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Home , Alexander of Hales, Augustine of Hippo, Bonaventure, John Scotus Eriugena, On the Trinity, Richard of Saint Victor

Lydia Schumacher The Halensis and Augustine

Abstract: Augustine of is, without adoubt,the authority that the Summa Ha- lensis invokes most frequently. This has led the editors of the Summa and many other scholars subsequentlytoconclude thatthis text and the earlyFranciscan tradition more generallyislittle but an effort to systematize the tradition of Augustine that had prevailed for most of the earlier . In turn, that assumption has led to atendency to downplaythe significance of earlyFranciscan thought and to its ne- glect in scholarship. This chapter highlight some significant ways in which the Summa departs from Augustine in the process of innovation. In the first of three case studies, Iwill show how the Summa employs amethodology, in fact,scholastic methodology, which invokes invoking authorities likeAugustine with aview to ad- vancingits own opinionswhich are not necessarilyfound in Augustine himself. In two further studies, Iwill examine how the Summa departs from Augustine on two of its most fundamental theological concerning the of as one and as Triune.

Augustine of Hippo is, withoutadoubt,the authority thatthe Summa Halensis in- vokes most frequently.¹ Accordingtoits Prolegomena,this multi-volume Franciscan text which was initiallyoverseenbyAlexander of Hales cites over 100 works by Au- gustine, some spurious but most of them genuine. In total, it contains 4,814explicit and 1,372implicit quotations to Augustine, which amounts to more than one quarter of the texts cited in the bodyofthe Summa.² Although the Prolegomena acknowledge that ‘the whole Western Christian tradi- tion was nourished by his [Augustine’s] writingsuntil the introduction of ’,it describes the Summa Halensis as particularlysignificant in this regardfor one main , namely, ‘that bothits theologyand philosophycollatethe tradition of Augus- tine, and are ordained to its defense’,inaworld whereAristotle’srecentlyrediscov- ered works wererapidlyrising in popularity.For this reason, the Prolegomena con-

 See Victorin Doucet, ‘Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros IetII“Summae Fratris Alexan- dri”,’ in Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum ,vol. 4(Quarac- chi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948), lxxxviii: ‘Patres Latini’;cf. Jacques-GuyBougerol, ‘The Fathers and auctoritates in Scholastic to ,’ in TheReception of the in the West,ed. Irena Backus(Leiden: Brill, 1996), 289–335, esp. 301. Formoreinfor- mation on the relationship between Alexander’sworks and the Summa,see Victorin Doucet, ‘ANew Source of the Summa fratris Alexandri,’ Franciscan Studies 6(1946): 403–17;Victorin Doucet, ‘The of the Problemofthe Authenticity of the Summa,’ Franciscan Studies 7(1947): 26–41;Victorin Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa (Continued),’ Franciscan Stud- ies 7(1947): 274–312.  Doucet, ‘Prolegomena,’ lxxxviii.

OpenAccess. ©2020 Lydia Schumacher,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685022-005 34 Lydia Schumacher

cludes,the Summa ‘is universallyand rightlyseen as the foundation of the Augusti- nian-Franciscan school in the 13th century’.³ Forthe authors of the Summa,its editors assumed, there was consequentlylittle major between the Augustinian and Franciscan schools otherthan that the latter was more systematicallyand comprehensively expressed. Thus, one of the first modernmedievalists, Franz Ehrle, defined the Franciscan school as ‘neo-Augustini- an’ in away that influenced manysubsequent scholars, to the present day.⁴ By most accounts, this schoolofthought is one that Alexander’sprizestudent Bonaventure articulated in its mature form.⁵ Moreover,itisthe school of thought from which later like John eventuallydeparted in favour of following the new Aristotelian—and modern—intellectual trends.⁶ Although prevalent and longstanding, scholarlyassumptions about the Augusti- nian character of earlyFranciscan thought have not been subjectedtothe test of sus- tained research, in part because this tradition of thought has been dismissed from the start as amere attempt to bolster an Augustiniantradition whose authority sup- posedlybegan to diminish in the of earlyFranciscans themselves. In the proc- ess of researching the work of their school, however,significant emerge to re-think theirrelationship to Augustine. Someofthese reasons pertain to the meth- odologythey employed in developing their arguments, which, on closer examina- tion, complicateastraightforward of quotations to Augustine as indicators

 Doucet, ‘Prolegomena,’ lxxxviii.  Franz Ehrle, Grundsätzliches zurCharakteristik der neueren und neuesten Scholastik (Freiburgim Breisgau: Herder,1918). BernardVogtfollowedEhrle’sreading in an importantarticle, ‘Der Ursprung und die Entwicklungder Franziskanerschule,’ Franziskanische Studien 9(1922).Étienne Gilson argues that Aquinas critiqued aFranciscan rendering of Augustine in his landmark article, ‘Pourquoi Thomas acritique saint Augustin,’ Archivesd’histoiredoctrinale et littéraireduMoyen Age 1(1926–7): 5–127. More recent scholars whohavesupported the Augustinian reading of earlyFranciscans in- cludethe following: A.-M. Hamelin, L’écolefranciscaine de ses debuts jusqu’àl’occamisma,Analecta mediaevalia Namurcensia, 12 (Louvain: Nauwelaerts,1961); Leone Veuthy, ScuolaFrancescana:filo- sofia, teologia,spiritualia (: Miscellanea Francescana, 1996): LeonardoSileo, ‘Iprimi maestri francescani di Parigi ediOxford,’ in Storia della teologianel Medioevo,ed. G. D’Onofrio (Casale Mon- ferrato:Piemme,1996), 645–97.  Étienne Gilson, ThePhilosophy of St Bonaventure (: Sheed and Ward, 1938); Joshua Ben- son, ‘Augustine and Bonaventure,’ in TheT&T ClarkCompanion to Modern Theology,ed. C.C. Peck- nold and Tarmo Toom (: T&T Clark, 2013). Bonaventurenames as his ‘mas- terand father’ and claims to add nothingnew to what he learned from his teacher in Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae operaomnia,10vols (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), 2:1–3.  Olivier Boulnois, Être et representation: Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne àl’époquede Duns Scot (Paris:PressesUniversitaires de , 1999); Hans Blumenberg, TheLegitimacyofthe Modern Age (Cambridge,MA: MITPress, 1985): Ludger Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens: Die for- male Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (DunsScotus,Suárez, Wolff,Kant, Peirce) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,1990); Allen Gilles- pie, TheologicalOrigins of Modernity (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 2008). The SummaHalensis and Augustine 35

of exactallegiancetohis opinions. Other reasons concern certain key theological concepts they developed, which clearlydiverge from Augustine’sown views. Although Icannot discuss all the methodological or conceptual movesthe Sum- mists make thatcall for the reconsideration of their relationship to Augustine, Iwill present threecase studies, which collectively provide abasis for doing so in the many cases where they use Augustine. The first will illuminatetheir methodologyinways that requireustothink more critically about the meaning they attribute to quotations from Augustine.⁷ The second and third will assess the doctrines they endorse con- cerningthe one God and the , which represent two clear cases—and arguably the most central aspects of earlyFranciscan theology—in which they depart from Au- gustine in obvious ways.

The Summa’sMethodology

The period in which Alexander and his colleagues worked was one in which the scholastic method, as high medievalscholars came to employ it in the 13th century particularly, was onlybeginning to develop. As manyreaders will be aware, this method required scholars to marshalauthoritiesfor and against acertain position before developing their own opinion about it,alsoinconversation with authorities. Although it was the common methodfor advancingbothwritten and oral arguments in the , the wayinwhich the scholastic method was deployed— and how to interpret its uses of authoritative sources—has rarelybeen the subject of extensive research, especiallyfor the earlyperiod in question. This maybebecause scholars of medieval thoughthavesimplytended to assume that scholastic thinkers quoted authorities in much the same waythat scholars do so today, thatis, in the effort accuratelytopresent and interpret their views. As we have seen, this assumption has led scholars to conclude that earlyFranciscans operated in aprimarilyAugustinian cast of mind. Although modernscholars have admittedlyrec- ognizedother influences and nuances as relevant in the case of different thinkers, they have drawnasimilar about earlier figures like Anselm and Hugh of St Victor,bothofwhom have been called an alter Augustinus, and even Peter Lom- bard, around half of whose Sentencesare quotations to Augustine.⁸ What the ‘Augustinian’ readingofsuch thinkers neglects to appreciate is the ex- tent to which every scholar at this was constrained on some level to position themselveswith reference to the key representative of the Western Christian tradi-

 Formoreonthis see Lydia Schumacher, ‘The EarlyFranciscanDoctrineofthe of God: Between Augustine’sAuthority and Innovation,’ TheMedieval Journal 6(2016): 1–28.  See the entries on these thinkers in TheOxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine,3 vols, ed. Karla Pollman et al. (: OxfordUniversity Press,2013); Jacques-Guy Bougerol, ‘The Church Fathers and the of ,’ in TheReception of the Church Fathers in the West,ed. IrenaBackus(Leiden: Brill, 1996), 113–64. 36 Lydia Schumacher

tion, namely,Augustine, not to mention other authorities. Furthermore, such areduc- tive or ‘face ’ reading of medieval texts overlooks the unique ways in which dif- ferent figures manipulated Augustine and other authorities in unique ways that ren- dered them distinctive thinkers in their own right,rather than mere perpetrators of a monolithic past tradition. While it would be impossibleinthis context to untangle the manywaysinwhich different thinkers developed different ‘Augustines’,Iwill endeavour in the casestudy that follows to offer awindow into the sophisticated and even unusual waythat early Franciscan thinkers like Alexander invoked Augustine’sauthority.Tothis end, Ihave selected asection from the Summa Halensis on the nature of human knowledge of God, in which Augustine is heralded as the main authority.⁹ After analysingthis text,itwillbeclear that it offers far more than astraightforward re-iteration of anyAugustinian theory.Indeed, it enlists Augustine in supportingaproject he never envisaged or attempted, namely,the development of adistinctly Franciscan understanding of what it means to know God.

The of the KnowledgeofGod in the Summa Halensis

The article on the cognition of God ‘on the way’ (De cognitione Dei in via)orinthe present life in the Summa Halensis starts by inquiring whether God is knowable by the human or mind (I.1). In this connection, the Summa enumeratessome rea- sons whyone might arguethatGod is not knowable by the human soul. Quoting Au- gustine’s De videndo Deo (‘On Seeing God’; Epistula 147.8.20), it statesthat:

“God is by natureinvisible, not onlythe Father,but also the Trinity itself, one God.” But this is what it is for him to be visible, namely, to be knowable. Forasitissaid in the same book (Epis- tula 147. 2.7): “There is adifference between seeingand believing, because present things are seen, while things believed areabsent.However,weunderstand present things here as those things which are present to the senses of the soul or the body(…).” However every knowable thingisvisible to the senses of the soul or body; as therefore God is invisible, therefore he is also incognizable.¹⁰

The second reason cited also makes referencetoAugustine’s Epistula 147.15.37:

 Christopher M. Cullen, ‘Alexander of Hales,’ in ACompanion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages,ed. JorgeJ.E. Gracia and TimothyB.Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 104–9.  Alexander of Hales, Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica, 4vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48). All mine. SH I, TrInt,Q2, M1,C1 (n. 8), arg. 1, p. 15: ‘“Invisibilis est natura Deus,non tantum Pater,sed et ipsa Trinitas,unus Deus”; sed hoc est ei esse visibilem, quod cognoscibilem. Sicut enim dicitur in eodem libro: “Hoc distat inter videreetcredere, quia praesentia videntur,creduntur absentia. Praesentia autemhoc loco intelligi- mus quae praestosunt sensibus sive animi sive corporis (…).” Omne autemcognoscibile est visibile sensibus animi velcorporis;cum ergo Deus sit invisibilis,ergo et incognoscibilis.’ The SummaHalensis and Augustine 37

“No one has ever seen nor will be able to see God, because God inhabits light inaccessible” (1 Tim. 6:16), and as invisible things arebynature also incorruptible, and as that which is now in- corruptible does not later become corruptible, so not onlynow but also always,God is invisi- ble.¹¹

The third reason citesJohn of Damascus’ De fide orthodoxa 1.4: ‘“God is infinite and incomprehensible”,but all that is known by the soul is understood by the intellect; thereforeGod is not knowable.’¹² Similarly, the author states his own opinion in giv- ing the fourth reason:

Every cognition of the infinite, inasmuch as it is in this same mode, is infinite, because if it were finite, it would not measureuptothe infinite. As thereforethe divine substance is infinite,itis not known unless by an infinitecognition; but afinitepowercannot have an infinitecognition, because an infiniteact cannot be achieved by afinitepower; as thereforeevery power of the rational soul is finite, it cannot attain to that action which is the cognition of the substance of the infiniteGod.¹³

After enumerating avariety of reasons whyGod is not knowable, the Summist moves into the contra section of his article, presentingopinionsonthe other side of the ar- gument,intypical scholastic fashion. The first mentioned is that of Augustine, who writes in his Soliloquies 1.8.15: ‘the earth is visible and light is visible, but the earth cannot be seen unless it is brightened by light.Similarly, the mark of the disciplines or sciences is that they cannot be understood, unless they are illumined by their own sun, namelyGod.’¹⁴ Another reason is givenasfollows:

as the power of the affective reason is ordered towards lovingthe , so the powerofthe cog- nitive reason is aimed at knowingtruth. If therefore the highestgood is desirable on the part of the affective reason,thereforealso the highesttruth is knowable by the cognitive reason.¹⁵

 SH I, TrInt,Q2, M1,C1(n. 8), arg. 2, p. 15: ‘“Deum nemo vidit unquam nec viderepoterit,quoniam lucem habitatinaccessibilem” [1 Tim. 6:16], et est natura invisibilis sicut et incorruptibilis,etsicut nunc incorruptibilis nec posteacorruptibilis,ita non solumnunc, sed et semper invisibilis.’  SH I, TrInt,Q2, M1,C1(n. 8), arg. 3, p. 15: ‘“Infinitus est Deus et incomprehensibilis”;sed omne quod cognoscitur animo, comprehenditur intellectu; Deus ergo non est cognoscibilis.’  SH I, TrInt,Q2, M1,C1(n. 8), arg. 4, p. 15: ‘Omnis cognitio infiniti, in quantumhuiusmodi, est in- finita, quia si esset finita, non transiretsuper infinitum. Cumergosubstantiadivina sit infinita, non cognoscetur nisi cognitione infinita; sed cognitio infinita non potest esse apotentia finita, quia actio infinita non egreditur apotentia finita; cum ergo omnis potentia rationalis animae sit finita, non egredietur ab ipsa actio quae sit cognitio substantiae Dei infinitae.’  SH I, TrInt,Q2, M1,C1(n. 8), Contra a, p. 15: ‘“Nam terravisibilis est et lux, sed , nisi luce illustrata, videri non potest; similiter disciplinarumspectamina videri non possunt,nisi aliquo velut suo sole illustrentur”,videlicet Deo.’  SH I, TrInt,Q2, M1,C1(n. 8), Contra c, p. 15: ‘Sicut affectivae rationalis est ad amandum bonum, sic virtus cognitivae rationalis ad cognoscendumverum. Si ergo summumbonum est appe- tibile ab affectiva rationali, ergo et summum verum cognoscibile acognitiva rationali.’ 38 Lydia Schumacher

In the attempt to resolve the dilemma described aboveinhis own response (respon- deo)section of the article, the Summist quotes Augustine’s Epistula 147.15.37: ‘if you inquire whether God can be known, Irespond: he can. If youinquire how Iknow this, Irespond: because in the most true Scriptures, it is read: “blessed are the pure of heart,because they will see God” (Mt.5:8).’¹⁶ In classic scholasticfashion,the Summist then proceeds to respond in the light of the abovetothe initial objections raised to this conclusion.Hereagain, he cites Augustine (Epistula 147.15.37):

“If youinquirebywhatmode God is said to be invisible, and if he can be seen, Irespond, he is invisible by nature; however he can be seen, when and as he wills.” From this, the following distinction is clear:that God is invisible by nature,but visible according to his will. According to this therefore the followingdistinctionmust be drawn, namely, between what is visible by necessity and what is visible by will. Thingsvisible by necessity arecorporeal and sensible. Things visible by the will arespiritual,such as they areinthe mode of the and God him- self. And this is whatAugustine says in the same book (Epistula 147.6.18), claimingthe authority of (…): “sensible things arenot seen similarlytoGod, whose natureitisnot to be seen, but to be seen by the will; for if he does not will, he is not seen; if he wills, he is seen. ForGod appeared to , because he willed; and he did not appear to others,because he did not will.”¹⁷

The response to the second argument by Augustine alsocites Augustine’s Epistula 147. 20.48back at itself:

“As invisible thingsare incorruptible by nature”,soitmust be said according to Augustine (…) that “bodies customarilyspeakingare called visible; for this reason,God is called invisible lest he be believed to be abody. However,hedoes not cheat the pureofheart of his substance by , as this highest rewardispromised to those whodiligentlyseek God.”¹⁸

The author concludes this section by summarizing this point in afurther quotation from Augustine’s De Trinitate 14.8.11: ‘the imageofGod is in thatwhich is capable of

 SH I, TrInt,Q2, M1,C1(n. 8), Respondeo, p. 16: ‘Si quaeris utrum possit Deus videri, respondeo: potest.Siquaeris unde hoc sciam, respondeo:quia in veracissima Scriptura legitur [Matt.5:8]: “Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt.”’  SH I, TrInt,Q2, M1,C1(n. 8), Ad obiecta 1, p. 16: ‘“Si quaeris quomodo dictus sit invisibilis Deus,si videri potest,respondeo:invisibilem esse natura, videri autem potest,cum vult et sicut vult.” Ex quo patet distinctio:quod Deus est invisibilis natura, visibilis vero voluntate. Secundum hoc ergo distin- guendum: quod est visibile necessitateetest visibile voluntate.Visibilia necessitatesunt corporalia et sensibilia;visibilia vero voluntate sunt spiritualia, quemadmodum angeli et ipse Deus.Ethoc est quod dicit Augustinus,ineodem libro, sumens auctoritatem Ambrosii (…): “Non similiter sensibilia videntur et is, cuius naturae est non videri, voluntatis videri, nam si non vult,non videtur;sivult, videtur.Apperuit enim Deus Abrahae, quia voluit; aliis,qui noluit,non apparuit.”’  SH I, TrInt,Q2, M1,C1(n. 8), Ad obiecta 2, p. 16: ‘“sic est natura invisibilis sicut incorruptibili”, dicendum secundum Augustinum (…): “Corpora consuetudine loquendivisibilia nominatur;propter- ea Deus invisibilis dicitur ne corpus esse credatur,non quia munda corda suae substantiae contem- platione fraudavit,cum haec summa mercesDeum diligentibus promittatur (…).”’ The Summa Halensis and Augustine 39

him and is able to be aparticipant or sharer in his :the capability is through cognition, the participation through .’¹⁹ In afurther section, the Summa proceeds to consider how God is known (II.4), invoking adistinction drawnfrom the pseudo-Augustinian De anima et spiritu 13,be- tween superiorand inferior parts of reason: ‘The superiorpart is ordered towards the contemplation of God and eternal things, and the inferior part is for the contempla- tion of creaturesand temporal things.’²⁰ According to the Summa,the innate knowl- edge of God and by implication all creaturelyortemporalthings, as creatures of God, is innatelyimplanted in the human mind. Although it is impossible to know God by inferior reason alone, the Summa al- lows, God can be known through creatures when inferior reason is informed by su- perior reason. Furthermore,hemay be known in himself through reflection upon the innate knowledge of him that can be found preciselythere. If the mind fails to access this knowledge,whether of God himself or of creatures, the Summa further contends, it is because of astubborn will, which becomes preoccupied with the objectsofin- ferior reason and therebybecomes ignorant of the knowledge of God implantedin reason. By repentingbefore God of this , and thus through the softening of the will out of lovefor God, however,the mind regains access to the knowledge that is always there. Although Ihaveonlyprovided asmall glimpse into the content of the Summa’s treatise on the knowledge of God above, the section Ihavediscussed conveys the ex- tent to which Augustine, or pseudo-Augustine, whose works Franciscan authorsat this time regarded as authentic,was treated as authoritative on this topic. The trea- tise as awhole contains atotalof70quotations from Augustine; 34 of these are to Augustine’s Epistula 147,which is by far the most-cited text in the section overall, with Scripture alone registering as anear rival; 31 further references are to works like De libero arbitrio,DeGenesi ad litteram, De vera religione, De Trinitate, and So- liloquia, although some are drawndirectlyfrom the Glossa Ordinaria, astandard ed- ition of the VulgateBible, which was widelyreferenced in the 13th century and con- tained manycomments by Church Fathers and other Christian sources in the margins. There are five additional references to pseudo-Augustinian works,such as De spi- ritu et anima. The quotations from authorities other than Augustine are less numer- ous, and often refertothe exactsame passage. Thus, ’ Consolation of Philos- ophy 4.4iscited five times, ’ De fide orthodoxa 1.4, three times, and excerpts from Ambrose’sExposition on the of Luke 1:24–27,four times. Al- though the Summa as awhole does not always relyasheavilyonAugustine as in

 SH I, TrInt,Q2, M1,C1(n. 8), Ad obiecta 5, p. 16: ‘Imago Dei est in hoc quod capax eius et perticeps esse potest: capax per cognitionem,particeps per amorem.’  SH I, TrInt,Q2, M2,C4(n. 17), Respondeo, p. 28: ‘Superior pars est ad contemplandum Deum et aeterna, inferior ad contemplandas creaturas et temporalia. Ad superiorem pertinet sapientia, ad in- feriorem scientia.’ 40 Lydia Schumacher

this section, and selects other sources relevant to the different topics it considers,I have alreadynoted that atendencytoengageextensively with Augustine on most topics was not uncommon, even when other authorities wereinvolved.²¹ In this con- nection, what is perhaps most striking about the text examined aboveconcerns the waythat one and the same authority,namely,Augustine, is invoked to represent op- posing sides of an argument,toarticulate their resolution, and to supplyrepliesto objections initiallydrawn from the work of Augustine himself.²² What this suggests, Iwould submit,isthat the primary concern of the Summists, to saynothing of scholasticauthors in this period more generally, was not necessarily to interpret authoritative quotations accuratelyorevenconsistently, as modern scholars steepedinhistorical-critical methodsmight endeavour to do. Rather,the aim was evidentlytoisolate ‘ texts’ which presented ideas the Summa itself wishedtobolster or oppose, withoutmuchregard for the question of how to interpret the quotations in context.²³ As mentioned already, the reason particularauthorities, aboveall, Augustine wereoften quoted had much to do with the traditions of thought they were perceivedtorepresent. Since Augustine presumably championed the Western understandingofknowl- edge of God, it is not surprising that Franciscans looked primarilytohim in develop- ing their own tradition of thought on this ; werethey writing on or soteri- ology, they might have turned instead to Boethius or Anselm, respectively. The authority of Augustine was all the more pertinent on this topic in light of the Con- demnation of 1241, which addressed agrowingtendency of Latinthinkers,working under the influenceofnew Greek patristic sources, to denythe cherished Augustini- an affirmation of an ultimate, direct vision of God. To invoke Augustine more than anyone in treating the specific matter of knowledge of God wastosituate the early Franciscan school on the right side of the condemnation. By invoking an authority likeAugustine in this context,however,the Summists to saynothing of scholastics did not operate in an entirelyservile manner with ref- erencetopast authorities. Rather,they sought to lend legitimacy to their own ideas, which, on closerexamination, emerge as quiteunique and innovative in their time. In the case of their views of knowledge not least of God, these ideas bear astriking resemblancetothoseofthe Arab scholarAvicenna, who was particularlyinfluential

 In the Summa Halensis,there are4,814 explicit and 1,372implicit references to Augustine; this amounts to morethan one quarter of the textscitedinthe bodyofthe Summa,accordingtoBougerol, ‘The Church Fathers and Auctoritates,’ 301.  Forother examples of the same phenomenon, as wellasthe medieval practiceofattributing views to authorities that they did not hold, see Marcia L. Colish, , Fiction and ForceinMedieval Baptismal Debates (Washington,DC: The University of America Press, 2014).  Support for this contention can be found in Eric Saak, ‘Augustine and his Late Medieval Appro- priations (1200 –1500),’ in TheOxfordGuide to the Historical Reception of Augustine,1:39 – 50.See also Bougerol, ‘The Church Fathers and auctoritates,’ 334, which statesthat scholars at this time used authorities however they chose. The SummaHalensis and Augustine 41

at the time the Summa was being written.²⁴ To take one example thatisrelevant here, the Summa’srendering of the distinction between higher and lower reason and the that goes along with it,brieflydescribed above, was originallyaprod- uct of .²⁵ AccordingtoAvicenna, higher reason, or the theoretical face of the soul is turned upwards toward the realmofuniversal forms, while the practical face is turned downwards.Ituses the universals acquired by the theoretical faculty to deal with matters pertaining to bodilylife. Forthis purpose,the higher reason is innately im- pressed with certain transcendental concepts, aboveall, that of Being—or God— which presupposes true understanding of all . Rather thanproviding the con- tent of knowledge of thosebeings, however,the innate concept of Being regulates the mind’seffortstorender of them intelligible, thus ensuring that correct ideas about them are formed. This is preciselythe account of knowledge that the Summa references in the question on the knowledge of God and develops further in other treatises, including its treatise on the rationalsoul, which is discussed in the other chapter Ihavecontributed to this volume. The lesson of this analysis is at least two-fold. First,the erratic and contradictory ways in which earlyFranciscans used Augustine suggest thatthey were more con- cerned with buildingtheirown case thanAugustine’sregardingthe nature of knowl- edge of God, although Augustine was keytoestablishing the legitimacy of their en- deavours. Secondly, when it came to constructingtheir viewpoints, they projected onto Augustine views thatwerenot necessarilyhis own, even views derivedfrom an Arab thinker thatweredeemed expedient in terms of elaborating their ownvision. In this and other respects,they did not hesitate to manipulate Augustine’swords in ways that betray arelative disregard for his authorial intent.

 DagN.Hasse, Avicenna’sDeanima in the West (London: The WarburgInstitute, 2000), 63. In this work, Hasse explains in considerable detail how adiverse rangeofauthors from this period, in- cludingAlexander of Hales and the authors of the Summa,employed Avicenna in their own ways.See Avicenna, Avicenna’sPsychology,ed. and trans. Fazlur Rahman(Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1952).This is atranslation of Avicenna’sabridgement of his original treatise,which appeared in his comprehensive philosophical , for which see Avicenna Latinus,Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus I-III,ed. Simone van Riet (Leuven: Peeters,1972).Onother affinities between earlyFranciscan thoughtand that of Avicenna, see Gilson, ‘Pourquoi saint Thomas acritiqué saint Augustin,’ 5–127; Étienne Gilson, ‘Lessources Greco-arabes de l’augustinisme avicennisant,’ Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraireduMoyen Age 4(1929): 5–107; Étienne Gilson, ‘Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle,’ in Étienne Gilson, HistoryofChristian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Lon- don: Sheed and Ward,1955), 327–31. AlthoughÉtienne Gilson noticed manyaffinities between Avi- cenna and Augustine some time ago, he believed that most of the continuities between earlyFrancis- cans and Avicenna were compatible with the Franciscan effort to systematize Augustine’sthought. Thus,the relationship between the Franciscans and Avicenna has not been extensively investigated since.  Avicenna, Avicenna’sPsychology,32–3. See also Lydia Schumacher, : TheHis- toryand FutureofAugustine’sTheoryofKnowledge (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 90 –100. 42 Lydia Schumacher

In this connection, Ihaveargued elsewhere, one major guiding factor for early Franciscans was the spiritual and ministerial vision of to which Alexander and his colleagues mayhavesought to give systematic expression in the university context.Akey to thateffort,inturn, was seemingly the development of anovel doctrine of God, both as one and as Triune,from which further doctrines consistent with Francis’ outlook apparentlyfollowed naturally. It wasindeveloping these doctrines, Iwillnow explain, that Alexander and his collaborators made some of theirmost radical shifts away from the tradition of Augustine.

The Doctrine of God

Since the time of Augustine, medieval thinkers in the West had largely identified ‘’ as the most fundamental feature of the divine nature. This doctrine was propounded by such noteworthyscholars as ,Peter Lom- bard, and , who offered amature formulation of the standard teach- ing about God’ssimple nature.Although Alexander of Hales and his colleagues men- tion simplicity in passing in the treatise of the Summa Halensis on the doctrine of God, mainlytoinquire whether it is compatible with affirming God as Triune, they depart radicallyfrom the longstandingand relatively continuous tradition of Augus- tine in stressingthe immensity or of the divine.²⁶

The Context of the Summa’sDoctrine of God

Prior to the 12th century,there are onlyscant and relatively unremarkable references to divineimmensity in Western Christian thought.The situation onlyappears to changeinthe 12th century itself, duringwhich Hugh of St Victor popularized the works of Pseudo-.Frequently throughout his corpus,Dionysius refers to the immensurabilitas (immesurability) of God. In his commentary on Dionysius’ Cel- estial Hierarchy, Hugh picks up on this and translates it into comments on divine im- mensitas (immensity), which werefurther developed by Richard of St Victor,whose De Trinitate proved enormouslyinfluential for Alexander’sdoctrine of God. In this work, Richard bemoans the fact that he finds in the preceding tradition no purelyrationalexplanation thatsatisfieshim fullyastohow God can be both one and three, even though he finds these ideas everywhereaffirmed on authoritative grounds.Thus, he sets out to provide such an explanation, which he subsequently

 Meldon C. Wass, TheInfinite God and the ‘Summa fratris Alexandri’ (Chicago:Franciscan Herald Press, 1964). The Summa Halensis and Augustine 43

works out entirely in terms thatcan be accessed by reason.²⁷ In the first instance,he seeks to defend the claim thatGod is one.²⁸ It is in this context that the doctrineof divineimmensity quicklycomes to the fore. In the context of this discussion, Richard postulates three possible modes of being,seemingly drawnfrom the work of , whose of the Dionysian corpus would have been the one of several available translations which Richard might have consulted.²⁹ Thesemodes of being are: from and deriving its existencefrom itself; neither from eternity nor from itself; or from eternity but not from itself. AccordingtoRichard, afourth possibility—the opposite of this lastone—is impossible, because there cannot be anybeing that is not from eternity but is nevertheless from itself, otherwise therewould have been atime when existed that could have givenrise to the existenceofother things. On Richard’saccount,two such non-identical beingscannot exist,otherwise one would have to be superior to the other and could not be the most powerful being.³⁰ On the basisofthis four-fold distinction, consequently, Richard concludes that asin- gle, supreme being,both eternal and from itself, necessarilyexists, invoking An- selm’sfamous argument and thereby appropriating it for the purposes of defending divinenecessity,inaway theFranciscans take up in theirown discussion of this issue.³¹ In this connection, Richard further contends that since God is infinite in terms of his eternity,hemust also be infinite in terms of his greatness.³² That is to say, he is immense—there is no measure to his goodness, which cannot be comprehended. As such abeing,God is immutable: he cannot deteriorate or improve, since his great- ness is unsurpassable.³³ Once again, Richard contends, there can onlybeone im- mense being,otherwise there would be multiple beingsthatcannot be comprehend- ed by others, such that each would be superior to the others, which entails a contradiction.³⁴ Such asupreme being cannot lack anydesirable attributes:his definition is to be all that is good.³⁵ In that sense, Richard follows alongstandingtradition, upheld by Anselm, which posits aunity of God’sessence and his attributes.³⁶ Accordingtothis

 RichardofStVictor, De Trinitate 3.1(hereafter, DT), in RichardofStVictor, De Trinitate: texte cri- tique avec introduction, notes et tables,ed. J. Ribaillier(Paris:Vrin, 1958),115.Pagenumbers hereafter takenfromRichardofSaint Victor, ,trans.Ruben Angelici (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2011).  DT 1.5(Angelici, 76).  DT 1.8(Angelici, 79); cf. John ScotusEriugena, Divisione 1.1(PL 122:441B).  DT 1.14 (Angelici, 83).  DT 1.11 (Angelici, 81).  DT 2.5(Angelici, 95).  DT 2.3(Angelici, 93).  DT 2.6(Angelici, 95).  DT 2.16,(Angelici, 104).  DT 2.16 (Angelici, 105). 44 Lydia Schumacher

tradition, God is or is the definition of the he has—he has them in their fullness—whereas creatures simplyhavethose properties in limited or qualified ways.God is whatever it is best to be. As such, he is one thing,and simple, not sub- ject to the complex components or alterations that characterize his creatures.³⁷ While Richard thus concludes his discussion with abrief nod to the doctrineof divinesimplicity,thatfeature is mentioned onlyafter much more attention has been giventothe immensity of God. In Richard’swork, therefore, we witness the begin- ningsofthe shift in the doctrine of God, wherebysimplicity and manyother features are subjectedtoimmensity rather thanthe otherway around, which the Franciscans would pick up and popularize in their own way. This bringsustoadiscussion of the Franciscan doctrine itself, which Iwill contrastinthe first instance with the tradi- tional doctrine of ,asarticulated by Augustine. In his De Trinitate, Augustine explains the doctrine of divine simplicity by offer- ing examples of thingsthat are not simple.³⁸ As he notes,bodilysubstancesare not simple because they are comprised of parts that are subject to accidental changes, that is, changes in the properties of shape, color,etc. In his view,eventhe human soul is composed of parts in the sense that it is present throughout the body, while not located at anyone place in the body, and it is subjecttochanges in thoughts or feelings. By contrasttoembodied beings, God is incorporeal and thus invisible. As such, he is not composed of parts.³⁹ Forthe same reason, he is not changeable, giventhatchangeimpliesanaltera- tion in the accidents or properties that are attributed to asubstance or entity and a corresponding adjustment in the shape or size of its component parts. Thus, he can- not become more wise or more merciful, or become just where he previouslywas not. In fact,all of the properties that can be attributed to him are not attributed as acci- dents, which are subject to alteration, but to his substance.Asmanymedieval au- thors following Augustine famouslyquipped, ‘God is what he has:his is his accidents.’⁴⁰ This means that God is whatever it is best to be, and is always com- pletelyso. To sum up: God always completelyiswhat he is, which is the essence and sourceofall that is good.

The Summa Halensis on God

As noted already, the Franciscan Summa treats the idea of divine simplicity,albeit in amere four pages. Although the placement of this discussion just to thatofdi- vine immensity does suggest acertain deferencetolongstandingtradition, the Sum- ma’sapproach to the question of simplicity represents quite an unusual theological

 DT 2.20 (Angelici, 107).  DT 6.6(Angelici, 209–10).  DT 5.1– 2(Angelici, 171– 3).  DT 6.7(Angelici, 210–1). The Summa Halensis and Augustine 45

departure. His account focuses on aconceivable threat to the possibility of asimple God, namely,the Christian assertionthat God subsists in multiple , which could be taken to implythat God is composed of parts and thereforefails to count as simple.⁴¹ With this threat in view,the Summist insists thatthe three persons in God do not undermine divinesimplicity,because they do not represent diverse substancesbut rather diverse modes of relation in God, which actuallyenact his simplicity.Insup- porting this contention, the Summist appeals to Richard of St Victor—akey authority for earlyFranciscan Trinitarian theology. In his De Trinitate, Richard argued that a plurality of persons does not detract from the unity of the divinenature, just as aplu- rality of substances—specifically, bodyand soul—does not detract from the unity of a human .⁴² Thus, we see that for earlyFranciscans, the doctrine of divine sim- plicity is not so much astatement about the fundamental nature of God but a ground-clearingexercise, whereby they showed how their in the Trinity could be reconciled with the unity of God. When it comestodetermining the most basic attribute of this one God, as noted already, the earlyFranciscans turn—straightawayfrom the discussion of simplicity— to elaborate on the immensity of God, in atreatise thatruns nearly60pages. Forall practical purposes, consequently, they defined the one God in terms of immensity and substituted the doctrine of simplicity for one concerning this very feature. Thus, it remains to consider what the founding fathers of the Franciscan school have to sayabout the immensenature of the divine. The contours and importance of the doctrine of divine infinity to Franciscans like Alexander becomes especiallyclear in asection of the treatise on immensity,which discusses the existenceofGod in things(existentia Deiinrebus).⁴³ This section treats the wayinwhich God is ‘inside and not included, outside and not excluded’ from things.⁴⁴ On this score, the Summa follows alongstanding tradition, stemmingat least from Pseudo-Dionysius,ofaffirmingthat God is in thingsbyessence,power, and presence.⁴⁵ While God is in thingsbyessence insofar as he makes them to be what they are, he is in them by power in terms of the abilitieshegives them, and by presence, through theircorresponding acts or operations.⁴⁶

 SH I, P1,In1, Tr1, Q3,C1(n. 31), Ad obiecta 2, p. 51.  SH I, P1,In1, Tr1, Q3,C2(n. 32), Solutio, p. 52.  Peter Lombardalso treats this topicinhis Sentences,Book 1, Distinctions 36–7, which cover the presenceofthings in God and God in things:Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae 1, dd. 36–7, 2vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum,4–5(Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971– 81): 1:258–275.  SH I, P1,In1, Tr2, Q3,Ti3,M1, C1 (n. 45), pp. 70 – 1.  SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3,Ti3,M1, C2 (n. 46), arg. 1a,b,c,p.71; cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, TheCelestial Hierarchy 11; DT 2.23;Anselm, Monologion,13.  SH I, P1,In1, Tr2, Q3,Ti3,M1, C2 (n. 46), pp. 72–3. 46 Lydia Schumacher

On affirming this, the Summa stresses that thingsare not converselyinGod by essence, otherwise the divine essence would depend upon the of creatures, which are not the cause of God but instead depend on him as their cause.⁴⁷ Never- theless, it admits that they are in him by power,insofar as he is their cause, and by presence, insofar as he knows them. In the latter respect,the Summa lays astrong emphasis upon the specific terms in which God knows and can by the same token be known through createdthings. As the artificerofall thingsgreat and small, the Summa insists, God knows not onlyuniversals but also singulars or individuals.⁴⁸ Thus, he has an individual idea for all thingsthatcan and do exist.⁴⁹ In that sense, his ideas are infinite in number, just as he is infinite in his being.⁵⁰ That said, the Summa asserts thatthe multiplicity of the divine ideas does not threaten the unity of God, on the grounds that his ideas ultimatelysimply reflect his supreme and singular goodness in awide variety of ways.⁵¹ The diversity is on the side of creatures rather than God himself. Accordingtothe Summa,God giveshuman minds aunique opportunitytocon- nect with his ideas by bestowingupon them an innate knowledge of his Infinite Being.⁵² Though this knowledge does not provide the actual content of his ideas about finite creatures—let alone afford the full comprehension of the Infinite Being of God himself—it supervises human efforts to abstract concepts from sense in the Avicennian manner described above, thus ensuring that human concepts ultimatelycorrelatetoGod’s. By discerningthis correspond- ence, human beingsgain direct,albeit finite, insight into some aspect of the nature of God;they encounter him in apalpable way. Of course, such knowledge is onlyaccessible to thosewho have fulfilledthe pre- condition for obtaining it.Asthe Summa makes clear in its very first section, on the- ologyasa‘practical science’,the conformity of the human will to the willofGod,

 SH I, P1,In1, Tr2, Q3,Ti3,M1, C4 (n. 48), II. Respondeo,p.75.  See RegaWood’sarticle on Alexander’sdiscussionofthe divine ideas in his Gloss on Lombard’s Sentences and Disputed Questions: RegaWood, ‘Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solicitude:Alexander of Hales,RichardRufus,and Odo Rigaldus,’ Franciscan Studies 53 (1997): 7–31. See also Alexander of Hales, Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi,4vols, Bib- liotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5(Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7).  SH I, P1,In1, Tr5, S1, Q1,M3, C1 (n. 168), Respondeo, pp. 250–1.  SH I, P1,In1, Tr5, S1, Q1,M3, C2 (n. 169), Respondeo, p. 252.  SH I, P1,In1, Tr5, S1, Q1,M4, C1 (n. 175), II. Respondeo, p. 258.  SH I, P1,In1, Tr3, Q1,M1, C1 (n. 72), Respondeo, p. 113: ‘(…) “ens” sit primum intelligibile, eius intentio apudintellectum est nota [Avicenna, 1.6]; primae ergo determinationes entis sunt primae impressiones apud intellectum: eae sunt unum, verum, bonum, sic patebit; non poterunt ergo habere aliqua priora specialiter ad sui notificationem. Si ergo notificatio fiat eorum, hoc non erit nisi per posteriora, ut per abnegationem veleffectum consequentem’ [Beingisthe first intelligible that is known to the intellect; therefore the first determinations of beingare the first impressions on the intellect: these areunity,, goodness. And thus it is clear that these cannot have anything prior to them that is able to make them known. If thereforethey aretobemade known, this cannot happen except through posterior things,either throughabnegationorthrough effects of acause]. The SummaHalensis and Augustine 47

through piety or lovefor God, satisfiesthis pre-condition. It purifies the mind and thereby opens the door to the knowledge of Infinite Being whereby all finite beings can trulybeknown—and whereby God himself can be known through these beings to the limited extent that is currentlypossible.

The Trinity

In his magisterial history of Trinitarian doctrine, Theodore de Régnon defendedthe then novel thesis that the late Middle Ages witnessed the branching off of anew tra- dition of Trinitarian theological thinkingfrom the previouslyrelatively continuous tradition of Western Trinitarianism founded by Augustine.⁵³ From this time forward, he contends, there weretwo main traditions of Western Trinitarian thought,includ- ing the original tradition of Augustine, which was carried forward by the likes of An- selm and Peter Lombard, and which receivedmature expression in the work of Tho- mas Aquinas; and the new tradition, initiallyformulated by Richard of St Victor and later developedmore fullybythe Franciscans,who adhere to it to this day.⁵⁴

Augustine and RichardofStVictor on the Trinity

In order to throw the uniqueness of the Franciscan doctrineinto relief, Iwill start by offering abrief synopsis of Augustine and Richard of St Victor’sviews on the Trini- ty.⁵⁵ Forhis part,Augustine drawsakeydistinctionbetween terms applied to the es- sence of God and thus to all three persons—such as wise or omnipotent—and terms applied relatively to just one of the persons.⁵⁶ Forinstance, the Father is the begin- ning of the Trinity,whereas the Son is begotten or generated by him.⁵⁷ Likewise, the Spiritproceedsfrom the Father and the Son together.⁵⁸ In alater section of his famous De Trinitate, Augustine elaboratesonwhat he means when he describes the relations between the three persons in this way. An analogyhefinds especiallyapt for this purpose is that of the human mind, its knowl- edge and its willfor knowledge.Asthe Father is the First of the Trinity,so the mind is the beginning of all knowledge.Conversely, knowledge is what is gener-

 ThéodoreDeRégnon, Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité, 2vols (Paris:Retaux, 1982).  See also Dominique Poirel, Livre de la natureetdébat trinitaireauXIIesiècle: le De tribus diebus de Hugues de Saint-Victor (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002).  See especiallyLewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2004).  Augustine, De Trinitate 5.11 (herafter, trin.); Lewis Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2010).  trin. 5.13.  trin. 5.14. 48 Lydia Schumacher

ated by the mind as the Son is begotten by the Father.That very act of begetting— which requires the mind and knowledge together—implies awillordesire to know which serves as the impetus behindthe act. In the caseofthe Trinity,this loveordesire consists in the , who is said to proceed from boththe Father and the Son as the will or lovethat binds them togeth- er.⁵⁹ As the person that clinches the unity of the three persons of the Trinity, the Spirit acts in amannernot unlikethe wayadesire to know enacts asingular act of know- ing on the part of the mind. Just as this act is ultimatelyone entity despite entailing mind, knowledge and love, consequently, so it is possible to affirm that the three per- sons in God, rather than undermining his unity,enact and uphold it. Whereas Augustine seemingly took apsychological model as the foundation for his understanding of the Trinity, Richard proposes acommunitarian or social model that is quite distinct from Augustine’s, although he does uphold the crucial Latin doctrine of the , thatis, the procession of the Spirit from boththe Father and the Son.⁶⁰ At the start of his discussion, Richard insists thatGod as the supreme good be aGod of love,since no being thatissupremelygood would withhold its goodness from another—or withhold love. Since lovemust be aimedatanother, Richard concludes thatthere must be multiple persons in God.⁶¹ Because it is supremelyperfect,however,God’slovemustbedirected at some- one of equal supremacy and dignity.Thus, theremust be asecond divine person who is equal in greatness to the first and who in an equallysupreme way.⁶² Since the loveofthe first two persons must be the sameinits nature, intensity and direction in order to achieveperfection on Richard’saccount,Richard concludes that perfect love consists in a ‘shared love’ on the part of the Father and Son for athird person, who is the full expression of their love.⁶³ Because the persons of the Trinity on this account ‘possess an entirelysingle, identical and supremelysimple being,itisnot possible for them to differ from one another accordingtoany qualitative distinction.’⁶⁴ Thus, Richard contends that the differencebetween the divine persons is not between their mode of relations, as in Augustine, but is instead entirelyaquestion of theirdiverse origins.While the first person

is characterizedbythe fact that he does not proceed from anyother person but he has another one proceeding from him, the second person is characterizedbythe fact that he proceeds from another person and that at the same time he has another person proceeding from him,

 trin. 10.11; cf. trin. 9.3onself-knowledge.  trin. 8.10.  DT 3.2(Angelici, 116); cf. Nico den Bok, Communicating the Most High: ASystematic Study of Per- son and Trinity in the Theology of RichardofStVictor (+1173) (Paris:Brepols,1996).  DT 3.3(Angelici, 118).  DT 3.19 (Angelici, 132).  DT 4.15 (Angelici, 154). The SummaHalensis and Augustine 49

though not in the primarysense that belongstoprocession from the Father alone.⁶⁵ The third person proceeds from the first and the second persons, but does not himself give rise to another person. Put differently, the first person is characterized by apurelygratuitous or self-giving love; the second both givesand receiveslove; and the third is simplythe object and reflection of divinelove. In that sense, Richard posits, the relations of all three divine persons to one another are immediate: while this third person proceedsimmediatelyfrom the first,insofar as the first is the initial sourceofdivine love, he alsoproceedsimmediatelyfrom the second,who directly expresses alovefor the third that he himself receivesalsofrom the first person of the Trinity. As aresultofthe immediacy of their relations,each of the three persons is directlycapable of loving the others as he himself is loved in away that would not be possiblewereany additional persons added,and lovetherebyachieves its perfec- tion.⁶⁶

The Summa Halensis on the Trinity

In developing its account of the Trinity, the Summa closely follows Richard’slogic while expandingupon it even further.The central part of its work in this connection is conducted under the heading of two major sections on the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit from the Father which will be assessed at much greater length in Boyd Taylor Coolman’sessayonthe Trinity in acompanion to this volume, TheSumma Halensis:Doctrines andDebates. In arguingfor the gener- ation of the Son, the Summa follows Pseudo-Dionysius in arguing thatgood things are self-diffusive by nature,because what is good does not withhold itself.⁶⁷

 DT 5.13 (Angelici, 188).  DT 5.11 (Angelici, 183).  Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 4.1; SH I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1,Ti1, C1 (n. 295), arg. 1b,p.414: ‘Bonum naturaliteretessentialiter est sui diffusivum; unde haec est laus boni, scilicet se diffundere, quia si poneretur duobona in omnibus aequalia praeter quam in hoc quod unum suam bonitatem diffunderet,aliud non: constat quod bonum illud,quod se diffunderet,inhoc esset laudabile et melius alio bono quod se non diffunderet.Completa ergo ratio boni includit in se diffusionem; ergo ubi est , ibi est summa diffusio; summa autemdiffusio est qua maior excogitari non potest; maior autem diffusio cogitari non potest quam illa quae est secundum substantiam et maxime secundum totam; ergo summum bonum necessario se diffundit secundum substantiamtotam, et in ipso naturaliterintelligitur haec diffusio;sed nihil aliud est virtus generativa nisi virtus diffusiva sub- stantiae suae ad hoc ut producatur simile in natura; ergo in summon intelligitur haec virtus summe et ab aeterno, cum illud bonum summum sit et aeternum; sed ubi est haec virtus est generatio; ergo generatio aeterna est’ [The good is naturallyand necessarilyself-diffusive.Indeed, the of the good is to diffuse itself. Because if thereare twogoods which areequal in all respects,with the ex- ception that one diffuses its goodness and the other does not,itisclear that the good that diffuses itself would in doingsobemorepraiseworthyand betterthan the other good that did not diffuse it- self. Therefore, the full definitionofthe good entails self-diffusion. Therefore, where there is the high- est good, thereisthe highestdiffusion. However the highest diffusion is that than which agreater 50 Lydia Schumacher

In the greatest diffusion, it further contends, the whole substance of abeing must be diffused. As the greatest being,consequently, God’spower of diffusing is apower of producingsomething similar to himself in nature.⁶⁸ Thisisprecisely what the generation of the Son involves, namely,what the Summa calls aprocession by naturewhereby the Father produces another like himself. Such aprocession is also said to occur by intellect or knowledge insofarasthe Father knows himself in the Son that is his image. From this point,the Summa goes on to consider the procession of the HolySpi- rit.⁶⁹ Building on its previous arguments concerning the naturallyself-diffusive na- ture of the good, the Summa states that such self-giving essentiallyimplies love. While the Father is the sourceofapurelygratuitous or self-giving love(amor gratui- tus), the Son enjoys alovethat is both receivedand given(amor permixtus). Accord- ing to the Summa,however,the lovethey share cannot achieveperfection unless it is exactlythe sameinits nature, intensity,and direction.⁷⁰ On this basis, the Summa concludes that the Father and Son possess acommon lovefor the Spirit,who is thereforethe object of apurelyreceptive love(amordebitus). As such, the Spiritis the full and final expression of the shared love, or condilectio, of the first two persons of the Trinity and is consequentlysaid to proceed from the Father and the Son not by nature but by desire or will.⁷¹

cannot be conceived. And agreater diffusion cannot be conceivedthan one that is accordingtosub- stanceand, even more, maximallyaccording to the whole [substance]. Thereforethe highestgood necessarilydiffuses itself accordingtoits whole substance, and this [kind of]diffusionisnaturally understood [tobe] in it.But the powerofgenerating is nothingother than the power of diffusing one’sown substance so that somethingsimilar in natureisproduced. Therefore the highestbeing is understood to possess this power in the highest degree frometernity,asthat highestgood is also eternal. But where thereisthis power, thereisgeneration. Therefore thereiseternal generation].  SH I, P1,In2, Tr1, Q1,Ti1,C1(n. 295), arg. 1b,p.414.  SH I, P1,In2, Tr1, Q1,Ti2 (nn. 304–11), pp. 438 – 53.  DT 3.19,quoted in SH I, P1,In2, Tr1, Q1,Ti2,C5(n. 311), Respondeo, p. 453: ‘Quando unus alteri amorem impendit et solussolum diligit, dilectio quidem est,sed condilectio non est.Quando duo se mutuo diligunt et istius in illum, illius in istum affectus discurrit et quasi in diversa tendit,utrobique quidem dilectio est,sed condilectio non est.Condilectio vero est cum aduobus diligentibus tertius concorditer diligitur et socialiter amaturetduorum affectus tertii amoris incendio in unum conflatur. Ex iis itaque patetquod in ipsa divinitate condilectio locum non haberet, si duobus existentibus tertia persona deesset’ [Thus,Richardsays: ‘when one loves another and is alone in doing so, thereisdi- lectio,but not condilectio. What two mutuallyloveeach other however and reciprocallydemonstrate intense desire,this affection, of the first for the second and the second for the first,isdispersed and turned in various directions.There is loveonboth sides but thereisnot co-love. Co-loveoccurs when athirdisloved by the two in harmonyand collectively (concorditer et socialiter)sothat the two per- sons’ affects arefused to become one because of the of lovefor the third’].  DT 3.15,quoted in SH I, P1,In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti2, C5 (n 311), Respondeo, p. 453: ‘Quamdiu enim isteab alio solusdiligitur,praecipuaedulcedinis suae delicias solus possiderevidetur;similiter et alius, quamdiu condilectum non habet, praecipui gaudii communione caret; ut autem uterquepossit istius- modi delicias communicare, oportet eos condilectum habere’ [‘But as longasone is the sole person beingloved by another,healone enjoysthe delights of this highestsweetness;similarly, even the The SummaHalensis and Augustine 51

Although the Summa likeRichard thus finds away to incorporate Augustine’s psychological analogyinwhich the Son and Spiritare likened to intellect and will, respectively,along with the filioque,italso clearlyfollows Richard in recasting these Augustinian within acompletelydifferent,social,framework.Within this framework, the persons of the Trinityshare an identical—or univocal—sortof love. Thus, they are not distinguished as in Augustine’sthoughtbythe ways in which they communicatethatloverelative to one another.Instead, they are differen- tiated in terms of theirvarying pointsoforigin, as happens in manyGreek models of the Trinity. Thus, the Father is defined in terms of the fact that he does not derive from another principle, that he is innascible or unbegottenand ungenerate, precisely insofar as he is Father to the Son. In turn, the Son is defined in terms of the fact that he proceeds from the Father by wayoffiliation, while the Spirit does so by means of spiration or servingasthe breath of life, which is love.⁷²

Reassessing the Relationship between Alexander and Augustine

As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, thereare reasons to re-think the theory that earlyFranciscans, particularlythe authors of the Summa Halensis,are essential- ly Augustinian in their outlook.The first case studycalls this theory into question by illustrating how theymanipulated Augustinian quotations, took them out of context, and changed their meaning in order to achievetheir own intellectual ends. In short, it shows that scholastics often had reasons for citing figures like Augustine which had little to do with presentinganauthentic interpretation of Augustine—reasons to do with their effortstoalign their own oftennovel perspectivestoalongstanding tradition and thereby lend them authority in the waythat was considered appropri- ate and standard practice at the time. What,then, werethe perspectivesthe Franciscans sought to bolster?AsIhave suggested elsewhere, one major concern of the mature Alexander mayhavebeen to translate Francis of Assisi’sministerial and spiritual vision into theological and philosophical terms that would justify the Franciscan involvement in the university context—although it would not have been customary to sayasmuch in auniversity textbook like the Summa Halensis. Regardless, however,Alexander and his collea- gues wereFranciscans before they werereaders of Augustine or anyother authority.

other is deprivedofthe highestjoy of communion as long as he does not have condilectio’,orthe ability to sharehis lovewith the first for athird. Thus, ‘if both aretobeable to communicatedelights, it is necessary that they have condilectio’,orathirdperson they can lovetogether in the same man- ner.This of course is the ].  SH I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1,Q1, M3,C3(n. 467), Respondeo, p. 668. 52 Lydia Schumacher

Their religious affiliation took priority over their affiliation to past authorities when it came to developing their system of thought. What was central in this effort to renderFrancis’ vision in an intellectual form was the development of relevant doctrines of God and of God as Triune,doctrines which we have seen depart significantlyfrom the longstandingAugustinian tradi- tion. Thesefundamental doctrines inevitablyshaped all further ideas Franciscans de- velopedabout the nature of as created by God, the nature of the human being as an imageofGod—and thus the nature of human knowing and willing—what the loss of the imagethrough sin and its recovery through the redemptive work of entails. To articulate adoctrine of God thatcaptured Francis’ vision of God was there- fore to set the stagefor the development of further ideas that wereconsistent with that vision. What then makes the doctrines pertaining to God outlined abovecompatible with Francis’ vision?⁷³ In the first place, the doctrine of divine immensity or infinity made it possible for Franciscans to give an account of aGod who loved and cared for all creatures great and small—the kind of God Francis worshipped. Although Augus- tine’sdoctrine of simplicity certainlydid not undermine the reality of such aGod, it tended to emphasize his total othernessorincommensurability with all known be- ings, makingitslightlymore difficult though certainlynot impossibletoexplain the individual and specific sense in which they exist in him, and he manifests him- self in them.Similarly, the related notion of an innate human knowledge of Being, which is in fact derived from Avicenna—made it possible for Franciscans to explain Francis’ intuitiveconnection with God as well as his ability to find God in all things and thus to know those thingswith asort of divine insight. When it came to delineating the doctrine of the Trinity,Richard of St Victor’sac- count presumablyappealed to the Summists because the Father’stotalself-diffusive- ness served effectively to portrayFrancis’ vision of what God is like—and what human beingsshould be like who attempt to imageGod, namely, completelyself-sac- rificial and self-impoverishing.⁷⁴ The role of the Spirit in the Godhead further be- speaksthe totallypassive or receptiveposition creation and humanitymust assume with referencetoGod:itstresses thatcreatures are entirelydependent upon his sus- taining,gratuitous loveinawayFrancis himself always emphasized. Furthermore, the mediating role of the Son, who stands in the middle between the Father and the Son, plays well into awider vision of the direct and completeway the Father

 The vision and values of Francis,asauthors around this time understood them, become especial- ly clear in the writings of Francis himself and in the earlybiographies by Thomas of , which can be found in St Francis of Assisi: Early Documents,3vols,ed. Regis J. Armstrong,J.A. Wayne - man and William J. Short (New York: New City Press,1999–2001). On the wayinwhich earlyFran- ciscans understood their intellectual life, see the important recent workbyNeslihan Senocak, The Poor and the Perfect: TheRise of Learning in the Franciscan Order 1209–1310 (Ithaca: Cornell, 2012).  Maria Calisi, Trinitarian Perspectives in the Franciscan TheologicalTradition (StBonaventure, NY: FranciscanInstitute, 2008). The SummaHalensis and Augustine 53

transfers his ideas to the Son, who in turn instantiates them in the Spirit in asimilar manner.Itreinforces the Franciscan perspective on all creatures as direct instantia- tions of adivineidea and thus divine lovewhich should be understood and dealt with by humans in accordance with their elevated and indeed spiritual status. As Ihavebeen trying to suggest,these twodeparturesfrom Augustine on the most fundamental aspectsofthe Franciscan intellectual vision should lead us to be suspicious about arguments that describeFranciscans as purelyAugustinian on anyother matters they address.Inthe context of discussing othermatters,such as the nature of human knowledge,wehavelearned,Franciscans mayhavebeen using Augustine in inauthentic ways—which werenonetheless regarded as appropri- ate use under the auspices of —that do not necessarilyindicate an al- legiance to him. Although Icannot in the space provided here go through every single major phil- osophical or theological issue whereAugustine is treated as acentral authority by Franciscans, Ihaveendeavoured in the abovetoprovide apoint of departure for doing so.While the second and third case studies illustrate the ‘spirit’ behind the ‘let- ter’ of Franciscan writingswhich we must always bear in mind when readingFran- ciscanstexts,the first case studysensitizes us to the complexities of the ‘letter’ of scholastic thought, predisposing us to be more discerningregardingthe spirit it en- deavours to conveythrough its complex modes of argumentation.What remains thereforeisfor scholars to deploy these tools in the effort to re-readthe textsasso- ciated with Alexander and the earlyFranciscan intellectuals with regardtotheirre- lationship to Augustine. My own suspicion is that they will find that earlyFrancis- cans weresome of if not the greatest innovators of the Franciscan order and even of the medieval tradition as awhole.