Canadian Military History

Volume 19 Issue 4 Article 4

2010

What was the point? Raiding in the Summer of 1917

Geoffrey Jackson

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Recommended Citation Geoffrey Jackson "What was the point? Raiding in the Summer of 1917." Canadian Military History 19, 4 (2010)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : What was the point? Raiding in the Summer of 1917 What was the point? Raiding in the Summer of 1917

Geoffrey Jackson

anadian military historians institutionalized in the winter of have argued that through the Abstract: This article examines the 1916-1917 when British General C effectiveness of raiding by the 4th ’ flexibility and Headquarters ordered every British Canadian Division in July and August initiative, the Canadians had become 1917. The 4th Division carried out and dominion division to carry out the masters of trench raiding by extensive raiding during this period, at least two raids per month.4 This 1917.1 Raiding, so the argument goes, however, the raiding did not give the may have been done for intra-allied had a number of benefits. It gave 4th Division any noticeable advantage political considerations, so that Field when they attacked the city of Lens at the Canadian Corps an offensive Marshal Douglas Haig, commander- the end of August. This paper concludes esprit de corps, helped soldiers and that raiding did not bring any benefit for in-chief of the British Expeditionary junior officers escape the supposed the division. Force (BEF), could point to the large monotony of trench warfare, seriously number of BEF raids as a rebuttal if undermined German morale, and he seemed to have at least temporarily the hard-pressed French complained not the least, allowed the troops cast aside his reservations about the of British “inactivity.”5 That said, by and Canadian headquarters to gain cost of raiding, and during the next the summer of 1917 not every division invaluable intelligence about enemy few months set an intensive raiding in the BEF took part in raiding dispositions as well as familiarity program for units. operations. Notably, the Australian with the terrain over which the Corps A closer examination of the Imperial Force (AIF) had stopped might soon be attacking.2 However, raiding program mounted by the 4th mounting such attacks, having raiding was also seen to carry with Division in the summer of 1917 shows concluded that they generated little of it certain costs, and at times the that the operations undertaken, military value. A company sergeant- Canadian Corps frankly debated its though successful in their own right, major of the Australian 14th Battalion usefulness. As Tim Cook noted in failed to generate many of these tersely summed up the Australian Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the supposed benefits for the division’s position: “Raids are not worth the Great War, 1917-1918, while main attack on Lens launched in mid- cost, none of the survivors want to August. In this instance, at least, it go anymore.”6 The abandonment recognized the needs to be asked what was actually of raiding by an elite attacking importance of raids in providing learned from the raids, and equally formation like the AIF illustrates that essential battle skills for his troops, important, how was the information not all BEF units viewed raiding as he also knew the casualties sustained employed? This paper will argue playing a significant role in achieving in these missions were taking out that on the 4th Division front during higher troop morale or gaining vital his best men. When he raised his July and August of 1917, even if information about the Germans. concerns with Byng, the senior corps individual attacks were successful, Nevertheless, senior officers of commander chided him for being too the overall benefit from raiding did the Canadian Corps continued to cautious…3 not warrant the cost incurred. give raiding a high priority during From early 1916 onward, trench the summer of 1917, and this is When Currie was promoted to lead raiding had become a routine practice essential context for the raids by the Canadian Corps in June of 1917, for the Canadian Corps. It was further 4th Division in the Hill 70/Lens

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sector. Very large raids they faced the most organized at the corps difficult conditions of level using multiple any of the corps’ four brigades and battalions divisions, and suffered w e r e l a u n c h e d i n the heaviest casualties. May and June as part N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e of the Scarpe battles. infamous raid on Hill Carefully planned, with 145 mounted five weeks the officers and men prior to Vimy, in which training over taped several of Watson’s courses, these were battalions were all broadly successful in but annihilated, has the judgment of G.W.L. raised questions among Nicholson, the CEF’s historians as to the official historian.7 One 4254 PA Canada (LAC) Library and Archives battlefield judgement such “large” raid, of Watson and his executed around the GSO 1, Lieutenant- same time period as C o l o n e l W i l l i a m the 4th Division’s Ironside, in 1917. 9 many raids on the Lens Watson’s meteoric front, was launched rise from battalion to on 23 July by the divisional commander 3rd Division’s 116th in a matter of months Battalion. The objective spoke of his political for this battalion-sized connections and savvy raid was the railway a s m u c h o r m o r e embankment in the than his operational southern section of Lens. p e r f o r m a n c e . A n The raid successfully outward self-confidence reached the railway seems to have masked embankment where insecurities, with the vicious fighting broke result that Watson out. The Canadians could be susceptible succeeded in blowing to pressure from above Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie, commander of the Canadian Corps

10 1352 PA LAC up a series of dugouts (left) and Major-General David Watson, commander of 4th Canadian to get “results.” For a n d c a p t u r e d 5 3 Division, both supported trench raids. h i s p a r t , I r o n s i d e prisoners before pulling was a brilliant young back after 35 minutes. For its efforts, raids) which were planned and British staff officer, but arrogant and the 116th suffered 74 casualties.8 executed at the brigade and battalion ambitious. Watson relied on the more What useful information the raiders level and sustained day-in and day- experienced professional as a mentor, gleaned has not been looked at, out, usually leading up to a major which was precisely the reason however, as the 44th Battalion would attack, the nature of the 4th Division why Ironside had been seconded discover a month later to the day, the operations that are the focus of the to the newly formed 4th Division formidable German defences around present study. in the spring of 1916. But there was the railway embankment were still in B y the summer of 1917, evidence Watson, though a quick place and undiminished. In practice, Major-General David Watson had learner who was clearly maturing as the Scarpe as well as the 116th commanded the 4th Division through a field commander, still relied on his Battalion operations constituted two major battles – the latter stages GSO1 too much, and at the wrong massive “one-off raids” – basically of the Somme and Vimy Ridge – as times, particularly considering the formal attacks followed by planned well as several lesser operations. The degree to which Ironside’s ego and withdrawals. These were in sharp division and its commander fought impetuosity could interfere with contrast to the more conventional capably in their first engagement, his own thinking. The result was “minor operations” (as the Canadian and also acquitted themselves rather that neither acted as a check on Corps referred to traditional-style well in the Vimy assault, considering the other’s decision-making. Quite

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rightly, Watson saw his responsibility respective brigades in action during were still integrating large numbers as carrying out higher orders – the war, leading them with distinction of junior officer, NCO and enlisted if ordered to raid by Currie, he and much impressing Generals Byng reinforcements into their ranks, a would raid, and enthusiastically and and Currie in the process. As much time-consuming process.13 unquestioningly. His command, the or more than any other brigadier in Watson commanded in a collegial CEF’s most junior division, would the corps, Odlum was a disciple of style, regularly seeking not only not be found wanting in élan.11 raiding, having personally led many Ironside’s opinion in particular, but The 4th Division was blessed with such operations during his time also the views of his brigadiers, at least capable brigadiers, all hand-picked by with the 7th Battalion, even while when matters directly affected them. Watson. The British regular leading serving as its commanding officer. By predisposition, and sometimes the 10th, Edward Hilliam, was made All three were personally loyal to still by necessity, Ironside exercised of stern Imperial stuff, a “fighter” but Watson and respectful of Ironside’s greater “command” responsibilities also a man whose relationship with undeniable talents. Overall, the than were normally associated with his Canadian subordinates steadily working relationship among brigade his position, namely the organization deteriorated until he eventually had and divisional headquarters was a and coordination and a significant to be replaced. The commanders of smooth one.12 role in the operational control of the 11th and 12th Brigades – Victor Collectively, the 12 infantry the division. In the raiding on the Odlum and James MacBrien – were battalions making up the division Lens front, Watson was responding Canadians, the former an energetic were ably commanded by experienced to orders from corps headquarters, prewar militia officer and the latter officers, as the fighting during the those generally emanating from a regular with staff officer training remainder of the war would confirm. Currie’s very capable chief of staff, and a more stolid personality. They But all the units had suffered heavy Brigadier-General Percy Radcliffe. In were the only men to command their combat losses earlier in the year, and consultation with Ironside, Watson

Lieutenant-Colonel William Ironside was the GSO 1 (senior staff officer) of in 1917. Ironside, a young British officer, was considered brilliant but arrogant and ambitious. His views held great sway as Major-General Watson relied on him as a mentor. LAC PA 1352 PA LAC

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Major-General Watson was fortunate to have three capable brigadiers – Edward Hilliam of 10th Brigade (left), of 11th Brigade (centre) and James MacBrien of 12th Brigade. These men were the only commanders of their respective brigades during the war and earned the respect of Watson, Byng and Currie.

would then issue directions to time to organize and carry out raids. they were crossing. No records from Hilliam, Odlum or MacBrien and The raids examined here were not just these so-called “minor operations” their staffs to work out the specifics thrown together to showcase specific – the Canadian Corps’ euphemism of the raids with the battalions tasked units’ skills or to keep the men in an for raiding – demonstrate that the to carry them out, though the input aggressive frame of mind. 4th Division’s raiders brought back from battalions seems to have been Foremost among the arguments any information of such importance quite limited in practice throughout for the usefulness of raiding put that it warranted a change in overall the corps. During July and the first forward by the Canadian Corps was plans, such as altering the axis three weeks of August, raids were the acquisition of practical knowledge of the main attack on Lens. The dispatched into Lens from one or of the enemy-held territory over tactical realities of Lens and the more of the 4th Division’s battalions which the troops would advance infamous Green Crassier position in an apparent rotation (all battalions during a main assault.16 This holds dictated the direction of the attacks participated) about every three some truth, though through the decided at brigade and divisional days. After the raids, the “results” diligent employment of existing level, regardless of any information were collected by the battalion, maps, trench observation posts, and brought back by raiders. forwarded to brigade and then to aerial reconnaissance the terrain At Lens, most tellingly, any divisional headquarters where the was generally very well known. information the raiders may have intelligence acquired from all the Nevertheless, it was still argued gained to familiarize the troops with raids was collated, classified and that the raiding troops would gain a the ground and enemy dispositions summarized. This information was better insight into the details of the simply did not pay off. Almost then placed at the disposal of the Germans’ trenches and gun positions. immediately after the 4th Division divisional commander as well as the Raiding the forward German lines in launched its attack on 21 August corps commander and his staff.14 front of Lens during July and August there was confusion as to where to Tim Cook has argued that 1917 was done during both the hours go, and the withering fire from the within the Canadian Corps raiding of daylight and darkness.17 At night, German defenders fighting from became a very competitive activity. with limited visibility, learning the hidden pillboxes that raiding (and This growing competitiveness had lay of the land and the details of all other intelligence gathering for detrimental effects, as both the plans German defences would have been that matter) had failed to locate and operations were rushed.15 While extremely difficult. During the day, began to decimate the attackers.18 this may have been the general case the raiders also would have faced The 50th Battalion’s effort to push for the Canadian Corps, during the the obvious problem that attacking into the ruins of the city was typical summer of 1917 the 4th Division in broad daylight would bring – of the intelligence failure on the had a clear purpose in the upcoming their own exposure – although they Lens front. The intelligence reports operation at Lens, and had plenty of could at least clearly see the terrain used by Lieutenant-Colonel Lionel

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Page, commanding officer of the 50th the 4th Canadian Division believed attack, with their forward positions Battalion, stated that the German they had identified the German units fully manned and their artillery front (Aloof Trench) was weakly facing them, the 8th and 11th Reserve accurately registered on the Canadian held.19 Unfortunately for Page and Divisions. Major-General Watson start line. The assault companies of his men, these reports were wrong and his staff viewed the former as the 50th Battalion had to endure a LAC PA 2004 PA LAC and the 50th battalion ran into heavy having very high fighting ability savage German bombardment for German resistance. In the words and morale, in contrast to the latter 25 minutes before even commencing of one signaller: “[The Germans] which they categorized as average.23 their attack.27 The Canadians then launched a powerful attack against Despite this assessment Watson and met stiff resistance from the forward- our decimated ranks with such his staff did not alter their attack most German posts whose machine ferocity that [their] onslaught drove plan to take advantage of the sector guns had bloody effect. Overall, us back to our original position.”20 held by the less effective division. out of five Canadian battalions that Another serious intelligence failure In any case, the raiding and other attacked on 21 August, only two that occurred despite the extensive forms of intelligence gathering were reached their planned objectives – the raiding and patrolling in Lens only partially right, as the German German front lines – after a full day contributed to the selection of the force opposing them in the Lens of fighting, and the other three had to wrong route for the 44th Battalion’s area actually consisted solely of the return to their jumping off points.28 attack on the Green Crassier two supposedly weaker 11th Reserve Though the claim that raiding was days later. Lieutenant-Colonel Division.24 effective at lowering the German Reginald Davies had decided, based It has also been argued that frontline troops’ morale is impossible on supposedly sound raiding and one of the main goals of raiding to measure, it was irrelevant in scouting intelligence, that the chosen was to keep the Germans “taut and the Lens case. The 11th Reserve route to the Green Crassier was only nervous”25 and that it “forced them Division had been replaced by the lightly defended.21 Just the opposite to abandon their forward posts and elite 1st Guards Reserve Division was true. As the Canadians made patrolling, and limited their ability on 20 August, a development the their way to the Green Crassier, to detect attacks which was being Canadians were unaware of until the route was defended by tunnels prepared against them…keeping their attack commenced less than 24 and hidden German pill boxes that German morale low.” 26 On the hours later.29 had been built into the rubble of Lens front, however, the Germans, Another benefit claimed for Lens. Hard fighting ensued and the despite extensive Canadian raiding, raiding was that it stopped the Canadians were forced to fall back. were thoroughly prepared when Germans from sending out their own The 44th Battalion suffered 260 the Canadian Corps launched its raids and reconnaissance patrols, casualties in its assault on the Green Crassier.22 These were far from the only examples of the vital questions that intelligence from raiding was supposed to answer, but had not. In summary, the raids mounted around Lens in the summer of 1917 did not gain information that helped Canadian commanders and staff officers understand how best to navigate the terrain in major assaults or how the enemy was deployed.

* * * * * Bechthold ©2010 Mike by Map drawn nother often hailed benefit of Araiding was the acquisition of information, usually from prisoners, about enemy units, and in particular their strength, morale, and combat readiness. Yet how useful was this information? Through raiding and other forms of intelligence gathering,

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and thus helped to mask Canadian morning of the 9th. The object of importance for Canadian intelligence, activities. However, historian Bill this raid was to secure a prisoner and flee before the enemy had time to Rawling, who argues that raiding for identification purposes [and] the respond. On 28 July the 87th Battalion was aggressively pursued by both raiders brought back two…33 carried out a raid against the 11th sides over the course of the war, states Reserve Division for identification that: “[German] raids continued even Though the diary mentions that the purposes. After a sharp skirmish, as the Canadians became more active battalion suffered casualties, it does in which three Canadians were in trying to gain information for not say how many. The purpose of killed and four wounded, the patrol upcoming offensives.”30 This held the raid was to gain information from returned with neither useful German true on the 4th Division’s front during prisoners, information which had documents nor prisoners.35 One is the summer of 1917. Even with the already been acquired from earlier hard pressed to see how this raid Canadian artillery pummelling the raids, and which was unlikely to could have raised the confidence of German front lines, and the division alter the plans one way or another the men in the 87th Battalion. With carrying out a very aggressive raiding during the final days before the an approaching large scale offensive, program, the Germans were still main assault. In the lead up to the moreover, the “monotony of trench actively patrolling no-man’s-land Lens attack, the raiders did acquire life” should not have set in on this as confirmed by the 38th Battalion German documents and maps, but front, as the troops had only been war diary.31 Raiding was supposed these did not change the plans that moved into their positions in mid- to gather vital information, and the had been laid out in mid-July – before July.36 Instead of sending a constant German dugouts often contained the raiding had even commenced. stream of raids into the German lines, maps and other documents that these soldiers, a great many of them in Canadian hands would help * * * * * replacements for the division’s heavy the corps plan its assaults more t was argued during the war – losses at Vimy Ridge, would surely effectively. Raiders were also under Iand continues to be argued – that have benefited more by focusing on orders to bring back prisoners who raids were justified for enhancing preparations for the main assault. could be interrogated on everything the attacking soldiers’ élan and thus The number of troops assigned to from issues bearing on the upcoming strengthening the Canadian Corps’ a particular raid during the summer battle to how the German home front battlefield prowess. Senior officers of 1917 varied, usually from eight was coping with the demands of the thought that junior officers and other to 30 men. In what was typical war.32 A raid by the 75th Battalion ranks would become bored and for the organization of small raids illustrated the importance placed on restless with the monotony of trench at the time, on 29 July the 54th capturing prisoners. As the war diary life, and raiding was something Battalion sent out a party comprising recorded matter-of-factly: that would break this up.34 Raiding one non-commissioned officer, two demanded a lot of initiative, fitness, riflemen, two rifle grenadiers and A raid on the front line was carried and bravery as the raiders had to enter three bombers.37 A larger raid would out by the platoons under Lieuts. the enemy’s lines, either sabotage have committed a force of about Brunton and Bradfield on the German trenches or grab something of 30 men led by a lieutenant but

Canadian soldiers examine concrete German gun positions in the destroyed suburbs of Lens following the battle. CWM EO-1857a

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otherwise would have new battle theories and been made up of similar tactics [and that] it was proportions of NCOs, the trench patrol and bombers, grenadiers raid that became the and riflemen. In August, laboratory of battle.”47 when the attack on Hill Perhaps this was true on 70 was approaching, the quiet fronts in the long

raiding parties of the 4th CWM EO-3852 months between major Division progressively operations. It stretches grew in the attempt to credibility, however, confuse the Germans that while preparing as to where the corps’ f o r a n i m m i n e n t main thrust would fall. assault by three of The 87th Battalion, for the corps’ divisions instance, launched a there would be tactical company sized raid on experimentation. 4 8 12 August.38 None of the war diaries, Some raids might operational orders, suffer no casualties at or directives from A German bunker near Lens, photographed in September 1917. all, such as one on 12 battalion, brigade, and August by the 38th divisional commands Battalion, though this was a rarity.39 of the land.43 Soldiers sent to scout the mention anything about raiding being Examination of the war diaries of route that the 44th Battalion would intended to generate new tactics or the battalions of the 4th Division take into Lens and up the Green ideas that would be employed in confirms that the raiding parties Crassier reported back that the route the assault on Lens. Rather the usually suffered five or six casualties, was relatively clear of Germans.44 documentation exclusively concerns though there are instances of much Four days later, when the 44th intelligence gathering.49 heavier losses. An 87th Battalion Battalion attacked on this “relatively In the summer of 1917, intelligence raid on 1 August miscarried when clear route,” it turned out that the gained from a number of different the Germans became aware of its scouts had been wrong. Allen Hart, sources made the information presence and dropped gas shells a private in the battalion, recounted raiders brought back less significant. on top of the men, inflicting eleven after the war how unprepared they Gathering information on the enemy’s casualties.40 In another instance, from were for the attack into Lens and up forward defences came from a wide the 102nd Battalion’s war diary: “a the Green Crassier – “Well of course range of sources including existing raiding party proceed[ed] up the road everything was anything but lovely maps, aerial observation, interviews …the crater was entered and their because these boys got over there with local citizens, diligent forward [sic] in successfully bombed, but the and it was – it was no small show, it observers, the experiences of BEF lip of the crater facing the wrong way was a big show, and it hadn’t been units previously engaged in the we had no cover and were compelled realized how big an undertaking same sector, “quiet” patrolling, the by heavy machine gun and rifle fire to it was…”45 The 44th Battalion was interception of German wireless withdraw.”41 The casualties suffered involved in vicious street fighting messages, in addition to raiding.50 were four other ranks killed and where they suffered 260 casualties.46 Confirmation, for example, that seven wounded.42 The disastrous attacks into Lens the preparatory shelling severely During July and the first and against the Green Crassier disrupted the Germans’ front line three weeks of August, raids were demonstrated that the intelligence defences came from intercepted dispatched into Lens by one or more from all sources, including raiding, wireless communications: “the British of the 4th Division’s 12 infantry was a failure, and that many enemy [sic] by destructive fire lasting for

CWM EO-1857a Battalions about every three days. strong points had in fact not been four weeks have turned the foremost One private boasted before the attack located. German positions into a shell hole that “we even know the names of area like Flanders.”51 Of course, the streets we are to march up and * * * * * these results had also been picked the actual houses we are to mop up” istorians have argued that up by aerial photography. Raiding but the troops were mistaken in their H“by raiding and patrolling, confirmed such reports, at the cost of belief they had a good feel for the lay the Canadians experimented with unnecessary casualties, and seemed

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Aerial photographs, such as this composite image of the northern half of Lens taken on 9 August 1917, provided a great deal of essential intelligence for the Canadian Corps.

like a high risk activity compared the formation’s mission to deceive but were silent on the raiding.54 As to other more passive intelligence- the German defenders into believing Major-General Edward Morrison, gathering methods. that the primary assault would be on commander of the Canadian Corps Most historians agree that raiding Lens rather than Hill 70, where the field artillery, subsequently wrote was an inherently limited activity, 1st and 2nd Divisions were in fact to of the role his guns had played in in the sense that raids could not make main effort a few days before convincing the Germans that the penetrate very far into enemy lines, the 4th Division’s attack on Lens. main attack was Lens: “to our great usually only reaching the Germans’ Fourth Division strived mightily to satisfaction the enemy put down first line of defence. In an area attract the enemy’s attention to Lens, a tremendous barrage in front of such as Lens, the pulverized ruins placing dummy tanks in the sector Lens and Avion…He was entirely CWM EO-1794 of a small city, it was especially facing the town, subjecting the town outmanoeuvred...and by the time difficult for raiding troops to find to heavier artillery shelling than the Germans realized their mistake their way. Getting useful information Hill 70, and sending more raids into the attacking troops [at Hill 70] from beyond the front lines by Lens than the surrounding areas.52 were in their final objective.”55 The raiding alone would have been very As many historians have argued, raids could only have confirmed the challenging. At best, the information artillery played a crucial role in the Germans in their misapprehension gathered from raids could only been Canadian Corps’ success throughout that the main attack would be against of limited use, since the 4th Division’s the Great War. Hill 70 and Lens Lens, but the after-action interviews assault was planned to press much were no different.53 In interviews leave little doubt that the artillery farther into Lens than raiders had conducted after the attack, German bombardment was the key to the been able to reconnoitre. prisoners often mentioned how successful deception.56 The 4th Division’s raids may have fierce the machine gun barrage or Certainly the Lens sector was a been more effective in contributing to artillery bombardments had been, unique situation for raiding in the

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Canadian Corps’ history. The 4th documents at the divisional and it was actually misleading, causing Division’s attack into the town on corps level confirm that it was overconfidence among the attackers 21-24 August demonstrated that thought success at Hill 70 would when the main assault went in. As for fighting in the ruins of a built-up rely to a significant degree on the disrupting the Germans, one is forced area posed daunting challenges, and 4th Division misleading the Germans to conclude that the raiding program underscored the unique difficulties into believing that the main thrust had no great effect. that the raiding program in that of the coming Canadian attack was This paper solely analyzes a six- same area had encountered.57 Yet, the going to be directed at Lens.59 Perhaps week raiding campaign carried out CWM 19940001-436 raids carried out in July and August the meaning of the intelligence by the 4th Division of the Canadian were viewed as being successful, gathered on other issues (such as Corps at Lens in 1917. To establish if and not just by the 4th Division’s how well defended Lens was, how these conclusions have validity over own commanders. The participating booby-trapped the rubble and how a longer period – in other words, soldiers did not report difficulties disorienting navigating through the that raiding did not serve as vital different from those encountered in town would be for the attackers) was a role in the CEF as much of the raids carried out over other types of ignored in pursuit of the overarching historical wisdom asserts, and that ground. They were confident about goal for the raids: trying to confuse there would have been few adverse the intelligence gleaned from their the Germans about where the main effects on the corps’ operational prisoners and the other information thrust of the Canadian Corps’ assault effectiveness if it had been reduced they brought back from their forays would fall. Concerned that the 4th or perhaps even eliminated – would into German lines. A 12th Infantry Division’s feinting role succeed, corps require a far more extensive study Brigade report that “daylight raids headquarters may have been focusing of raiding operations. What is clear, were [sent] out from 72nd Bn., on certain questions about Lens and however, is that the paradigm that and gained valuable information misinterpreting, downplaying or raiding was a worthwhile activity as to the enemy defences and his even ignoring other information that must be questioned, as Canadian method of holding the line opposite had been gathered which would have military historians have recently our front” was typical of opinion been important for the second phase begun to do. Yet arguments that on the utility of the raids.58 This of operations, the attack on Lens there was a cult of competitiveness confidence demonstrates that the itself. in the Canadian Corps and that raids raids were working as the Canadians By 1917, raiding was an activity lost their effectiveness because of intended. The disappointing results most of the BEF engaged in religiously increasingly reckless behaviour do of the 4th Division’s main attacks – only the Australians considered not seem relevant in this particular starkly illustrate that the “valuable raiding ineffective. Analyzing the study. The 4th Division raids were information” the 12th Brigade had multitude of raids carried out in carefully planned and carried out received was an illusion. the summer of 1917 in front of Lens with specific goals in mind over a One reason why the raiding might shows that for the most part the period of weeks. They were viewed have been ineffective on the Lens actual operations were successfully as successful, and the information front is that the information gathered carried out.60 In sum, however, garnered from the raiders was used – may have been misinterpreted. most of the intelligence gained it just happened to have had very little Though the war diaries and after- through raiding was either of little of value. It is worth noting that in the battle reports do not mention the importance, redundant or obtainable summer of 1918, the Canadian Corps CWM EO-1794 underlying purpose of these raids, by alternative means. In some cases did not partake in raiding leading up

A shell bursts in the outskirts of Lens, August 1917.

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to one of its most successful attacks, 14. David Love, A Call to Arms: The 43. LAC, MG 30 E 488, William C. Morgan Organization and Administration of Canada’s Papers, diary, 24 July 1917. the . Instead, it was Military in World War One (Winnipeg: 44. LAC, RG 9 III C 1, vol. 3851, folder 63, felt that the element of surprise Bunker to Bunker Books, 1999), p.14. File 9, “4th Canadian Division Operation would bring much more benefit 15. Cook, Shock Troops, p.61. Order No. 52,” 19 August 1917. 16. Godefroy, “A Lesson in Success,” p.25. 45. RG 41 B III 1, vol. 10, 44th Battalion, Allen for the attacking Canadians than 17. Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG Hart interview any information raiding would 9 III C I vol.3850 folder 61, file 1, Lens: 46. LAC, RG 9 III C 1, vol. 3850 folder 62, file have gleaned about, or the chaos it Main file: Army and Flank Corps. 4, Report on the Attack on the “Green 18. LAC, RG 9 III C 1,vol. 3851 folder 63, Crassier” by the 44th Canadian Infantry, would have sewn in, the enemy’s file 9, Report on Operations by 50th 23 August 1917. forward defences. The extensive Battalion from August 17th/18th to 47. Cook, Shock Troops, p.54. employment of raiding in the Lens August 25th/26th, 1917, 27 August 1917. 48. The troops leading up the attacks on Hill 19. Ibid., 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade 70 and Lens spent time practicing new sector proved of marginal use and Operations, c. September 1917. tactics outlined in a document that had the resources and effort expended 20. Victor Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No been issued by then Lieutenant-General could have been channelled into Man’s Land (Ottawa: CEF Books, 2000), Julian Byng specifically for the Canadian p.139. Corps. “Notes on the Attack” released different preparations which would 21. LAC, RG 9 III C 1, vol. 3850 folder 62, in May, covered the training needed for have been more beneficial to the Lens file 4, Report on the Attack on the ‘Green success in the “modern” attack. It should operation’s success. Perhaps in the Crassier’ by the 44th Canadian Infantry, be noted that the tactical innovations that 23 August 1917. were mentioned in this document were end the raids of the 4th Division in 22. Ibid. also being implemented by the BEF. LAC, the summer of 1917 did not matter. 23. Ibid., folder 61, file 1 G.435/25-15-1, RG 9, III C3, vol.4028, folder 17, file 20, Canadian Corps Scheme of Operations, 26 “Notes on the Attack,” 21 May 1917. July 1917. Precisely how they determined 49. LAC, RG 9 III D 3, vol. 4943, WD, 75th the morale of the German divisions was Battalion, 9 August 1917. Notes not spelled out in the report. 50. LAC, RG 9 III C 3, vol. 4026 folder 11, file 24. LAC, RG 9 III C 3, vol. 4041 folder 25, file 10, “German Wireless Extract,” 20 August 2, “Appreciation of Enemy’s Defences 1917. 1. See Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians and Disposition around Hill 70,” 19 July 51. Ibid. Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918 1917. 52. LAC, RG 9 III C 1, vol. 3850 folder 61, file (Toronto: Viking, 2008), pp.59-61, 25. Tim Cook, “‘A Proper Slaughter’: The 4, “Artillery Appreciation of the situation Andrew Godefroy, “A Lesson in Success: March 1917 Gas Raid at Vimy Ridge,” with reference to proposed attack on Hill the Calonne Trench Raid 17 January Canadian Military History 8, no.2 (1999), 70,” 11 July 1917. 1917,” Canadian Military History 8, no.2 p.9. 53. On why artillery was so crucial both Cook, (1999), and Kenneth Radley, We Lead 26. Godefroy, “A Lesson in Success,”, p.26. Shock Troops and Rawling, Surviving Others Follow: First Canadian Division 27. LAC, RG 9 III C 1, vol. 3851 folder 63, Trench Warfare offer excellent arguments. 1914-1919 (Toronto: Vanwell Publishing, file 9, Report on Operations by 50th 54. LAC, RG 9 III C 1, vol. 3940 folder 43, file 2006) p.369. Battalion from August 17th/18th to 1, “Employment of Machine-guns at Hill 2. Dan Jenkins, “The Other Side of the Hill: August 25th/26th, 1917, 27 August 1917. 70,” c. August 1917. Combat Intelligence in the Canadian 28. Geoffrey Jackson, “Anything but lovely: 55. Edward Morrison, “Vimy and Hill 70,” Corps,” Canadian Military History 10, no.2 The Canadian Corps at Lens in the Toronto Star Weekly, 24 April 1928. (2001), pp.7-26. Summer of 1917,” Canadian Military 56. Ibid. 3. Cook, Shock Troops, p.61. History 17, no. 1(2008), p.9. 57. Jackson, “‘Anything but lovely.’” 4. Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: 29. Geoffrey Jackson, “Hill 70 and Lens, the 58. LAC, RG 9 III D 3, vol. 4938, WD, 12th Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914- Forgotten Battles: The Canadian Corps in Infantry Brigade, 5 August 1917. 1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto the Summer of 1917” (unpublished MSS 59. LAC, RG 9 III C 1, vol. 3850 folder 61, file Press, 1992), p.102. thesis, University of Calgary, 2007), p.53. 4, “Artillery Appreciation of the situation 5. Ibid., p. 102. 30. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.101. with reference to proposed attack on Hill 6. Peter Pedersen, The Anzacs: Gallipoli to the 31. LAC, RG 9 III D 3, vol. 4938, War Diary 70,” 11 July 1917. Western Front (Victoria: Penguin, 2007), (WD), 38th Battalion, 1 August 1917. 60. “Successful” meaning the attack plan p.122. 32. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.112. was carried out, and with acceptable 7. G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary 33. LAC, RG 9 III D 3, vol. 4943, WD, 75th casualties, not that valuable intelligence Force: The Official History of the Canadian Battalion, 9 August 1917. was necessarily gleaned. Army in the First World War 1914-1918 34. Cook, “‘A Proper Slaughter,’” p.9. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1964), pp.279- 35. LAC, RG 9 III D 3, vol. 4945, WD, 87th 283. Battalion, 28 July 1917. 8. Ibid., p.287. 36. LAC, RG 24 vol. 1832, file G.A.Q. 9. Patrick Brennan, “Major-General David 37. LAC, RG 9 III D 3, vol. 4847, WD, 54th Watson: A Critical Appraisal of Canadian Battalion, 29 July 1917. Generalship in the Great War,” contained 38. Ibid., vol. 4945, WD, 87th Battalion, 12 in Andrew Godefroy, ed., Great War August 1917. Geoffrey Jackson is a PhD Candidate Commands: Historical Perspectives on 39. Ibid., vol. 4723, WD, 38th Battalion, 31 at the Centre for Military and Strategic Canadian Army Leadership 1914-1918 July 1917. Studies at the University of Calgary. He (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence 40. Ibid., vol. 4945, WD, 87th Battalion, 1 is currently working on his dissertation, Academy Press, 2010),p.122. August 1917. which is a comparative study between 10. Ibid., p.122. 41. Ibid., vol. 4967, WD, 102nd Battalion, 5 the Canadian 4th Division and the 11. Ibid., p.123. August 1917. British 62nd Division during the First 12. Ibid., p.124. 42. The war diaries do not mention the size of World War. 13. Ibid., p124. the 102nd Battalion’s raid, but do specify that the raiders came from D Company.

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Jackson - Raiding 1917.indd 10 1/24/2011 12:29:27 PM