BEYOND VOM KRIEGE The Character and Conduct of Modern War

If you need this document in an alternate format for accessibility purposes (e.g. Braille, large print, audio, etc.), please contact the UNG Press at [email protected] or at 706-864-1556. Beyond Vom Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War

Beyond Vom Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War

By R. D. Hooker, Jr. Foreword by LTG H. R. McMaster

The technology of warfare has changed since Carl von Clausewitz’s Vom Kriege was first published, but the fundamental nature of modern warfare is still the same. Beyond Vom Kriege furthers Clausewitz’s theory of war by offering a first-hand account of global conflicts and strategies that influenced American national security strategy across six presidential administrations. Intelligence officers and policy makers 978-1-940771-71-7 | $24.99 will appreciate this honest and clear-cut essay collection, which Military Nonfiction includes reflections on , Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. A 6 x 9 inches | 310 pp foreword by LTG H. R. McMaster begins this valuable collection of For media inquiries, contact: military strategy. University of North Georgia Press [email protected] This is a book of great value to military professionals, (706) 864-1556 civilian policymakers, and all those interested in issues of national and international security. The essays will help Wholesalers may purchase copies from deepen understanding of and provide perspective for Ingram Content Group: contemporary issues. And they also serve as an example of Ingram Content Group what it means to be a true military professional. One Ingram Blvd. James Stavridis, the former Supreme Allied Commander La Vergne, TN 37086 Europe (SACEUR), enjoined officers to “live well, write (615) 793-5000 about it, and write it well.” R. D. Hooker has done just that. [email protected] www.ingramcontent.com/retailers —LTG H. R. McMaster

The University of North Georgia Press, a scholarly, peer-reviewed press, is an extension of our sponsoring university, University of North Georgia. Our primary function is to promote education and research, with a special emphasis on innovative scholarship and pedagogy.

ung.edu/university-press (706) 864-1556 [email protected] Beyond Vom Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War

R. D. Hooker, Jr., is a University Professor and the Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Affairs at the National Defense University. He served three tours as a director and senior director with the National Security Council; as director for the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU; and as dean of the NATO Defense College in Rome. He served for 30 years in the Army as an infantry officer and participated in combat operations in Grenada, Somalia, , Iraq, and Afghanistan, including command of a parachute brigade in Baghdad.

R. D. Hooker, Jr., author

“A thoughtful, comprehensive, and incisive look at modern warfare in its many dimensions. R. D. Hooker combines deep practical experience as a warfighter and policymaker with an extensive academic background to produce a rich and varied assessment of how and why we fight in the 21st century. A must- read for students and practitioners of national security alike.”

—Admiral James Stavridis, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commander, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe

“If you want to explore the character of modern warfare and critical issues of national security and strategy,

read this book! Beyond Vom Kriege is a masterful and engaging read that illustrates R. D. Hooker’s decades of study of the art of war and his many years of service as a Soldier-Leader with experience in many of our nation’s recent conflicts.

— Curtis M. Scaparrotti, U.S. Army (Retired), former Commander, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe

“A wonderfully stimulating, thoughtful, and engrossing survey of recent wars, the context in which they were fought, and the leadership exercised by those who conducted them.”

—General , U.S. Army (Ret.), former Director of the CIA, and former Commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and U.S. Central Command

The University of North Georgia Press, a scholarly, peer-reviewed press, is an extension of our sponsoring university, University of North Georgia. Our primary function is to promote education and research, with a special emphasis on innovative scholarship and pedagogy.

ung.edu/university-press @TheUNGPress @TheUNGPress @ung_press R. D. Hooker, Jr., Former White House Fellow, Offers First-Hand Reflections about National Security Strategy in New Book Jillian Murphy 706-864-1556 [email protected]

• Former White House Fellow offers a first-hand account of global conflicts and strategies across six presidential administrations. • Beyond Vom Kriege is the first publication in the UNG Press’s role as an official publishing partner of the Association of the U.S. Army.

Dahlonega, GA—The University of North Georgia (UNG) Press is pleased to announce our newest release: Beyond Vom Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War by R. D. Hooker, Jr. Beyond Vom Kriege is the first book published from the UNG Press in our role as an official publishing partner of the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA). Beyond Vom Kriege releases July 21, 2020 and includes a forward by former National Security Advisor Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster (retired). The technology of warfare has changed since Carl von Clausewitz’s Vom Kriege was first published, but the fundamental nature of warfare is still the same. Beyond Vom Kriege furthers Clausewitz’s theory of war by offering a first-hand account of global conflicts and strategies that influence American national security strategy across six presidential administrations. R. D. Hooker, Jr., is a University Professor and the Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Affairs at the National Defense University (NDU). He served three tours as a director and senior director with the National Security Council; as director for the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU; and as dean of the NATO Defense College in Rome. Hooker served for 30 years in the U.S. Army as an infantry officer and received the Defense Superior Service Medal in his role as White House Fellow. As partner to the AUSA Book Program, the UNG Press will aid AUSA’s educational mission by producing high-quality books to be designated as “AUSA Books.” These books will address such subjects as military land power and land warfare history, technology, combat, and strategy and tactics. This curated collection will serve to help and educate members of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, the AUSA, U.S. government officials, and the general public. To further these goals, AUSA will promote these titles by linking them to AUSA’s website, listing them in AUSA publications as a member benefit, and reviewing them in ARMY magazine or other AUSA publications. Beyond Vom Kriege (978-1-940771-71-7) costs $24.99 and is a 6-by-9-inch perfect- bound paperback. Wholesalers can purchase copies from Ingram; individuals can purchase copies from their favorite independent bookstore and other major retailers. More details can be found at the UNG Press’s website. The UNG Press is a scholarly, peer-reviewed press that serves as an extension of our sponsoring university, the University of North Georgia. Our primary function is to promote education and research with a special emphasis on innovative scholarship and pedagogy. Through our partnership with Affordable Learning Georgia and eCore, the UNG Press is the leading press in Georgia for producing Open Educational Resources and Open Textbooks.### Contributor Biographies R. D. Hooker, Jr.

R. D. Hooker, Jr., is a University Professor and the Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Affairs at the National Defense University. During his career, he served three tours as a director and senior director with the National Security Council; as director for the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU; and as dean of the NATO Defense College in Rome. A former White House Fellow, he taught at West Point and at the National War College in Washington, D.C. Colonel Hooker graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1981 and holds a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Virginia. He served for 30 years in the as an infantry officer and participated in combat operations in Grenada, Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, including command of a parachute brigade in Baghdad.

H. R. McMaster

H. R. McMaster served as National Security Adviser from 2017–2018, culminating a distinguished military career as a combat leader and soldier/statesman. Lieutenant General McMaster was awarded the Silver Star, Bronze Star with V, and the Purple Heart in a career that saw service in the , Afghanistan, and Iraq, where he commanded the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. A West Point graduate, he holds a doctorate in history from the University of and is the author of the award-winning Dereliction of Duty.

Joseph J. Collins.

Joseph J. Collins is a professor at the National Defense University. A retired Army colonel, he is a former deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations and holds a doctorate in international relations from Columbia University. Colonel Collins served extensively in the offices of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and is the author of Understanding the War in Afghanistan.

Ricky L. Waddell

Ricky L. Waddell is a Lieutenant General in the U.S. Army Reserve and Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He served as Deputy National Security Adviser from 2017—2018 following extensive service in Iraq and Afghanistan. A West Point graduate and Rhodes Scholar, he holds a doctorate in international affairs from Columbia University, taught at West Point, and commanded the 76th Division. He is the author of Wars Then & Now. BEYOND VOM KRIEGE The Character and Conduct of Modern War Title: Beyond Vom Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War Author: R. D. Hooker, Jr. Publication Date: July 2020 Format: perfect-bound paperback ISBN: 978-1-940771-71-7 Retail Price: $24.99 USD Length: 310 pages Trim: 6 x 9 inches

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Printed in the United States of America For more information, please visit: http://ung.edu/university-press Or e-mail: [email protected] BEYOND VOM KRIEGE The Character and Conduct of Modern War

R. D. Hooker, Jr.

Foreword by Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, USA To Beverly My shield and strength War is the father and king of all: some he has made gods, and some men; some slaves and some free . . . —Heraclitus CONTENTS

Foreword ix Acknowledgments xi Introduction xiii

1 The Grand Strategy of the United States 3 2 The Strange Voyage: A Short Précis on Strategy 40 3 National Security Decision Making and the NSC 56 4 The Character and Conduct of Modern War 73 5 The Future of Deterrence 92

Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American 109 6 Civil-Military Relations 7 A Critique of the Maritime Strategy 129 8 The Role of Airpower in Modern War 146

The Role of Land Power in American National 183 9 Security

Presidential Decision Making and Use of Force: 199 10 Case Study Grenada Hard Day’s Night: A Retrospective on the 217 11 American Intervention in Somalia

Offshore Control: Thinking about 241 12 Confrontation with China

Iraq and Afghanistan: Reflections on Lessons 253 13 Encountered 14 NATO in Crisis 272

About the Author and Contributors 284 FOREWORD | ix - Foreword America’s military has made the development of leaders its top top its leaders of military the development made has America’s career officer’s an into a window provide volume in this essays The priority. That is because the complex environments in which U.S. forces forces U.S. in which environments is complex the because That priority. which for contingencies potential of range the broad and operate must leader innovative and adaptive, courageous, demand prepare they must in operated forces U.S. ended, perioda during whichthein Cold War ambiguous the strategically during missions of range broad a of context the on attacks murder mass the1990s, and decade of War “post-Cold He war.” longest America’s 11, 2001, initiated September on States United to the conflicts of served because he in many authority unique with writes period combines because he in that and deployed were forces which U.S. clearly write to ability an and experience academic training with that them. about ship. While the issues that R. D. Hooker, Jr., explores in this volume are in- are in this volume explores Jr., Hooker, R. D. that the issues While ship. and scholarship of example his is equally important trinsically important, emphasizes Army U.S. service. decades of four The across professionalism the with use it to the ability expert and of knowledge development “the home at everyin excellence endeavor, sustains that character moral right - a true pro how of example an for looking leaders are young If abroad.” and self-education—thinking, expertise time through develops over fessional - their respon bear on that the issues about writing and discussing, reading, in this collection. example that provides Hooker D. sibilities—R. x | BEYOND VOM KRIEGE done just that. officers to“livewrite well, about it,write and it well.” R. D.Hooker has formerthe Supreme Commander Allied Europe (SACEUR), enjoined what professional. it military means atrue to be Admiral James Stavridis, forspective contemporary as an example issues.serve also And of they security. The essays help understandingwill deepen of and provideper interested and those cymakers, all inissues of national and international soughtbe far from battlefield.” the dimensionscal and “the because roots and of defeat victory often have to cultural, economic, social, their human, moral, political, and psychologi- context wars because cannot understood without be consideration of of confusion the and horror of real experience.” And lastly to study in causality of events as “tidy the outline dissolves,” and we “catch aglimpse in depth through examination the of campaigns to reveal complex the warfare developed over history. Next, leadersshould study armed conflict enjoined leaders to study military war firsthowwidth in to observe subjectthe of war and warfare inwidth, depth, and context. Howard Hooker’s essays approach subject the from that perspectives consider professionals should develop or own understanding their theory of war, This is a book book Thisgreat is a of valueprofessionals, to military poli civilian- Consistent with Sir Michael Howard’s guidance on how military Lieutenant U.S. General, Army (Retired) H. R. McMasterH. R. - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | xi Acknowledgments This volume represents an intellectual journey that began at West West at began journey that intellectual an represents volume This many over friendship and the mentorship acknowledge to I wish Point and continued throughout a long military career and beyond. beyond. military and career a long throughout continued and Point awakened first to write, and think desire the soldier, a career Though service. decades of four through me with remained Point, West at the intellectual me provided Virginia of the University school at Graduate force the use of and strategy begin to think about to seriously equipment Thompson, Kenneth under studied I There, relations. in international me who helped others many and Henry Abraham, MacFarlane, S. Neil - also a practical understand but foundation, a theoretical only not build ethical the juridical and framework of and politics international of ing I it. within place society the military’s guides our and and which shapes social of in the department sciences this experience a tour with followed Generals David whose include alumnae treasure a national Point, West at others. many and Chiarelli, Pete Abizaid, John Scowcroft, Brent Petraeus, officers young brilliant by surrounded I was faculty, Point On the West Afghanistan. and in Iraq roles pivotal play later who would shape helped support whose and people, advice the following of years this project: supported indirectly who or thinking, directly and my General Brigadier MacFarlane, Neil S. Collins, Professor Joseph Professor General Rick Major General H. R. McMaster, Zais, Lieutenant Mitchell Sir Professor Gray, David Colonel Davis, General Skip Major Waddell, xii | BEYOND VOM KRIEGE course entirely responsible. andof war. peace For any errors of omission or commission, I am of fight, evenand more who for those must contendwiththe questionsawful assistance. toI wish thank Ms.Brittany also Porro, provided who valuable editorial Press, and to my colleagues at Institute the for National Strategic Studies. Smotherman and exceptional the staff the of NationalDefense University offeredpermissionkind to reprint my workthis in forum, to Dr. Jeff Harvey Rishikof. Iextend grateful appreciation to editors the have who MikeBrigadier General Meese, Admiral Stansfield Turner, and Professor Petraeus, John General Mr. Allen, Admiral Bell, James Robert Stavridis, Lieutenant Doug Lute, General Admiral Harris, Harry David General Hew Strachan, Professor Meghan O’Sullivan, Mike General Scaparrotti, These These reflections, then, are whooffered those for respectfully must National Defense University Washington, D.C R. D.R. Hooker, Jr. . |

INTRODUCTION xiii Introduction America’s performance in war since 1945 has been mixed, at beenat 1945 has since mixed, in war performance America’s a security in a period by enterprise marked the national I joined best, and this volume attempts to explore both the virtues and the the both the virtues and explore to attempts this volume best, and strategymaking. and security national American attend that flaws a strong economy; leading the world’s many: are advantages America’s unmatched an technology skilled base and workforce; innovative and invulnerable an the ground; on and particularly in the air military, of supportive and in both is confident that a public deterrent; nuclear a dense people; young qualified pool of a large militaryits institutions; the of much for account together partners that allies and of network position. geostrategic a favorable and the planet; on military capacity in twentieth the to dominance U.S. the propelled attributes These the Cold and wars in both world successful outcomes enabling century, strategic its in conflict, faltered often 1945, America has since Yet War. what and this is so, Why promise. its of short falling well performance it? about becan done ill-disci - resourced, under an divisions, internal struggling economy, confidence national military of a loss and poorly-managed and plined, changed. had 1990s, much the early By a decade overcome. took to that successes scoring swagger, its military recovered had U.S. A rejuvenated the of the end over presiding and War, the Gulf and Panama, in Grenada, xiv | BEYOND VOM KRIEGE heralded a“Newheralded World Order.” Cold War.Cold Scholars wrote of eraof anew “unipolarity” 3 2 Cambridge Studies inInternational Relations, Yale University, 2014. The international systemtherefore is unipolar.” See Nuno P. Monteiro, Theory of unipolar politics, 1 huge financial and human costs. Philippines that dangerously over-stretched U.S. the and imposed military ism and counter-insurgency inIraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, the Africa, homeland, inthe of security ushering inageneration of counter-terror was working Pentagon inthe on shattered 9/11,which an American sense twentieththe centuryreceded, brushfire wars and terrorismI exploded. states and non-state actors. While cataclysmic the great power clashes of breakdownthe of bi-polarity brought with it an explosion of new, weak backed by its traditional “big brother,” aresentful Russian Federation. has resulted Kosovo and inaweak fragile and an intransigent Serbia, operations than before, western-supported while Kosovo independence campaign—but more Kosovar civilians were afterthe start killed of military In Kosovo, forces Serbian military were after a evicted short, intense air but resulting the settlement political has proven unstable and untenable. inenforcingsuccessful Dayton the Accords and preventing open conflict, stress on a much reduced U.S. Army. stabilization In Bosnia, efforts were “stabilization” deployments and later inBosnia Kosovo, placing surprising U.S. military, U.S. the found itself engaged in large and enduring scale to Rwandan the genocide. In midst the of adramatic downsizing of the caution, Clinton pursued ahands offtowardspolicy Balkan the Wars and power there are wars.” no small Swinging from overconfidence to extreme Clinton administration, recalling Wellington’s admonition that “for a great intervention epic failure experienced inSomalia early inthe days of the waning in the start a good days of Bush the ’41 presidency, U.S. the R. D. R. Hooker, Jr.. and Joseph 2016,Lessons Collins, encountered: Learning from the Long War, PresidentSee George H.W. Congress the of session Bush, joint a Address before “Since collapse the of Union, Soviet the United the States enjoys power. unparalleled military Far from ushering War inan eraof post-Cold the calm, and period The warm afterglowCold the in victory of soon faded. War After 2 3

Neither Iraq nor Afghanistan to led clear 1 while politicians while , September 11,1990. - xv | INTRODUCTION Despite far greater economic resources, we face real we resources, economic greater far Despite 4 Gray zone challenges have been described as “attempts to achieve one’s security objectives one’s achieve to been described have “attempts as challenges zone Gray How is it that our economic and military power so often fails to translate to translate fails military so often and power economic our that it is How “kill targets—to destroy and attack to ability military’s American The pp. 421–440, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press. University Defense National D.C.: 421–440, Washington, pp. 4 works: 2018, “What July et al., Schaus See John force.” use of sizable and direct to resort without . Studies International and Strategic for Center coercion,” zone gray Countering gains—while was eliminated and the terrorist safe haven haven safe the terrorist and eliminated was Hussein Saddam gains—while to subject and unstable dangerously today is Iraq removed, Afghanistan in weakof in face the resilient remains Taliban while the influence, Iranian a decade than more from back stepping again Once governance. Afghan as the sidelines from watched the U.S. operations, combat wrenching of the Syrian of the chaos into degenerated spring the Arab of the promise thirteen than million more dead a half civilian and million (with civil war and economic American despite Today, persons). displaced and refugees powers revanchist by challenged itself finds the U.S. military dominance, Iran. and Korea North like states rogue as well as Russia China and in the cyber challenges information and face pressing we Importantly, U.S. important put that zone” in the “gray generally, more and, domains risk. at interests - criminal organiza transnational from as well as these states from threats many and Our global dominance groups. terrorist proliferating and tions system. international ordered and a stable created not allies have strategy. America approaches begincan how with We in war? success into strategy. “grand” American in continuity great is there terms, broad In alliances strong in the world, economy military the largest strength, Great industrial innovative a powerful and basing, forward partnerships, and deterrent nuclear strategic invulnerable an technology base, and and global America’s ensured and the Cold War of success the great underlay Vietnam, Somalia, specific cases—Korea, many in But preponderance. Why? elusive. proved Afghanistan—“victory” and Iraq, every almost In the problem. not clearly things”—is break and people in battles prevailed has decades, the U.S. in recent record on example xvi | BEYOND VOM KRIEGE intensely politics to is polarized partly blame, towards tendency this “no ultimate success that crippled and evendestroyed presidencies. While accurately, and to means link to desired ends inconcrete ways, prevented victory. An apparent inability to comprehend strategic the challenge administrations to make decisions that staved off defeatwithout enabling sive results (as well as other competing strategic priorities) successive led ations didnot to lead clear success. Instead, mounting costs and inconclu- action. sparked (or was thought to have sparked) an urgent for need military In eachof our major interventions military since 1945,asingular event dynamic political recurring has which hindered American success inwar. almostwhich by definition rarely engagevital truly U.S. interests. isAmerica poorly suited to large counter-insurgency scale campaigns, required. If there is alesson found to be three conflicts, inthese thatit is proved aspirational and unrealistic, our “means” well below level the with means the we were prepared to bring to bear. Too often, our “ends” governments—themselves drivers of conflict—could the solved notbe in adjoiningsanctuary countries and incapable and corrupt host nation Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, we that to failed discern problems the of intervention were manifestly inadequate to achieve desired the end. In land. The means we were prepared to bearbring withto to copeChina’s that our massive air power and sea might not translate into success on wouldChina not North permit Korea defeated to be and occupied, or to leaders failed discern—despitemilitary many warning signs—that oftentoo flawed. For example, the in Korean conflict, political U.S. and our ability understand to see, andthe define strategic challenge all is and engagements, outnumbered evenwhen and outgunned. Rather, supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction. 2003 with 9/11,an that assertion to failed gain and traction was subsequently replaced with Saddam’s Afghanistan, 9/11attacks. the The Bush ’43administration attemptedthe invasion to link of Iraq in effort advisory followingled the Diemcoup; the in Gulf War, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait; in 5 In regard, this there is clear inour evidence post-war of history a In Korea, North the Korean invasion inJune 1950; in Vietnam, collapse the of U.S.- the 5 With single exception the of Gulf the War, resulting oper military - | INTRODUCTION xvii The Navy’s air arm is again again armis air Navy’s The 7, 8 6 When interviewed by the author for a study of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, then-CJCS then-CJCS campaigns, Afghanistan and the Iraq of study a for the author interviewed by When of forces armed entire the than is larger 184,000 troops, with Marine Corps alone, U.S. The In talks that navy.” army little navy’s Corps called“the the Marine famously Truman President A few examples are illustrative. A close look at the department of the of the department close A look at illustrative. are examples few A While it is unfair to hold the U.S. military accountable for poor for militaryaccountable the U.S. hold to unfair is it While larger and more capable than most of the world’s air forces—while Marine Marine forces—while air the world’s of most than capable more and larger air, of powerful The possession claim. the same make can itself by aviation a into military a single within translates department sea and forces land Navy reveals by far the largest and strongest fleet in the world but also (in but world fleet in the strongest and the largest far by reveals Navy than capable more and larger Corps) force land a the Marine of theform the planet. on the armies of a handful all but 6 served term he Secretaries different three four-year his during that DempseyGeneral noted Martin Carter). See Ashton and Hagel Chuck (, Defense of 7 boasts twice component aviation (150,000). Its the U.K. (161,000) or (178,000), France 2018 , balance military of The these three. any of forces air in the found as aircraft combat many as Studies. Strategic of Institute International 8 in the world. powerful military and institutions versatile the most of one is fact, it political decisions, it must share responsibility for outcomes. Since the Since outcomes. for responsibility share must it politicaldecisions, have 1980s, we in the late reforms the Goldwater-Nichols of passage is the reality Yet “jointness.” improved about triumphalism seen much In peacetime, militarythe with each servicestrain different. rarely quite remain missions and roles and warfighting to Service approaches other. new- tech with updated of WWII, experiences in the definitive grounded preserve to their the serviceshard the battlefield, on fight Even nology. over doctrine best papers at Joint each other. to relative action of freedom between services, all disagreements the use respectsharp to with above the Joint of the Chairman 10 legal authorities, Lacking Title airpower. of material demand cannot but suggest and cajole can (CJCS) Staff Chiefsof and influence congressional in service while strong changes culture, the secretary of the ability limit high turnover and tenures short typically the problem. address to defense of win, no lose” approaches represents a clear trend in American strategic strategic in American trend a clear represents approaches lose” win, no the for consequences II (WWII). The War World since performance been doleful. have States United xviii | BEYOND VOM KRIEGE commander inTampa under theater the commander, but instead reported to combatant the Afghanistan, air force and marine units were not tasked organized operations inatheater of war largely independently. In Iraq both and autonomy, Air the Force—like Navy—can the deploy and conduct ment budgets far greater than Army, the and to free operate with great outcomes independently by Aided procure from other the - services. Mitchell, itself capable as fully sees of achieving decisive “strategic” seapower that remains much very alive and well. holdtradition to through avison of of Mahan, victory services sea the degree ofhigh autonomy Navy the which guards. jealousy inthe Soaked 9 It requires lanes of sea secure communication to Even survive. most the to theater the of war. It cannot defend against strong enemy air forces. Army is uniquely dependent It on its sister cannot services. move itself exempted from general this critique. Unlike Navy the and Air Force, the ism. Too often, it doesn’t. American conflicts. The national interest parochial- trump must service plish demanding and complex tasks. This strategic disability all in recurs most the efficientseeks and useeffective of availableresources to accom- autonomy must collide with requirements the of effective strategy,which possible share of resources. There is no here.mystery Butthe drive towards holds that organizations strive for freedom of action and for greatest the achieve, unity of while command was altogether absent. battlespace.their In such circumstances, unity of effort proved difficult to “owning” air the force, marine, operations and special forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan found themselves unenviable in the position of not most of conflicts. both As a result,theater joint force commandersboth in Similarly, U.S. the Air Force, bathed of theories inthe Douhet and Alone among America’s U.S. the services, military Army can be Such behavior comfortably aligns with organizational theory, which Lessons encountered Lessons , p. 10. .9 The same was true of special same The operationstrue wasof special forces for | xix INTRODUCTION To insist on service autonomy in the service on insist autonomy To 10 11 The masks of war: of masks The Builder’s described Theseaspects in at length of Carl are service culture Land Component under not and separately fought Forces Marine and Army War, the Gulf In Perhaps as a result, the Army finds itself a consistent loser in the itself a consistent finds the Army a result, as Perhaps budget and acquisition battles that largely define success success the “inside define largely that battles acquisition and budget and in the air preponderant strongly America is measure, any By beltway.” and well-equipped While different. rather is the picture sea. On land, at four some now are legacythat fields systems Army the U.S. trained, well as deep the cuts artillery suffered and armor communities Its decades old. light predominantly is the Army 9/11; today following reorganized Army has the Army size, In formerly. than striking less power far with infantry, in 18 divisions and 800,000 soldiers almost at Manned liabilities. similar today the Army mechanized), or armored which were the 1980s (half of it with responsibilities, global tasked Though 500,000. less than fields contingency” regional “major a single than more realistically fight cannot cannot sea and power air the contrary, to claims despite And a time. at as seen on land, fought thisscale deficiency campaigns in large supply this volume several essays, In Afghanistan. and Iraq, Vietnam, in Korea, have we and balance, of military out is America’s this theme. emphasizes accordingly. a price paid - profes no who have commanders, occur does Army war not to of theater it. experiencesional of 10 Press, University Hopkins Johns The (Baltimore: analysis and strategy in styles military American 1989). 11 Carpenter, Mason interposed between them. See Division P. Armored (UK) the 1st with Command, Airpower Advanced School of University Air Analysis, Allison An War: Gulf the in Operations Joint river, the Euphrates of west fought in 2003, the Army Iraq of the invasion 1994. In June Studies, organized task were units Force Air Afghanistan, and both Iraq In the river. of east the Marines reporting and based a 3-star in Qatar Commander, Component Air Central Command’s U.S. under servicehow illustrate These examples Kabul. in Baghdad and commanders the theater not Tampa, to of command. of unity at expensethe finessed in wartime rivalries are junior army officer exists in a milieu where external help in the form of form in the help external in a milieuwhere exists officer army junior outside else—allfound much and logistics,intelligence aviation, artillery, From death. and spell life literally tankunit—may the basic infantry or and this autonomous, but anything to bred be is officer birth, the army culture. factArmy’s defines the xx | BEYOND VOM KRIEGE p. 12,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 12 Yet war severely punishes fundamental mistakes—the inability to identify pragmatic business.” Sir Hew Strachan and others have pointed out, “strategy is aprofoundly that we must and learn relearn same the lessons over and over again. As of history the at America surveying war, one by is struck astrange sense political This degrees of reality has consequences.varying expertise. In agencies three- and four-levels with appointees political deep with byed American the custom of salting government departments and normally found on presidential resumes, aphenomenon compound- largelybeen ignored by later administrations. Storm represents ablueprint for success. Regrettably, its lessons have himself a master of joint and coalition warfare. In many ways, Desert ligent command and control, suppressing and rivalries proving service commanderthe of U.S. Command, Central provided driving and intel- ered most the outstanding chairman ever. Norman General Schwarzkopf, aformerChiefs—himself national adviser—is security generally consid- Powell, position. Colin critical this General Chairman the of Joint the national adviser, security as “the described has gold been standard” in commander-in-chief American history. inmodern Brent Scowcroft, his W. Bush came to office as arguably the mostand experienced qualified ground phase inonly four days. What was different here? extremely low, campaign the while was won inamatter of weeks—the level; and extraordinarilytactical competent execution. were Casualties public and sound and allies; intelligent planning from national the to the Kuwait”); overwhelming force; strong support from Congress, the the War was marked by clear, limited objectives political (“eject Saddam from success inmajor Storm theater Operation Desert in1991.The war: Gulf Sir Hew Strachan, 2014,TheDirection of Contemporary War: Strategy in Historical Perspective, A strategic education and inmanaging experience wars are not In aword, answer the must “leadership.” be President George H. In there is post-war one the period, example striking of strategic 12 In its essence, it not difficult. need diabolically be | xxi INTRODUCTION In addition to the major campaigns mentioned above, the U.S. has has the U.S. above, mentioned campaigns the major to addition In the counterinsurgency, and of counterterrorism generation a After engaged in many smaller ones in the post-WWII era, again with varying with in the post-WWII era, again smaller ones in many engaged the and in 1958 in Military success. interventions of degrees The successful. be to generally judged in 1965 were Republic Dominican the and in 1980, rescue mission the in 1975, Iran incident Mayaguez The be failures. classed as in 1983 must in Lebanon intervention Marine revealed but objectives its 1983 accomplished late in Grenada of invasion friendly of a high number and operations joint with serious problems U.S. military the showed in 1989 Panama of invasion The casualties. fire complex and challenging its as a best, at team the Bush-Scowcroft and minimal casual with - and order short in carried was out plan operational an despite Somalia in endeddisaster, in 1993 in intervention ties.later A in Bosnia in operations enforcement” beginning, while “peace auspicious operations) stability subsequent (and campaign air the Kosovo 1995 and of Below the threshold cost. low at their objectives in 1999 accomplished mixed, therefore 1945 is since record the U.S. operations, combat major - detailed understand a more requires these outcomes understanding and be can force overwhelming however, general, the particulars. of In ing friction, intimidating “smothering” own, all its a quality seen have to than often more much successful outcomes enabling and opponents the dangers illustrate Desert like Mogadishu and One failures Epic not. services, the from far multiple involving operations in complex inherent forces. small, light only involving and homeland conflict focused state-on-state deterring again on once is States United the problem, poor assumptions, failure to link means with ends, failure failure ends, with link means to failure poor assumptions, the problem, an by abetted is approach ahistorical Our often adapt. learn and to view. of point the adversary’s from see to the problem inability apparent opponent one’s that assume tendency to “filters”—the of problem This besettinga American in sin do—is we as allies see the world one’s and making. strategy xxii | BEYOND VOM KRIEGE party is willing to on. is this willing take party ation unless checked—and there are no far signs so that either political to crowd begin will out other government all spending within agener is that domestic entitlement spending, dwarfs which defense spending, command and control may not answer. the be Arelated but worry critical more exquisite and more expensive forces combined with more and more Norththe Vietnamese, and Taliban the al-Qaeda, suggest that smaller, military. and defense agencies since 1945that sap fighting the strength the of U.S. along with personnel costs and amassive expansion of headquarters coststhe of acquiring systems new and technologies have exploded, persistence continue to hinder effective strategy and warfighting. Next, roots deep for whose and rivalries, recognizing and solving service technologies available. Yet troubling concerns remain. U.S. is investing in some of most the advanced, and most expensive, and National Defense Strategies. budgets Big military are back, and the of efforts,focus these as explicitlylaid outcurrent in National Security and major theater war. D.C.: National Defense University Press. 15 administration new a 14 Defense Strategy, 2018,Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense. 13 fortunes to corrupt and failing regimes. Abetter approach, perhaps, is to of law, or fair elections. Too often, we have political and tied our military But it cannot substitute for solutions political like better governance, rule of policy, by helping conditions to set for outcomes. political successful solving inherently problems. political War ends the done right can serve comprehend war poorly. too The first lesson that is poor war isa vehicle for of war. In we America, resort to war often, too infrequently,win too and First, U.S. the national enterprise shows security limited enthusiasm See Michael See Meese, Strategy and Force Planning in aTime of Austerity , May 2014, Washington, For assessment adetailed of author’s issues,the these see Charting acourse: Strategic choices for See As for with abetter better understanding strategy letus making, begin The NationalSecurity Strategy, 2017, Washington, D.C.: The White House, and 14 Our inability Our decisively to deal with low tech opponents like , pp. 61-82,2016,Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press. 13 China, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are the 15 The The National - | INTRODUCTION xxiii At the outset, we must carefully define the problem, problem, define the carefully must we the outset, At 16 “The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the statesman that judgment of act reaching far most the supreme, “The the first, These, then, are the key points of the essays collected in this volume. collectedvolume. in this of essays the key the points are These, then, Successful strategy, therefore, begins by understanding the nature thenature understanding begins by therefore, strategy, Successful , pp. 88, 579. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Eds.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. University NJ: Princeton (Eds.). Princeton, Paret Peter and Howard 88, 579. Michael , pp. consulting the important national interests that may be engaged, and and be engaged, may that interests national the important consulting force to resort to or goals vague set to aspirational, the impulse resisting courses generating to werush suffice. Before may approaches whenother make missing, facts are where the facts, and, gather must we action, of must We risks. and intentions, capabilities, about assumptions sound to are if we adversaries view our the to perspective the casestrive of from link must We reactions. and their actions understanding of hope any have adjust must we fall short, means the available where and ends, to means devise of metrics— measures must We means. our increase or ends our At all necessary. if adjust and progress our judge we can effectiveness—so legislatures, our of publics, voting our of the weigh support must times, we if we Finally, opinion. public international of allies, friends and and our of all if at win and, to a determination with it wage must we war, decide on and these steps of one any at Fail decisively. and win quickly to possible, probable. is failure overall as humility, of with a measure but with certainty not offered are They 16 commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither neither embarking, which they are on war . . . the kind of establish to is make to have commander starts a one “No nature.” its alien is to that something trying into, nor it turn to for, it mistaking own mind what in his clear being first do so—without to senses in his ought one no rather, war—or (1976). On Clausewitz, von Carl it.” conduct to intends he how and war that by achieve to intends he War of the conflict. of fight less often, for clearer objectives, with stronger forces and stronger stronger and forces with objectives,stronger clearer for often, less fight to be will tempted always allies.Presidents and voters our from support urgent an to answer immediate an as the button or the sword for reach judicial or congressional by decades unencumbered in recent problem, if permitted. hand of will out get and nature own its has war Yet checks. survival—and the about is war alike, the president the soldier and For admonitory Churchill’s Here limits. of struggle survival for impatient is be heeded. should voyage” a “strange as war of description xxiv | BEYOND VOM KRIEGE father and king of all.” Would that it were not so. Yet as Lincoln advised lessonspainful learned. “War,” painfully Heraclitus reminds the us, “is 17 wrongs revenged. to be incidents of [war] as philosophy to from learn and none of as them as and silly asand as wise, us bad therefore Let as good. study the compared with men the of we this, have shall asand weak as strong, Human nature not will change. In any future great national trial, Speech by President Abraham Lincoln, November 10,1864. 17