MONITORING MB#07/2014EN, 14 April 2014

BISS POLITICAL MEDIABAROMETER (October - December 2013)

Introduction

The Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) presents its seventh quarterly report BISS Political Media Barometer (October - December 2013). It sums up the Belarusian political forces’ media performance in 2013 and offers information on the forces’ political communications and their media coverage. The report presents both tendencies typical of 2013 on the whole and trends characteristic of the fourth quarter in particular. Following our mission as a non-partisan, independent Belarusian think-tank we designed this product with one major goal in mind: to scientifically analyze the quality of the political communication between the democratic Belarusian political forces and the society and contribute to its improvement.

To accomplish this goal, the BISS Political Media Barometer objectively and quantitatively evaluates media appearances of 24 individual politicians, 13 Belarusian political forces and two coalitions, basing on the systemic monitoring of the available open media sources.

The analysis of political communications throughout the year has led us to a number of conclusions about the overall development of the independent political communications field, as well as the most and the least successful communication strategies pursued by the political forces. The report also concludes that preparations to the local elections did not have a considerable impact in the independent political forces’ communications. The authors of the BISS Political Media Barometer are grateful to the International Board of the project for their insightful comments and recommendations. We are open to discussion on the research methodology, dimensions of analysis and data interpretation. All responsibility for any errors or shortcomings rests solely with the BISS.

Authors: Alexei Pikulik, Alena Artsiomenka MB #07/2014EN 2

Contents

Introduction ...... 1

Summary and recommendations...... 3 Detailed research findings ...... 6 Quantitative index ...... 6 Total presence in the information field for individual politicians and political forces by the number of references...... 6 Individual politicians: media presence vs. their own communications ...... 7 Political forces: total presence in the information field, media coverage and their own communications ...... 8 Total presence dynamics in time...... 11 Qualitative index...... 13

Where and how the opposition speaks...... 15 Distribution of total presence by the source...... 15 How the independent Belarusian political forces use the available information field ... 15 Correlation between offline activities and political communications...... 19 Levels of political actors’ and forces’ activeness in the media...... 22

Types of representation of political forces in the media...... 24

Profiles of political forces’ representatives ...... 24 Political forces’ profile...... 31

Appendices ...... 35

Detailed findings...... 35 Major trends of the political communications field in 2013...... 38

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Summary and recommendations

Overview of the political communications field The present report covers the political communications field from October to December 2013. Below we give our basic research findings.

 The number of political communications increased dramatically. The time span from October to December 2013 was marked by a spike in political communications. The number of references to the political forces and individual politicians in the analyzed sources grew from 3,217 in the third quarter to 5,998 in the fourth. There were several factors that boosted interest to the political sphere. First and foremost, it was Paval Sieviaryniec’s release; the politician immediately went to number one in the quantitative index of total presence in the information field. The second driving force in the political communications field was the BPF Party, which celebrated its 25th anniversary. Furthermore, the events in Ukraine and three years since the presidential election of 19 December 2010 brought the political subjects in general into the spotlight.

 The structure of the political communications field remained unchanged. Paval Sieviaryniec’s release as a ‘personal story’ made him a major newsmaker during the analyzed time span. This, however, did not alter the structure of the communications field in terms of the topics, pro-activeness in communications and the levels of the covered events. Under similar circumstances there had been an upsurge in the media coverage of repressions, personal events and passive communications before. Yet, the fourth quarter of 2013 г. did not demonstrate these trends. The leaders of the political communications field deserve credit for maintaining the balance of communications’ contents and staying focused on relevant topics.

 The local elections received low-key coverage. Although the fourth quarter of 2013 was supposed to be marked by active preparation for the upcoming local elections, this did not have any essential influence on the structure of communications. From this perspective, the performance in the political communications field can be regarded as unsuccessful. Firstly, the weight of elections-related communications went down as compared to the previous time span. The proportion of regional events, which should have gone up as the local elections were approaching, remained unchanged, making up 15%. The share of references to parties as parts of coalitions showed a downward trend, too. Moreover, the coverage of economic issues, which are a number one priority for the general population and consequently should have been brought into the spotlight in the run-up to the elections, fell from 10% to 8%. At the same time the information about economic initiatives accounted for only 0.6% of all the initiatives that received coverage. Events aimed at the electorate were at a low level, meetings with electorate making up only 3% of all offline activities.

 The coalitions showed comparatively low levels of communication activity. The present report includes a detailed analysis of the communications by two political coalitions, namely the ‘People’s Referendum’ campaign and the Civic Alliance Talaka for Just and Fair Elections for a Better Life. In general they are characterised by relatively low communication activity. The ‘People’s Referendum’ came ninth in the total presence index for political forces, while the Talaka held

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the 15th position. The communications of the ‘People’s Referendum’ campaign look much more effective, showing a greater proportion of offline activities, proactive communications and diversification of its representatives. However, the overall share of references to parties as parts of coalitions was below 10%, which was a major drawback in their communication strategy. The positive aspect was that economic issues accounted for a large proportion of topics covered in the communications by the coalitions.

The following table describes major trends in the dynamics of political forces’ and actors’ communication performance. They are interpreted further in the text.

Trends in July – September 2013 Trends in October – December 2013 Where and how the opposition speaks There remained a considerable share of The share of the independent Belarusian the independent press, namely 10%. The press fell to 3%, while the proportion of share of independent online resources online resources rose up to 59%. The went up from 43% to 58% due to more share of the political actors’ and forces’ active use of politicians’ own online own channels of communication showed a resources, while the proportion of partisan certain growth rather than a fall, the resources dropped from 38% to 28%. partisan portals increasing their share of communications to 31%. International relations went down in the The distribution of topics remained topic rating. Social issues showed a unchanged, with social issues and internal growth from 40% to 45%, while the politics in the lead (48% and 42%, proportion of references to repressions respectively). In the fourth quarter neither increased from 17% to 26%. the elections nor political repressions acquired any extra weight. The share of national events dropped The proportion of international events because of a slight growth in regional went up from 9% to 20%. The reasons events – from 12% to 15% – and a were the Eastern Partnership Summit on dramatic growth in personal events – from 28 – 29 November and an active 12% to 29%. International events were discussion of the developments in covered in only 9% of communications, Ukraine. The share of personal events which constituted a marked fall as dropped to 18%. compared to 24% in the previous quarter. Throughout the analyzed time span the The share of related to offline activities share of communications related to offline remained rather high. It peaked at 49% in activities remained rather high. Having October and November, to fall slightly in reached the peak of 57% in July, it never December, making up 41%. (It is now fell below the 40% line. absolutely clear that the levels of offline activity are not subject to seasonal changes, as in October – December 2012 they fluctuated between 9% and 24%.)

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The proportion of ‘reactive’ There were minor changes in the levels of communications went back to normal due activeness in communications. The to a growth in ‘passive’ communications. proportion of ‘proactive’ communications After a fall to 6% the share of ‘proactive’ rose to 20%, while the share of ‘passive’ communications got back to 14%. ones did not increase. Types of representation of political forces in the media The share of references to political actors The proportion of references to individual without mentioning their affiliation grew politicians without mentioning their from 27% to 35%. affiliation was still at a quite high level, showing a growth to 38%. The proportion of individuals who are not The types of representation of political members of political parties grew forces became more diverse. Rank-and- considerably. There was a slight increase file activists were mentioned in 11% of in the representation of regional rank- the communications. and-file activists, which made up 3%. If we take the total number of references There was a marked fall in the share of to political forces and actors, the share of female representatives, from 16% to 9%. women went back to 16%. Political forces were presented as The proportion of references to political members of coalitions in 22% of forces as members of coalitions dropped references, which was an all-time to 10%. The coalitions were mentioned in maximum throughout the research. 6% of communications. The share of references to politicians as The proportions of references to politicians participants in the events fell to 32%, as participants in the events and experts while the proportion of general reasoning remained unchanged: in 32% of grew to 33%. communications they were presented as participants in the events, while in 34% of communications they came up with some general reasoning. Over 90% of communications did not There was a slight growth in the number include any evaluation of political actors or of evaluations of political actors and forces. forces. Individual politicians were mentioned without any evaluation in 87% of cases, while for political forces this figure made up 84%.

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Detailed research findings

Quantitative index

1. Total presence in the information field for individual politicians and political forces by the number of references The individual politicians’ rating underwent essential changes. Paval Sieviaryniec went to the top for the first time since the research was launched. As we are going to explain further in the text, it was not only owing to ‘passive’ communications, initiated by the media because of his release, but also due to his active presence in the information field throughout the analyzed quarter. Paval Sieviaryniec quickly plunged himself into the work of the Belarusian Christian Democracy and commented on the overall situation in the political sphere. At the same time it is important that the share of personal events as compared to the previous quarter dropped, in spite of the leader’s ‘personal story’ with its powerful news-making potential.

The following political actors also improved their standing in the rating: Vitaĺ Rymašeŭski (from the 8th to the 3rd position), Zianon Paźniak (from the 20th to the 9th position), Juraś Hubarevič (from the 17th to the 13th position), Ryhor Kastusioŭ and Siarhiej Kaliakin (they both rose by one point, to the 14th and the 15th positions, respectively), Lieŭ Marholin (from the 18th to the 17th position) and Dźmitry Vus (from the 23rd to the 21st position).

Iryna Chalip and Andrej Sańnikaŭ plummeted down from the 5th to the 20th and from the 3rd to the 7th positions, respectively, their personal situation probably being a major factor in how much media attention they get. Volha Karač and Andrej Dźmitryjeŭ also moved down in the rating, from the 14th to the 22nd and from the 6th to the 11th positions, respectively. The drop in the number of references to the latter two may be attributed to their private circumstances, as they both had babies in the fourth quarter of 2013. The other politicians’ rating position dynamics was insignificant, mainly caused by the emergence of Paval Sieviaryniec as the new leader and the inclusion of Źmicier Daškievič into the list.

Table 1. Total presence in the information field for individual politicians

Politicians Number of Total Position in Rating position dynamics references presence the rating (the rating position in index July – September is given in the brackets) 1. Paval Sieviaryniec 377 1957 1 ↑(10) 2. Uladzimir Niakliajeŭ 400 1831 2 ↓(1) 3. Anatoĺ Liabiedźka 405 1659 3 ↓(2) 4. Źmicier Daškievič 278 1540 4 5. Aliaksiej Janukievič 289 1411 5 ↓(4) 6. Vitaĺ Rymašeŭski 212 1167 6 ↑(8) 7. Andrej Sańnikaŭ 170 1004 7 ↓(3) 8. Aliaksandr Milinkievič 171 694 8 ↓(7) 9. Zianon Paźniak 151 606 9 ↑(20) 10. Maryna Adamovič 136 558 10 ↑(11) 11. Andrej Dźmitryjeŭ 146 552 11 ↓(6) 12. Stanislaŭ Šuškievič 90 527 12 =(12) 13. Juraś Hubarevič 111 465 13 ↑(17) 14. Ryhor Kastusioŭ 81 442 14 ↑(15) 15. Siarhiej Kaliakin 88 396 15 ↑(16) 16. Alieh Hajdukievič 54 389 16 ↓(13) 17. Lieŭ Marholin 110 361 17 ↑(18)

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18. Nastaśsia Daškievič (Palažanka) 62 354 18 ↓(9) 19. Viktar Karniajenka 54 245 19 =(19) 20. Iryna Chalip 37 191 20 ↓(5) 21. Dźmitry Vus 31 139 21 ↑(23) 22. Voĺha Karač 62 120 22 ↓(14) 23. Siarhiej Hajdukievič 18 111 23 ↓(21) 24. Iryna Vieštard 19 47 24 ↓(22)

2. Individual politicians: media presence vs. their own communications

The share of individual politicians’ own communications dropped for all of them except for Maryna Adamovič and Dźmitry Vus. This can be viewed as a general trend for the independent political communications field.

However, for many politicians the absolute numbers of their own communications either did not fall or fell only insignificantly. The decrease in the proportion of the politicians’ own communications can be attributed to the growth in the number of media references.

The potential of the politicians’ own communications is limited, and even important news- making opportunities have not led to a growth in this variable in the last few research periods.

Table 2. Individual politicians: media coverage vs. their own communications

Politicians Media coverage 1 Their own communications Share of their Dynamics of 2 own the share of communications the in the total politicians’ presence own communicati ons 3 Number of Index Number of Index references references 1. Paval Sieviaryniec 322 (47) 1902 55 (23) 55 15% ↓(33%) 2. Uladzimir Niakliajeŭ 352 (169) 1783 48 (54) 48 12% ↓(24%) 3. Anatoĺ Liabiedźka 263 (134) 1517 142 (129) 142 35% ↓(49%) 4. Źmicier Daškievič 252 (58) 1514 26 (-) 26 9% 5. Aliaksiej Janukievič 232 (94) 1354 57 (56) 57 20% ↓(37%) 6. Vitaĺ Rymašeŭski 154 (56) 1109 58 (40) 58 27% ↓(42%) 7. Andrej Sańnikaŭ 159 (116) 993 11 (22) 11 6% ↓(16%) 8. Aliaksandr Milinkievič 141 (67) 664 30 (46) 30 18% ↓(41%) 9. МилинкевичZianon Paźniak 137 (22) 592 14 (5) 14 9% ↓(19%) 10. Maryna Adamovič 85 (53) 507 51 (23) 51 38% ↑(30%) 11. Andrej Dźmitryjeŭ 97 (72) 503 49 (59) 49 34% ↓(45%) 12. Stanislaŭ Šuškievič 90 (43) 527 0% ↓(30%) 13. Juraś Hubarevič 72 (24) 426 39 (42) 39 35% ↓(64%) 14. Ryhor Kastusioŭ 64 (30) 425 17 (19) 17 21% ↓(39%) 15. Siarhiej Kaliakin 82 (27) 390 6 (37) 6 7% ↓(58%) 16. Alieh Hajdukievič 51 (26) 386 3 (6) 3 6% ↓(19%) 17. Lieŭ Marholin 61 (19) 312 49 (37) 49 45% ↓(66%) 18. Nastaśsia Daškievič 55 (28) 347 7 (27) 7 11% ↓(32%) (Palažanka) 19. Viktar Karniajenka 52 (14) 243 2 (9) 2 4% ↓(39%) 20. Iryna Chalip 37 (83) 191 21. Dźmitry Vus 31 (10) 139 22. Voĺha Karač 19 (38) 77 43 (24) 43 69% ↑(39%) 23. Siarhiej Hajdukievič 15 (12) 108 3 (3) 3 17% ↓(20%) 24. Iryna Vieštard 15 (10) 43 4 (13) 4 21% ↓(57%)

1 The number of references in July – September 2013 is given in brackets. 2 The number of references in July – September 2013 is given in brackets. 3 The share in July – September 2013 is given in the brackets.

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3. Political forces: total presence in the information field, media coverage and their own communications The BPF Party rose from the second position in the previous quarter to the first. The Belarusian Christian Democracy came second. It was the first time within a long period that the campaign ‘Tell the Truth!’ had not come top but gone down to the fourth position, giving way to the United Civil Party, which took the third place. Furthermore, the Young Front rose from the sixth to the fifth position and the BPF Conservative Christian Party moved from the thirteenth to the eighth place. Thus, the final quarter of 2013 was marked by an increased media presence of the right political forces, albeit for quite different reasons.

Among the significant events that had an impact on the BPF Party’s media presence was its 25th jubilee. A number of events were held to celebrate it, including a meeting of the party’s Sojm (Board). The 25th anniversary since the creation of the Organizing Committee to establish the Adradžeńnie Belarusian People’s Front also drove up the media presence figures for the BPF Conservative Christian Party and Zianon Paźniak. In addition, the rally in Kurapaty at Dziady (Forefathers’ commemoration day) and the party’s deputy chairperson Juraś Bielieńki’s controversial statement on the use of Russian were relevant factors in the BPF Conservative Christian Party’s increased media presence. The BPF Party’s representatives also often appeared in the media in connection with Viktar Ivaškievič’s death. Furthermore, the picketing in protest against the deployment of Russian Air Force Bases in Belarus also contributed to the BPF Party’s increased media presence.

The rise in the Belarusian Christian Democracy’s media presence was first and foremost due to the release of their leader Paval Sieviaryniec, who immediately became actively engaged in political work. The key factor in the increased media presence of the Young Front was their eighth convention on 26 October 2013.

Interestingly enough, neither the participation in the ‘People’s Referendum’ coalition, nor the forthcoming local elections strengthened the standing of the campaign ‘Tell the Truth!’, the Movement ‘For Freedom’ and the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada in the political communications field.

By the total presence index the ‘People’s Referendum’ campaign found itself in the middle of the political forces’ rating with 248 references and 986 index points. The Talaka Alliance came last but one, with 43 references and 186 index points.

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Table 3. Total presence of political forces in the information field

Political forces Number of Total Position Dynamics references presence in the of the index rating position in the rating4 1. BPF Party 724 3634 1 ↑(2) 2. Organising committee to 679 3411 ↑(4) create the Belarusian 2 Christian Democracy party 3. United Civil Party 692 2690 3 =(3) 4. Civil Campaign «Tell the 573 2198 4 ↓(1) Truth!» 5. «Young Front» 393 2058 5 ↑(6) 6. Movement «For Freedom» 310 1326 6 ↓(5) 7. Civil campaign «European 155 1124 7 ↑(11) Belarus» 8. Conservative Christian Party – 181 1009 8 ↑(13) BPF 9. «People’s Referendum» 248 986 9 campaign 10. Belarusian Social Democratic 209 876 10 ↓(7) Party (Assembly) 11. Liberal Democratic Party 107 759 11 ↓(8) 12. Belarusian United Left Party 149 742 12 ↓(9) «A Just World» 13. Public Association «For Fair 51 210 13 ↓(12) Elections» 14. Civic Alliance Talaka for 43 186 14 Just and Fair Elections for a Better Life 15. Civil campaign «Our House» 79 159 15 ↓( 10) A fall in the proportion of their own communications was typical of all the political forces. At the same time the Belarusian Christian Democracy, the United Civil Party and the Young Front increased the absolute number of their own communications. There was a fall both in the shares and numbers of their own communications among such key players of the ‘People’s Referendum’ campaign as the BPF Party, the campaign ‘Tell the Truth!’ and the Movement ‘For Freedom’. However, the coalition itself had very substantial figures of both the proportion and the number of its own communications: 48% (a maximum for all the analyzed political forces) with 120 references at its own resources.

4 The position in July – September 2013 is given in the brackets.

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Table 4. Political forces: media coverage vs. their own communications

Political forces Media coverage Their own Share of Dynamic communications their own s of the communicati share of ons in the their total own presence communi cations5

Number of Index Number of Inde references6 references 7 x

1. BPF Party 635 (243) 3545 89 (155) 89 12% ↓(39%) 2. Organizing 479 (150) 3212 200 (150) 200 committee to create ↓(50%) the Belarusian 29% Christian Democracy 3. Unitedparty Civil Party 410 (171) 2408 282 (223) 282 41% ↓(57%) 4. Civil Campaign «Tell 415 (236) 2040 158 (219) 158 28% ↓(52%) the Truth!» 5. «Young Front» 324 (105) 1989 69 (38) 69 18% ↓(27%) 6. Movement «For 227 (127) 1243 83 (143) 83 27% ↓(53%) Freedom» 7. Civil campaign 153 (44) 1122 2 (10) 2 1% ↓(19%) «European Belarus» 8. Conservative 179 (25) 1007 2 (8) 2 1% ↓(24%) Christian Party – BPF 9. «People’s 128 866 120 120 Referendum» 48% campaign 10. Belarusian Social 157 (62) 824 52 (10) 52 Democratic Party ↓(48%) 25% (Assembly) 11. Liberal Democratic 96 (41) 748 11 (10) 11 10% ↓(20%) Party 12. Belarusian United 141 (48) 734 8 (51) 8 Left Party «A Just ↓(52%) 5% World» 13. Public Association 51 (31) 210 «For Fair Elections» 14. Civic Alliance 6 6 37 180 Talaka for Just and 14% Fair Elections for a Better Life 15. Civil campaign 58 (41) 58 21 (57) 101 73% ↑ (58%) «Our House»

5 The share in July – September 2013 is given in the brackets. 6 The number of references in July – September 2013 is given in brackets. 7 The number of references in July – September 2013 is given in brackets.

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4. Total presence dynamics in time

Unlike the previous analyzed time spans, in October – December 2013 the dynamics of quantitative index accumulation for individual politicians was not marked by any significant spikes, with the indices being accumulated evenly. This was particularly true for the rating leader Paval Sieviaryniec. Although his release on 19 October put him in the focus of media attention, the quantitative index accumulation rate shows that his media presence did not drop in the following months.

There was a slight surge in the total presence index accumulation for such political actors as Uladzimir Niakliajeŭ, Aliaksiej Janukievič and Andrej Sańnikaŭ on 19 December, three years after the voting day in 2010 and the events that followed. Uladzimir Niakliajeŭ’s index accumulation rate also went up after his speech at Euromaydan in Kyiv on 8 December. Źmicier Daškievič showed another considerable upsurge in his index beginning from the Young Front convention on 26 October. Then he found himself in the focus of media attention due to the information that his wife was expecting a baby and his detention on 6 November, followed by three days’ arrest.

Chart 5. Accumulation of the total presence index for individual politicians

2500

2000 Sieviaryniec Niakliajeŭ

Liabiedźka

1500 Daškievič

Janukievič

Rymašeŭski 1000 Sańnikaŭ

Milinkievič

Paźniak 500 Adamovič

Dźmitryjeŭ

0 Šuškievič

01.10.2013 04.10.2013 07.10.2013 10.10.2013 13.10.2013 16.10.2013 19.10.2013 22.10.2013 25.10.2013 28.10.2013 31.10.2013 03.11.2013 06.11.2013 09.11.2013 12.11.2013 15.11.2013 18.11.2013 21.11.2013 24.11.2013 27.11.2013 30.11.2013 03.12.2013 06.12.2013 09.12.2013 12.12.2013 15.12.2013 18.12.2013 21.12.2013 24.12.2013 27.12.2013 30.12.2013

Overall, even accumulation of quantitative indices was also typical of the political forces. They fell into three groups by the index accumulation rate and its final figure.

The first one consists of the BPF Party and the Belarusian Christian Democracy, which led in the rating in the fourth quarter of 2013. The major events that helped the BPF Party make the news, ensuring its presence in the political communications field, were distributed evenly, so that the media kept the party in the focus of their attention all the time. This type of media presence dynamics can serve as an example of sound media strategy planning, by the political force. The Belarusian Christian Democracy, just like its leader Paval Sieviaryniec, maintained high index accumulation rate and extensive media presence. This can also result from the fact that the media invariably mention Paval Sieviaryniec’s political affiliation, which leads to a growth in references to the party and its recognition. The BPF Party and the Belarusian Christian Democracy demonstrated an upsurge in their index accumulation rates in the second decade of October, the former

www.belinstitute.eu MB #07/2014EN 12 due to the celebration of the party’s 25th anniversary and the latter because of Paval Sieviaryniec’s release. The second group includes the United Civil Party, the campaign ‘Tell the Truth!’ and the Young Front. Traditional leaders in the ratings, the campaign ‘Tell the Truth!’ and the UCP couldn’t keep up with the new leaders, who showed extensive media presence and high index accumulation rates. Meanwhile, the fact that the Young Front is included here does credit to the organization. After a hike in the media attention during the convention, its index accumulation rate went down, but the Young Front managed to show much better performance than the political forces in the third group. The third group includes political forces characterized by homogeneous index accumulation rates and final outcomes.

Chart 6. Accumulation of the total presence index for political forces

3800 BPF Party 3600 Organising committee to create the Belarusian 3400 Christian Democracy party 3200 United Civil Party 3000 2800 Civil Campaign «Tell the Truth!» 2600 «Young Front» 2400 2200 Movement «For Freedom» 2000 1800 Civil campaign «European Belarus» 1600 Conservative Christian Party – BPF 1400 1200 «People’s Referendum» campaign 1000 800 Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Assembly) 600 Liberal Democratic Party 400 200 Belarusian United Left Party «A Just World» 0 Public Association «For Fair Elections»

Civic Alliance Talaka for Just and Fair Elections for a Better Life

01.10.2013 05.10.2013 09.10.2013 13.10.2013 17.10.2013 21.10.2013 25.10.2013 29.10.2013 02.11.2013 06.11.2013 10.11.2013 14.11.2013 18.11.2013 22.11.2013 26.11.2013 30.11.2013 04.12.2013 08.12.2013 12.12.2013 16.12.2013 20.12.2013 24.12.2013 28.12.2013

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Qualitative index

Qualitative index of media presence assesses the contents and balance of topics of political actors’ communications.8 By the qualitative index, the top-12 political actors fall into three groups. The first one includes rating leaders with balanced communications and high levels of initiative, such as Paval Sieviaryniec, Uladzimir Niakliajeŭ, Anatoĺ Liabiedźka, Źmicier Daškievič, Aliaksiej Janukievič and Vitaĺ Rymašeŭski. The second group consists of politicians with much lower qualitative indices and actually zero levels of initiative. They made their way into the top-12 not due to active promotion of their political agenda and in some cases they work outside Belarus. The third group includes politicians with relatively low qualitative (and quantitative) indices who nevertheless act in Belarus, coming up with political initiatives, such as Andrej Dźmitryjeŭ and Aliaksandr Milinkievič. Although their communications were balanced, their numbers dropped, probably due to their private circumstances. In contrast with the previous quarter, the qualitative indices of the top politicians looked rather well-balanced. Paval Sieviaryniec’s leading position may have had something to do with his ‘personal story’, but his communications maintained high levels of both ‘political action’ and ‘initiative’.

Aliaksiej Janukievič came top in the ‘initiative’ sub-index, which must have contributed to his party’s leading position in the quantitative index.

Chart 7. Distribution of the qualitative index parameters9

Sieviaryniec Niakliajeŭ Liabiedźka 9,2 8,5 13,3

12,2 17,7 11,1 7,5 17,6 11,1 Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Action Action Action

Number of Number of Number of references Quantitative Qualitative references Quantitative Qualitative references Quantitative Qualitative =377 index=1957 index=32,5 =400 index=1831 index=33,7 =405 index=1659 index=42

Daškievič Janukievič Rymašeŭski 7,2 6,0 6,4 7,2 12,2 12,5 31,2 9,2 6,6 Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Action Action Action

Number of Number of Number of references Quantitative Qualitative references Quantitative Qualitative references Quantitative Qualitative =278 index=1540 index=28,6 =289 index=1411 index=49,7 =212 index=1167 index=20,2

8 For further details, see ‘Description of methodology’. 9 The maximal index for each dimension can be 100 points, so the total maximum index can be 300 points.

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Sańnikaŭ Milinkievič Paźniak 5,5 5,6 0 2,4 4,8 3,5 4,8 3,1 Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Action Action Action

Number of Number of Number of references Quantitative Qualitative references Quantitative Qualitative references Quantitative Qualitative =170 index=1004 index=9 =171 index=694 index=12,8 =151 index=606 index=8,9

Adamovič Dźmitryjeŭ Šuškievič 5,4 5,1 1,4

2,5 2,2 3,1 Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Action Action Action

Number of Number of Number of references Quantitative Qualitative references Quantitative Qualitative references Quantitative Qualitative =136 index=558 index=7,9 =146 index =552 index=20,1 =90 index=527 index=6,5

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Where and how the opposition speaks

1. Distribution of total presence by the source

The distribution of communication channels in the political sphere remained unchanged. A vast majority of communications appeared in the independent online media. A specific trait of the fourth quarter was a fall in the share of the independent press. However, it was not caused by a drop in attention to the political field. The reason was a considerable growth in the number of references in the online media, which, unlike their printed counterparts, are not limited in the amount of information they can present.

Chart 8. Distribution of appearances in the information field by the source

1. October – December 2013 2. July – September 2013

Facebook Facebook LiveJournal Facebook accounts of accounts of accounts of accounts of Facebook Partisan political politicians politicians Partisan political accounts of informa- forces 1% 0% informa- forces politicians tional 3% tional 3% 4% portals portals 30% 31% Indepen- National National dent government govern- Belarusian Indepen- press dent ment press online 0% 0% media Indepen- Belarusian Indepen-- 59% dent online dent Belarusian media Belarusian press 62% press 4% 3% 3. April – June 2013 4. January – March 2013 Facebook Facebook Facebook Facebook LiveJournal accounts of accounts of accounts of accounts of Partisan accounts of political politicians Partisan political politicians informa- politicians forces 1% informa- forces 1% tional 0% 6% tional 3% portals portals Indepen- 38% 30% dent Belarusian National online government National media government Indepen- press 43% dent 0% Indepen- press Indepen- dent 0% Belarusian dent online Belarusian Belarusian press media press 62% 12% 4%

2. How the independent Belarusian political forces use the available information field The distribution of topics of political communications remained actually unchanged. Just like in the third quarter, the biggest coverage was given to issues that belong to the category called ‘society’. It includes both ‘personal stories’, like Paval Sieviaryniec’s release and Viktar Ivaškievič’s death, and issues related to culture, religion and social sphere. In the final quarter of 2013 Stanislaŭ Šuškievič, Uladzimir Niakliajeŭ and Anatoĺ Liabiedźka presented their new books. Paval Sieviaryniec’s release and three years since the events of 19 December 2010 did not result in more focus on repressions, which were mentioned in 26.3% of messages (in the third quarter the figure was 25.6%). The events in Ukraine brought international relations into the foreground (20.8% of communications as compared to 14.9% in the previous quarter). Economic issues

www.belinstitute.eu MB #07/2014EN 16 received a little less coverage – 7.9% as compared to 9.7% in July – September 2013, even though the new duties on cars were actively discussed by the political actors, particularly by the UCP representatives. Strange as it may seem, as the local elections were approaching, they were getting less coverage – 18.6% in contrast with 22.6% in the previous quarter. Furthermore, topics related to political parties received less attention, so their share fell from 20.4% to 18.5%. This leads us to a conclusion that the local elections are not going to become a significant event in Belarusian political life and the opposition forces are not interested in running for local councils. In all the other aspects the distribution of topics did not undergo any changes.

Chart 9. Topics of communications

1. October – December 2013 2. July – September 2013

social sphere 48,4 social sphere 44,7

domestic politics 42,1 domestic politics 28,4

repressions 26,3 repressions 25,6

foriegn policy 20,8 elections 22,8

elections 18,6 parties 20,7

parties 18,5 rights and freedoms 20,4

foriegn policy rights and freedoms 8,8 14,9 economy 9,7 economy 7,9

3. April – June 2013 4. January – March 2013

foriegn policy 40,8 social sphere 75,4 domestic politics 40,1 domestic politics 46,9 social sphere 39,7 repressions 35,5 rights and freedoms 20,4 parties 33,3 economy 17,3 foriegn policy 18,6 repressions 16,7 elections 13,8 elections 14,8 economy 5,8 parties 12,9 rights and freedoms 2,7

There were certain essential differences in the topics of communications depending on the political force. In the first place, it was coalitions that centered on economic issues. Focus on economic problems is an effective strategy for new election-oriented political

www.belinstitute.eu MB #07/2014EN 17 structures. Nevertheless, in the general context of other forces’ communications economic issues were diluted. The Belarusian Christian Democracy paid a lot of attention to repressions, which can be explained by Paval Sieviaryniec’s release. The Young Front and ‘A European Belarus’ traditionally feature prominently the same topic.

The UCP and the Movement ‘For Freedom’ had a larger proportion of communications on international relations than the other political forces. This often reflected their increased media activity connected with the developments in Ukraine.

Chart 10. Distribution of topics of communications for political forces

BPF Party 47% 23%11%23% 20%5% 57% 4%

United Civil Party 45% 13% 21% 19% 33% 11% 35% 11%

Organising committee to create the Belarusian 34% 22% 36% 29% 18%3% 50% 9% Christian Democracy party

Civil Campaign «Tell the Truth!» 63% 28% 16% 20% 17%5% 42% 8%

«Young Front» 40% 2% 62% 12%10% 56% 11%

Movement «For Freedom» 37% 27% 10%14% 35% 4% 44% 12%

Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Assembly) 64% 25% 12%20% 20%11% 41% 10%

Belarusian United Left Party «A Just World» 51% 45% 13% 37% 22%1%26% 7%

Liberal Democratic Party 18% 36% 2%22% 23% 7% 43% 17%

Civil campaign «Our House» 28% 15% 23% 7% 44% 8%

Public Association «For Fair Elections» 67% 53% 51% 14% 29% %

Conservative Christian Party – BPF 65% 4%10%16%5% 91% 3%

Civil campaign «European Belarus» 28% 6% 53% 13% 48% 36% 9%

«People’s Referendum» campaign 57% 14%8% 11% 58% 13%

Civic Alliance Talaka for Just and Fair Elections for a 42% 35% 5%26%5% 79% 9% Better Life

domestic politics elections repressions parties

foriegn policy economy social sphere rights and freedoms

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Chart 11. Distribution of topics of political initiatives

social sphere 54,8

domestic politics 51,6

elections 25,2

repressions 12,9

parties 11,6

rights and freedoms 9,0

foriegn policy 5,2

economy 0,6

If we look into the topics of communications dealing with political initiatives and new projects, their structure appears to be similar to the overall distribution of topics. ‘Society’ and ‘politics’ (internal political processes) remained in the lead. The proportion of references to the elections increased to a certain extent, as 25.2% of initiatives covered in the media were related to this topic.

Although economic issues could make the independent political sphere more attractive to the general public in view of the forthcoming elections, the share of economic initiatives was miniscule – it did not exceed 0.6%. This is evidence of the fact that economic discussions in the independent political sphere are limited to criticism of what is being done without developing and presenting any alternative proposals.

The structure of the levels of the events changed due to the discussion of the developments in Ukraine, the proportion of international events reaching 20%. Despite some important events in the politicians’ private lives, the share of personal events fell.

The percentage of regional events remained unchanged, even though the local elections were approaching.

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Chart 12. Levels of events

1. October - December 2013 2. July – September 2013

Interna- Inter- national Personal tional Personal 9% 18% 20% 29%

Regional 15% National Regional 47% National 15% 47%

3. April – June 2013 4. January – March 2013 Inter- national Personal 14% Personal Inter- 15% 12% national 24% Regional Regional 12% 12%

National National 59% 52%

3. Correlation between offline activities and political communications

In the final quarter of 2013 political actors and forces looked quite active. Like in the previous quarter, the levels of offline activities in the media coverage remained pretty high, reaching 49% in October and November and slightly falling in December to 41%.

Chart 13. Correlation between offline activities and political communications

49%

41%

The activities appeared to be rather varied. Certain changes had been made in the methodology: thus, two separate categories called ‘policy implementation’ and ‘public events’ had been singled out. The former presupposes the use of some institutional mechanisms for achieving certain political goals and objectives. The latter covers events for a limited circle of participants and journalists, such as presentations, public debates, etc. In the past these events were categorized as meetings with the electorate, though in fact they were not, as members of the public were not present there. When these types

www.belinstitute.eu MB #07/2014EN 20 of activities were excluded from the category ‘meetings with the electorate’, it substantially lost weight. In the fourth quarter of 2013 this form of offline-activities made up only 3.4%. This is a very low figure in view of the upcoming elections. On the other hand, such activities should be sanctioned by executive bodies, which is a considerable obstacle under the current circumstances.

Chart 14. Types of offline activities10

1. October – December 2013 2. July – September 2013

Meeting with electorate 3,4 Meeting with electorate 20,7 Round table, discussion Round table, discussion with with other opposition… 10,2 other opposition 30,9 representative Partisan meeting 10,5 Partisan meeting 8,8 Press conference 9,5

Foreign trip 9,5 Press conference 12,9

Meeting with foreign politicians 13,6 Foreign trip 4,4

Statement, application 6,6 Meeting with foreign politicians 8,0 Appeal 3,1 Statement, application 14,8 Public events 18,4

Policy implementation 15,2 Appeal 1,6

3. April – June 2013 4. January – March 2013

Meeting with electorate 45,0 Meeting with electorate 38,7

Round table, discussion with Round table, discussion with other opposition 67,1 other opposition 40,5 representative representative

Partisan meeting 7,2 Partisan meeting 7,0

Press conference 74,9 Press conference 21,0

Meeting with foreign Meeting with foreign politicians 18,2 politicians 4,1

Statement, application 21,7 Statement, application 26,8

Appeal 4,1 Appeal 1,4

10 The sum total exceeds 100%, as one article can mention several events.

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There is not much difference between the political forces depending on the proportion of communications related to offline activities. ‘Our House’ campaign fell behind the others, which was also typical of the previous quarter. The ‘People’s Referendum’ campaign displayed a lower level of offline activities than the Talaka alliance – 31% vs. 41%.

Chart 15. Media coverage of political forces’ activities

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

BPF Party 52% 48%

United Civil Party 48% 52%

Organising committee to create the Belarusian 58% 42% Christian Democracy party

Civil Campaign «Tell the Truth!» 51% 49%

«Young Front» 52% 48%

Movement «For Freedom» 53% 47%

Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Assembly) 64% 36%

Belarusian United Left Party «A Just World» 48% 52%

Liberal Democratic Party 41% 59%

Civil campaign «Our House» 29% 71%

Public Association «For Fair Elections» 41% 59%

Conservative Christian Party – BPF 64% 36%

Civil campaign «European Belarus» 56% 44%

«People’s Referendum» campaign 31% 69%

Civic Alliance Talaka for Just and Fair Elections for a 43% 57% Better Life

Connected with offline activity Not connected with offline activity

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4. Levels of political actors’ and forces’ activeness in the media

The distribution of political communications by the level of activeness did not undergo any essential change. There was a slight growth in the share of ‘proactive’ communications, while the proportion of ‘reactive’ ones went down a bit. The share of ‘passive’ communications remained at the same level – 39%, which was very god for a time span marked by a spike in the number of political communications. Dramatic upsurges in the number of political communications are usually caused by the media’s particular focus on some news-making events. In the analyzed time span, however, the growth resulted from political actors’ and forces’ active performance. Yet, throughout 2013 ‘passive’ communications were in the lead.

Chart 16. Levels of activeness in communications

1. October – December 2013 2. July – September 2013

Proactive Proactive 14% 14%

Passive Passive 39% 39%

Reactive Reactive 47% 47% 3. April – June 2013 4. January – March 2013

Proactive Proactive Passive 6% 15% 9% Passive 24%

Reactive Reactive 85% 61%

The BPF Party and the Young Front displayed a bit higher proportion of ‘passive’ communications than the overall figure. The Liberal Democratic Party, ‘Our House’ campaign and ‘A European Belarus’ showed the lowest levels of ‘proactive’ communications.

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Chart 17. Distribution of levels of activeness in political forces’ communications

0% 50% 100%

BPF Party 21% 32% 47%

United Civil Party 25% 50% 26% Organising committee to create the Belarusian 22% 45% 33% Christian Democracy party Civil Campaign «Tell the Truth!» 28% 43% 29%

«Young Front» 25% 30% 45%

Movement «For Freedom» 27% 52% 21%

Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Assembly) 31% 41% 28%

Belarusian United Left Party «A Just World» 22% 40% 37%

Liberal Democratic Party 10% 64% 26%

Civil campaign «Our House» 13% 63% 24%

Public Association «For Fair Elections» 39% 39% 22%

Conservative Christian Party – BPF 46% 19% 35%

Civil campaign «European Belarus» 6% 47% 46%

«People’s Referendum» campaign 26% 47% 26% Civic Alliance Talaka for Just and Fair Elections for 14% 29% 57% a Better Life

Proactive Reactive Passive

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Types of representation of political forces in the media

1. Profiles of political forces’ representatives The media profiles of political forces’ representatives hardly changed at all as compared to the third quarter of 2013. Like in the previous analyzed time span, the proportion of references to individual politicians without mentioning their affiliation was quite high. It made up 38%. It can be attributed to a considerable number of events where the politicians featured as individuals, such presentations of new books by Stanislaŭ Šuškievič, Uladzimir Niakliajeŭ and Anatoĺ Liabiedźka, Paval Sieviaryniec’s release and Zianon Paźniak finding himself in the focus of media attention in connection with the BPF Party’s jubilee. Moreover, the leaders of political forces that belong to coalitions were often referred to as coalition leaders, without mentioning their own political forces. The same trend had been characteristic of the previous quarter. The representatives of the BPF Party and the Liberal Democratic Party had the highest proportion of references mentioning their political affiliation. In the case of the BPF Party we can see that this strategy had a positive effect on its media presence.

On the other hand, an increase in the number of references to Uladzimir Niakliajeŭ as the leader of ‘Tell the Truth!’ campaign might have resulted in its higher quantitative index and prevented the fall in the rating.

Chart 18. Positioning of messengers

1. October – December 2013 2. July – September 2013

No No affiliation affiliation 38% Affiliated 35% with the Affiliated force with the 62% force 65%

3. April – June 2013 4. January – March 2013

No No affiliation affiliation 27% 28% Affiliated with the Affiliated force with the 72% force 73%

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Chart 19. Positioning of messengers for individual politicians

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Liabiedźka 74% 26% Niakliajeŭ 50% 50% Sieviaryniec 68% 32% Janukievič 93% 7% Daškievič 68% 32% Rymašeŭski 78% 22% Milinkievič 63% 37% Sańnikaŭ 62% Paźniak 46% 54% Dźmitryjeŭ 78% 22% Adamovič 100% Hubarevič 82% 18% Marholin 65% 35% Šuškievič Kaliakin 75% 25% Kastusioŭ 9% Daškievič (Palažanka) 34% 66% Karač 48% 52% Karniajenka 70% 30% Alieh Hajdukievič 98% 2% Chalip 5% 95% Vus 100% Vieštard 79% 21% Siarhiej Hajdukievič 89% 11%

Affiliated with the force No affiliation

In the last two analyzed periods the diversity of political forces’ representation had been growing, with the share of regional leaders increasing up to 4% and the proportion of rank-and-file activists from Minsk rising up to 3%. This was accompanied by a fall in the representation of top leaders from 45% to 34%. However, it could be attributed to a specific methodological detail, which puts the co-chairmen of the Belarusian Christian Democracy, including Paval Sieviaryniec, under the tag ‘one of the leaders/member of the Board’.

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Chart 20. Positions of political forces’ representatives

1. October – December 2013 2. July – September 2013

Not a Not a repre- Common repre- Leader Common sentative regional sentative 45% regional 26% member 29% member 3% 6% Leader 34% Regional Common leader member 1% from Common One of One of center member the the 5% from Regional leaders/ leaders/ center leader board board 0% 4% 25% 22%

3. April – June 2013 4. January – March 2013 Common Common member Common regional from Not a member Common member Not a center repre- from regional 0% repre- center member 2% sentative sentative 5% 2% 2% Regional Regional 4% leader leader 0% 2%

One of One of the the Leader leaders/ leaders/ 48% Leader board board 59% 36% 42%

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Chart 21. Positions of political forces’ representatives for each force

0% 50% 100%

BPF Party 66% 27% 3%

United Civil Party 55% 20% 10% 11%

Organising committee to create the Belarusian Christian 19% 61% 5%8%6% Democracy party

Civil Campaign «Tell the Truth!» 42% 33% 9%4%13%

«Young Front» 52% 26% 21%

Movement «For Freedom» 43% 42% 3%8%

Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Assembly) 19% 27% 31% 5% 18%

Belarusian United Left Party «A Just World» 75% 13%10%1%

Liberal Democratic Party 23% 76%

Civil campaign «Our House» 65% 2%11%7%15%

Public Association «For Fair Elections» 76% 24%

Conservative Christian Party – BPF 67% 25% 6%

Civil campaign «European Belarus» 38% 21% 31% 10%

«People’s Referendum» campaign 57% 31% 9%

Civic Alliance Talaka for Just and Fair Elections for a 100% Better Life

Leader One of the leaders/ board Regional leader Common member from center Common regional member

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Chart 22. Positions of political forces’ representatives by the resource

34% 27% Independent Belarusian online media 6% 26% 36% 20% Independent Belarusian press 2% 41% 35% 25% Partisan informational portals 5% 17% 54% 24% Facebook accounts of political forces 1% 4% 17% 12% 9% Facebook accounts of politicians 1% 78% Leader One of the leaders/ board Regional leader

Common member from center Common regional member Not a representative

A fall in female representation from 16% to 9% marked an essential change in the overall profile of the political actors. The reason is that women had traditionally spoken on behalf of the repressed politicians rather than presented the political forces’ strategic proposals or initiatives. As a rule, following the politicians’ release female voices are hardly ever heard.

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Chart 23. Representation by gender

1. October – December 2013 2. July – September 2013

Female Female 9% 16%

Male Male 91% 84% 3. April – June 2013 4. January – March 2013

Female Female 7% 16%

Male Male 84% 93%

The distribution of types of references remained unchanged. One-third of the references presented general reasoning and one-third featured the politicians as participants in events. Aliaksiej Janukievič and Juraś Hubarevič had the largest proportion of appearances as participants in events, as they had been present at Maydan in Kyiv.

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Chart 24. Types of references

1. October – December 2013 2. July – September 2013

Participant of the Participant of the events 31,7 44,2 events

Comment on the events 15,4 Comment on the events 5,9

Expert opinion 8,8 Expert opinion 10,7

General reasoning 33,6 General reasoning 31,8 New project, initiative 2,6 New project, initiative 2,7 New strategy 0,4 Just mentioned 4,8 Just mentioned 7,5

3. April – June 2013 4. January – March 2013

Participant of the 52,2 Participant of the events 32,4 events

Comment on the events 0,3 Comment on the events 10,0

Expert opinion 18,0 Expert opinion 11,5

General reasoning 26,8 General reasoning 32,7

New project, initiative 0,7 New project, initiative 5,3

Just mentioned 1,9 Just mentioned 8,1

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Chart 25. Distribution of types of references for individual politicians

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Liabiedźka 37% 25% 10% 23% 3%2% Niakliajeŭ 33% 9% 11% 29% 1% 17%

Sieviaryniec 34% 9% 6% 42% 4% 5%

Janukievič 52% 21% 9% 15% 3%1%

Daškievič 35% 11% 8% 31% 3% 13%

Rymašeŭski 36% 20% 8% 32% 1% Milinkievič 20% 14% 18% 36% 2% 10%

Sańnikaŭ 18% 8% 11% 41% 24%

Paźniak 18% 3% 18% 41% 2% 19%

Dźmitryjeŭ 27% 34% 21% 14% 4%1%

Adamovič 15% 43% 4% 35% 4%

Hubarevič 50% 24% 5% 14% 5%2%

Marholin 18% 11% 59% 7% 4%

Šuškievič 40% 16% 2% 19% 1% 22%

Kaliakin 36% 19% 15% 25% 3% Kastusioŭ 36% 25% 10% 19% 11%

Daškievič (Palažanka) 31% 26% 5% 29% 3% 6%

Karač 15% 16% 50% 5% 5%

Karniajenka 24% 11% 52% 2%

Alieh Hajdukievič 30% 19% 31% 6%2%

Chalip 5% 3%3% 68% 22%

Vus 20% 17% 40% 17%

Vieštard 26% 11% 16% 37% 11%

Siarhiej Hajdukievič 44% 6% 39% 11%

Participant of the events Comment on the events Expert opinion General reasoning

New project, initiative New strategy Just mentioned

2. Political forces’ profile

By the fourth quarter of 2013 the two political coalitions had already taken shape and begun working. Even though, the share of political forces’ representation as parts of coalitions dropped from 22% in the third quarter to 9.7% in October – December. However, the proportion of references to coalitions as such grew up to 6.3%.

It should be mentioned that in the fourth quarter the UCP was not mentioned as part of the Talaka alliance at all. (The same was true of the Movement ‘For Freedom’ as a member of the ‘People’s Referendum’ campaign.) The Talaka civic alliance was most commonly represented by the NGO ‘For Fair Elections’ (31%). The Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada was most often mentioned as part of the ‘People’s

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Referendum’ campaign. ‘Tell the Truth’ campaign and the BPF party were less often presented as members of the coalition (25% and 24%, respectively).

The share of positive evaluations of political actors was a bit higher than that of political forces. Positive evaluation of political forces most often appeared in communications through their own channels.

Chart 26. Types of political forces

1. October – December 2013 2. July – September 2013

Political party 53,1 Political party 53,5

Movement 30,9

Movement 46,3 Coalition 6,3

Party/ movement as Coalition 0,2 9,7 a part of coalition

3. April – June 2013 4. January – March 2013

Political party 53,5 Political party 60,0

Movement 46,3 Movement 40,0

Coalition 0,2 Coalition 0,5

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Chart 27. Types of political forces for each force

0% 50% 100%

BPF Party 76% 24%

United Civil Party 100%

Organising committee to create the Belarusian Christian Democracy party 100%

Civil Campaign «Tell the Truth!» 75% 25%

«Young Front» 100%

Movement «For Freedom» 100%

Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Assembly) 61% 39%

Belarusian United Left Party «A Just World» 78% 22%

Liberal Democratic Party 100%

Civil campaign «Our House» 100%

Public Association «For Fair Elections» 69% 31%

Conservative Christian Party – BPF 100%

Civil campaign «European Belarus» 100%

Political party Movement Coalition

Chart 28. Evaluation of politicians

Positive Negative 6% 1% Neutral 6%

No evaluation 87%

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Chart 29. Evaluation of political forces

Positive Negative 4% 3% Neutral 9%

No evaluation 84%

Chart 30. Evaluation of political forces by the source

Facebook accounts of politicians 7% 7% 24% 62%

Facebook accounts of political forces 10% 8% 7% 75%

Partisan informational portals 5% 3%12% 79%

National government press 100%

Independent Belarusian press 4%3% 13% 80%

Independent Belarusian online media 2%3%7% 88%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Positive Negative Neutral No evaluation

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Detailed findings

Chart 31.Topics

Referendum 15% Political prisoners 14% Events organized by the opposition 12% Political parties 12% Local elections 10% Society 9% History 8% Solidarity 8% Relations with supporters among politicians 8% General criticism of the government 8% Relations with the EU 7% Engaging the public 7% Rights and freedoms 7% EuroMaydan 6% One candidate for the presidential election 5% Detention 5% Coalition Talaka 5% Literature 5% Red-letter days 4% 2015 election 4% Dziady/Commemoration of victims of repression 4% Criticism of the government’s economic policies 4% EaP summit 4% Arrest 4% Rallies and strikes 3% Relations with Russia 3% Kurapaty 3% Presidential election 3% Electoral legislation 3% Local self-government 2% Public opinion 2% Electoral Code 2% Pressure on political prisoners 2% Sanctions 2% Release of political prisoners 2% Taxes 2% Conflicts in the opposition 2% Primaries 2%

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Chart 32.1. Accumulation of the total presence index for the ‘top-6’ individual politicians by the date

300

250

200

Sieviaryniec

150 Niakliajeŭ Liabiedźka

Daškievič 100 Janukievič

Rymašeŭski 50

Chart 32.2. Accumulation of the total presence index for individual politicians ranking 7th to 12th in the quantitative index rating by the date

160

140

120

100 Sańnikaŭ

80 Milinkievič Paźniak

60 Adamovič

Dźmitryjeŭ 40 Šuškievič

01.10.2013 04.10.2013 07.10.2013 10.10.2013 15.10.2013 18.10.2013 22.10.2013 25.10.2013 29.10.2013 01.11.2013 04.11.2013 07.11.2013 10.11.2013 13.11.2013 16.11.2013 19.11.2013 22.11.2013 25.11.2013 28.11.2013 01.12.2013 04.12.2013 07.12.2013 10.12.2013 13.12.2013 16.12.2013 19.12.2013 22.12.2013 25.12.2013 28.12.2013 31.12.2013

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Chart 33.1. Accumulation of the total presence index for the ‘top-8’ political forces by the date

600

BPF Party

Organising committee to 400 create the Belarusian Christian Democracy party United Civil Party

Civil Campaign «Tell the Truth!»

«Young Front» 200 Movement «For Freedom»

Civil campaign «European Belarus»

Conservative Christian Party – BPF 0

Chart 33.2. Accumulation of the total presence index for the political forces ranking 9th to 15th in the quantitative index rating by the date

200

«People’s Referendum» campaign

Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Assembly)

Liberal Democratic Party 100 Belarusian United Left Party «A Just World»

Public Association «For Fair Elections»

Civic Alliance Talaka for Just and Fair Elections for a Better Life Civil campaign «Our House»

01.10.2013 04.10.2013 07.10.2013 10.10.2013 14.10.2013 17.10.2013 20.10.2013 23.10.2013 26.10.2013 29.10.2013 01.11.2013 04.11.2013 07.11.2013 10.11.2013 13.11.2013 16.11.2013 19.11.2013 22.11.2013 25.11.2013 28.11.2013 01.12.2013 04.12.2013 07.12.2013 10.12.2013 13.12.2013 17.12.2013 20.12.2013 24.12.2013 27.12.2013 30.12.2013

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Appendix 2. Major trends of the political communications field in 2013

The following table describes major characteristics of the political communications field in 2013.

Major trends of the political communications field in 2013

2013 was characterized by the quite a lot of activity in the political communications field. There was not a single quarter with less than 3,000 references to political actors and forces. The numbers were 3,900 in January – March; 3,084 in April – June; 3,217 in July – September and in October – December the figure peaked at 5,988 references. However, judging by the topics of communications, the amount of attention to the political sphere depends on personal stories, related to waves of repression and release of repressed politicians rather than the stages of political and business cycle in the country.

Throughout 2013, Uladzimir Niakliajeŭ and Anatoĺ Liabiedźka competed for the top position in the quantitative index ratings. It was only in the fourth quarter that Paval Sieviaryniec took the lead.

Among the political forces ‘Tell the Truth!’ campaign consistently led in the ratings. Yet, in October – December the BPF Party, which had been steadily improving its standing, went to the top, while ‘Tell the Truth!’ campaign gave way to the Belarusian Christian Democracy and the United Civil Party.

The proportion of the political forces’ own communications must have reached its maximum and inevitably began to go down as the number of media references increased. On the whole it was the online media that accounted for the growth in the number of references, as they are free from such limitations as frequency and a fixed number of pages that are typical of the printed press. For this reason as the number of communications fell in the second and third quarters, the share of the press increased, but it dropped again in October – December.

During 2013 the distribution of topics became more balanced. Whereas in January – March over 75% of communications focused on society-related issues, from the second to the fourth quarters the most popular group of topics did not exceed a 50% threshold. Overall, society-related topics received most coverage, with the exception of the second quarter, when international relations went into the foreground. In general the distribution of levels of events did not undergo sufficient changes. Approximately half of communications were about events of national level. The other half was more or less evenly distributed between regional, personal and international events.

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The proportion of media coverage of offline activities was steadily growing, from a modest 16% in January to over 50% in June. By the end of the year, it had stabilized at 40% to 50%. Meanwhile, the share of ‘reactive’ communications had fallen: they made up 60% in the first quarter, peaked at 85% in the second but began going down in the third, to account for only 41% of communications at the end of 2013.

The profile of political forces’ representatives remained quite stable. The share of communications that mentioned the political actors’ affiliation fell from 72-73% in the first half of 2013 to 62-63% in the second. The reason was the huge amount of information about politicians as individuals, particularly Źmicier Daškievič’s and Paval Sieviaryniec’s release. Still, the roles in which the politicians appeared in communications remained unchanged. In about one-third of cases the politicians came up with some general reasoning and in one-third of references that were presented as participants in events.

Throughout 2013, the share of female voices among individual politicians fluctuated between 7% and 16%. The representation of political forces was becoming more diverse. In the first quarter references to their leaders made up 48%; in the second quarter the figure was 59% but in the fourth quarter it dropped to 34%.