Source: (2012, January 30). New York Times Hypes Israeli Attack On Iran . Retrieved Oct 15, 2012, from http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/?p=42157 Amaliateh Akhareh Donya Final Draft Rev. 1 16 October 2012 Source: (2012, August 31). Israel in a limbo over Iran attack | Saach.TV. Retrieved Oct 16, 2012, from http://www.saach.tv/2012/08/31/israel-in-a-limbo-over-iran-attack/ Amaliateh Akhareh Donya Final Draft 16 October 2012 Team Cyber Dragons
TL-Mark Shea Cesar Salas XO-Sandra O'Brien Christopher Rauseo XO-Cherilyn Neal Dae'Shaun Hodge Ops-Michael Larry Harris Chandler Lamar Jones Michael Levi Ravi Wurah
10/20/2012 Final Draft 3
Agenda
Facts Issue #2 Defense Issue #1: Attack Boost Issue #2: Defense Boost Issue #3: Policies Rules/Regulations Conclusions References 10/20/2012 Final Draft 4 Issue #2 Defense ISSUE#1 ATTACK/DEFENSE- WHAT THREE TARGETS WILL MAXIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF SUCH NUCLEAR ATTACKS?
ISSUE#2 DEFENSE/ATTACK- WHAT PHYSICAL COUNTERMEASURES ARE IMPLEMENTED TO PREVENT AND PROTECT POPULATION FROM SUCH POTENTIAL NUCLEAR DISASTERS?
ISSUE#3 POLICIES- HOW WOULD ISRAELI AND U.S. POLICY CHANGE IN RESPONSE TO AN IRANIAN ATTACK? 10/20/2012 Final Draft 5 10/20/2012 Final Draft 6 1948 – 1979
Israel Iran Established as a Supplied oil to Israel country Conducted joint Permanent military projects delegation in Tehran
10/20/2012 Final Draft 7 1979 -1989 Iranian Revolution brings Ayatollah Khomeini into power Became an Islamic nation under Khomeini
Ended all official ties to Israel
Referred Israel and the United States as enemies of Islam
10/20/2012 Final Draft 8 1989 – Present
Anti-Israel rhetoric increases within Iran Political support and weapons to terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah
Hamas and Hezbollah orchestrated attacks on Israel and are known enemies to Israel
Iran’s Nuclear program combined with the anti-Israel rhetoric has heightened Israel’s fear of a Nuclear attack from Iran
10/20/2012 Final Draft 9 Source: Zanotti, J., Katzman, K., Gertler, J., & Hildreth, S. Congressional Research Service, (2012). Israel: Possible military strike against iran’s nuclear facilities (R42443). Retrieved from website: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/187403.pdf 10/20/2012 Final Draft 10 Tehran
A Nuclear Research center created in 1967 Equipped with US supplied 5 megawatt nuclear research reactor fueled by highly enriched uranium Converted to low-enriched uranium after fuel supplies cut by the US
10/20/2012 Final Draft 11 Natanz
Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility Monitored by the IAEA with cameras and visits by Inspectors Intended to only produce electricity according to Iran Built 8 meters underground and protected by a 25 meters thick concrete wall According to the IAEA Director-General’s February 2012 report, Iran has installed 9,100 centrifuges in the facility
10/20/2012 Final Draft 12 Isfahan
A uranium conversion facility Reprocesses uranium concentrate known as yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride gas Hexafluoride gas is the feedstock that is spun in centrifuges for enrichment An above ground facility
10/20/2012 Final Draft 13 Fordow
An underground uranium enrichment facility Iran said it would move 20% of Natanz production of LEU to Fordow Existence of this site was disclosed to the IAEA after being discovered by Intelligence agencies
10/20/2012 Final Draft 14 Bushehr
Nuclear power plant with a pressurized water reactor Plant operated as a joint venture between Russia and Iran
10/20/2012 Final Draft 15 Ardakan
Plant for processing uranium into yellowcake Reported to IAEA that the facility would be hot tested in July 2004 As of 2008, no further information as provided to the IAEA
10/20/2012 Final Draft 16 Arak
Heavy water research reactor Expected to replace the Tehran Nuclear Research Center According to a February 2012 IAEA report, the plant appears to be operating
10/20/2012 Final Draft 17 Potential Ranges of Iranian Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles
Source: Zanotti, J., Katzman, K., Gertler, J., & Hildreth, S. Congressional Research Service, (2012). Israel: Possible military strike against iran’s nuclear facilities (R42443). Retrieved from website: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/187403.pdf 10/20/2012 Final Draft 18
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 190 countries are signatory as of 1995, includes five nuclear weapon states: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China Four non-parties to the treaty possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel Iran is party to the Treaty (NPT) since 1970
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1995, UN Security Council demands halt to uranium enrichment activities 1996, US imposed sanctions on Iran 2009, concerns over Tehran's nuclear program increased July 2012, negotiations to resolve the nuclear issue fails 67th UN General Assembly 2012, September 25 – October 1
10/20/2012 Final Draft 20 US President said a nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be contained Sept. 27, 2012. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to UN General Assembly
Source: (2012) Tama, M. (Photographer). (2012). Benjamin-netanyahu-bomb-chart.jpeg. [Web Photo]. Retrieved from http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/neta nyahus-bomb-explodes-on-the-internet/
10/20/2012 Final Draft 21
Aug. 17, 2012. Hezbollah’s Secretary- General Hassan Nasrallah stated Iran’s retaliation response against by Israel military strike would be huge Sept. 28, 2012. Iran President dares Israel to attack on CNN interview with Piers Morgan Sept. 28, 2012. Iran’s military chief threatens Israel will be annihilated if it dares attack Iran
10/20/2012 Final Draft 22
2006, George W. Bush started a cyber warfare called Olympic Games against Iran 2009, President Obama increased attacks on Iran’s main nuclear enrichment facilities 2010, Iran’s uranium enrichment centrifuges were hit by the Stuxnet virus April, 2011 Iran’s main oil export terminal on Kharg Island hit by a computer virus forcing shut down
10/20/2012 Final Draft 23 July, 2011 Metasploit attacked the nuclear systems and shut down the automation network at Natanz and another facility These alternative means have included attacks carried out in Cyberspace with the use of malware such as: Flame Stuxnet Duqu Aimed against Iran and its interest around the world
10/20/2012 Final Draft 24 Sept. 2012. Cyber attacks on Middle Eastern banks in Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia Oct. 2012. US banks; Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank, PNC, the New York Stock Exchange and others by cyber attack by Shamoon A group claiming Middle Eastern ties, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters, took credit for the attacks online on the US banks 2011 Iran opened their own cyber warfare department
10/20/2012 Final Draft 25 The ruling Royal Family of Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer in the world Saudi Arabia has the capacity to create an oil surplus that allows them to stabilize the oil market Following points are pushing Saudi Arabia towards a revolution or purification: Fighting within the Royal Family Poor conditions of Saudi citizens
10/20/2012 Final Draft 26
Saudi public opinion is changing to that of an anti- American view 15 members of the 9/11 attacks against the U.S. were Saudis Popular preachers all over Saudi Arabia call openly for a jihad against the west The Royal Family has in turn supported fundamentalists with money in order to stave off an uprising against them In 1997 a member of the Royal Family put together a $100 million aid package for the Taliban
10/20/2012 Final Draft 27
An aging crown prince passes away and his successor is promptly chosen: Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud Though seen as an island of stability, deep-seated structural changes may yet destabilize the monarchy Saudi Arabia continues to suffer from a high unemployment rate while inflation persistently erodes purchasing power
10/20/2012 Final Draft 28
Two-thirds of the population are under 30 years of age, creating demographic problems in the region House of Saud has predicated its authority on religious legitimacy and economic development The security and stability of Saudi Arabia is a major concern for the United States The stability of the House of Saud cannot be guaranteed through religious militancy and economic rewards to a restive citizenry
10/20/2012 Final Draft 29
House of Saud is the object of bitter resentment amongst the poor of the region and increasingly amongst its own subjects Saudi rulers are struggling to contain a new wave of public protests that has erupted across the Arabian kingdom Across Saudi Arabia, grievances in the populace against the House of Saud unite Shia, Sunni and non-religionists alike
10/20/2012 Final Draft 30
Despite Saudi Arabia’s vast oil wealth and official GDP per capita, unemployment and poverty are rampant Saudi Arabia’s rulers rely on a slave labor economy recruited from South Asia and Africa Many young Saudis have to endure a life of unemployment A collapse of the House of Saud could cause the price of oil to hit record levels beyond $150 a barrel
10/20/2012 Final Draft 31
Satellite television, the Internet and social media, educated the young on government corruption 40% of Saudis live in poverty and nearly 70% can't afford a home 90% of all employees are imported Sunnis Saudi government feared that the Shi’ites in the Eastern Province might seek independence and its oil Independence for the Eastern Province would have a catastrophic outcome for the Saudi state
10/20/2012 Final Draft 32 Source: Peters, R. (Photographer). (2012). the_20project_20for_20the_20new2.jpg . [Web Photo]. Retrieved from http://aacounterterror.wordpress.com/int ro/ With the instability of the House of Saud in recent years, there is a strong possibility that the outbreak of a nuclear war between Israel and Iran will have an adverse effect on the House of Saud to sustain an already weak control over the region. 10/20/2012 Final Draft 33 What would happen to people? Most people within a few miles of an exploding nuclear weapon will be killed or seriously injured by the blast, thermal, or initial radiation People in the lighter damages areas would be endangered both by the blast and direct effects by heat Radioactive fallouts would be the main danger in the lighter damage areas In a nationwide strike, damages and causalities are highly dependent on people’s proximity to the nuclear detonation
10/20/2012 Final Draft 34 What is Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)?
Source: (1985, June ). Protection in the Nuclear Age. Retrieved Oct 02, 2012, from http://www.nukepills.com/docs/fema_nuclear_war_survival.pdf EMP affects all electrical and electronic equipment connected to a power source. 10/20/2012 Final Draft 35 What is Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)? an additional effect caused by a nuclear blast caused by a nuclear explosion that is detonated just above the earth’s atmosphere damage to electrical and electronic equipment for thousands of miles electrical in nature similar to the effects of a lightning strike on electrical or electronic equipment
10/20/2012 Final Draft 36 What is Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)? has no direct effect on living organisms EMP charges are collected by typical conductors of electricity, such as cables, antennas, power lines, or buried pipes, etc. Affects all electronic that is connected to its power source (except batteries) or to an antenna (except 30 inches or less) Damages could range from minor interruption of functions to burnout of electrical and electronic components
10/20/2012 Final Draft 37 What is Fallout?
Source: (1985, June ). Protection in the Nuclear Age. Retrieved Oct 02, 2012, from http://www.nukepills.com/docs/fema_nuclear_war_survival.pdf
Impact and effect of a nuclear and radioactive explosion.
10/20/2012 Final Draft 38 What is Fallout?
During a nuclear weapon explosion on or near ground, a nuclear blast sucks up a large amount of pulverized earth and other debris creating a vacuumed effect Radioactive gases are condensed on and into this debris, generating radioactive particles known as fallout Difficult to predict what areas would be affected Hard to predict when and where the particles would re- enter the earth
10/20/2012 Final Draft 39 What is Fallout? Distribution of the fallout are determined by the wind currents and weather conditions. Wind patterns will varied day to day Areas close to the nuclear explosion might receive fallout within 15-30 minutes upon detonation Might take 5-10 hours or more for radioactive particles to drift down on a community a couple of hundreds of miles away from the initial blast Actual size of fallout particles range in size, from granular (largest) to fine dust-like (smallest)
10/20/2012 Final Draft 40 What is Fallout? Quantity of the radioactive particles are determined by the size and the method of detonation (near the ground or in the air) Fallout participles can ONLY be detected by specialized instruments, available in inventories at local and state Emergency Service Offices
10/20/2012 Final Draft 41 Protection from Fallout
Source: (1985, June ). Protection in the Nuclear Age. Retrieved Oct 02, 2012, from http://www.nukepills.com/docs/fema_nuclear_war_survival.pdf
Source: (1985, June ). Protection in the Nuclear Age. Retrieved Oct 02, 2012, from http://www.nukepills.com/docs/fema_nuclear_war_survival.pdf
10/20/2012 Final Draft 42 Protection from Fallout
Three factors to consider: Distance, mass and time
The greater the distance between you and the fallout particles, will determine the rate of survivability and quantity of radiation you will receive
Materials such as bricks, concrete and earth absorb many of the gamma rays
10/20/2012 Final Draft 43 Protection from Fallout
The strength of the radioactive fallout will weaken over time
Fallout shelters are the best means of protection, during the first few days of an nuclear attack
Amount of time to remain in a fallout shelter will range from a few days to a few weeks
10/20/2012 Final Draft 44 Radiation Sickness
Radioactive rays from fallout particles are invisible Could cause physical or chemical damage to the human body Large dose of radiation can lead to serious illness or even death Radiation has a cumulative effect, acting like a chemical poison
10/20/2012 Final Draft 45 Three types of radiation from Fallout ALPHA – is halted by the outer skin layers BETA – is more penetrating and can cause burns on unprotected skins exposed to fresh fallout particles for a few hours GAMMA – is the greatest threat to life and is the most difficult to protect against Penetrates the entire body, like the strong x-ray machine Cause severe damage to the organs, blood and bones The human body cannot recover from excessive exposure to gamma rays 10/20/2012 Final Draft 46 Three types of radiation from Fallout
Source: (1985, June ). Protection in the Nuclear Age. Retrieved Oct 02, 2012, from http://www.nukepills.com/docs/fema_nuclear_war_survival.pdf Illustration depicts the short-term effects on humans after a brief period of whole body exposure to gamma radiation. 10/20/2012 Final Draft 47 Psychological effects in civilian people after terrorist attack
The deliberate targeting of civilians, including women and children is an unconventional military tactics used in terrorism
Source: Glazov, J. (Photographer). (2010). israel.jpg. [Print Photo]. Retrieved from http://frontpagemag.com/2010/jamie- glazov/remembering-israels-victims-of-terror/
10/20/2012 Final Draft 48 Serious personal consequences produced in victims exposed to terrorism attack
Post-traumatic stress symptoms (Smith & Segal, 2012):
Re-experiencing the traumatic event Avoiding reminders of the trauma Increased anxiety and emotional arousal
Experiencing terrorism can lead to increased use of tobacco, alcohol and drugs, and to self-medication.
10/20/2012 Final Draft 49 Re-experiencing the traumatic event
Intrusive, upsetting memories of the event Flashbacks (acting or feeling like the event is happening again) Nightmares (either of the event or of other frightening things) Feelings of intense distress when reminded of the trauma Intense physical reactions to reminders of the event (pounding heart, rapid breathing, nausea, muscle tension, sweating)
10/20/2012 Final Draft 50 Avoiding reminders of the trauma
Avoiding activities, places, thoughts, or feelings that remind you of the trauma Inability to remember important aspects of the trauma Loss of interest in activities and life in general Feeling detached from others and emotionally numb Sense of a limited future (you don’t expect to live a normal life span, get married, have a career)
10/20/2012 Final Draft 51 Increased anxiety and emotional arousal
Difficulty falling or staying asleep Irritability or outbursts of anger Difficulty concentrating Hyper vigilance (on constant “red alert”) Feeling jumpy and easily startled
10/20/2012 Final Draft 52 Psychological Effects
Wayment, Barger, Tolle & O'Mara (2010) Mentioned: In the early weeks after the attacks, terrorism-related distress and perceived similarity may have uniquely contributed to different restoration strategies: Perceived similarity to the victims (helping) and terrorism-related distress (desire to retaliate)
10/20/2012 Final Draft 53 Survivor Family Reactions
For many survivors the first news of the violent homicide strikes a mortal blow to the self evoking their own sense of personal loss Irritability or outbursts of anger Families may clamor for information about the identity the dead and any possible relationship to the victim they may have had The survivors usual range of territorial and affiliative activity becomes constricted as the home is turned into a protective fortress, strangers are avoided, and unfamiliar surrounding are circumvented Survivors may over identify with the slain victims, sleeping in the dead relatives bed, wearing his or her clothing, or even assuming vocal and behavioral characteristics of the slain person
Family Therapy of Terroristic Trauma
Death Notification: Proper notification of family members, that a loved one has been killed or that the body of a missing relative has been located and identified Accordingly interventions with parents and their families should be directed at assisting the child to regain a sense of safety Young children may ask the same questions repeatedly until they are able to process and understand all the information Therapist should advise adult caregivers to be patient and respond to the child's questions
10/20/2012 Final Draft 55 The scale shows the range of Risk from Low to High.
10/20/2012 Final Draft 56 RISK (R) = f (1/ COUNTERMEASURES (C) Risk Prior to Attack(currently) is Medium-High at 68% as shown on the scale above
R • Potential for damage or loss of an asset
• Function of variables (0,1,…., Threat, N) that correlates positively with risk F
• The coefficient of variables that positively correlate with risk 1
C • Action taken to reduce/eliminate factors that increase risk
10/20/2012 Final Draft 57 Threat Variable Countermeasure R=f(1/C) Iran knows she is being watched Israel Suspicious of an Attack Medium High •Guard against preemptive strike •Israeli population preparedness by Israel •Efficient first responders’ system •Iran is Secretive 98% 30% 68% Sponsors Hezbollah and or Hamas Israeli Intelligence (Mossad) is one Medium High Attacks of the best 94% 26% 68% Iran’s weapons delivery systems Israeli Defense systems Medium High •Shahab 3 •Arrow II missile defense system •Musudan •Iron Dome •Seijil 98% 30% 68% North Korea missile export to Iran Help from western allies (US) Medium High 88% 20% 68% Iran government public statements Israel government public statements Medium High 92% 24% 68%
58 Current10/20/2012 Risk ProbabilityFinal Draft assessed at 68% WHAT THREE TARGETS WILL MAXIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF SUCH NUCLEAR ATTACKS?
10/16/2012 Final Draft 59 Change in Threat R=f(1/C) Iran has a nuclear weapon High •Iran is keeping bomb a secret •Israel, US and IAEA unaware of bomb •No preemptive strike by Israel 99.5% 90.5% Hezbollah and Hamas attack Israel with High multiple rockets as a decoy 99% 90.5% Iran’s 3 Nuclear Weapon Missiles High • Shahab 3-50MT • Musudan-30MT • Sejil-30MT 97% 90.5% Nuclear missile targets; Jerusalem, Ashdod High and Be’ersheva. 98% 90.5% Attack Boost Risk Probability assessed at 91% 10/20/2012 Final Draft 60 Issue #1 Iran’s Missile and Nuclear related sites
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.nti.org/gmap/?country=iran&layers=biological,chemical,missile,nuclear10/20/2012 Final Draft 61 Date, Time & Targets
Date/Time : March 26, 2013 - Sunset 17:57 hours Attack: 1900 hours First night of Passover ( most important holiday in Jewish calendar) Most important part of Passover is ceremony of Seder, elaborate meals the first two nights of Passover No work permitted on March 26th or 27th Citizens at home (including military and government)
10/20/2012 Final Draft 62 Date, Time & Targets
Targets: Jerusalem - 50MT Be’ersheva - 30MT Nazareth - 30MT
10/20/2012 Final Draft 63 Nuclear and Radiological Weapons Actual impact and effect will be multiplied exponentially by 30-50 times due to the magnitude of the Nuclear Bombs ranging from 30-50 Megatons of destructive power…
Source: (1985, June ). Protection in the Nuclear Age. Retrieved Oct 02, 2012, from http://www.nukepills.com/docs/fema_nuclear_war_survival.pdf 10/16/2012 Final Draft 64 Israeli Defense Systems
Arrow II missile defense system – target long range missiles and projectiles
Iron Dome – designed to target shorter range rockets
Diversion tactic - Recruit Hezbollah and Hamas to launch thousands of rockets to increase the chances of successful delivery of nuclear Source (2012) TEIBEL , A. (2012, August 5). Israel Arrow Missile Defense System Upgraded. Retrieved weapons Oct 1, 2012, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/05/israel-arrow-missile-defense- system_n_1744959.html
10/20/2012 Final Draft 65 Israel Defense System: Iron Dome
Source (2010) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.imemc.org/article/58730 10/20/2012 Final Draft 66 Missile Related sites in Israel
Source (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.nti.org/gmap/?country=israel&layers=biologica l,chemical,missile,nuclear
10/20/2012 Final Draft 67 Nuclear Related Sites in Israel
Source (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.nti.org/gmap/?country=israel&layers=biological,chemical,missile,nuclearn 4 10/20/2012 68 WMD
Iran nuclear devices: 3 Nuclear Warheads • 50 MT • 30 MT • 30 MT Detonation height varies according to weapon size to create maximum destruction Method of Delivery: 3 missiles systems
10/20/2012 Final Draft 69 Weapons Delivery Systems Shahab 3 Country: Iran Associated Country: North Korea, Pakistan Class: MRBM Basing: Road mobile Length: 16.58 m Diameter: 1.38 m Launch Weight: 17410 kg Single warhead, 1,200 Payload: or 800 kg Nuclear, HE, chemical, Warhead: or submunitions Source (2011) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.iranmilitaryforum.net/media/?sa=album;in=15;PHPSESSID=2cd1e067009 Propulsion: Single-stage liquid 76a2a2a2ad316cb0db7d8 Range: 800-1300 km Status: Operational 10/20/2012 Final Draft 70 Shahab 3
Source: (2011) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.iranmilitaryforum.net/media/?sa=album;in=15;PHPSESSID=2cd1e06700976a2a2a2ad316cb0db7d8 10/20/2012 Final Draft 71 Shahab 3
Source: (2006) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://vitalperspective.typepad.com/vital_perspective_clarity/north_korea/ Missile Range – 800 to1300 km 10/20/2012 Final Draft 72 Weapons Delivery Systems Musadan Country: North Korea Associated Country: Iran Alternate Names: No Dong B; BM-25; Taepodong X; Rodong-B Class: IRBM Length: 12 m Diameter: 1.5 m Launch Weight: 19000 kg Payload: 1000-1200 Propulsion: liquid Range: 3200 km
10/20/2012 Final Draft 73 Weapons Delivery Systems Musadan
Based on Soviet R-27 Technology used by N Korea N Korea tested successfully April 2009 Iran Purchased 18 from N Korea Delivered in 2005 Launch platform – mobile, cargo ships, and submarines
10/20/2012 Final Draft 74 Musadan
Source: (2011) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.iranmilitaryforum.net/media/?sa=album;in=15;PHPSESSID=2cd1e06700976a2a2a2ad316cb0db7d8 10/20/2012 Final Draft 75 Weapons Delivery Systems Sejil
Country: Iran Associated Country: None Class: MRBM Warhead: Nuclear Range: 2000 Km Status: Operational
Two stage ballistic missile Powered by solid propellant rocket Payload - 2000 lbs Range/Distance - 2200 km
10/20/2012 Final Draft 76 Sejil
Source: (2011) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.iranmilitaryforum.net/media/?sa=album;in=15;PHPSESSID=2cd 1e06700976a2a2a2ad316cb0db7d8
10/20/2012 Final Draft 77 Source: (2012) SUSRISblog. Retrieved Oct 16, 2012, from http://susrisblog.com 2000 km radius shows cities within Iranian missile range
10/20/2012 Final Draft 78 Weapons Delivery Systems
Source: (2011) Retrieved 10/1/12 10/20/2012 http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/iran/images/irnkupdatedmissiles.jpgFinal Draft 79 The Greatest Political Target and the Holiest of Jewish Cities!
10/20/2012 Final Draft 80
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Jerusalem
10/20/2012 Final Draft 81 Jerusalem Population – 801,000 Government Mayor Nir Barkat Located in the Judean Mountains between the Mediterranean Sea and Dead Sea Supreme Court of Israel Israeli Foreign Ministry Bank of Israel 10/20/2012 Final Draft 82
Jerusalem
Home of the President Home of the Prime Minister Home of the Cabinet Headquarters for Israeli Police Leading logistics hub for Israel
10/20/2012 Final Draft 83
Jerusalem Several Prestigious Universities Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities Academy of the Hebrew Language Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jewish-Arab school “Hand in Hand”
10/20/2012 Final Draft 84
Jerusalem Dome of the Rock Place were Mohammed ascended to heaven Where Abraham attempted to sacrifice his son One of the most visited landmarks Temple Mount and West wall Jews states this were the world was created Church of the Holy Sepulchre The site where Jesus was buried The site of pilgrimage
10/20/2012 Final Draft 85
Jerusalem
Elevation is about 800 meters above sea level 70 kilometers south-east of Tel Aviv Jerusalem central location makes it ideal for locals and tourist Jerusalem is close to many attractions: Tel Aviv The Dead Sea The Judean Desert Masada
10/20/2012 Final Draft 86
Jerusalem
Chapel of the Ascension Site where Christ ascended to heaven Tomb of the Virgin Mary Resting site of the Queen Melisende Belz Synagogue Largest synagogue in the city of Jerusalem Capacity to hold 6,000 It’s one of the city’s prestigious Jewish landmark Jews attend Shabbat services on Fridays
10/20/2012 Final Draft 87
Overview of Jerusalem’s historical periods
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/14/2012 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Jerusalem 10/20/2012 Final Draft 88 Jerusalem Outlying Affected Areas Belt Shemesh Population 80,600 Founded in 1950 Mayor is Moshe Abutbul Name meaning “ House of the Sun” Abu Ghosh Population 5,700 Known for its good relations with the State of Israel Mayor is Salim Jaber Biblical Town Hummus Capital Mevaseret Zion Population 22,800 Located on the moutain ridge 750 meters above seal level The wealthies per capital in Jerusalem Mayor is Arye Shamam
10/20/2012 Final Draft 89 Jerusalem Outlying Affected Areas Kiryat Ye’arim Population 3,100 Kiryat Ye’arim means “ Town of Forests Predominantly Jewish with a growth rate of 1.2%
10/20/2012 Final Draft 90 Jerusalem, based on a height of blast = 0
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 10/20/2012 Final Draft http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/effects.htm 91
Jerusalem, based on a height of blast = 0
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/effects.htm
10/20/2012 Final Draft 92 Jerusalem, Affected Nuclear/Missile Sites
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 10/20/2012http://www.nti.org/gmap/?country=iran&layers=biological,chemical,missile,nuclear Final Draft 93 Jerusalem Detonation Calculations Based on Scaling laws
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 10/20/2012 http://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/ABC_Weapons/Nuke_Effects_Calculator.htmFinal Draft 94 Jerusalem, Missile Detonation Altitude
5 psi is called the “kill radius”
Height of blast (HOB) = 0, 5 PSI = 10.53 miles
Height of blast = 4.2 km, 5 psi = 25.3 km = 15.7 miles
SUMMARY: A HOB of 3.4 km produces 5.7 more miles of kill radius or 426.1 more sq/miles of 5 psi destruction!
10/20/2012 Final Draft 95 Jerusalem Infrastructure FUELS
Ashdod – 2nd largest oil refinery in Israel
Type Production [Thousands tons per year] Gasoline 1,000 Gasoil 1,300 LPG 250 Jet fuel 300 Fuel Oil 1,300 Total 4,000
10/20/2012 Final Draft 96 Jerusalem Infrastructure FUELS
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://maps.nationmaster.com/country/is/1
10/20/2012 Final Draft 97 Jerusalem Infrastructure FUELS Natural Gas
Source: (2011) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.adiraenergy.com/projects/israel/
10/20/2012 Final Draft 98 Jerusalem Infrastructure TRANSPORTATION
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=wl Ben Gurion Airport: 13 million passengers a year 10/20/2012 Final Draft 99 Jerusalem Infrastructure TRANSPORTATION Jerusalem Light Rail System – 130,000 passengers a day, 31 million in first year. Jerusalem Central Bus Station - one of the largest and busiest in Israel.
Source: (2012) Retrieved 9/15/12 http://israelity.com/wp-content//2012/04/Jerusalem- Light-Rail.jpg
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerusalem_Central_Bus_Station 10/20/2012 Final Draft 100 Jerusalem Infrastructure WATER
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://maps.nationmaster.com/country/is/1
10/20/2012 Final Draft 101 Source: (2012) Be\'er-Sheva - Israel - SkyscraperCity. Retrieved Oct 16, 2012, from http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=490439
10/16/2012 Final Draft 102 Be’ersheva
The largest city in the Negev desert of southern Israel. Often referred to as the "Capital of the Negev"
The seventh-largest city in Israel with a population of 194,300
10/20/2012 Final Draft 103 Be’ersheva - Negev Nuclear Research Center Israeli nuclear installation located in the Negev desert, about thirteen kilometers to the south-east of the city of Dimona
An estimate based on the known power of the reactor concluded that enough plutonium for 100 to 200 nuclear bomb
10/20/2012 Final Draft 104 Be’ersheva - Dimona Nuclear Reactor
Produce plutonium used in atomic bombs The reactor was purchased from France as part of a secret agreement related to the Suez War Construction of the reactor started late 1957, it began operation (became critical) in 1963 Fueled by natural uranium and deuterium
10/20/2012 Final Draft 105 Be’ersheva - Dimona Nuclear Reactor
The French (via the Alsace Corporation) delivered a reactor with a capacity of 24-26 megawatts, which was secretly increased by Israel, first to 70 megawatts and later to 150 megawatts It is estimated that Israel spends on its nuclear program more than $1 billion a year
10/20/2012 Final Draft 106 Be’ersheva - based on a height of blast = 0
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.fas.org/nuk e/intro/nuke/effects.ht m
10/20/2012 Final Draft 107 Be’ersheva - based on a height of blast = 0
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/effects.htm
10/20/2012 Final Draft 108 Be’ersheva - Affected Nuclear/Missile Sites
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 10/20/2012http://www.nti.org/gmap/?country=iran&layers=biological,chemical,missile,nuclear Final Draft 109 Be’ersheva - Detonation Calculations Based on Scaling laws
Source: (2009) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/ABC_Weapons/Nuke_Effects_Calculator.htm 10/20/2012 Final Draft 110 Be’ersheva - Missile Detonation Altitude
Height of blast (HOB) = 0, 5 PSI = 8.73 miles
Height of blast = 3.4 km, 5 psi = 21.4 km = 13.297 miles
SUMMARY: A HOB of 3.4 km produces 4.567 more miles of kill radius or 316 more sq/miles of 5 psi destruction!
10/20/2012 Final Draft 111 Be’ersheva - Infrastructure FUELS
Source: (2011) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://maps.nationmaster.com/country/is/1
10/20/2012 Final Draft 112 Be’ersheva Infrastructure FUELS Natural Gas
Source: (2011) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.adiraenergy.com/projects/israel/
10/20/2012 Final Draft 113 Be’ersheva Infrastructure AGRICULTURE
Source: (2011) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://maps.nationmaster.com/country/is/1
10/20/2012 Final Draft 114 Be’ersheva Infrastructure WATER
Source: (2011) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://maps.nationmaster.com/country/is/1 10/20/2012 Final Draft 115 Source: (2011. Padfield, D. (2011, ). Israel, Greece, Turkey, Egypt and Italy in Bible Times | History and Geography. Retrieved Oct 16, 2012, from http://biblelandhistory.com 10/20/2012 Final Draft 116 Nazareth
Largest city in the North District of Israel Population – 80000 Childhood home of Jesus Christ, Founder of Christianity 16 miles from Sea of Galilee (freshwater fishing)
10/20/2012 Final Draft 117
Nazareth
Top10 tourist destinations as is Sea of Galilee Arab Holocaust Museum Visited by Pope in 2000 Over half a million people effected outside Nazareth
10/20/2012 Final Draft 118
Nazareth - Outlying Affected Areas
Haifa Third largest city in Israel population 270,000 Home of Technion - Israel Institute of Technology Major seaport Haifa oil refinery (66 million barrels of crude a year)
10/20/2012 Final Draft 119 Nazareth - Outlying Affected Areas
Afula Population 46,000 Immigrants from Ethiopia and FSU Health clinics for immediate area
Kiryat Ata Population 50,000 some fact about Kiryat Ata
10/20/2012 Final Draft 120 Nazareth - Outlying Affected Areas Karmiel Population 50,000 Serves as major commercial, cultural, and industrial hub in western Galilee Beit She’an Population 17,000 Collective community based on agriculture 10/20/2012 Final Draft 121
Nazareth - Outlying Affected Areas
Tamra Population 27,000 Safed (Tzfat) Population 35,000 One of Jewish worlds holy cities and center of Kabbalah and Jewish Mysticism Major tourist area
10/20/2012 Final Draft 122 Nazareth - Outlying Affected Areas
Tiberias Population 41,000 Major tourist area Host Israel’s largest marathon Afula Population 40,000 Immigrants from Ethiopia and FSU Center of area for healthcare, dining, and shopping
10/20/2012 Final Draft 123 Nazareth - Outlying Affected Areas
Umm el Fahm Population 43,000 Urban center for surrounding villages
Qabatiya Population 20,000 Agriculture and limestone industry
10/20/2012 Final Draft 124 Nazareth - Outlying Affected Areas
Jenin Population 39,000 Administrative center for Jenin Governorate Arab American University
10/20/2012 Final Draft 125 Nazareth - based on a height of blast = 0
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/ nuke/effects.htm
10/20/2012 Final Draft 126 Nazareth - based on a height of blast = 0
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/effects.htm
10/20/2012 Final Draft 127 Nazareth - Affected NUCLEAR MISSILES Sites
Source (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 10/20/2012 http://www.nti.org/gmap/?country=israel&layers=biological,chemical,missile,nuclearFinal Draft 128 Nazareth - Detonation Calculations Based on Scaling laws
Source: (2009) Retrieved 10/1/12 10/20/2012 http://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/ABC_Weapons/Nuke_Effects_Calculator.htmFinal Draft 129 Nazareth - Missile Detonation Altitude
5 psi is often called the “kill radius”
Height of blast (HOB) = 0, 5 PSI = 8.73 miles
Height of blast = 3.4 km, 5 psi = 21.4 km = 13.297 miles
SUMMARY: A HOB of 3.4 km produces 4.567 more miles of kill radius or 316 more sq/miles of 5 psi destruction!
10/20/2012 Final Draft 130 Nazareth Infrastructure TRANSPORTATION
Haifa Airport Kiryat Shmona Airport
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://maps.google.com/maps?num=10&hl=en&biw=1280&bih=882&q=be%27ersheva&safe=active&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=il
10/20/2012 Final Draft 131 Nazareth Infrastructure FUELS
Haifa Bay - largest refinery in Israel
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://maps.google.com/maps?num=10&hl=en&biw=1280&bih=882&q=be%27ersheva&safe=active&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=il 10/20/2012 Final Draft 132 Nazareth Infrastructure FUELS Natural Gas
Source: (2011) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://www.adiraenergy.com/projects/israel/
10/20/2012 Final Draft 133 Nazareth Infrastructure POWER
Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://maps.nationmaster.com/country/is/1
10/20/2012 Final Draft 134 Nazareth Infrastructure AGRICULTURE Source: (2012) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://maps.nationmaster.com/country/is/1
Haifa Wastewater treatment plant used for agriculture, 3rd largest in Israel. 10/20/2012 Final Draft 135 Nazareth Infrastructure WATER
National Water Carrier of Israel Largest water project in Israel Freshwater from Sea of Galilee piped south Water pipes routed through Nazareth
10/20/2012 Final Draft 136 Nazareth Infrastructure WATER
Source: (2011) Retrieved 10/1/12 http://maps.nationmaster.com/country/is/1 10/20/2012 Final Draft 137 RISK =90.5% Rounded to 91% Before Attack Boost Risk is 68% The Risk Difference is 91-68=23 So Risk increase 23% with Attack Boost Risk Probability Difference is assessed at 23%
10/20/2012 Final Draft 138 WHAT PHYSICAL COUNTERMEASURES ARE IMPLEMENTED TO PREVENT AND PROTECT POPULATION FROM SUCH POTENTIAL NUCLEAR DISASTERS?
10/20/2012 Final Draft 139 Boost in Countermeasure R=f(1/C) Israel Suspicious of an Attack Medium • Israeli Intelligence has credible information on Iran’s nuclear Preemptive strike on Iran’s Nuclear sites 44% 43% • Comprehensive family reaction planand training Medium • Population supplied with Disaster kits and protective gear • Family Evacuation and escape plan 34% 43% Israeli Defense systems Medium •Arrow II missile defense system tested and ready •Iron Dome ready and tested 36% 43% New US President affirms allegiance to Israel Medium 50% 43% Incident command center ready and tested Medium 50% 43%
Defense10/20/2012 Boost Risk ProbabilityFinal Draft assessed at 43%140 Objectives:
Emergency Management Plan for Israeli population Civil Defense Missile Shield Preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities Cripples Iran’s nuclear program
10/20/2012 Final Draft 141 Source: (2010). Retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/30/world/main7102796.shtml Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Terrorist weapons are often referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) because of the ability to kill large numbers of people
The four categories of weapons are:
1. Conventional Weapons & Explosives 2. Nuclear and Radioactive Weapons 3. Chemical Weapons 4. Biological Weapons
Since, we are dealing with an Nuclear Attack, we will focus on item # 2 “Nuclear and Radioactive Weapons”
10/20/2012 Final Draft 143 CBRNE Impact, Preparedness, Survivability, and Incident Planning The immediate impact of such attacks may reach much further than the scene of the disaster
Source: (2006). Retrieved from http://www.sfmhosp.com/house_calls_oct_4_2006.php
10/20/2012 Final Draft 144 Conventional Weapons and Explosives
Most likely type of terrorist weapon is a conventional explosive device
Some of these conventional weapons pack a very powerful punch and can bring down large buildings
Casualties could number in the hundreds in this type of attack
10/20/2012 Final Draft 145
CBRNE Impact, Preparedness, Survivability, and Incident Planning For this reason is important to establish a plan
First Responders may be exposed to in a terrorist attack
Knowledge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive weapons (CBRNE) is needed for every first responder
First Responders and community: Managing community emergency programs enough basic information to safeguard themselves and those for whom they are responsible
10/20/2012 Final Draft 146 Civil Defense Program: Family Plan Checklist How will family communicate? What supplies do you need at home If you remain home If you flee Destination Safe room or basement • No windows • Contains a telephone and a radio • Bring your supplies with you Someplace else? 10/20/2012 Final Draft 147 Family Emergency Action Plan Develop plan to deal with the emergency Find safe spots in the home Draw a floor plan and mark 2 escape routes from each room Post emergency telephone numbers Teach children to call emergency police and fire Turn on radio for emergency information
10/20/2012 Final Draft 148 Family Emergency Action Plan Pick a local and out of state friend to call if separated Pick 2 emergency meeting places One in and one outside of neighborhood Discuss The dangers Actions if someone is hurt Action if power goes out How to turn off the water, gas, and electricity at the main switches
10/20/2012 Final Draft 149 Family Emergency Action Plan
Take first aid and CPR training Keep family records in a waterproof and fireproof container Have cash on hand; ATMs may not be operable
10/20/2012 Final Draft 150 Family Emergency Evacuation and Escape Plan
Tune in to the radio Follow instructions of the local officials Wear protective clothing and sturdy shoes Take disaster supply kit Lock the house
10/20/2012 Final Draft 151 Family Emergency Evacuation and Escape Plan
Use official routes Take cash with you Shut off utilities Let others know where/when you are going Make pet arrangements
10/20/2012 Final Draft 152 Family Disaster Supply Kit 1 gallon of water per person per day Prescription medication for at least one week A supply of nonperishable packaged or canned food and a hand operated can opener Special foods for infants or special diets Non-prescription drugs (aspirin, antacids…)
10/20/2012 Final Draft 153 Family Disaster Supply Kit
Change of clothing and rain gear and sturdy shoes Thermal blankets and sleeping bags First aid kit Sanitation and personal hygiene Cellular phone
10/20/2012 Final Draft 154 Family Disaster Supply Kit Battery powered radio, flashlight & batteries and bulbs Credit cards and cash Extra set of car keys Family documents (passports, wills, financial records) Camping items – compass, matches, tent
10/20/2012 Final Draft 155 Family Car Getaway Kit
Flashlight Booster cables Fire extinguisher Tire repair kit Maps, flares Full gas tank and certified container gasoline
10/20/2012 Final Draft 156 Special Procedures
Away from home: Proceed home unless directed otherwise by the authorities Cover your mouth and nose with wetted towels or paper towels Shield your eyes
10/20/2012 Final Draft 157 Special Procedures
At home: Close all doors /windows Turn off ventilation system Seal all windows / doors with plastic tape Attempt to identify type of attack that has occurred
10/20/2012 Final Draft 158 Special Procedures
Children at school: Talk to school authorities Find out their plan of action Talk to your children Make a plan
10/20/2012 Final Draft 159 Self-Protection for Responders Barrier protection, reducing the time of exposure and distancing yourself from the hazard are the keys to survival for all first responders:
Put the best available barrier between you and the nuclear agent Keep the hazard from entering or coming in contact with your body is the best method of protection Cover your eyes and all of your skin quickly before you become contaminated Must adequately filter the air you breath 10/20/2012 Final Draft 160
Self-Protection for Responders
In some cases, respirator filters will not fully protect you from all CBRNE hazards, and supplied-air breathing apparatus must be used in the contaminated area Verify that a correct certified filter type is installed when using a filter respirator Reduce the time you are exposed to the agent You should not be in a contaminated area, if you are not properly trained to deal with a hazardous substance
10/20/2012 Final Draft 161 Self-Protection for Responders
Move out of the contamination quickly, if you are caught without a mask or other protective equipment Using any expedient means of creating a barrier between yourself and the hazard Layers of clothing, rain slickers, hats, ski goggles, wet towels or handkerchiefs over the face may be used as protection Get away quickly and decontaminate immediately
10/20/2012 Final Draft 162
First Responders: Incident Command Center Establish the Incident Command Center and all staging areas well outside the most pessimistic danger zone It would be possible to deliberately establish operating facilities within the zone of contamination with specialized equipment and highly trained teams, when no other practical solution exists Contact your regional Civil Support Team for advice and guidance for the need of this capability
10/20/2012 Final Draft 163
Preplanning and Training
Assume that any CRNBE terrorist attack creates at least a HAZMAT Level A situation involving Toxic-by-Inhalation- Hazards (TIH) Implement evacuation, isolation and protection distances in accordance with Green Pages Section of the Emergency Response Guidebook, for release of a TIH of best-guess quantity There are expedient defensive measures that will reduce risk, when Emergency response teams or command officers find themselves suddenly and unexpectedly in an area from which they cannot escape
10/20/2012 Final Draft 164
The following precautions may be helpful when forced to operate inside or near the hazard area
Locate the command post upwind from the hazard hot zone Locate the emergency refuge or command center inside a building as opposed to using a vehicle Buildings provide greater physical protection and are much easier to seal against chemical and biological hazards Select the most protected interior room available. Many hazardous fumes are heavier than air, an interior room on a middle floor of the building might be advisable
10/20/2012 Final Draft 165 The following precautions may be helpful when forced to operate inside or near the hazard area
Shut off central fans and air handling equipment Establish a decontamination station at the entrance to the facility to prevent contamination from being carried inside Windows and doors should be covered with plastic and sealed with duct tape
10/20/2012 Final Draft 166 The following precautions may be helpful when forced to operate inside or near the hazard area
If possible, a HEPA filter should be placed in the temporary field station and a positive room pressure generated The room should remain sealed until after the chemical or biological plume has totally passed the area If possible, keep escape vehicles in a nearby garage or other protected area in case emergency evacuation is needed Cover with plastic or blankets if left outdoors Establish a site evacuation and rescue plan
10/20/2012 Final Draft 167 General Safety Procedures at Terrorist Incidents
Suspect the worst at all terrorist incidents until the air is tested Use barrier protection until the area is tested to be safe Establish decontamination stations as soon as possible Contain all run off from decontamination activities 10/20/2012 Final Draft 168 General Safety Procedures at Terrorist Incidents
Be on the alert for structural collapses Be on the alert for secondary explosive devices You are part of a crime scene, preserve all evidence when possible
10/20/2012 Final Draft 169 Indicators of a possible CBRNE attack
Unusual numbers of people dying in an area, or from strange causes Unusual numbers of sick or dying animals, birds or fish Lack of insect life where it should be seen Unusual numbers of people in an area complaining of blisters/rashes, nausea, disorientation, difficulty in breathing, convulsions, localized sweating, conjunctivitis (reddening of the eyes), erythema (reddening of the skin), or any irregular symptoms
10/20/2012 Final Draft 170 Indicators of a possible CBRNE attack
Strange colored smoke coming from the area of a detonation Explosions that seem to do very little damage or which release an unusual amount of smoke, or leave droplets of liquid in the area, or fragments covered with liquid or droplets Unusual appearance of any liquid droplets, particularly where there should be none Abandoned aerosol sprayers in the area of sick people People reporting unusual odors or tastes
10/20/2012 Final Draft 171 Indicators of a possible CBRNE attack
Unexplained mists or hazes in urban area Sudden or unexplained appearance of low- lying clouds Unidentified, low-flying aircraft--particularly crop dusters--over a populated area
Whenever a CBRNE incident is suspected, immediately put on your protective equipment. Remember the time-distance- shielding rule for protection: Spend as little time as possible in the hazard zone, and keep your distance from the area Shield yourself from the hazard at all times Decontaminate as soon and as thoroughly as possible
10/20/2012 Final Draft 172 Source: (2007). Retrieved from http://www.welt.de/politik/article1090373/Russland-plant-ueberlegene-Raketenabwehr.html Israeli Defense System Iranian integrated air defense system (IADS) composed of Cold War relics originally designed and built between the 1950s and late 1960s Soviet built SA-5B (S-200VE) has a range of 200 nautical miles Chinese HQ-2 30 nautical mile range U.S supplied Hawk system F-14 and Mig 29
Israeli Response
Source: (2009). Retrieved from http://www.iran- resist.org/article5724.html Electronic warfare principles to bypass an enemy IADS 10/20/2012 Final Draft 174
Israeli Defense System IDF Availability Total Population: 7,473,052 Military Age: 121,722
Active Military: 187,000 Active Reserve: 565,000
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://www.globalfirepower.com/ Available Manpower: 3,511,190
10/20/2012 Final Draft 175 Israeli Defense System IDF Availability Total Land Weapons: 12,552 Total Logistical Vehicles: 7,684 Total Tanks: 3,230 Total APCs / IFVs: 6,278 Total Towed Artillery: 550 Total SPGs: 706 Total MLRSs: 138 Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://www.globalfirepower.com/ Total Mortars: 750 Total AT Weapons: 900 Total AA Weapons: 200 10/20/2012 Final Draft 176
Israeli Defense System
IDF Availability Total Aircraft: 1,964 Total Helicopters: 689
Total Serviceable Airports: 48
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://www.globalfirepower.com/
10/20/2012 Final Draft 177 Israeli Defense System IDF Availability Total Navy Ships: 64 Total Patrol Craft: 42 Merchant Marine Strength: 10 Major Ports & Terminals: 4 Total Submarines: 3 Total Aircraft Carriers: 0 Total Destroyers: 0 Total Frigates: 0 Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://www.globalfirepower.com/ Total Mine Warfare Craft: 0 Total Amphibious Assault Craft: 0 10/20/2012 Final Draft 178 Israeli Defense System Magic Wand: A multi-functional defense system Purpose of the system Deal with all threats Based on Highly advanced, cutting edge interception technology Operational Conditions Any weather condition System Analyzes/Intercepts Threats System Targets Specific area to detonate its warhead
10/20/2012 Final Draft 179 Israeli Defense System Magic Wand: A multi-functional defense system Defends against numerous threats: Missiles targeting low-flying helicopters Any imaginable ballistic threat Range Includes: Atmosphere to ground Long range Across wide areas Defends against several types of missiles Ballistic Short range cruise missiles
10/20/2012 Final Draft 180 Israeli Defense System Magic Wand: A multi-functional defense system Centrally located Protection area extremely wide Non battery based system Platform connects Additional Sites Allowing Regional / National Coverage Range Functionality Between Protected areas of Arrow missiles /Iron Dome
10/20/2012 Final Draft 181 Israeli Defense System Magic Wand: A multi-functional defense system
Intelligent Solution ability to Contact all other defense systems Serve as platform Operate additional interception systems Deal with multiple / simultaneous attacks Select most dangerous threat from different types of targets in barrage
10/20/2012 Final Draft 182
Israeli Defense System Magic Wand: A multi-functional defense system Deal with non targeted airborne elements such as own aircraft and missiles Mobile launcher platform Carries 12 vertical launch missiles Cover a 360-degrees spectrum Fast launches/high reload rate Platform Based Controlled remotely/deployable anywhere
10/20/2012 Final Draft 183 Israeli Defense System Arrow II and III: Interceptive capabilities Missile Defense System Developed In Israel Addresses transforming threats against Israel Development Includes Conjunction with Boeing American funding Impedes Missile Attacks Identifying /locating incoming missile Performs calculations finding optimal launch point Launches rocket intercepting missile before target is hit
10/20/2012 Final Draft 184 Israeli Defense System Arrow II and III: Interceptive capabilities Arrow III missile: Currently under development, Intercepts long-range ballistic missiles Higher altitudes than the Arrow II Exo-atmospheric Capabilities: Intercept rocket attacks in outer space Target ballistic missiles while airborne.
10/20/2012 Final Draft 185 Israeli Defense System Arrow II and III: Interceptive capabilities
Source: (2007). Retrieved from http://www.welt.de/politik/article1090373/Russland-plant-ueberlegene- Raketenabwehr.html Intercept faraway missiles, outside the atmosphere, and enables a larger number of interception capabilities.
10/20/2012 Final Draft 186 Iron Dome System: Dual-Mission Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) and Very Short Range Air Defense (V-SHORAD) System
Source: (2010). Retrieved from http://www.defencetalk.com/israel-delays-deployment-of-iron-dome-anti-rocket-system-30000/ 10/20/2012 Final Draft 187 Iron Dome System: Dual-Mission Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) and Very Short Range Air Defense (V-SHORAD) System
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/0/1190.pdf Defense solution effectively: Counters rockets artillery & mortars (C-RAM) ( ranges of up to 70 km) aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, PGMs 10/20/2012 Final Draft 188 Iron Dome System: Dual-Mission Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) and Very Short Range Air Defense (V-SHORAD) System
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/0/1190.pdf Defense solution effectively: VSHORAD protection (Up to 10 km) Handles simultaneously multiple threats efficiently Effective and selective handling of critical threats 10/20/2012 Final Draft 189 Iron Dome System: Dual-Mission Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) and Very Short Range Air Defense (V-SHORAD) System
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/0/1190.pdf Defense solution effectively: Uses unique interceptor Special warhead detonates any target in air (seconds) Uses radar seeker to acquire target Guides interceptor within passing distance 10/20/2012 Final Draft 190 Iron Dome System: Dual-Mission Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) and Very Short Range Air Defense (V-SHORAD) System
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/0/1190.pdf Defense solution effectively: Uses unique interceptor Special warhead detonates any target in air (seconds) Uses radar seeker to acquire target Guides interceptor within passing distance 10/20/2012 Final Draft 191 Iron Dome System: Dual-Mission Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) and Very Short Range Air Defense (V-SHORAD) System
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/0/1190.pdf
Defense solution effectively: Targets warhead detonated over neutral area Reduces collateral damage to protected area
10/20/2012 Final Draft 192 Source: (2008). Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/2282030/Iran-doctors-images-of- missile-test-after-dud-fails-to-fire.html Preemptive Strike: Iranian Nuclear Facilities
Tehran Natanz Isfahan Fordow Arak
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42443.pdf
10/20/2012 Final Draft 194 Iranian Nuclear Facilities: Tehran
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://cooperrepublic.com/Iran%20TV%20Home.htm
10/20/2012 Final Draft 195 Iranian Nuclear Facilities: Tehran
Description Quantity
Elevation 1,200 m.
Area Metro 18,814 km 2
Population 13,413,348 Metro
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://cooperrepublic.com/Iran%20TV%20Home.htm
10/20/2012 Final Draft 196 Tehran
Tehran Nuclear Research Center Cited as reason • enriching uranium (+-20%) • Research vs. Weapons Built & Fueled by • U.S Assistance (1967) • Weapons grade Uranium
Source: (2003). Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3248854.stm
10/20/2012 Final Draft 197 Iranian Nuclear Facilities: Tehran
Description Quantity
Elevation 1,200 m.
Area Metro 18,814 km 2
Population 13,413,348 Metro
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://cooperrepublic.com/Iran%20TV%20Home.htm
10/20/2012 Final Draft 198 Tehran
Location Downtown Tehran Commercial facility Surrounded by Thousands of civilians Key location for research
Source: (2003). Retrieved from unlikely preemptive Target http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3248854.stm
10/20/2012 Final Draft 199 Tehran
Backup Complex Production Includes: 99Mo 131I and 133Xe radioisotope Wide range lab services
Source: (2003). Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3248854.stm
10/20/2012 Final Draft 200 Tehran
Main Facilities Include: Nuclear Spectrometry Lab Gamma-Ray Spectrometry System Alpha-Particle Spectrometry Liquid Scintillation Counting
Source: (2003). Retrieved from Spectrometry http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3248854.stm Neutron Activation Analysis facilities Radiocarbon Dating Laboratory
10/20/2012 Final Draft 201 Tehran
Instrumental Analysis Labs Include:
UV IR XRF
Source: (2003). Retrieved from ICP http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3248854.stm
10/20/2012 Final Draft 202 Tehran
Instrumental Analysis Labs Include:
Atomic Absorption Thermal Analyses GC
Source: (2003). Retrieved from GLC http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3248854.stm Health Physics Section
10/20/2012 Final Draft 203 Tehran
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/tehran-tnrc7.htm 10/20/2012 Final Draft 204 Tehran
Strategic Importance Producing radioisotopes Produce plutonium from spent nuclear fuel
Yellow cake production Source: (2003). Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3248854.stm
10/20/2012 Final Draft 205 Natanz
Located approximately 130 miles south of Tehran Commercial facility-Fuel Enrichment Underground; hardened by steel-reinforced concrete covered by earth Capable of eventually holding more than 47,000 centrifuges First-generation centrifuges produce uranium enriched up to 5% uranium-235 9,100 centrifuges in the commercial facility and is feeding uranium hexafluoride into as many as 8,808 of those centrifuges. 10/20/2012 Final Draft 206 Natanz
Pilot Centrifuge Facility Produces uranium enriched up to 20% uranium-235 Testing ground for advanced centrifuges
10/20/2012 Final Draft 207 Natanz
Source: (2010). Retrieved from http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn3481-irans-nuclear-programme-rapidly-expanding.html 10/20/2012 Final Draft 208 Natanz Strategic Importance Greatest immediate risk If converted to military use, the 9,000 centrifuges installed at Natanz might be capable of producing a bomb’s worth of weapon-grade uranium gas in about two months, assuming Iran fed them from Iran’s stockpile of uranium gas enriched to 3.5 percent
10/20/2012 Final Draft 209 Natanz
Challenges Underground Facility • Constructed using a form of ultra high performance concrete (UHPC) • GBU-28 “Bunker Buster” would be effective to penetrate, but several would be required – Bombs would have to be dropped at the same point repeatedly to break through one area of the barrier • Covered by multiple layers of SAM protection in • Close proximity to Iranian Air Force bases
10/20/2012 Final Draft 210 Natanz
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://manglermuldoon.blogspot.com/2012/06/what-would-israeli-strike-on-iran.html
10/20/2012 Final Draft 211 Defense Natanz
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://manglermuldoon.blogspot.com/2012/06/what-would-israeli-strike-on-iran.html 10/20/2012 Final Draft 212 Fordow
Located approximately 20 km north of the city of Qom Centrifuge Facility Underground; built into the side of a small mountain and specially hardened Facility is eventually supposed to contain approximately 3,000 centrifuges Configured to produce both uranium enriched to 5% uranium-235 and 20% uranium-235 700 first-generation centrifuges in the facility, and it is now reportedly producing 20%- enriched uranium
10/20/2012 Final Draft 213 Fordow
Source: (2009). Retrieved from http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/qom-gas-centrifuge-uranium-enrichment-site- in-iran-may-have-been-re-purpose/8 10/20/2012 Final Draft 214 Fordow
Strategic Importance Dedicated to the production of 20 percent enriched uranium gas, which is close to weapon-grade At full operation could produce 480 kg of 20 percent uranium gas each year Enough to fuel up to three nuclear weapons with further enrichment.
10/20/2012 Final Draft 215 Fordow
Challenges Built into the side of a mountain Nearly invulnerable to the GBU-28; the inner enrichment hall is buried by an estimated 80-120 meters (264-396 feet) of hard rock Covered by multiple layers of SAM protection in Close proximity to Iranian Air Force bases
10/20/2012 Final Draft 216
Fordow
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://manglermuldoon.blogspot.com/2012/06/what-would-israeli-strike-on-iran.html
10/20/2012 Final Draft 217 Fordow
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://manglermuldoon.blogspot.com/2012/06/what-would-israeli-strike-on-iran.html
10/20/2012 Final Draft 218 Isfahan
Located approximately 295 km from the Iranian capital, Tehran Uranium Conversion Plant Above-ground; converts uranium oxide into several compounds, including gaseous uranium hexafluoride that can be enriched in centrifuges
10/20/2012 Final Draft 219 Isfahan
Source: (2011). Retrieved from http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/no-visible-evidence-of-explosion-at-esfahan-nuclear-site-adjacent-facility-/ 10/20/2012 Final Draft 220 Isfahan
Strategic Importance Only known location where Iran is capable of converting its domestic supply of raw yellowcake uranium into hexafluoride gas necessary for the centrifuges at Natanz, Fordo and other facilities Destroying the facility would impact the Iranians' ability to provide material for the enrichment work at Fordo and Natanz
10/20/2012 Final Draft 221 Isfahan Challenges Materials are stored in underground tunnel at the facility Valuable hexafluoride gas is stored in small, easy to move canisters Covered by multiple layers of SAM protection Close proximity to 2 Iranian Air Force bases
10/20/2012 Final Draft 222 Isfahan
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://manglermuldoon.blogspot.com/2012/06/what-would-israeli-strike-on-iran.html 10/20/2012 Final Draft 223 Arak Heavy-water reactor facility Above-ground; Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) is designed to produce 40 megawatts thermal of power and is set to begin operating by the end of 2013 Moderates nuclear fission chain reaction either in a certain type of reactor or produce plutonium for use in a nuclear bomb
10/20/2012 Final Draft 224 Arak
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://www.visualphotos.com/image/1x6558530/nuclear_reactor_arak_iran_satellite_image 10/20/2012 Final Draft 225 Arak
Strategic Importance Designed to produce 40 megawatts thermal of power Could eventually use the facility to produce enough weapons-grade plutonium to arm one or two nuclear weapons per year
10/20/2012 Final Draft 226 Arak
Challenges Covered by multiple layers of SAM protection Close proximity to Iranian Air Force bases
10/20/2012 Final Draft 227 Arak
Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://manglermuldoon.blogspot.com/2012/06/what-would-israeli-strike-on-iran.html 10/20/2012 Final Draft 228 RISK = 43% Current Risk is 68% The Risk Difference after Defense boost is (43-68)=25 So Risk increase 25% with Attack Boost
Risk Probability Difference is assessed at 25%
10/20/2012 Final Draft 229 10/20/2012 Final Draft 230 Policy Change
Increased Sanctions Trade Embargos National Defense Changes United Nations Ban U.S. Cyberspace Policy
10/20/2012 Final Draft 231 Sanctions
Economic
Intellectual
Material
Travel
10/20/2012 Final Draft 232 Economic sanctions
Freeze all foreign Iranian currency reserves held in any nation
Prevent all monetary transactions with any Iranian bank including loans
Deny access to any nations financial system
10/20/2012 Final Draft 233 Intellectual Sanctions
Stop all Information Technology exports to Iran
Prevent the export of all intellectual property to Iran, including but not limited to industrial designs, trademarks, artistic works, architectural design
10/20/2012 Final Draft 234 Material Sanctions
Prevent any nation from importing oil or natural gas from Iran
The Iranian government makes most of it’s money through the exportation of oil and natural gas
A complete ban on all importing of Iranian oil and gas will cripple it’s economy
10/20/2012 Final Draft 235 Material Sanctions
No country shall export aviation parts or planes to Iran
No exports of medical equipment or medicine
Stop all military exports to Iran
Iran does not produce commercial aircraft or aviation parts domestically
10/20/2012 Final Draft 236 Material Sanctions
Aviation equipment must be imported By banning aircraft companies from selling to Iran, their economy will suffer greatly. Their airlines Iran Air and Mahan Air will be forced to shut down flights All EU countries will also not be allowed to refuel any Iranian flight
10/20/2012 Final Draft 237 Travel Sanctions
Deny Iranians access to the U.S. or any European country
Withdraw all U.S. visas to Iranians
Deny any cargo or luggage to be exported out of Iran to any nation
10/20/2012 Final Draft 238 Travel Sanctions
About 2 million tourists visit Iran each year, mostly coming from Asian countries
Israel and the International community will place restrictions on travel to Iran
This shall further damage the Iranian economy
10/20/2012 Final Draft 239 Trade Embargo
Place trade embargo on Iranian goods to U.S., Israel, and all United Nation members
Further damage the Iranian economy
10/20/2012 Final Draft 240 National Defense Changes
Israel must change national defense strategies in wake of Nuclear attack from Iran Improve nationwide communication systems Train citizens in nuclear defense Provide wide access to nuclear personal protective equipment
10/20/2012 Final Draft 241 National Defense Changes Develop a national notification system to alert citizens of an incoming attack Provide CBRN (nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical) suits to all citizens. These will provide protection against direct contact with radioactive materials Educate citizens on CBRN attacks and how to prepare Construct radiological bomb shelters and evacuation plans
10/20/2012 Final Draft 242 Source: (2006). Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1538149/Police-seek-suits-to-cope- Source: (2012). Retrieved from with-dirty-bomb.html http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_9movAH42- BA/TTcREOXDD_I/AAAAAAAAAFk/C1mQ5 Source: (2010). Retrieved from http://www.radshelters4u.com/index3.htm LB7yIM/S1600- R/FalloutShelterSignLarge.jpg CBRN Suits Mass Produced Shelters
10/20/2012 Final Draft 243 National Defense Changes
Israel will initiate more defense strategy post attack
Cyber defense of the country will be given more attention
With the help the United States and some European countries, the Israelis will step their cyber attacks in an attempt to shut down Iran’s nuclear facilities
10/20/2012 Final Draft 244 United Nations Ban
The U.S. and Israel shall prohibit Iranian leaders from entering the U.S. to take part in any United Nations event
Prevent Iranian president from addressing the UN assembly
10/20/2012 Final Draft 245 United Nations Ban
Israel should seek more international cooperation condemning the attack and assist in eliminating Iran’s nuclear program.
The Israel government should seek assistance from China and Russia to put pressure on Iran to eliminate their nuclear arsenal.
10/20/2012 Final Draft 246 United Nations Ban
Israel should seek more international cooperation condemning the attack and assist in eliminating Iran’s nuclear program.
The Israel government should seek assistance from China and Russia to put pressure on Iran to eliminate their nuclear arsenal.
10/20/2012 Final Draft 247 US Cyberspace Policy The United States will work internationally to promote an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information and communications infrastructure that supports international trade and commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters free expression and innovation To achieve that goal, we will build and sustain an environment in which norms of responsible behavior guide states’ actions, sustain partnerships, and support the rule of law in cyberspace (The White House, 2011). Source: (2012). Retrieved from http://onlinebusiness.volusion.com/articles/expanding-your-online- presence-overseas/
10/20/2012 Final Draft 248 Stability Through Norms
The United States will work with like-minded states to establish an environment of expectations, or norms of behavior, that ground foreign and defense policies and guide international partnerships
The last two decades have seen the swift and unprecedented growth of the Internet as a social medium; the growing reliance of societies on networked information systems to control critical infrastructures and communications systems essential to modern life; and increasing evidence that governments are seeking to exercise traditional national power through cyberspace
10/20/2012 Final Draft 249 The Basis for Norms
Upholding Fundamental Freedoms: States must respect fundamental freedoms of expression and association, which includes cyberspace
Respect for Property: States should respect intellectual property rights, including patents, trade secrets, trademarks, and copyrights
Valuing Privacy: Individuals should be protected from arbitrary or unlawful state interference with their privacy in cyberspace
Protection from Crime: States must identify and prosecute cybercriminals, to ensure laws and practices deny criminals safe havens, and cooperate with international criminal investigations
Right of Self-Defense: Consistent with the United Nations Charter, states have an inherent right to self-defense that may be triggered by certain aggressive acts in cyberspace
10/20/2012 Final Draft 250 Defense: Dissuading and Deterring
The United States will defend its networks, whether the threat comes from terrorists, cybercriminals, or states and their proxies
Just as importantly, we will seek to encourage good actors and dissuade and deter those who threaten peace and stability through actions in cyberspace
We will do so with overlapping policies that combine national and international network resilience with vigilance and a range of credible response options In all our defense endeavors, we will protect civil liberties and privacy in accordance with our laws and principles
10/20/2012 Final Draft 251
Risk with Attack Boost (23%) - Risk with Defense Boost(25%) = A/D Boost Difference (2%) Absolute value
The Risk Probability with Attack and Defense(A/D) Boosts is 2%
10/20/2012 Final Draft 252 We conclude that with a nuclear weapons Iran… Israel taking all the necessary defense postures. .. There is a 2% Risk Probability of a Nuclear Attack on Israel by Iran RISK= 2% So to achieve a 2 point Risk Probability, it will in monetary terms cost 2 million dollars.
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