Remarks at the KSP Seminar on April 16, 2012

Today’s topic is an assessment of the results of the nineteenth parliamentary election of Korea that took place only last week. The first question I would ask is: am I surprised by the outcome? A little bit, but not much.

When I visited Korea in December of last year, most people I talked to seemed to think that the era of the Grand National Party, which is now the Saenuri Party, was almost over and that the question to ask was not whether the opposition party would win the parliamentary election, but by how much. However, when I went back to Korea a month ago, the mood was significantly different than it had been last year. Expectations had changed quite a bit, and more people seemed to believe that the opposition party would still win, but not decisively. In a sense, last week’s results were not totally unexpected. It was for this reason that I was surprised—but only moderately—to see the results of last week’s election.

So, what happened?

First of all, I would say that the ruling party won the game of framing key issues during the campaign. They framed the election as a competition between a future power (Park) and the bygone power (Roh). The opposition tried to frame the election as an anti-Lee Myung Bak campaign, but this frame had already been used repeatedly in previous elections. Its effort to characterize the election as a referendum on Lee did not work well.

Park was seen as a force of opposition within the ruling party, and people did not necessarily equate Lee with Park or the Saenuri Party. Park remade the ruling party and vigorously campaigned to reclaim her reputation as the “queen of the election.” Some voters probably supported her candidates so as ultimately to support her. They took the election as a referendum on Park.

On the other hand, the Democratic United Party made two strategic mistakes. One was to bring the KORUS FTA and the Jeju Naval Base issues to the fore early in the campaign. Both issues were first initiated and promoted by the Roh administration and are now being denounced by the former pro-Roh Moohyun faction, such as Han Myung Sook, Moon Jae In, and Lee Haechan, who took over the Democratic Party. There was self- contradiction, and the ruling party portrayed them as being untrustworthy.

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The Democratic Party also clouded the question of its own identity. The Democratic Party was so eager to come up with candidates allied with the Progressive Party in some key districts that they accepted much of that party’s progressive agenda, including the two issues mentioned earlier. This not only diluted the central identity of the Democratic Party but also created a sense of crisis among conservatives, who then decided to rally for the ruling party instead.

This time we saw a repeat of some earlier patterns, especially in terms of the power of regionalism. The ruling party failed to elect any member to the assembly from the Honam-Jolla region (although two candidates came close to winning). The opposition gained only four seats from the Youngnam region. In fact, this regional bifurcation became stronger than it had been in the previous election, reflecting fierce fights between the two main parties. The parties pretty much split the Seoul-Kyonggi-Incheon areas, though the opposition party fared better in Seoul. This is nothing new or surprising.

However, two crucial areas in this most recent election were Chungcheong and Kangwon. The ruling party won all the seats in Kangwon province—the same province that elected the opposition party candidate as its governor last year. Also, the relative success of the ruling party in Chungcheong provinces (winning twelve districts out of twenty-five) can be attributed to Park’s support for the move of the government ministries from Seoul to those areas, despite Lee’s strong push to block such a move earlier in his administration. This has important implications for Park’s chances of being elected president in the next election, a point that I will come back to later.

In addition, there is a huge turnover in the members of Parliament, with almost fifty percent of the members serving for the first time—this is not new to Korean politics.

On the other hand, there were very few independent politicians who won seats, very different from the previous election. Only three were elected this time, as opposed to the twenty-five independents elected four years ago. This suggests a stronger bifurcation of the electoral vote and a more intense fight between conservatives and progressives in the coming year.

Here it is worth comparing last week’s elections to the by-elections of last year that elected independent candidate Park Won Soon as mayor of Seoul.

2 Most people interpreted the results of last year’s by-elections as the defeat of the ruling party, but I had a different opinion. The ruling party had lost the Seoul mayorship but won most of the others in provincial and rural areas—I thought that this boded well for them in the upcoming parliamentary elections. We find the basically same pattern in last week’s results. Also, the results of both elections show that the impact of SNS should not be exaggerated: it is an effective means of mobilization among young, educated voters in larger cities, but its impact elsewhere is quite limited.

What about the implications for inter-Korean relations and the United States – Republic of Korea alliance?

We would expect little change in either of those areas, at least until the new administration comes to power next year. Since the ruling party won the majority of the seats in the assembly, there would not be a strong pressure to change the course of the existing level of inter-Korean relations toward more engagement. Also, I wouldn’t expect to see any further controversy over the KORUS FTA issue. It is now safe to say that KORUS FTA has survived Korean politics and will survive. We will have to wait until next year to see if there are any changes in these sensitive areas.

Finally, what about the prospects for the presidential election being held in mid-December?

The resounding victory of the ruling party is certainly good news for Park. She has once again proven her leadership abilities, and the ruling party has become her party. She is very unlikely to face any major challenges to her presidential nomination. Also, the fact that she and her party were victorious in both Kangwon and Chungcheong, the two swing-vote provinces in past elections, should be very encouraging for her. In the latest poll setting Park and Ahn head-to-head in a hypothetical presidential election, Park led Ahn 45.1% to 35.9%. Park also led Moon Jae In, 47.7% to 31.4%.

On the other hand, eight months is a long time in Korean politics, and she needs to do better in Seoul with younger voters. Voters in their twenties in Seoul came to vote in record numbers, with a 64.1% participation rate, and they are the ones who tilted Seoul heavily in progressives’ favor. Korean voters are keen on maintaining a balance in power and tend to dislike seeing one party control both the Blue House and the National Assembly. In addition, the defeat of the opposition party will create a sense of crisis

3 among the opposition forces, who may then push for a single unified ticket so as to defeat the ruling party, as happened in the 2002 presidential election. The fact that Moon Jae In has largely failed to deliver elections in the way that Park has will cast doubts about his capabilities as a presidential candidate. This will create room for Ahn Cheol Soo, who might be a more challenging opponent for Park.

What about the Democratic Party? They lost the elections that they should have won. Han has already stepped down, and the party will hold a convention in June to elect new leadership. But the party’s main challenge is whether they will be able to produce a viable presidential candidate—one who can defeat Park in December. I think the Democratic Party will go through a period of crisis, and whether it will be successful in December will depend on the ability of its leadership to resolve that crisis, as Park did for the Grand National Party.

Finally, let me mention the progress of the Progressive Party. Interestingly, they failed to win any seats in their traditional stronghold, Ulsan, but they should be quite pleased with the overall results. They are sure to continue to increase their voice in Korean politics. Although their number of seats, at thirteen, is still small, they have been very vocal about certain issues, such as KORUS FTA and social welfare, and can continue to press the Democratic Party with their agenda. They know that the Democratic Party needs their help in winning the presidential election. That will pose a dilemma for the Democratic Party, especially considering what happened this time.

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