Berkeley Model United Nations Welcome Letter Delegates, welcome to BMUN LXIX! My name is Justin Flesher, I am a sophomore majoring in Economics at Berkeley. I grew up in Atlanta, Georgia where I was able to gain a working knowledge of and deep respect for Model UN. Later, I had the opportunity to graduate early from high school and participate on a year-long exchange through the State Department to Germany during what would have been my senior year. There I had the wonderful experience of learning German and I gained a deeper understanding of European politics. I hope to share the same excitement I have for European political issues with you all this year in BMUN. Along with other members of my dias, I am very excited to join delegates in debating and crafting resolutions this year. Melika Rahbar is a junior at UC Berkeley double majoring in Economics and Political Science. This is Melika’s third year in BUMN, in addition to having done four years of Model United Nations. Outside of BMUN, she is involved in other on campus clubs such as UEA consulting and her sorority Delta Sigma. Melika is so excited for BMUN 69 and can’t wait to meet all of the delegates and see what ideas they come up with! Rajita Pujare is a junior at UC Berkeley majoring in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. This will be her second year at BMUN, after having participated in Model United Nations for four years at high school. Aside from BMUN, Rajita is involved with other campus organizations such as Computer Science Mentors. She is thrilled for BMUN 69, and looks forward to meeting the delegates and hearing their discussions and solutions! Joseph Maga is a freshman at UC Berkeley with interests in music and economics. He is for many years. Aside from BMUN, Joseph plays the piano and organ, swims, and plays board games with his friends. He looks forward to seeing the delegates, and the solutions that they present.

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 1 General Information

Background Information on

*Throughout this essay, italics will be used to differentiate between acronyms/abbreviations and citations. Acronyms in parentheses will be in italics.

Brief European History in the Early 20th Century

War plagued much of the modern history of the European continent. In the aftermath of WWI, many states who participated in the war abandoned their last attempts at European monarchical empires, either through forced war concessions or through political and social movements (Royde- Smith). The period following WWI saw the beginnings of widespread European democracy. However, emboldened by rising economic and social tensions in the late 1920’s, Europe also became the birthplace of a new political movement called fascism which embraced militaristic nationalism and turned away from electoral democracy (Soucy). Fascist inspired authoritarian leaders soon controlled many of Europe’s most populous and industrially productive nations – Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, Franco in Spain, and Salazar in Portugal to name a few (Soucy). Fascist/Nazi ideology — as well as racist, antisemitic, and eugenic ideology — fueled leaders like Hitler and Mussolini to engage in the expansion of land to create their empires and expand their power. Eventually war — later known as II — broke out again and engulfed the European continent for six years (Royde-Smith).

Aftermath of WWII

WWII completely destroyed Europe, both victors and vanquished decimated Europe in the process of defeating their respective enemies. During the reconstruction period following the war, new leaders across Europe came together in an effort to prevent future wars and their ensuing destruction. In 1950, the French foreign minister Robert Schuman proposed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) with the aim to “make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible” (“European Union”). The aim of creating a more economically connected Europe was twofold. Not only would it create more economic opportunities and a bigger market to aid an

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2 economically recovering Europe, but some leaders like Schuman really believed that the linking of various European nations’ economic and political systems together would make war on the continent virtually impossible. Some visions for a more connected Europe went further, some scholars and leaders, Winston Churchill among them, envisioned the eventual creation of a pan- European state working much like a “United States of Europe” (Churchill). In 1952, six nations: Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands – who are now accredited as the six founding members of the European Union — brought a piece of this vision to reality and Economic Community (EEC) known commonly as the “common market” which established a customs union between the six member states (Gabel).

Photo of a destroyed Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. Many cities across Europe experienced similar destruction. Source: The Atlantic.

The European Union Today Creation of the European Community

Following the creation of the EEC, the next few decades saw its expansion with Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joining in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986.

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 3 Following mass protests across the Eastern Bloc and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 — precluding market” in 1986 which formally established one market for goods and services, in 1993 the EEC instituted the “four freedoms”, which included the freedoms to move goods, services, people, and money across the borders of EU/EEC member states (Gabel). The Treaty on European Union — also known as the “” or the TEU — in 1993 formally established the European Union, and fully integrated the three : the EEC, ECSC, and the European Atomic (Euratom) (“Maastricht Treaty”). The TEU also renamed the EEC to the European Community (EC) and created a path for the ECSC and Euratom to fully integrate into the European Community, which would become part of the fully formulated, newly named European Union (EU or Union the , which abolished internal border controls and established a common visa policy (“European Union”).

An Italian bank clerk is seen counting Italian Lira in Banca d’Italia in Palermo, Italy in 2002 before the notes were due to be destroyed after the introduction of the . Source: Business Insider.

The EU spent much time throughout the 1990’s preparing for a European Monetary Union — outlined in the Maastricht Treaty — which culminated in the creation of the Euro on January 1st, national currencies for the Euro happened three years later on January 1st decade of the 21st century also oversaw the biggest expansion of the EU since its inception with the BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 4 addition of many former Eastern Bloc nations, such as Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004, and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 (“European Union”).

The Lisbon Treaty

the EU were outlined in Article 13 of the Maastricht Treaty and include: the , the , the Council of the European Union, the , the Court of Justice of the European Union, the , and the Court of Auditors (Treaty on European Union). These core institutions oversee the economic, legislative, operational, and judicial functions of the EU as many sovereign states do themselves. The de facto capital of the EU is Council, as well as the secondary seat for the European Parliament. Other important EU operational cities include Frankfurt, Germany as the host of the Central Bank, Luxembourg City, Luxembourg as the host of the Secretariat of the EU Parliament, Court of Justice, and Court of Auditors, and Strasbourg, France as the primary seat of the Parliament (“European Union”).

Crisis in the European Union and the EU Today st century have presented major crises for the European Union, which have challenged member states’ commitment and tested the strength of the EU’s institutions (Szczepaniuk)

* States with the bursting of the housing bubble in 2005-2006 (“Great Recession”). The burst made housing prices fall sharply and led many to abandon their mortgages which they had borrowed while housing prices were still very high preceding the burst; subsequently, the value of mortgage-backed securities declined causing many investment banks to a worldwide decline in GDP (“Great Recession”) BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 5 in the aftermath of the Great Recession during the European Debt Crisis when several countries in the European Union – mainly Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain – did not generate enough because of the adoption of the Euro, could not devalue their currency as a country with their own currency could in order to make it more attractive (Ray). Additionally, the EU faced one of its most challenging migration and asylum issues during the of Syria, and along with asylum seekers from other Middle Eastern, Asian, and African nations (and like Kosovo), many people crossed into European Union territory, a vast majority of which traveled by sea on man-made boats on routes usually from Northern Africa to Spain and Italy and to a much larger extent, from Turkey to Greece. Many EU member nations were unprepared to receive a large number of asylum seekers and tensions rose as many felt their burdens were disproportionate, especially Hungary, Italy, and Greece (“European migrant crisis”). In the aftermath of both the popularity throughout Europe in response to vocalized societal concerns over upticks in immigration (“European migrant crisis”).

Pictured at the height of the 2015 Migrant Crisis are refugees crowded onto boats headed for Turkey, Greece, Italy, and other destinations away from Source: Institute for National Strategic Studies. BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 6 27 member states including Croatia (not mentioned above, joined in 2013). The EU is currently occupied with the health and economic crisis brought by the COVID-19 pandemic (Stevis-Gridneff, “Coronavirus Nightmare Could Be the End for Europe’s Borderless Dream”).

Topic A: Addressing the Rise in European Authoritarianism

Topic Background

Some view the European Union as the world’s only (or close to an) example of a functioning confederation, and although the European Union has become ever closer to a functioning state, in recent years many problems have arisen that threaten the EU’s democratic legitimacy. One of the most pressing problems is the growth in the number of states who have abandoned or are showing signs of abandoning their democratic institutions, and the subsequent rise in authoritarian regimes.

The EU’s Democratic Commitment

Precisely because of the EU’s creation in the aftermath of WWII and their goal of safeguarding the future of Europe by uniting the continent socially, economically, and politically, the EU has made democracy and the rule of law a central principle of its governing doctrine (Treaty on European Union). In the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the TEU, Article 2 states, The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. (Treaty on European Union) Union directly recognizes the EU as an institution committed to democratic principles. The TEU also states that any European country may seek membership if they respect the EU’s democratic values BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 7 and are committed to upholding them (“Conditions for Membership”). The “Copenhagen criteria” have further outlined an adherence to democratic principles by stating that countries wishing to join the EU must have: stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU; the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. (“Conditions for Membership”) The EU started as a way to unite and intertwine the member states economically and politically to strengthen their economies and societies in the aftermath of the most destructive war in Europe. As time progressed, the Union passed new treaties that increased the power of the supranational organization. In order to safeguard the democratic future of the EU, the Union also tried to ensure that democracy and the rule of law would also be a central tenet in those treaties which would govern the organization and create the legal basis for its ruling (Gabel).

Authoritarianism vs Populism Debt Crisis, and the European Migrant Crisis contributed to a surge in nationalist, populist political parties, populism overall in Europe has been growing since the 1980’s (“Europe’s Populists Are Waltzing into the Mainstream”). However, with a new breath of life fueled by the economic and political turmoils of the 21st century thus far, populism has rapidly increased across Europe; from 2000 to 2017, the Tony Blair Institute reports an increase in the average EU state’s populist vote from 8.5% to 24.1.1% in national elections (“Europe’s Populists Are Waltzing into the Mainstream”). opposition to “judges, journalists, and bureaucrats” (“Europe’s Populists are Waltzing into the Mainstream”). Populism is described as a very weak ideology whose central goal aims to coalesce the power of the people and bring down some corrupt elite or “the establishment” (Rice-Oxley). Populist parties come from both the right and left sides of the political spectrum, however right-wing populism has gained a particularly strong following in more recent years in Europe (Galston). Early BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 8 thoughts of populist political movements characterized them as part of a broader dissatisfaction with the aforementioned economic turmoil following the Great Recession and it was believed that this surge in populist energy would eventually fall, however right wing populism has in fact gained popularity in Europe even as the economy recovered and unemployment levels fell (Galston).

National Front (now known as National Rally), the French populist, anti-immigrant right wing party led by Marie Le Pen seen in the middle, marching on May 1st, 2015. Many in the crowd chanted “go back home” in reference to immigrants and refugees in France. Source: The Financial Times.

The surge in support of populist parties has weakened the post-WWII center-left and center- right political domination and stability; as the economy has recovered, populist parties have found a new strength in collective opposition to “mass immigration, cultural liberalization, and the perceived surrender of national sovereignty to distant and unresponsive international bodies” (Galston). A few important populist parties to note include: the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany, the “YES” party (ANO the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in Austria, Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland, and the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the League (Lega) in Italy (Galston). Most of these populist parties mentioned are heavily Eurosceptic, meaning they do not want the European Union to have more power and sometimes actively support leaving the European Union altogether; for example the AfD in Germany has called for a “Dexit” signifying a German style “” following the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU (France-Presse). Although populist presents a challenge and threat to the future of the EU, BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 9 it does not inherently pose a threat to the democratic stability or legitimacy of the EU. Technically, outlined in Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, there is a path to leaving the European Union for all countries who wish to leave (Treaty on European Union). It is important to note the difference between populism/Euroscepticism and authoritarianism. Anti-establishment and anti-immigrant sentiments and political parties do not necessarily pose a threat to democracy. However, when these attitudes embolden leaders to take undemocratic actions to solidify their political regime or to promote their policies, the conditions are created for populism to transition into authoritarianism. Increasingly, authoritarian leaders, both in the EU and in other places, establish themselves through democratic means and in many cases, authoritarian leaders are democratically elected and many of them remain very popular (Gros).

The Scope of the Problem The European Union has experienced a rise in authoritarianism, mainly concentrated in former Eastern Bloc nations who joined the Union in the early 2000s. Hungary and Poland have most recently gone the furthest in democratic backsliding and have gone the furthest in the establishment of autocratic rule (Kelemen). However, many other member states are slipping into illiberal democracies amidst rising tensions stemming from both long-standing issues and current issues like the COVID-19 pandemic (Stevis-Gridneff, “E.U. Tries Gentle Diplomacy to Counter Hungary’s Crackdown on Democracy”). Viktor Orbán was democratically elected to be the leader of the state of Hungary, but has turned increasingly authoritarian, “…leading scholars of comparative politics agree that Hungary is no longer a democracy at all. Instead, it is a ‘competitive authoritarian regime’ or ‘pseudo- democracy’ – a hybrid authoritarian regime that maintains formal democratic institutions but fails to meet the minimal standards for democracy” (Kelemen). The upkeep or direct implementation of democratic institutions like periodic elections and the establishment of the press — the latter of which operating in a severely limited capacity — creates a facade of democracy which gives strength both domestically and internationally to the authoritarian regime (Kendall-Taylor). The Visegrád Group, also known as V4, was formed in 1993 and consists of four nations: The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Each member of V4 has recently dealt with the surge in anti-establishment, anti-EU and anti-immigrant rhetoric and sentiment in their respective BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 10 countries (Vit). The Czech Republic has, like many nations in the wake of the migrant crisis of 2015, experienced a sharp surge in nationalism; before the migrant crisis however, the Czech Republic also experienced a growth in negative EU sentiment which, along with a rise in nationalism, contributed to a rise in anti-EU sentiment across the state (Vit). Preceding the rise in anti-immigrant nationalism, most of the anti-EU sentiment came after the exit of the political generation responsible for EU accession who, in many people’s eyes, fell short of keeping the Czech Republic engaged with the EU which contributed to indifferent attitudes towards the EU (Vit). The rise in Euroscepticism, nationalism, and anti-immigrant sentiment in the Czech Republic has been met with opposition mostly from citizens of Prague, the metropolitan capital of the Republic (Culik). The opposition stands as a stark yet lonely contrast to the rest of the country who has warmed up to and voted for political leaders like Miloš Zeman, the openly nationalist and occasionally xenophobic President of the Republic and the current Prime Minister and leader of the populist, anti-immigrant ANO party, Andrej Babiš, a billionaire businessman (Galston, Culik).

Tomio Okamura, a far-right Czech politician addresses a crowd gathered to protest immigrants from muslim-majority countries in Prague in 2015. Source: World Politics Review.

In addition to the V4 member states, other nations who joined the EU following their departure from the Eastern Bloc and subsequent establishment of democratic nations have experienced similar brushes with populism and/or authoritarianism. Bulgaria has recently turned very autocratic, but they have also long struggled with post-Soviet era systemic corruption issues in BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 11 the design and operation of their state functions (Vassileva, “Bulgaria’s Autocratic Model”). Many of said state institutions and functions were and are relics of the Soviet satellite state that cannot keep up with a modern democracy. The primary institutional tool to Bulgaria’s autocratic government is used to abuse inconvenient opponents, including judges who refuse to comply with political orders, journalists who criticize government policies, and businessmen who refuse to succumb to corruption” (Vassileva, “Bulgaria’s Autocratic Model”). Bulgaria is a case of autocratic leaning governments in the EU who have more or less dealt with problems with autocracy outside of the growth in populist and nationalist sentiment for a much longer time. Their experience with democracy is more short-lived than other former Eastern Bloc countries because of systemic issues Bulgaria has had authoritarian tendencies dating back to the Soviet era. Their authoritarian practices have led to serious issues for the European Union, as Bulgaria has even gone so far as to aid other authoritarian regimes, directly in opposition to EU foreign policy, “In 2016, Bulgaria arrested seven Turkish opponents of Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan when they were trying to cross the Bulgaria-Romania border. It repatriated them to Turkey without extradition proceedings in blatant violation of the European Convention on Human Rights” (Vassileva, “Bulgaria’s Autocratic Model”). Bulgaria’s regressive reforms in the past few years of their already-weakened democracy have damaged the role of the free press, helped undermine the economy, and have made Bulgaria look to other autocrats for moral and economic support. Mass protests broke out in Bulgaria on July 9th, 2020 and have continued to grow in the months following, most are protesting against the third term of Prime Minister Boyko Borissov and the General Prosecutor Ivan Geshev (Vassileva, “Bulgaria: 100 Days of Protests”; “2020 Bulgarian Protests). The protests have garnered support from the European Parliament as the Parliament stepped away from the European Commission’s normal nonchalant attitude towards Bulgaria’s abandonment of democratic rule through their adoption of a resolution calling out the “rule of law decay” in Bulgaria (Vassileva, “Bulgaria: 100 Days of Protests”).

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 12 their ninth day of protesting the Bulgarian government in July of 2020. Source: Deutsche Welle

Again it is important to note the difference between populism and authoritarianism and the intersection of both issues. Throughout this topic, delegates should focus on authoritarianism in the EU. However, it is important to understand how and why authoritarian regimes have come to be, and through that lens it is also important to understand the rise in nationalism and populism in the past decade or so in Europe; some of which has contributed to the instillation of leaders and parties who have used populist popularity to erode democratic institutions. It is also important for delegates to understand the views of the countries they will be representing; many countries in the EU currently have or have recently had populist and/or nationalist political parties taking part in said countries’ governing coalitions. In Italy for example, Giuseppe Conte was selected in 2018 as Prime Minister to lead the coalition between the populist M5S and the more right-wing populist League; currently he rules as Prime Minister of a coalition between M5S and the center-left Democratic Party (“Giuseppe Conte”). As recently as May of 2019, before a scandal led to the dissolvement of the Austrian parliamentary coalition, the populist right-wing Freedom Party Austria (FPÖ) was a junior partner in the governing coalition (“First Kurz government”).

What Can the Union Do?

As previously mentioned, states who wish to join the European Union must demonstrate a commitment to democracy and democratic rule. However, the EU does not execute methods to

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 13 control the ways in which individual member states should ensure their commitment to democracy i.e. they do not control the safeguards of each member states’ democratic institutions directly. The EU’s main vehicle for punishment/enforcement of the rules of democracy and human rights is through Article 7 of the TEU (Treaty on European Union). Article 7 has two parts, “article 7.1 would allow the Council to give a formal warning to any country accused of violating fundamental rights. If that doesn’t have the desired effect, Article 7.2 would impose sanctions and suspend voting rights” vote must be passed (Treaty on European Union). The unanimous vote required to enact Article 7 of the TEU has created problems for the communist country in the European Union, said it will oppose any sanctions imposed by the bloc has also pledged to oppose sanctions brought against Poland (“Poland Says It Will Block Any EU Sanctions Against Hungary”). This pact between states has made it virtually impossible for the EU to suspend the voting rights of either nation, and to a much more serious extent, it has stopped the European central authority from being able to remove either nation from the EU despite the extent of their democratic abandonment.

The European Union’s Response

The European Union has approached the issue of authoritarianism and democratic backsliding differently throughout the years. As the European Union became a stronger, more state-like organization, they have tried to adopt a certain cohesiveness in regards to their foreign policy decisions. They have long presented an attitude that has been very sympathetic to and supportive of democracy and democratization, especially in matters regarding and former Eastern Bloc states. Most recently, the EU has recognized that there is an issue of democratic backsliding amongst its own member states and how that issue has created problems for the cohesion of the Union, and in the last few years, the EU has tried to take more decisive action against regional shifts away from democracy and towards authoritarianism (Bayer). The European Union has taken action on member states who have violated the commitment BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 14 to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law outlined in the Treaty on European Union. However in general, and especially with regards to Hungary, the EU was slow to action. The former European Commission Vice President in charge of justice, fundamental rights, and citizenship from 2010-2014, Viviane Reding has described the EU’s response to member states abandonment of democracy by stating that the commission did as much as it could, but was fundamentally unprepared to deal with the issue of democratic backsliding because no one had “intellectually foreseen” a challenge of this nature nor created the tools to combat it (Bayer). This points to a larger issue (that will be further elaborated upon), that although the EU has taken action, it has taken action fairly late and now has a limited capacity to distribute punishment.

Case Study: Hungary

Hungarian Prime Minster and leader of the populist Fidesz party, Viktor Orbán pictured in Berlin on May 8th, 2014. Source: Financial Times

stint as Prime Minister; he lost in 2002 but won again in 2010 (“Viktor Orbán”). Both Orbán and his national political party Fidesz started their careers in the late 1980’s during a time of upheaval across the Eastern Bloc preceding the fall of the (“How Viktor Orban Hollowed out Hungary’s Democracy”). In 1987 Orbán graduated with a law degree from the University of Budapest, and later became a founding member of the anticommunist Federation of Young Democrats, known in Hungarian by its acronym, Fidesz (“Fidesz”, “Viktor Orbán”). In 1989, Orbán gave a speech at the BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 15 reburial of the former premier Imre Nagy, who led the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, in which rebels led by Nagy gained control of Hungary and tried to implement a multiparty Hungarian government separate from the Soviet Union (“Hungarian Revolution”). The new Hungary only lasted about a month, eventually the Soviet Union brutally crushed the rebels and sentenced Nagy to death for treason (“Hungarian Revolution”). Orbán’s speech at Nagy’s reburial called for free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, it also gave Orbán widespread recognition throughout Hungary (“Viktor Orbán”). However, Orbán and Fidesz’s recapture of Hungarian parliament in 2010 with a from both Orbán and Fidesz’s roots in the freedom struggle of the late 1980’s (“How Viktor Orban Hollowed out Hungary’s Democracy”) . Step-by-step, Orbán and his party – who have moved from center-right Christian democracy further right and have become enormously nationalistic and patriotic – have eroded Hungary’s democracy through constitutional reforms aimed at increasing his party’s power (“How Viktor Orban Hollowed out Hungary’s Democracy”). Orbán packed courts with loyal judges and chipped away at the media’s powers and credibility. During the refugee crisis in 2015, Orbán led Hungary in building an “anti-migrant” fence to help continue his nationalist appeal (“How Viktor Orban Hollowed out Hungary’s Democracy”). Orbán is a self-described “illiberal democrat” who most recently signed into law a “rule by decree” statute in order to guide Hungary throughout the COVID-19 pandemic (“Hungary Is No Longer a Contestable Democracy”). Although the rule by decree law was set to expire on June 20th, most see this as merely a front to keep up the appearance of democracy, and it is widely believed House downgraded Hungary from “free” to “partly free” (Bayer). Orbán and Fidesz have blurred the lines of separation between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government in what Orbán calls a “system of national co-operation,” however this system should more straightforwardly be described by the truth to which it stands: a governmental system rebuilt to support and sustain Orbán and his party (“How Viktor Orban Hollowed out Hungary’s Democracy”). Many times, Orbán has tried to stave off criticism of his erosion of democratic norms by stating that he is trying to build a “different kind of democracy” citing both a creation of an “illiberal democracy” and a “Christian democracy” (Bayer). BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 16 During the last national election in Hungary in 2018, Fidesz won a supermajority— for the third election in a row — in parliament with over — of the seats (Csaky). Many reasons contribute to both Orbán and Fidesz’s ability to hold on to such vast popularity. One such reason is due to Fidesz’s supermajority held since 2010 which in addition to permitting Fidesz to enact constitutional changes (“How Viktor Orban Hollowed out Hungary’s Democracy”), it has given Fidesz the time to severely restrict the freedom of the media and to pack civil institutions full with those committed to the continuity of the party and Orbán’s rule (Csaky). Orbán has used scare tactics and propaganda (Csaky) to drum up intense support with his driving other media corporations out of business and eventually by more extreme measures like purchasing Hungary’s biggest opposition newspaper, Népszabadság (“How Viktor Orban Hollowed out Hungary’s Democracy”). By turning mass media into a propaganda machine, Orbán has been able to consolidate xenophobic, Islamaphobic, and anti-semetic scare tactics together into one central propaganda message with “seemingly unlimited public funds” (Csaky). Most of the country, save a small liberal bubble in Budapest, reads media controlled and manipulated by Fidesz (“How Viktor Orban Hollowed out Hungary’s Democracy”). Fidesz has also adopted the use of ethnic nationalism and economic populism in their central messaging and subsequent propaganda barrage which has helped exploit and exacerbate fears of cultural change and the evils of the “supposed globalist neoliberal consensus” among Hungary’s ethnically homogeneous population of around 10 million (“How Viktor Orban Hollowed out Hungary’s Democracy”).

Posters with slogan saying: ‘Don’t let George Soros have the last laugh’. George Soros is a Hungarian-national Jewish billionaire philanthropist and attacks from Fidesz and from far-right groups across the globe.

Source: Al Jazeera.

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 17 In the most blunt — or perhaps more apt — of terms, Hungary has become an authoritarian state. It is the result of a gradual yet ultimately impactful process of power accumulation by Prime Minister Orbán. A reason why Hungary’s slide into authoritarianism is so pressing for the European Union and the world is because it was less noticeable than the descents into despotism of contemporary nations; this so-called “slide” was far more subtle and more deliberate than other cases of democratic erosion (Bayer). Orbán chipped away at the Hungarian democracy, newly adopted by the state after the collapse of the Soviet Union, piece by piece and used his state- regulated media empire to excite fear among Hungarians in order to consolidate more power (Csaky). This decline towards authoritarianism made it easier for Hungary to pass the scrutiny of other EU actors and avoid action taken against the state (Bayer). It could be argued that Hungary is the best example of the European Union’s unpreparedness; the Union did not expect a member state to reverse its gains in democracy after meeting the democratic requirements to join and therefore did not adequately prepare for this very situation (Bayer). In Hungary’s case, Orbán exploited loopholes and shortcomings of the EU and its political system. The European Parliament functions like many other “federal-type” states meaning that the Pan-European parties are encouraged to win as many votes in each country as possible, giving incentives to protect European authoritarian leaders who deliver the broader party votes in Parliament (Kelemen). The European People’s Party is a big, generally center-right political party Germany and Angela Merkel’s CDU, Bulgaria and Borissov’s GERB, and Hungary and Orbán’s Fidesz (Bayer), the most ironic of pairs being Merkel, “the defender of Europe’s liberal democratic order” and Orbán, “an authoritarian populist seeking to disrupt that order” (Kelemen). Additionally, the EU still funds states who are actively involved in authoritarian practices; in 2019, Hungary was the biggest recipient of EU funds per capita and Poland was the biggest overall recipient (Kelemen). And lastly, because of the free movement of people throughout Europe, those who live in states that member states (Gabel). Since Orban’s rise to power in 2010, emigration from Hungary has more than doubled other member state’s emmigration rates, and unlike a fully federal state, immigrants in the EU do not have the right to vote in national elections in their new states and member states BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 18 can make — and in Hungary’s case have made — it harder or nearly impossible for immigrants not residing in their home countries to vote (Kelemen, “How Viktor Orban Hollowed out Hungary’s Democracy”). various methods of response. However, the European Union can mostly only threaten Orbán. The most effective measure against Hungary has been the European Court of Justice who has ruled many times against the extreme measures that Orbán has taken in the past years (“Hungary Is No Longer a Contestable Democracy”). The European Union as a whole has had severely incapacitated enforcement powers when it comes to enforcing the democratic commitment of member states, as both Hungary and Poland have pledged to block the unanimous vote required to remove a member state of the European Union (“Poland Says It Will Block Any EU Sanctions against Hungary”). Neither Hungary nor Poland would be able to vote on their own punishment — whether that be sanctions or removal — but one country can count on the either to vote against said punishment (Bayer).

Slow Response In general, the response to the rise in authoritarian states has been slow from both the response to Hungary’s democratic abandonment. However, another great way to understand the rise in authoritarianism and the slow-to-action response from the EU is through the lens of the Visegrad group. Each of the four countries of the Visegrad group has struggled since their accession with forms of democratic backsliding and Eurosceptic governments. The most dangerous part of the rise in authoritarian practices and states has been their slow walk away from democracy to authoritarianism. As seen with Fidesz in Hungary, parties across the Visegrad group, like Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS), have used similar nationalist tactics like fear mongering about the refugee crisis to convince their constituents to give their respective parties more power in order to secure the borders and keep everyone safe (Morillas). This shift in political ideology to power consolidation and illiberalism should not be “...considered as an overnight phenomenon, but one that has developed and taken hold over the past decade with roots of discontent” (Morillas). Additionally, many in the former Eastern Bloc credited the rejection of communism as one of national identity in opposition to the Soviet Union and not because of some strong support of liberalism or capitalism (“How Viktor BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 19 Orban Hollowed out Hungary’s Democracy”). This rather weak cultural support of liberalism has helped contribute to the acceptance of stronger political parties like Fidesz and PiS who have taken more consolidative power grabs. It has also allowed these parties to further weaken the tie between their constituents and liberalism by taking measures to give themselves more power, to limit the press in reporting any opposing views, and to declare civil society groups that promote government accountability and transparency as enemies of the state (Morillas).

Nationalism It is again important to note the differences between a rise in populist parties and the rise in illiberal democracies in Europe. As mentioned earlier, many/most states in the EU experienced a rise in populist parties in the mid to late 2010’s. Many of these parties aimed at representing very and cultural instability by blaming globalization and immigration. Again it is important for delegates to note and to understand the rise in European populism, especially when it comes to their respective countries. To reiterate once more, nationalism and populism do not inherently promote illiberal democracy or authoritarianism, but authoritarian leaders in Europe and elsewhere have used them as tools to rise to power and to solidify their rule.

Case Study: Poland

After the fall of the Polish communist state in 1989, Poland focused on integrating with the European continent at large, culminating in its accession to the EU in 2004. Thanks in part to economy which led to long expansion of GDP growth in Poland (Cienski). Since 1989, Poland’s economy has tripled and growth extended so long and forcefully that the Polish GDP kept expanding during the 2008 global Financial Crisis unlike its neighbors in the EU, which led to the view among the European Union that Poland was the EU’s “wonder child” (Cienski). Since accession, Poland has become a strong and visible member of the European Union; their most prominent politician and former Prime Minister Donald Tusk even became the President of the European BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 20 Council in 2014 (“Donald Tusk”). Poland was proof to the European Union that democracy and the rule of law could be adopted and upheld in Eastern Europe and that investments in former Soviet satellite states could be rewarded with long-term economic stability (“Europe’s New Headache”).

Pictured in the foreground of the Warsaw skyline is the Palace of Culture and Science, a relic of rapid post-Soviet GDP growth. Source: Associated Press

However, like many European states, Poland experienced a rise in nationalism which helped the populist Law and Justice Party (PiS) to rise to power in 2015 (“Europe’s New Headache”). In May of 2015, Andrzej Duda of the convservative-rightest Law and Justice (PiS) party won the Polish presidential election and in October of the same year, PiS also won with a coalition-free majority in Parliament (“2015 Polish parliamentary election”, Sobczyk). PiS’s main goal since its rise to power has been to solidify its power and its main vehicle for this consolidation has been the erosion of the judiciary branch. Borrowing tactics from neighboring illiberal state Hungary, PiS packed the constitutional court and copied other tactics like lowering the retirement age for judges to expand their power over all three branches of government (“How Viktor Orban Hollowed out Hungary’s Democracy”). The PiS’s rise to power in Poland was fueled by the rise in economic frustration and immigrant anxiety in Poland. Although Poland had one of the fastest growing economies in Europe, much of that growth was unevenly distributed, leading to a sense of discontent amongst many Poles BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 21 who feel cheated by both their country and the European Union (Charnysh). A poll taken of Polish citizens in April of 2017 showed that “only 22 percent of respondents agreed that everyone in Poland had equal opportunities, regardless of material circumstances, and 86 percent complained that the gap between the rich and the poor in Poland was too large” (Charnysh). Poles have also responded to the migrant crisis with a surge of anti-immigrant rhetoric and sentiment. Another poll examining Polish immigrant sentiment found that “against the background of terrorism and without personal contact with refugees, Poles appear to have little empathy for non-Christian migrants” (Charnysh). The national poll showed that 74% of respondents opposed accepting refugees from the Middle East and Africa but only around 40% resisted accepting refugees from Ukraine (Charnysh). Additionally, thanks in large part to a successful campaign of economic-populism, PiS experienced a surge in support from working-class, family-oriented voters who were convinced by promises — eventually kept — of economic vigour and cash infusion (Santora). PiS has been able to unite broad swaths of the Polish electorate discontent with the “aura of complacency and sleaze” they felt the centrist party, Civic Platform, had adopted (“How Viktor Orban Hollowed out Hungary’s Democracy”). Most strikingly and exemplary of the broader socio- cultural issues creating the foundations for similar feats of democratic backsliding in Europe, the rise in anti-immigrant, right-wing populism can be attributed further to issues stemming from the early 20th century. Drawing on the power of unifying Poles across the spectrum through Catholicism, Roman Dmowski championed Polish independence in the period between WWI and WWII and has Italian faciscm (Charnysh). However, the link between Polish nationalism and Catholicism was really driven home in the late 1980’s during Solidarity, the anti-communist labor movement that advocated fronts between far-right Polish nationalists and nationalist Catholics, “proposals to ban abortions and euthanasia unite racist skinheads and pious grandmothers” (Charnysh). This ability to easily stoke members make their own xenophobic comments, saving face for the more xenophobia-averse voter, while also promoting themselves as champions for a nationlist-Poland for the more far-right voter (Charnysh). BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 22 Marchers at the Polish Independence Day march in November 2017. The theme of the march of over 60,000 was religious, but many far-right marchers happily joined in. Source: Foreign Affairs

Hungary and Poland have many similarities in their recent abandonment of democracy, Hungary’s arguably best example for which being the state crackdown on the media. When looking at Poland’s role in democratic abandonment however, it might be better understood through the sustained attacks the PiS has committed against the judiciary. The European Union responded in economy and stop the PiS from abusing the rule of law and unfairly packing courts, citing an “absence of judicial independence” (“European Commission Triggers Article 7 against Poland”). However, as mentioned before, the EU has effectively no real enforcement power against Poland or Hungary, as both have pledged to block the unanimous vote required to kick the other out of the European Union, so the triggering of the article can go no further than 7.1, the warning stage of the article (“What Is Article 7, the EU’s ‘Nuclear Option’?”). Both Poland and Hungary have tried extensively to test the limits of their powers, both becoming increasingly emboldened in their blatant disrespect for the rule of law.. Following Duda’s Presidential reelection in July of 2020, the EU Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs committee formally adopted a nonbinding report declaring that the rule of law has “seriously deteriorated,” pushing EU leaders to move closer to adopting sanctions (Baume, Pronczuk). Recently and more controversially, the PiS party created a judicial review board with powers over several tiers of the Polish judiciary (Berendt). Although the review board may appear harmless BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 23 or in good faith, in actuality it has the power to send current members of local and Polish federal courts to prison for past “misconduct” — a phrase used purposefully to allow broad interpretations — giving the review board and the PiS party the power to pack courts with PiS loyalists (Berendt). In February of 2020 a German regional court in Karlsruhe declined an extradition of a Polish citizen the citizen could receive a fair trial in Poland, a “remarkable rebuke from the judiciary of one E.U. member country to another” (Berendt). Additionally, in February of 2020, the European Court ruled that Poland must suspend this disciplinary panel for judges as it clearly violates not only the Polish constitution but the integrity of Polish and European judicial stability in favor of the PiS (Berendt).

Questions to Consider

The European Union has had a long history full of challenges to its fundamental commitment to European economic and social integration and its commitment to democracy and the rule of law. No such challenge that the European Union has faced has brought along such an opposition to the fundamental workings of the Union than the challenge that authoritarian states bring. While remember that regardless of their member states’ political positions, the European Union itself is a governmental body that has fundamentally committed itself to the task of promoting democracy and the rule of law. Below are some important questions to consider while formulating positions on the 1. Why are the differences between authoritarian states and political populism important when 2. Is it possible to promote democracy and the freedom of speech/press/etc without promoting democratic, political movements who directly oppose democracy or its values? a. The question here is really asking, how can the European Union uphold the democratic ideal that all opinions and positions can be represented and then have to promote opinions/ideals/parties that directly want to take down the European Union? 3. How can the European Commission, Council, and Parliament stand up for European BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 24 democracy and values while adhering to the current EU judicial framework? a. Here it should be noted that although delegates may formulate their responses and plans based on theoretical solutions to these issues, it may be more realistic and helpful to formulate responses to these problems using the framework of current European Union legal and judicial workings.

Topic B: The Militarization of the European Union

Topic Background Aftermath of World War II

The European Union was founded after WWII, the most disastrous, industrialized war to have ever taken place on the European continent. As previously mentioned, the French diplomat, Robert Schuman proposed the European Coal and Steel Community with the aim to “make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible,” to deeply integrate and link together the economies of European nations to prevent a possible resurgence of war on the European continent. The ECSC eventually gave rise to the modern European Union, which has presided over the longest modern period of in Europe, often referred to as Pax Europaea (“Pax Europaea”). Following the addition of many former Soviet satellite states in the early 2000’s, tensions declined between East best by the EU’s receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 (“Pax Europaea”). During the rebuilding of Europe following WWII, some European leaders and scholars envisioned the continent connected through economic means, some even proposed that the linking of European economies would and should lead to the eventual creation of a European State with member nations serving as the new provinces/states (Churchill). Organizations and political movements, like the Union of European Federalists, were created to pressure European leaders and politicians into the creation of a framework for a European federalist state (“Union of

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 25 European Federalists”). However, there were intense political rivalries and complications that arose between those who wanted an integrated state and those who wanted to keep the sovereignty and independence of their home nations.

European Leaders’ Vision

Some saw the creation of a European state as necessary for European protection. At the time following the war, Europe was divided by the “Iron Curtain,” a phrase coined by Winston Churchill to describe the political divide between and their alliance with the United States during the and Eastern and and their alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War (“Iron Curtain”). Western European leaders, primarily the six founding members of the European Union, viewed the Soviet Union as a threat to democracy and the world order in general (Gabel). However the prominent French President, former WWII general and Nazi Germany-resistance leader Charles De Gaulle categorized the tensions arising in the Cold War as a power struggle between, “the Soviet and Anglo-Saxon camps” (Waters). De Gaulle envisioned the sorts to balance out the Soviet Union and United States’ tension; he theorized that Europe would need to integrate to become the “arbiter” between the Soviets and the United States/United Kingdom, which would include a formal, European military that would provide protection and strength for Europe as it took its place as the world’s peacemaker (Waters).

French President Charles De Gaulle pictured here in November of 1967 when he rejected the United Kingdom’s application to the European Economic Community and “common market”. It wasn’t until 1973, after De Gaulle had lost power and actually passed away, that the UK was able to join the “common market.” Source: BBC

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 26 Following the second world war, Charles De Gaulle led a campaign of reconciliation with Germany as he saw the future to safeguarding a peaceful and prosperous Europe was through by the Nazis, in saying to the German crowd, “yesterday it was our duty to be enemies, today it is our right to be brothers,” (Gerhäusser). Near De Gaulle was Konrad Adenauer, the former mayor of Cologne before the rise of the Nazis, a founding member of the Christian Democratic Union — the Chancellor of West Germany (“Konrad Adenauer”). Adenauer toiled tirelessly to ensure , working closely with Robert Schuman to create the European Coal and Steel Community, making sure that a path for integration into this new economic community would be available in the future to other European states (European Parliament, 2018). Much like De Gaulle, Adenauer hoped for the creation of a European-run defense community, but acquiesced and heavily supported Germany’s accession to NATO and its subsequent contributions (“Konrad Adenauer”, Waters).

Konrad Adenauer pictured speaking and standing next to De Gaulle in Bonn in 1962. Source: Deutsche Welle

The Union’s Defense Community

Although the European Union has grown in power and size since its inception, it has not formally become a sovereign state although it may perform many functions of a sovereign state: state-like, they have increased the importance in adopting an EU-wide foreign policy to address BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 27 both diplomatic and security issues concerning the EU (“Common Foreign and Security Policy”). The name for the Union’s adopted foreign policy is the Common Foreign and Security Policy, otherwise noted as CFSP. The CFSP really only outlines general terms and requirements for the Union’s actions in regards to foreign policy and defense security, however it more importantly includes subgroups and policies like the Common Security and Defense Policy, otherwise noted as CSDP (“Common Security and Defense Policy”). The EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy outlines the objectives and workings of the European defense structure, also referred to as the European Defense Union (EDU). Although the EU conducts military operations and objectives through the EDU, with the deployment of secondments from member states’ armed forces, it is not formally recognized as possessing its own military, mostly because the CFSP designates NATO as “responsible for the territorial defense of Europe and reconciliation” (“Common Foreign and Security Policy”).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1949 as a military treaty between the United States, Canada, and at the time mostly Western European nations in order to provide common security and defense for these nations against the military threat of the Soviet Union and its satellite states who later entered a similar agreement named the Warsaw Pact (Haglund,“Warsaw Pact”).

Pictured in 1949 in Washington D.C., US President Harry Truman meets with the co-founding heads of government to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Source: BBC BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 28 Arguably the most important part of NATO is the principle of collective defense outlined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, stating that “an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies,” (“Collective Defense - Article 5”). Since its creation in 1949, NATO rapidly expanded across Western Europe and North America and even to countries like Turkey which straddles both Europe and Asia (Haglund). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many former Soviet satellite states left the Warsaw Pact and joined NATO seeking retributive defense against Russia, what was left of the Soviet Union (Haglund). Many of the states who joined NATO also joined the European Union, the EU and NATO have 27 and 30 member nations respectively with 21 member nations belonging to both (“European Union — NATO relations”). Precisely because of NATO’s history and its high level of EU membership, the CFSP directly categorized NATO as the Union’s military protector and buffer (“Common Foreign and Security Policy”). NATO’s headquarters are located in Brussels, the de facto capital of the European Union (“European Union — NATO relations”). Although the Cold War has ended and the Iron Curtain no longer stands, both NATO and the EU and Europe as a whole still face threats. Global terrorism has presented an immediate threat to and response from NATO. Article 5 has only been enacted once so far, when it was invoked on September 12, 2001 committing its members to stand by the United States in its response to the September 11th attacks,” (Pruitt). Additionally, many leaders in the European Union see a threat to peace both globally and on the European continent with the rise of global military superpowers like Russia and China who are trying to compete with the United State’s global military dominance. The 21st century has seen the expansion of technological warfare like the expansion of security and control through facial recognition technology, the use of unmanned drones in military operations, and the rise in technological terrorism, and the EU has begun to recognize its role in promoting European technological innovation and independence (Barker). More recently, many European leaders, mostly those in the bigger military powers like France and Germany, have called for a European army. During the creation of the CSDP, European nations came together to address some of the rising concerns of the European Union and its member states thought was necessary for the future of European Defense; the meeting highlighted the leaders’ determination to take autonomous control and decisions over military operations, and to launch and BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 29 conduct EU-led operations where NATO was not engaged (Fiott). However, many issues have arisen as European leaders and the European Union itself have begun talks and formations for the eventual creation of a centrally controlled European army. What is not most clear is the political, economic, and technological will to get to the goal of an EU army, “nor is it clear that national governments want to relinquish control. The [EU] is still wrestling with the decades-old question of how much of hard power to put under the authority of Brussels — a weapons and military operations,” (Herszenhorn).

The European Union’s Response A Slow Walk to Military Independence

The 1990’s and early 2000’s were a period of expansion for the European Union. In addition to the expansion of the number of EU member states, the EU also began military operations in the and Africa in response to the political and military turmoil that took place in the overseas deployment in Macedonia and the Congo (Payne). During this time period, in addition to creating the CFSP and the CSDP, the EU also began implementing the framework and subsequent organizational bodies that would oversee future European military operations. One reason that Europe wanted to achieve more military autonomy (from NATO), was the rise in “…advocates of a more autonomous [European Security and Defense Policy] driven by [the] desire to fashion a security apparatus independent from Washington as well as by [the] desire to improve Europe’s ability to tackle global instability” (Payne). As of late, both individual member states and the European Union as a whole have begun to take small steps in the direction of creating an EU-coordinated military. Thus far, the furthest that the EU has come to a fully international operation consisting of multiple EU member state’s individual armed forces has been a training demonstration conducted by German and Dutch armies (Bennhold).

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 30 Pictured are Spanish troops in a EURFOR mission in the Congo. As recent as 2014, the EU has committed to sending troops to places like the Central African Republic. Source: Atlantic Council

Joint Demonstration

Although a Franco-German brigade was created previously in 1989, this military exercise European Union. It is important to note here that, like a military operation consisting of many allies, the soldiers are training and working for the same goal, the main difference being that both Dutch constitute one singular army instead of two separate entities working together (Bennhold). The Colonels said that they “no longer think in national terms” and that the values they are defending and promoting are “European” (Bennhold). Although a small operation, the battalion and its importance should not be understated. For the European Union, it is a signal that the future of European military operations lies in the integration of EU member states’ armed forces.

Pictured here are Dutch and German soldiers at the join training demonstration. Source: New York Times

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 31 Recently, more leaders in the EU have called for the full integration of European armed forces and the creation of a pan-European army. Two of the strongest champions for a pan-European army have been German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emanuel Macron and have come to represent a modern version of the relationship between Adenauer and De Gaulle (Tigner). Macron has described the world military future as unsure and insecure for Europe because, according to Macron and many in the European Union, the United States under Donald Trump has demonstrated an inconsistent commitment to the military defense of Europe, NATO, and its allies around the world, all the while China, Iran, and Russia have become increasingly belligerent (Pothier). Similarly, in a speech in 2018, Merkel said that Germany could no longer rely on the assumed immediate military support of the United States (Delfs). Thanks in part to Vladimir Putin’s military aggression and Donald Trump’s abandonment of its European allies, European governments have gone through serious transformations in the last few years dismissing claims of creating political gimmicks by calling on the creation of a pan-European army (Potheir). Over the past few decades, European NATO members have become complacent in their defense spending, but in 2015-2016, European defense budgets stopped their post-Cold War decline and have begun increasing defense spending targets, the average of which still lies below the 2% GDP threshold created by NATO but is steadily increasing (Pothier). These actions that the European Union have begun to take are big strides to make their security policies and operations more serious, creating a strong European military attitude on the world stage.

Pictured here are French President Emanuel Macron with German Chancellor Angela Merkel leaving the Elysee Palace in Paris on July 13, 2017. Source: Politico BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 32 Rising Issues and Tensions America and NATO’s Roles

Although Europe sees NATO as a reliable military institution, especially when it comes to the protection of the European continent in regards to the security of Ukraine and the Baltic states against Russian military threats, the EU has recently moved to a position where an EU army would mostly compliment NATO’s operations and give Europe more autonomy in their own military behind NATO (“Emmanuel Macron Warns Europe: NATO Is Becoming Brain-Dead”). In an interview with the Economist, President Macron commented on NATO and the current state of the US foreing policy saying, “What we are currently experiencing is the brain death of NATO,” and further elaborates to show that in his view, America is showing signs of turning its back on its allies as it demonstrated starkly with its unexpected troop withdrawal from north-eastern Syria in late 2019 forsaking its Kurdish allies (“Emmanuel Macron Warns Europe: NATO Is Becoming Brain-Dead”).

Pictured here are U.S. military vehicles on a road in the town of Tal Tamr after pulling out of a base in northern Syria in October of 2019 following a directive by US President Donald Trump. Source: NPR

Since the end of the Cold War, European nations have severely defunded their militaries following

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 33 the de-escalation of high tensions across the Iron Curtain. Now, Russia has become increasingly interested in European territories like Ukraine and the former Soviet and Baltic states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all of which are in the EU (Scrutton). European states in NATO have increased their military spending as of late following calls from US President Donald Trump for a need for the renewal of the NATO requirement for member states to spend 2% of their GDP on their military (a battalion typically has a few hundred soldiers, and slots into a larger brigade). By 2015, even with Germany reunited, that had fallen to 34, a remarkable 84% cut. The number of Italian battalions fell by 67% and British ones by almost half,” (“Western European Armies Have Shrunk Dramatically”). military operations in Europe, as “American forces in Europe shrank from 99 battalions to a paltry 14—from half a million troops to 76,000 today, which is still more than all but seven European NATO allies,” (“Western European Armies Have Shrunk Dramatically”). As the EU is presented with security the United States’ commitment to support NATO and its allies (Gstalter).

Pictured here is a huge military march of Russian soldiers through Red Square in Moscow. Source: The Wall Street Journal

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 34 Questions to Consider

The European Union was created as a way to economically link the nations of Europe together in order to avoid war and destruction and safeguard a peaceful future for Europe. During the creation of the European Union, and still today, many called for the full integration of European nations into one European nation. Although the modern European Union is not a full state, it has many functions of a federalist nation with its member states giving up some individual powers to the central European Union government, much like states/provinces do in a federal state. Today Europe faces many challenges in a world increasingly dominated by military superpowers, leading to a more serious discussion of the formal creation of an EU permanent and centralized command and control center for its military operations, which would be a dramatic increase in the integration of European Union member states. While formulating responses to the central question, should the European Union continue on the path to military integration, how and why, delegates should refer to the questions to consider below. 1. Could the creation of a European army work with NATO and not undermine its presence and position in the world? a. Here it is crucial for delegates to understand the debate around the creation of an EU army and its potential implications for the stability and future of NATO. It is also crucial the future of militarization, using both historical stances to military operations and the European Union as a whole and possibly their states’ positions and operations with NATO. 2. Would the creation of a European military force undermine the militaristic (or for that matter the non-militaristic) goals of smaller nations that would be a part of the European Union’s military? a. It is also important for delegates to think about the implications of bigger, more militarily advanced or more militarily demonstrative powers in the EU like France or Germany and their military goals. How much power would these nations have in the operation and running of the military? Would it be feasible for Brussels to create military strategy and policy that would address the militaristic goals of each individual

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 35 operations and how would it affect the arms and military industry in Europe? Is the adoption of a pan-European military innately against any of these changes or desires? b. Smaller member states of the European Union may not want to be subject to the control of their military operations by Brussels. In general, it would be hard for a supranational organization of 27 individual member states to unilaterally adopt military strategies and operations and possibly demand the participation of citizens from each member state in those operations. 3. afford it? a. would do to NATO in the eyes and pocketbooks of your respective countries. If a state wants to create a European army because they see threats only solvable through said creation, would they still fund NATO? Would those threats be easily solved with a more direct relationship between NATO and the EU? Would they have to fund spending for NATO and for a new European army or would they eventually drop support of NATO? 4. of the post-WWII order that supposes strong defense spending and military outposts for countries to be able to most effectively promote their ideology and institutions. However, not every country or ruling party may agree with that stance. There are many parties in Europe and across the world, some even part of ruling coalitions, that believe military interventionism and desires of their respective member states.

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BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 37 Topic A

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Kendall-Taylor, Andrea, and Erica Frantz. “How Democratic Institutions Are Making Dictatorships More Durable.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 30 Apr. 2019, www.washingtonpost. com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/19/how-democratic-institutions-are-making- dictatorships-more-durable/.

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Novak, Benjamin. “Hungary Moves to End Rule by Decree, but Orban’s Powers May Stay.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 16 June 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/ world/europe/hungary-coronavirus-orban.html.

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Pronczuk, Monika. “Poland’s Supreme Court Declares Presidential Election Valid.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 3 Aug. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/world/europe/ poland-court-presidential-election.html.

Rice-Oxley, Mark, and Ammar Kalia. “How to Spot a Populist.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 3 Dec. 2018, www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/03/what-is-populism-trump- farage-orban-bolsonaro. BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 40 Santora, Marc. “In Poland, Nationalism With a Progressive Touch Wins Voters.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 10 Oct. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/10/10/world/europe/poland- election-law-and-justice-party.html.

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BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 41 Topic B

Barker, Tyson. “Europe Can’t Win the Tech War It Just Started.” Foreign Policy, The FP Group, 16 Jan. 2020, foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/16/europe-technology-sovereignty-von-der-leyen/.

Bennhold, Katrin. “A European Army? The Germans and Dutch Take a Small Step.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 20 Feb. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20/world/europe/ germany-defense-spending-european-army.html.

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Gstalter, Morgan. “Merkel: Germany Can’t Rely ‘on the Superpower of the US’ Anymore.” TheHill, 20 July 2018, thehill.com/policy/international/398025-merkel-we-cant-rely-on-the-superpower-of- the-us-anymore. BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 42 Herszenhorn, David M., et al. “EU, Founded as Project of Peace, Plans Military Future.” POLITICO, POLITICO, 18 Apr. 2019, www.politico.eu/article/eu-founded-as-project-of-peace-debates-a- militarized-future-nato-european-defense-fund-russia/.

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BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 43 June 2019, www.institutegreatereurope.com/post/2019/06/25/charles-de-gaulle-and- his-europe-of-nations-theory-and-practice. “Warsaw Pact.” Encyclopædia Britannica, 10 Sep. 2020, Britannica. www.britannica.com/event/ Warsaw-Pact. Accessed 05 Nov. 2020. “Western European Armies Have Shrunk Dramatically.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 2 Mar. 2020, www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/03/02/western-european-armies-have- shrunk-dramatically.

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