Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Guidelines for Consideration

CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES: Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Guidelines for Consideration

Lisa L. Spahr with Joshua Ederheimer and David Bilson CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES: Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Guidelines for Consideration

April 2007 This publication was supported by Motorola, Incorporated. The points of view expressed herein are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent the opinions of Motorola, Inc., or individual Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) members.

Websites and sources listed provide useful information at the time of this writing, but authors do not endorse any information of the sponsor organization or other information on the websites.

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 978-1-934485-01-9

Cover design by Dave Williams Photos are (clockwise from upper left corner): March 9, 2005 attack on Baghdad Head- quarters of the U.S. Police Advisory Mission in Iraq, courtesy of Michael Heidingsfield; July 2005 London bombings, EMPICS Limited of Pavilion House, 16 Castle Boulevard, Nottingham, NG7 IFL; September 2004 suicide bombing in Jakarta, courtesy of Reuters/ Bea Wiharta; and December 2005 Miami International Airport bomb threat, © [2007] Lou Toman/South-Florida Sun-Sentinel. Contents

Foreword ...... i Patrol-Level Response to Acknowledgments...... iii a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration ...... 13 Overview ...... 1 Risks to the United States ...... 1 Graduated Force Option Protocol ...... 18 Perspectives from Around the World ...... 5 Glossary of Terms ...... 19 United States: Los Angeles Police Department ...... 5 About the Authors/PERF/CFA/Motorola ...... 23 United Kingdom: Metropolitan Police Service of London ...... 6 Appendices Iraq: Training Iraqi Police Forces ...... 7 1. Participant List from the Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference, Washington, D.C., March 31, 2006...... 29 The Development of the PERF Guidelines ...... 9 2. Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference Agenda...... 31 Overview of Research Methods ...... 9 3. Participant List from the Patrol-Level Initial Conference: Suicide Bombing Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit, Preparedness and Response, March 31, 2006 ...... 9 Baltimore, Md., January 17-18, 2007 ...... 33 PERF Interview Guide...... 9 4. Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Site Visits ...... 10 Threat Summit Agenda ...... 35 Interviews ...... 10 Data ...... 10 5. Site Visit and Interview Guide ...... 37 Open-Source Data...... 10 6. U.S. Army, National Ground Intelligence Restricted Data ...... 10 Center’s Improvised Explosive Device Guideline Development and Review Process ...... 11 Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet ...... 39 Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit, January 17–18, 2007 ...... 11 Guideline Considerations ...... 11 Description of the Glossary of Terms ...... 12 Description of the Graduated Force Options Protocol...... 12

Foreword

he United States has not had an extensive In 2006, the Police Executive Research Forum Thistory of dealing with suicide bomb attacks. As a (PERF) began a dialogue with the policing commu- result, few police and sheriffs’ departments have felt nity to better understand what needs to be done to the need to develop policies and training programs prepare for the threat of suicide bombers. In March specifically addressing the issues raised by such of that year, PERF held a conference in Washington, incidents. D.C. on suicide bombing preparedness. Fifty partic- However, the 9/11 attacks drastically changed ipants from federal, state, local, and international how the United States views its own vulnerability to policing agencies identified policy issues that terrorism in general. The implications of Septem- should be considered. PERF followed up on that ber 11 regarding the threat of suicide bombers are conference, and spent the remainder of 2006 con- still being felt around the world. After all, the 9/11 ducting research, making site visits to police agen- hijackers were the ultimate suicide bombers. They cies in New York City, Los Angeles, London, used commercial aircraft as bombs rather than Washington, D.C., and elsewhere, and writing a set devices that fit inside a backpack. But at their core, of proposed guidelines for consideration by policing agencies. In January 2007, PERF held a second their motivations were the same—they believed conference in Baltimore, during which we asked that political or religious ideology justified murder- participants to vet the guidelines. ing innocent bystanders and killing themselves in This report is the result of those meetings and the process. research. It presents 68 guidelines for departments There have already been several incidents in to consider—along with related documents such as this country over the last few years involving per- a Glossary of Terms, to prevent confusion by ensur- sons wearing or carrying explosives who killed ing that the terminology is used consistently. Some themselves or were killed by police. Knowledgeable of the guidelines offer broad recommendations people agree that potential suicide bomb attacks in about law enforcement agencies’ entire approach to the United States are unfortunately part of what Sir incidents that may involve a suicide bomber—for Ian Blair refers to as the “New Normality.” For example, setting criteria for assessing the threats example, a 2006 survey of more than 100 foreign- posed by the attacker and the risks of various police policy experts—Republicans and Democrats responses. Other guidelines offer very detailed alike—found that 91 percent said it is “likely or cer- advice based on what we learned from policing tain” that within the next decade the United States agencies around the world—for example, how far will suffer an attack similar in scale to the July 2005 away from an attacker police should remain if they London bombings. And when the experts were asked are using various types of radios that could inad- which two types of attacks are most likely, the most vertently trigger a suicide bomber’s explosives. common response was “suicide bombing attacks,” Fundamentally, the purpose of the guidelines followed closely by “attack on major infrastructure.” is to answer this question: What should first Other types of attacks, such as use of radiological or responders do—and what should they not do— biological weapons, were ranked far lower. when encountering a potential suicide bomber?

Foreword — i The guidelines recommend that law enforce- type of threat that involves many considerations ment agencies create a stand alone policy and/or not present in other types of incidents. training curriculum on suicide bomb threats. PERF At the same time, it should be noted that the recognizes that this is controversial. At our first Suicide Bomb Threat Guideline Number 1 states meeting in March 2006, it became evident that that suicide bomb protocols generally should be there was some reluctance to put suicide bomber “consistent with an agency’s use-of-force policies, policies into writing. Perhaps some chiefs think of procedures, and training.” In other words, suicide the adage, “If the only tool you have is a hammer, bomb policies should expand upon policing agen- you will see every problem as a nail.” In other cies’ existing policies on use of force in general. words, if officers are trained to think carefully Motorola, Inc. and PERF are pleased to pres- about suicide bombing scenarios, will it increase ent the Guidelines for Consideration, Graduated the chance that they will misinterpret situations, Force Option Protocol, and Glossary of Terms seeing a suicide-bomber terrorist every time an which culminated from our year-long efforts to incident involves someone wearing a backpack? research the international policing response to sui- This is particularly important because we also rec- cide bomb threats. It is our hope that this publica- ognize that a patrol officer is usually the first to tion will help more local law enforcement arrive at a scene that may involve a suicide bomber. executives openly discuss this issue with other com- But in the end, there was a strong consensus munity leaders, examine current policies and prac- that policing agencies need stand alone guidelines tices, and create or modify planning and training because suicide bombing incidents are a unique strategies to address the threat of suicide bombers.

Chuck Wexler Executive Director Police Executive Research Forum

ii — Foreword Acknowledgments

his publication represents a culmination of Police; Chief Charles Payne and his staff from the TPERF’s year-long effort to work with the interna- Department of Homeland Security’s Office for tional policing community on a highly sensitive Bombing Prevention; Major General Mickey Levy topic. We received many valuable contributions and Brigadier General Simon Perry, Israel Police from policing agencies, and had the pleasure to Force; Chief William Bratton, Deputy Chief Mark learn about the committed efforts and interest of so Leap, Commander Michael Downing, Lieutenant many more. James West, Sergeant Sean Malinowski, and Detec- We would like to thank the Metropolitan tive Supervisor Ralph Morten, Los Angeles Police Police Service of London for approaching PERF Department; Commissioner Raymond Kelly, with its concerns regarding the preparation, plan- Deputy Commissioner Michael Farrell, Inspector ning, and training for suicide bomb attacks. Assis- Michael Healey, Captain Hugh O’Rourke, Lieu- tant Commissioner Stephen House, at the direction tenant Mark Torre, Sergeant Bacharik, and mem- of Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner of the Metropolitan bers of the Emergency Services Unit, New York City Police, led PERF to investigate the matter, which Police Department; Former Chief Charles Ramsey resulted in the joint research efforts of this project, and Chief Cathy Lanier, Washington, D.C. Metro- a conference to lay out the issues, and a summit to politan Police Department; Deputy Chief Consta- finalize much needed guidelines for consideration. ble Ian Arundale, Association of Chief Police Special thanks are due to our partners at Officers, West Mercia Police Department, UK; Motorola, Inc., for their support of the Critical Commanders Simon Foy and Jo Kay, Staff Officer Issues in Policing Series. Motorola has supported Helen Cryer, Former Superintendent Stephen PERF for many years in our effort to stimulate Swain, and Police Constable Spike Townsend, Lon- progress in policing. We are especially grateful to don Metropolitan Police Service; Dr. Jonathan Greg Brown, President and Chief Operating Offi- Crego, Hendon Training Center, UK; Chief Gil cer; Mark Moon, Corporate Vice President and Kerlikowske, Seattle Police Department; and Chief General Manager, Government and Commercial Liz Woollen, University of Oklahoma Police Markets; and Rick Neal, Vice President, Govern- Department. ment Strategy and Business Development. We also would like to thank Chief John Tim- Our project would have been incomplete oney, Miami Police Department; Chief Thomas without the openness and hospitality we received Robbins, Boston University Police Department; on our many site visits with departments here and Assistant Director Michael Bouchard, Bureau of abroad. We wish to thank the following people and Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Assis- agencies for sharing their insights on this complex tant Director John Miller and Deputy Assistant issue: Assistant Director Michael Bouchard and Directors Joseph Billy and Donald Van Duyn, Fed- Division Chief Joseph Riehl, Bureau of Alcohol, eral Bureau of Investigation; Assistant Director Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Agent Charles Michael Stenger and Assistant Special Agent in Wood and Detective Jack Dineen, U.S. Capitol Charge Robert Novy, U.S. Secret Service; President

Acknowledgments — iii and CEO Michael Heidingsfield, Memphis Shelby PERF staffers. Executive Director Chuck Wexler Crime Commission; Detective Supervisor Ralph guided the project from start to finish with insight, Morten, Los Angeles Police Department Bomb thoughtfulness, and determination to provide a Squad; and Captain Jeffrey Herold, Washington, meaningful product for the field. Corina Solé Brito D.C. Metropolitan Police Department for their pre- and Andrea Luna coordinated the first conference sentations during the Suicide Bombing Prepared- and set the pace for the work to follow. Emily Mil- ness and Response Conference in March 2006 and stein-Greengart was instrumental in planning a the Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat successful summit and conducting site visits perti- Summit in January 2007. nent to the project. PERF Fellow Rick Weger, San Critically important to the completion of this Jose Police Department, assisted staff on site visits. report was the willingness of an exceptional group Eric Albertsen delivered essential support at the of individuals to participate in these two events. summit. Bill Tegeler, acting director of the CFA, These extremely busy professionals graciously gave contributed to the writing and editing of this pub- their time and expertise to determine the key issues lication. Jerry Murphy and Craig Fischer both pro- related to suicide bomb preparedness at the first vided helpful editorial reviews of this document. conference and to produce and revise the Guide- Jim Cronin and Jason Cheney provided additional lines for Consideration during the summit. (A support throughout the project to ensure its suc- complete list of participants can be found in cess. We thank each of them for their valuable con- Appendices 1 and 3.) tributions. Finally, this document reflects the many This report could not have been produced talents of Dave Williams, who provided layout and without the strong efforts of talented and dedicated cover design.

Lisa L. Spahr Joshua Ederheimer Associate Captain Police Executive Research Forum Metropolitan Police Department Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C.

David Bilson Chief Superintendent Metropolitan Police Service London

iv — Acknowledgments Overview

he United States is fortunate in comparison of them said they considered such an attack likely toT countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel within a year. Two-thirds of the participants pre- with respect to suicide bomb threats. These coun- dicted that the next attack will be in the form of a tries are constantly on heightened alert to the threat suicide bombing.1 The increase in suicide bombing of suicide bombers. Security is at the forefront of incidents internationally, coupled with the unrest everyone’s mind, not just those of the police forces. over current foreign policy, should be reason enough And while the events of September 11, 2001 for police and sheriffs’ departments to put plans in opened our eyes to the threats to our homeland, place to combat such threats before they occur. particularly when a committed group of people In fact, there have been a number of such wishes to cause unimaginable harm to our country, threats and attacks that have already occurred in the as time goes on the threat of a new suicide bomb United States. These include: incident fades in many Americans’ minds. The tragic bombings of underground trains and a bus n In September 1995, a man killed himself and his in London in 2005 were a terrible reminder that the family in a car packed with explosives in Balti- United Kingdom, the United States, and other more County, Md. The man lured his estranged nations are at risk of continued attacks from indi- family into the car by promising to take them viduals and organizations that are willing to kill school-shopping. The police ascertained that he 2 innocent people for a particular cause or out of dis- fully intended to kill them in this manner. agreement with government actions. n In December 2001, Richard Reid (the “Shoe Bomber”) attempted to ignite an explosive in his RISKS TO THE UNITED STATES shoe while on board an airplane from Paris to Miami. He was subdued by passengers and the Many experts agree that a suicide bomb attack is flight crew. He pled guilty to the crime and inevitable on U.S. soil. A 2006 survey of more than acknowledged his associations with al-Qaeda.3 100 of America’s top foreign-policy experts found that 80 percent expect an attack similar in scale to n In August 2003, a man, likely a victim himself, 9/11 within a decade. Ninety-one percent of the par- was killed by an explosive locked around his neck ticipants believe that an attack similar to that of the in Erie, Pa., after he was forced to rob a bank. The 2005 London bombings is likely by 2016; 57 percent explosive detonated while he was surrounded by

1. The Terrorism Index. July/August 2006. Foreign Policy and the Center for American Progress Publica- tion. Retrieved February 7, 2007 from www.foreignpolicy.com 2. New York Times. September 13, 1995. Man Kills Estranged Wife and Children with Bomb. Retrieved February 6, 2007 from www.nytimes.com 3. CNN. January 22, 2003. Richard Reid Pleads Guilty. Retrieved on February 6, 2007 from www.cnn.com

Overview — 1 police, who were waiting for the bomb squad.4 suicide bomber classification. This document is not This case remains unsolved, and no one has been meant to delineate between a lone-wolf type of charged with any crime related to it. bomber and one with a highly organized plot with multiple bombers; it is intended to provide tools for In June 2005, a 52-year-old male walked into a n law enforcement agencies to begin considering how federal courthouse in Seattle with a backpack patrol-level officers should respond to a suicide strapped to his chest and a grenade in his hand. He bomber threat. Although each incident will be had a history of legal battles over child-support unique, they all require situation and threat assess- payments. The man was shot twice and killed by ments by the officer who responds to the call. police officers. The grenade was found to be inac- Most law enforcement experts agree that a patrol 5 tive, and the man was carrying a living will. officer is the most likely person to identify and n In October 2005, a student with explosives in a potentially confront a suicide bomber. Although backpack blew himself up outside a packed uni- many agencies have highly skilled specialized units versity football stadium in Oklahoma. It is to deal with bombs and active shooters, patrol offi- unknown whether he intended to kill others or cers will require training to handle such situations not. A review of his background uncovered years if they arise. of bomb-making and an interest in explosives.6 Some U.S. police departments, including A search of his property yielded high quantities those in Los Angeles and New York City, have iden- of explosive materials and a significant amount tified the risk of future suicide bombers as immi- of jihadist literature.7 nent. They have written policies and conducted department-wide training, and are consistently n In December 2005, Air Marshals at Miami Inter- assessing and improving their readiness. On the national Airport shot and killed a man who ran other hand, some departments have not yet begun from an airplane and onto the jetway, claiming to specifically address this issue. Some don’t see the he had a bomb. The man’s wife said he was suf- threat as imminent or they feel that their jurisdic- fering from mental illness and had failed to take tion would not be a likely target. Others feel that his medication. The Air Marshals defended the due to the complexities, and specifically the uncer- decision to shoot and noted the adherence to tainties, of a suicide bomb attack, little can be done protocol for use of lethal force.8 until an event actually occurs. A lack of resources or expertise remains an obstacle for readiness in some Subject matter experts often disagree about departments. Many police departments in the the language and definitions related to suicide United States have recently experienced increases in bombing, using terms such as “suicide terrorism,” violent crime, and therefore are devoting more “homicide bomber,” and “body bomber.” Depend- resources to that area rather than to crisis prepared- ing upon an agency’s definitions and terminology, ness. Although there are many reasons why police some of the examples above may not fit into a departments are not actively preparing for a suicide

4. Fox News. September 1, 2003. Investigators Probe Bizarre Bomb Death of Pizza Man. Retrieved February 6, 2007 from www.foxnews.com 5. Seattle Times. June 21, 2005. Man Killed at Court was Upset over Child Support. Retrieved February 15, 2007 from www.seattletimes.nwsource.com 6. Chief Liz Wollen, Oklahoma University Police, Presentation at the Forum on Crime and Justice, Luncheon Series. August 25, 2006. 7. Accuracy in Media. October 7, 2005. Terrorism Strikes the Heartland. Retrieved February 6, 2007 from www.aim.org 8. New York Times. December 8, 2005. Marshals Shoot and Kill Passenger in Bomb Threat. Retrieved February 7, 2007 from www.nytimes.com

2 — Overview bomb threat, we believe that police agencies would guidelines, see “The Development of the PERF be well served by devoting time to assessing their Guidelines,” page 9. By absorbing the lessons own capacity to deal with these kinds of situations. learned by our national and international policing Our country should not put off planning for a sui- partners, the work of bomb squads and specialists, cide bomb threat until another bombing of cata- and the progressive actions of a number of depart- strophic proportions occurs. ments, PERF hopes to provide information to initi- PERF set out to conduct research and develop ate the development of training and policy as well guidelines to assist departments in this area. For as to foster further discussion on this complex and details about PERF’s process in developing these sensitive topic.

Overview — 3 “Bus destroyed by a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in Baqubah, Iraq, January 2, 2006.” Photo by Pfc. Danielle Howard, courtesy of Department of Defense (released to public). Perspectives from Around the World

The United States Perspective WILLIAM BRATTON CHIEF, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT PRESIDENT, POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM

As the paradigm shift in modern policing continues attempt to deto- to evolve, we must challenge ourselves to open our nate an explosive minds to what may have been unthinkable in the device in an urban area, inflicting mass casualties past. The reality is that as we improve our methods and killing himself or herself in the process. of target hardening in response to the threat posed The Los Angeles Police Department is fortu- by terrorists in our cities and towns, we may at some nate enough to have developed a cadre of personnel point encounter individuals bent on destruction with specialized knowledge in this area. Our officers and willing to sacrifice their own lives in the process. and detectives have worked closely with the police in While we must continue to fight crime, we various countries who have encountered these now have a clear mandate to continue to expand threats in the past. We have developed detailed poli- our mission into the homeland security arena. It is cies and tactics to respond to a rapidly unfolding incumbent upon us as police leaders to anticipate event involving a homicide bomber. Recognizing the the myriad of possible threats posed by extremist need for an in-depth analysis leading to best practice groups. We must actively pursue best practices in this area, PERF assembled a prestigious group of when it comes to scenario-based training, tactical professionals and other stakeholders to create guide- planning and preparation. lines to assist departments across the country in There are still those who will say that we are addressing this potential threat to public safety. erring on the side of caution as we explore all possi- The work group developed a series of guide- ble scenarios, including the homicide bomber strik- lines for a patrol-level response to a suicide bomb ing in the heart of U.S. cities. They say, “That topic threat. These guidelines represent the latest thinking is too complex or sensitive to address,” or that the from some of the top names in counter-terrorism threat posed is an unlikely one in our context. They training and tactical response, and encompass rec- are wrong. We would be doing ourselves and our ommendations on threat assessment, operations, jurisdictions a disservice by not confronting this and training. By disseminating this information to threat head-on and planning for all eventualities. as wide a range of police agencies across the country To that end, the Los Angeles Police Depart- as possible, we will be heightening officer awareness, ment has, for a number of years, been painstakingly spurring further discussion of the issue, and lessen- researching, analyzing, and planning for the even- ing the possibility of a tragic outcome should the tuality that, at some point, an individual will hypothetical threat become a horrible reality.

Perspectives from Around the World — 5 The United Kingdom Perspective SIR IAN BLAIR COMMISSIONER, METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE OF LONDON

The Metropolitan Police Service has more than 30 The changed years of experience dealing with terrorist attacks on threat, referred to in the streets of London, but the July 7, 2005 attacks London as the “New on our public transport system were a type of Normality,”demands onslaught that was new to the city: “suicide that we identify new ways of working. But our bomber” attacks. It is impossible to overstate the efforts to counter terrorism must not become sepa- impact that those assaults had on the Metropolitan rated from mainstream policing as a new discipline. Police Service, just as the police departments of the Terrorism is a crime, and like other crimes, it can United States were changed forever by the 9/11 sui- be successfully frustrated through tried and proven cide bombers’ attacks on the World Trade Center approaches in policing—visible patrol, intelligence, and the Pentagon. forensics, and detection. Efforts to counter terror- I asked Assistant Commissioner Stephen ism must not become separated from mainstream House to contact the Police Executive Research policing as a new discipline of science. Forum in order to progress further study of what Successful resolution of such complex events policing agencies in the United States and the UK also requires the highest level of training to ensure are doing to plan for attacks by suicide bombers. It that officers fully understand their agencies’ plans is important that our two nations continue to work and make the best decisions at all levels. We are very together to consider what this new threat means to proud of our Hydra and Minerva simulation train- police departments. ing systems, developed within the Police Service, in One thing we have learned is that developing which officers train in a specially-built facility to a response to counter the threat of a suicide bomber simulate the complexity, chaos, and challenges of will not be successfully achieved by the police serv- real-time incidents. The approach allows officers to ice acting alone. Even with the best police work, it participate in scenarios that test and develop their will be communities that uncover terrorists and operational decision-making and professional skills. defeat terror. That is why it is essential to build trust The MPS has developed strong operational through strong working partnerships between frameworks to respond to terrorist threats and inci- communities and the police, involving all levels of dents, to provide security and reassurance to the government as well as voluntary and private-sector people of London, and to protect the city’s infra- organizations. All have a crucial contribution to structure. We must continually search to improve make in protecting our citizens. our response and find the best measures to protect It is also important to understand that while our citizens and the cities that we serve. That is why there is always the need to protect operationally it is so important that PERF, with the support of the sensitive tactics, we must share policing plans with Metropolitan Police Service, New Scotland Yard, those to whom we are held to account. Police man- has developed this essential guidance for first- agement and oversight authorities must ensure that response officers. By preparing officers for the plans are appropriate and proportionate, while they threat of suicide bombers and training them to hold police to account and inform citizens about respond effectively, we can disrupt terrorism and police activities, objectives, and outcomes. save life.

6 — Perspectives from Around the World The Iraq Perspective MICHAEL HEIDINGSFIELD PRESIDENT AND CEO, MEMPHIS SHELBY CRIME COMMISSION

Suicide bombers in the United States? That seems to find and develop be one of many of the dire challenges facing local law that life-saving enforcement in America today. The answer seems to technology. be more of a question of ‘when’ and not ‘if,’ but no Second, we must one can be absolutely sure. However, as the target of n continue to pursue and strike the enemy where he four suicide bombing attempts while heading the begins production or planning of such attacks. U.S. Department of State Police Advisory Mission in Once the threat is deployed and our adversaries Iraq from 2004 to 2006, I can speak with absolute certainty about the outcomes of such attacks: chaotic are on the move against their targets, our ability to aftermaths, unprecedented frustration at the enemy’s mitigate or defeat that threat is severely ability to strike with relative impunity, and frenzied compromised. searches for countermeasures. n Third, we must never dismiss the experiences of As we tried to rebuild Iraq’s Police Service, 13 law enforcement professionals who have dealt U.S. police advisors under my command lost their with the specter of such attacks for decades. We lives; those losses were overwhelmingly tied to sui- must embrace, in particular, our Israeli and cide bombers using improvised explosive devices British counterparts, to whom we can turn for against us and against what we represented. For me, lessons learned. The concept of ‘jointness’ cannot there were never the right words to express the be overstated. depth of our grief to those officers’ families. Multi- ply those scenarios, which were my personal expe- n Fourth, we must recognize that it is the patrol rience, against the impact of the thousands of officer on the street who will be the first to con- civilian Iraqi casualties by suicide bombers, and you front this threat on American soil. We will not have a measurable sense of just how quickly any have the luxury of containment and a traditional sense of order can devolve out of control. Explosive Ordnance Disposal response. We must The public safety of our communities, our train patrol officers in the most foreign and management of the risk to our police officers, and unthinkable scenarios that they have ever faced. our control of the consequences of such attacks lie n Fifth and finally, it is not just technology or street in five elements: skills that will save us. It is the development of n First, we must develop technology that detects, real time intelligence that reveals the enemy’s neutralizes, or destroys suicide bomb threats at intentions, tactics and strategies. either a speed or distance that minimizes risk. In this effort, agencies in the defense industry, such In Iraq, we continuously tried to understand as the Department of Defense and the Joint and forecast the enemy course of action. Regret- Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organiza- tably, we must now bring that military concept tion, are expending blood, sweat and tears to home to the domestic front.

Perspectives from Around the World — 7 “U.S. Air Force (USAF) Staff Sergeant (SSGT) Phillips, an Explosive Ordnances and Devices (EOD) specialist from the 824th Airborne Red Horse (ARH), examines a bomb attached to a simulated suicide bomber during a Safe Flag exercise at Avon Park Air Range, Florida (FL). Safe Flag exercise is designed to ready troops to become a highly capable and responsive team when opening air bases worldwide.” Photo by SSGT Matthew Hannen (USAF), courtesy of Department of Defense (released to public). The Development of the PERF Guidelines

OVERVIEW OF in Washington, D.C. The 50 participants were from RESEARCH METHODS federal, state, and local policing agencies in the United States; policing units in Canada, New Prior to the development of PERF’s “Patrol-Level Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Israel; and Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Guidelines for private-sector partners, including the Memphis Consideration,” little had been offered, nationally, Shelby Crime Commission and the Center for to police departments about this topic. Our inter- Technology Commercialization (See Appendices 1 national colleagues, specifically Israel and more and 2 for the Participant List and Agenda respec- recently the United Kingdom, appear to have devel- tively). The conference participants discussed the oped the majority of the responses to suicide bomb nature of suicide bombing missions, international threats as a direct result of their experiences. The experiences, and challenges to policy and training United States is less prepared, perhaps because of development and implementation. They also iden- limited experiences, other priorities, and/or the tified policy concerns, such as whether a police sheer number of departments nationwide to coor- agency’s suicide bomb policies should be developed dinate. Other challenges to preparedness include as a separate document or should be encapsulated the complexity of the issue, the belief of some that an attack is not imminent, and the feeling that there into the general use-of-force policy. This work is little that can be done to prepare for such an allowed the PERF staff to begin developing the unpredictable event. guidelines, as well as to identify site visits and fur- PERF set out to examine the issues pertaining ther research that would be necessary to complete to suicide bomb threat response, identify American the project. and international departments that have developed policy and/or tactics to address such threats, and PERF Interview Guide develop guidelines that could assist departments in preparing for a suicide bomb incident. The research PERF developed an interview guide to facilitate dis- model included: a conference and summit with cussion during the site visits and interviews (See stakeholders, site visits, interviews, and review of Appendix 5). This guide was designed to help the open-source and restricted data for relevant arti- interviewers focus their research on certain topics, cles, training materials, and/or protocols. such as: whether a police agency’s existing policies specifically addressed suicide bombers; how an agency would respond to various scenarios suggest- Initial Conference: Suicide Bombing ing that a suicide bombing might be imminent; Preparedness and Response agencies’ use of various terms regarding suicide PERF began this project with the first of two stake- bombings; agencies’ use of bomb squads; and the holders meetings, the Suicide Bombing Prepared- specific tactics that patrol officers are taught to ness and Response Conference, on March 31, 2006 address threats of suicide bombers.

The Development of the PERF Guidelines — 9 Site Visits a myriad of topics pertinent to international PERF conducted site visits with the following police policing communities and less-lethal force alter- departments/agencies: New York City; Los Angeles; natives, including suicide bomb response and the U.S. Capitol Police; Metropolitan Police Service of potential use of chemical “calmatives” to inca- London; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and pacitate individuals or crowds.

Explosives; Department of Homeland Security; n The Federal Bureau of Investigation created two U.S. Secret Service; and the Israel Police Force. Dur- multicast DVDs related to suicide bombing ing each site visit, PERF staffers met with bomb threats. The multicasts feature prominent police squad specialists, special weapons and tactics chiefs and federal officials talking about pre- (SWAT) and related specialized units, counter-ter- paredness and response to threats and related rorism units, and patrol divisions. Site visits were situations. integral to identifying department policies, procedures, equipment, and future needs with regard to suicide bomb threat response. Data Open-Source Data Interviews PERF utilized open-source materials such as: academic articles related to suicide bomber ideolo- In addition to the interviews conducted during the gies and evolutions; military documents related to site visits, PERF interviewed a number of individu- explosives and standoff distances; police doctrines als with expertise in this area, including Terry such as active-shooter protocols; explosives training Gainer, then-chief of the U.S. Capitol Police; Major materials offered by government and private-sector General Mickey Levy, former Israel Police com- sources; and media reports of bombing incidents. A mander of the district of Jerusalem; and Michael sample of articles and documents reviewed include: Heidingsfield, former U.S. State Department Police Robert Pape’s The Chicago Project on Suicide Terror- Advisor to Iraqi Police Forces. Interviews also ism; the Institute of Land Warfare’s paper on Sui- included various meetings and briefings attended by cide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom (2004); PERF staff to obtain further insight on the topic: Penn State University’s Advantages and Limitations n The U.S. Department of Homeland Security of Calmatives for Use as a Non-Lethal Technique Office of Bombing Prevention held an Advisory (2000); and Department of the Army, National Group Conference on December 4–5, 2006 to Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), Intelligence discuss a national strategy for bombing preven- and Security Command’s Improvised Explosive tion to present to the President. Device Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet. All of this information was useful in understanding the wide The Forum on Crime & Justice, a University of n picture of suicide bomb threats, policing, and soci- Pennsylvania program that brings federal legisla- ety at large, as well as the specifics of thwarting such tive- and executive-branch officials together with attacks, such as training opportunities and tactics. criminal justice practitioners and other leaders to discuss critical issues, held a luncheon discussion Restricted Data on suicide bombers on August 25, 2006. Speakers PERF examined restricted-source data from included Chief (and former PERF President) Gil police departments, bomb specialists, policing and Kerlikowske, Seattle; Chief Liz Wollen, University specialized membership organizations, and other of Oklahoma; and Jeff Fuller of the National sources. These documents are labeled “sensitive,” Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board. “for law enforcement only,” “for official use only,” n The International Law Enforcement Forum, an and so on. The material contained in the docu- international network of security professionals, ments included information such as specific tactical held an event on November 7–9, 2006 to discuss maneuvers and drafts of departmental protocols.

10 — The Development of the PERF Guidelines GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT AND departments. The event highlighted the complexi- REVIEW PROCESS ties and sensitivities surrounding various preparedness and response methods that could be utilized. The PERF site visits, interviews, and open and However, it was abundantly clear that most depart- restricted-source research led to the development of ments wanted national guidelines to help them nearly 100 initial draft Guidelines for Consideration begin developing policies within their own agen- regarding patrol-level response to a suicide bomb cies. Nearly two days’ worth of discussion regarding threat. The overall purpose of the guidelines was the guidelines resulted in another evolution of the to answer the question: What should first process, with the nearly 100 initial draft guidelines responders do—and what should they not do— boiled down to 68 vetted guidelines. when encountering a potential suicide bomber? The guideline development process posed a challenge: Those drafting the guidelines strove to Guideline Considerations avoid too much specificity, which could render The Guidelines for Consideration were finalized guidelines inapplicable to certain agencies, but also and vetted by PERF. Feedback from Summit partic- to avoid writing guidelines that were so general they ipants resulted in modification of some guidelines, would fail to offer much assistance. Guidelines elimination of others, and creation of new ones. often were based on multiple sources of informa- Inclusion of guidelines in the final document (and tion; in some cases guidelines were based on a strong consensus in the literature and research, exclusion of others through the vetting process) are while other guidelines reflected a melding of several not meant to imply 100-percent consensus. PERF perspectives. Guidelines were first vetted by PERF took into consideration all feedback and comments executive management and lead researchers on the related to each guideline. And while the guidelines project. As a result of this review, guidelines were may not necessarily reflect the individual views of revised, eliminated or newly created. each participant or each participating department, they do reflect the amassed wealth of knowledge collected during this project regarding suicide Patrol-Level Response to a bomb threat preparation and response. Suicide Bomb Threat Summit PERF recognizes that each potential suicide The most critical step in the process was the vetting bomb threat will include a dynamic set of variables of the guidelines at the summit meeting in Balti- that may not be fully covered by each guideline. The more on January 17–18, 2007. Participants from guidelines do not discount the need for proper train- the previous conference were invited, as well as oth- ing in risk and situational assessments. Further, the ers identified during the project, to review the guidelines are meant to be considered in conjunc- PERF proposed guidelines, protocol, and glossary. tion with existing use-of-force policies and train- (See Appendices 3 and 4 for the Participant List and ing protocols. Departments should consult their Agenda respectively.) Prior to the summit, the legal counsel prior to guideline implementation to guidelines and supporting materials (the Glossary ensure that the guidelines are legally sound and and the Graduated Force Options Protocol) were acceptable within their jurisdiction and in conjunc- sent to each participant for preliminary review. Par- tion with other legal requirements. This legal review ticipants were asked to review the guidelines with will also encourage the cooperation of local govern- their police leadership and bring feedback to the ment officials and employees in a comprehensive summit. During this event, participants from more and collective approach to this very sensitive issue. than 30 policing agencies, both national and inter- Further, guidelines should be examined in the con- national, revised the guidelines through discussion text of the National Incident Management System and debate on each guideline’s appropriateness to (NIMS) and coordinated at the local, state, regional policy and/or training domains for individual and federal levels as most appropriate.

The Development of the PERF Guidelines — 11 The following guidance alone will not prevent The glossary was also vetted through the Summit or successfully eliminate threats of suicide bombing participants and modified as necessary. incidents. However, our goal is to provide some assistance to preparing for a sensitive and complex issue: first-responder actions in a suicide bomb Description of the threat situation. Graduated Force Options Protocol PERF developed the Graduated Force Options Proto- col, a visual tool to use in conjunction with the guide- Description of the Glossary of Terms lines, to demonstrate how threat assessments of The Glossary of Terms was developed early in various suicide bomb incident scenarios lead to differ- PERF’s work to ensure that the research staff was ent levels of intervention and force. Although each using terminology consistently and uniformly in scenario is likely to be different, a threat assessment discussions. Further, PERF identified subtleties in must take place based on the scenario, and an inter- terminology and definitions during site visits and vention level will be determined based on the assess- interviews that, if not clarified with a glossary, ment. Assessments are not static and may in fact could have led to confusion when speaking about change as the scenario develops. Therefore, continual the topic to a wider audience. assessments may change the level of intervention ap- Items were included in the glossary if they plied to each scenario. The Graduated Force Options commonly appeared in research or conversation re- Protocol is meant to highlight the various dynamics garding the topic. Definitions were adopted using related to assessments and interventions while also al- open source materials, departmental definitions, or lowing mobility between the categories as the threat a hybrid of both. This glossary proved useful in de- changes. The Protocol should be considered as a tool veloping guidelines and sharing them with others. in conjunction with the Guidelines for Consideration.

12 — The Development of the PERF Guidelines Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration

GENERAL 6. Policy development should include a review of officers’ legal authority and tactics (on private 1. Generally, the principles of an agency’s suicide and public property). bomb response protocols should be consistent 7. Agencies’ suicide bomb response policies should with an agency’s use of force policies, procedures be flexible in order to adapt to the variation in and training. threats and level of response.

2. Similarly, the principles of an agency’s active 8. Agencies should develop strong operational link- shooter protocol should be considered in the ages between patrol and SWAT, bomb squad and development of the suicide bomb response policy. specialized units. 3. Law enforcement agencies should create a stand 9. Agencies should partner with other public and alone policy and/or training curriculum ad- private organizations, as necessary, to develop dressing the response to suicide bomb threats. interagency and multijurisdictional collabora- 4. The suicide bomb response policy should state tion, policy, planning and training. clear strategic objectives that include: 10. In developing a suicide bomber response pro- n Preservation of life; tocol, agencies should consider graduated use

n Prevention and reduction of the impact of of force options consistent with the depart- terrorism; ment’s use of force policies (see suggested suicide bomb Graduated Force Option Protocol). n Providing for responses that include other agencies; and 11. Officers should consider the suicide bomb

n Providing a framework for law enforcement graduated force option protocol prior to the use and emergency response for other similar of deadly force. incidents of crime, significant accidents, or 12. In the event of any suicide bomb threat,a natural emergencies. supervisor should immediately respond and 5. A suicide bomb response policy should include take charge. incident response and contingency plans for pre- 13. Upon confirmation of a credible suicide bomb incident, incident, and post-incident phases, as threat, a member of the executive command well as address required support unit response. should assume responsibility for the incident as soon as practical.

NOTE: Words/phrases in boldface in the guidelines are included in the glossary of terms. Some guidelines are repeated because they are applicable to more than one section of the document.

Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration — 13 14. Agencies should consult, inform and engage they use a handheld police radio (0-29 watts) in elected and other community leaders about proximity to a suspected suicide bomber. suicide bomb response policies. 18. Officers should position themselves at least 170 ft. (10 police car lengths) away from a suspect if Threat and Risk Assessments they use a vehicle-mounted police radio (30–49 watts) in proximity to a suspected suicide 15. Agency response plans should include bomber. processes that require the completion of threat 19. Upon arrival at the scene, responding officers and risk assessments and the extent of the dan- should report the following information: ger posed to police and the public. Location of suspect and officer; a. Threat assessments should include: n n Description of suspect and/or device; n Location of the incident, whether contained, static or mobile; n Areas/streets unsafe for responding units or general public to enter; n The method of the attacker (i.e., bomb worn on the body, carried, or in a vehicle); n Number and location of innocent persons in close proximity to suspect; and n Descriptions of suspects and suspected devices; and n Presence of any injured persons and the possibility of safe evacuation. n If possible, identify the intended/possible target (e.g. crowded public spaces, notable 20. Officers should request the response of special- buildings, events, VIP presence, etc.). ized support units when threat and risk assess- b. Risk assessment should include: ment dictates such a response.

n Danger posed by the device and potential evacuation area size; Safe Distances and Evacuations n Risks of evacuation (versus sending to cover); 21. When possible, officers should confront a suspected suicide bomber in an isolated or less Hazards and danger to emergency n populated area. responders; and 22. While every effort should be made to maintain n Other safety issues. a safe distance from a suicide bomb suspect, c. Responders should continue to review the there may be unanticipated situations in which threat and risk assessments throughout the officers find themselves within close proximity incident and consider designating a specific to the suspect. Under these extreme circum- officer to that task. stances, it may be necessary to grab a suspect’s arms and keep them away from the torso or in OPERATIONS AND TACTICS some other restraint tactic. Communications 23. If the bomber is on the ground while detained by an officer(s), officers should restrain the sus- 16. Officers should limit the use of electronic com- pect’s hands to prevent movement. munications in close proximity to a suspected suicide bomber. 24. When maintaining a safe distance, officers should seek cover from a potential blast, heat 17. Officers should position themselves at least 100 and shrapnel from both the device and other ft. (6 police car lengths) away from a suspect if objects (glass, bomb debris, etc.).

14 — Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration 25. Officers should attempt to contain the sus- and assess the situation in a possible suicide pected suicide bomber, and should not allow bomb threat. the suspect to leave the area or enter a vehicle. 36. Patrol vehicles should include specific equip- 26. In general, take cover and attempt to maintain ment needed to implement suicide bomb/ a safe standoff distance from a suspected sui- critical incident plans. Equipment may include: cide bomber.9 n 3 rolls each of inner and outer perimeter 27. If a suspect is aware of the officers’ presence, tape officers should not close on these distances to n Megaphone/bullhorn negotiate with, or handcuff, a suspect.10 n Maps

28. Where applicable, officers should evacuate n Personal Protective Equipment endangered citizens. n Visibility gear

29. In evacuation decisions, officers should con- n Reference/flashcards sider background and collateral injuries to n Copies of operational plans bystanders upon the possible detonation of an Decision logs explosive device. n n Radiation Protection Pagers 30. Officers should be aware that evacuation of Gauze masks; eyewear; gloves and boot persons from public areas or buildings can n coverings carry as great of a risk as keeping them in place. 37. Officers should not use Conducted Energy 31. Locking or making a building secure at the time Devices on a suspected suicide bomber. of the threat or attack can disrupt an attacker’s movements, bar entry and save lives (be mind- 38. Shooting an area of the body that might contain ful that a need may arise to evacuate premises a bomb carries an increased risk of detonation. soon after). 39. If the area is secure and contained, officers should 32. Officers should remain vigilant in their efforts to generally not approach a suspect (bag, vehicle, or detect secondary devices, additional suspects or body), even if a suspect is willing to surrender attacks. Consideration should be given to deploy- (or appears to be dead/incapacitated) until the ing plainclothes officers to conduct such duties. explosives are rendered safe by bomb technicians. 33. Agencies should maintain different color 40. In order to manage the police response to a sui- perimeter tape to designate inner and outer cide bomb threat, agencies should consider perimeters (e.g. red and yellow). developing suggested defined tasks for the first officers arriving on the scene with three primary objectives: General Operations and Tactics a. Identify, locate, and contain the suspect, 34. Consider all suspected bombs live devices. take cover, pass information back to a command center, and challenge the suspect if 35. If available, and if time allows, plainclothes appropriate. officers should respond to conduct surveillance

9. See the U.S. Army, National Ground Intelligence Center’s IED Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet in Appendix 6. 10. Ibid.

Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration — 15 b. Focus on warning bystanders, clearing the 49. Based on the actions of the suspect (e.g. the immediate vicinity of people, and securing officers have established probable cause to witnesses/informants. believe the suspect is in possession of an explo- c. Conduct perimeter search and surveillance sive device) and the officers’ belief that the sus- activities, seeking secondary devices and/or pect represents an immediate threat of death or accomplices. serious bodily injury to the officers or others, officers may need to utilize deadly force to inca- 41. To avoid confusion and conflicting messages, pacitate the suspect and/or prevent detonation. a single lead officer should be designated to communicate with the suspect. 50. Shooting an area of the body that might contain a bomb carries increased risk of detonation. 42. The deployment of a canine in order to intercept a suspected suicide bomber may be considered. TRAINING 43. Officers should attempt to seek compliance/ Behavioral Anomalies surrender of a suspected suicide bomber. 51. Law enforcement officers should focus on If the Suicide Bomb Suspect is Compliant behaviors rather than age, race, ethnicity, and gender in regard to suicide bomber suspects. 44. Officers should order the suspect to show his/ 52. Suicide bomb suspects may display behavioral her hands with palms open. anomalies that would draw attention to them- 45. When responding officers identify a suspect in selves (such as behaviors or indicators that possession of a bomb, they should order the would be out of the ordinary). However, law suspect to gently and slowly place the object on enforcement agencies should work to develop the ground and have the suspect step away skills in identifying behavioral anomalies. from the device. Anomalies include: a. Irregularity—something that deviates 46. If the bomber wants to surrender, officers from the norm or from expectations. should order him/her to remove all explosives and clothing, and turn 360 degrees. Items b. Peculiarity—something strange and should be gently placed on the ground. difficult to identify or classify.

47. Officers should avoid ordering the suspect to drop to his knees or lie on the ground. Some General Training bomb switches are located in the chest or waist area and may cause the explosive device to det- 53. Law enforcement agencies should create a onate if the suspect lies down. stand alone policy and/or training curriculum addressing the response to suicide bomb threats. If Suicide Bomb Suspect is Noncompliant 54. Suicide bomb training should include decision 48. If the suicide bomb suspect is contained and at making and critical thinking components in a safe distance from others, attempts should be order to strengthen an officer’s ability to con- made to negotiate with the suspect to resolve duct a situational assessment. the situation without the need to use deadly 55. Patrol officer training should regularly include force. bomb technicians and representatives from partner agencies as expert presenters.

16 — Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration 56. Officers should be aware that a suicide bomb and other hazards) as well as variation in the triggering device may be in hands, on belt, numbers of responding officers. waistband and/or chest. Triggers may also be 63. Training should include exercises that simulate held by a third party (handler) in the crowd. terrorist activities to be played out by a group 57. Suicide bomb response training for patrol offi- of officers to test and better prepare responses cers should incorporate live explosives demon- to such situations (e.g. the purchase of explo- strations to highlight realistic threats. sive materials at a local hardware store, parking a large vehicle in front of a precinct, etc.). 58. Training should provide a comprehensive understanding of suicide bomb preparation 64. Training should include instructions not to and delivery processes (e.g. recruiting, training; approach the bomber, even if dead/incapaci- planning, reconnaissance, surveillance; bomb tated, wounded or apparently willing to sur- assembly; support, etc.). render. In this scenario, officers should be aware that a threat still exists; and the bomber 59. Patrol officers should receive suicide bomb- may be attempting to initiate the explosive making recognition training—enabling them to device when officers approach. detect/identify bomb making equipment, odors, supplies and other paraphernalia (such as explo- 65. Agencies should develop training for officers sive device switches and various types of both that allows them to make contact with, and commercial and homemade explosive materials). immobilize, suspected suicide bombers when deadly force is not reasonable (intermediate 60. Dedicated in-service training should be consid- strategies). ered for patrol officers on terrorism/suicide bomb intelligence, situational assessments, and 66. Training should include instructions not to use explosives recognition. Training should include a Conducted Energy Device on a suspected tabletop exercises, simulation-based training suicide bomber. and/or role-playing activities. 67. Training should include use of force options to 61. Terrorism and suicide bomb topics (to include incapacitate suicide bombers. current events) should occur regularly in roll 68. Training should incorporate the Department of call training and agency bulletins. Homeland Security’s reference library (known 62. Training should include multiple variations of as TRIPwire), for contemporary suicide bomb/ an incident (e.g. number of bombers, threats terrorism information.

Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration — 17 Graduated Force Option Protocol

THREAT SUICIDE BOMB GRADUATED FORCE ASSESSMENT INCIDENT SCENARIO INTERVENTION LEVEL Low Person acting suspiciously and: Citizen contact: Conventional a. No device seen stop and/or frisk without b. No intelligence other than call firearms drawn c. Possibly some behavioral anomalies Medium Person acting suspiciously and: Armed felony stop (including a. No device seen less lethal options—not CED) b. Suspicion from intelligence, information, or behavioral anomaly High Suicide bomb device observed Armed Intervention Graduated or probable cause that device Force Option Sequence is present. 1. When feasible, warning 2. Critical shot to incapacitate

Detonation

18 — Graduated Force Option Protocol PERF Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Glossary of Terms

A received by the public or a member of the service, indicating that an explosive device has been, or will Active Shooter — An active shooter is an armed be placed at a particular location(s). person who has used deadly physical force on other persons and continues to do so while having unre- C stricted access to additional victims. Conducted Energy Device (CED) — A weapon Active Shooter Protocol — An agency protocol for primarily designed to disrupt a subject’s central addressing a situation involving an active shooter nervous system by means of deploying electrical (see above). energy sufficient to cause uncontrolled muscle con- tractions and override an individual’s voluntary Authorization to Use Deadly Force — An officer is motor responses. authorized to use lethal force when it reasonably appears necessary: to protect himself or others Contained — An incident is fixed at a location, or from an immediate threat of death or serious bod- law enforcement has secured the scene so that a sus- ily injury; or to prevent a crime where the suspect’s pect(s) is unable to move away from that point. actions place persons in jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or to apprehend a fleeing felon D for a crime involving serious bodily injury or the use of lethal force where there is substantial risk Deadly Force — Any tactic or use of force that has that the person whose arrest is sought will cause an intended, natural, and probable consequence of death or serious bodily injury to others if appre- serious physical injury or death. hension is delayed. E B Executive Command — A level/rank of law Bomb — Any article, detonated by mechanical or enforcement leadership that is beyond simply oper- electrical means, which may possibly contain ational or supervisory, and which maintains chemical, gas, liquid or other substance capable of responsibility for the wider resources of the agency. causing a fire, explosion, burn, or other chemical reaction intended to cause injury to a person or G result in damage and/or destruction of property. Graduated Force Option Protocol — A graduated Bomb Threat — Any communication, including use of force model that may be considered when written correspondences or telephone calls, responding to a threat of a suicide bomb suspect.

PERF Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Glossary of Terms — 19 Graduated Use of Force — A training philosophy reasonable person under the attendant circum- that supports the progressive and reasonable escala- stances to believe that an individual has committed tion and de-escalation of officer-applied force in or is committing a criminal offense or an infraction. proportional response to the actions and level of resistance offered by a suspect. The level of R response is based upon the situation encountered at the scene and the actions of the suspect in response Reasonable Suspicion — Knowledge of articulable to the officer’s commands. Such a response may facts or circumstances that are objectively, and progress from the officer’s physical presence at the without resort to arbitrary profiling, sufficient to scene to the application of deadly force. induce a reasonable person under the attendant circumstances to suspect that an individual has H engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in criminal activity. Handler — A person who delivers a bomb to a suicide bomber and then escorts them to the target. S The handler also provides security and instruction on how to detonate the bomb. Secondary Devices — Explosive devices placed at the scene of an ongoing emergency response that Homicide Bomber — See suicide bomber. are intended to cause casualties among responders. Secondary explosive devices are designed to I explode after a primary explosion or other major emergency response event that has attracted large Incapacitate — To make someone unable to per- numbers of responders to the scene in order to form a certain action. inflict additional injury, damage, and fear.

Inner and Outer Perimeter Tape — The inner Specialized Units — Law enforcement and/or perimeter tape in a suicide bomb threat situation is emergency response personnel trained in unique used to alert law enforcement personnel of danger areas that require particular knowledge and skills. from the possible detonation of an explosive device Examples include: special weapons; bomb disposal; or to secure an area immediately adjacent to where air support; hostage negotiation; investigations; such an incident occurred. The outer perimeter media interaction; surveillance; hazardous materi- tape is used to protect others from similar risks or als; and canines. to secure the area adjacent to the inner perimeter. Stand Alone Policy — An agency sanctioned docu- M ment that is specific to an issue or circumstance focusing narrowly on the subject. Mobile — A suicide bomb incident/suspect is not at a fixed location, and suspects are traveling or Static — A suicide bomb incident/suspect is sta- moving, and law enforcement has not secured the tionary at a point or location, but, which has not scene. been secured by law enforcement personnel.

P Suicide Belt/Vest — A garment filled with explosive materials and armed with a detonator (toggle Probable Cause — Knowledge of articulable facts or rocker-type switch attached to the mid-section or circumstances that are objectively, and without of the device or handheld), worn by suicide resort to arbitrary profiling, sufficient to induce a bombers. Explosive belts and vests are usually

20 — PERF Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Glossary of Terms packed with nails, screws, bolts, and other objects Surrogate — A third party or person who is used to that serve as shrapnel to maximize the number of transport, carry or wear a bomb or improvised casualties in the explosion. Belts and vests may con- device, whether knowingly (by coercion or threat) or tain some types of anticoagulant making them innocently (without knowledge of the explosives). more deadly. T n Belts may be worn on the stomach or lower abdomen area. Terrorist — A person who employs terror as a n Vests may be worn on the chest and stomach political weapon. area. They often have shoulder straps. Third-Party Attackers — Additional suspect(s) in Suicide Bomber — An individual (including a ter- a suicide bombing that may include support team rorist) who is willing to die by means of an explo- to the initial attack phase (transport, logistics, look- sion in order to kill or injure other people and/or out, camera operator, and third-party explosive cause property damage. detonator) or second phase (suspects that launch a further attack after the primary assault). Suicide Bombing — An attack using explosives on people or property, committed by a person who TRIPwire — Technical Resource for Incident Pre- knows the explosion will cause his or her own death. vention: an online, collaborative, information-sharing network for bomb squads and other law Suicide Mission — A scheme in which planning enforcement officials to learn about current terror- takes place to facilitate a person killing him/herself ist bombing tactics, techniques, and procedures, by means of an explosion in order to kill or injure including improvised explosive device (IED) design other people and/or cause property damage. and emplacement.

PERF Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Glossary of Terms — 21

About the Authors

Lisa L. Spahr Josh Ederheimer Lisa Spahr is an Associate for Police Executive Joshua Ederheimer is a Captain with the Metropol- Research Forum’s (PERF) Center on Force and itan Police Department of the District of Columbia. Accountability (CFA). She has more than 14 years of He is currently serving in the Executive Office of experience in research and development in various the Chief, coordinating the transition efforts for areas including law enforcement, military applica- newly appointed police Chief Cathy L. Lanier. tions, and the dual field of law and psychiatry. At Captain Ederheimer is the former Director of PERF, Ms. Spahr manages multiple research projects, the Police Executive Research Forum’s (PERF) Cen- including: the 2006 Critical Issues in Policing Series, ter on Force & Accountability (CFA) in Washing- patrol response to suicide bombing threats; ton, D.C. He joined PERF in January 2004, as a redesigning an officer discipline system; less lethal Senior Associate after a successful career with the weapons’ impact on injuries and liabilities; and iden- Metropolitan Police Department. He subsequently tifying effective homicide investigative strategies. returned to MPD in January 2007. Prior to joining PERF, Ms. Spahr served as a At MPD, he had attained the rank of Inspector project manager for the University of Pittsburgh, and was named Director of the D.C. Police Civil Law and Psychiatry Research Department, inter- Rights and Force Investigations Division. During his viewing psychopaths in prisons and juvenile deten- tenure at the MPD, he acquired expertise as a com- tion facilities. In this capacity, she screened and manding officer in several areas, including: internal interviewed more than 400 prisoners, trained inter- affairs; use of force; equal employment opportunity; viewers on various interviewing techniques, and and civil rights divisions. Captain Ederheimer administered a battery of clinical assessments. Ms. reengineered numerous processes, and developed Spahr has also served as adjunct faculty, instructing and led several operational units that emerged as in both law enforcement and psychology course- national models in such areas as: internal and force work, and has managed a community corrections investigations; consent decree implementation, facility in Philadelphia. She has traveled extensively police accountability, policing in public housing, and has experience working with both interna- and environmental crimes investigations. tional and domestic policing communities. He specializes in police leadership, management Ms. Spahr received her Bachelor of Arts reform, and business process reengineering. Captain degree in psychology from Temple University in Ederheimer is also an adjunct professor at American Philadelphia, and Master of Science degree in inves- University’s Department of Law, Justice, and Society, tigative psychology from the University of Liver- where he has taught both graduate and undergradu- pool, England. She is a member of the American ate courses. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in justice Psychological Association, the Psychology-Law from American University, and a Master’s Degree in Society, and the American Society of Criminology. management from Johns Hopkins University.

About the Authors — 23 David Bilson research to develop a model for police leadership. Chief Superintendent David Bilson has served in For the past three years Chief Superintendent the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), New Scot- Bilson has been focused on the development of land Yard, London, for over 28 years. He has sub- police performance metrics and operational frame- stantial borough policing experience at operational works within the operational commands, with and command levels in addition to more strategic partner agencies and at group command and cor- posts at command group and corporate headquar- porate levels. He has continued to develop his ters levels. He has worked on policy and program knowledge of performance metrics, frameworks development; leadership, performance and review and mapping systems through field research visits frameworks; and in internal affairs investigations. to U.S. policing agencies in Philadelphia, New York, He holds a Master’s Degree in Business Administra- Baltimore, Chicago, Newark and Washington. Cur- tion from Middlesex University, where he attended rently, he is a Fellow at PERF, contributing his inter- full-time on an MPS Scholarship, completing national experience to a host of ongoing projects.

24 — About the Authors About the Police Executive Research Forum

he Police Executive Research Forum they are primarily from Harvard University’s T(PERF) is a professional organization of progressive Kennedy School of Government. chief executives of city, county and state law PERF’s success is built on the active involve- enforcement agencies who collectively serve more ment of its members. The organization also has than 50 percent of the U.S. population. In addition, types of membership that allow it to benefit from PERF has established formal relationships with the diverse views of criminal justice researchers, law international police executives and law enforce- enforcement professionals of all ranks and others ment organizations from around the globe. Mem- committed to advancing policing services to all bership includes police chiefs, superintendents, communities. As a nonprofit organization, PERF is sheriffs, state police directors, university police committed to the application of research in polic- chiefs, public safety directors, and other law ing and to promoting innovation that will enhance enforcement professionals. Established in 1976 as a the quality of life in our communities. PERF’s non-profit organization, PERF is unique in its com- objective is to improve the delivery of police serv- mitment to the application of research in policing ices and the effectiveness of crime control through and the importance of higher education for police the exercise of strong national leadership, the pub- executives. Besides a commitment to police innova- lic debate of criminal justice issues, the develop- tion and professionalism, PERF members must ment of a body of research about policing and the hold a four-year college degree. provision of vital management services to all police PERF continues to conduct some of the most agencies. innovative police and criminal justice research and PERF has developed and published some of provides a wide variety of management and techni- the leading literature in the law enforcement field. cal assistance programs to police agencies through- Recently, PERF released three publications on con- out the world. PERF’s groundbreaking work on temporary law enforcement issues. The books— community and problem-oriented policing, racial entitled Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of profiling, use of force, less lethal weapons, and crime Force, Police Management of Mass Demonstrations: reduction strategies has earned it a prominent posi- Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches and A tion in the police community. PERF continues to Gathering Storm—Violent Crime in America—serve work toward increased professionalism and excel- as practical guides to help police leaders make more lence in the field through its publications and train- informed decisions. In addition, PERF has released ing programs. PERF sponsors and conducts the a series of white papers on terrorism in the local law Senior Management Institute for Police (SMIP). enforcement context, including: Protecting Your This program provides comprehensive professional Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law management and executive development training to Enforcement, which examined such issues as local- police chiefs and law enforcement executives. federal partnerships, working with diverse commu- Convened annually in Boston, SMIP instructors nities, bioterrorism, and intelligence sharing. Other include professors from leading universities, though publications include Increasing Community-Police

About the Police Executive Research Forum — 25 Partnerships to Fight Crime: A Case Study of Analysis Through Computer Mapping (1995); USAID’s Grants Pen Anti-Crime Initiative in And Justice For All: Understanding and Controlling Jamaica (2005); Managing a Multijurisdictional Police Use of Deadly Force (1995); Why Police Case: Identifying Lessons Learned from the Sniper Organizations Change: A Study of Community- Investigation (2004); Community Policing: The Oriented Policing (1996); and Police Antidrug Past, Present and Future (2004); and Command Tactics: New Approaches and Applications. PERF Performance: Career Guide for Police Executives publications are used for training, promotion (1999). Other PERF titles include the only authori- exams and to inform police professionals about tative work on racial profiling, Racial Profiling: A innovative approaches to community problems. Principled Response (2001); Recognizing Value in The hallmark of the program is translating the lat- Policing (2002); The Police Response to Mental Illness est research and thinking about a topic into police (2002); Citizen Review Resource Manual (1995); practices that can be tailored to the unique needs of Managing Innovation in Policing (1995); Crime a jurisdiction.

Other publications in the “Critical Issues in Policing” series are:

Challenge to Change: The 21st Century Policing Project Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force Police Management of Mass Demonstrations A Gathering Storm—Violent Crime in America Violent Crime in America: 24 Months of Alarming Trends Police Planning for an Influenza Pandemic: Case Studies and Lessons from the Field Strategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing Use of Force

To learn more about PERF, visit www.policeforum.org.

26 — About the Police Executive Research Forum About the PERF Center on Force and Accountability

reated in April 2005, the PERF Center on statistics, tracking, and analysis; vehicle pursuits; ForceC and Accountability (CFA) is designed to be a and violence against law enforcement officers. As it significant resource for PERF members and others relates to police accountability, CFA competencies in law enforcement, and to serve as the principal include community involvement; consent decrees/ clearinghouse for ideas, strategies, and data that memoranda of agreement; discipline and conduct will address problems related to police use of force review; early intervention systems and processes; and accountability. Ultimately, the CFA provides equal employment opportunities; internal investi- law enforcement executives with information and gations; law enforcement ethics; misconduct statis- strategies that will help them make more informed tics, tracking, and analysis; policy development; decisions as they serve their communities. technology; training; and trends and identification The PERF Center on Force and Accountabil- of promising approaches. ity has four primary objectives: The CFA released national guidelines for conducted energy devices that have been embraced by Identify emerging trends and seek effective new n law enforcement agencies throughout the country. strategies; Most recently, the CFA gained national recognition n Conduct groundbreaking research; for work conducted on the rise in violent crime. The outcome was a 2006 publication entitled, Provide high quality technical assistance to law n A Gathering Storm—Violent Crime in America. enforcement agencies; Further, the CFA completed two guides on early n Create a central resource for information regard- intervention systems to help agencies better man- ing use-of-force and police accountability issues. age their human resources. The CFA provided technical assistance to municipalities seeking to To that end, the CFA is continually develop- assess their use of force and disciplinary systems ing competencies in several specific areas. For use of within their police departments. The CFA also force, CFA competencies include community out- examined critical use of force issues in a 2005 reach and accountability; equipment and weapons; publication entitled Exploring the Challenges of investigations; police canines; policy development; Police Use of Force, and a 2006 publication entitled review boards; tactics; technology; training; trends Strategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing and identification of promising approaches; Use of Force.

To learn more about PERF and the Center on Force & Accountability, visit www.policeforum.org.

About the PERF Center on Force and Accountability — 27 About Motorola

otorola is a Fortune 100 global com- by providing innovative products and services to Mmunications leader that provides seamless mobility the home. products and solutions across broadband, embed- Mobile Devices offers market-changing icons ded systems and wireless networks. Seamless of personal technology—transforming the device mobility means you can reach the people, things formerly known as the cell phone into a universal and information you need in your home, auto, remote control for life. A leader in multi-mode, workplace and all spaces in between. Seamless multi-band communications products and tech- mobility harnesses the power of technology conver- nologies, Mobile Devices designs, manufactures, sells gence and enables smarter, faster, cost-effective and and services wireless subscriber and server equip- flexible communication. Motorola had sales of U.S. ment for cellular systems, portable energy storage $35.3 billion in 2005. products and systems, servers and software solutions Today, Motorola is comprised of three busi- and related software and accessory products. nesses: Connected Home Solutions; Mobile Networks & Enterprise is a leading provider Devices; and Networks & Enterprise. of end-to-end infrastructure, integrated voice and Connected Home Solutions provides a scala- data communications, and information solutions. ble, integrated end-to-end system for the delivery of Networks & Enterprise delivers mission-critical broadband services that keeps consumers secure two-way radio, cellular and wireless broad- informed, entertained and connected. Its technol- band systems to meet the needs of public safety, ogy enables network operators and retailers to government, private, service provider and enter- create and execute on new business opportunities prise customers worldwide.

To learn more about Motorola, visit www.motorola.com.

28 — About Motorola APPENDIX 1 Critical Issues in Policing Series: Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response

Washington, D.C. n March 31, 2006

PARTICIPANTS

Major Barry Barnard Helen Cryer Captain Jeffrey Herold Prince William County Staff Officer to AC House D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Metropolitan Police Service, Police Department London Anna Berke Chief Melvin High Conference Manager Lieutenant Richard Cundiff Prince George’s County Police Executive Research Prince William County Police Department Forum Police Department Deputy Chief Stephen Holl Joseph Billy Captain Nancy Demme Arlington Police Department Deputy Assistant Director Montgomery County FBI, Counter Terrorism Unit Police Department Assistant Commissioner of Operations Stephen House Michael Bouchard Josh Ederheimer Metropolitan Police Service, Assistant Director Director, Center on London ATF, Field Operations Force and Accountability Police Executive Research Sergeant John Ingoldsby Tim Boyle Forum New York Police Department Vice President Motorola, Inc. Chief Terrance Gainer Clifford Karchmer U.S. Capitol Police Director of Federal Programs Lieutenant Jeff Cotner Center for Technology Dallas Police Department Sergeant Joseph Gentile Commercialization D.C. Metropolitan Jim Cronin Police Department Inspector Matthew Klein Associate Director of Internal Police Executive Research Chief Polly Hanson Affairs Division Forum Metro Transit Police D.C. Metropolitan Department Police Department Lieutenant Mike Crosbie Prince William County Michael Heidingsfield Sergeant Apollo Kowalyk Police Department President and CEO Edmonton Police Service Memphis Shelby Crime Police Executive Research Commission Forum Fellow

Appendix 1. Participant List from the Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference — 29 Commander Cathy Lanier Emeka Moneme Commander David Sobczyk D.C. Metropolitan Chief of Staff Chicago Police Department Police Department Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Corina Solé Brito Commander Mickey Levy Senior Associate Israel Police Department Major Larry Moser Police Executive Research Fairfax County Police Forum Deputy Chief Sharon Lubinski Department Minneapolis Police Department Lisa Spahr Jerry Murphy Associate Andrea Luna Director, Homeland Security Police Executive Research Senior Associate and Program Development Forum Police Executive Research Police Executive Research Forum Forum Michael Stenger U.S. Secret Service Chet Lunner Officer Marcos Perez Acting Director Miami Police Department Captain Kathy Suey Office of State and Local Las Vegas Police Department Coordination, DHS Brigadier General Simon Perry Israel Police Department Chuck Wexler Superintendent Neville Executive Director Matthews Captain Charles Roper Police Executive Research New Zealand Embassy Los Angeles Police Department Forum

Lieutenant Mike McCrimon Thomas Ryan Lieutenant Andrew White Las Vegas Metropolitan D.C. Emergency Management D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Agency Police Department

Lieutenant Tom Monahan Michael Seelman Las Vegas Metro Police Management and Department Program Analyst FBI

30 — Appendix 1. Participant List from the Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference APPENDIX 2 Critical Issues in Policing Series: Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response

Washington, D.C. n March 31, 2006

AGENDA

Friday March 31, 2006

9:00 AM – 10:00 AM Welcome & Introductions Chuck Wexler, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum

10:00 AM – 10:30 AM U.K. Police Preparedness and Response Stephen House, Assistant Commissioner of Operations, London Metropolitan Police Service

10:45 AM – 11:30 AM Israel Police Force: Lessons Learned Brigadier General Simon Perry, Israel Police

11:30 AM – 12:15 PM Lessons from Iraq Michael Heidingsfield, President and CEO, Memphis Shelby Crime Commission

1:00 PM – 1:30 PM Facilitated Group Discussion: U.S. Federal Law Enforcement and Security Preparedness Response Michael Stenger, Assistant Director Protective Research, U.S. Secret Service Joseph Billy, Deputy Assistant Director Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of Investigation Michael Bouchard, Assistant Director Field Operations, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

1:30 PM – 3:30 PM Facilitated Group Discussion: Critical Issues for Major U.S. Cities— Local Law Enforcement Preparedness

3:30 PM – 4:30 PM Where Do We Go From Here?

Appendix 2. Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference Agenda — 31

APPENDIX 3 Critical Issues in Policing Series: Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit

Baltimore, MD n January 17 – 18, 2007

PARTICIPANTS

Eric Albertsen Jim Cronin Lieutenant Kevin Gaddis Project Assistant Associate Metro Transit Police Police Executive Research Police Executive Research Department Forum Forum Captain Steven Gallagher Kristopher Baumann Captain Mike Crosbie Norfolk Police Department Chairman Prince William County Fraternal Order of Police, Police Department Major Dale Greene D.C. Metropolitan Police Charlotte-Mecklenburg Department Lieutenant Richard Cundiff Police Department Prince William County David Bilson Police Department Michael Heidingsfield Chief Superintendent President and CEO Metropolitan Police Service, Sergeant Dennis Dudley Memphis Shelby Crime London Frederick Police Department Commission

Michael Bouchard Josh Ederheimer Captain Jeffrey Herold Assistant Director Director, Center on Force D.C. Metropolitan ATF, Field Operations and Accountability Police Department Police Executive Research Major Sean Breslin Forum Steven Izzett U.S. Army Asymmetric Staff Inspector Warfare Office Errol Etting Toronto Police Department Director of Intelligence Major Jeff Caslin Maryland Transportation Lieutenant Randy Jones Baltimore County Authority Police Department Anne Arundel County Police Department Police Department Captain Horace Frank Shawn Coffey Los Angeles Police Department Matthew Klein Deputy Chief Inspector U.S. Secret Service, Captain Gregory Fremin D.C. Metropolitan Uniformed Division Houston Police Department Police Department

Appendix 3. Participant List from the Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit — 33 Neville Matthews Albert Pearsall Lisa Spahr Superintendent Senior Policy Analyst Associate New Zealand Embassy COPS Office Department Police Executive Research U.S. Department of Justice Forum Sergeant Kevin McGoldrick Boston Police Department Carl Peed Chief John Timoney Director Miami Police Department John Miller COPS Office Assistant Director U.S. Department of Justice Drew Tracy Federal Bureau of Investigation, Assistant Chief Office of Public Affairs Joseph Pietro Montgomery County Baltimore County Police Department Ken Miller Police Department Deputy Chief Donald Van Duyn Charlotte-Mecklenburg Lieutenant Fred Plitt Deputy Assistant Director Police Department Anne Arundel County Federal Bureau of Investigation, Police Department Counterterrorism Unit Emily Milstein-Greengart Project Assistant Capt. Dave Pressley Dee Walker Police Executive Research Acting Deputy Chief Assistant Chief Forum Anne Arundel County Montgomery County Police Department Police Department Ralph Morten Detective Supervisor Jim Pryor Chuck Wexler Los Angeles Police, Bomb Squad Assistant Chief Executive Director Seattle Police Department Police Executive Research Jerry Murphy Forum Director, Homeland Security Lisa Quinn Police Executive Research Assistant to SAC Lieutenant Andrew White Forum U.S. Secret Service D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Lieutenant Col. Eric Naeseth Chief Joseph Riehl U.S. Army Asymmetric ATF, Arson & Explosives Col. Scott Williams Warfare Office Programs Division Baltimore City Police Department Rick Neal Chief Thomas Robbins Vice President, Boston University Special Agent Charles Wood General Manager Police Department U.S. Capitol Police Department, Motorola, Inc. Bomb Squad Amy Schapiro Robert Novy Senior Research Analyst Assistant to SAC COPS Office U.S. Secret Service U.S. Department of Justice

James Owens Sergeant Thomas Sharkey Deputy Chief Metro Transit Police Las Vegas Metropolitan Department Police Department

34 — Appendix 3. Participant List from the Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit APPENDIX 4 Critical Issues in Policing Series: Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit

Baltimore, MD n January 17–18, 2007

AGENDA

Wednesday, January 17, 2007

8:30 AM – 8:45 AM Welcome & Introductions Joshua Ederheimer, Director, PERF Center on Force & Accountability Chuck Wexler, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum Dave Pressley, Acting Deputy Chief, Anne Arundel County Police Department

8:45 AM – 9:45 AM International Perspective David Bilson, Chief Superintendent, Metropolitan Police Service, London Michael Heidingsfield, President and CEO, Memphis Shelby Crime Commission (Iraq Police Advisor)

9:45 AM – 10:30 AM Chiefs Perspective Chief John Timoney, Miami Police Department Chief Thomas Robbins, Boston University Police

10:45 AM – 11:30 AM Local Perspective Ralph Morten, Detective Supervisor, Los Angeles Police Department Jeffrey Herold, Captain, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

11:30 AM – 12:15 PM Federal Perspective Michael Bouchard, Assistant Director of Field Operations, ATF Donald Van Duyn, Assistant Director of Counter Terrorism, FBI Robert Novy, Assistant to SAC, U.S. Secret Service

1:15 PM – 4:30 PM Review Guidelines for Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat

Appendix 4. Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit Agenda — 35 Thursday, January 18, 2007

8:30 AM – 8:45 AM Review of Progress

8:45 AM – 12:30 PM Review Guidelines for Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat (continued)

12:30 PM – 12:45 PM Closing Remarks and Adjourn

36 — Appendix 4. Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit Agenda APPENDIX 5 Critical Issues 2006 Suicide Bomber Project Site Visit and Interview Guide (Amended)

This guide is meant to serve as a useful tool for interviews and site visits for the suicide bomber project.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT bombing and (2) there is a debate on whether it is necessary to have specific policies regarding tactics Experts agree that police in the United States need and training related to suicide bombing or if these to prepare for a suicide bomber attack. More specif- are incorporated (or should be) into existing use of ically, we need to prepare for our response to the force policies. threat of a suicide bomber. How will dispatchers handle the calls of a detected or perceived threat? How will first responders handle the suspected TASKING bomber and civilians that may be nearby? Once a PERF plans to conduct a number of site visits over threat is confirmed and in preparation of a detona- the next six months to learn more about what tion, what do we expect will happen and how will departments (nationally and internationally) are law enforcement respond? These split second deci- doing to prepare patrol for the imminent threats of sions will most likely need to be made by patrol suicide bombers. officers who will arrive on the scene first. Law enforcement can begin preparing a response to the threat of a suicide bomber by con- SITE VISIT GUIDE ducting immediate and comprehensive reviews of General Language — Do you use language current policies and developing training for all offi- such as suicide bomber in policies and training? Do cers. We can better prepare all officers to respond to you use other language, i.e., suicide terrorist? suicide bomb threats with greater confidence in: Define the language you use. For instance, would (1) what decisions need to be made, (2) a firm the 9/11 hijackers be called suicide bombers in your understanding of how to assess the situation and vocabulary? If not, what would they be called? make those decisions, and (3) tactical solutions for (Make sure you understand the language they are handling the situation, considering the multiple using. Working definitions can be misunderstood variables that may exist. or assumed incorrectly.) In March PERF held a one-day forum in Scenario — A call comes in saying a suspi- Washington, D.C. in which participants began to cious person is in the city center yelling religious discuss the multitude of issues surrounding policy ideologies and wearing a large backpack. What hap- and tactical decisions that may be necessary in pens? How does the call get labeled and where does addressing this threat. Two specific issues emerged: it go? Who responds (if anyone)? Now, the suspi- (1) departments seem reluctant to talk about suicide cious person appears to be holding an object that is

Appendix 5. Site Visit and Interview Guide — 37 connected underneath their clothing and their rich answer. If so, document the scenario or use the behavior continues to be erratic. They do not above noted scenario.) respond to the police verbal commands. What does Bomb Squads — Quick overview of the squad the responding officer do? and their work. Date of squad inception and significant changes to squad, protocol, etc… How quickly does the bomb squad assemble in a targeted What are specific tactics that patrol are taught place? What working relationship does the bomb to address threats of suicide bombers? squad have with patrol? Is it assumed that the bomb Historical Perspective — Identify the evolu- squad would handle a call about a suspicious per- tion of related incidents in their jurisdiction (as son who could be a suicide bomber? If this has hap- well as nationally recognized incidents—such as pened, get the details of how it was processed. What 9/11) and overlay that information with the evolu- other agencies/departments does the bomb squad tion of their bomb oriented and counter-terrorism work with to prepare for suicide bombers? Why? squads and/ or protocols to address such threats How often? In what capacity? (and related threats). When did they begin to start Counter-terrorism Units — Same questions as talking about suicide bomber threats? What action- above for Bomb Squad. able items resulted from those talks and when? Do SOPS & Policies — The following areas you have an active shooter protocol? What is cur- should be examined for guidance on policy recom- rently on the table related to suicide bomber threats mendations and tactical decisions:

(discussions, disagreements, tactics, training, n Current use of force policies, procedures and etc…)? Do you participate in Red Cell exercises? training (including active shooter protocols); Speaking to the front line — It is essential that you talk with patrol officers to gauge their under- n Bomb squad protocols and training; and standing of what to do if they get a call or observe n Suicide bombing-specific policies, training and behavior that could be a suicide bomber. What protocols (if they exist). would they do? Have they been given guidance? What sort of guidance have they been given and by (In all of these items—How do they relate to whom? What guidance would they like? (It may or guide patrol response? Remember that an help to deliver a scenario to get a more contextually absence of something is a finding.)

38 — Appendix 5. Site Visit and Interview Guide APPENDIX 6 U.S. Department of the Army, National Ground Intelligence Center, Intelligence and Security Command, Estimates of Dangers Posed by Various Types of Explosives

CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES

Special thanks are due to our partners at Motorola, Inc., for their support of the Critical Issues in Policing Series. This report would not have been possible without their help.

Police Executive Research Forum 1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930 Washington, DC 20036 202-466-7820 202-466-7826 fax www.PoliceForum.org