1921 e SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. 1920U LEAGUE 0F NATIONS. r '
REGISTRY. Classement. Classement Document No. Dossier No. POLITICAL. X N o. • ' 1 1 . ! K J % . J 5 ' T
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A /y«X- ^ C a U & Z ^o> //& ^ -Za ^ J A & ' L USAGE DE CET EMPLACEMENT EST R em ettre ce document À- R em ettre ce document à— D ate. D ate. r é s e r v é a u R e g is t r y . (En premier lieu). (En second lieu). Réponses, &o. (Out Letter Book) :— /3 w i V ♦V. ^ 1 . 4 / 4 , t ' ^ / a * * 4 iA \rtzs W ' i ' U Document -kt , , Copies envoyées pour information précédent ‘ préalable â :— Index A. £- Index B. Sommaire. Imprimé. Distribution. Voir les dossiers :— Index G. y A classer. Document | XT suivant | * M lO 'i'l ^ Prière d’inscrire les commentaires sur la feuille blanche à l’intérieur. Voir, pour Distribution (éventuelle), la feuille bleue à l’intérieur. 260763—Wt. P. 1800/97 R .—26250—2-20—IV. A S. Ltd. (E.) [T.S.V.P.] COMMENTAIRES. MINUTES. (Page 1) 1 vo U-O-i-^-ol (jl ^ItUi. ^ 'trvU^'- VlA 'UZ Ij ct jOk.t-0^6 . Vua . l^-o^yvirv,. JL sLj j ^ ^ x / - , Ou fV,1^ l-^ ^ ^ ^ GU^, ^rtZUL^J , A^U^A \ftCoi*~. & )Cl<^0V4-^v,' TpuLl-x. ~fo ^X^o^SV ^ UWL tfcu^ LouvUZD €s?t(f&x* h \fcxj ' t t a . ? ^V«Wvft °- le document rédigé par Monsieur Narouchevitch est fort confus. Il a pour but d'exposer le point de vue du gouvernement de Kov- no dans la question de Yilna. En outre, h Voccasion du voeu qu* il exprime de voir la neutralité de la Lithuanie reconnue par les Puissances, il touche à la question de la politique à a- dopter par l ’Europe vis-à-vis de la Russie, puisqu'il propose d'inviter le gouvernement des Soviets à une conférence inter nationale où serait débattue la neutralité de la Lithuanie et affirme qu’un accord entre l'Europe et la Russie serait le seul moyen d ’établir une paix durable dans l ’Europe Occidentale. Il est impossible de ne pas observer qu’il est étrange que le gouvernement de Kovno, alors qu'il s'abstient de four nir au Conseil de la Société des Nations la réponse qu’il lui a demandée, expose longuement au gouvernement britannique sa politique sur les points qu’il a acceptés de soumettre à la Société des Hâtions. 2°~ Monsieur Narouchevitch estime que la Russie n ’acceptera jamais que Yilna et Grodno deviennent polonais. Il considère au con traire qu’elle pourrait accepter que ces villes devinssent li thuaniennes. Cette affirmation n ’est pas démontrée et elle est assez surprenante. A juger d'après les renseignements que nous possédons, il semble que les Soviets ne sont prêts justement à faire des concessions \ la Lithuanie que parcequ'ils se trouvent en lutte avec la Pologne. 3°- Monsieur Harouchevitch insiste sur 1 ’attitude prise par les Soviets en ce qui concerne le règlement du sort de Yilna. Ce qu’il en dit ne modifie pas 1'impression que nous avons reti rée des documents que nous avons eus entre les mains. Les pro testations du gouvernement des Soviets portent principalement contre la présence de Zeligowski et non pas contre un règlement du sort de Yilna par un accord entre la Pologne et la Lithuanie. C'est contre Zeligowski que le gouvernement des Soviets offre à la Lithuanie son appui• Le mémoire de M. Harouchevitch semble indiquer que lui-même a 1'impression que les Soviets cherchent avant tout à conserver des prétextes pour pouvoir éventuellement repren dre la lutte et pénétrer soit en Pologne soit en Lithuanie, et tpie la décision qu'ils prendront dépendra moins de la façon dont le traité du 12 juillet aura été exécuté que des forces qu'ils se sentiront et des circonstances intérieures ou exté- •#» rieures qui régleront leur politique. 4°- II. ITarouchevitch affirme qu'il est nécessaire de reviser la décision du Conseil prise h Bruxelles le 28 octobre. Cette nécessité résulte: a) de ce que la décision a été prise sans tenir compte du danger russe (voir paragraphe précédent); bj de ce que la résolution est en elle-même inapplicable. Sur ce point, le mémoire est un peu hésitant; il affirme quelque part qu'en raison de l'ignorance de la population, on peut se demander si un plébiscite serait un moyen acceptable de régler l'attribution de ces territoires. M. Harouehevitch parait fon der les droits de la Lithuanie sur des raisons toutes autres que le voeu des populations, peut-être sur des considérations d ’ordre historique. Mais le mémoire développe surtout longuement Vidée que le plébiscite ne pourra être régulier que si les deux états sont placés dans des conditions d'égalité parfaite. Il signale les avantages que tire la propagande polonaise du fait que les Polonais auraient administré la région de Vilna sous l'occupa tion allemande, qu'ils continueraient h en être maitres sous le régime de Zeligowski; il en conclut qu'il est indispensable d'accorder au gouvernement lithuanien un long délai pour sa propagande, qu'il faut d'ailleurs laisser le temps aux émigrés de rentrer dans le pays, d'établir des listes électorales d'ou les étrangers soient exclus;yênfin, il montre la nécessi té de mettre fin à l'autorité de Zeligowski et de disperser ses troupes. Sur ce point, un grand nombre des remarques contenues dans le mémoire ont leur prix, en particulier les observations relatives à Zeligowski. Mais le Conseil est loin d'avoir perdu de vue cet ordre de considérations, et s ’il est prêt à exami ner les suggestions du gouvernement de Kovno, il ne peut ad mettre que celui-ci se considère en droit de définir les con ditions auxquelles le plébiscite lui paraîtrait acceptable. £Î enfin, la décision du Conseil de Bruxelles doit être revi sée parcequ’une autre solution peut être envisagée qui aurait des chances d'établir une entente plus durable entre les deux gouvernements intéressés. M. ITarouchevitch songe \ un accord entre le gouvernement lithuanien et le gouvernement polonais qui serait le résultat des négociations directes actuellement engagées à Varsovie. Dans la mesure où il précise les vues du gouvernement de Kovno, il semble que le programme qu'il skjpec- à Varsovie est le suivant : retour h la décision du Conseil du 20 septembre, et reconnaissance par la Pologne de la neu tralité du territoire lithuanien tel qu'il a été défini par le traité du 12 juillet avec les Soviets. Jouant sur les mots M# Narouchevitch passe de cet engagement, pris par la Polo gne en septembre de respecter au cours de la guerre qui sévit entre la Pologne et le gouvernement des Soviets la neutralité de ces territoires, à l'idée d'une reconnaissance par les Puissances de la neutralité de l^flj^Hkanie; ce sont là deux idées entièrement distinct^. Pour^J^ler le statut de neu tralité de la Lithuanie, M. Narouchevitch propose la réunion d'une convention internationale où il demande que les Soviets soient représentés. P'P A. Le Gouvernement de Kovno n Ta encore / adressé au Conseil de la Société des îîations aucune réponse à la demande qui lui a été présentée le 20 Décembre. Il n'est pas admissible que, négligeant de répondre au Conseil, il sTadresse au Gouvernement britannique pour lui exposer son point de vue sur la question de 'filna et les difficultés qu’ il éprouve à remplir les obligations prises envers le Conseil de la Société des listions. B. Comme nous l’avons déjà signalé antérieurement, il serait extrêmement impolitique d*accepter que le Gouvernement lithuanien se chargeât d'exposer le point de vue des Soviets. Quelle que soit la réalité du danger d'une intervention russe, tout- ce que le Gouvernement lithuanien (À OL pourra j t i d ire /restera nécessairement suspect. le Gouverne ent lithuanien désire actuellement éviter ou retarder 1 Texécution de la consultation populaire. i Il est conduit par là à utilisez/le s arguments favorables et ne peut manquer de pousser les choses au nôir en ce qui concerne les intentions des Soviets. Nous n'avons naturellement pas le droit de soupçonner que 1 * attitude des Susses soit le résultat d*un accord avec le Gouvernement de Kovno* Nous considérons comme des calomnies les renseignements qui nous sont parvenus et qui pourraient faire penser à un . accord de ce genre (Golosrosii 12 Janvier). Mais il est certain que si quelque chose pouvait donner à ces r uneurs une apparence de fondement;, ce serait ie fait que üarouchevitch, qui négocia avec la Russie le traité lithuanien du 12 Juillet, se permette de prévoir l ’effet qu’ aura sur le Gouvernement des Soviets la réponse du Prince Sapieha (page 3 de son rapport) o u 1 ÛV*.1 ,JL WtvuUk)'»-*- 1 yijJtikKSJifls se f a ir e l'intermédiaire du Gouvernement des Soviets en demandant que la Russie prenne part à une conférence intern a tioiiale où serait discutée la neutra lité de la Lithuanie. C. S ’il est impossible au Conseil de s ’en remettre au Gouvernement lithuanien pour juger de la gravité du danger russe, ce danger n ’en reste pas moins extrê mement préoccupant. Il semble que le Conseil puisse prendre deux partis : 1°- ou bien, comme il l ’a fait jusqu’ici, ignorer le oint de vue russe»* ne pas se mêler aux discussions ouvertes entre les soviets d’une part, la Lithuanie et la Pologne de l'autre; et, en définitive, rendre une décision qui ne réglera pas la question au point de vue russe et ne sera jamais opposable à la Russie. 2°- ou bien, envisager dès maintenant de mêler la Russie à ces pourparlers. Cette solution qui n’aurait certainement pas été acceptée par une partie des membres du Conseil lors de la dernière session, n ’est peut-être plus aussi comulè- tement impossible à escompter actuellement et il y aurait peutetre utilité à se renseigner prudemment sur l’accueil qui lui serait fait à Paris et à Londres. Il serait bon : 1°- décrire à LI. Balfour, en lui demandant s'il n Testime pas qu'il serait utile que le Foreign Office répondît au Gouvernement lithuanien sur un ton sévère, en lui exposant les points A et B; E°- d'envoyer une copie dû rapport de M. ITarouchevitch à m. Bourgeois et au Colonel Chardigny et d'attendre, pour le distribuer aux autres membres du Conseil, de connaître la réponse de I I . Balfour; 3°- de faire i&6 démarche<,officieuse£ suggérée^ dans C. lljI p V 1* I M M . le 1 Janvier 19»! 'don after Colonel, Je rone envoie, à titre confidentiel, I p traduction d»un lérolre de . ïîaro icbevitch, tr ne le îu Forcit» Ofl ice par l e I gntlon lithuanienne et qui m*a été oomnoniqué p'r • Bnlfour* U* Snroacbevlteh e s t V a n des négoei tears du Traité ài 1 Jail et entre l a L ith u a n ie et les soviets. jfs i pensé que cet exposé du point de vue lithuanien pourrait votas servir à suivre et à interpré ter les négociations qui se potrsu ivent à Varsovie, iieeevo 2 , ion Cher Colonel, 1 * s e o r mco de mes meilleure eentl icnts* (S&nad) Eric Drummond iÂoàsieur le Colonel CH ;:n. ic n ï, aux soins de la Léc&tlon de France, T t it S O m . CSESV*. le El Janvier 191 tw i*nlot~to ,a*em a»!* sircv e| 4e» 8 t n s r i i •ToniEusxe m u » ; a/of tirp Je(,e?a. eX wale oM ,«ii a a or ai (i»t>vsi aeJUi£?eV .nol#«Tè5iaaoo t m d sm &b itw m ii1! ,Mo Slaèif « onsleur la -«iré aident, ’înommuiQ oi i2 ( b e n ;:> 5) J»al l'hcrom r 4« voue trananettre la tra- .1 I ductlor 4 je y oi a o n v o le e n fin un e x tr r .lt du " °^°® l t z s iïru tz i? ? nient doa Soviets, I l nedble que oce d iv e rs In d ic e s , de r & * v r fü ^ y g ^îiiî^éealî? 6 ^ Idu Conseil do prendra, alt nea de se «îlcî^aue^'toîoncl C f r ^ a l t été iuet^ont chnrgé de lu i remettre untul Xvm tW * . . Jn ce q u i ooroome U nouvelle p^nic «œ . le -0O1OB ..OBBll” . J 'a i ê tr e adresser à ce propos une m te ~ h la «ép.->tlon I X •x /Jtvoet X.i el Lithuanienne à Paria et ge r o m transmets, ci-jo int, un projet que roue pourree examiner* Veuille s Bfrtler, Je votie rie, o sieur le Président, 1* assurance de ma haut oo sldém tlon. toeôlaà* ■ (Stfned) Eric Drummond - -ti &î ait ^esrarr-OYt auov <5 'coermed 1 r jt.cs• 5, \ b t m r 'V' 0 Secrétaire Séné m l • •• î l .W ti yj :.?■■■ -, : -,r. • m âB « le ee 0D •» W '-.i» tH Ital M i § -y'.-r jm, J • eti i,)ù $ ne lp*t la»' ‘zaq t-iffcîla£r .... i jl*eè»t èermèn tm le • •* w m l » «rftii-o . ,r0- 1 . ,, . el oxrç enq etuoR eu et .XleamS «f> loimrtrr , tlltii-b *î ettlœte 5 6 ixo.tfqeoèï leasreo» 4 eniod ee e eolüO rr 4 .,ne~ •a n i i • • rïdo aotf $1 «... e6 axt/e#3lo : " ^ iJ0<î f1T ùi> f:' ’;r: -to»*°* • ^ Btel »éïl a ’XXI-*6 1 : ; : 'iJ v . ;/ 00 fl* »**« 1 . 8 Bit b ea efe nelX tie x XI* ; n ta 1 .raeeez l i l x e e f t t ï t l t f a 1 - a tnceeretuvt t»tè il i >rojet da Lettre, Monsieur le iniatre, lion attention a été attirée sur une nouvelle parue dans le "Golos Bonsii" du 12 Janvier, dont vous trouverez copie ci-jo in te. Je suie naturellement très loin d’ajouter foi à cette nouvelle* Toutefois, du moment qu’elle a été publiée, je croie qu’il serait utile que le Gouver nement lithuanien voulût bien la démentir officiellem ent. foulez-voue, je voua rie , transmettre à votre Gouverne ant l'e x tra it du "Oolos Roseil", qui a u r i i t 1*1 lui échapper et vois assurer *11 ri*eat pas d'avis qu’un démenti e’im ose* Veuillez afTe er, >r,eieur le inietro, l 1 ar.iiurance de a très haute c 8id rati n. ionBieur le Chargé d1 Affaires do Lithuanie à Paris, légation de Lithuanie, Avenue lé ber, PViŒE. Qenera. r 19th J&wuyry, 1921. Èfy dear Jerry, I enoloee < letter for itir. Balfour, which I should to glad if you would read &ed then peso on. X vm§ a little .uzsled bee^uee the itegaal■ aomps wnt mémorandum to Mr. Balfour. 1 présuma the explanation Is that there were two oodles, one for Aim and one fo r m , «ni that the two got confused. Ill you let ee know whether the Foreign Off lee hfcie “B; ofcjeotion to N.* s zsestomndisa being sent o t t la ta lly te fell «f mbers of the Oouneil. in tills ofc-se It would olearly hnee to go to the Polish üowemænt. Tours e w r , j - » v . pi Iv ■ > - J 5<^h. kkciu-l” ' »• S. Sploer,f Esq., f ve»e O.B. 9 Offloes of the Cabinet, S.W.I. Mÿ dear Mr* Btilfour, m m m * reo«l»n . M > « * * « • * - » — — üdursaeed to frcnt Monsieur 3f«mM*T»lultra, 110,1 M a«, 0. O. Forolgn IM . »* ->tlr*1? ,l,n **" HH»b-Llthu-nian difficulties. . * . w - ««—— ^ W tori* th. «-M». — “ ,0U B1™ » .«wont». th. cm .il. HI. m m * «—«- . oratoln. M M — • « ‘ m * * * •* °— “ bWa‘ - thou«h oortoin edditlonti nooono " • *lwn f"T°"r °f tW •ol loy I» pro « ■• • • I think th a t th . l-r— o t L i w n tsn B ttito d . 1* > » to tie foot that wMn tie? aooepWd, “ «•» 4U *“ hout t» ..ooonoiHatlon of too oouooU «hot o leMoolto ibould to t o n in th. di.p.Wd orooo, th.;> to» fairl:, oon,1MoO ttot ,™» « -lohiooito «Old go in thoir f-wor. m , ». r n u m «hot «• »«it 1. iix.1, » to „» th., tboMtoro «1* » «•* «"* 61 theUr “ 1 "* t u r * * g 1= 0 0 0 T, IM M to fine Pi— *» »— * 80 doing. l*o *6 -tod. I» Uthot nUn » p » » n t.tl.. ot B „ .» l, « « . o grow B i.tti», from Mo ﻓ ‘ »f ,1,e‘ 111 accepting O loMooito without aUwluUlj in.iotin* oo a oenOltion that t«o sollgoo*i for» tiw ld bo i— dlotol» 1u1mM o l th. non-natl» ooldl.r. -»tlr. fra. th. *»W *^ territory. Hoooror, ho ltd «» • “ «* “ oh • Uthu.nl», orroro In ylUfi* «- <*«•* ” “ on• ** a t ^ t Honble JU JU B&lfeur, Oette, 4e O&rlton Qeràens, S.l.I. the mémorandum ares» 1) The continued presence of ZeligO R *!'* troops, I ttsve already dealt Incident ally with thle in the preceding sentence, but I may add that the League Ooomleslon ie doing e ll In Its power to hasten the disbandment of the se troope, and tl* Polish Government have given a formal plCuge to help# Shis being so, I believe that we shell be ib l* to ewrore the dieeppeerenoe of the Sellgomski army, at any rate before the beginning of the ftebieolte* 2) The Interest shewn by the ovlete in the fate of the territories* > 1 1 the informâtion which reaches as seems to show that ths Lithuanian Government are working In olose accord with the soviet Government* ▲ report in a Kussian paper stated recently that the Lithuanian Government had addressed a direct request to the voviete for the concentration of o ussian force against 2ellgowtid. Whsthe this Is true or false, the attitude of Monsieur Henrues v M n ric étrange, as he apparently at’«tee him as If the Interpreter of the feelinge of the £ ovlet iiovernment, and even asks that that Government should take part In en Internat ionel Conference to discuss Lithuanian Neutrality* It may well be, and as you know I havs often bro-ohed the eubjeet to you personally, that the only solution of &11 these Be.ltlc problems is an International Conference, In which iussia takes part* As fer ea I can Juige, however. It seeme to me unlikely that^tbe -ovemments mainly concerned w ill agree at present to eny such proposal* If this ie so, It Is uwleee to pro s for it , whatever one's own personal opinion on the subject may be, and It would, I feel sure, be a mistake to deal with the question piecemeal* I do not know whethç You have bee kept fu lly informed of I the la t e s t bap enings in the d ie u te * Owiwç to the fa c t th a t negeoiatlone are carried on mainly in Paris, it is somewhat d i f f i c u l t d ifficu lt for us to keep In as alow touch ee we should wish. I enclose, however, » short memorandum, from which yeu w ill see that the ïrluwrlr&to in arle are sags» sting that the Lithuanians should te given a time lim it, In which to reply to the note £*»vlously sent to the* by the decision of the Council, asking them whether they intended to fu lfill the obligations ttey haws undertake®* Cherdigny is to he given dieoretion as to the time when this note should he presented» strong pare enure is also being brought to tear on tte Polish side, with regard te Zeligowskl. I hope, therefor^, that tte Foreign ffioe w ill not be tempted NiflUvv^t-cL*i/fctJL to engage in any freSh négociations w ith Monsieur Itessuaaefcotus op tte Lithuanian Government. I do not, of course, thinx that this is likely, bat 1 feel sure that it is what tte Lithuanians would desire, in order to give them aB excuse for non-fulfilment of their «qpgsmente towards the League. , [V, & I am sending a copy of Monsieur Mearuaevioius’ s memoranda* to Colonel Chardigny and the three rapporteurs in paris for their confidential information, but I shtil not circulate it officially to the Members of the Council unless, and u n til, Bpicer, to who* I s* writing, tells ms that there is no objection. flu I was delighted to tear fro* *thr telegra® hloh I received e x c e lle n t from Spicer that there was a*krospeot of your coming here in February. It is far better news than I dareu to anticipate. Yours very sincerely, — 1 0 • \ » 4 I Ivf UvA—S tfVi » D U-oK^-f YvvvivA- , m (fM roio/zn/es^ p. » — f/ i # L o u ^ lu jd V f 1 0 3 1 4 t > v IVith the compliments of the Under-Secretary of State r 4 W for Foreign Affairs} c-rv h ^1 A ? ^A< Foreign Office, y /? jcx-'vv^. 8— P.O.P. 5000 4 I 20 (27431) i ? -ï s ï ■ •> OFFICES OF THE CABINET 38/D/19 ^ ^-fcghax! gardens s.w'i. 4 11th January, 1921 The Secretary to the Cabinet presents his compliments to the Secretary-General to the League of Nations and begs to transmit herewith .copies of a letter and Memorandum from Mr T. Narouchevitch regarding the Polish Lithuanian dispute . The Secretary-General League of Nations Hotel National Geneva 1C (N 5010/27 2 /5 5 ) LITHUANIAN LEGATION 175/2E . 10, Palace Gate Kensington, London, W.8 29th December, 1920 S ir : - I have the honour to transmit to you h e re w ith the enclosed l e t t e r and Memorandum from Mr. T. Narouchevitch who has "been delegated by my Government on a special mission to this country. I am, etc., (Signed) H.Rabinovitch Acting Charge d’Affaires J.D.Gregory Esq., H.M.Foreign Office Whitehall, S.W.l 174/2E LITHUANIAN LEGATION, 10, Palace Gate, Kensington, London, W.8. 29th December, 1920. S ir : - I sun delegated by my Government to present to you an exposition of the facts attending the present Polish- Lithuanian conflict, in order to assist, if possible, in its just and peaceful solution. For this purpose, therefore, I have prepared the Memorandum a ttac h e d h e re w ith . Should the suggestions contained therein commend themselves to the consideration of His Majesty’ s Government and should His Majesty’ s Government require any further information on any particular points, I shall be only too glad to give my assistance in the matter. I am, etc., (Signed) F.Narouchevitch. J.D.Gregory Esq., Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W.l Copy. (#5010/272/55 ). 1031 4 EEKOBAHDUk OS THE PRESENT POLISH-LITHUANIAN CONFLICT. Russia's Attitude In Regard To The Future Of Vilna and Grodno. ISEKORAEDUE CM THE PRESET P Û LIS H -LITHUAInIAiî CONFLICT. Russia’s Attitude In Regard To The Future Of Vilna and Grodno. The d isp u te between L ith u a n ia and Poland concerns not only these two countries but also affects other States lying beyond their boundaries. The interests of Russia are not, in fact, less affected than those of Poland because the controversy is mainly concerned with the question of who shall govern the provinces of Vilna and Grodno, which, ethnographically, are not Polish. The aim of Poland is to subjugate these territo ries, talcing advantage of her temporarily favourable political and m ilitary situation. Hone of the Russian political parties w ill ever consent to the annexation by Poland of the above mentioned districts. To unite Vilna and Grodno with Poland would undoubtedly result in a war between the latter and Russia. Russia can only assent to the government of Vilna and Grodno by Lithuania, as ethno graphic ally these territoriès are Lithuanian, not Polish. The question of the future government of Vilna. and Grodno never came up for discussion between the Poles and the Russians in the Duma as it was unanimously agreed that the Poles had no right to claim them. The quarrel between the Russians and Poles at that time centred principally on Liublin and Cholm and matters concerning religious tolerance in other Russian provinces. The Intervention of the Soviet Government in Deciding the future of Vilna. Although in the preliminary Peace Treaty with the Poles Poles at Riga the Soviet Government consented in the matter of the corridor and the boundary line, yet this agreement was only a temporary one. Having lost the m ilitary campaign, the Russians were compelled "by sheer force to accept the conditions laid down by the Poles; nevertheless they never gave up hope that, with the improvement of their m ilitary situation, there would come the settlement of the question of boundary with Poland on a more just basis which would correspond with the ethnographical and economic interests of both countries. At the present moment, therefore, now that the Russian m ilitary situation has decidedly improved since the defeat of Wrangel, it is very unlikely that Russia w ill wholely agree to the conditions of the Riga Preliminary Peace Treaty and leave the question regarding the boundary line as they are at present set forth therein. On December 4th 1920 Axelrod, the representative of the Russian Soviet Government in Lithuania, definite ly stated that Russia seriously intends to observe the conditions of the Peace Treaty with Lithuania signed on July 12th and the interpretation of the Polish-Russian Preliminary Peace Treaty (recorded by the Polish Representative Askenazy on October 26th at the eighth sitting of the Council of the League of Nations) called forth a protest from the Russian side." By issuing the above statement of December 4th, the Soviet Government conveyed to Lithuania the idea that she is also under an obligation to observe the Peace Treaty of July 12th. Russia demands that Lithuania should adhere strictly to the terms of the Peace Treaty, this requirement being necessary to the Soviet Government in order that, on this ground, she could have legitimate cause to invade L ith u a n ia Lithuania in the event of Russia making war with Poland and thus justifying her action, not only in the eyes of Russia but also before the Democracies of the World. Russia^ Protest* against Zeligowski's Army» Further, with the same object in view, the Soviet Government, in accordance with Par» 4 of the Lithuanian Peace Treaty of July 12th, declared that she w ill consider the sending of the League of Nations’ Troops to Vilna as a hostile act towards Russia and a violation of the said Treaty. The Soviet Government lays especial emphasis on the violation of the Treaty by the fact of the presence of Zeligowski's troops and their cooperation with Balachovich*s, Savinkov’s and other fctrees hostile towards the present Russian Government. In spite of the declaration which Obolensky made to the Polish Government in October, the Soviet Government, through its spokesman Joffe, found it again necessary in December to repeat the warning, especially concerning Zeligowski. The Menace of the Soviet Government's Threats to Lithuania. It is very doubtful whether the Russian Government w ill be satisfied with Sapieha’s answer to their Note, The Soviet Government considers it very important to have a legitimate excuse for aggressive action which could be put before the masses and used in such a way as to e n lis t t h e ir sym pathies. Having first justified themselves in the eyes of their own masses and the democracies of the world, the S o viet Soviet Government w ill have paved its way for further action. There are persistent rumours that next Spring, Russia contemplates an attack on Poland; In order to guard against the reoccurrence of the catastrophe of the last campaign against Poland, the Russians are preparing to occupy Lithuania and probably the other Baltic States, thus ensuring the safety of the right wing of their army. The Russians, as a whole, have no hostile feeling towards the Lithuanian nation, the Soviet Government therefore hes to have recourse to explaining to their own people that their occupation of Lithuania is due to the actions of the Lithuanians in failing to fu lfil their Treaties. How worthy of acceptance is such an explanation by the Soviet Government, can be seen by the news concerning the concentration of the Russian force* in the vicinity of Smolensk and especially near Molodechno, (in the direction of Vilna). On the other hand, Russia might adopt another scheme; namely that of posing as the true champion of smaller nations in contradietinction to the League of Nations, which had been impotent in preventing, up to the present time, Zeligowski devastating the country and terrorising the inhabi tants. Evidence of this can be seen in the Note of Axelrod to the Lithuanian Government dated December 12th, which concludes as follows "In the struggle against the adventure of Zeligowski, as in every attempt to crush the independence of small nations, the Russians Socialist Federative Soviet Republic w ill always be a faithful ally". Taking Taking advantage, therefore, of the presence of Zeligowski in Lithuania, Russia, according to confidential reports, is also planning a coup de main led by a Communist Mickievicz. Inis coup is organised among those Lithuanians who during the war, were exiled from Lithuania into Russia and are now returning to their country, as organised m ilitary forces with the object of freeing it from the yoke of Zeligowski. The presence of Zeligowski's troops in Lithuania, therefore, furnishes a good excuse fo r the B o lsh eviks to begin a new war in Eastern Europe. In view of the above facts, the anxiety of Lithuania for her future w ill be well understood. On the occasion of the last occupation of Vilna by the Bolsheviks, Lithuania, in accordance with the terms of the Peace Treaty had legitimate reasons to demand the evacu atio n o f the c it y ; i f , however, the Soviet Government should again occupy it in the coming year, the Lithuanian capital might remain in the hands of the Bolsheviks for ever, because the Lithuanian Government would be confronted with the very difficult task of finding legitimate reasons for driving them out. Lithuania is receiving assistance from nowhere and nobody w ill defend her against the Bolsheviks. She must therefore adhere strictly to the terms of the Peace Treaty. The Necessity of the Revision of the Decision of The League of Nations made in B ru ssels October 2 8 th . 1920. Whereas the decision of the League of Nations (Brussels 28th October 1920) has been made without taking into consideration the above mentioned facts, which which were not realised at that time, it seems therefore, necessary to modify that decision and thus to avert fresh calamities. This revision is all the more necessary because it is doubtful whether the Brussels decision can be applied to the disputed territory at the present time. It is hoped that there can be arrived at a more practical solution of the dispute and one which w ill give mutual satisfaction to a ll parties concerned. As the situation is at present, it is more important to ensure protection of the above mentioned territories from new perils of war than to appease one or other of the contending Parties. Since the outbreak of the war, Vilna has been occupied by five different invading forces. The prestige and the aims of the League of Hâtions demand th a t the P o lis h -L ith u a n ia n q u estio n should be solved in the most just and satisfactory manner possible. Taking full cognisance of this, the President of the League of Nations, M. Leon Bourgeois in his letter of November 9th to the Representative of Lithuania says:- H...... m ais il (Conseil) l ’entreprend avec l ’espoir d’aboutir, a' une solution qui prepare entre les deux pays intéresses une bonne entente durable et une collaboration féconde." Poles and Lithuanians to be Placed on Equal Footing During Plebiscite. In order to arrive at a satisfactory solution, it is necessary that both countries should be placed on an equal footing in every respect. To this end the following conditions are necessary:- (l) That both parties should be accorded sufficient time to place their respective sides to the local population. In this connection it is necessary to explain more f u l l y fully the inequality of the present status of Poland and Lithuania in the disputed territories. As is well known, Russia especially persecuted Lithuania in order to Russianise her as soon as p o s s ib le . The old Government of Russia prohibited the printing of Lithuanian books and newspapers, and even for using the Lithuanian prayer book our people were exiled to Siberia. The Poles took advantage of this situation and very energetically carried out their propaganda of Polanisation. The Polish clergy, profiting by the extremely religious nature of the people, tried to persuade them that everything Polish was pleasing to God and everything which was L ith u a n ia n was h e a th e n is h . Thus P o la n is a tio n was intimately associated with religion. Even at the present time if one asks a peasant of the Eastern provinces to what nationality he belongs, he w ill answer • 'Catholic* and what is Catholic is the same as P o lis h . The prohibition of printing in Lithuanian resulted as follows: the people living in the Western part of the country were able secretly to import books, periodicals etc., written in the Lithuanian language, therefore as regards culture and general knowledge of national affairs, the Western section of the community are highly advanced. In this respect they have had a great advantage of the inhabitants of the Eastern side, who were unable to do likewise and were thus kept in comparative ignorance regarding the general and political situation. Poland is accordingly trying to take every advantage of this state of affairs in Eastern Lithuania and is demanding that a plebiscite shall be taken at the earliest moment, hoping that t h e ir their temporary influence on the local population may prove stronger than the Lithuanian influence and so bring ahout a settlement of the dispute in their favour. Since under such circumstances many inhabitants of the Government of Vilna had no opportunity to learn to read and write and up to the present day the Lithuanian priest, intelligenzia, and the Lithuanian press are not admitted to the people, because, after the German oocupation, the Poles ruled the districts of Vilna under the pretext of the war with the Bolsheviks, and, with the assistance of Zeligowski, they are ruling it also at this moment and most severely persecuting everything which is Lithuanian and terrorising our social educationists and priests; therefore the Lithuanians, when they received the news that the League of Nations intended in the near future to hold a plebiscite in the country, naturally became very anxious and some of them doubted whether insufficiently informed, the League of Nations , making a hasty plebiscite, might not be helping one of the disputed parties to the disadvantage and injury of the \ other. So to avoid the wrong solution of the question, the Lithuanian Government is asking for a longer period in order that they may adequately and fully explain to the people in the disputed territory the j question at issue. Further as the masses in the \ province of Vilna are not as politically advanced and developed as those in Western Europe, the question arises whether, generally speaking, in such a country such a question as ’to which state to belong* can be solved by plebiscite. However, if the means is to be a a plebiscite then it is absolutely indispensable that each of the parties concerned shall have a longer and equal time to explain to the people the situation. The L ith u a n ia n s have not demanded a p le b is c it e in their own country. It is a proposal of the League in accordance with the demand of the Poles. If the j Lithuanians have agreed to it, they have done so with the object of coming to some understanding with Poland; but by no means have they consented to accept a plebiscite on unequal conditions. (2) That both sides (Lithuania and Poland) shall enjoy an equal international status i.e . that Lithuania also has to be recognised Powers, because even at the present time the Poles are already conducting their propaganda against Lithuania submitting the question in such a way to the people as to make it appear whether they desire to join Poland, which is recognised by a ll states or the "Bolsheviks11, which latter term is being used by the Poles instead of •Lithuania", which is not recognised de jure and not admitted to the League of Nations. In other words, the propaganda of Poland is briefly " If you do not vote for Poland you vote for Bolshevik Government." (3) On account of the fact that the Eastern part of Lithuania has been occupied many times by different foreign forces, there are at the present time in great numbers a ll kinds of social flotsam and jetsam, foreign elements of a very low order, and different secret and open organisations, whose interests are antagonistic to the interests of the local population. Hundreds of thousands of native inhabitants, exiled during the war into Russia, have not yet returned home; others fled from from their homes "before the advance of Zeligowski. It is only just that a sufficient time and opportunity should be allowed for these people to return to their homes. All these facts make it imperative that lists of the people who are entitled to vote should be drawn up so that the influence of the foreign elements be eliminated and the native population be assured of and protected in the free expression of their w ill. (4) That all agencies terrorising the local population must be eliminated and firs t and foremost a ll the troops of Zeligowski, which are composed of great numbers of a ll kinds of adventurers produced by the war period. In connection with this M. Hymans, acting President of the Council of the League of Hâtions, said in B ru s s e ls :...... "In a note addressed to M. Paderewski to be forwarded to his Government, and in a communication for the press, M. Leon Bourgeois in the name of our Council, has already protested strongly against any act which constitutes a violation of agreement entered into with the League of Nations. This Polish Government declares that it is not responsible for the state of affairs. It has repudiated Zeligowski and has declared that he has acted as a rebel. We duly noted this declaration and we realised all the difficulties of the situation." Finally, according to the resolution proposed by the League of Hâtions to both sides, the Council of the League recognised the following: "The Council of the League of Hâtions desiring above a ll to re-establish peace "between the L ith u a n ia n and P o lis h peoples and having duly noted the solemn declaration by which the Polish Government has disclaimed responsibility for the action of General Zeligowski and has declared him a r e b e l...... rebel formally Invites "both Parties to accept etc." M.M.I. Paderewski and S. Askenazy in their note on November 18th to the Secretary General give the following statement of the proposition concerning Zeligowski. "The most d iffic u lt question concerns the demobilisation of the troops of General Zeligowski. The Polish Government cannot take upon itself the responsibility of carrying out this task by force. It would seem, however, that the best solution of this problem would be transformation of these troops into local m ilitia." So it is obvious: (a) The League of Nations has officially admitted that Poland has violated the agreement entered into with the League of Nations. (b) The Polish Government has declared that Zeligowski has acted as a r e b e l. (c) M. Leon Bourgaois in the name of a Council of the League of Nations has already protested against an act which constitutes a violation of agreement etc. In spite of this, Zeligowski, who has already been in Lithuania three tfconths, is constantly receiving assistance from Poland in soldiers, ammunition and food and is looting the local population, throwing bombs on peaceful inhabitants, enforcing compulsory mobilisations among the local inhabitants and farcing them to fight against their brothers. The League of Nations and the Great Powers have been unable to compel P oland, a member o f the League o f Nations to withdraw the troops of Zeligowski, saying that they have no adequate force to drive him out. The Poles, of course, are very pleased with it and are even proposing "to transform these troops into local m ilitia ." What What sort of plebiscite can there he held with the presence of a strong m ilitary organisation which does not recognise any obligations and is acting according to its own will? Who w ill risk expressing his free and independent opinion in the presence of such a terror as that which reigns there? Finally, who can prevent any other rebellious adventurer punishing the local population if the results of the plebiscite do not favo u r him? The m ilitary adventure of Zeligowski presents a bad example which is always contagious especially if it is an example which goes unpunished. It is obvious that so long as right and justice are not assured there can be no just and fair plebiscite under such conditions, for example, the Jews would not be able to participate in the plebiscite for fear of pogroms in Lithuania and Poland. The Lithuanians can never have thought about such a plebiscite and w ill certainly never agree to it if the necessary guarantees are not given to ensure a fair and unconstrained exercise of this means of record ing their wishes. The Zeligowski army is the poison or canker of the country and has to be first of all eliminated. Its presence in Lithuania only plays into the hands of the Bolsheviki who are rejoicing at the confusion and chaos which Zeligowski is creating and at the proper moment, as has been pointed out above they w ill take advantage of it. Anybody of an impartial mind w ill see from the above statement that the Brussels proposition for solving the Lithuanlan-Polish question is not only very difficult to apply for the realisation of the solution, but in the circumstances is a very dangerous experiment for both sides. The International Recognition of the Neutrality of Lithuania Presents the Possibility of the Establishment, of p Common Front with Poland against the Bolsheviks. While the dispute is waged about the manner of the plebiscite and the allotment of territory etc., the Soviet forces on one or other pretext w ill prepare as above point ed out the way to invade the disputed area. Therefore it is necessary to find some other way to settle this ques tion; a method "by which a ll would Toe satisfied. The best way to solve the controversy would be the following : Whereas : (1) The League of Nations has not admitted Lithuania into its membership and thus placed Lithuania in an unequal posi tion with Poland on the question relating to the plebiscite; (2) The other agencies do not furnish at the present time a prospect of enforcing the plebiscite properly- as for instance, the difficulty for making out thé lists of names of those entitled to vote (many refugees not yet having returned from Russia); the necessity to eliminate the foreign elements remaining from numerous occupations etc. (3) The intrusion and intervention of Russia into the Lithuanian-Poland conflict concerning the plebiscite and the presence of the troops of Zeligowski give them right to consider these facts as violation of the agreements and thus furnish them to invade again Lithuania; therefore, in view of all these facts, the truest solution of the situation would be to stand by the old decision of the League of Nations in Paris on Sept. 21st until the results of the conflict between Russia and Poland are manifested. The decision of the League of Nations on Sept.21st reads as fo llo w s : (l) The Lithuanian Government adopts as a provisional line of demarcation, reserving all its territorial rights and awaiting the result of its direct negotiations with Poland, the frontier fixed by the Supreme Council of the Allies in its declaration of the 8th of December, 1919 and and undertakes to withdraw its troops from the territory to the west of that line. (2) The Government of Poland undertakes, reserving a ll its territorial rights, to respect during the war between Poland and the Government of the Soviets, the neutrality of the territory occupied by Lithuania to the East of line of demarcation above specified, provided that respect for this neutrality be also secured from the Soviet authorities by Lithuania. The recognition of the neutrality of Lithuania would be an advantage to a ll Parties, Lithuania, Poland and also the League of Nations. First of all, by respecting the neutrality of Lithuania Russia would be deprived of a legitimate excuse for intervention in the dispute between Poland and Lithuania and for advancing into Lithuania and thus rousing through Lithuania a new conflagration in Europe. Russia has repeatedly expressed her consent to res p ec t th e L ith u a n ia n n e u t r a lit y as is shown in the following instances: 1. Paragraph 5 in the Treaty of Lithuania with Russia reads as follows: "In the event of recognition of the neutrality of Lithuania, Russia on her own behalf undertakes to respect this neutrality and to participate in the guarantees for the preservation of her neutrality". 2. Besides this, on the 12th of July 1920 the Russian Peace Delegation consented to respect the neutrality of Lithuania on condition that Russia would be invited to an international conference at which the question of the Lithuanian neutrality would be discussed. 3. When in Paris on October 21st the League of Nations brought forth the above mentioned decision concerning the observation observation of our neutrality by Russia, and Chicherin, who was asked "by the Lithuanian Government concerning this point, immediately consented to it if the Poles on the other hand, would do the same. Since Lithuania on her own behalf long ago declared her neutrality and the League of Nations recommended the same to Poland, it now only remains for the Polish Government to agree to it. In this case, Lithuania would consent to defend her neutrality with arms if Russia tried to invade Lithuania for the purpose of rendering the defeat of Poland easier. Such an understanding of Lithuania with Poland against Russia would be legitimate and is easily acceptable to Lithuania. The Russians would have no legitimate pretext for attacking her for this. On the other hand if Lithuania came to some understanding with Poland - say a m ilitary convention - Russia would be dissatisfied and would at once eeek for a pretext for attacking Lithuania. If the Russians attacked Lithuania recognised as a neutral state they would violate their Peace Treaty with her and thus be deprived of the sympathy of the world's democracy and their own masses, as serious consideration for them since the Bolsheviki, after all, care very much for the opinion of the world’s democracies. In the above case if the Russians should plan to invade Poland through Lithuania, they would be obliged to smash not only the resistance of the Lithuanian regular army but also the powerful resistence of the whole of the inhabitants, especially with regard to men from 18 to 45 years of age, because with the object of defence Lithuania is giving compulsory m ilitary training to to a ll able bodied men of the above mentioned ages. Their number is approximately 200,000. Thus Poland would enlist the weighty support of Lithuania in her struggle against the Bolshevik. International recognition of the neutrality of Lithuania followed by certain obligations would create on the other hand a corridor between Russia and Germany, which is desired by the Allies. And the Allies would thus be really able to control the communication between Russia and Germany through Lithuania. Since the Soviet Government, recognising the neutrality of Lithuania states one condition, namely, her invitation to the international conference which w ill discuss the question of Lithuanian neutrality, then the raising of this question at this moment could furnish to the Allies a good opportunity to compel Russia to participate in this conference and to settle together, perhaps, more justly the Ruseian-Polish dispute and thus arrive at a common understanding and peace and prevent a fre s h c a la m ity in Europe o f which symptoms b egin to a p p ear, The acceptance of this proposal entirely depends on the political sense of those men who are managing at the moment the affairs of the Polish State. This proposal is a sincere effort to help the two neighbouring nations, Lithuanian and Polish, both of which have suffered so m uch from the frightfulness of war and wish to enjoy peace at all costs.