Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 21 June 2019 KYIV 22 June 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The SMM observed two residential houses damaged by shelling in government-controlled Chermalyk. The SMM observed about 160 explosions and about 4,600 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire in areas south-east of government-controlled Popasna. The SMM saw 30 multiple launch rocket systems in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure. Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. Its freedom of movement was also denied in non- government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region at checkpoints near Novoazovsk, Naberezhne and in Kozatske.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 380), compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east-south- east of Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), at southerly, south-easterly and south-westerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at easterly directions of Hnutove (government- controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol), while about 60 explosions were recorded at southerly and westerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (165), compared with the previous reporting period (about 170 explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
Two residential houses in Chermalyk damaged by shelling At 41 Pervomaiska Street in the centre of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), about 500m from the contact line, the SMM observed a fresh crater (10cm in diameter) in the concrete tiles 2m south of the south-facing metal gate of a residential single-storey house, as well as at least 50 fresh small holes in the aforementioned metal gate and the adjacent south-facing entrance door. The Mission also observed at least 15 fresh holes on the east-facing wall of a summer house located about 5m west of the house, as well as a hole in its east-facing window. The SMM assessed that the crater was caused by a projectile of an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23- 2, 23mm) fired from a southerly direction and that the holes were caused by shrapnel. The owner of the house (a woman in her eighties) told the SMM that she had been at home on the evening of 20 June, when she had heard shelling.
At 47 Pervomaiska Street, 20m south and across the street from the abovementioned house, the SMM saw 25 holes on the east-facing brick wall of a single-storey residential house, as well as six holes in three east-facing windows on the same wall. It also saw multiple scratches on a tree located about 3m east of the house, as well as some of its branches lying on the ground. The SMM assessed the damage to be fresh and caused by a projectile of an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2), impacting the tree, from a southerly direction, as well as shrapnel. Additionally, about 5m north of the house, the SMM saw fresh holes in a street light, assessed as caused by spray from the abovementioned impacts. The owner of the house (a man in his fifties) told the SMM that on the evening of 20 June, he had been at home and had heard a loud explosion.
Disengagement areas[2]
During the night of 20 to 21 June, while on the northern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard about 155 undetermined explosions and about 4,600 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire over a period of five hours in areas south-east of Popasna, immediately outside the 5km periphery of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). During the day on 21 June, positioned on the northern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and 12 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.
On the same day, positioned on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government- controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined shots assessed as outside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.
On the same day, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non- government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation. [3]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. In violation of withdrawal lines:
Non-government-controlled areas
20 June
An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:
eight multiple-launch-rocket-systems (MLRS) (BM-12 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 20 June 2019); and
22 MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 6 June 2019).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
21 June
The SMM saw four tanks (probable T-64) near Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled
20 June
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10), six tanks (T-64), nine self-propelled-howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), and 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in a training area near Miusynsk (see above); and 29 towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, six D-30 and 18 types undetermined), six self-propelled-howitzers (2S1), and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Khrustalnyi (see above).
An SMM mini-UAV spotted 25 tanks (20 T-72, four T-64, a probable T-72), as well as eight probable tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 21 June 2019).
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
20 June
An SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). 21 June
The SMM saw:
an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) in Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk); an APC (BTR-70) in Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk); and an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
19 June
An SMM mini-UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP-1, BMP-2 and two BMP variants), an APC (BTR-80), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU- 23, 23mm) among civilian houses in the eastern outskirts of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk).
20 June
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1) near Pryshyb (34km north-west of Luhansk).
On 18 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a 10m-long trench, running north to south, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, about 3.5km north-west of Smile (non-government-controlled area, 31km north-west of Luhansk) (not visible in imagery from 2 June 2019).
On 20 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a 70m-long trench (not visible in imagery from 18 June 2018), running north-east to south-west, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 2km south-east of Krymske (government-controlled, 42km north-west of Luhansk). The same UAV also spotted for the first time an at least 55m-long trench (not visible in imagery from 15 November 2018), assessed as belonging to the armed formations, running north to south about 500m south of Sokilnyky (non-government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk).
New mine hazard sign near Mykolaivka
About 2km north-west of Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a red and yellow sign with the words “Attention! Civilian traffic prohibited.” in Ukrainian, 1m east of the road, as well as, 5m further north, a red and yellow mine hazard sign with instructions in Ukrainian on what to do when finding a mine/unexploded ordnance (UXO).
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, a water pipeline between Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government- controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), a power line near Raivka (non-government- controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), power lines in Spartak (non-government- controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), a power substation in Betmanove (non- government-controlled, formerly Krasnyi Partizan, 23km north-east of Donetsk), power lines in Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk), as well as maintenance works to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).
The SMM also facilitated the operation of the DFS and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government- controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
At a checkpoint at the northern entrance to Novoazovsk (non-government- controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south into the town, as well as south-east towards Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk), citing “orders from superiors”. In Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM could not proceed east towards Porokhnia (non-government- controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol) because of a concrete barrier with a red-and-white sign blocking the road. Later, also in Kozatske, a member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a compound. At the eastern edge of Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, citing “security reasons”. Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Other impediments:
An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol). [5]
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.
See the table of ceasefire violations
Contacts Dragana Nikolic-Solomon Chief of Press and Public Information Unit OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 26 Turhenievska Street 01054 Kyiv Ukraine Office: +380 44 392 08 55 Mobile: +380 95 291 99 18 [email protected] [email protected]
Liudmyla Palamar National Outreach Officer OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 26 Turhenievska Street 01054 Kyiv Ukraine Office: +380 44 392 0965 Mobile: +38 067 828 06 79 Mobile: +38 050 387 93 98 [email protected] [email protected]