged in the counterinsurgency program. It is police coordination committee, embracing essential to establish specialized intelligence both national and municipal officials, was cre- components vvhose personnel have been inten- ated. Both these actions had a marked impact sively trained in information collection meth- on the capability of the Caracas police to deal ods, including the use of technical surveillance with the insurgents.18 devices, and in the techniques used to de- Although the primary responsibility for velop, recruit, train, manage, and utilize so- meeting the thrcat posed bv urban guerrillas phisticated informants. Particular attention rests with the police and other internai secu- should be given to “ professionalizing” police rity forces, this does not mean that conven- and internai security forces, to preclude any tional military forces have no role in combat- Wholesale loss of qualified personnel as a result ing urban insurgency. On the contrary, the of political changes in the government and to military can and will play an important role preclude the promotion of personnel based on in any urban counterinsurgency program; but political influence rather than on ability or that role, rather than being primary as in the merit. Since the police vvill have primary re- case of rural insurgency, will be secondary sponsibility for detecting and neutralizing and supportive of the primary role assumed urban insurgency, failure to properlv train bv those agencies responsible for the exercise and equip them to meet this responsibility will of the police function. Convcntional military have the gravest of conscquences. We firmly forces can be used in a variety of ways tc believe that urban insurgency cannot be de- support the ovcrall counterinsurgency pro- feated without a vvell-trained, well-equipped, gram. In a tactical sense, they can be used tc and effective police department. strengthen border Controls to preclude outsidí URBAN INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA 63

intervention and deny the insurgent an exter­ telligence and counterintelligence officers can nai source of supplv. Th e y can also be used to be used to augment police intelligence units guard fixed installations likely to be priority until such time as the latter have acquired the targets of urban guerrilla groups, assist in riot training and experience to handle it them- and crowd control, develop and implement selves. Such use of the m ilitary w ould con- highwav control measures, perform civic ac- tribute materially to a fully integrated tion and public works designed to w in popu­ police/military counterinsurgency effort. lar support for the government, and provide military equipment and facilities to enhance T he pr o spe c t of increased use of urban in­ police Communications and mobility. In a surgency and terrorism by subversive revolu- strategic sense, conventional forces can be sta- tionary groups in Latin America during the tioned within easy reach of urban areas, thus Corning decade is very real. Should this pat- psvchologically inhibiting the urban insurgent tern prove successful, we do not believe it un- from resorting to unrestricted violence and reasonable to anticipate its use by dissident terrorism for fear of militar)' intervention. groups in underdeveloped nations elsewhere in The value of having conventional military the world. forces in close proximity to centers of urban The advantages inherent in waging an ur- insurgency must be vveighed against the psy- ban-based insurgency combine to make urban chological damage to the counterinsurgent insurgency extremely attractive to those cause should they be employed. One of the groups intent on overthrowing the existing po- major advantages of combating an insurgency litical and social order. Although countering with police forces is that it permits counterin- urban insurgency is a difficult task, it is not an surgent propaganda to treat the insurgents as insurmountable one, provided existing coun- nothing more than violence-prone criminais terinsurgency tactics and techniques are re- rather than as ideologically motivated revolu- vised and emphasis is placed on equipping tionaries. This criminal image is difficult to and training police and internai security agen- sustain once conventional forces are employed. cies to carry the primarv responsibility, with Perhaps the most important area in which the military assuming its secondary and sup- the military can assist the police is that of portive role. As unpalatable as this may be to training, particularly in the field of intelli- the military, which has long enjoyed primacy gence. Intelligence has alwavs been an inte- in the field of counterinsurgency, it is essential, gral part of conventional military operations, since we doubt any urban counterinsurgency and the military normally has experienced in- effort conducted by police and other internai telligence officers as well as training programs security agencies can succeed without the in-being that can readily be adapted for use wholehearted cooperation and support of the by the police and internai security forces. In conventional military establishment. addition to providing training in the tech- niques of intelligence, experienced military in- Directorate of Special Investigations, Hq USAF

Notes

1. Frank Bonilla, “ The Urban Worker,’ ' in Continuity and Change American Radicalism, ed- Horowitz, de Castro, and Gerossi (New in Laiin America, ed. John J. Johnson (Stanford: Stanford Univer- York: Vintagc. 1969), pp. 140-76. ■ity Preas, 1964). 3. Thomas F. Carroll, “ The Land Reform Issue in Latin America*' 2. For a concise diacussion of the motivators involved in rural*to* in The Dynamics of Change in Latin America, ed. John D. Martz ttrban migration, see Irving Louis Horowitz, “ Electoral Politics, (Englcwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 174. U rbanizatioo and Social Development in Latin America," in Latin 4. Preeton James, Latin America (New York: Odyssey Press, 1959), 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

p. 868: “ The fact is that in Latin America the thinly popuiated Press. 1965), pp. 93-101. and Vol. I, pp. 13-19. For an analysia areas are becoming more thinly popuiated. and the areas of con- of the failure of the Peruvian insurgency see Héctor Brjar. Peru centrated settlement denser. It is in the cities, or in the densely 1965: Notes on a Guerrilla Experience (New York: Monthly Review popuiated urcas around the cities, that one finds the greatest Press, 1969). This book was publishcd originally in Spanish as number and variety of economic opporlunities . . . lt is to the Peru 1965: Apuntes Sobre Una Experiência Guerrillera. city, and if possible the largest city, that the counlrymun wants 14. Debray, pp. 68-69. to go . . . this trend toward increased urbanization, taking people 15. Tricontinental, Havana, Cuba, OSPAAAL, nr 16, January- oway from the empty areas toward the more densely crowded spots. February 1970. is a basic fact.“ 16. Tricontinental, nr 17. March-April 1970, pp. 45-60. 5. Horowitz, p. 147. 17. Phung Houng Advisor Handbook, Headquarters U.S. Military 6. Ibid., p. 146. Assistance Command, Yietnam, Saigon, Republic of Yietnam. Novem- 7. Rêgis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (New York: Grove ber 1970, pp. 2-3. It is interesting to note that the introduetion Press, 1967), pp. 24, 26, 41. to this handbook States that the primary operating element of the 8. K. H. Silvert, “ The University Student,” in Continuity and Phung Hoang prograrn is the RVN National Police and not the Changc, pp. 206-26. military forces, although the military does have an important but 9. Ibid., p. 213. primarily supportive role in the prograrn. “ Phung Hoang” is the 10. El Mercúrio, Santiago, Cuba. 14 November 1970, p. 1. and term given to the Republic of Vietnam’s prograrn to detect and the Star, Washington, D.C.. 14 November 1970, p. A-2. Ün 13 neutralize the Viet Cong infrastrueture (V C I). The VCI is the November Tupamaro elements robbed a branch oflicc of the Bank Communist shadow government which provides money, rccruits, of the Republic in Montevideo, Uruguay, taking S6 million in supplies, intelligence, and support to Viet Cong military units. jewcls and $48,000 in cash. The U.S. advisory effort in support of the Phung Hoang prograrn 11. Arriba, Madrid. Spain, 2 February 1971, p. 12. is called “ Phoenix.” 12. Castro, for example. focused his guerrilla activity in Cuba’ s 18. For an excellent analysis of the police role during the 1958-63 Oriente Province, an area where 60.2 percent of the population is insurgency in Venezuela, see D. M. Condit et al.f Challenge and rural, the highest in Cuba. Antonio Xúrtez Jimcnez, Geografia de Cuba (Havana: Editorial Lex, 1960), p. 191. Response in Internai Conflict, Vol. III, The Experience in África 13. For the importance of these concepts in Maoist doctrine see and Latiu America (Washington: American University, Center for Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. II (Peking: Foreign Languages Research in Social Systems, 1968) , pp. 484—88. Military Affairs Abroad

NATO'S THIRD DIMENSION

M arshal l E. W il c h e r

HE North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The maintenance of this security position dic- T which commemorated its twentieth anni- tated that the focus of the alliance rest on versary in 1969, has been an unqualified suc- military considerations. cess as a defensive military alliance, maintain- As the estimated severity of the military ing the territorial integrity of the member na- threat diminished, evidenced by the Harmel tions. In addition to this military aspect of the Report of 1967, nato entered an era of dé- alliance, throughout its history there has been tente, recognizing that détente and defense considcrable political consultation among were compatible pursuits.2 The alliance was nato governments. Nevertheless, some scholars seeking a more active role in exploring ways have pictured nato as somewhat dysfunctional of reducing tension. Thus the last few years in its role as a regional organization under have sccn nato striving to expand its nonmili- Article 52 of the United Nations Charter.1 tary efforts.

nato s efforts have been almost wholly mili- nato’ s military and political dimensions, tary/political in nature, and efforts in the faccd with the possibility of U.S. troop reduc- more functional economic, cultural, and social tions and a cooling of U.S.-Soviet relations, spheres were accorded only token recognition. were buoyed by the renewed solidarity ex-

In the face of a grave thrcat to the security of pressed at the nato ministerial meeting in De- Western and Central Europe, it scems natural cember 1970. At that meeting the allies that the alliance was prcoccupied mainlv with agreed on conditions for a European Security a security posture that would provide a basis Conference, and the United States, Canada, for economic recovery and political stability. and the major European members agreed on 65 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW a $ 10-billion five-year plan designed to im- thrust in these areas would be competitive prove the nato defense posture. In addition, with other international organizations. President Nixon pledged that no substantial The North Atlantic Council, in a commu- troop reductions would be made without re- niqué issued at the close of the 43d session, ciprocai reductions by the Soviet Union. One expressed a concern for environmental prob- observer considered that the statements of the lems and instructed the Permanent Represent- leaders of the major nato povvers reflected a atives to study this area in order to determine tendency to place “ détente” in a secondary the manner in which nato could contribute role and that the meeting appeared to give most efTectively in these pursuits.5 nato a more militant aspect than any meeting In December 1969 the North Atlantic since the one immediately following the Rus- Council established the Committee on the sian action in Czechoslovakia in 1968.3 Challenges of Modern Society ( ccms) as the In the general atmosphere of détente that organizational instrument to work on common has prevailed during the last few years, result- environmental and social problems and to ing from what most consider to be a decreas- stimulate action by member nations of the al- ing military threat, nato’ s raison d’être has liance in these areas. The committee was in- been threatened, and its continued existence structed to submit a progress report to the has become open to conjecture. At the very spring 1970 meeting of the North Atlantic least, the nature and thrust of nato’ s future Council. At the first meeting of the ccms in role have come under scrutiny. December 1969, the body considered several

What has been called nato’ s “ third dimen- pilot studies of environmental and social sig- sion” was added at a time when nato was nificance. The committee agreed to recom- searching for new avenues of expression as an mend to the North Atlantic Council that these international organization. The impetus for pilot studies be undertaken as a first step. In nato’ s new dimension was provided by Presi- January 1970 the council approved eight pilot dent Nixon at the 43d Ministerial Meeting of projects, each with a nation designated to be the North Atlantic Council in Washington in responsible for it: 1969. In an address to the session, President 1. Road Safety, with the United States as

Nixon pointed out that nato is more than a pilot nation; military alliance and that the time had come 2. Disaster Relief, with the United States as pilot and Italy as co-pilot nation; to devote more attention to those nonmilitarv 3. Air Pollution, with the United States aspects which could result in mutual benefits as pilot and Turkey as co-pilot nation; for all members. Elaborating on this theme, 4. Open Waters Pollution with Belgium as the President said: pilot, and Portugal and France as co-pilot . . . I strongly urge that we create a committee nations; on the challenges of modem society, responsi- 5. Inland Water Pollution, with Canada ble to the Deputy Ministers, to explore ways as pilot nation; in which the experience and resources of the 6. The problems of individual and group Western nations could most efTectively be motivations in a modern industrial society— marshalled toward improving the quality of with emphasis on individual fulfilment. The life of our people. That goal is provided for United Kingdom will act as pilot nation; in Article 2 of our treaty, but it has never 7. The problem of transmission of scientific been the center of our concerns. . . ,4 knowledge to the decision-making sectors of governments. The Federal Republic of Ger- The President further commented on possible many is to act as pilot nation for this project; areas of concern for the third dimension. He 8. Environment and the strategy of terri- indicated that he did not consider that a nato torial development.6 MIL1TARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 67

The ccms is concerned with two basic lems, makes nato one of the few international Jiemes: (1 ) the “pilot study” concept, in organizations with such a common flavor (as .vhich one country (often in association with opposed to other international organizations another) is made responsible for a study on a with a great diversity of m em bers). particular subject; and (2) the idea that the In response to charges of nato’s possible committee efforts are directed not towards duplication of efforts of such agencies as the carrving out research but towards the stimula- Organization for Economic Cooperation and rion of governmentai policy formulation and Development ( oecd) or European Economic possible legislation in the fields of interest. The Community ( eec) , Dr. Randers considers that work of the committee is to be open, and the problems of improving the environment in ccoperation with other international organiza- which we live are so vast and complex that tions and/or nonmember States is envisaged. they should and must be dealt with by many Thus it can be seen that nato has taken on organizations. He feels that information or a third dimension in an effort to fulfill the recommendations from two or more organiza- promise of Article 2 of the North Atlantic tions may give a nation a better framework Treaty. Nevertheless, there is doubt in the for making decisions and adopting programs; minds of many as to the propriety or necessitv that the dual pressures of recommendations by of nato’s involvement in these more functional nato and another organization (for example, tasks. Critics generallv express concern about oecd) could give added political impetus to the utility of nato as an effective instrument action. Some coordination with the oecd has for progress in the environmental and social already occurred, when nations have sent areas, citing possible duplication of effort and their representatives to the oecd Committee conflict with other international organizations on Research Cooperation to the meetings of also dealing with these problems. nato!s As- the nato ccms. nato’s Secretary-General has sistant Secretary-General for Scientific Affairs, already discussed cooperative efforts with the Dr. Gunnar Randers, who also chairs the Secretary-General of oecd.8 ccms, has provided arguments supporting Dr. Randers notes that the ccms does not nato’s involvement in these nonmilitary conduct research but that it hopes to be a pursuits.7 research-gathering agency, using existent Dr. Randers has pointed out that an impor- knowledge and experience and making recom- tant basic fact is simply that nato is there, i.e., mendations for governmentai action. He the organizational structure and framework maintains that the political weight of nato exist and have functioned for two decades. may make it better suited to effect physical During this period nato has provided the results than other international organizations, mechanism for considerable consultation and citing the nato infrastructure program as an cooperation between governments and a great example of nato’ s physical achievements. amount of technology transfer. In addition, Perhaps one of the most important results problems of pressing urgency, if they are con- of establishing ccms, Dr. Randers notes, is sidered by nato, have drawn the attention of that it has brought the problem of the envi- the highest government leveis in each nato ronment into focus in some of the nato na- country. He further contends that nato’s con- tions. Some of them had no government cern in the environmental/social field is fully agency to deal with these problems and found compatible with Article 2 of the North Atlan- it necessary to establish responsibility for envi- tic Treaty. Further, the fact that the nato ronmental problems within their governments. membership is made up of relativelv advanced Another important facet of the third di- countries, having generally the same prob- mension is its potential as an area in which 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW possible cooperation can be achieved between to start work at once in order to achieve, by the nations of nato and those of the Warsaw 1975 if possible, the elimination of intentional Pact. The Warsaw Pact, in a memo adopted discharge of oil and oily wastes into the sea.11 in June 1970, indicated a general willingness This declaration has been endorsed by the to discuss cultural and environmental prob- North Atlantic Council. lems in conjunction with other mutual The December 1970 meeting of the North problems.9 Of course, the environmental Atlantic Council was held in an atmosphere problems are greatly overshadowed bv the of concern over possible U.S. troop reductions more crucial and pressing East-West issues. and growing concern over Scviet influence in Nevertheless, the environment is an area that the Middle East and Mediterranean. That may hold promise for reaching agreements be- meeting devoted little attention to the third tween the two blocs. dimension. Nevertheless, the members seemed Regardless of rhetoric about nato’s rightful determined to make the third dimension an role in environmental problems, the organiza- important part of nato’s future. tion has moved ahead in this field, seeking to In Mav 1971, the United States and nato deal with specific aspects of the problem. jointly sponsored the International Confer- Meetings were held in Detroit in May 1970 ence of Cities at Indianapolis, to consider the on the subject of the latest auto safety devices. common problems facing urban ofhcials. Rep- Meetings and discussions were also conducted resentatives of fifteen nations attended this in May and June 1970, on open water pollu- conference.12 tion, air pollution, disaster relief, and inland At the recent nato Ministers Meeting in water pollution.10 It should be noted that two Lisbon, which dealt primarilv with Soviet nonmember nations participated in one of overtures for discussions on mutual and bal- these meetings. anced force reductions, the Ministers ex- pressed satisfaction in the impressive progress In October 1970 the ccms held its third plenary meeting to take stock of progress of achieved by the ccms.13 The Ministers took the pilot studies. Observers from several or- special note of the fact that the benefits of the ganizations, including the European Eco- allied efforts had not been confined to the nomic Community, attended the meeting. In countries of the alliance. November 1970 a special meeting of the Whether or not there will be a continuation of the initial enthusiasm for the third dimen- ccms was held for the purpose of considering the conclusions drawn at the colloquium on sion and interest in its adoption as a major oil spills sponsored by Belgium as part of the nato concern is a question that can only be Coastal waters pollution study. The meeting answered by future events. resulted in a declaration by nato governments Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Notes

1. Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VIII, “ Regional Letter, January 1970. XVIII/1, 8—12. Arrangements,” Articlc 52. 8. Ibid., p. 10. 2. The Future Tasks of the Alliance— Harmel Rcport (Brussels: 9. “ Documentation,” NATO Letter, September 1970, W II1/9, NATO Information Service, 1968). 23-24. 3. “ Nixon Gives NATO Pledge on Troops,” New York Times, 10. “ NATO*s Work on Environmental Problems,” NATO Letter, December 4, 1970, p. 7. July—August 1970, XVIII/7—8, 7. 4. “Speeches at the Commemorativc Se99Íon,“ NATO Letter, 11. " ‘Actions’— Keyword of the CCMS,” NATO Letter, December May 1969, p. 5. 1970, XVIII/12. 12. 5. Ibid., p. 11. 12. “17-Nation Parley Focuses on Cities,” New 1 ork Times, 6. “ NATO Council Approves Project9,“ NATO Letterf February May 27. 1971. p. 52. 1970, XVIII/2, 14. 13. “NATO Seeks Talks with Soviet Bloc on Cut in Troops,” 7. “Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society,” NATO Nexo York Times, June 5, 1971, pp. 1—3. WHAT WAS PAST WAS PROLOGUE

D r . R ussel l F. W eigley Books and Ideas RESIDENT Lyndon B. Jchnson’s “Tues- ment of the central foreign policy problem of day Cabinet” of intimate advisers was un- the Johnson administration, the Vietnam war. usualP among such groups in that almost its en- On a fourth such landmark occasion he spoke tire membership was inherited by the Presi- with the President but not with the full range dent from the preceding administration. Pro- of Tuesday Cabinet members. In light of pub- fessor Henry Graff emphasizes that among the lications more recent than Professor GrafTs “ masterful figures” who made up the Tuesday book, notably the New York Times docu- Cabinet “ the overwhelming force in their rnents of June 1971, it would seem that one official lives was Lyndon Baincs Johnson.” ! shorteoming of GrafTs account is that his in- But although the President towered over those terviews occurred only after the most crucial he inherited, it is the mainly inherited nature decisions, including the decision to take the of the membership of his Tuesday Cabinet offensive in a land war, had already been that seems to set the theme which permeates made. The occasions of GrafTs interviews were the book: that the Johnson administration, in 9-11 June 1965, the eve of massive engage- its major decisions on foreign policy, claimed ment in Vietnam; 22-23 February 1966, just to feel its options closed in by history. after the 1965 Christmas initiative for peace; President Johnson was not a reader of his- 19-20 December 1967 and 15 and 20 January tory, but he was strongly influenced by the 1968, the eve of the Tet offensive; and 19 twentieth-century political history which he November 1968, just after the halting of knew well through having participated in it, American air attacks on North Vietnam. from the time of the New Deal onward. His Almost every Tuesday, President Johnson sense that history was a kind of presence de- met for lunch in the President’s Dining Room termining what it was possible for him to do on the second floor of the VVhite House with and watching to render judgment upon him his closest sênior foreign policy advisers, to contributed much to the creation of this book. discuss the Vietnam war and the issues asso- That sense of history made Johnson receptive ciated with it— thus, the “ Tuesday Cabinet.” to the idea that an account of the foreign When these meetings began early in 1965, the policy deliberations of his administration members of the Tuesday Cabinet were Secre- should be presented the public by a repórter tarv of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense given freedom to converse with the major par- Robert S. McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy, ticipants in those deliberations and that the Special Assistant to the President for National repórter should be not a journalist but a histo- Security Affairs. These three Kennedy ap- riam E. Hayes Redmon, an assistant to Bill pointees were soon joincd by a Johnson man, Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, Bill Moyers. At first, General Earle G. had been a student in Professor GrafTs gradu- Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of ate course, History of the Foreign Relations of Staff, was invited only occasionally; he be- the United States, while earning a mastcr’s came a regular member early in 1966. degree in history at Columbia University. It Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelli- was Redmon who suggested that Graff be the gcnce Agency, began to be invited at about historian-reporter. the same time. Walt W. Rostow succeeded to Graff spoke with the President and the Bundy’s position and seat in the Tuesday members of the Tuesday Cabinet on the occa- Cabinet in 1966. George E. Christian re- sions of three major landmarks in the dcvelop- placed Moyers that year, and Clark M. Clif-

t Henry F. Graff, The Tuesday Cabinet: Deliberation and Decision on Peace and War under Lyndon li. Johnson (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-H all, 1970, $6.95), 200 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 71

ford succeeded to McNamara’s place in 1968. Vietnam. The Secretary of Defense referred to At various times Professor GrafT inter- 1954 and the commitments President Eisen- viewed Rusk, McNamara, Bundv, Moyers, hower had made to South Vietnam beginning Wheeler, and Rostovv as well as the President. then. The commitments still stood. The “ esca- In his book he records the major points of his lations” had been initiated not by the United conversations with them and occasionallv with States but by North Vietnam and the Viet other administration figures, such as Redmon Cong, as when their stepped-up activity had and Under Secretary of State George W. Bali, prompted the United States to increase the following his notes taken during the conversa- number of American advisers in South Viet- tions and filled in immediately afterward. The nam in 1961, or when they destroyed Ameri- purpose is to offer “ a presentation and defense can military installations in 1965. The Ameri- of an Administratioms war aims to an histo- can commitments remained unfulfilled, and as rian by the men responsible for framing and long as they did, “ the mission itself remains implementing them, including the President unchanged.” Similarly, McGeorge Bundy himself.” Graff's accounts of the first two sets stressed the continuing nature of the commit- of conversations appeared in the New York ment to South Vietnam. By December 1964, Times Magazine on 4 Julv 1965 and 20 Bundy told GrafT, a contingent decision had March 1966. They appear in the book in been made: that if the militarv situation in fuller form and with the final sets of conversa- Vietnam did not improve, it might be neces- tions completing the record. In the questions sary to bomb the North and increase the he asked during the conversations and in his American military presence; the governing presentation, GrafT’s posture was sympathetic contingencies had now arisen. Similarly, too, to the Johnson administration, yet with the Rusk stated that the American commitment historiams appropriate detachment. to Vietnam had been affirmed long since, and When GrafT first started interviewing, mas- the rate of escalation of the war had been sive American engagement in Vietnam had determined by the other side. not yet begun, but crucial steps in that direc- The President himself saw only two options tion had been taken, apart from decisions be- besides the Vietnam policy he was following: hind the scenes which were not revealed to to adopt what he called the “ Goldw'ater solu- GrafT: the first bombing of North Vietnam on tion,” use of nuclear weapons; or to pull out 7 February 1965, the President’s “ Peace with- altogether, which he said was what such crit- out Conquest” address at Johns Hopkins Uni- ics as Senator Wayne Morse and Walter versity on 7 April, and the landing of the first Lippmann really wanted. President Johnson of 3000 Marines at Da Nang on 10 April. By found neithcr of thesc options satisfactory. the time of the first conversations, the admin- This conviction that they were following a istration had decided to raise the American course which histoiy had formed for them as troop strength in Vietnam to 60,000. At this the only course which would not sacrifice the juncture GrafT found it conspicuous that, interests of the United States still animated rightly or not, the leaders of the Johnson ad- the leaders of the Johnson administration ministration professed to think of themselves when Professor GrafT spoke with them again not as making criticai decisions which would early in 1966. By that time they had at- lead the country down new paths but as fol- tempted their 1965 Christmas initiative for lowing in paths which history had already peace. On 23 December 1965 they had halted marked for them. the bombing of North Vietnam and had dis- In 1965 GrafT asked McNamara when the patched American diplomats to capitais all decision had been made to escalate the war in over the world to explore every means of con- 72 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW tact which might open the way to peace nego- Graff the members of the Tuesday Cabinet tiations with North Vietnam. “ Our decision continued to deny that the Vietnam conflict to stand firm,” said the President in his State had developed or was developing into a large of the Union Message in January 1966, “ has land war. “ I begrudge the loss of a single been matched by our desire for peace." But man,” said Secretary McNamara, “ but the the initiatives had borne no fruit, and on 31 casualty rate of 250 to 300 men a month” January President Johnson ordered a resump- does not betoken an “ overt land war.” tion of the bombing of the North. By the start of 1968, however, when Profes- On this occasion, Secretarv Rusk reiterated sor Graff next spoke with the Tuesday Cabi- to Graff the importance of this country’s net, the President had scheduled a buildup of long-standing commitments. Referring to a American strength in Vietnam to 525,000 suggestion by James Reston, that he had men by the middle of 1968, and the evolution enunciated a “ Rusk Doctrine” committing the of American involvement into an overt land United States to the defense of more than war could scarcely be gainsaid. By that time, forty countries, Rusk commented: “ I didn't too, rising public discontent with the Vietnam vote for a single one of those commitments. war was threatening the repudiation of the Those guys did” — meaning the Senate. But, Johnson administration and the President’s Rusk said, “ When you go into an alliance you party in the coming Presidential election. In have to mean it. . . . If you abandon one his third conversations, Professor Graff found commitment how do you expect us to per- the Tuesday Cabinet less sure than previously suade anybody else that our word is to be that history had compelled them to follow the relied on?” paths they did; they were more questioningly reviewing their own record to find decisions that might have been crucial. In early 1966, though Under Secretary Bali this juncture, Graff had then thought “ we haven’t got any op- found even Under Secretary George W. Bali, tions,” he had differed from his colleagues in whose reputation was that of a critic of exist- believing that viable options had still existed ing policy within the administration, saying: until the massive American engagement in the “ As far as we are concerned today, we haven’t summer of 1965. By late 1967 and 1968, the got any options. . . . I am greatly concerned members of the Tuesday Cabinet were com- over the hand-wringing I see. . . . The one ing to concede this view to Professor Graff. By thing we have to do is to win this damned the end of 1967, Professor GrafFs renewed war.” The Tuesday Cabinet believed they had question to Secretary McNamara about when given Hanoi ample opportunities to negotiate the war had begun no longer prompted the and make peace. Since Hanoi had not Secretary of Defense to look back to 1954. “ It grasped the opportunities, American commit- began at different times,” McNamara now ments obliged the United States to seek a mili- said, “ but more important than that is the tary solution, and the onus of guilt now lay question, ‘When were there opportunities for clearly on the other side for having blocked choice?’ ” He now said he believed there were the possibilities for peace. “ several Y ’s in the road,” when “ wise alterna- At that point early in 1966, Secretary tives” had existed, and that one of them carne McNamara was announcing the dispatch of between February and July 1965, when the 30,000 more troops to South Vietnam to raise massive American engagement began. But this the American military presence to 235,000. was not the sort of thing he had told Graff in Still, in their conversations with Professor June 1965. BOOKS AND IDEAS 73

In this third series of conversations, Profes- regard his reporting of the deliberations of the sor Graff taiked for the only time with Gen- administration as entailing assessments of re- eral Wheeler, and Wheeler conceded that sponsibility or blame. But some of the conver- there had been “ surprises” along the way in sations he reports are suggestive about certain \'ietnam. He had come away from a visit of the roots of trouble. The decision to bomb there in late 1963 certain that the United North Vietnam early in 1965 marked one of States was on the right course militarily, that the Y s in the road, and surely so long a step the war was progressing well, and that success forward in American involvement would seem of the arvn— the South Vietnamese army— to have merited clarity of judgment about the was practicable; but then, he said, the South purposes for which the step was being chosen Vietnamese government “ proved feckless, and and the likelihood of accomplishing them. successive governments were increasingly When the reader extracts from throughout the worthless and ineffectual.” In 1965 the arvn book the comments of various administration began to fa.il, and the United States had to leaders on the bombing, however, and places introduce its own troops to fend off collapse. them side by side, an absence of clear purpose General Wheeler still believed military suc- is striking. cess could be achieved; Secretary McNamara, Why did the United States bomb North despite his talk of “ Y ’s in the road,” still Vietnam? According to McGeorge Bundy in maintained that the United States had fol- 1965, the bombing was chiefly important for lowed the right course; and Secretary Rusk maintaining South Vietnamese morale. Be- was still speaking in terms of the credibility of cause the decisive confrontation with the American commitments. But at the very least enemy would have to be in the South, the there was a new anxiety in the Tuesday Cabi- bombing wfas irrelevant except for stimulating net in late 1967 and early 1968 and a wistful- morale. “There is nothing to bomb for.” ness about decisions made in the past. The Under Secretary Bali, in contrast, offered in most conspicuously hawkish figure GrafT en- early 1966 a detailed summary of the argu- countered at thLs relatively late date was Walt ments for and against bombing the North. As W. Rostow. arguments in favor of bombing he cited that it As for the President himself, Graff found wras necessary to maintain the morale of the that “ by 1968 the claritv of his convictions, South and of American troops by denying the which had characterized his part of our con- enemy immunity from the cost of aggression; versations in 1965 and 1966, had given way that it was necessary to interdict partially the to a bluer tone, less assured and more irrita- movement of military goods from North to ble.” By the final conversations, when the South; that it was necessary to convince President had announced the bombing halt North Vietnam that the war would not be and his term of office was coming to an end worth the price; and that it was necessary to with his party in disarray, Graff concluded resume bombing after the Christmas peace ini- “ — although not on the basis of anything spe- tiative of 1965-66 because a failure to re- cific that he said— that he believed he had sume would appear to be a sign of weakness. been led down a slippery path by men he had Against bombing the North, Bali cited the ar- relied on too implicitly, and that he would guments that fear for the morale of South willingly barter anything he owned or de- Vietnam had ceased to be a serious concern; served for the chance of being able to retrace that bombing for interdiction purposes could his steps.” produce no political consequences because the If it was advisers who led the President enemy had small supply needs, which could down a slippery path, Professor Graff does not be met by using human transportation and 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW living ofT the country; and that bombing the country in the Vietnam war thoughtlessly or North increased the danger of Chinese inter- casually. In the conversations recorded here, vention or at least made North Vietnam more and consistently throughout his administra- dependent on China. Bali believed the con- tion, President Johnson revealed an acute and trolling argument in favor of bombing was the Lincolnian concern for the American lives one involving the interdiction of supplies. being disrupted and sacrificed through contin- Once American troops were committed to uation of the war. Yet for all that, there was Vietnam, he said, it became necessary “ to do something uncomfortably close to casual in everything possible to minimize our losses.” the making of decisions, which at the time At the same time, however, Bill Moyers could be presented as historically preordained said that while the bombing of the North was — the mere fulfillment of existing commit- useful in restricting the size of the force the ments— and which only later, when they were Communists could support in the South, “ the irrevocable, could be recognized for the Y ’s in overriding reason” for the bombing “ is politi- the road that they really were. Nevertheless, it cal: to put pressure on Hanoi and China. It was in this light that the President and the will disabuse them of the idea that they can Tuesday Cabinet presented their decisions to have a privileged sanctuary if they are going Professor Graff; if subsequent publications to sustain their aggression.” suggest that they were deceiving him, then our Walt Rostow, speaking just before the Tet conclusions must be more disturbing still. offensive, argued that the purpose of the In an epilogue, Professor Graff emphasizes bombing in the North was not like that of how his conversations with the President and strategic bombing in World War II. The the Tuesday Cabinet impressed him with the United States was observing restraint. Bomb- omnipresence of history in the deliberations of ing on the limited scale maintained was “ an government. “ In a great measure,” Graff says, economical way to impose an awkward incon- “ this is because the perspective of American venience. Hanoi must run its economv and history has been flattened by television, the logistical system at a lower throttle.” motion pictures, illustrated histories, ‘restora- As George Ball’s list of arguments for tions’ of historical sites, and good history-writ- bombing suggested, the bombing of the North ing. Public figures to a greater degree than could well be viewed as serving several pur- ever in the past feel at one with their prede- poses. But the range of differing opinions cessors, and meet the ordeals of their ofhce which Professor Graff collected regarding the with extreme self-consciousness.” The Presi- chief or overriding purpose of the bombing dent especially, Professor Graff says, can never surely indicates a lack of clarity in the think- stand alone but is always in the presence of ing of the Johnson administration about what the history of his office and is forever playing it was that the American military force in the role which his predecessors have designed Vietnam was intended to accomplish and thus for him. a failure to think through the questions of But Professor Graff warns that awareness of both means and ends in the Vietnam war. the past is not necessarily beneficiai; “ for un- trained minds, it too often simplifies rather than clarifies.” The minds of the Tuesday Cabinet were hardly untrained historically; P ro f esso r Graff portrays a several of the members were in a measure group of earnest, conscientious, responsible academic historians. Yet if awareness of the men, and one would hardly charge the John- past did not simplify their problems for them, son administration with having involved the it did imprison them to a greater extent than BOGKS AND IDEAS 75

the past itself, without the awareness, would Kennedy and Johnson administrations were to normally have done. The evidence of their wage and win another Korean War, they earlv conversations with Professor Graff is were not ready for the war in Vietnam. that thev entered the massive American en- Judgments such as these, however, are only gagement in Vietnam under the conviction most cautiously and indirectly the stuff of The that history was carrying them along in its Tuesday Cabinet. Professor GrafTs sympathy train, that they were responding to history for the burdens of the President and the Tues- and not making new commitments and deci- day Cabinet remains consistent to the end, sions. and his purpose remains the detached one of They allowed history to condition their compiling a contemporary record of decision- choice of means in fighting in Vietnam as well making “ unprecedented in Presidential histo- as their choice of ends. When Professor Graff riography.” The record Graff presents is frag- asked Secretary McNamara in 1965 whether mentary, and because of his admirable sympa- he found the analogy of Munich or of Korea thy for heavily burdened men his questions more compelling in dealing with Vietnam, were not always so hard and probing as some McNamara “ focused immediately on the Ko- might like, nor the answers as revealing. Still, rean episode.” He conceded that an analogy the book will make a contribution to the even- between Korea and Vietnam was “ false in tual writing of the history of the Vietnam logic,” but he found the analogy “ significant war. in psychology.” Why? There would be “ no Professor Graff found the men of the Tues- sanctuaries this time.” By implication, the day Cabinet “ strong, discerning, and gallant” ; United States would avoid the mistakes it had but he would also remind the reader that they made in fighting in Korea and this time were mere mortais, not “ that fancied com- would fight a limited war to a successful con- pany of Solons who unerringly would have clusion without excessive cost. All through the confronted the tragic challenge of Vietnam 1950s American military leaders and strategic with full comprehension and perfect wis- critics had restudied the Korean War and in dom” ; therefore, they should “ not be judged doing so had re-experienced its frustrations. by the yardstick of qualifications that they did They had determined that the United States not have— and no men possess.” This com- should never be compelled to repeat the frus- ment is true enough, and appropriate enough; trations of Korea; they called for the develop- but the historian above all should remind his ment of the kind of limited war capacity fellow citizens that history too easily can be which, if it had existed in 1950, would have turned into a tyrant foreclosing our choices, permitted at least a measure of American vic- that an awareness of history may make our tory in Korea, not mere stalemate. One of the ability to determine our own destinies appear premises of the Kennedy administration, more limited than it really is, and that per- which carried over into Johnson’s Tuesday haps the first thing to learn from history is not Cabinet, was that the U.S. would develop a to let it teach us too much. capacity to wage successfully a war resembling Perhaps, by focusing on the handful of men the Korean War. When the Vietnam troubles who constituted the Tuesday Cabinet, Profes- mounted in the early sixties, the administra- sor GrafTs book conveys too much of a tion prepared to respond by waging a success- suggestion that a relatively few advisers led ful Korea-type war in which there would be President Johnson down “ a slippery path.” “ no sanctuaries this time.” But an excessive Rusk, McNamara, and the other major fig- historical consciousness again played the ures of GrafTs book remained loyal to Lyndon United States false, for however ready the Johason in his Vietnam troubles longer than 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW many of the other officials he inherited from far from being alone among liberal Democrats the previous administration. But in the middle in the conviction that history had foreclosed sixties the men of the Tuesday Cabinet were the Vietnam paths other than the one which far from being alone— and in particular and the United States found itself taking. despite more recent versions of history were Temple University 100 AIRCRAFT ON PARADE

R oval D. Frey

EBSTER defines “ opinion" as a belief agree with King and Taylor on many of their W stronger than an impression but less selections, I cannot help questioning their wis- strong than positive knowledge, also as a for- dom in selecting others, particularly since mal expression by an expert. Both H. F. King these aircraft are presented at the expense of and John W. R. Taylor, who collaborated to some which I consider to be of much greater produce Milestones of the Air,f are widely rec- significance. ognized as experts in the field of aviation his- The criteria established by the authors for torv. They must novv be considered as purvev- consideration and inclusion of aircraft in the ors of understatement, for in the Foreword of book were three: that they “ represent mile- the book Mr. Taylor— undoubtedly with the stones in the technical or operational develop- sanction of Mr. King— wrote . . the end ment of powered aircraft, introducing new de- produet vvill, inevitably, cause controversy.’' sign concepts, or advancing performance to a It is difficult to imagine any buff or student spectacular degree.” It is on these three points of aviation history reading this book and then that I must take initial issue, for I believe they not taking issue with the selection of at least are much too limited to permit a full review one of the hundred aircraft chosen by these of all aircraft that should have received con- two men, regardless of their professional stat- sideration. ure. They vvisely provided themselves a route There should have been two additional cri- of strategic withdrawal, for although the dust teria if the book were truly to present the most jacket infers that the book pertains to the one “ significant" aircraft in aviation history. The hundred significant aircraft in the annals of first would have permitted consideration of aviation, the Foreword says “ one hundred of those aircraft which have had such a pro- the most significant aircraft ever built,” sug- found effect upon the world of the past fifty gesting that there are other aircraft of equal or so years that they changed in some distinct importance. This point, howevcr, will proba- manner important public attitudes of the day. bly escape the average reader, and he will The second would have permitted inclusion of assume from the dust jacket that King and aircraft that infiuenced the establishment and Taylor have selected without condition what maintenance of overall national policies to an they consider to be the one hundred leading appreciable degree. aircraft in aviation history. It is not difficult to substantiate this posi- Since Milestones of the Air is based upon tion. In 1927 Charles Lindbergh flew the interpretation of a vast amount of historical Ryan nyp Spirit of St. Louis nonstop across facts, it is without question a produet of per- the Atlantic. This single flight by this aircraft, sonal opinion. As the book s reviewer, I admit the only one of its exact type built by Ryan, to an average levei of human frailties and in completely changed the face of aviation. It this am probably little different from other awakened the world to the potential of flight typical aviation enthusiasts. Although I fully as did no other aircraft for years preceding

t H. F. King, com piler, John W . R. Taylor, editor, Milestones of the Air: Jane’s 100 Significant Aircraft (New York: M cGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969, $10.00), 158 pages. 77 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW and following its 1927 triumph. It completely not consider the B-36 worthy of inclusion in captured the public’s imagination and, in their book. However, this aircraft was the only reality, signaled the beginning of the golden weapon possessed by the Free World in the era of aviation which lasted for more than a late 1940s and early 1950s which could freely decade. range over any potential target at any location One has only to ask the man on the Street, on the face of the globe. National policy and be he French, British, American, or any other military strategy, not only on the part of the nationality, to identify the Spirit of St. Louis United States but by its allies as w-ell, were flown by Lindbergh and then to identify the actually determined with the B-36 backstage, Vickers Vimy flown by Alcock and Brown. ready for use if needed. The fact that the To which is given the greatest recognition and aircraft was never employed in the role for recall by the vast majority of people? Despite which it was designed should not be permitted this lasting historie impression made by the to detract from its tremendous significance nyp and its significant impact upon societv, it and importance. In reality, the lack of any apparently did not meet the criteria estab- requirement to use it in retaliatory operations lished by the authors, whereas the 1919 flight could be considered as the greatest of all testi- of the Vimy across the Atlantic did meet the monials of its true significance to history. criteria, even though its impact on societv was The Sikorsky Gr and (p. 21) and the Dor- fairlv negligible. nier Do X (p. 66) were undoubtedly great Another excellent support of mv position is design achievements of their eras, but what the U.S. Air Force Convair B-36 interconti- did thev reallv contribute? In other words, nental bomber. Apparently the authors did would aviation history have been appreciably BOOKS AND IDEAS 79

different had they never existed? Few compe- has just been discovered that a man in Fin- tent historians would argue that either the land made a successful powered and con- Grand or the Do X was of greater importance trolled flight in 1859 but that he did abso- to the world than the 380 or so B-36s, their lutely nothing to spread the knowledge he had bomb bays loaded with nuclear and thermo- gained and it went to the grave with him. nuclear weapons, which served so many years Consequently, his success was of no real im- as freedom’s greatest cudgel against possible portance to the world in the evolutionary de- aggression. velopment of flight as were the lessons learned This discussion brings to mind a situation and recorded by such great men as Cayley, that has occurred several times in the past. An Lilienthal, and Chanute for the benefit of individual, without doubt completely sincere, those who were to come after them. has come forth with what he believes is evi- In a similar manner, unless I have been dence that some unknown and unrecognized misled in my study of aviation history, the aviation pioneer made a successful powered, existence of the Sikorsky Grand and the Do X controlled flight prior to that of the Wright had very little direct impact upon aviation. brothers in 1903. Without wishing to appear They did exist and they were flown success- impertinent, one has onlv to ask, “ So what?” fullv, but memory of them serves primarily as In order for any event to be of historie a tribute to the engineering genius of the men importance and significance to the world, it who designed them. In themselves, these air- must have had some effect, favorable or other- craft are now little more than oddities of the wise, upon mankind. For the sake of discus- past. sion, let us assume that irrefutable evidence Another aircraft that had a significant im-

;giant leap forward ■ aviation was the New York to Paris flight of \arles A . Lindbergh in 1927 in t R y a n N Y P Spirit of St. Louis.

The Free World’s only global-range bomber for several years after World War II, the B-36 earned its place in aviation and military history merely by existing— a great deterrent. Forerunner of more recent long-range strategic bombers, Britain’s Handley Page 0/400 flew night bombing missions from France over Germany in World War I. . . . The Hindenburg epitomized the historie role of lighter-than-air craft, making ten commercial round trips across the Atlantic before its fiery destruetion in 1937. . . . The Waco glider, along with the Horsa, although minus an engine, played a significant role in defeating Nazi Germany. BOOKS AND IDEAS 81 pact upon the world, although in a more sub- have an appreciable impact upon aviation tle manner, was the Handley Page 0/4 0 0 and our society, though in a negative manner. bomber of the late World War I period. It It was, without question, quite significant to was the 0/400, along with the Caproni (p. aviation history. 34), that made such a deep impression on The Messerschmitt Me 323, a military Billv Mitchell. Employed by the British Inde- transport developed from a towed glider (p. pendem Air Force, the 0/400 flew at night 108), appears to me to be of doubtful signifi- from Ochey near Toul, France, on strategic cance when compared to the Horsa and Waco bombing missions against targets inside Impe- invasion gliders that were so highly important rial Germany. Realizing the great potential of and successful during World War II. Al- the plane, Mitchell devised a plan for 60 though the authors did specify “ powered air- squadrons of 0/400s, 20 planes per squadron, craft” for consideration, this is another point which were to drop paratroopers and equip- on which thev should have relented, in that ment behind German lines in 1919 in the gliders do satisfv the definition for aircraft. manner that became so important militarily Without question, the Horsa and Waco glid- during World War II. Although Mitchell ers made greater contributions to the world died in 1936 without ever seeing his dreams than those made by the contemporary Me 323 realized by the U.S. Army, he left a legacy or such other aircraft as the Mini Guppy, the that did, indeed, become reality. The exact Pregnant Guppy, and the Super Guppy, all degree to which his revolutionary ideas were aviation monstrosities. (p. 144) True, the Me- based upon the existence of the 0/400 can 323 did incorporate the features of nose-open- never be more than conjecture, but the part ing doors and multiple-wheel landing gear, played by the 0/400 in the subsequent formu- lation of MitchelTs plans for a massive force of strategic bombers striking deep behind enemy lines cannot be denied. Although the authors did not include light- In the XCO-5, Lieutenant John A. Macready pioneered the upper air, acquiring knowledge that enabled er-than-air ( lta) vehicles in their book, development of the turbosupercharger in time to be a whether by intent or oversight, lta craft do decisive factor in the air war over Germany and Japan. qualify as aircraft: “ a weight-carrying struc- ture for navigation of the air that is supported either by its own buovancy or by the dynamic action of the air against its surfaces.” Accept- ing this definition by Webster, the reader must agree that the famed Hindenburg should have received appropriate consideration. The loss of this dirigible at Lakehurst, New Jersey, in 1937 sounded the death knell for the rigid airship, for military as well as commercial ap- plications. Although there have been periodic attempts to revive the rigid airship during the past 35 years, for all practical purposes the dirigible is gone and with it the dreams and aspirations of those who toiled so diligently through the decades to make it a practical and acceptable aircraft. The Hindenburg did 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW but did these technological advancements McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio, in 1923, the have a greater overall effect on the history of XCO -5 was extensively modified almost im- mankind than the tremendous roles played by mediately for high-altitude flight to test the the Horsa and Waco gliders in helping the turbosupercharger of Dr. Sanford A. Moss Western Allies defeat Nazi Germany? Did not then under early de\'elopment by General these advancements have a lesser lasting effect Electric. New high-lift wings employing the upon our world, despite the present-day exis- Joukowsky StAe-27A airfoil were designed tence of the multiple-wheel landing gear on and built, and the fuselage was remodeled such aircraft as the Lockheed C-5A? considerably to ward off the effects of the Even if one is not disposed to accept this frigid temperatures to which the plane was to reviewers proposal for the tvvo additional cri- be subjected. teria, there are still many other significant air- In this craft Lieutenant John A. Macready craft which satisfy the original three criteria made flight after flight into the unknown established by the authors but not presenteei upper air, some even into the general region in their work. of 40,000 feet. The knowlcdge which this one An excellent example is the XCO -5, an air- man acquired with this one airplane. and craft of little renown but of tremendous tech- which he brought back to earth for analysis, nological importance to the world. Originally made possible the continuing development of designed and built by the Engineering Divi- the turbosupercharger, which ultimately was sion of the U.S. Army Aviation Section at so widely used during World War II. How

The world’s first produetion helicopter, the Sikorsky R-4, had its combat baptism in Burma in 1944, is now looked upon as the progenitor of a definitive vehicle in some present-day warfare. . . . The Martin XB-26H, modified from a TB-26G, first tested and proved the technical feasibility of bicycle landing gears, later used on hundreds o f aircraft. . . . In a Curtiss R 3 C -2 Lieutenant “ Jimmy” Doolittle set a world speed record of 245.7 mph in 1925, 19.1 mph better than that set earlier by Captain Henri Biard in a Supermarine S.4. BOOKS AND IDEAS 83

different might the history of the air war over land, the XB-26H was tested extensively in Germany and Japan have been if the turbo 1946 to prove the technical feasibility of the had not been available for the B-17, B-24, bicycle gear which was later used extensively B-29, P-38, and P-47! Without the knowledge on hundrcds of aircraft, including the usaf gained from Macready’s XC O -5 flights of the B-47, B-52, and U-2, the British Harrier, and 1920s, it is quite possible General Electric the Soviet Bounder. would not have had the turbo ready for mass Another World War II aircraft to which production at the time it was needed so des- the authors failed to credit sufFicient signifi- perately. cance was the Sikorsky R-4. It was not only Bicvcle landing gears, though not entirely a the world’s fírst production helicopter but the post-World War II idea, were certainly not first to be used in a mercy role when on 3 engineered for heavy metal aircraft of high January 1944 it delivered two cases of blood wing Ioadings and high takeoff and landing plasma to Sandy Hook, New Jersey, for the speeds until the Martin XB-26H proved the injured survivors of a destroyer explosion. practicality of such an arrangement. This air- This single mercy flight presaged a future for craft, modified from a standard TB-26G, was the helicopter which few, including the most equipped with tandem main wheels and small visionary, would have believed possible at that outrigger gears for ground stability and ma- time. neuverabilitv. Named the “ Middle River The R-4 was also the first helicopter to be Stump Jumper'’ for Martin's plant in Mary- used for rescue and evacuation in a combat 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW theater. In January 1944 it evacuated a which were included in Milestones of the Air, wounded enlisted man from Air Warning Sta- nor do I wish to infer that my own suggested tion No. F-76, located at Ponyo in the Naga selections are sacrosanct. There is no question Hills of Burma. but that many readers will be able to desig- The initial operational use of the R-4 in nate aircraft of their own choosing which they Burma engendered that elassic statement bv could substantiate as being of greater signifi- the famed Colonel Phil Cochran, in a letter to cance than some which the authors selected or a friend in the States, “Today the ‘egg-beater those which I have proposed. That is the risk went into action and the damn thing acted which any historian, aviation or otherwise, like it had good sense.” T o appreciate this must face whenever he prepares for public statement fully, one must realize that a YR-4 consumption a work that so greatly depends had been rushed by air from the States for upon his personal opinions, interpretations, rescue work in Burma, and once it had been and evaluations. Suffice it to say that the au- assembled at Myitkyina North Strip and had thors have synthesized into one book a tre- taken off on its initial test hop, it presented mendous amount of factual data, and in gen- such a conglomeration of whirling blades and eral their selections are excellent. awkward mannerisms that the old-time fixed- It is my primary purpose to bring to the wing pilots gazed in utter disbelief. Small attention of those readers with minimal back- wonder thev were so greatly amazed when it ground in aviation history that they should be got into the air and then back down to the wary of accepting as gospel all the aircraft in ground in one piece, as they had been told it Milestones of the Air. The book may be con- was supposed to do. sidered as a very accurate, authoritative I cannot help questioning the rationale used source for data on 100 historie aircraft, but to select several other aircraft included in not necessarily the 100 most historie aircraft. Milestones of the Air. For example, with ref- Despite the general excellence of Milestones erence to the Mitsubishi Karigane the authors of the Air, it contains some errors and omis- State that its 1937 flight from Tokyo to Lon- sions that should be noted for those who may don and return “ marked the emergence of eventually use it for research purposes. On Japanese aviation as a momentous force page 52 there is the statement that the Day- ....” (p. 95) This statement is ambiguous, for ton-Wright R. B. Racer was powered by a by 1937 the world had already become cogni- Hall-Scott Liberty Six 6-cylinder engine. This zant that Japanese military aviation had pro- is incorrect, for although the R. B. Racer was gressed far beyond the point of being a mere powered by a Hall-Scott L. 6, the “ L” was token force. Were the Karigane actually so strictly a letter designation selected by the historically significant, it would be much bet- manufacturer and not an abbreviation for the ter remembered by competent aviation histori- famous Liberty. It is true that the L. 6 used ans, whereas in fact it is greatly overshadowred standard Liberty cylinders and valve gear, but by such aircraft as the de Havilland Comet beyond that it was a different power plant. flown by Black and Scott from London to There was a 6-cylinder Liberty, but it was an Melbourne or the Fokker T-2 which made the experimental model only, made by Packard first nonstop flight across the United States. and not Hall-Scott. Could it be that the authors are giving more On page 60 the authors introduce the Fok- weight to “ hindsight of the present” than to ker FVII-3m as the most famous of “ the Fok- “ foresight of the past” ? ker commercial monoplanes of the 1920s and It has not been my intention to be overly 1930s . . . .” Though the material presented is criticai of the authors’ selections of aircraft accurate, I believe that the full significance of BOOKS AND IDEAS 85 the wooden-wing Fokker transport was ig- Southwest Pacific during the first year the nored. While this significance was of a nega- United States was cngaged in World War II, tive value similar to that of the Hindenburg, it was withdrawn in favor of the B-24, which the Fokker most certainly had a deep and had greater range for the long overwater mis- lasting impact upon the development of com- sions that were required. The “ massive em- mercial aviation, particularly in the United plovment” over Japan must be credited to the States. On 31 March 1931, Fokker FX-A, B-29. NC-999E, of Transcontinental and Western In their presentation on the Fairchild Airlines, crashed to earth near Bazaar, Kan- Packet the authors failed to distinguish be- sas, carrying its two-man crew and six passen- tween the C-82 Packet and the C -119 Flying gers to their death. The accident received Boxcar, the lattcr name not even being men- enormous publicity, for one of the passengers tioned. (p. 110) They also failed to point out was the famous Knute Rockne, Xotre Dame that these two aircraft were more different football coach and a leading sports celebrity. than similar, and their statement that the C- When it was learned that the Fokker had lost 119 w^as “ a new and improved version of the the outer section of its left wing while in C-82” is an oversimplification. The one and flight, the public’s reaction was so fierce that, only C-l 19A was originally considered an im- rightly or wrongly, the airlines were forced to proved version of the C-82, even the Air remove their wooden-wing Fokkers from Serv- Force failing to realize the significant differ- ice in order to remain in business. Potential ences between the two aircraft. When Fair- passengers refused to accept the results of an child proposed conducting wind-tunnel tests investigation which found that the wings of on the C-l 19, the Air Force took the position Fokkers still in Service were safe. Instead they that such tests were unnecessary— the planes placed their faith in the metal-wing Ford Tri- were so similar that data accumulated in C-82 motor. The wooden-wing airliner was doomed wind-tunnel tests could be applied to the C- bv this one isolated accident of a Fokker 119 program. However, when the C-119A FX-A. was test-flowm, the Air Force learned how In discussing the Supermarine S.4, the au- wrong it had been, for the aircraft immedi- thors point out that on 13 September 1925 ately evidenced serious stability, control, and Captain Henri Biard set a world's speed rec- structural difficulties that had not been en- ord of 226.6 mph in the plane. After its en- countered with the C-82. Extensive changes gine was tuned and a more efficient propeller were made to the C-119A design to correct was installed (suggesting an even higher speed the deficiencies, but when the C-119B began potential j, the S.4 had an accident and was coming off the production line both Fairchild unable to participate in the 1925 Schneider and the Air Force realized quite forcefully Trophy race, which was won by Lieutenant that the difficulties had not been corrected, Jimmy Doolittle in a “ Curtiss Army biplane particularly with regard to directional and with a speed of 232.57 mph. . . .” (p. 58) longitudinal stability. Various other measures However, King and Taylor fail to mention were taken, such as adding and removing dor- that the day following the Schneider race, sal and ventral fins, but a constantly increas- Doolittle flew this same biplane, the R3C-2, ing accident rate supported the contention to a new world‘s speed record of 245.7 mph. that the C -l 19 had totally different character- There is a glaring historical error in the istics from the C-82. statement regarding “ massive employmcnt” of In 1951-52 Fairchild went to the extreme the B-17 in operations over Japan. (p. 88) of developing another design, the C-119H, to Although the B-17 was used extensively in the correct the problems of the production C -l 19. 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Because of cost and performance factors, how- a B-58A, both X-15s (one of which is on loan ever, the Air Force rejected the C-119H pro- to the Smithsonian Institution), and the only posal. Eventually, in-service C-119s became MiG-15 believed to be on display outside the quite satisfactory through such measures as Iron Curtain. The NC-4 is at the Smith- rewriting the piloFs handbook for single-en- sonian; the Dayton-Wright R. B. Racer is at gine speeds and gross takeoff weights. Never- the Ford Museum near Dearborn, Michigan; theless, the C -119 had quite a gestation pe- and numerous other institutions around the riod, the likes of which the C-82 never en- world have such aircraft as the Me 163 and countered. Me 262, the Sopwith l / 2 Strutter, the Avro The F-102 is referred to as both “ Delta 504, the Mitsubishi Zero, and even a Junkers Darr’ and “ Delta Dagger.” (p. 117) The F- J1 and Ju 57. 102 is the Delta Dagger; the F-106 is the To recapitulate, Messrs. King and Taylor Delta Dart. have produced an interesting and useful book, The general layout of the book is quite well worth its cost. It should be of particular pleasing, but the publisher omitted the page value to the student of aviation history who number on too many pages. The Wright Flyer does not have ready access to all the issues of is listed in the table of contents as being on ]ane’s All the World’s Aircraft since the early page 8, yet the first numbered page is 19. 1900s or other reputable reference works, for it Certainly numbers should have been placed at is a reliable source for obtaining or verifying least on all those pages that are listed under basic historical and technical data on the 100 Contents. Furthermore, the table of contents aircraft presented. Again I caution against would be more useful if alphabetized. using it as the final authority for accepting or In some instances the authors stated where defending those aircraft selected as the 100 certain historie aircraft are preserved for pos- most significant ones in aviation history. terity and can be seen. However, they over- Someone well versed in the historical impor- looked various other aircraft that are also on tance and significance of the XB-70 Valkyrie public exhibit. For example, the U.S. Air could present quite a convincing argument for Force Museum at Wright-Patterson af b, its inclusion in the top 100 aircraft instead of Ohio, has been entrusted with numerous his- or alongside the British-French Concorde. torie aircraft, including the XF-92A, the X-5, Springfield, Ohio The Contributors

Lie l t e n an t General Ceorce B. Siml e r COLONEL RUSSELL H. SMITH (U S M A ; (B.S., Univeraity of Maryland) is Com- M.S., Air Force lnstitute of Technology) mander, Air Training Command. During is Chief. Seminar Division, Air War World War 11 he was Commander, 451 st College Associate Prograin. Hia career Médium Bombardmcnt Squadron. Eng- has included assignments as instructor His Excel l ency Nobuhiko Ushiba. land. His assignments have been in pilot in Air Training Command, tactical Ambas&ador of Japan to the United States, Personnel at Hq USAF and Hq ADC; fighter pilot, B-47 and B*52 aircraft ia « graduate of the Faculty of Law, Professor of Air Science and Tactics, commander, and deputy commander for Tokyo Imperial Univeraity. He has University of Maryland; Director of operations of an F-4 Wing in South serre d as atuché. Berlin; a secretary in Athletics, USAF Academy; Commander, Vietnam. Colonel Smith is a 1971 gradu- the Treatieã Bureao. Tokyo; Third 4520th CCTW, Nellis AFB; in Okinawa Secretary of the Embassy. London, and ate of Air War College. as Comdr. 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, Second Secretary, Cermany. During and Vietnam as Director of Operations. World War II he was assigned to the Political Affairs Bureau. Tokyo. Rejoin- 7AF; and in Cermany as Vice Com- mander in Chief, USAFE. General Simler ing the Mioistry of Foreign Affairs in is a graduate of the National War 1954, he beaded Japan'a first poatwar gorernznent mission to the Soviet Union. College. He has aince been Counaelor of Embaaay, Rangoon; head of the Econocnic Affairs Bureau; and Ambassador to Canada. Ambassador Ushiba achieved the bighest career po«f in the Foreign Service in 1967 aa Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Charles a . R ussel l (J.D., Gcorgetown University; M.À., American Univeraity) COLONEL ARTHUR R. MOORE. JR. ís Chief, Anulysia and Dis6emination (USMA; M.S., Ceorge Washington Uní- Rranch. Counterintelligcnce Division, Di- veraity), ia Commandanl, Squadron •ectorate of Spccial Invcsligationa, Hq Offirer School, Air Univeraity. A com- USAF. wherc he has servcd since 1951. mand pilot and navigator, he has held GENERAL JOHN C. MEYER (B.A.. Dâft With Major Hildner, he has lectured at nperatmnal poaitiona at SAC head* Air Conunand and Staff College and mouth College) it Vice Chief of Staff, quarters and in aeveral bomb winga. USAF. Whtle terving «■ deputy com- USAF Spccial Operations School on Hp wai one of the first twclvc officera insurgcncy in the undcrdcvelopcd world mander, 352d Fighter Group, hc became a**igned to the initial staff and faculty the ieading U.5. aee in Europe in and the role of counterinlelligence in of thr Air Force Academy. Hr in a countcrinsurgcncy. World War II. Other aaaignmcnu have graduate of Squadron Officer School, included USAF Liaiaon Officer. House Naval War College, and Air War College. of Rcpttwnuiivei. Uler aaatatant Hou*e Liaiaoa OAcer. OAce of the Secretary of the Air Force. General Meyer has held u n o u i poaitiona ín operations and baa been commander of two air division* and a numbered air force. He Director of Operafiona. The Joint Staff, Office of the Joint Cbiefs of Staff, prior to hia prevení «Mifnmeni ia 1969. 87 Virginia Univcrsity), is a Ph.D. candi- five years bcfore acccpting his present date in inlernational affuirs, Univcrsity position. Mr. Frey is author of several of Pittsburgh. During his military career Air Force histories and a contributor to he served in administrative positions at flight periodicaU. Hq USAF; with the U.S. Air Attaché in Taiwan; with USAF Rccruiting Serv- ice; and at Hq SHAPE, Paris, for sevcn years. He is also a political Science instructor at the New Keusington Cam- pus, Pennsylvania State University.

Major Robert E. Hil dn e r (M.S., Univcrsity of Colorado) is Chiei, Western Hemi9phere Section, Ánalysis and Dis- semination Branch. Counterintelligence Division, Directorate of Special Investiga- tions, Hq USAF. He has served in counterintelligence with Office of Special Inve9tigations in Japan, 1962-65; as Commander, OSI Detachmcnt, Da Nang Air Base. Yietnam. for a year; and preceding his current assignment was Chief. Middle East. África, South Asia (MEAFSA) Section of his prcsent branch.

DR. RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY ( P h .D ., Uni- versity of Pennsylvania) is Professor of History, Temple University. He formerly taught at the University of Pennsylvania and Drexel Institute of Technology. Dr. Weigley. once trustee of the American Military Institute, has published several books un military history as well as ROYAL D. Frey, L ie u t e n ant COLONEL, articles in Encyclopaedia Britannica and USAFR (R et). (M.S., Ohio State Uni- historical journals. He has been editor versity) . is Chief. Research Division, of the quarterly journal, Pennsylvania Air Force Museum. A pilot and prisoncr History. of war in Europe during World War II, he then became historian. Hq AMC. In 1951 he was recalled to active duty as Sênior Master Serceant Marshal l E. an Air Defense Command pilot. He was WILCHER. USAF (Retired), (M.A., West Command Staff Editor. Hq AMC, for

% AWARD

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “ The Civilian Analysts, in Their Pride and Their Fali” by Brigadier General Noel F. Parrish, USAF (R et), as the outstanding article in the July-August 1971 issue of Air University Review. C olonel E ldon W. D owns, USAF EDITORIAL STAFF Editor

J ack H. M ooney Managing Editor

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Laun C. Smith, J r ., USAF Associate Editor

M ajo r Edward V al l entiny, USAF Associate Editor

E dmund O. Barker Financial and Administrative Manager

J ohn A. W estcott, Jr . Art Director and Production Manager

E nrique Gasto n Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition

L ia M id o s i May Patterso n Associate Editor, Portuguese Language Edition

WlLLlAM J. D e P a OLA Art Editor and Illustrator

C aptain Clemmer L. S laton, USAF Editorial Project Officer

C olonel Jack L. G ia n n in i Hq Military Airlift Command

C olonel Elbert T. H ovatter ADVISERS Hq Air Force Logistics Command

C olonel John W. K eeler Hq Air Training Command

C olonel Arthur S. R agen Hq United States Air Force Academy

C olonel Boone Rose, J r . Hq Tactical Air Command

C olonel John B. V oss Hq Strategic Air Command

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Arthur F. M c C onnell, Jr . Hq Aerospace Defense Command

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel John H. Scrivner, J r . Hq Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

D r . H aro l d M. H elfman Hq Air Force Systems Command

F rancis W. J ennings SAF Office of Information

ATTENTION Air University Review is published to stimulate pro- fessional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents reflect the opinions of its authors or the investiga- tions and conclusions of its editors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Department of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. STATES AIR FORCE AIRREVIEW UNIVERSITY

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