Fall Readings • CAS in Nonlinear Warfare • Desert Storm’S Meaning

Fall Readings • CAS in Nonlinear Warfare • Desert Storm’s Meaning

Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Gary A. Voellger

Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark

Associate Editor Capt John J. Doherty

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin VV. Bassett, Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Manager

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a cour- tesy line. JOURNAL Fail 1992, Vol. VI, No. 3 AFRP 50-2

Editorial 2 Desert Storm as a Symbol: Implications of the Air War in the Desert Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired 4 Which Way to the FEBA? Maj John \1. Fawcett. Jr., USAF 1 4 Operations Law and the Rules of Engagement in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm Lt Col John G. Humphries, USAF 2 5 Financial Management for the New World Order Maj Paul G. Hough. USAF 4 3 Psychological Effects of Aerial Bombardment Maj Martin L. Fracker, USAF 5 6 Becoming a Better Military Writer Greg Todd 6 9

Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 84 Notams Notices of Interest 93 Contributors 9 5 EDITORIAL

Where Would You Like To Go?

FEW YEARS ago, some officers who improve the situation by publishing Air were studying Air Force officer pro- Force Manual (AFM) 53-1, United States Afessional military education (PME) made Air Force Officer Professional Military an interesting discovery. Amazing as it Education System, which actually con- seems in today’s total-quality environ- tained a description of the professional ment, we have no clearly articulated Air Force officer. There isn’t room on this description of what we want our officer page to quote the entire description, but PME system to produce. part of it said (please remember it was Army Air Forces Regulation (AAFR) 20- written before gender-neutral language 61, Organization, Air University—the was required), guidance in effect on 3 September 1946 when the first postwar officer PME classes The professional Air Force officer is the aerospace expert of the nation’s fighting began at Maxwell Field, Alabama—didn’t forces. He understands the nature of war and give Gen Muir S. Fairchild, the first com- is proficient in the art of waging it under any mandant of Air University (AU), very level of conflict. He is a leader of men in much direction. It simply said that AU both peace and war. . . . would “be responsible for the supervision He combines military bearing and self-confi- and operation, in accordance with policies dence with loyalty, integrity, self-discipline, established by the Commanding General, versatility and adaptability. His ethics and AAF,” of the three schools under its con- conduct are based upon the idea of service trol (page 1). It didn’t say what the prod- above self. uct of the education was supposed to be. He communicates effectively and works effi- Perhaps we can understand this lack of ciently with people at all levels. . . . direction. After all, those early pioneers had just victoriously concluded the most The professional Air Force officer recognizes demanding war in history and were in the that he must continually expand his knowl- throes of organizing the nation’s first sepa- edge and understanding of the art of war. He recognizes his responsibilities to the Nation, rate air service. both as a citizen and a military officer. He Unfortunately, the guidance hasn’t got- thus seeks to maintain those high intellec- ten much more specific. Despite a multi- tual, ethical and physical standards requisite tude of revisions over the years, the cur- to a corps of professional officers which mer- rent guidance still doesn’t tell what the its the trust and respect of the society which product of the PME system should be. it serves. (Page 2) What kind of officers are supposed to come out the other end of the educational Although there is room for discussion as system? What should they know? What to the completeness or accuracy of the should they be able to do? How would we description, at last the PME system had a like them to feel? product description to work toward. The Report of the Educational Unfortunately, succeeding revisions have Requirements Board on Professional dropped any such description of the pro- Military Education of 1963 highlighted fessional Air Force officer. this lack of guidance, and the Air Force Certainly, an educational system is not a made an honest attempt in 1966 to production-line factory from which exact

2 duplicates with interchangeable parts Besides, how would we know when we issue forth on graduation day. Strict con- got there? formity of thought is not the goal. Even if Maybe the current system is doing the it were achievable, it would not be desir- best job that can be done. There’s no way able. Diversity is the key to both survival of knowing until we determine what it is and progress. On the other hand, if we we are trying to produce. As Stephen R. don’t know where we are trying to go, it Covey says, we need to “begin with the doesn’t really matter which path we take. end in mind.” RBC

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- opment. In fact, the early leaders of the indus- spondence should be addressed to the Editor. trial revolution simply adopted a proven sys- Airpower Journal, Walker Hall. Bldg. 1400, tem: the centuries-old military command Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the structure. Since the time of Genghis Khan and right to edit the material for overall length. Alexander the Great, this has been the dominant structure of countless military organizations, and for good reason. We simply didn't TQ-ING TQ “invent” the military command structure dur- Capt Graham W. Rinehart’s article on “A New ing the industrial revolution of the 1700s and Paradigm for Organizational Structure” (Spring 1800s. 1992) was very interesting, considering the As the industrial revolution ended and we emphasis placed on total quality management moved into a technological revolution, condi- today. I always read several articles in each tions changed, thus requiring a review of the issue. Keep up your good work! way we do business. This led to Dr Deming’s statistical methods. These methods should not, SMSgt Frank J. Wallace, USAF. Retired however, be a substitute for the proven require- Austin. Texas ment of the military command structure. The “continuous improvement” ideal of Dr Deming’s philosophy works well under the I have grave concerns about Captain Rinehart’s conditions of a peacetime, business-oriented basic assumptions regarding the effectiveness atmosphere. As long as we have the time and of Dr VV. Edwards Deming’s quality improve- resources to identify the customers, establish ment philosophy as it applies to the military. goals, analyze the processes, and so forth, the In a purely business-oriented, profit-motivated system will be effective. But I am afraid as we organization, the philosophical ideals of qual- ingrain this attitude in our young airmen, non- ity improvement certainly have merit. Admit- commissioned officers, and officers, we will tedly, there are practical points we should risk losing our military identity, which will adopt in the Air Force as they apply to procure- result in a total failure of the discipline that ment, research and development, and other allows an airman or soldier to enter combat similar “business" activities. However, I without question. wouldn’t try to take them to the battlefield and I have certainly experienced this attitude. As expect them to work. a young second lieutenant during a mobility- Captain Rinehart implies that the current employment exercise, I was in charge of a con- pyramidical command structure was born out tamination-control area with over 100 personnel of a response to the early industrial revolu- assigned to me. Recognizing that the airmen of tion—that is, as a method to control its devel- continued on page 78

3 DESERT STORM AS A SYMBOL IMPLICATIONS OF THE AIR WAR IN THE DESERT

Col Dennis M. D rew, USAF, Ret ir ed DESERT STORM AS A SYMBOL 5

ICTORY IN the Gulf war power and its dominant position in late brought with it both euphoria twentieth-century warfare. Most impor- and controversy. Almost noth- tant, however, victory in the Gulf war ing could dampen the euphoria symbolized the need to reevaluate and which followed such a successful short reform traditional ways of thinking about war that produced remarkably few casual- the art and science of war. ties. The controversy has been mostly good-natured, centering on the question, Who won the war? Success has a thou- The Real and Symbolic sand fathers, and proud airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines are quick to trumpet Victory their contributions to the victory. In truth, everyone is correct. It was a The story of what happened in the air great victory for joint warfare. The stran- during Desert Storm is well known. gling naval blockade, the devastating air Beginning in mid-January 1991, coalition campaign, the integration of space assets air power (note that the term is air power, into all operations, the lightning-fast not air force) seized control of the air over ground maneuvers, the threatened both Kuwait and Iraq within hours and seaborne invasion—these and many other within a matter of days achieved total air operations define the essence of joint war- supremacy. In nearly simultaneous fare. The spirited controversy between the actions, air power “blinded” the Iraqi services is good fun, even if it sheds little leadership, making command and control useful light on the event. of Iraqi forces in the field exceedingly dif- There is, however, a serious side to ficult. Meanwhile, strategic targets— what might otherwise be harmless macho including Iraqi nuclear facilities—were posturing by airmen, soldiers, sailors, and attacked and either destroyed or heavily marines. Operation Desert Storm symbol- damaged. The campaign quickly moved ized a fundamental shift in the traditional on to physically isolate Iraqi surface forces method of waging mechanized warfare. deployed in and around Kuwait (a classic The stunning performance of coalition air interdiction campaign) and then to attack power symbolized both the maturity of air field forces directly from the air. Although Desert Storm was conceived as a four-phased campaign, all phases over- lapped to the point that they were nearly simultaneous. The result, of course, was that when the ground offensive began in mid-February, it met minimal resistance and quickly swept forward from Saudi Arabia all the way to the Euphrates River, accepting the surrender of tens of thousands of hungry, demoralized Iraqi soldiers. The magnitude of 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

the aerial victory in the overall campaign The importance of air power was revealed was revealed by the almost unbelievably only with further experience in the wars low casualty rate suffered by coalition sur- that followed. face forces. Experience—sometimes bitter and dis- In previous wars, the impact of air appointing, sometimes dramatic and deci- power had always been a bone of con- sive—was also the key element in temper- tention. an article of unresolved and unre- ing and honing the blade of air power. solvable debate. In the Gulf war, the The global experience of World War II and impact of air power (again note the generic its somewhat mixed results in terms of air term) was clearly overwhelming and deci- power, the disappointing experience of sive. The clarity of the aerial victory also the Korean War, and the confusing experi- provided a symbolic beacon of sorts. It ence of the war in Southeast Asia all pro- symbolized the maturity of air power, the vided the know-how to structure, train, domination of air power, and the need for equip, and employ air power effectively a new paradigm of warfare. across the entire spectrum of conflict.2 The extravagant promises of the air power prophets also seemed hollow Symbol of Maturity because their visionary reach exceeded their technological grasp. Either the The most obvious symbolic meaning of prophets were unaware of the many prob- the Desert Storm experience was that air lems that would confront airmen or they power has matured as an instrument of too easily assumed them away. In the war. At long last, air power lived up to its beginning, the list of problems which hin- potential and fulfilled the promises made dered air power was almost endless— by the early prophets of air power. Much inadequate power plants, poor aerody- credit has been given to the sophisticated namics, limited range and lifting capacity, technology employed by airmen in the inadequate speed, inaccurate delivery sys- Gulf war. However, the maturation of air tems, and so forth. The list goes on and power is a much more complicated story on. Even nature conspired to hinder the that goes far beyond technological gadgets. airmen. Poor weather and the dark of The maturity of air power resulted from night were two of the most difficult and the confluence of three streams of devel- universal problems with which airmen opment over the past 80 years: experi- had to contend. ence, technology, and doctrine. Sometimes slowly, sometimes with Air power’s early prophets—Giulio mind-boggling speed, but always with pre- Douhet, Gen William (“Billy”) Mitchell, dictable persistence, technology overcame and others—predicted during their hey- the limitations, peeled away many of the days in the 1920s that air power would problems, and left air power with its revolutionize the nature of war. Some prophetic revolutionary essence. Today it even predicted that surface forces would is not much of an exaggeration to say that become obsolete. But their visions were air power can carry any load, anywhere, simplistic, unseasoned by extensive expe- under any conditions, and deliver that rience in warfare generally and in aerial load with great speed and incredible pre- warfare specifically. World War I had cision. Although air power has not fully seen the only large-scale employment of realized this long-sought goal, it is getting air power in a major conflict, and the closer and closer. results were mixed. In all likelihood, But experience and technology by them- World War I would have been fought in selves are not enough to create the domi- much the same way and with the same nating influence of present-day air power. general results had air power not existed.1 Equally essential is doctrine. Conceptu- ally, doctrine ties together the lessons of The performance of coalition air power in Operation Desert Storm symbolizes both the maturity of air power and its experience and the technology of the pres- dominant position in the late twentieth century. Here, US. ent into an effective operating scheme. It Canadian. French, and Qatari aircraft fly in formation establishes what airmen believe about the during Operation Desert Shield. best way to wage aerial warfare, given what they have learned and what they can men the tools they needed to fulfill the do. The development of doctrine is the prophets’ dreams.3 third stream of development in the matu- The nuclear era brought with it the ration of air power. seeds of its own demise. Fear of nuclear The air power prophets were enthralled calamity led the United States to fight by the idea that air power could destroy only limited wars for limited objectives an enemy’s ability to resist by destroying with limited means. The Korean War was his means of producing the wherewithal a major disappointment for airmen, but so of mechanized war. The doctrine of strong were their beliefs that they chose to strategic bombing, which had its roots in view it as little more than an aberration. World War I and was fervently articulated As a result, strategic bombing continued to in the 1920s and 1930s, envisioned attacks drive US air power doctrine through the on an enemy’s industrial capabilities that 1950s. Not until the Vietnam conflict did would lead to quick collapse. As demon- it become clear that nuclear weapons strated in World War II, bombing an would rarely—if ever—be used except in enemy into submission was not quite so extremis. Further, both Korea and simple or so easy. The advent of nuclear Vietnam highlighted the indecisive nature weapons, however, seemed to provide air- of strategic industrial bombing in a war

7 against a nonindustrialized country (a facet of the war in the Gulf. However, the kind of war the air power prophets had dominant nature of air power is not a sur- not imagined) as well as the crucial role of prising “bolt from the blue.” Rather, it is nonstrategic air power missions in such the culmination of a long-term trend. wars. Throughout its 80-year history, military In the wake of the Vietnam conflict, air power has become a more important some airmen began thinking of air power factor in warfare with each passing year. in a much broader and more sophisticated The trend was obvious even in the early manner. Rather than emphasizing certain experience of World War I. Envisioned missions (e.g., strategic bombing), in the before 1914 only as reconnaissance plat- early 1980s some US airmen began look- forms, aircraft not only became invaluable ing at the operational level of war and air in that role, but performed many other campaigns designed to create synergies roles as well. In World War II, control of from the careful orchestration of all air the skies became the first priority in plan- power missions. The notion of a compre- ning virtually every operation, whether on hensive air campaign, which came to full land or at sea. In North Africa as well as flower in the Gulf war, reflected the matu- Northwest Europe, land forces had great rity of US air power doctrine. difficulty operating under hostile skies and operated much more effectively with friendly air control and assistance. Symbol of Domination Air power was perhaps even more important to amphibious operations. One can also view Desert Storm as a Note, for example, that control of the air symbol of the dominant role that air was a prerequisite for Operation Sea Lion power has assumed in modern mecha- (the planned German assault on Great nized warfare. Clearly, it dominated every Britain) and Operation Overlord (the

8 DESERT STORM AS A SYMBOL 9

Allied invasion of Northwest Europe in As was evident with land forces, sea 1944). In the former case. Germany never surface forces operating without sufficient achieved air superiority over Britain— air cover were at constant risk. The sink- thanks to Churchill’s “few” to whom so ing of the British warships Repulse and much was owed—and Sea Lion was can- Prince o f Wales by Japanese air power off celed. In the latter case, total Allied air the coast of Malaya and the sinking of the supremacy over the invasion beaches of Japanese superbattleship Yamato by US Normandy played a significant role in the air power late in the war are just two well- success of Overlord. known examples. Gen George C. Kenney’s At sea, the growing importance of air use of land-based air power to establish power was even more pronounced. Prior control of the narrow waters of the to World War II, most naval leaders envi- Southwest Pacific theater of operations is sioned naval air power as an extension of another example, but on a much larger the eyes and ears of the fleet, rather than scale.5 its principal striking arm. By the end of The importance of air power is not just a the war, it was clear that the face-to-face contention of the US Air Force. Rather, it gun battles between contending fleets is a reality underscored by the US Army, were a thing of the past and that naval avi- Navy, and Marine Corps. The Army has ation was the primary offensive striking its own air force (mostly helicopters), arm of the Navy. Worth noting is the fact rivaling the US Air Force in the number of that in 1941 the US Navy had eight aircraft airframes it possesses. At sea, the Navy’s carriers with 521 aircraft aboard. At the aircraft carriers are clearly the centerpiece end of the war, the Navv had 99 aircraft of a fleet largely organized into carrier bat- carriers with 4,000 aircraft aboard.4 tle groups—with all due respect to sub- Over the years, naval aviation has evolved into the primary mariners, who take a slightly different offensive striking arm of the fleet. The US Navy began view. In the Marine Corps, closely inte- World War II with only eight aircraft earners blit increased that number to 99 by the end of the war. At left, a crippled grated air/ground operations are standard F6F lands aboard the USS Yorktown in 1944. Today's operating procedure. Air power now carriers, like the one below, are the centerpiece of the Navy. dominates warfare. 10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

Symbol of Need two-dimensional context. The early twen- for a New Paradigm tieth century saw war expand into the third dimension, but only as a simple As pointed out previously, the matura- extension of the traditional two-dimen- tion of air power is not the result of the sional model. This was appropriate in the sudden introduction of some new gadget. early days, insofar as the capabilities of It is the result of the accumulation of airmen were limited by primitive technol- experience, the development of technology, lack of experience, and questionable ogy, and the refinement of doctrine over doctrine. the past 80 years. The same holds true for However, even as air power matures, the the dominating nature of air power. It is traditional view of air power persists. Air the culmination of an 80-year trend. In a power has been—and generally still is— sense, the culmination of these two viewed by nonairmen as an adjunct to sur- trends—symbolized by the aerial victory face forces, an instrument used to lend in Desert Storm—has crept up on airmen, support to warriors tied to the surface of soldiers, sailors, and marines alike and our planet (nuclear warfare excepted). caught them off guard. The result is the Even conventional strategic bombing was urgent need to develop a new paradigm—a considered by all but air power zealots as new way of thinking about modern mech- merely a means to reduce the enemy’s anized warfare. ability to resist in the field. The two- For literally thousands of years, military dimensional model has persisted so long establishments have operated within a that a good many airmen, particularly The Marine Corps and Army have their own air warfare. Further, progress is simple to arms—evidence that the importance of air power is not just a evaluate—one uses a map and watches the contention of the US Air Force. Left. Army OH-58 scout helicopters land in preparation for refueling at Camp Silopi, orderly advance (or retreat) of the front Turkey. Above. Marine Corps aircraft between missions at lines. an air base in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert A three-dimensional model of warfare is Storm. based on a unique capability that defines the essence of air power. That capability is the quick concentration of great power those involved with so-called tactical air over any spot on the surface of the globe. power, believe that air power’s role is to The result is that an enemy is vulnerable support surface operations. everyplace all the time. Conceptually, But times have changed. The need to every tangible facet of an enemy’s power develop a new paradigm that makes the structure can be attacked with equal facil- best use of air power’s newfound maturity ity at any time. Consequently, one no and domination is obvious. The new longer requires sequential orientation. model should not just address long-stand- Operations against the enemy—whether at ing questions of who supports whom—the the front lines, at some deep-seated center main weight of effort—and who controls of gravity, or at some place in between— what. Rather, the new model must return can be parallel in nature, perhaps carried to the fundamentals and reevaluate the art on simultaneously. of warfare itself in the air power age. An Controlling territory becomes much less example will illustrate the point. important in a three-dimensional model. The two-dimensional model of warfare Forces deployed to hold territory can, in has a sequential orientation. It assumes fact, be a disadvantage in some circum- that an enemy’s military forces will be stances. The Iraqi case provides a classic deployed to defend his centers of gravity. example in which air power reduced the Thus, the two-dimensional model of war- Iraqi army in the field to a bedraggled, fare postulates that (1) fielded armies and demoralized, undersupplied, and hungry navies must be defeated and driven back, mob that wanted to do little more than to the extent that (2) an enemy’s center(s) surrender. As a result of all this, in the of gravity become(s) vulnerable. Seizing, three-dimensional model, maps no longer controlling, and holding territory become serve as adequate or accurate tools for of paramount importance in this model of measuring the progress of a war.

ll 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

The air campaign in Desert Storm illus- model, forces on the offensive have enor- trated the advantages of parallel opera- mous advantages over those on the defen- tions in a three-dimensional model of war. sive. Successful defense would require The result was a thundering aerial one to be strong everywhere all the time— onslaught that put enormous pressure on a near impossibility. In this model, the strategic, operational, and tactical targets question of who is supporting whom can all at once and continuously, offering the become irrelevant or can be a constantly enemy no chance to recoup. changing relationship, depending upon Previous wars in the air power age fore- the enemy’s actions and reactions. shadowed, in limited ways, the parallel air But the key is air power. Air power campaign in the Gulf war. In World War makes such warfare possible to begin II, for example, the strategic bombardment with, and air power will make it possible of Germany progressed even while Allied to execute in practice. The absolute crite- forces built up in Great Britain for the ria are control of the air and overwhelm- invasion of the Continent. In the Pacific, ing amounts of air power to take advan- the bombardment of Japan began in tage of that control. In the Gulf war, the earnest even as Allied forces were moving coalition achieved total air supremacy. through the island chains toward the Whether or not such total control of the air Japanese homeland. is required remains a question that can be For the most part, however, the strategy resolved only with further study. used in World War II was sequential in nature. The Battle of the Atlantic had to be won before forces could be massed in The Challenge for Airmen Great Britain. Adequate forces had to be massed in Great Britain before the inva- It seems to this writer that airmen must sion could take place. The Normandy address three basic agenda items if they beachhead had to be established and port are to fully develop the new three-dimen- facilities secured before Allied forces sional paradigm. First, they must address could break out across France, and so the implications of such a model of war- forth. In the Pacific, the story was much fare. Some are obvious. Clearly, airmen the same. must be able to operate 24 hours a day, in The capabilities of modern air power all weather, at a high tempo. They must and a truly three-dimensional war-fighting be able to respond quickly and accurately model may obviate the need for sequential to a campaign situation that will change strategies in many situations. If an enemy rapidly. These requirements, in turn, can is vulnerable everywhere all the time, the- have serious implications for weapons ater commanders can choose and then system design, force structures, manning orchestrate the combination of simulta- levels, logistic patterns, intelligence neous or near-simultaneous actions that requirements, and command and control will create the greatest impact upon that structures. As thinking about the new par- enemy’s ability to resist. The result adigm unfolds, airmen will certainly have should be a rapidly unfolding campaign in to address a good many more require- which there are no front lines, in which ments and implications. holding territory is often irrelevant (and Second, airmen must overcome the fears may be a detriment), and in which air, and resistance that will surely come from land, and sea forces are used to their great- their compatriots in arms who serve in the est advantage against the most appropriate surface forces. Is the future of surface and important enemy vulnerabilities any- forces dim? Certainly not. On the con- where at any time. trary, the three-dimensional model of war- In such a three-dimensional campaign fare will open new vistas for the use of DESERT STORM AS A SYMBOL 13

surface forces of all kinds. At this early Our colleagues in the surface forces must stage in its development, the three-dimen- enter the dialog, challenge airmen and sional model of warfare appears to be the their ideas, and present alternative argu- epitome of joint operations. ments. The full development of the new The third agenda item is both a method paradigm of warfare requires a vigorous for accomplishing the first two and a dialectic process. requirement in itself. Airmen must edu- Operation Desert Storm, although not cate themselves and others. We must large by historical standards, was one of force ourselves to challenge assumptions those symbolic events that few people are and to rethink long-standing beliefs. fortunate to witness. It symbolized both a Airmen must commune with one another, fundamental shift in the way many wars feed off each other’s ideas, and develop will be conducted and the need for a new the new model of warfare to the fullest. way of thinking about military operations. Airmen must write in their journals and Viewed from the Iraqi perspective, Desert debate the ideas and their implications. Storm symbolized the terrible penalty for Airmen should initiate conferences to adhering to the old model. It is time to stimulate the free flow of ideas. But this change, and airmen must lead the way. □ process must not be limited to airmen.

Notes 1. See Lee Kennett. The First Air War, 1914-1918 (New 1987); David R. Mets’s Master of Airpower: General Carl A. York; Free Press, 1991). In particular, see chapter 13—espe- Spaatz (Novato. Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988); and James cially pages 220-29. There is no question that air power per- Parton’s "Air Force Spoken Here”: General Ira Eaker and the formed many important roles. But in truth, the total air Command of the Air (Bethesda. Md.: Adler and Adler, effort and its severely limited capabilities were simply 1986). dwarfed by the enormous struggle on the ground. 4. An excellent, brief, well-documented, and recent treat- 2. There are a good many survey histories of US air power ment of the evolution of US naval power is George W. Baer's over this extended period. Three of the more informative are "U.S. Naval Strategy, 1890-1945," Naval War College Review fames L. Stokesbury’s A Short History o f Air Power (New 44, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 6-33. York: William Morrow and Company. Inc., 1986); Herbert 5. General Kenney, who was Gen Douglas MacArthur's Molloy Mason. Jr.'s The United States Air Force: A chief airman in the Southwest Pacific theater in World War Turbulent History (New York: Mason/Charter, 1976): and II. used land-based air power in very creative ways. He Robert Frank Futrell's monumental Ideas. Concepts. essentially denied the narrow waters of the Southwest Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol. Pacific theater to the Japanese navy, thus neutralizing an I. 1907-1960, and vol. 2. 1961-1984 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: enormous Japanese advantage and allowing MacArthur to Air University Press. 1989). take important offensive actions far earlier than had been 3. See any or all of the following: Stokesbury’s A Short expected. Kenney’s first-person account of the struggle is a History o f Air Power. Mason's The United States Air Force', classic in air power literature. See George C. Kenney, Futrell's Ideas, Concepts. Doctrine; R. |. O v e r y 's The Air General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War. 1939-1945 (New York: Stein and Day. 1980); Michael War (1949; reprint. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force S. Sherry's The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of History. 1987). Armageddon (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, WHICH WAY TO THE FEBA?

Mai jOHN M. Fawcett, Jr ., USAF

e f in it io n s in the ciose-air- support (CAS) arena are difficult at best, getting twisted around by doctrinal statements and the intricacies of interservice rivalry. But when long-range air assault operations are involved, the discrepancies and dichot- omiesD get dangerous. During Operation Desert Storm, elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) penetrated 90, then 150 miles into Iraqi territory in brigade-sized assaults. As long as the lines on the maps remain connected, everyone understands (at least conceptually) where CAS, battlefield air interdiction (BAI), and air interdiction (AI) fit into WHICH WA Y TO THE FEB A 15

ARMY AIR FORCE CAS— Air action against hostile targets that are CAS—Close air support is air action requested in close proximity to friendly forces and that by the ground commander against hostile requires detailed integration of each air mission ground targets near friendly forces. The ground with the fire and movement of those forces. (FM commander must integrate each air mission with 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, Oc- the fire and movement of his forces. (Tactical tober 1985, 1-15.) Air Command [TAC] Pamphlet 55-51, Tactical Air Control Party Handbook, 21 August 1987, BAI— Air action against hostile surface targets 7-1.) which are in a position to directly affect friendly forces and which requires joint planning and BAI— Air attacks against targets having a near- coordination. While BAI requires coordination term effect on friendly forces (scheme of in joint planning, continuous coordination may maneuver). (Workbook. Joint Firepower Control be required during the execution stage. (FM Course, July 1989, sec. 52C, 3; Air Force 101-5-1,1-10.) Manual [AFM] 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 16 March 1984, Al—Air operations conducted to destroy, 3-4.) neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively Al—To delay, disrupt, divert, or destroy an against friendly forces. It is conducted at such enemy’s military potential before it can be distance from friendly forces that detailed in- brought to bear against friendly forces. Per- tegration of each air mission with the fire and formed at such distances from friendly surface movement of friendly forces is not required. (FM forces that detailed integration is not required. 101-5-1,1-3.) (Workbook, Joint Firepower Control Course, July 1989, sec. 52C, 3; AFM 1-1,3-3.)

the game plan. Problems arise when large system (AAGS). The sidebar above con- troop formations appear well past the for- tains some fundamental definitions agreed ward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and to by those who produce the manuals. the call goes out for air support. These definitions are fairly close and in To grasp the subtleties of this problem fact get closer the further they get from and to see just how it could develop, we ground troops in contact with the enemy. need an understanding of the current defi- At the tactical level, there is a problem nitions and procedures of the tactical air with translating the definitions into control system (TACS)/Army air ground clearly understood employment options. 16 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

Forward Line Forward Edge Fire Support of Own of Battle Area Coordination Line Troops (FLOT) (FEBA) (FSCL)

XXX CAS _^ „__ Al

DAI□ Ml------— ► X X X

Figure 1 Army View of Air Operations Relative to the FLOT, FEBA. and FSCL (adapted from FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion [Infantry. Airborne, and Air Assault], December 1984, 8-15)

The Army likes to work with overlays on support the concept of a linear battle maps. Figure 1 shows how CAS, BAI, and developing where “in depth” means an AI appear to the Army relative to coordi- area still within the range of long-range nation lines. artillery and the FSCL moves only as the In this figure, friendly troops are attack- FEBA and forward line of own troops ing from left to right. Army fire coordina- (FLOT) move in a coordinated effort. tion measures also expand to include sev- Before we can fully address the problem eral permissive and restrictive measures, encountered during Desert Storm, we need but for the purpose of this article, we will to know something about the air request stick to the basics. These basics are system itself. Figure 2 shows how it reflected in actual Operation Desert Storm works. Figure 2 also presents the night- tactics as presented later. For our discus- mare of everyone who has ever attended sion to continue, we need another defini- the Joint Firepower Control Course. What tion, this time for the fire support coordi- we see is the TACS. A tactical air control nation line (FSCL): party (TACP) with an air liaison officer (ALO) is located with each Army unit A line beyond which all targets may be down to the battalion level. Although the attacked by any weapon system (including following definitions are from an Army aircraft and special weapons) without endan- gering troops or requiring additional coordi- field manual, they come close to reality: nation with the establishing headquarters. Air Liaison Officer (ALO)—The senior Air The effects of any weapon system may not Force officer at each tactical air control party fall short of this line. Purpose—To expedite (TACP). Advises the Army commander and the attack of targets beyond the FSCL.1 staff on the capabilities, limitations, and Now we begin to see the kernel of the employment of tactical air operations. He operates the Air Force request net. He coor- problem for an air assault unit. One mis- dinates close air support (CAS) missions with sion option of an air assault unit is a deep the fire support element (FSE), and assists in penetration—that is, an attack well behind planning the simultaneous employment of air enemy lines either as a raid or an attack in and surface fires. He supervises forward air force.2 The term deep is sufficiently vague controllers (FACs) and will assist the fire as to cause a definitional problem. If you support team (FIST) in directing airstrikes in pass the FSCL on a deep mission, can you the absence of a FAC... still get CAS? Even though the tactical air Tactical Air Control Party (TACP)—The employment mission definitions are vague TACPs are collocated at each appropriate enough to permit this possibility, the command echelon of the supported ground Army and Air Force employment tends to force, normally battalion through corps. WHICH WA Y TO THE FEB A 17

They advise and assist the commander, Tactical Analysis Bulletin for Desert Shield request and coordinate tactical air support, and Desert Storm.) The Air Support and meet other requirements of the individ- Operations Center (ASOC) manages the ual ground force echelon supported. A daily offensive war in support of the corps TACP consists of experienced air crews and and handles the immediate requests. One technicians, ground and/or airborne vehicles, and the communications equipment required TACC may have numerous ASOCs. The to obtain, coordinate, and control tactical air ASOC is normally collocated with the support of ground operations.3 Army corps as shown in figure 2. Immediate requests for close air support The mechanics of the air request system are transmitted directly from the affected break down into two parts: preplanned Army unit to the ASOC. Silence on the net and immediate. Preplanned requests are by any higher TACP is considered approval just as the name implies, planned well in at that level. If there is no objection by the advance of the ground or air attack opera- TACP chain, the ASOC will fill the request tion and submitted prior to a cutoff estab- with whatever air is available based on pri- lished by the tactical air control center ority and guidance established by the corps (TACC). The TACC manages the air war commander through his fire support ele- for the joint force commander; theoreti- ment (FSE). The priority should include cally, it even liaises with the Navy, but that real-time factors as well as the corps com- is another Desert Storm story. (See the mander’s concept of the operation.

Figure 2 Tactical Ak Control System 18 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

the resistance on the LZs was unknown, the plan covered the times we considered crucial to establishing the perimeter in Objective Cobra. (Objective Cobra was the initial operation for the 1st Brigade and required securing a major supply dump inside Iraq for continuing helicopter operations.) YVe decided that if we were still having trouble 33 hours after the initial landing, we would have a pretty high priority on CAS. The requests were submitted to the division TACP five days prior to the assault. Two days after division for- warded the requests on to corps, the corps ALO informed the division ALO that the requests had been passed on but would not be honored by the TACC. They had determined that since the target area was over 60 miles beyond the FSCL, the requests should have been for AI rather An Apache helicopter makes a low pass over a tactical air than CAS. The division ALO and his control party (TACP) and its high-mobility multipurpose assistant, the fighter liaison officer (FLO), wheeled vehicles (HMMWV). TACPs are collocated at each appropriate command echelon of the supported ground personally appealed the decision, but by force, normally battalion through corps. now we were inside of two days prior to the operation and past the TACC-established cutoff for submission of preplanned Now that we have covered the pertinent requests. I submitted immediate requests background and alluded to some of the (table 2). These requests covered the time difficulties of integrating air and land just prior to and through just after the final forces, we turn to the specific problem wave of the air assault. that sparked this article. After the immediate requests were sub- The 101st Airborne was assigned a mitted, we moved to our final positions series of air assault operations in support for the assault and waited. Just after mid- of the ground invasion of Iraq. These were night on the night of 23-24 February, the brigade-sized operations—a brigade task division FSE passed the air tasking order force includes about 4,000 people—with (ATO). a listing of the missions to be the first going 00 miles into enemy terri- flown for the next 24-hour period. The tory. As the ALO for the 1st Brigade, I ATO listed missions reflecting the original completed a close-air-support plan that preplanned requests (table 3). With just covered 36 hours starting two hours prior three hours to go until lift-off, I was a bit to the projected landing time for the first confused but felt that I would be happy if I wave of the air assault. The air requests got the air shown on the ATO. At 0400 are shown in table 1. The plan was and 0430 two two-ships of A-lOs checked worked out in conjunction with the in. The weather was deteriorating due to brigade fire support officer (FSO) and the rain and blowing dust, and the attack heli- attack aviation battalions. YVe figured it copters had been pulled back. Without would be a good idea to have fixed-wing the attack helicopters I had no way to assets prep the landing zones (LZ), escort mark targets obscured by the darkness and the mission into the area, and stick around the weather. 1 sent both sets of aircraft up for the subsequent assault waves. Since the invasion route on an armed reconnais- WHICH WA Y TO THE FEB A 19

TABLE 1 Preplanned Air Requests for G Day Operation Desert Storm

Request Number TOTZt Mission Type

3C2401 D 0001/0301 JAAT 3C2421D 0030/0330 JAAT 9C2416D 0001/0301 Suppression 3C2417D 0100/0400 JAAT 3C2422D 0130/0430 JAAT 3C2430D 0200/0500 AC-130 3C2418D 0200/0500 Escort 9C2401A 0200/0500 Electronic Counter 3C2423D 0230/0530 CAS 3C2420D 0300/0600 AFAC 3C2403D 0300/0600 CAS 3C2424D 0330/0630 CAS 3C2404D 0400/0700 CAS 3C2425D 0430/0730 CAS 3C2405D 0500/0800 CAS 3C2426D 0530/0830 CAS 3C2406D 0600/0900 CAS 3C2407D 0700/1000 CAS 3C2408D 0800/1100 CAS 3C2409D 0900/1200 CAS 3C2410D 1000/1300 CAS 3C2411D 1100/1400 CAS 3C2412D 1200/1500 CAS 3C2413D 1300/1600 CAS 3C2414D 1400/1700 CAS 3C2415D 1500/1800 AC-130

3C2501D 0001/0301 AC-130 3C2502D 0400/0700 CAS 3C2503D 0500/0800 CAS 3C2504D 0600/0900 CAS 3C2505D 0700/1000 CAS 3C2506D 0800/1100 CAS 3C2507D 0900/1200 CAS 3C2508D 1000/1300 CAS 3C2509D 1100/1400 CAS 3C2510D 1200/1500 CAS

Legend: TOT = Time Over Target Z/L = Zulu/Local JAAT = Joint Air Attack Team 20 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

TABLE 2 left flank on the ground. I reminded the Immediate Air Requests for G Day ASOC that the French had armor; that my Operation Desert Storm organic fire support was about 24 attack helicopters, six 105-mm howitzer tubes, and some tube-launched, optically Mission Request tracked, wire command (TOW) missiles; Number TOTZA. Type and that priorities should shift to cover 4C2401 D 0001/0301 JAAT my landings. The ASOC informed me that 4C2402D 0100/0400 JAAT when I had troops in contact I would get 4C2403D 0200/0500 JAAT air. About that time my third battalion 4C2404D 0300/0600 JAAT reported taking fire on the LZ. I relayed 4C2405D 0330/0630 JAAT this information to the ASOC, which sent 4C2406D 0400/0700 JAAT some air. Luckily, the 3d Battalion prob- 4C2407D 0430/0730 JAAT lem turned out to be snipers and was recti- 4C2408D 0230/0530 Air FAC fied before the CAS arrived. But when the 4C2409D 0200/0500 AC-130 CAS did arrive, two F-16s, it was just as 4C2410D 0500/0800 Escort the 1st Battalion ran into a bunker com- 4C2411D 0530/0830 Escort 4C2412D 0600/0900 Escort plex. The F-16s worked over the bunkers 4C2413D 0630/0930 Escort while the attack helicopters refueled and 4C2414D 0700/1000 Escort the artillery set up; the battalion took over 4C2415D 0730/1030 Escort 400 prisoners and captured a supply complex when the dust settled. The CAS was Legend: the key in the bunker assault and in the TOT = Time Over Target subsequent capture of a division supply Z/L = Zulu/Local dump. JAAT = Joint Air Attack Team Is there a problem here? I needed CAS, I got CAS. None of my people died, and we took the objective. Actually there are sance and hoped for the best. No targets two major problems: the confusion con- were found, and the A-lOs moved off sta- cerning preplanned CAS beyond the FSCL tion. The helicopter assault was delayed and the inability of the corps FSE to coor- two hours due to weather. dinate air priorities across the XVIII Finally, at 0700, the first assault wave of Airborne Corps battle plan. 66 UH-60 Blackhawk and 33 CH-47 In the final analysis, if it walks like a Chinook helicopters headed across the duck and quacks like a duck and looks border. Once airborne, I contacted the l i k e a d u c k . . . i t ’s C A S . A i r p o w e r ASOC on secure high frequency for a radio applied in direct support of an air assault check and to determine the status of the is not interdiction, no matter if the objec- rest of the missions on the ATO. The tive is short of or beyond the FSCL. In ASOC informed me that the ATO was fact, if the air support is to be used in being redirected based on need. Since I direct support of troops, no matter where was heading into Iraq with an unknown they are, it is CAS. This view is supported threat on the LZs, and the most critical by the definitions we referenced earlier. period of an air assault is during the land- Neither definition mentions any fire sup- ing, I figured I needed some CAS on sta- port coordination measures or geographic tion to cover me. The ASOC disagreed requirements—just that the air action is and informed me that the corps FSE had requested by the ground commander, is established the priority for immediate near friendly troops, and is integrated CAS with the 6th French and 82d with the fire and movement of the ground Airborne, which were advancing on our forces. WHICH WA Y TO THE FEB A 21 TABLE 3 ATO for 24 February 1991 Received from 101st Airborne Division Fire Support Element 0100L 24 February 1991

Mission (Air Assault) Number Call Sign TOTZ,t

5103A Thompson 03 0000/0300 5105A Bowser 05 0030/0330 5107 A Gatling 17 0130/0430 5135A Nitro 35 0200/0500 5154A Greyhound 45 0200/0500 5137A Pyro 37 0230/0530 5103B Thompson 03 0300/0600 5001A Ruger 01 0300/0600 3121B Bingo 01 0330/0630 5105B Bowser 05 0330/0630 5017B Gatling 17 0400/0700 3121A Bite 01 0430/0730 3131A Boxer 01 0500/0800 5031A Beretta 13 0530/0830 5015A Sten 15 0600/0900 3141B Bart 41 0600/0900 5017A Gatling 17 0630/0930 5003A Glock 03 0633/0933 5103C Thompson 03 0700/1000 5021A Mossberg 21 0700/1000 5105C Bowser 05 0730/1030 5001B Ruger 01 0730/1030 5017C Gatling 17 0800/1100 3121B Bingo 61 0830/1130 5005B Springfield 05 0830/1130 5003B Glock 03 0840/1140 5101D Zipaun 10 0900/1200 5007B Carbine 07 0900/1200 5103D Thompson 03 0930/1230 5011B Weatherby 11 0930/1230 5105D Bowser 05 1000/1300 5013B Beretta 13 1000/1300 5015B Sten 15 1030/1330 5017B Gatling 17 1100/1400 5021B Mossberg 21 1130/1430 5001C Ruger 01 1200/1500 5003C Glock 03 1230/1530 5005C Springfield 05 1300/1600 5007C Carbine 07 1330/1630 5011C Weatherby 11 1400/1700 5013C Beretta 13 1430/1730 5017C Gatling 17 1500/1800 5135C Nitro 35 1930/2230

5145B Mauser 45 2130/0030 5151B Hitman 51 2230/0130 5135D Nitro 35 2300/0200 5141D Bazooka 41 0001/0301 5145C Mauser 45 0100/0400

When the ALO checked in with the ASOC at 0700L, he was informed that all the air support listed above had been redirected. 22 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

I am still not sure what happened to my ordinary vis-a-vis the training preplanned air requests. Based on the TACS/AAGS personnel receive at the Joint ATO, it would appear that the TACC hon- Firepower Control Course of the Air ored the requests even though the corps Ground Operations School or the proce- ALO and the ASOC said the TACC would dures we had discussed with the ASOC not. The fact that such confusion still during the preceding six months. During existed within 72 hours of the invasion a telephone interview after the war ended, should give us some pause as we review the fighter duty officer (FIDO), who was the operation. on duty during the 1st Brigade attack, As for the difficulty of the ASOC in inte- acknowledged that the argument we just grating the battle plan with air priorities, it developed was certainly logical but that would appear that there was a breakdown the priority of fires had been established at the corps FSE. There were two XVIII by the corps FSE and could not be altered Airborne Corps efforts that morning: the unless I had troops in contact with the 6th French with the 82d Airborne and the enemy. 101st Airborne. The French had armor Do we have a doctrinal hole here? support and organic artillery traveling Actually, I don’t think so. What we do with their assault echelons. The 82d have is a series of flexible definitions that Airborne was traveling with the French. have been interpreted for armor or mecha- This would normally indicate a shift in nized forces on a linear battlefield. The CAS priorities to the 101st based on the key to using that flexibility without the 1st Brigade’s organic fire support. constraining influences is for all elements Another factor to be considered at this of the TACS/AAGS to be conversant with point is the amount of resistance each the ground commander's concept of the attack was encountering. As part of a lin- operation and battle plan at each level, as ear battle, the French would be able to well as each unit’s capabilities. That report enemy resistance as they proceeded should have happened in the Persian Gulf toward their objective. Theater competi- but obviously did not. tion for CAS assets did exist since the So where do we go from here? Step one Marines and coalition forces were is a complete revision of a term so old that involved with the invasion of Kuwait. But it carries a lot of conceptual baggage with that was also a linear battle. Of course, it: CAS. What we really have is either air the 101st could not know about enemy power applied in close proximity to troops resistance until actually on the LZs. With or air power applied not in close prox- this in mind, it seems reasonable to expect imity to troops. Definitions and lines on that the ASOC would shift any available maps that do not allow for the flexibility assets—and according to the airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC). there were assets available at the time of the 1st Brigade attack—to cover the helicopter landings. Once a determi- nation was made concerning resistance on the LZs. the CAS could either be released or increased. None of this is out of the

An interior view of the air liaison officer's HMMWV during Operation Desert Storm. The vehicle is being repacked in preparation for the next assault. required bv nonlinear battle plans should be scrapped. Close proximity to troops can include missions under the direct, ter- minal control of a ground or airborne FAC or bombing missions beyond visual range of the controlling agency but clearly deconflicted with friendly forces. This is obviously going to get tricky when an operation like the one described above results in a linkup between air assault or airborne forces well beyond the FEBA and heavy forces moving in a linear battle. Battle handoff and combat identification will become crucial, and air support not under direct control of the FACs may not be permitted. At the risk of being named as an accomplice in creating new The author, left, and SSgt led Turner, noncommissioned acronyms, I suggest getting rid of the term officer tn charge of the TACP. take a break somewhere in CAS and coming up with a name that is Iraq. descriptive of the requirements of the joint arena. Should we also junk the TACS/AGGS system? No. But we do need to exercise every aspect of the system until the basics Immediate requests will be handled by the are automatic. Every Army, Marine, or ASOC and come from a pool of available Navy exercise has to include some role for sorties managed by the TACC and the at least the TACC. For Army exercises numbered air forces to include tankers if here in the States, this isn’t as difficult or needed. Flight crews will have to actually expensive as it may sound. The air plan nonstandard missions with time con- request net already has the long-range straints and little warning. No deployment communications equipment to operate or exercise costs are incurred because from each u nit’s home station. everyone trains from home station. Involvement has to include having the Everybody is a player, A-lOs to F-15Es. TACC and ASOC task active-duty. Air Obviously, some are going to be tasked Guard, and Reserve fighter squadrons to more than others. This cannot be done provide sorties in support of Army exer- because of training requirements and cises, with little warning, for preplanned maintenance restrictions. Unacceptable; and immediate requests. this is realistic training for combat opera- When I was in the 35th Tactical Fighter tions. Squadron at Kunsan, South Korea, the What about the Guard and Reserve? squadron was regularly tasked to provide Everybody plays. Establish what kind of support for CAS operations by an ATO. lead time the reserve forces need and give There was no whining or debate; the it to them, but hold them to it and pay squadron simply planned and flew the them with man-days for their participa- missions. ALOs will submit preplanned tion. requests through Army channels to the There will be growing problems with assigned peacetime TACC in accordance this kind of system, but better to sweat in with TACC-established requirements and peace than to bleed in war. If this requires cutoffs. I am talking about responsive cut- an overhaul of current training guidance, offs with as little lead time as a week. so be it.

23 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

In Iraq we recovered from a series of mis- operations will be joint with all services understandings and got the job done. We participating in planning if not in execu- have the capability to do the job better next tion. I have been told not to take these time. The Army field manual (FM) on air problems so personally. At 0700 on 24 assault operations covers low-, mid- and February 1991, the members of my TACPs high-intensity conflict. Support of those and I took it real personally. □ operations in areas far from Army direct- fire support must be provided either by Train like you want to fight. fixed- or rotary-wing assets or a combination of both. Do not construe this article as Notes strictly Army/Air Force. Flexibility is 1. FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault), December 1984, 8-11. essential in the employment of air power in 2. FM 90-4. Air Assault Operations. March 1987,1-2, 3. all joint force operations, and all future 3. FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, October 1985. 1-3.1-69. ... BUT HOW DO I SUBSCRIBE? EASY . . .

• Just write New Orders, Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954.

• Tell them you want to subscribe to AFRP 50-2, Airpower Journal, stock number 708-007-00000-5.

• Enclose a check for $13.00 ($16.25 for international mail).

• Spend a year enjoying four quarterly issues mailed to your home or office. OPERATIONS LAW AND THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD A N D DESERT STORM

Lt Col John G. Humphries, USAF

HORTLY before the coalition forces put the finishing touches on the victory over Iraq, Gen Norman Schwarzkopf gave a briefing that explaineds the strategy and objectives of the Persian Gulf war. His remark praising President George Bush for allowing the military to “fight this war exactly as it should have been fought" provided a perspective on how this war differed from the one in Vietnam.1 Adm U. S. Grant Sharp, US Navy, Retired, who was commander in chief of Pacific Command during much of the Meeting of the special planning staff s strike cell in the year of unleashing unconstrained "Black Hole" (formerly a basement storage room in tile Royal Saudi Air Force Headquarters building) during American air power. Operation Desert Shield in October 1900. Judge advocates What happened in the Persian Gulf war assigned to the strike cell assisted combat planners in was that ordinary wisdom prevailed. selecting legitimate targets. President Bush, as commander in chief, and the other national command authorities Vietnam War.-was asked if he had desired (NCA) provided general guidance on the the kind of command autonomy that prosecution of the war and then delegated General Schwarzkopf enjoyed. He the planning and execution of wartime oper- replied. "If I had had the same sort of free- ations to military professionals. dom that General Schwarzkopf (had), the These professionals had received years Vietnam War would have been over in of inculcation in the law of armed conflict. about 1966. We would have defeated Not only had the US long ago undertaken North Vietnam, saved hundreds of treaty obligations to instruct its military American lives, and won the war.”2 Adm personnel about their rights and obliga- Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint tions under this law,3 but it had also suf- Ghiefs of Staff (JGS) from 1970 to 1974, fered from the outcry of international con- concurs with the view that the United tempt that arose from the massacre at My States could have won that war within a Lai and from other real and alleged misad-

26 OPERA TIONS LA W AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 27 ventures in Vietnam. The American mili- holds that our forces will comply with the tary establishment decided there could be law of armed conflict,7 which is com- no more room for military operations that prised primarily of two categories of law. might lead to allegations of indiscriminate One consists of the Hague conventions8 of or illegal activities.4 Requiring that mili- 1907 and the Geneva conventions9 of tary personnel be educated in the law of 1949; the other is based on the customary armed conflict was considered a crucial practices of nations in conducting war.10 part of this effort. The law of armed conflict sets the rules Due to the perception that its forces had for how nations are to conduct wartime not generally followed the laws of war, the operations. US lost domestic and international public Guiding coalition air operations support. Its forces returned home branded throughout Desert Shield and Desert improperly as war criminals. Further, Storm was a body of standards known as North Vietnam illicitly refused to grant US rules of engagement. These rules “delin- aircrews prisoner-of-war status. eate the c ir c u m s t a n c e s . . . und er w h ic h During the same period, judge advocates United States forces [can] initiate and/or of the military services and of the unified continue combat engagement” with hostile and specified commands increased their forces, both in peacetime and in involvement in advising commanders, wartime.11 They also represent the pri- planners, intelligence staffs, and aircrews mary means by which the NCA can guide about the law of armed conflict and other deployed forces in peacetime crises and in issues related to war fighting. This w a r t i m e f i g h t i n g . 12 A l e g a c y o f t h e nascent discipline in the military commu- Vietnam War was that rules of engagement nity became known as “operations” or had come to be viewed chiefly as con- “operational” law.5 straints on the employment of military Against this backdrop, the US-led coali- force. The more historically correct tion prepared to reverse Iraq’s invasion of view—and the one that is in ascendancy— Kuwait. Judge advocates deployed with maintains that in peacetime these rules the headquarters staffs of US Central dictate the circumstances under which Command (CENTCOM) and US Air hostile forces may be engaged and, at a Forces. Central Command (CENTAF) and minimum, authorize a commander to with wing and group commands to bases employ force as a matter of preemptive in the Persian Gulf. They clearly under- self-defense in response to the imminent stood and assumed their roles as advisors threat of force. In wartime, they should in operations law. Likewise, Air Force not unduly impede the effective use of commanders apparently were aware that force. the judge advocates on their staffs could Rules of engagement are not the same as help them accomplish their missions the law of armed conflict. These rules are within the law.6 Operations law, which directives that the US imposes on its own includes such diverse areas as the law of military forces to govern the employment armed conflict, operations and contin- of firepower. The law of armed conflict, gency planning, rules of engagement, and however, is binding on all nations and target selection and validation, was active their armed forces.13 during the Desert Shield and Desert Storm This law is, nevertheless, an important operations. influence in drafting rules of engagement Before we launch into a further consid- applicable to air warfare.14 Embodied in eration of operations law. it is important Air Force doctrine and strategy are the law to understand the foundations upon of conflict’s cardinal principles: military which it rests within the Department of necessity (the right to use any degree or Defense (DOD). American national policy means of force—not forbidden by other 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

considerations—to achieve a military tary actions in Desert Shield solely to objective)15 and unnecessary suffering (the defensive responses to hostile acts or prohibition of intentional attacks on non- demonstrations of hostile intent (i.e., the combatants and civilian objects and bans threat of the imminent use of force). on the use of certain weapons against These peacetime rules were wisely combatants if they cause excessive suffer- drawn. They vested commanders at any ing not justified by military necessity).16 level with broad latitude in meeting their fust as importantly, these precepts are the obligations, allowing them to take any most significant bases for formulating necessary and appropriate action to rules of engagement for air operations. defend their units’ aircraft and person- Notwithstanding its importance, the law nel.19 Thus, the rules recognized the mili- of armed conflict is not the sole influence tary commanders’ authority—and their at work during the drafting of the rules of duty—to exercise the inherent right of engagement. In their final form, these self-defense. Exercising this right has tra- rules also normally reflect collateral limi- ditionally been a responsibility of com- tations, which include political consider- manders, based on the notion inherent in ations, national policy objectives, and the law of armed conflict that a military operational concerns. As a result, rules of unit is not required to “take the first hit’’ engagement can restrict and have before using force.20 restricted US air combat operations far As in Vietnam, rules of engagement beyond what is required by the law of have often been the means by which the armed conflict.17 For example, US air NCA and other upper military echelons of forces employed during Operation Rolling command have retained the power to Thunder in the Vietnam War were decide when to employ certain forces and severely constrained by rules of engage- weapons systems against enemy military ment imposed by American political lead- objectives. In this way, the rules have ers who feared that conducting the cam- assisted in limiting hostilities only to paign to the full extent allowed by law those believed necessary to achieve would somehow provoke Chinese or national policy objectives. The Persian Soviet intervention.18 In the Persian Gulf, Gulf rules were different from those in political and policy constraints that might Vietnam because they were about as broad have been imposed on coalition forces as they could be. With the extensive man- through the rules took a backseat to the date accorded coalition forces under the clear military objectives of the operations, aegis of the United Nations, the wartime the most important of which was reversing rules of engagement in Operation Desert Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Storm extended, in the main, to the In the Persian Gulf, the US relied upon bounds of the law of armed conflict. the two primary categories of rules—one When hostilities began in the Persian for peacetime, the other for hostilities. Gulf on 17 January 1991, the wartime During Operation Desert Shield, CENT- rules of engagement—devised by CENT- COM promulgated the peacetime rules of COM and CENTAF and approved by the engagement based upon the JCS model, JCS—guided coalition air combat opera- with General Schwarzkopf’s CENTCOM tions. These rules recognized the coali- staff proposing supplemental measures for tion’s state of hostilities with Iraq and JCS approval. These rules provided typi- authorized its air forces to seek and cal peacetime guidance insofar as they destroy targets connected with Iraq’s war were primarily defensive and were effort within the area of operations. These designed to preclude the inadvertent start operations could now occur without of war; yet, they also preserved the right of reliance on the principle of self-defense self-defense. Thus, the rules limited mili- for each engagement. OPERA TIONS LA W AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 29

This was in stark contrast to the tying their hands with constraints. This, wartime rules applicable during much of in turn, maximized the effectiveness of the Vietnam War. For instance, prior to coalition air power. attacking Vietnamese urban areas, US air Further. CENTAF judge advocates forces were required to warn the inhabi- played a central role in assisting in the tants by leaflets, loudspeakers, or other development of wartime rules of engage- appropriate means and give them suffi- ment. They ensured that the rules were cient time to evacuate the area, notwith- not more restrictive of coalition opera- standing the fact that US air forces were tions than was required by the law of receiving fire from the area and were armed conflict and collateral limitations. legally permitted to attack.21 The con- The first draft of wartime rules of engage- straints imposed by these rules of engagement was 18 pages long. Col Dennis ment included a requirement that Kansala—the CENTAF staff judge advo- American air forces could strike surface- cate—and his staff eventually condensed to-air missile (SAM) sites only after the the rules to four pages that covered the SAMs themselves had been launched at US aircraft.22 In the Persian Gulf, American political leaders embraced and During the Vietnam War. Hanoi successfully shielded targets by locating them in and arounii civilian property and heeded these lessons; they permitted their cultural objects. Here, over 600 drums of petroleum, oil. and war fighters to conduct combat operations lubricants are stored in the center of a populated North within the law of armed conflict without Vietnamese village. 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

generic precepts for coalition operations.23 enemy air defenses, the fewer rules they Supplementing the basic rules were have to rely upon, the better off they are. appendices that addressed rules for A complete understanding of the rules unique, sensitive US operations.24 This of engagement requires that we look at distillation of the rules made them “opera- them in the context of the targeting tionally friendly” for aircrews. Thus, process used in Desert Storm. Early in the Colonel Kansala and his staff adhered to a deployment to Saudi Arabia, the CENTAF fundamental principle in drafting these commander, Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, wartime rules of engagement: no set assembled a special planning staff of com- rules—no matter how lengthy and bat planners, logisticians, and judge advo- detailed—can anticipate every potential cates to plot the air campaign against scenario that aircrews might face in an Iraq.25 Consigned to a basement storage area of operations. After everyone has room in the Royal Saudi Air Force been educated in the law of armed con- Headquarters building, known as the flict and trained in the rules of engage- “Black Hole,” these people formed what ment, it comes down to an aircrew com- was called the special planning staff’s mander’s judgment in deciding when, where, and how to employ military force. StuiJam llussem attempted to protect his military assets hy There is no substitute for this judgment, placing them in populated areas. Below. Iraqi antiaircraft and 18 or 100 pages of rules would have artillery atop a Baghdad apartment building. At right, one of been a hindrance rather than a help. For several Silkworm missiles found at a school in Kuwait City aircrews flying missions into the maw of shortly after the Iraqi retreat. OPERATIONS LA W AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 31

"Strike Cell.”26 Brig Gen (now Maj Gen) air combat operations had to be approved Buster C. Glosson led the planning effort. by the JCS. not once did Pentagon officials With reconnaissance and other sources reverse decisions from the Black Hole providing raw intelligence data, the Black about what weapons to use, what targets Hole team segregated Iraq's war resources to strike, and how and when to attack into 12 target sets: leadership: command, them.28 In the war's aftermath. Secretary control, and communications (C3) facili- of Defense Dick Cheney has repeatedly ties and operations; air defense systems: defended target selection, calling every conventional military depots and storage Iraqi target “perfectly legitimate.” locations; nuclear, biological, and chemi- One reason for this agreement between cal weapons and their associated produc- higher military authorities and the war tion facilities; airfields; railroads and planners was the early and frequent par- bridges; Scud missiles; oil refineries: elec- ti( ipation of judge advocates in the target- trical production: naval ports: and the ing process.2'1 Planning for a particular air Republican Guard.27 Because these sets strike could take anywhere from just a few were at the heart of Iraq's war effort, the hours to five days.30 Targeting officers planning staff considered them key mili- received and confirmed intelligence data, tary objectives. evaluated targets to be nominated for As alluded to earlier, General Horner attack in view of their proximity to loca- and his staff had exceptionally broad lati- tions where noncombatants were known tude in determining the course of the air to be, and assessed the threat that striking campaign. Although CENTAF's target them would pose to those civilians. They selection and the rules of engagement for nominated targets to the CENTAF consoli- 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

dated target board, one member of which vehicles and equipment. However, other was an Air Force judge advocate. General policy considerations—which were con- Horner and one of his legal advisors sistent with the law of armed conflict— “scrubbed” the targets approved by the placed several limitations on striking tar- board. If they survived this review, the gets in Iraq. For example, mosques, targets were then put on the air tasking shrines, schools, museums, national mon- order (ATO). Compliance with the princi- uments, and other historical or cultural ples of military necessity and unnecessary sites could not be engaged except in self- suffering was an inherent part of assessing defense. Further, hospitals and archaeo- target values and validating targets for logical property received the special pro- attack. tections afforded them by law (e.g., coali- Adherence to these rules was also a part tion aircrews could not engage hospitals of the weapons evaluation and selection and other medical facilities unless Iraqi process. After the special planning staff forces were using them to commit acts refined the target list, their next challenge harmful to US forces). was to select weapons systems and muni- A review of the coalition rules of tions appropriate for the targets. This also engagement reveals how expert CENTAF’s required decisions about what the desired staff had become in this area of operations level of damage should be and how air- law. A long-standing red herring in opera- crews could best deliver the munitions, all tions planning and execution had been the the while considering aircrew safety as cautionary language regularly appended to well as the protection of any Iraqi civilians rules of engagement urging forces to take nearby. In preparing strike packages of measures “to minimize risk of civilian aircraft and munitions, planners took all casualties,” or words to that effect.34 The reasonable precautions to minimize civil- upshot of these warnings is that they mis- ian casualties and damage to civilian led aircrews about what the law required objects.31 Each day this process culmi- from their performance in combat. The nated in an ATO that covered 2,000-3,000 fact that this frustrated them is less impor- sorties and detailed the targets, time over tant than the fact that it often led to their target, weapons systems, ordnance, com- deaths. This kind of language implied munications frequencies, and refueling that avoiding collateral noncombatant orbits. This order was sent to flying units casualties and incidental damage to civil- for the next day’s missions. Once targets ian objects is a sine qua non to a lawful air had been struck, planners added new ones campaign. It is not. to the list. The law of armed conflict proscribes the Coalition air forces flew about 120,000 intentional attack of individual noncom- sorties during the 43-day war, 60 percent batants and the civilian populace per se. of which were combat m issions.32 It also proscribes an attack that would According to a briefing on 15 March 1991 result in so many collateral casualties and by Gen Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force chief such severe damage that it would be con- of staff, these combat sorties delivered sidered an intentional attack on individ- 84,200 tons of ordnance, 8.8 percent ual civilians, the civilian population, or (7,400 tons) of which were precision civilian property.35 But the general immu- guided munitions.33 The remainder of the nity of civilians from attack does not pro- ordnance consisted of unguided conven- hibit operations that may cause collateral tional munitions. death or injury to civilians or incidental Wartime rules of engagement in damage to their property. Thus, civilians Operation Desert Storm permitted attacks who remain in or near a legitimate target on all Iraqi combatants, as well as their after the onset of hostilities are not to be Tear Out and Remove □ Detach one of these cards, fill it out, and mail it along with a check, with itmail along itand fill out, cards, of these one Detach FOR: R T O F F I | G GIFT FOR: Enclosed is my check for $ 13.00 for ($ each ordered subscription 16.25 mail). for international Ilike would toa purchase one-year tosubscription the Order ProcessingOrder Code •5151 Order ProcessingOrder Code *5151 Enclosedis mymail).check for ($16.25 $13.00 forfor ordered international each subscription I wouldlike to purchase a one-year tosubscription the alt: New Mail of P.O.Documents, to:Orders, Superintendent Box 371954 ofDocuments Superintendent Maketo:payable checks PLEASE PRINT PLEASE Mail to: New Orders, Superintendent of P.O.Documents, NewBox Orders, 371954Mail Superintendent to: Make checks payable to: Superintendent ofDocuments Superintendent Make checks payable to: PLEASE PRINT PLEASE □ □ VISA VISA Pittsburgh. PA 15250-7954Pittsburgh. PA Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 Want atoSubscription the R: VISA Cty HankTin* Rank" Tile RartcTi&e Cuy akut First Name Rank utte □ □ Airpower Journal? St'eef Adores* C*ty StateCoumry Zip Code Zip StateCoumry C*ty Adores* St'eef Street Address Street Actress Street Slreei Address Slreei Visa, or Number Mastercard to: MASTERCARD MSECR | | | MASTERCARD Pittshurnh PA lR9Rn.7 PA Pittshurnh BoxP.O. 371954 NewDocuments Orders, of Superintendent Stale First NameFirst First Name State Zip Code Country (rtieqd) Country Code Zip State /itfin/rrui Ml —

____ Card No. Expiration Dale Expiration No.Card Zip Code Initial nta LastName Initial City Card No.Card Initial Initial ______Q \ [|HIM [ | [ [ l | | | | M I [ | H *wl JOURNAL JOURNAL AIRPOWER JOURNAL AIRPOWER JOURNALAIRPOWER State Ccur'try Last Name Last Country I'f reg'd) I'f Country Last Nam* Las! Name ------Expiration Date Expiration

(AURE). (AURE). Zip Code Zip New Orders, Superintendent of Documents P.O. Box 371954 Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954

New Orders, Superintendent of Documents P.O. Box 371954 Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 OPERA TIONS LAW AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 33 specifically attacked by air strikes, but whether certain considerations of the law they are at risk of injury or death other- of armed conflict might require changes in wise. these rules.39 Iraq began storing military According to one expert, superfluous materiel in and near schools, medical language in rules of engagement has illogi- facilities, and places of worship. It cally and without legal foundation ele- located command and control centers in vated the concern for civilian casualties schools and public buildings. The Iraqi above the desire for mission success and military scattered antiaircraft weapons aircrew safety.36 US war planners recog- throughout residential areas and on nized this problem, however, and coali- rooftops of public buildings. Tanks and tion rules in the Persian Gulf contained artillery pieces were placed near homes in none of these cautionary statements. In small Iraqi villages. MiG fighters were fact, the "boilerplate” language often parked next to the most important archae- grafted onto these rules was missing too.37 ological sites within Iraq’s borders. Iraq Maj Harry Heintzelman, a CENTAF legal apparently did all this for one of two rea- officer consigned to the Black Hole, has sons: to shield legitimate targets from indicated that this omission was inten- attack or to draw coalition forces into tional and was done to pare the rules to The air campaign has received and probably will continue to their essence for the benefit of aircrew receive adverse "popular" publicity in what one historian members.38 calls the "Bambiftcation" of Iraq and the war. Here, the About 30 days into the air campaign, supposed Iraqi baity-milk factory lies in ruins after a several events led CENTAF to review the coalition air raid. The coalition conteruls that tile structure rules of engagement and determine adually was a chemical weapons facility. 34 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

Lt Gen Thomas Kelly, director of operations for the Joint tural objects. Although these actions con- Chiefs of Staff (JCS). and Rear Adm John McConnell. JCS director of intelligence, at a press conference during travened the law and did not render these Operation Desert Storm. Members of the press often targets immune from attack, they inquired about the rules of engagement and criteria for remained off-limits to US air strikes. In target selection. Kelly discussed the circumstances those instances in which US attacks inad- surrounding the bombing of the Al Firdos bunker, which vertently hit prohibited targets. North doubled as an Iraqi command post and air raid shelter. Vietnam won the propaganda battle. International and American public opin- damaging civilian property and cultural ion turned against the US military by objects. These actions complicated target alleging that illegal American air strikes planning because many of Iraq’s cultural caused the damage, notwithstanding the objects are popularly associated with the fact that American air combat operations birthplace of civilization. intentionally attacked only legitimate tar- With regard to either or both of these gets under strict rules of engagement. premises, Saddam Hussein appeared to be Public opinion overlooked the strength of walking in North Vietnamese—style shoes. North Vietnam’s air defense system, During the Vietnam War, Hanoi success- which interfered with the accuracy of US fully shielded military targets by commin- munitions delivery. Public opinion was gling them with civilian property and cul- likewise blind to the extent of self- OPERA TIONS LA W AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 35

inflicted damage caused by the discharge “Bambification” of Iraq and the war.42 of North Vietnamese defensive weapons This is the process critics are using to and the return of their projectiles to transform the consensus and accurate earth.40 Fortunately, Saddam Hussein did view of the war as a legitimate enterprise not fare as well in his efforts to emulate to one in which the American military is North Vietnam’s successes. seen as brutish, inhumane, and indiscrim- Under the law of armed conflict, the inate in causing an excessive amount of responsibility for protecting noncombat- death and destruction. They understand ants within a war zone lies with the neither Clausewitz’s maxim that war is an attacker, the defender, and the noncom- extension of politics by other means nor batants themselves. Although an attack- the method by which the law of armed ing force may not specifically target non- conflict actually applies to the conduct of combatants or civilian objects, a defender hostilities. may not conceal or shield military targets In view of the significant adverse press from attack by moving them into civilian- the air campaign has received and will populated areas or near protected likely continuejro receive,43 it is important objects.41 And under customary practice, to understand other allegations against the noncombatants must exercise reasonable coalition. For instance, some critics have precaution to remove themselves from the alleged that the coalition committed vicinity of military objectives or military numerous violations of the law of armed operations. conflict.44 We will discuss two prime Iraq’s acts violated these fundamental examples. The first is that the coalition rules. In using civilians, civilian property, should not have struck the Al Firdos mili- and cultural objects to shield legitimate tary bunker because it should have known military targets, Iraq breached its obliga- that civilians were being sheltered there, tions as a signatory to the Geneva conven- or—alternatively—it should have done so tions by exposing its citizenry, their pri- only after issuing a warning to civilians. vate property, and the heritage of the The second is that the coalition air cam- world’s civilization to the increased risk of paign failed to minimize civilian casual- harm. At the Al Firdos bunker, discussed ties. later, such an action by Iraq resulted in Should legal considerations and the disaster. rules of engagement have precluded the Coalition forces could have lawfully bomb strike which killed scores of Iraqi attacked military threats in, around, and civilians in the Al Firdos bunker in on top of public buildings and cultural Baghdad on 13 February 1991? In short, objects, but—in accordance with the rules the answer is no. The evidence indicated of engagement—they did not strike those that Iraq had converted this facility from a targets if noncombatants, purely civilian civil defense shelter to a C3 military com- structures, or cultural objects were likely mand post. From the bunker’s reinforced, to suffer collateral damage. The law 10-foot-thick concrete ceiling and secured required the Iraqi government to take mea- entrances to its camouflaged exterior sures to segregate military targets from (painted to make it look as though it had civilians. Unfortunately, collateral injury already been struck), as well as the mili- to Iraqi civilians and damage to their prop- tary command signals intercepted from it, erty occurred but were the incidental the coalition’s air planners reasonably result of lawful coalition attacks on legiti- concluded that the bunker was a military mate military targets. location. After intercepting the electronic Harry Summers, a leading military his- command communications and detecting torian and strategist, has identified the a military presence in the bunker through incipient stages of what he calls the satellite imagery, the CENTCOM intelli- 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

gence staff added it to the target list. ther evidences Iraq’s disregard for its citi- Civilians sought refuge in the bunker on a zens and the intentional commingling of floor above the command post during civilians and their property with military nighttime coalition air raids. Coalition targets. planners were unaware of the civilians’ Alternatively, the Al Firdos detractors presence, as noted by both Lt Gen Thomas allege that this air strike violated the law W. Kelly, JCS director of operations, and because the coalition failed to warn Iraq the CENTCOM staff in their numerous that an attack on the bunker was planned. media briefings after the strike.45 This view holds that the legal requirement Coalition personnel did not know that Iraq to minimize civilian casualties mandated had allowed civilians in the bunker; in coalition issuance of a public warning that fact, these planners had taken reasonable it considered the bunker a military target precautions, despite the fog and friction of at risk of imminent attack. This would war, before assessing it as a valid military have permitted civilians a chance to heed target.46 the warning, refrain from entering the As noted previously, under customary bunker, and remove themselves from the law, Iraq and its noncombatant population vicinity. were primarily responsible for limiting This “lack of warning” allegation is collateral civilian casualties. The coali- legally and factually without merit. From tion force had, at most, only a scant obli- a legal perspective, the law of armed con- gation to do so in these circumstances. flict remains resolutely commonsensical Fortunately, the law of armed conflict is in this regard. It aligns itself with the based on a commonsense view of how principle of war known as the element of wars are fought and how forces engage one surprise. On the one hand, providing a another, rather than on impractical restric- warning would have amounted to a death tions. In most cases, an attacking force sentence for aircrews flying into heavily normally has no way of discovering with defended Baghdad. Iraq is sure to have any certainty where an enemy’s civilian increased its air defenses in the vicinity of populace will be situated at the time of the bunker, making a planned air strike attack. Given the mobile nature of a mod- even more hazardous. On the other hand, ern society—especially one in the throes a warning would have permitted Iraq to of constant bombardment such as Iraq’s move this important C3 function to a more was—a defending nation is virtually in secretive locale. In sum, a warning would absolute control of what areas and struc- have undermined the principle of sur- tures its populace travels in or moves to, prise. Recognizing this dilemma and the respectively. Further, that nation is fact that the defending nation is in control responsible Tor allocating resources to of its populace, the law does not require build a civil defense and warning system an attacker to provide such a warning. and is accountable for warning and evacu- Notwithstanding the gap in the legal ating its citizenry when attacks are immi- argument that supports this allegation, the nent. It is reasonable to conclude that Iraq latter is factually wrong as well. knew what its duties were with respect to Extensive coalition leaflet drops and radio protecting its noncombatant citizens. In broadcasts from three stations in the the- December 1990, the Iraqi government con- ater of operations warned Iraqi soldiers ducted a major civil defense exercise dur- and civilians about the onslaught they ing which as many as a million or more faced.48 The air campaign’s critics have Baghdad residents evacuated the city.47 overlooked this evidence. They have also Curiously, no evacuation of any civilians ignored the fact that normal humans from the capital occurred during the 43- could not have continued to reside in day coalition bombing of Iraq. This fur- Baghdad from the start of the air campaign OPERATIONS LA W AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 37

(17 January 1991) to the date of the attack The Desert Storm rules of engagement dictated that when an on Al Firdos (13 February 1991) without aircrew could not locate or positively identify their primary or secondary targets, they were to return to base with their knowing that their safety was at risk. weapons. This rule reduced the possibility of dropping There is no gainsaying that this was a bombs—like this 2.000-pounder—in populated areas. military C3 bunker into which, unfortu- Upwards of 25 percent of all combat missions culminated in nately, noncombatants were allowed to undelivered ordnance. enter. Clearly, the responsibility for these deaths lies with the Iraqi government and its leaders, who ignored their legal obliga- results of otherwise lawful attacks upon valid tions on two counts. First, they failed to military objectives in their territory.49 prevent noncombatants from entering a Had it been known that Iraqi civilians military facility. Second, they converted were occupying the bunker as a shelter, an air raid shelter to a C3 bunker, thereby coalition commanders might have with- locating a military objective in an area sur- held attack until the civilians had rounded by its civilian populace. In short, removed themselves—even though the these failures to segregate military facili- law of armed conflict does not require ties from the civilian populace trans- such restraint. Further, Iraq had other gressed the rule that a recourse than to commingle members of party to a conflict which places its own citi- its civilian populace with an obvious mili- zens in positions of danger by failing to carry tary target. Under the law, Iraq could out the separation of military activities from have desisted from using the bunker for civilian activities necessarily accepts . . . the military purposes and designated it a neu- 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992 tral zone for civilians.50 Iraq’s failure to able lessons about conducting warfare. do so, however, exposed its citizens to the They deride the war by saying it was too tragic consequences. glib—a mismatch. However, it certainly As the Desert Shield and Desert Storm can serve as a model for future combat operations showed, the rules of engage- operations insofar as the effective applica- ment reflect political and operational con- tion of rules of engagement is concerned. siderations that limit the application of Years of military education, preparation, military force. The coalition’s refusal to exercises, and analysis of the Vietnam attack legitimate targets that were com- ordeal paid dividends. The coalition’s mingled with the Iraqi civilian populace prosecution of the air war was vigorous and civilian objects was based on an amal- but discriminate. In fact, preliminary gam of political and policy reasons. For information indicates that it is arguably instance, its decision not to strike military one of the most—if not the most—discrim- targets near cultural objects (e.g., the two inate air campaigns in the history of mod- MiG-21 fighter aircraft parked adjacent to ern warfare. the ancient temple at Ur) was based on The test to determine a campaign’s dis- respect for the cultural value of these crimination (hence, its legality) has tradi- objects.51 Just as important was the fact tionally examined its operations in toto. that Iraq’s positioning of these aircraft two This test applies the concept of propor- miles from an air base effectively tionality, which weighs noncombatant grounded them. Although the law of casualties and property damage against armed conflict would have permitted their the overall military gains achieved.55 This destruction, these aircraft—as well as the concept proscribes combat operations other Iraqi military hardware purposefully whose negative results would clearly out- collocated among archaeological sites and weigh the anticipated military advantage. cultural objects—remained on the coali- Although many people consider the con- tion “Joint No-Fire Target List” because of cept ill suited to determine whether a sin- the cultural value of the objects nearby gle attack against a specific target should and because the location of the aircraft be planned and executed, it has also been effectively took them out of the fight.52 used for precisely this purpose. The rules of engagement also contained The concept of proportionality does not, other operational constraints which however, restrict a nation from using its played a significant role in minimizing weapons systems to their fullest capabili- collateral damage and civilian casualties. ties.56 It requires a nation to refrain from For instance, if a coalition m ission’s intentionally targeting and employing “fragged” target or an alternative one weapons against civilians who are not could not be located, the rules required involved in the hostilities and prohibits pilots to return with their weapons.53 the intentional attack of their property. Similarly, aircrews could attack a target in But the concept recognizes that collateral populated areas only if they were sure of casualties and damage to private property the target’s identification and location: may inevitably occur during combat oper- otherwise, they were not to deliver their ations, stipulating only that combatants ordnance. Consequently, numerous coali- use ordinary care to minimize such occur- tion aircraft returned from combat sorties rences.57 carrying undelivered ordnance. Indeed, The coalition appears to have been approximately 25 percent of all combat highly successful in this area of its opera- missions culminated in undelivered ord- tions. As noted previously, if coalition nance.54 aircrews could not positively identify Many military strategists and historians their targets, they returned without doubt that this war will yield many valu- expending their munitions. The coalition OPERA TIONS LAW AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 39 also selected aircraft and munitions so the number of civilian deaths for which that any operation in a populated area the air campaign was responsible. would be carried out with maximum This war can also serve as a paradigm accuracy and minimal risk to civilians and for political leaders and military com- their property. In locations where its air- manders. The US NCA wielded its prerog- craft were susceptible to antiaircraft atives of civilian control wisely by trusting artillery (AAA) and SAMs, the coalition its military commanders to prosecute a tasked support aircraft to suppress enemy military operation. Military commanders air defenses to minimize the distractions exercised brilliant leadership by relying for aircrews delivering munitions.58 on their staffs to plan the war’s opera- Although neither the amount of damage tions. Military operators and their sup- to Iraqi civilian property nor the number port elements executed the plan within of Iraqi civilians injured has been defini- the law and the rules of engagement. In tively established, one prominent group of the midst of all this, political and military critics has estimated that 3,000 Iraqi non- decision makers at all levels found that combatants died as a result of coalition air DOD attorneys and judge advocates knew operations.59 Based on these early esti- how to find legal ways to accomplish vari- mates, this civilian death rate is lower ous missions. Operations law took full than that of any other significant air cam- flight. paign in history.60 Of course, attributing The Persian Gulf war proved that all of the Iraqi civilian deaths to the coali- American civilian and military leaders tion’s air campaign ignores wartime had learned important lessons from reports of television broadcasts and coali- Vietnam. Well-defined rules of engage- tion aircrews about the destructive effects ment played an integral role in making of heavy Iraqi AAA barrages, almost all of this possible. Consequently, US opera- which missed their targets and returned to tions in the Persian Gulf bore little resem- earth. Furthermore, Iraq sought to down blance to those in Vietnam, where restric- attacking aircraft with SAMs, the vast tions on targets and aircrews unreason- majority of which also missed and ably and unnecessarily hampered military crashed back to terra firma. Obviously, effectiveness and exposed our aircrews to the deaths caused by these armaments are increased risks. Efforts to educate our not attributable to the coalition’s air personnel in the law of armed conflict strikes. Likewise, the coalition is not have succeeded. Prosecuting the war accountable for the 300 or so civilians legally while at the same time treating killed in the Al Firdos bunker, since Iraq Iraqi soldiers and civilians humanely was permitted their entry into it. Other non- essential to maintaining domestic and combatants killed while shielding legiti- international public support. More mate military objectives should not be importantly, it was the right thing to do. assessed against the coalition either. The practice of operations law contributed More fact-finding may lower even further to this success.

Notes

1. Tom Shales. "Stormin' Norman, in High Command," 3. Article 1. Hague Convention No. 4 Respecting the l.aw Washington Post. 28 February 1991. D2. and Customs of Warfare on Land of 1907. reprinted in Air 2. Ibid. Admiral Sharp's account of his Vietnam War Force Pamphlet (AFP) 110-20, Selected International experience. Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (San Agreements. 1981, 3-5. Each of the Geneva conventions of Rafael. Calif: Presidio Press. 1978), attributed the loss of the 1949 directs its signatories to comply essentially with the war to the failure of American civilian leadership. If his same instructional requirements (see note 9). assessment here is valid, tens of thousands of American 4. DOD Directive 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program (GC), lives, rather than “hundreds.'' would have been spared. 10 July 1979, was first promulgated in 1974. It requires each 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

military service to design a program to ensure that the law of ensure that rules of engagement are not more restrictive than war is observed and to prevent violations of that law. the law requires but are used for specific operational, politi- Military personnel are to receive training in the law of armed cal. or diplomatic purposes. conflict commensurate with their duties and responsibilities. 18. Walt W. Rostow, "Memorandum of May 6, 1967, on For example, the Air Force's compliance with this directive the Bombing Program,” in Gerald Gold. Allen M. Siegal, and is implemented by Air Force Regulation (AFR) 110-32, Samuel Abt, eds.. The Pentagon Papers, New York Times ed. Training and Reporting to Insure Compliance with the Law (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), 573-76. An article by W. of Armed Conflict, 2 August 1976. Hays Parks, "Rolling Thunder and the Law of War," Air 5. Steven Keeva. "Lawyers in the War Room.” American University Review 34. no. 2 (|anuary-February 1982): 2-23, Bar Association Journal, December 1991, 58. In recognition provides an excellent analysis of how the gradualism of the that Air Force judge advocates who practice international Rolling Thunder campaign, which resulted from overly law are also involved in advising Air Force war fighters on severe restrictions on USAF operations, guaranteed its fail- legal issues related to military operations in peace and war, ure. Col Dennis M. Drew's Rolling Thunder 7965: Anatomy Maj Gen Keithe E. Nelson, the judge advocate general of the o f a Failure, CADRE Papers, Report no. AU-ARI-CP-86-3 Air Force, redesignated the International Law Division as the (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, October 1986) International and Operations Law Division, Office of the examines the extent to which the Vietnam War undermined Judge Advocate General, in January 1991. This was the offi- American air power doctrine and the reasons for believing cial beginning of the practice of operations law in the Air that the threat of intervention was probably overstated. Force. 19. Roach. 49. 6. On 13 December 1991, Lt Gen Michael A. Nelson, Air 20. Ibid. In fact, a fair reading of the Uniform Code of Force deputy chief of staff of plans and operations, and Maj Military fustice, Title 10, United States Code. secs. 801-940, Gen David C. Morehouse, the judge advocate general of the concludes that a commander who failed to do so could, as a Air Force, signed a letter dealing with operations law. The consequence, face a trial by court-martial on a number of letter exhorted operators and planners at all levels to forge charges. closer ties with their judge advocates to ensure that air oper- 21. Parks. 12, 20. ations in peace and war continue to adhere to the require- 22. Ibid., 9. ments of the law. 23. Col Dennis Kansala. CENTAF staff judge advocate, 7. DOD Directive 5100.77, 1. The "law of war" is synony- and Maj Harry Heintzelman, CENTAF assistant staff judge mous with the “law of armed conflict." For the sake of uni- advocate, briefing. Air Force Judge Advocate General’s formity. the latter is used throughout this article. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action 8. Hague conventions nos. 3, 4. 5, and 9 of 1907, reprinted Workshop, subject: Rules of Engagement. Maxwell AFB, in AFP 110-20, chap. 3. Ala., 10-14 June 1991. 9. The four conventions are (1) Geneva Convention for the 24. Review of “Rules of Engagement” files, CENTAF Staff Protection of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Judge Advocate's Office. Headquarters USAF International Field. 12 August 1949 (GWS): (2) Geneva Convention for the and Operations Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and General, Washington. D.C., 7 January 1992. Although the Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. 12 August specifics contained in these files remain classified, it is per- 1949 (GWS Sea); (3) Geneva Convention Relative to the missible and correct to say that they show how the military Treatment of Prisoners of War. 12 August 1949 (GPW): and services had to work closely together on deconfliction and (4) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian beyond visual range (BVR) issues. Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 (GC). All are 25. Kansala and Heintzelman briefing. For an interesting reprinted in AFP 110-20, chap. 3. Iraq and all of the coali- account of this operation, see Tom Mathews, "The Secret tion nations were parties to these conventions during the History of the War," Newsweek. 18 March 1991, 28-39: and Persian Gulf war. Barton Gellman, "Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq," 10. AFP 110-31, International Law—The Conduct of Washington Post, 23 June 1991, Al. Armed Conflict and Air Operations. November 1976, 1-6. 26. Mathews, 28—29. 11. Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and 27. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, 4-2. Associated Terms, 1 December 1989, 317. 28. Casey Anderson. "War Planner: Civilians Didn’t 12. Ibid. Change Target List,” Air Force Times, 8 July 1991, 27. This 13. DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An article reports on an interview with General Glosson, who Interim Report to Congress, July 1991, 16-1. The Persian explained another of the contentious targeting issues from Gulf war ultimately involved the air forces of our coalition the war. The question was whether the coalition had tar- partners; however, each nation relied on its own rules of geted statues of Saddam Hussein and the arcs of his hands engagement, which CENTAF succeeded in harmonizing and whether planners were told by Pentagon officials not to through negotiations with representatives of each coalition do so. General Glosson said that these objects were never on air force. the target lists. His judge advocates advised him that it 14. Similarly, all US ground and naval forces in an area of would be inconsistent with the law of armed conflict to operations such as the Persian Gulf theater have peacetime strike them, inasmuch as they were cultural objects. and wartime rules of engagement which guide their conduct. 29. Keeva, 58. This article details only a part of the con- 15. AFP 110-31, 1-5. 1-6; Article 22, Annex to the tributions of Major (Lieutenant Colonel-select) Heintzelman Convention, Hague Convention No. 4 of 1907, reprinted in to the war effort. He was centrally involved in devising the AFP 110-20, 3-8. wartime rules of engagement for coalition forces. 16. AFP 110-31, 1-6. 6-2. 30. Kansala and Heintzelman briefing. 17. J. Ashley Roach, “Rules of Engagement," Naval War 31. Richard MacKenzie. "A Conversation with Chuck College Review. January-February 1983, 47. Captain Roach, Horner," Air Force Magazine 74. no. 6 (June 1991): 61. a Navy judge advocate, demonstrates how rules of engage- 32. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, 4-5. ment can restrict military operations far more than domestic 33. Reported in Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Civilian or international laws do. He suggests that judge advocates Casualties during the Air Campaign and Violations of the render the best advice to combat commanders when they Laws of War, ed. Human Rights Watch Committee (New OPERATIONS LAW AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 41

York: Human Rights Watch Committee, 1991), 114. General the country's infrastructure despite the continuation of UN McPeak presented these data on a slide entitled "Tonnage sanctions. See Bernd Dubesmann, "Postwar Iraq Rebuilds Expended—U.S. Only." indicating that American air forces Rapidly," Washington Times. 12 January 1992. 14. alone had delivered this amount of ordnance, although his 45. Rick Atkinson and Dan Balz. "Bomb Strike Kills remarks throughout suggested that this was the coalition's Scores of Civilians in Building Called Military Bunker by tonnage. U.S., Shelter by Iraq." Washington Post. 14 February 1991, 34. W. Hays Parks. “Righting the Rules of Engagement." Al. US Naval Institute Proceedings. May 1989. 89. 46. Peter Tyler. “U.S. Stands Firm on Bomb Attack and 35. AFP 110-31, 5-7 through 5-8. Says Investigation Is Closed," New York Times, 15 February 36. Parks. "Righting the Rules of Engagement," 89. 1991, 1; and "Kelly: 'We Knew This to Be' a Military 37. Review of “Rules of Engagement” files. Facility." Washington Post, 15 February 1991, A30. 38. Kansala and Heintzelman briefing. 47. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict. 12-3. 39. Message, 162323Z, US Ambassador Thomas P. 48. Ibid., 5-3. Pickering to Headquarters USAF/XO, February 1991, 4-5. 49. AFP 110-31, 5-31. Recounted in this paragraph is the ambassador's statement 50. Articles 14 and 15. GC, reprinted in AFP 110-20, 3-82 on developments in Operation Desert Storm, contained in through 3-83. the referenced message. 51. MacKenzie, 61; and Conduct of the Persian Gulf 40. Parks, "Rolling Thunder and the Law of War." 20. Conflict, 12-4. 41. Articles 13-26, GC. contained the provisions that pro- 52. Review of "Rules of Engagement" files. This list was tect the entire civilian population. Articles 27-149, GC. pro- updated throughout Operation Desert Storm and regularly vide for the treatment of protected civilians. Specifically, contained 20 pages of off-limits targets. Article 28. GC, rules that a civilian "may not be used to ren- 53. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict. 12-3. der certain points or areas immune from military opera- 54. Memorandum. W. Hays Parks, chief, International tions.” Iraq, as a signatory to the Geneva conventions, was Law Branch, International Law Division. Office of the Army bound by this rule. Judge Advocate General, to Col Robert L. Bridge, chief. 42. Harry Summers, “The Battlefield's No Forest of International and Operations Law Division, Office of the Air Bambis." Air Force Times. 30 September 1991, 62. Force Judge Advocate General, USAF. subject: Review of 43. Tim Weiner, "Studies: 70.000 Deaths in Postwar Coalition Air Operations, 10 December 1991. Iraq," Philadelphia Inquirer. 9 January 1992, 3: William 55. AFP 110-31, 5-10. Matthews. "Greenpeace Criticizes High Iraqi Death Toll of 56. Ibid. War," Air Force Times 51. no. 45 (17 June 1991): 5; Richard 57. Ibid., 5-10 through 5-11. See W. Hays Parks, Homan, “Report Says U.S.-Led Air Campaign against Iraq "Linebacker and the Law of War," Air University Review 34. Violated 'Law of War'.” Washington Post, 17 November no. 2 (January-February 1983): 11-12. 1991, A37; and Julie Bird, "AF Faulted on Targeting in Gulf 58. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 12-3. War," Air Force Times, 20 January 1992. 6. 59. Needless Deaths in the Gulf War. 19. 44. Needless Deaths in the Gulf War. 128-47. Greenpeace 60. Parks, “Linebacker and the Law of War," 19-20. Parks International, too. has implied that the coalition's air cam- compares the number of civilian deaths per ton of bombs paign had to have been indiscriminate because of the extent delivered in the 1972 Linebacker II operation with like fig- of the damage to Iraqi society and the suffering of the Iraqi ures from several earlier air operations. Although people since the war's end. See Weiner. 3. This is not, how- Linebacker II was the most discriminate of these operations. ever. the test for whether a bombing campaign was discrimi- Desert Storm appears to have been marginally more discriminate. Interestingly, within days, Iraqi government officials nate in this regard. This observation, of course, is subject to reported they were making outstanding progress in restoring change as more facts about the war come to light. Summer 1992 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

1 st Lt Gary A. Vincent, USAF for his article In the Loop: Superiority in Command and Control

Congratulations to 1st Lt Gary A. Vincent on his If you would like to compete for the Ira C. selection as the Ira C. Laker Award winner for Eaker Award, submit an article of feature length the best eligible article from the Summer 1992 to the Alrpower /oumal, Walker Hall, Maxwell issue of the Alrpow er JournM. Lieutenant AFB AL 36112-5532. The award is for the best Vincent receives a $500 cash award for his eligible article in each issue and is open to all contribution to the Air Force’s professional US military personnel below the rank of colonel dialogue. The award honors Gen Ira C. Laker or equivalent and all US government civilian and is made possible through the support of employees below GS-15 or equivalent. the Arthur G. B. M etcalf Foundation of Winchester, Massachusetts.

42 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER

M a ) Paul G. H ough, USAF

HE TURN of world events in recent initiatives are arguably the most profound years has led to wrenching change changes to the defense resource manage- for US military forces. Coping with ment system since former Secretary of Tnew political realities, a fast-falling Defense Robert McNamara introduced the budget, and the defense management Planning, Programming, and Budgeting review process is stressing Air Force insti- System (PPBS) in the early 1960s. Yet few tutions to the breaking point. So much is people outside of the Pentagon are aware going on that it is possible for command- of the ramifications of these new policies. ers to overlook other significant changes For example, wing commanders will get that could completely alter the way we do increased funding authority to pay for business. Such is the case with unit cost support services that were formerly pro- resourcing (UCR) and the Defense vided “free” but could also lose direct Business Operations Fund (DBOF). These control over some of their own support Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) services. Full implementation of the

43 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

DBOF entails more than simply a change cost. For example, military pay is a sup- in financial management. It requires port cost that is not funded at the installa- philosophical, structural, and procedural tion level. Nevertheless, military pay is a changes in mission operations. real cost that must be included when con- Commanders must understand these sidering different methods of producing changes now to positively shape their the same level of support. impact on tomorrow’s forces. This article Eventually, OSD decided to fund certain provides a quick overview of the concep- activities based on set unit costs and the tual framework behind UCR and the DBOF projected demand for outputs. Thus, a and discusses potential effects on day-to- flight-training installation might get $1 day operations. million for every student graduated from undergraduate pilot training instead of a lump sum for the total number of expected graduates. Under unit cost resourcing, Supporting Defense through funding is “earned” based on the quantity Revolving Funds of support that customers demand. One consequence is that installation command- Most Air Force operations are financed ers will not be able to build a kitty from through direct appropriations from the these functions because there is no guar- general fund of the US Treasury. anteed annual appropriation. Further- However, since the early 1950s, certain more, the commander loses money dollar support activities financed their opera- for dollar as unit costs rise above the unit tions through collections from sales of funding target. Conversely, a decrease in goods and services. This method of unit costs leads to real savings that will be financing is known as a revolving fund. readily apparent to OSD through reporting An example of an Air Force revolving systems now in development. More fund is the Systems Support Division, important, funding operations through which purchases consumable supplies for unit cost resourcing prepares the activity resale to operating units. In the future, for eventual inclusion in the DBOF, the many more support activities will operate end goal. through revolving funds. In fact, OSD’s OSD formally established the DBOF in long-range goal is “to move all of the sup- fiscal year 1992. All existing revolving port establishment into the DBOF,”1 a very funds merged into a single fund with sepa- large revolving fund. rate service and functional divisions. The Expanding the use of revolving funds fund also added the Defense Finance and began in August 1989 when the OSD Accounting Service, the Defense Comptroller iqitiated a program to identify Commissary Agency, and some functions the total costs of various support outputs. of the Defense Logistics Agency—activi- Called cost per output, this program ties that were historically managed sought to develop a consistent system of through direct appropriations. Other sup- tracking resource inputs to support out- port activities may be included in subse- puts across the services for making deci- quent years if they demonstrate working sions about resources, performance, pro- accounting systems, quantifiable outputs, ductivity, and quality improvements.2 and identifiable customers.3 The end Joint task forces identified key outputs for result will be a defense system in which selected support programs and the total all support is provided on a fee-for-service cost of producing those outputs without basis through the DBOF to the operating regard to who controls those costs. The forces which are the primary customers. total cost divided by the total number of The new financial system for support outputs equals the cost per output, or unit activities is shown in figure 1. OSD pro- FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER 45

Figure 1. Unit Cost Resourcing and the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) vides funding directly to mission opera- entire system is based on a few simple tions for purchase of goods and services principles. from the DBOF. To induce efficiency, OSD can set unit cost targets for each division below the previous year's actual unit Principles for cost. Goods and services provided by non-DBOF support activities in the cost- the New Financial per-output program will receive funding Management System via UCR. The latter activities are either provided free or on a fee-for-service basis There are four main principles behind without the flexibility of the revolving the financial management philosophy. fund. Some support activities are consid- Central tenets of unit cost resourcing ered overhead or “general and administra- include awareness of total costs, business- tive” costs that are part of the total cost of like efficiency, market pressures, and mis- other activities. DBOF programs acquiring sion budgeting.4 Understanding each is overhead services from other organiza- necessary to predict the shape of the new tions must buy the support through inter- support infrastructure and the potential service support agreements and pass the impact on Air Force operations. costs on to the final customer—the commanders of mission operations. Overhead Total Costs is allocated to other organizations to determine their total costs. Obviously, imple- The extreme complexity of combat opera- mentation is complex. However, the tions is matched only by the complexity 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992 of mission support, organizational struc- tion of data-processing centers and central ture, and funding methods necessary to design activities.9 As more activities make the system work. As a result, host move into the DBOF, there will be fewer installations, and flying wings in particu- military personnel in support and greater lar, have direct control over only a small control by OSD. Looking further into the portion of the total resources necessary to future, we can envision a defense infra- accomplish their mission. In essence, the structure in which the services are depen- current system creates a fiscal illusion in dent on OSD for support. Support activi- which lower echelons may waste ties will operate like businesses but with- resources due to incomplete information. out a profit incentive. In essence, the For example, commanders generally want DBOF becomes the services’ general store. more of those resources (such as military personnel) paid from someone else’s budget than they would otherwise request. Market Pressures The Department of Defense (DOD) is Support functions under direct appropria- repricing support to eliminate distortions tions, in order to provide high levels of and make all costs apparent. In effect, service to operational commanders and prices will rise not because costs are rising their customers, naturally seek larger bud- but because the new prices will reflect gets. And operators gladly accept higher costs that had been there all along. levels of “free” support. The DBOF, with its market-like structure, allows the opera- Business-like Efficiency tor to determine the desired level of service and to make trade-off decisions based Modeling the public sector along the lines on known requirements and available of the private sector is a classic paradigm resources. Giving the money to the cus- of public administration. Deputy tomers means that support providers will Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood, for- have to sell their output to survive. The merly of General Motors, is strongly goal is to create a clear incentive for sup- behind the emphasis on business-like effi- port functions to focus on cost manage- ciency. Given the current political pres- ment and responsiveness to customer sures to vastly reduce the size of the demands.10 In turn, the operator will have defense establishment, the need to realize an incentive to reduce usage of high-value efficiencies in support is not simply nec- resources. essary; it is vital. Thus, the DBOF is Introducing market concepts to DOD is advertised as a means to save money and not new. Revolving funds have been to preserve an effective force structure.5 around since 1951. Martin Bailey, at the One way Defense Management Report time a member of the Institute of Defense Decisions (DMRD) directives achieve sav- Analysis, wrote in 1967, “The principal ings is by consolidating major support formal device by which a measure of functions. The new Defense Finance and decentralized decision making is now Accounting Service and the Defense accomplished is that of revolving funds, Commissary Agency are initial steps in including buyer-seller arrangements inter- this direction. Events in the past year also nal to the defense establishment.”11 There saw movement toward a defense health are, however, three fundamental differ- agency (although the services still retain ences between the goals of the current ini- some autonomy),6 and the consolidation tiative and revolving funds of the past. of all printing plants under Navy control.7 The first has already been stated—all sup- Pressure continues to consolidate engi- port. not just a small portion, will be in a neering services into public work centers.8 revolving fund. Second, activities in a We can also easily foresee the consolida- revolving fund must pass along all their FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER 47

Figure 2. Moving Toward Mission Budgeting costs. Some significant costs were previ- Today, estimating the total cost of, say, an ously funded by direct appropriations F-16 wing requires a cost model that iden- instead of customer payments. Now, only tifies the total resources necessary for those costs related to maintaining war operation. As noted earlier, many of these mobilization requirements will retain resources are not under the control of the direct appropriated funding. The third, wing. and perhaps most dramatic change, is that Figure 2 depicts all mission operations operators will be free to purchase support in the upper box and all support in the from either organic or commercial sources lower box. The larger the upper box is rel- as long as direct and indirect costs are ative to the lower box, the greater the fairly compared.12 Together, these “tooth-to-tail” ratio. Total cost visibility, changes introduce significant elements of business-like efficiency, and market forces a free market into defense support. are tools for shrinking the support box. However, the support box includes activities in the DBOF, in cost per output, and Mission Budgeting other general and administrative (G&A) services. As the portion of support in the When the entire support structure is in the DBOF increases, mission budgeting DBOF and operators literally control all becomes more feasible. the funding necessary for mission accom- There are major advantages to true mis- plishment, then mission budgeting will be sion budgets, not the least of which is a reality. The wing’s budget will be its eliminating the need for arbitrary cuts. total cost! Commanders, OSD, and When a wing is eliminated in the defense Congress will have a complete picture of drawdown, it is difficult for budgeteers to the full costs involved in operations. identify the elements, location, and dollar 48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992 amount of support to remove from the careerism in the officer corps in the past Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). In the two decades. It is logical to assume that DBOF model, eliminating the wing and its the DBOF will magnify careerist tenden- budget would automatically capture the cies amongst support officers who find full support tail.13 The effect would be themselves in a “business” operation sell- similar to a business losing customers. In ing support to the services. Tensions addition, the effects of base closures, force between professionals in support and fly- structure changes, and changes in operating operations may increase if support ing tempo could be more accurately esti- officers find themselves even further on mated. But most important, the complete the outside looking in. As OSD moves mission budget would give the command- activities from service control into a er full control over the funding necessary defense agency, support officers may find to accomplish the mission. their loyalties lie closer to their speciality As revealed above, the DBOF represents rather than to the larger profession of a structural change of monumental pro- arms. portions. But that change won’t come Support officers work to provide quality easy. Service financial managers have sig- service so that pilots can best fulfill their nificant concerns over the speed of imple- mission. The values of officership and mentation and the lack of special account- loyalties to the profession encourage maxi- ing systems to make the system work. mum support and responsiveness to oper- Outside of DOD, the General Accounting ator requests. Furthermore, support is Office testified to the House Armed offered through a command and control Services Committee that “Defense does framework in which commanders can not have the policies, procedures, and sys- either direct support actions under their tems in place to implement and operate control or go through channels to request the Fund in a ‘business-like’ manner.”14 support from other commands. When the The remainder of this article analyzes the DBOF is complete, this form of command impact of these changes under the and control will be a thing of the past. assumption that OSD will solve these Commanders will get support not because technical problems and implement the they ask but because they pay. In harness- concept as planned. ing the tremendous power of self-interest, the DBOF could reduce the commitment to the traditional military value of self- sacrifice. Changing Values in Support The Air Force and the other services attempt to institutionalize an intense In a very feal sense, the introduction of focus on mission accomplishment among a market system between operators and their officer corps. The DBOF will not support personnel threatens the basic val- threaten this norm for those officers close ues underlying officership. These values to force employment. But it does create include loyalty to the profession of arms, the potential for an even greater sociologi- self-sacrifice, and an intense focus on mis- cal division between operational and sup- sion accomplishment. Each of these val- port forces than currently exists. The lat- ues is compromised by the sociological ter’s goal will no longer be to assist the norms and expectations of a free market. former in accomplishing the mission but We are (or should be) officers first and rather to satisfy the customer, whoever specialists second. However, the intro- that may be. In practice, this difference duction of the all-volunteer force along may not be apparent, but the change in with the professionalizing of many sup- motives is real. Support functions will port services has increased concern over provide service to stay in business, not FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER 49 because their proper role is to assist opera- verify this proposition. In spite of this tors. Furthermore, because officers cost evidence, many would argue that military more than civilians of an equivalent support should be structured along the grade, DBOF activities will prefer civil- lines of a command economy. Their argu- ians in the same position. Already in fis- ment is that while market failure in the cal year 1992, DBOF activities must reim- private sector may lead to inefficient burse the military central pay accounts for results, market failure in providing essen- the officers working for them. As these tial military support could have disastrous activities trade officers for cheaper civil- consequences. There are also objective ians, and as the activities themselves differences between the DBOF and a free become defense agencies, the command market. link to the operational forces is weakened. In reality, the American economy only Commanders needing services will find approximates a free market. Government themselves dealing more with bureaucrats regulations, taxes, externalities, monopo- outside of service control and less with lies, and other defects combine to form people who share their same concerns. serious distortions to efficient economic An example is the recent decision to trans- decision making. The rules governing the fer ownership and management of bulk DBOF and the limitations of revolving petroleum from the Air Force to the funds further distort the free-market anal- Defense Logistics Agency. The command- ogy. For example, private businesses er will no longer have direct mission sup- operate to earn a profit—a positive incen- port responsibility for a critical opera- tive. However, DBOF activities must tional requirement.15 break even. Their only incentive is nega- Not only does the DBOF threaten to tive—to avoid going out of business. erode fundamental military values, it Furthermore, to meet the milestones of the questions the very nature of military sup- PPBS, prices must be set two years in port. The only way to protect wartime advance and held stable during the course support missions (defined here as a func- of each fiscal year. Military customers tion that unequivocally requires a blue will have to anticipate their orders well in suiter) within the DBOF is to specifically advance of the actual requirement. These identify them and either make sure they constraints result not in a free market but remain under direct appropriations or are rather some form of quasi-market. provided for within the revolving fund (by As mentioned earlier, the current policy edict or perhaps a subsidy to offset the dif- suggests that commanders will be able to ference in cost over a civilian). Simply purchase support from either commercial stating that a function embodies a wartime or organic sources. But the constraints of role is insufficient. The burden of proof revolving funds and our budget system do shifts to the services to show objective not offer a level playing field. Organic cause. activities will not be able to compete with commercial vendors. The support functions in the DBOF cannot react to changing circumstances nearly as fast as private From Revolving Funds to businesses, which enjoy much greater the Free Market flexibility. Nor will Congress allow the services to make major capital invest- The free market is widely recognized as ments without line-item control over mili- the most efficient means of coordinating tary construction. Moreover, the latter productive activities in a socially benefi- may seek to underbid military support cial manner. We need only look at the activities if they believe they can turn a economic collapse of the Soviet Union to significant profit once the competition 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992 from within government is eliminated. But to work, funding must be pushed to DOD will not have the ability to fully ver- the lowest level possible. The alternative, ify private sector costs to ensure compara- centralized funds used to procure support bility. As a result, the increased flexibility services from centralized support agen- of the commander comes at the potential cies, is only one step removed from the expense of the service’s long-run interests current funding arrangement. But as to maintain a viable support infrastruc- funds dwindle over the coming years, ture. commanders of support functions will If a DBOF activity loses a customer, it maneuver to adjust the new financial man- must pass along its fixed costs and over- agement rules to their maximum benefit. head to those who remain. Unless the As the budget pressure increases, we can function has captive customers (there are expect more subtle and more desperate many examples of this), it could quickly means for maintaining budget shares. go out of business. The effect on opera- Even if centralized support is nothing tions depends on how critical the function more than a monopoly, commanders still is to the mission and the specific rules have the option of whether to buy or not, governing competition. OSD wants to and how much.18 Competition, however, include the following G&A support activi- could lead to unintended inequalities ties in the DBOF in fiscal year 1994: between commands. Figure 3 depicts Air administrative services, retail supply oper- Combat Command (a buyer) and two ations, maintenance of installation equip- sources of support, providing commands ment (excluding aircraft and vehicles), and private firms. Each organization has other personnel support, real property general and administrative pools repre- management (RPM) and engineering sup- sented by circles. These G&A pools port, and other base services (which include morale, welfare, and recreation includes security police functions, train- (MWR), RPM, and base operating support ing and mobilization support, security (BOS). Support commands like Air Force operations, etc.).16 Assuming full compe- Materiel Command will have to compete tition, rising base prices will cause other with private firms that probably have functions to seek off-base support as well. fewer and smaller overhead pools. (How The effect will be that many services pro- many businesses have an auto hobby vided within the current support structure shop?) The operational commands receiv- will transfer to the private sector. ing the benefit of competition could con- Evaluating the merits of this result is ceivably end up with relatively greater dependent on whether the function services than support commands. should ever have been within the scope of Support agencies anticipating a drop in government control in the first place. demand for their services will push to maintain “strategic” withholds to protect their activities. Ostensibly, these withholds are necessary to ensure the contin- Maneuvering within the ued funding of functions that allegedly New Infrastructure shortsighted commanders would fail to procure. Managers argue that command- The basic outline of the DBOF suggests ers would underinvest in support training a parallel between the commander pur- or fail to invest at all in functions that pro- chasing support from a revolving fund vide no peacetime benefit but which are and a customer purchasing goods in a free critical in war. To the extent that current market. Satisfying commander’s prefer- levels of support from any one agency are ences at lower cost is a fundamental more or less than the commander would objective of the new form of support.17 prefer if given the funds to choose, then FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER 51

even a monopoly situation would be an seeking will not stop because of it. improvement. Instead, self-interested behavior will be Economic rent seeking is the term used channeled in other directions under the to describe behavior in which people best of intentions—to preserve war-fight- attempt to influence public decision making capability. Requests for withholds to ing for the benefit of private interests.19 avoid the demands of the free market are Examples include import limitations, sub- only the most obvious example. Another sidies, tax loopholes, and other schemes more subtle form of rent seeking is creden- that provide tremendous gains to a few at tialing. This is the requirement for given the expense of collective welfare. This is levels of experience and training for sup- not malicious behavior but rather the port officers or civilians to qualify for cer- expected result of the existing institu- tain positions or grades. An example of tional incentives. Similar behavior is this is the identification of mandatory found in defense when, for example, sup- courses to achieve Levels I, II, and III certi- port officers create new services that even fication in some weapons acquisition dis- if beneficial may not be the wisest use of ciplines. The intent is to have a more pro- resources.20 Rent-seeking behavior under fessional acquisition corps in accordance the current system of direct appropriations with congressional direction. However, is responsible for much of the waste that some proposals to extend the creden- the DBOF is trying to eliminate. But rent tialling concept to other support areas 52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

have an implied goal of pressuring the budget will grow enormously at the same commander to purchase “required” train- time local comptroller support is being ing for support personnel. Doubtless, scaled back. Commanders must have a many more forms of creative rent seeking comprehensive understanding of the full will take place as support functions range of defense activities to make this maneuver as best they can to protect their system work, and they will need, in this livelihoods. author's opinion, a much larger budget and analytical staff than they now have. Furthermore, current plans to locate the financial analysis staff under the wing DBOF and the Objective commander block further decentralization Wing Structure of funding control and decision making. A second area of contention is operating At the same time OSD is laying the control over support. The objective wing foundation for the complete expansion of seeks to place control over support ser- the DBOF into all support, the Air Force is vices under the user through command restructuring the force employment pack- channels. On the contrary, the DBOF age through the objective wing. The objec- offers financial control over support ser- tive wing includes an operations group, a vices through supply and demand logistics group, and a support group, each arrangements rather than command and with lean management staffs. The two control. In fact, OSD hopes to place all plans, the DBOF and the objective wing, G&A activities (which comprise the bulk were conceived by separate individuals of the mission support group) in the DBOF and for different purposes. Inevitably, by fiscal year 1994.-1 Other functions on basic elements (if not formal propositions) the base (tenants and the other two of the plans contradict each other in scope groups) will have to purchase services of responsibility, operating control, and from the mission support group (fig. 4). flexibility. As long as the wing commander controls Giving the commander greater responsi- both the provider (mission support bility is an objective of both the DBOF and groups) and two major customers (opera- the wing-restructuring plan. However, the tions and logistics group), there is a funda- location and size of the commander's mental contradiction between the aims of financial management team would neces- the DBOF and the command structure of sarily differ for each plan. Assuming that the new wing. If control of support ser- formerly centralized support funding is vices is centralized in line with other con- provided to at least the installation level, solidations. it would not be unreasonable then the commander of an objective wing to predict a move to strip the command- will have much greater financial responsi- er's control of the mission support group bility. Imagine having to budget not only in order to “free” him or her to concen- for direct operations but for all personnel trate on the business of operations. (not just civilian as now), their recruit- Whether or not the commander has con- ment and training costs, automated data trol over these services, he or she must processing services from regional centers, become efficient as well as effective. With commissary support from the Defense the rapid fall in resources, there is no Commissary Agency, financial support other choice. from the Defense Finance and Accounting Finally, the whole idea of consolidated Service, printing from the Navy, all logis- support that underlies the DBOF and tics support from the industrial and stock manv of the DMR initiatives is contrary to funds, and other support from as yet the notion of an expeditionary force. unidentified defense agencies. The base Large, centralized support functions FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER 53

Figure 4. General and Administrative Costs in the DBOF reflect a garrison mentality (at least in the ity is decentralized is up to us, not OSD. CONUS). Given the need for efficiency Nevertheless, modeling the defense sup- and savings in a peacetime military under port structure according to the philosophy attack from all sides, it is not likely that behind total cost visibility, business effi- more flexible, but more costly decentral- ciency, market mechanisms, and mission ized support arrangements will prevail. budgeting suggests enormous change. Operating commanders will have greater funding power than ever before, but at the Conclusion same time may see direct control over support operations slip away. Commanders Unit cost resourcing and the Defense must become more cost conscious; and Business Operations Fund promise to pro- war-fighting capabilities—if all other fac- foundly impact the defense support infra- tors remain unchanged—will increase to structure and current modes of resources the extent they succeed. Depending on management. However, the actual effect one’s perspective, the new initiatives rep- on command operations depends on the resent either a refreshing breath of air or a specific rules imposed by OSD and the dangerously defective idea. But attacks procedures selected by the services for against the system stemming from fear of final implementation. For example, as change itself are not productive. No set of funding shifts from support commands to rules will give perfect results. It is the net operators, the transfer can be held at the effect of incentives and disincentives to Air Staff, major command, wing, or even provide maximum defense capability that squadron level. How far funding author- matters in the long run. What is needed is 54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

a careful evaluation of alternative sets of this deliberation. To avoid serious error, rules that will best serve our institution in we should proceed with due caution and the future. Haste in the planned expan- implement changes as carefully as circum- sion of revolving funds does not allow for stances allow. □

Notes 1. Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) no. 971, ting mission budgets will eat into the defense infrastructure "DOD Financial Systems," approved by the Deputy Secretary at the expense of operating and support funds. As the of Defense, 2 February 1991, 2. defense drawdown continues, the fixed cost element will 2. Memorandum, OSD Comptroller, subject: Develop- result in rising unit costs. Col Sherry Sims, SAF/FMBMP. ment of a Financial Management System Based on "Cost per deserves the credit for this observation. Output," 10 August 1989. 14. Donald H. Chapin, “Defense’s Planned Implementa- 3. Congress placed a moratorium on further expansion of tion of the $77 Billion Defense Business Operation Fund," the DBOF pending review in fiscal year 1993. statement before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House 4. Actually, this philosophy is now new. The OSD Committee on Armed Services, 102d Cong., 1st sess., 30 Comptroller applied many of these concepts with mixed April 1991, 2. success during implementation of Project Prime in the late 15. Refer to OSD Comptroller fiscal year 1993 Program sixties and early seventies. See OSD Comptroller. Project Budget Decision no. 735. "Bulk Petroleum Management," Prime Handbook, June 1967. The current program applies approved on 5 December 1991: and SAF/FMB reclama mem- the same principles but with a new and more sophisticated orandum for the Department of Defense Comptroller, same strategy. subject, dated 21 November 1991. 5 Memorandum, OSD Comptroller, subject: Unit Cost 16. The inference is taken from draft policies and proce- Resourcing Guidance, 15 October 1990. 3. dures discussed in a joint G&A cost working group (refer to 6. Memorandum. Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject: memorandum, OSD Comptroller, same subject, 21 October Strengthening DOD Medical Functions, 1 October 1991. Part 1991) combined with the list of general and administrative of the direction calls for a unified DOD medical budget. base support categories from attachment 1 in OSD's memo- 7 DMRD no 998, "Consolidation of DOD Printing." randum. subject: Unit Cost Resourcing Guidance, 15 approved bv the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 16 November October 1990. 1990. 17. OSD Comptroller. Defense Business Operations Fund 8. DMRD no. 967. "Base Engineering Services." approved Implementation Plan Report. 1 January 1992. The DBOF sets by DOD Comptroller, 30 December 1990. up customer-supplier relationships, and the operating com- 9. DMRD no. 924. "Consolidate ADP Operations and mander as owner of the installation budget is the key cus- Design Centers in DOD,” approved by Deputy Secretary of tomer under this concept. Defense. 18 November 1990. 18. Ibid., 4. Again, the commander (OSD's customer) 10. OSD Comptroller. Defense Business Operations Fund states the unit requirements. There may be no requirement Implementation Plan Report. 1 January 1992. for services that were heretofore merely nice to have. 11 Martin J. Bailey. "Defense Decentralization through 19. Charles K. Rowley. "Gordon Tullock: Entrepreneur of Internal Prices." in Defense Management, ed. Stephen Enke Public Choice," Public Choice. September 1991. 149-69. The (Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Inc.). 1967, 343. concept of rent seeking was first identified in 1967 by public 12. Memorandum. OSD Comptroller, subject: Unit Cost choice economist Gordon Tullock. Resourcing Guidance. 15 October 1990, 16: and memoran- 20. This is the familiar case of “empire-building." The dum. OSD Comptroller, subject: Defense Business self-interest aspect occurs when officers seek to enhance per- Operations Fund Financial Policy. 27 September 1991, 3. formance reports by touting new services. The current Details on the extent of competition are sketchy at best. The "rules" offer little or no reward for support functions (com- more recent guidance encourages commanders to buy from mands) to manage to lower costs and transfer excess funds to the least cost source (commercial or organic) "unless operating functions (commands). lemphasis added| there is some other policy such as mobi- 21. Draft guidance by OSD Comptroller, subject: General lization considerations that prohibits this flexibility." and Administrative Cost Reimbursement Policies and 13. Because the new pricing structure cannot, as of vet. Procedures. 10 October 1991. distinguish between unit fixed and unit variable costs, cut- Basis of Issue

AFRP 50-2, AJrpower Journal, is the professional journal of the Air Force. Requirements for dis- triDution will be based on the following:

I copy for each general on active duty with 3 copies for each Air Reserve Forces unit the US Air Force and Air Reserve Forces. down to squadron level. I copy for every 5 active duty US Air Force 3 copies for each air attache or advisory officers in grades colonel through captain. group function. I copy for every 15 active duty US Air Force I copy for each non-US Air Force, US gov- officers in the grade of first lieutenant. ernment organization. I copy for each US Air Force or Air Reserve 1 copy for each US Air Force or US govern- Forces office of public affairs. ment library facility.

If your organization is not presently receiving Its authorized copies of the Air- power Journal, submit a com pleted AF Form 764a to your publications distribu- tion office (PDO). Note sample below . The Editor

(PRESS HARO WHEN USING BALL POINT PEN)

.shor t title ano dat e UNIT OF RON CLASS SYMBOL REQUISITION REQUIREMENT APR. P 5o-2 £A UK) £ (-)COplES TO: COMPLETE (Include ell changes) pr o m: Y0UPt OFFICE ADDRESS OF. CUSTOMER- A C C O U N T FOR FORMS USE ONLY 6>AS6 poo ON HAND

REMARKS

EMERGENCY ONE TIME ESTABLISH R6QU1R PD RESPONSE (—") COPIES OF AFR.P FOLLOW UP/TRACER MISSED SHORT 10 AlRPOWER JOURKIAU OTHER (Spociiy)

DATE PREPAREO

SIGNATURE AND TITLE

A f Form 764*. FEB M PREVIOUS EOITION IS OBSOLETE. RON AND ROMT REQUEST

55 ,112 LOGICAL LFFLCTS OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT

M a | M artin L. Fracker, USAF

TTEMPTS to exploit the psychological impact of aerial bombardment have a long history and remain central to Air Force Adoctrine.1 Examples include the firebombing of Dresden, the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the bombing of North Vietnam.- Other examples might include the German bombing of London and the British bombing of German cities in World War II, as well as the coalition bombing of Iraqi soldiers in Operation Desert Storm.1 In at least one instance, psychological effect was a factor in aircraft design.4 Despite their history, the psychological effects of bombardment have received surprisingly little system- atic study. As a result, a well-defined base of knowledge that could guide military planners in maximizing these psychological effects does not exist. This article addresses this need by considering the effects of aerial bombardment on three distinct groups: civilians, national decision makers, and troops in the field. In each case, the discussion identifies psychological issues that are still unresolved and suggests research that might lead to their resolution.-'1 58 AIRPOWEB JOURNAL FALL 1992

Effect of Bombing on Civilians cule campaigns of the First World War should have been even less effective— Early proponents of air power stressed which seems to contradict the historical the potent psychological effects of aerial facts.11 Further, the United States bombing on the will of enemy civilians to Strategic Bombing Surveys concluded that resist. Giulio Douhet, for example, pre- the Allied bombing campaigns against dicted that just two days of uninterrupted both Germany and Japan were successful bombing with high-explosive, incendiary, in demoralizing their civilian and poison-gas bombs would send a city’s populations;12 in the case of the Germans, population “fleeing to the open country- the bombing may even have turned them side to escape this terror from the air.”6 against their government.13 Similarly, J. F. C. Fuller believed that an A more satisfying explanation is enemy could force Britain’s surrender just Quester’s suggestion that the critical vari- by bombing London for 48 hours.7 In ret- able is not stoicism but expectancy. The rospect, these predictions seem less than bombings in the First World War were a cautious— witness the fact that the complete surprise to the average British German bombing of London in the Second citizen. In the Second World War, the World War did not lead to British capitu- German bombardment again came as a lation. Robin Higham, the eminent British surprise, but—according to Quester— air power historian, suggests that air British civilians were encouraged by the power prophets such as Douhet and Fuller fact that poison gas was not used and that were simply guessing.8 But one must keep the effects of the bombing were much less in mind that these visionaries worked severe than they had been led to expect.14 from the data that was available at the The Germans and Japanese, however, may time, especially information on the effects have been misled by their governments of German bombing raids in World War I. into believing they were safe from air George Quester, a distinguished professor attack. Thus, when the attacks came, they of military strategy who has taught at the began to believe that defeat was immi- National War College, notes that although nent.15 these raids caused minimal physical dam- Experimental studies support Quester’s age, they had considerable psychological expectancy hypothesis.16 One review of impact, inducing panicked Londoners to 54 experiments concludes that informa- riot and even assault "Royal Flying Corps tion that comes as a surprise is analyzed officers in the street for alleged failures to more thoroughly than is unsurprising do their duty.’’9 If such were the effects of information.17 Further, social psycholo- relatively light and ineffective bombing gists have observed that people are more attacks, what’ would be the effects of con- likely to try to analyze and explain unex- tinuous heavy bombing with incendiaries pected events than they are expected and gas? To theorists like Douhet and ones.18 This fact may help to explain the Fuller, the answer was all too obvious. impact of the 1968 Tet offensive on sup- How then does one explain the failure port of the American public for the of World War II bombing campaigns to Vietnam War. The offensive, which came cause Britons to rise up against their gov- as a surprise to most Americans, led them ernment and demand peace with the to reevaluate and finally reject American enemy? Some writers suggest that civil- participation in the war.19 Thus, both ians are not as psychologically fragile as experimental and historical evidences sug- Douhet and Fuller assumed.10 But the gest that unexpectedly severe or mild air answer cannot be that simple, for if the attacks may cause civilians to reassess massive bombing of Britain could not their chances of winning the war. crush the civilian psyche, then the minus- Evidently, if aerial bombardments are to PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT 59

cause a civilian population to rebel against example, weak commitment to the war’s its government, then the ferocity and objectives could lower the threshold while destructiveness of those attacks must anger in response to the bombing (i.e., exceed the population’s expectations. reactance) could raise it.20 In addition, the This conclusion raises a number of ques- populations of some cultures could have tions, perhaps the most important of higher thresholds than those of other cul- which is whether one can achieve the tures. At present, these issues pose a chal- desired psychological effects only by lenge to air power theorists and planners. attacking the civilian population directly. How can these questions be answered? If so, then most nations with high moral One approach would be to study popula- standards are unlikely to use air power in tions of nations, such as Iraq, that have this manner. On the other hand, perhaps been subjected to significant air attacks. one can obtain the same effect by attacking Although such studies are valuable, they the enemy nation’s economic infrastruc- have limitations. For instance, differences ture rather than its civilians. If so, then there is the problem of determining the target population’s expectations (e.g., a worst-case nuclear nightmare or some- An F t IX) Supersabre being prepared for takeoff on an early Foiling Thunder mission over Vietnam. Characterized by thing less severe) and determining grail lull escalation and periodic halts to the bombing. whether they can be exceeded. How Rolling Thunder merelv alerted North Vietnam to the much is enough to instill the necessary importance of upgrading its air defense systems and gave feelings of despair? Further, do other fac- Hanoi time to make such improvements, as well as repair the tors raise or lower this threshold? For damage from earlier raids. 60 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992 in culture and language may create prob- cheaply by conducting analog experiments lems, and researchers may encounter on dual-axis tracking.22 Finally, political resistance from the population’s govern- psychologists interested in international ment. Additionally, these studies repre- conflict obviously cannot conduct experi- sent only a single data point because they ments on real nations. As a result, they are obtained under a single set of circum- turn to analog experiments on the stances. To fully answer the questions at Prisoner’s Dilemma23 and are thus able to issue, one must obtain many data points shed light on many issues, including the under a variety of circumstances. A more mechanisms underlying nuclear deter- practical approach would be to conduct rence.24 simulations or analog experiments. These examples suggest that an experi- Analog experiments study things that mental analog to aerial bombardment are analogous to one’s true interest. This might also be possible. In one such exper- indirect, experimental approach is appro- iment, civilian subjects would be asked to priate when a direct study of the subject is decide whether to vote for a president too difficult, dangerous, or expensive to who has led the nation into war or for an conduct in a controlled, scientific manner. opponent who promises to give up the war For example, clinical psychologists inter- effort at once. One group of subjects ested in agoraphobia do not have access to would be led to expect massive, highly enough patients suffering from this disor- destructive bombing, while another group der to conduct scientific evaluations of would be told that any air attacks are potential therapies. As an alternative, likely to be limited and ineffective. they conduct experiments on common During the experiment, subjects would fears such as stage fright and are then able to develop successful treatments for agoraphobia.21 Similarly, human-factors psy- A B 52 lifts off the runway at Andersen ALB, Guam, in chologists interested in aviation find that December 1972. Unlike the Rolling Thunder operation. experiments on pilots in actual flight are Linebacker applied continuous, massive force against the too dangerous and that those in simulated North Vietnamese, eventually compelling them to enter into a truce. Despite this operation's success, it may be premature flight are too expensive. But they are able to conclude that only massive bombing can be effective to answer some questions safely and against an enemy. PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT 61

The reaction of civilians to aerial bombardment may he tied to their expectations. In World War II. the German Effect of Bombing government may have led its citizens to believe that they on National Decision Makers were safe from attack. After being bombed, however, they became < onvinced that defeat was inevitable. Above, the ravages of bombing are evident in this German city along the Although Douhet prescribed direct Rhine River in 1945. attacks on civilians, his real target was not the enemy populace but its government, receive various “news reports” about what which he hoped would acquiesce to civil- is happening in the war. including stories ian pressure to make peace with the about aerial attacks against their commu- enemy at any price.25 As mentioned ear- nity. For some subjects, these reports lier, such attacks in the Second World War would describe the attacks as devastat- failed to live up to Douhet’s predictions. ingly effective; for others, the reports In the case of the Germans, who appar- would describe them as ineffective. If ently did turn against their government, Quester’s expectancy hypothesis is cor- the Nazi police state proved capable of rect, subjects for whom the air attacks suppressing any outward dissent.26 exceed expectations should be more likely Perhaps for these reasons, recent history than the others to vote against the presi- has seen aerial attacks intended to have a dent. Similarly, subjects for whom the more direct effect on an enemy govern- attacks are less effective than expected ment’s decisions. Among the clearest should be more likely to vote for the presi- examples of such attacks were the major dent. aerial campaigns of the Vietnam War: Of course, this experiment is only one Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I, and example. Variations of the same experi- Linebacker II. ment could be designed to answer differ- Rolling Thunder (1965-68) and the two ent questions. Variables could include the Linebacker (1972) campaigns differed kind of enemy (democratic or totalitar- markedly in their underlying strategies ian), the enemy’s terms of surrender (lim- and in their effects. Rolling Thunder was ited or unconditional), the objectives of a gradually escalating bombing campaign the war (expelling an invader or gaining against the North Vietnamese punctuated access to raw materials), and so forth. by periodic halts to the bombing.27 The With data from such studies, one could strategy underlying Rolling Thunder bears begin to describe the impact of bombing some resemblance to the so-called gradu- on civilians under many different sets of ated and reciprocated initiatives in ten- circumstances—and thus guide the plan- sion (GRIT) reduction strategy for conflict ning of bombing campaigns in future management first described by the pio- wars. neering political psychologist Charles 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

Osgood in 196 2.28 In GRIT-type strategies, objectives or only when public opinion one of two opposing sides announces a favors a peaceful alternative to war. unilateral conciliatory gesture (e.g., the Evidently, these possibilities have not yet bombing halts) but threatens escalation if been tested by means of experiments. Yet, the opponent tries to exploit the situation. these hypotheses seem to lend themselves This strategy failed in Vietnam. Rather, well to analog experimentation. For the limited attacks early in Rolling example, experimental subjects could Thunder only alerted the Vietnamese gov- compete with a programmed opponent for ernment to the need to improve its air control over an initially neutral set of defenses, and the bombing halts gave the assets. In one condition, the competition government time to make those improve- could be peaceful; in another, subjects ments.29 In marked contrast, the could compete by destroying assets ini- Linebacker operations were successful in tially belonging to the other. Or subjects convincing the North Vietnamese to in one condition could receive a large accept a truce.30 Rejecting the GRIT-like monetary reward if they win and a sub- strategy of Rolling Thunder, the stantial penalty if they lose; in another Linebacker campaigns applied continu- condition, monetary rewards and penal- ous, massive force against the North ties could be negligible. If a GRIT strategy Vietnamese. works in the “war” or “high stakes” condi- One might easily conclude from the tions, then subsequent research could Vietnam experience that GRIT-tvpe bomb- compare GRIT to a Linebacker-like strat- ing strategies are not effective in influenc- egy using massive attacks. Still other ing the decision makers of an enemy experiments could examine whether GRIT nation and that only a massive, unrelent- works when simulated opinion polls favor ing bombing campaign would have the a military solution. In any event, the desired effect. Such a conclusion is con- results of such experiments could comple- gruent with Quester’s expectancy hypoth- ment studies of historical experiences esis and raises the same questions noted such as the Vietnam War. earlier: How does one exceed the enemy’s worst expectations? How far beyond those expectations will be enough? How is the threshold moderated bv reactance, by the Effect of Bombing on perceived value of the war’s objectives, or Soldiers in Battle by the population’s cultural values and beliefs?31 Whatever enemy decision makers do, On the other hand, one may be prema- the soldier is the one who ultimately ture in concluding that onlv massive fights the war.33 Thus, the effect of air bombing can be effective. Considerable power on the soldier is of considerable evidence indicates that GRIT-like strate- importance. Yet, the psychological effect gies work under some circumstances. In of aerial bombardment on soldiers is far addition to favorable results from analog from clear. The Canadian sociologist experiments, political psychologists Philip Anthony Kellett. in his monumental study Tetlock, Charles McGuire, and Gregory of combat motivation in World War II, Mitchell point to the Austrian State Treaty notes that air attack can induce nearly of 1955 and the end of the cold war as paralvzing shock but observes that there is examples of real-world GRIT success sto- no consensus on the persistence of this ries.32 effect as soldiers gain combat experi- Perhaps GRIT works only in the absence ence.34 As Kellett discusses, British and of overt violence or only when the bel- American studies conducted during the ligerents are weakly committed to their war came to opposite conclusions. British PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT 63 tmw*

The contradictory conclusions of British and American studies found that repeated air attacks, studies on the effects of aerial homhing on soldiers have yet which became increasingly frightening to he resolved. The British study finds that repeated attacks even though they did little real damage, tend to sensitize soldiers, while the American study indicates seemed to sensitize soldiers to the shock thill soldiers become desensitized. Interestingly, it is possible to use either conclusion to explain the huge number of Iraqi effect. On the other hand, American stud- surrenders in Operation Desert Storm (above). ies indicated just the opposite: repeated attacks seemed to desensitize soldiers. The disparity between the results of the Solomon’s bottom line seems to support British and American studies has yet to be the sensitization hypothesis. The data, he resolved. On the one hand, some psycho- wrote, suggest that “repeated battery will logical theory supports the American eventually fell even the hardiest souls.”38 desensitization hypothesis. For example, Recent experience in the war with Iraq opponent process theories of motivation (Operation Desert Storm) supports either suggest that repeated exposure to a fearful the sensitization or desensitization stimulus will tend to elicit less fear over hypothesis. Consistent with the sensitiza- time.35 Further, in terms of Quester’s tion hypothesis, Lt Gen Charles Horner— expectancy hypothesis, repeated bombing coalition air component commander dur- experiences are likely to adjust soldiers’ ing Desert Storm—suggests that continu- expectations until they match reality: ous bombardment by coalition forces was future experiences are then likely to have the principal reason Iraqi soldiers surren- less of a psychological impact. On the dered en masse without putting up any other hand, some research suggests that significant resistance.39 If so, the Iraqis the British sensitization hypothesis mav clearly did not get used to the bombing. apply under some circumstances. An alternative view more consistent with Psychologist Steven Reiss notes that the desensitization hypothesis holds that repeated exposure to a fearful stimulus the surrenders were induced by the real- can be either sensitizing or desensitizing, ization that coalition ground forces had so depending upon the exposure condi- easily penetrated Iraqi defenses. Those tions.36 Similarly, clinical psychologist defenses had proven formidable enough in Zahava Solomon’s research among Israeli the earlier Iran-Iraq War to produce an soldiers indicates that sensitization occurs eight-year stalemate. Thus, the rapid with some soldiers while desensitization coalition breakthrough may well have occurs with others.37 Nevertheless, come as a shock to the average Iraqi sol- 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992 dier. In keeping with Quester’s expec- The psychological goals of aerial bombardment seem elusive tancy hypothesis, this shock may have largely because the psychological effects of bombardment are not well understood. We still need additional research to been sufficient to induce the Iraqi troops define these effects. Right, an ageless B-52 departs an to surrender. airfield en route to a daytime bombing mission during Evidently, we need research that clari- Operation Desert Storm. fies the roles of sensitization and expectancy. Real-world studies like those reported by Solomon may seem ideal,40 but they face at least two limitations. performance will reflect their intellectual First and most obvious is the infrequent ability—a deception to which people are occurrence of wars in which air power is a generally vulnerable.45 By threatening the significant factor. For this reason, subjects’ performance, the noise would Solomon recognizes the need to consult also threaten the subjects’ self-image.46 “studies of psychological and somatic (Of course, subjects would eventually be reactions to adversity in general,” not just told the truth!) to combat.41 Second is the dependence of To examine the Desert Storm question,47 most real-world studies on soldiers’ recol- one could have the subjects perform two lections and perceptions of their own tasks in succession. One group could be states of mind.42 Psychologists have exposed to the noise during both tasks, learned that such recollections and per- while the other would be exposed only ceptions. though clearly useful, are often during the second task. If the sensitiza- inaccurate.43 The same limitation would tion hypothesis is correct, then the first also apply to transcripts of the many thou- group should perform more poorly on the sands of prisoner-of-war interviews taken second task, compared to the second during the war with Iraq. Although we group. Within each of these two groups, should study these transcripts, we cannot there could be three additional groups. consider them definitive. Analog experi- They would differ only in the difficulty of ments may prove to be useful adjuncts in the first task (easy, moderate, hard), and overcoming these two limitations. all groups would be told that the second Some questions about the effects of task was equal in difficulty to the first. In bombing on soldiers will defy analog reality, all three would receive the same study. There probably is no way to simu- moderately difficult second task. Thus, late the psychological experience of a sol- one group would find the second task dier who is being bombed day and night. unexpectedly hard, another unexpectedly Nevertheless, other questions may be more easy, and the third about as expected. If amenable to investigation. For example, the expectancy hypothesis is correct, then we could examine how repeated exposure the “unexpectedly hard” group should to generic threats interacts with expectan- perform more poorly than the other two. cies about those threats. To do so. we need a laboratory threat that is not actually dangerous. One candidate for a “safe” threat makes Questions for a use of the fact that noise of 75 decibels Psychology of Air Power disrupts cognitive task performance, although it is considered acceptable by After nearlv eight decades of air power, safety standards of the Occupational we still lack research that defines the psy- Safety and Health Adm inistration.44 chological effects of aerial bombardment. Specifically, while being subjected to 75 Nations have used air power in the hope decibels of noise, people would perform a that enemy populations would rise up cognitive task after being told that their against their governments, that enemy PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT 65

governments would decide to abandon the theme emerges: the role of expectancies. war, or that enemy troops would lose their Civilians and decision makers might aban- will to fight. These psychological goals don the war effort only when bombing have often proved elusive, largely because attacks are much worse than expected. the psychological effects of bombardment Soldiers might become desensitized to air are not well understood. This article has attack once they know what to expect identified several questions about these from such attacks. In each case, disrupt- effects. In general terms, these questions ing people’s expectancies may be the key focus on three issues. First, under what to their psychological defeat. Yet. these conditions will aerial bombardment cause expectancy effects may vary depending civilians to rise up against their govern- upon other factors, such as the perceived ment and demand peace with the enemy? value of the war’s objectives, reactance to Second, can only massive, unrelenting the enemy attack, or the cultural values of bombing campaigns persuade enemy deci- a population. If so, then we need research sion makers to abandon the use of force, or that develops and elaborates a model of can GRIT-tvpe strategies sometimes how the different factors interact to pro- achieve the same goal? Third, are duce people’s responses to bombardment. repeated bombing attacks the key to pro- Finally, the article has discussed ducing paralyzing fear in soldiers, or are research capable of addressing these other factors more important? issues. Although studies of real-world Although theoretical perspectives rele- wartime experience are ideal, they are vant to these issues vary, a common necessarily limited by the infrequency 66 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

with which major wars occur. Further, certainly will be needed. For example, such studies represent what happened none of the experiments described above under only one specific set of circum- addresses the cross-cultural question of stances. Making generalizations about whether people in different societies will future wars could be impossible.48 As we respond to bombing differently. have seen, analog experiments could help Nevertheless, this article has identified a by complementing real-world studies. place to begin. Now we must undertake Other experiments may be possible and the effort. □

Notes 1. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine 12. The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys of the United States Air Force. 16 March 1984, urges the (European War land] Pacific Warl (30 September 1945, 1 exploitation of bombardment's psychological impact on an July 1946: reprint, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, enemy's armed forces, people, and allies (page 2-17). October 1987), 39, 95. 2. See Robin Higham. Air Power: A Concise History (New 13. Ibid.. 12. York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), on the firebombing of 14. Quester, 205. Dresden (page 135); Air Marshal Sir Robert Saunby. Air 15. The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys. 39, 95. Bombardment: The Story of Its Development (New York: 16. See Quester. Harper & Brothers. 1961), on the atomic attacks against Japan 17. Charles Stagnor and David McMillan. “Memory for (page 205); and Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New Expectancy-Congruent and Expectancy-Incongruent York: Oxford University Press, 1978), on the bombing of Information: A Review of the Social and Social North Vietnam (pages 374 and 414). Developmental Literatures,” Psychological Bulletin 111 3. Germany's primary objective in bombing London seems (1992): 43-61. to have been military rather than psychological. Hitler 18. Gerd Bohner et al., "What Triggers Causal apparently hoped to force the Royal Air Force into the sky Attributions? The Impact of Valence and Subjective where it couid be destroyed (Higham, page 121). Probability.” European Journal of Social Psychology 18 Nevertheless, it would be surprising if Hitler did not also (1988): 335-48. hope that the bombing would destroy the British popula- 19. Lewy, 76. Though not a bombing campaign, the Tet tion’s will to resist. Regarding the British bombing cam- offensive illustrates the dramatic psychological impact that paigns. the main British objective seems to have been the surprising military action can have on civilians. destruction of German industry (Higham. pages 130-36). 20. By way of analogy, the Tet offensive might not have Nevertheless, during the interwar years, British military proved so effective in undermining US public support had planners assumed that enemy bombing of British cities the population been more strongly committed to the war's would severely panic the population and force an early sur- goals (cf. Christopher D. Wickens, Engineering Psychology render (George C. Quester, “The Psychological Effects of and Human Performance IColumbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1984], Bombing on Civilian Populations: Wars of the Past,” in 101-6). A good counterexample is the American public’s Psychological Dimensions of War. ed. B. Glad [Newbury response to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The angry determi- Park, Calif.: Sage, 1990], 204). Thus, one would expect the nation to defeat Japan illustrates the concept of reactance. British to have at least considered the psychological effects the tendency to increase one’s commitment to a goal or on the German population when they planned the Battle of behavior in reaction to social pressure to do just the opposite Germany. Regarding the B-52 bombings in Desert Storm, see (see Robert A. Baron and Donn Bvme, Social Psychology: the discussion of the effects of bombing on soldiers later in Understanding Human Interaction [Boston: Allyn and this article. Bacon. 1991], 162; and Jack W. Brehm, A T heory of 4. Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Psychological Reactance [New York: Academic Press, Soldiers in Battled Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff. 1982), 256. 1966]). Kellett notes that the German Junkers Ju 87 “Stuka” dive- 21. Geoffrey L. Thorpe and Sheryl L. Olson, Behavior bomber was designed to shock as much as to destroy the Therapy: Concepts. Procedures, and Applications (Boston: enemy and was in fact better at the former than the latter. Allyn and Bacon. 1990), 89. 5. 1 do not assume that the reader has any special back- 22. That is, two simultaneous single-axis tracking tasks. ground in modem scientific psychology. For the most part, 1 In single-axis tracking, subjects use a joystick and try to keep have avoided technical terminology, but the nature of the an error indicator centered on a "zero-error" position. In article requires reference to some psychological concepts most experiments, the error cursor moves along the tracking that may be unfamiliar to some readers. In those instances, 1 axis in what appears to be a completely random way, and the have provided brief explanations in the notes. subject's job is to compensate for each of these movements. 6. Giulio Douhet. The Command of the Air, trans. Dino In dual-axis tracking, the two axes may both be vertical or Ferrari (1942; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air horizontal, but more often one is vertical and the other hori- Force History. 1983), 58. zontal (see Wickens, 422-45). 7. J. F. C. Fuller. The Reformation of War (New York: 23. A social dilemma game. Suppose two fugitives are Dutton, 1923), 150. arrested by the police and interrogated separately. If one 8. Higham, 48. confesses and the other does not, then the one who con- 9. Quester, 203. fessed goes free while the other receives a 10-year sentence. 10. For example, see Higham, 10. If both confess, then each receives a five-year term. If nei- 11. Quester, 201-14. ther confesses, then both receive a one-year sentence. PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT 67

Obviously, both prisoners would be better off trusting each 42. See Kellett; Norman A. Milgram, Ruth Orenstein, and other and not confessing. In the typical experiment, how- Ezer Zafrir. "Stressors. Personal Resources, and Social ever. both "prisoners" (usually, volunteer college students) Supports in Military Performance during Wartime," Military confess. See Anatol Rapoport. Experimental Games and Psychology 1 (1989): 185-200: Joseph Schwarzwald et al., Their Uses in Psychology (Morristown, N.J.: General "Validation of the Impact of Event Scale for Psychological Learning Press, 1973): and Luc Reychler. 'The Effectiveness Sequelae of Combat,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical of a Pacifist Strategy in Conflict Resolution." fournal of Psychology 55 (1987): 251-56; Zahava Solomon. Mario Conflict Resolution 23 (1979): 228-60. Mikulincer, and Stevan E. Hobfoll, "Effects of Social Support 24. Philip E. Tetlock. Charles B McGuire, and Gregory and Battle Intensity on Loneliness and Breakdown during M itchell. "Psychological Perspectives on Nuclear Combat," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 Deterrence,” Annual Review of Psychology 42 (1991): (1986) : 1269-76; and Zahava Solomon, Mario Mikulincer, 239-76. and Stevan E. Hobfoll, “Objective versus Subjective 25. Douhet, 58. Measurement of Stress and Social Support: Combat-Related 26. The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys, 12. Reactions," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 55 27. Lewy. 374. (1987) : 577-83. 28. Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to H'ar or Surrender 43. Timothy D. Wilson, “Strangers to Ourselves: The (Champaign-Urbana. 111.: University of Illinois Press. 1962). Origins and Accuracy of Beliefs about One's Own Mental 29. Lewy. 393. States," in Attribution: Basic Issues and Applications, ed. 30. Ibid'410-17. John H. Harvey and Gifford Weary (New York: Academic 31. Carl von Clausewitz. On War. ed. and trans. Michael Press, 1985), 9-36. See also Martin L. Fracker. Measures of Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton Situation Awareness: Review and Future Directions. Report University Press, 1976), 80-81. No. AL-TR-1991-0128 (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: 32. See Tetlock. McGuire, and Mitchell. The Austrian Armstrong Laboratory, Crew Systems Directorate, October State Treaty of 1955 ended the Allied occupation of Austria 1991), 8, 16-21; and Martin L. Fracker and Sharon A. Davis. and guaranteed Austria's military neutrality. Explicit, Implicit, and Subjective Rating Measures of 33. The term soldier is used here to denote any member of Situation Awareness in a Monitoring Task. Report No. AL- the armed forces, including airmen, sailors, and marines. TR-1991-0091 (Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio: Armstrong One should note, however, that all of the research reviewed Laboratory, Crew Systems Directorate, July 1991). 19. The herein appears to have been conducted among ground forces. last two studies found that self-report measures of situation 34. Kellett, 254-57. awareness sometimes contradicted more objective measures. 35. Richard L. Solomon and John D. Corbit, "An 44. Mark S. Sanders and Ernest J. McCormick, Human Opponent-Process Theory of Motivation: I. Temporal Factors in Engineering and Design (New York: McGraw-Hill, Dynamics of Affect," Psychological Review 81 (1974): 1987), 468-70. 119-45. 45. Mario Mikulincer, "Attributional Processes in the 36. Steven Reiss, "Pavlovian Conditioning and Human Learned Helplessness Paradigm: Behavioral Effects of Global Fear: An Expectancy Model." Behavior Therapy 11 (1990): Attributions,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 380-96. 51 (1986): 1248-56. 37. Zahava Solomon. "Does the War End When the 46. Ibid. Shooting Stops? The Psychological Toll of War.” /ournal of 47. That is. what caused the mass surrenders: constant Applied Social Psychology 20 (1990): 1733—45. bombing or the unexpected coalition breakthrough? See the 38. Ibid., 1738' preceding discussion. 39. Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, “The Air Campaign," 48. For a congruent view, see Michael Howard, “Military Military Review 71, no. 9 (September 1991): 16-27. Science in an Age of Peace," RUSI: Journal of the Royal 40. See Zahava Solomon. United Services Institute for Defence Sciences 119 (March 41. Ibid., 1737. 1974): 3-11. 68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992 Can’t Wait to Order the Airpower Journal??? NOW YOU CAN PLACE YOUR ORDER BY PHONE AND CHARGE IT!!! By calling (202) 783-3238, you can order a subscription to the Airpower Journal, ISSN: 0897-0823, stock number 708-007- 00000-5, and charge your subscription to your MasterCard or Visa card. Subscriptions are $13.00 annually ($16.25 for international mail). If you prefer, you can mail your order to New Orders, Superin- tendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh PA 15250- 7954. Payment by check, money order, or credit card is acceptable. If you pay by credit card, be sure to include your card number and type (MasterCard or Visa), expiration date, and your signature for authorization. OW WELL you write is important to you personally and pro- BECOMING fessionally. How clearly you communicate on paper will eitherH help or hinder your career, and it A BETTER will help or hinder your service as well. Certainly, you owe it to your subordinates to be clear and concise in your written MILITARY directions, and you owe it to your service and your country to make sure that your official writing is competently crafted. It WRITER seems a truism that the discipline of good writing promotes clear thinking. And both clarity of thought and clarity of Greg Todd expression are essential to the proper planning and execution of military operations. Additionally, officers have some degree of obligation to write for publication. As a longtime editor associate of mine points out, if military officers fail to write for publication, if they refrain from joining the public dialogue on defense matters, then they abdicate to civilians the shaping of the military’s future. Most of you reading this probably can learn to write better with relatively little pain. Some of you may be hopelessly 70 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

mired in the bog of obfuscation, and some • Guide to Effective Military Writing by of you are already such good writers that W illiam A. McIntosh. Harrisburg, nothing I can say would help. But those Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1986, 224 of you in the middle can become better pages, $14.95 (paper). writers. • The Elements of Style by William To that end, my first step in this article Strunk, Jr., and E. B. White. 3d edition. will be to address in some detail four New York: Macmillan, 1979, 92 pages, books that will make you a better writer $4.95 (paper). (and you need to read only two of them!). • Words into Type based on studies by Second, I will discuss some other refer- Marjorie E. Skillin, Robert M. Gay, and ences that might be useful if you want to other authorities. 3d edition. Englewood go beyond the first four. Then, in four Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974, brief essays and five suggestions, I will try 585 pages, $39.95. to give you some useful guidance on mili- • Any first-rate dictionary. My choice: tary writing drawn from 18 years of mili- Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary tary editing. edited by Frederick C. Mish et al. Most of us can write adequately. We Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam- have learned the basics of grammar and Webster, Inc., 1985, 1,564 pages, $16.95 to composition somewhere in our schooling. $23.95. But we forget; sometimes we go too fast; and we pick up bad habits. Working in a bureaucracy seems to have a terrible aging effect on our writing skills. Like a lawn McIntosh Deserves mower, we can cut a pretty smooth path an Apple when we are new, but the summers pass and the sludge builds up in our engine and our blade dulls—and our prose dulls Col William A. McIntosh is a professor too. Then the papers we write are scarcely of English at West Point. I have never met sharp enough to knock the heads off dan- him, never seen him perform in a class- delions. Here are four books that can help room, but I bet he’s one hell of a good you kick off the rust, clean your engine, teacher. His book is important. Its subti- and sharpen your blade: tle is A Handbook for Getting Things Written Quickly, Correctly, and Easily. This book is written specifically for military writers. Part 1, comprising 116 pages organized into 10 straightforward, sensible chapters, can be read in a couple of sit- tings—maybe just one. It’s so worthwhile that you may want to read it-twice. Part 2, which is an alphabetically arranged “checklist of grammar, usage, and mechanics,” can be productively scanned, with close attention reserved for the here and there, picking and profiting from the author’s judgments on the linguistic crimes we individually commit. McIntosh begins with an obvious but almost uniformly overlooked basic. Borrowing from Hippocrates, perhaps, he tells us up front. BECOMING A BETTER MILITARY WHITER 71

Given the reality of unending mounds of anyone who has to write more than one paper, what can you do to improve the situa- page on an issue with more than one con- tion? For starters, try doing nothing that will tention. And McIntosh’s chapter 6, on make things worse. Specifically, you must style, and chapter 7. on correctness, resist the urge to write when writing isn’t should be required reading for all of us. absolutely necessary. The basic rule every I can quibble with bits of McIntosh's military writer ought to live by is this: I will write only when I must. book (editors always can do that), but the objections would be no more than quib- Such sense fills McIntosh’s book, and bles. His discussion of collective nouns is it’s available to you in the space of an oversimplified; that topic is better afternoon. He offers us golden advice on addressed in Words into Type. Also, his the elemental necessity to introduce sub- discussion of nonsexist language seems to stance to our writing (“Without it, the best countenance those annoying slash forma- you can hope to do is put together a series tions like he/she and him/her (not to men- of empty phrases that may. if you’re very tion the abominable s/he); but he barks at lucky, seem to have some utility”); on the unwelcome grammatical intruder who exercising judgment -in what we put in in the admirable pursuit of equality would and what we leave out (“Both gluttony cast aside number agreement and have us and starvation make the stomach hurt and say things like “Everyone should have injure the body. The object is modera- their report in on time.” On this difficult tion”); and on the aggravating mechanical issue, McIntosh admirably employs nits of putting words on paper (“Form throughout his book the solution I prefer— possessives of words ending in s by periodically (and gracefully) shifting his adding an apostrophe and another s, use of pronouns, in some sections using unless it sounds bad”). Such sense. the masculine he and in other sections the In chapter 5, “Organization,” McIntosh feminine she. (Addendum: We all may says what I have always thought about tra- have to get used to slash formations like ditional outlines and what I wish I’d had she/he in dealing with this stickiness; evi- the temerity to point out to my high dence is seen in the notes we receive from school English teachers: “The stuff I put our children’s elementary school teachers, after Roman numerals I and III was utterly invariably crafted with slashes.) w orthless.” Free at last. McIntosh Such criticisms are barely worth raising, releases us from the stifling, confining, however, and are so small as to serve bet- rigid structure of stepladder outlines and ter to point out the overarching worth and educates us instead in a new method of sensibility of McIntosh’s book, cover to organizing our thoughts. He calls it brain- cover. And it’s short. Rather than trying storming, but it goes beyond the common to be comprehensive and wading into the concept of that term. This has nothing to muck of contentious points of grammar, do with sitting in a room with a bunch of McIntosh has cut to the basics, simplifying other people who don’t want to be there where he could, illuminating everywhere, either and corporately seeking cosmic and working always to help the military inspiration or the lowest common denomi- writer. Read this book. If you take its nator. This is a personal style of brain- counsel, you will become a better writer. storming he brings us to, a method for getting inside our own skulls and drawing our ideas out onto paper in a way that elicits creativity and promotes an organiz- The Lasting Little Book ing process that leaves those old high school outlines to die in chalk dust. The second book you need to read is That chapter on organization can help even shorter than M cIntosh’s. The 72 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

Elements of Style, by William Strunk, Jr., for your reader to look at. Make him smile and E. B. White, has only 92 pages—and now and then. Make him feel what you the pages are little. But perhaps no book feel. The essence of good poetry is to con- ever written on the English language is vey emotion, and we could do with a bit better, ounce for ounce. In half an evening more poetry in our prose. of reading, you can find in this book a wealth of straight wisdom about writing with style and grace. The Elements of Style begins with a sec- Two References tion containing 11 ‘ Elementary Rules of Worth Referring To Usage," followed by a section with 11 “Elementary Principles of Composition.” The other two books listed above aren’t Read these rules and principles; don’t just for reading cover to cover, but for ready skim them. reference. Both should be within an arm’s Also read, especially and carefully, the length of where you do your writing. closing section of the book, titled “An Words into Type is the best single refer- Approach to Style.” This section, just 19 ence I have found for solving the puzzles pages long, invites your close attention if of construction that writers encounter. you want to be a better writer. It holds a Should you use a singular or plural verb? wonderful description of what “style” is Should you put a title in quotes or under- and how one achieves it in his writing. line it? When do you capitalize? When Listen: do you hyphenate? When do you punt? Words into Type has answers. It is a Style not only reveals the spirit of the man clear and complete reference for points of but reveals his identity, as surely as would his fin g e rp rin ts. . . . Young w rite rs often grammar, usage, and style, and it should suppose that style is a garnish for the meat of be helpful to you regardless of your level prose, a sauce by which a dull dish is made of writing expertise. Whether you have a palatable. Style has no such separate entity; problem with an unruly comma or with it is undetachable. unfilterable. The begin- objective case, this book can help you ner should approach style warily, realizing solve it. Words into Type is the technical that it is himself he is approaching, no other; manual to help you write correctly. It also and he should begin by turning resolutely contains excellent glossaries and a away from all devices that are popularly lengthy, instructive section on the ele- believed to indicate style—all mannerisms, ments of typography, composition, and tricks, adornments. The approach to style is by way of plainness, simplicity, orderliness, illustration. (Regrettably, parts are dated sincerity. because the current edition came out in 1974, before the computer revolution in Don’t misread that to mean that your writ- writing and publishing. A new edition is ing should be dull, unimaginative, or stac- scheduled for publication in 1993; one cato. To quote again, “The first piece of hopes that it will correct that shortcom- advice is this; to achieve style, begin by ing.) Yet, the book’s greatest strength is its affecting none." Choose precise nouns index. A reference book is worthless if (“The adjective hasn’t been built that can you can't find in it just what you are look- pull a weak or inaccurate noun out of a ing for. With the index in Words into tight place,” Strunk and White remind us), Type, you can find exactly what you are and choose strong, active verbs. Avoid looking for, quickly and easily. What a jargon. Seek clarity. Neither overwrite relief. nor oversimplify your writing. Don’t be You also need to keep a good dictionary afraid to use wit; don't be afraid to be col- within reach. I use Webster's Ninth New orful. Paint a clear and interesting picture Collegiate Dictionary, but several excellent BECOMING A BETTER MILITARY WRITER 73

Impact instead. Somebody catch this guy. Put him away. Or promote him. At the very least, strike his name every time you see it crop up in your prose. Sloppy use of faded nouns like impact and puny adjectives like major reduces our writing to mush. And it reduces our readers’ appetite accordingly. Get in the habit of using a dictionary—and perhaps a thesaurus—to find strong nouns and descriptive adjectives. (Use a thesaurus with caution, however, never relying solely on it. Close words can have quite different connotations. Finding a nugget in a thesaurus is fine, but assay it at the local dictionary before you try to spend it.) Writing well does take time, but your readers will appreciate the care you take, ones are available. Get a solid, cloth- and habitually using a dictionary will bound. two-inch-thick one to keep at your have the beneficial side effects of improv- side when you write. A cowboy in the ing your vocabulary, sensitizing you to wild West needed his six-gun when he proper usage, and expanding your think- rode into a dusty, dangerous town, and ing. you need to have a loaded dictionary at hand when you write into new territory. Unless you can unfailingly spell correctly words like dessicate, accomodation, On the Second Shelf and embarassing, you will need a dictionary. (All three of those examples were Four books will not a library, nor an mispelled in that sentence, by the way. accomplished writer, make. The four So was mispelled misspelled in that last works discussed above can indeed make sentence.) But you need a dictionary for a you a better writer if you are not already much more important purpose than familiar with them, but let’s now walk a merely correcting your spelling—the little deeper into the stacks. spelling checker in your word-processing The fifth book on your shopping list program can handle that. Rather, you might well be American Style and Usage: need a dictionary to help you find the The Consensus by Roy H. Copperud (New right words to express yourself precisely York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1980). and to help you use those words properly. This book is a comprehensive comparative Without using a dictionary to reach for study of what disputatious authorities better words, we end up using cliches. have to say about all the troublesome We end up with Major Impact. I’m about gremlins that complicate our writing and convinced there is an impish or perhaps collectively define American style and deranged officer whose assignment was usage. The gremlins are lined up here in lost. His name is Major Impact. Absent alphabetical order for ease of observation, any orders, he travels covertly from base or perhaps execution. In preparing the to post to station, inserting his name in book, Copperud has compared works like every document he can find, as many H. W. F o w le r ’s Dictionary of Modern times as he can. Thus, nothing “affects” English Usage, Wilson Follett’s Modern anything anymore; everything has a Major American Usage, and virtually all the 74 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

D issertations, or perhaps The MLA [Modern Language Association! Handbook. You may want a thesaurus, a book of quotations, an atlas, an almanac, references for your word processor, and— if you are writing for publication—perhaps a market guide (check your military library for M arkets fo r the Military Writer, an excellent listing of military publications that is compiled and distributed periodically by the office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Department of the Army). You may also want several shelves devoted to specialized subject references. But you need to spend some time, too, with books that only unintentionally teach you how to write better. That puzzling last sentence is meant to pass along good advice found in several quarters and variants: If you want to write good prose, you need to read good prose. Spending 10-hour days in the company of official regs and manuals won’t make you a better writer. But spending an evening casually reading the Essays of E. B. White will expose you to a stylish writer in action; spending some time with The Complete Short Stories of Mark Twain will teach you the remarkable power of finely turned humor. You don’t need to hew to my favorites, though. You know good writing when you see it; if you make time to read good prose for sheer enjoy- ment, you will find yourself writing better. other superior dictionaries and usage guides. He concisely tells us the range of authoritative opinion on how best to deal with literally thousands of those little Four Little Essays gremlins; he gives us the consensus view; and he does so with wit, charm, and clar- 1. On Communication. You don’t have ity. One word of warning: If you care to be a great writer to be an effective about using words carefully, you will find writer. Here’s how to be an effective it hard to put this book down in less than writer: Have something of substance to half an hour. I can’t look up a single entry say. Write carefully enough to avoid toxic without being drawn to others—the book errors in grammar, mechanics, and usage. is filled with tasty, seductive potato chips. Use short sentences and descriptive You will want other books on your sec- words. And try to write so clearly and ond shelf as well. If you deal in endnotes, directly that your reader will understand buy a copy of Kate Turabian’s A M anual what you have written the first time he for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and reads it. BECOMING A BETTER MIUTARY WRITER 75

Rephrased for the computer age, we hyphenated words; another doesn’t have need to make our writing “reader- periods in “U.S.”; another has too much friendly.” We need to be clear and con- space above the date, or too little; another cise. But that doesn’t mean that we need doesn’t abbreviate “enclosures” just right. to be dull. Use variety in your writing. So secretaries take the heat, bite their lips, Use words your reader can picture. Use and do the blessed things over, too often ideas he can associate with his own expe- again and yet again if some other piddling riences. Understand that there is a debili- fault is found. Someone up the chain tating difference between trying to express gloats at having exercised his authority, at yourself and trying to impress your reader. having made the world safer for democ- The job of any piece of writing is to racy—someone who obviously has too lit- communicate. McIntosh makes that gen- tle real work to do. Corporate good will is erality quite specific: "Writing exists to spent foolishly; time is wasted; and the these ends: 1. To delight. 2. To teach.” taxpayers get stuck with the tab. The enumeration pops up elsewhere as to Formats should be applied to facilitate entertain or to inform. Generally, our offi- communication, not to hinder it. They do cial writing is intended to inform, and this by making papers generally recogniz- when we lose sight of that—or when we able. They should be made available to inform badly—we do a disservice to the help an organization communicate, not military service, the government, and the used as a stick to beat effective writing taxpayers. The cost of badly written corre- into submission. Dazzle your subordi- spondence, memoranda, regulations, and nates with your common sense! If we doctrine is incalculable. In wartime, the want our people to write well, to commu- cost might be counted in human lives. nicate effectively on paper, then the supe- We are often told to “write as you riors who read and review those commu- speak.” I would modify that slightly, to nications have an obligation to judge them “write as you speak, only more precisely.” for their content. Too many such review- Writing enables us to unleash the power of ers seem too concerned with the width of words in a way that casual conversations the margins; they probably go home at or on-the-spot discussions don’t. Writing night and criticize their kids for coloring is time-consuming, and it requires a care- outside the lines. ful touch. Writing well means taking the 3. Be a Bit Audacious. Your challenge time to express clearly what you really as a writer is to reach for the right word, mean. Writing concisely is hard work. not to just always settle for plain vanilla “Not that the story need be long," wrote ones. Let your personality show through Henry David Thoreau, “but it will take a your writing. Be distinct. Filling your long time to make it short." When you prose with acronyms and jargon impedes write, take the time to write well. communication and puts your reader to 2. On Formats. Our concern should be sleep. Using perfectly descriptive words with substance. Too often that forest is sends your message and engages your obscured by a misplaced gaze on the trees reader. of format. Time after time, letters are Don't be afraid to use an unfamiliar bounced back to the authors to be redone word if it’s the right one. If a few of the for reasons having nothing to do with readers don’t understand it, what’s wrong whether they communicate effectively. with a little education? As Casey Stengel On one, the scribble says “Washington, said, “You could look it up.” My little boy D.C., should be abbreviated WASH DC,” is walking, talking proof that even second with an arrow aimed threateningly at the graders have the sense to ask what a word inside address; another must be retyped means if they don’t understand it. So as because it contains more than three long as you are using a word correctly, 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

you shouldn’t inhibit your vocabulary Finally, Five Suggestions unnecessarily in your writing. True, you want to be clear; simplicity is good; and 1. Keep It Simple. If a phone call isn’t you don’t want to be pretentious. But an appropriate response to that blivet that sometimes the exact word you need is an just fell on your desk, how about a short, uncommon one, and you should use it. informal, handwritten note? If you have 4. Blue Pencil Blues. We editors need access to electronic mail, learn to use it to to read McIntosh too (and for this discus- send informal messages. If you must sion the category of “editors” includes write a more formal paper, don’t get anyone who reviews another’s writing and wrapped around the axle about its format. either revises it or suggests revisions to it). Clarity should be your purpose, not petty We let our egos become too involved in conformity. That holds, too, if you are our work. McIntosh puts it this way; reviewing someone else’s written work; whether writer or reviewer, you should One of the hardest things editors must do is generally confine your concern to the let their own pet peeves pass unchanged paper’s clarity and substance. when they don’t impede effective communi- 2. Compose on a Computer. This is the cation. Face it: sometimes changing however computer age, so get with it. If high to moreover is simply an exercise in power. school sophomores can learn word pro- And that’s nonsense. Changing and to but is cessing, then so can you. The vast bene- another matter, though. Be sure you know fits will soon become apparent. Being the difference. Use your power when effec- able to make instant revisions will make tiveness is at stake; when the choice is sim- you a better writer. You will find, once ply a matter of personal taste, let the writer alone. It’s hard to do. but do it anyway. you become adept at driving that key- board, that writing drafts on a computer is quicker than writing in longhand. (If you Too often, we editors go too far. Too have a secretary, she probably has plenty many editors change happy to glad. Too to do without the added burden of having many editors force their own style on a to decipher your scrawl, and would no writer. We should lighten up a little. doubt happily format and print your work Jacques Barzun once wrote a beautiful for you if only you would compose on the damnation of editors for The American screen.) Learning word processing will Scholar. The essence of his lament was require some of your time and a lot of that writers are the only artists who let your patience, but it will pay terrific divi- somebody else screw up their art after it’s dends. finished. Editors should remember that. 3. Relax. To repeat, write as you speak, Sometimes an editor has to use her blue only more precisely. And relax: Write as pencil, or her scissors, or her axe, boldly. you speak when you are off duty—but Some writing is abstruse, or lifeless, or without the harsher expletives! Recall plain incorrect. Editors owe it to their Strunk and White’s advice on developing readers—and to their writers—to make the your style: “The approach to style is by prose clear, to breathe some life into it if it way of plainness, simplicity, orderliness, needs it, and to make it correct. But as sincerity.” they say back home, “If it ain’t broke, 4. Revise. Revising your written work don’t fix it.” Editors should encourage is a pain and time-consuming, but essen- writers to write, to write creatively, and to tial if you are writing something impor- develop their own style. We shouldn’t be tant. When you revise, try to substitute in the business of discouraging them by precise words for imprecise ones. Try to forcing them into some prescribed tem- sympathize with your reader: Find and plate. clarify anything in your paper that will be BECOMING A BETTER MILITARY WRITER 77

a riddle to him. Make sure your grammar will know what they mean. And work to is generally right— editors tire of seeing m ake your prose more forceful: Enlist subjects and verbs separated by a comma. meaningful nouns and descriptive adjec- And check your spelling. Use the active tives, deploy some short sentences, order voice rather than the passive (you can look strong verbs into the action, and aim for it up in Words into Type). Unless you are originality. adding something of substance, your revi- 5. Get Your Fingers on Four Books. sion should be shorter than the original. Read M cIntosh. Read Strunk and W hite. Kick out the buzzwords and cliches. Refer often to Words into Type and to that Avoid acronyms. If you must use solid dictionary you are going to keep on acronym s, lim it their num ber, and spell your desk. Then enjoy being a better them out once to make sure your readers writer. □

I Can Write Better Than That! OK, then do it! Airpower Journal is always looking for good articles w ritten by our readers. If you’ve got som ething to say, send it to us. W e’ll be happy to consider it for publication. The Airpower Journal focuses on the operational level of war, that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. We are interested in articles that will stim ulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational level, but also the im pact of leadership, training, and support functions on operations. We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don’t let the lack of those keep you from writing! We are looking for articles from 2,500 to 5,000 words in length—about 15 to 25 pages. As the professional journal of the Air Force, we strive to expand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force personnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging articles. W e look forward to your subm issions. Send them to the Editor. Airpower Journal, Walker Hall. Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. 78 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

Ricochets and is absolutely necessary for our effective- continued from page 3 ness and, ultimately, our lives. today are well educated (perhaps not smarter Capt Raymond P. Clark, USAF or dumber) and that they would like to know Chanute AFB, Illinois why they are performing a particular task (current management leadership style), I dutifully explained every aspect of the mission. However, during a particularly unpleasant point in the exercise (we were processing hun- Captain Rinehart’s Response: dreds of personnel at the worst possible time), the shift changed. I found myself having to I would not presume to debate Captain Clark explain to the outgoing shift the whys of their on the ultimate origin of the traditional organi- having to stay. I suddenly realized that this zational structure, because the hierarchical was not the time for explanation; it was the form has been with us for centuries (e.g., the time for action. I ordered each airman to the Egyptian and Babylonian bureaucracies). As line without question. Otherwise, they would Sun Tzu wrote in The Art o f War, “Generally, face appropriate punishment for failure to fol- management of many is the same as manage- low the direct orders of a superior. Lesson ment of few. It is a matter of organization.” learned. However, the fact that the structure has been This example must have been played over by with us for some time does not, by itself, sig- many people in Operation Desert Storm, albeit nify whether it is inherently good or bad. I with a little more at stake. However, it under- refer the reader to Joel A. Barker’s Discovering scores our uniqueness as an organization, com- the Future: The Business of Paradigms (St. pared to the civilian sector. The military is the Paul, Minn.: ILI Press, 1989) for a discussion only organization that is in the business of of the fallacy of arguing from antiquity or pre- breaking things and killing people. Ultimately, vious success. we are asking our people to die. (Some may As to Captain Clark’s “lesson learned,” I am argue that the same is true of fire fighters and forced to wonder what lesson was missed. police officers; however, the function of armed Why, for instance, did the troops demand any conflict has always been our primary mission.) explanation? Was their previous training inad- As a result, the necessity of command and the equate? Did they not understand the enormity inherent discipline required to function as a of their task or the need for expediency? Were military unit underscore the need for under- they not motivated or dedicated? The situation standing the difference between a peacetime was an exercise—a controlled situation made management operation and a wartime environ- to simulate a real-world emergency. Such ment. Gen Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force chief events allow participants to practice what they of staff, has said that we must organize in the should already know. Did they understand the same way that we intend to fight. More impor- necessity of realistic training? How much bet- tantly, I believe we must think and act in the ter might they have performed if they had fully same way that we intend to fight. understood and accepted the necessity? Good leadership involves all the aspects that I offer a somewhat similar example from my Captain Rinehart points out: an ability to iden- lieutenant days. As the chief of the disaster- tify where people fit and how they contribute, response force at an Air Force laboratory. 1 had an understanding of the goals of the organiza- the unpleasant duty of leading the response to tion, a desire to be a part of the team, and so two real-world accidents. In each case, the forth. However, military leadership (com- noncommissioned officers (NCO) on mv team mand) is unique. It separates us completely were ready and willing to take the risks from the civilian sector and validates the involved in bringing the situation under con- necessity for our current command structure. trol, despite danger to themselves (e.g., toxic It is that aspect of command that may not allow and hazardous rocket propellant) and difficult us to totally adopt Dr Deming’s philosophy of circumstances (e.g., desert heat combined with continuous improvement and statistical analy- full-body protective equipment). How did we sis. Let’s not lose our unique military con- get to that state of readiness and ability? Our sciousness. It is a centuries-old, proven ideal organization, like every other in the Air Force, RICOCHETS 79

regularly trained the response-team members the answer is “yes." In other words, either you and conducted major-accident-response exer- respect the wishes of your customers by giving cises to hone their skills. My team understood them the products and services they want at a the why of their duties (as well as the how) reasonable price or they will go somewhere through their training and were able to respond else to spend their money. without question when the need arose. Now, let’s look at this question from a differ- Perhaps I was particularly fortunate, and my ent perspective. Put your Air Force uniform team was atypical; however, I like to think that on. You need help from another Air Force unit all airmen and NCOs are as competent and pro- on base. You can’t get your job done properly fessional as those I had the pleasure of leading. unless you get the support you need. You walk I suspect the same is true of Operation Desert up to the customer service counter and expect Storm. That is, our troops performed well pre- prompt attention, professional treatment, and cisely because they had been well prepared quality service. You know very little about the ahead of time. This does not belie the fact that capabilities, limitations, and priorities of the emergency situations typically focus our atten- people on the other side of the counter, but you tion solely on the mission to be accomplished, expect them to know exactly what you need to more so than on issues of organizational poli- get your job done. You are the customer, and tics. If we are to “think and act in the same you are always right! Right? way that we intend to fight,” then we need to Not necessarily. In fact, technically speak- maintain our focus on the mission and evaluate ing, you’re not even a customer. Why? ourselves according to our contribution to the Because you can’t get what you need anywhere mission. else. You may not get treated properly, and you have every right to complain, but you can't Capt Graham W. Rinehart, USAF walk out and take your business elsewhere. Clemson, South Carolina So, if you’re not a customer, what are you? Very simple. You’re a member of a team. And so is the person on the other side of the counter. In fact, you’re both members of the Since being introduced to the Airpower Journal same team, and the team has a single, common while I attended Air Command and Staff objective: accomplish the mission. College from 1988 to 1989, I have enjoyed The two scenarios described above illustrate many very informative issues and have contin- a basic distinction between the private sector ued my professional military education by and the military, and this distinction should be reading the articles you publish. I hope that taken into account when one implements the recent budget reductions will not adversely principles of total quality management in a affect this publication. military organization. When you walk into 1 wish to commend highly Captain Rinehart’s your local car dealer to shop for a new car, you article on total quality management. It is definitely don’t feel like you’re on the same absolutely outstanding—one of your very best. team as the salesperson following you around. In view of the changes taking place in the Air And you know you don’t have the same objec- Force, it is extremely timely. Captain Rinehart tives. In that situation, you’re the customer, should be commended for his contribution. you’re always right, and you know there's another dealer just down the street. Maj Glenn S. Scadden, USAFR However, when you put on your uniform and H ill AFB. Utah head for the base, you're not really a customer anymore. You’re a member of a team, and only your teammates can give you the support you need. You might be a pretty important person Suppose you own your own business and you with a pretty important job, but you’re not as want people to spend their money on your important as the team. products and services. You know they can get And, believe it or not, you might not always similar products and services of varying quality be right. and price from your competitors. Are your Capt Kenneth R. Bashford, USAF customers always right? Generally speaking, Mather AFB. California 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

Captain Rinehart’s Response: with time and practice its utility may be proven.

Capt Graham W. Rinehart, USAF In light of the assertion that mission accom- Clemson, South Carolina plishment should be our primary goal and focus. Captain Bashford is completely correct DOCTRINAL DISPUTE in pointing out that we are all members of one team. This does not, however, mean that we Lt Col Price T. Bingham’s article, “Air Power in are not customers and suppliers of one another. Desert Storm and the Need for Doctrinal The concept of internal customers comes from Change" (Winter 1991), was very interesting Dr Kaoru Ishikawa, who says that all processes and presents some good points. Unfortunately, within an organizational system are intercon- it misses the mark. Some of the more connected, pointing out that “the next process is tentious issues are his views concerning doctri- your customer.” (See Kaoru Ishikawa, What Is nal change, air power dominance in future Total Quality Control? The Japanese Way wars, other services understanding the impor- [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., tance of air superiority, and his argument for 1985].) For the opposite viewpoint—that functional componency. internal customers should not be considered— Joint doctrine is authoritative, not directive. see Stanley M. Davis, Future Perfect (Reading, Doctrine is not crafted to usurp the command Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing, Inc., prerogatives of a war-fighting joint force com- 1987). If the word customer is difficult, you mander (JFC). It provides the JFC a framework may substitute user or client; however, as or menu of options to assist him in organizing Captain Bashford points out, we have had his force so he can effectively accomplish the customer service desks in military shops for mission. some time without bantering the semantics. Colonel Bingham draws heavily on the Gulf Captain Bashford asserts that the military war experience. But it’s important that the ser- orientation toward the mission—as opposed to vices do not selectively draw conclusions from an external customer—and the military mem- that conflict. Otherwise, we will bias the way ber’s position on the larger organizational we prepare to fight the next war and not profit team—as opposed to his or her position in the from lessons learned. We should remember the customer-supplier relationship—form “a basic example of the Israelis, who precipitously distinction [which] should be taken into changed their doctrine based on their success account" by those seeking to instill a quality in the 1967 war and came to the wrong conclu- consciousness. That the military is a unique sions, which they regretted in 1973. institution seems quite evident; that the mili- Apparent domination by any service’s capa- tary’s uniqueness means it cannot benefit from bility in warfare is limited by the parameters of continuous improvement does not necessarily the situation. Historically, other capabilities follow. (My focus, from inside, on how I can were believed to dominate the battlefield best serve my customers and accomplish the (archers, cavalry, artillery, machine guns, mission is very much different than my focus, armor, etc.) but have fallen to newer technol- from outside, on how I can best get what I ogy and applications of warfare. What must want. The first leads to improved processes dominate is the “Great Captain” who under- and services, the second to disputes and stands the entire spectrum of war and who can, threats.) at a given point in time and space, place We all employ tools to get our jobs done, emphasis on a particular application to bring whether they be wrenches, soldering irons, about victory. Desert Storm truly demonstrated computers, or airplanes. When we pick up a the importance of the synchronistic effect, or new tool, it may feel strange and may take us combat multiplier, of the total joint force. The time to learn to use it properly. For leaders commander in chief (CINC) of the joint force charged with accomplishing the mission, the recognized the importance of air operations as new organizational paradigm was presented as a part of his campaign plan but equally recog- a tool. It may feel unwieldy at first, and—like nized the importance of maritime and ground all tools—it is not good for every problem, but operations. RICOCHETS 81

The CINC did effectively use, during one ties to perform as a light-to-medium force that phase of the operation, ground troops and mar- can act as a sea-to-land bridge, an enabling itime operations to support the employment of force which provides access for the introduc- air power, but not to the extent the author sug- tion of heavier land-based forces. The air gests. As a result of defensive ground position- power employment differences between the US ing and maritime operations, the Iraqis, a Marine Corps and US Air Force are philosophi- poorly led and inept enemy, chose to remain in cal. Neither application of air power is incor- vulnerable, static positions with limited cover rect; they are merely different. Both are needed and consequently made themselves more vul- in different degrees to suit different situations. nerable to the lethality of air power. Desert The author presents a one-sided argument for Storm was exceptionally unique, and we cannot functional componency. The air component expect our next opponent to be so inept or the commander (ACC) does not need operational terrain to be so favorable to an action. When control of all air. Marine sorties for strategic ground operations commenced, the CINC efforts and excess marine air-ground task force employed air power to support the ground (MAGTF) support sorties were provided to the scheme of maneuver to accomplish the libera- JFC for tasking through his ACC, all within the tion of Kuwait. In essence, the point of main framework of the omnibus agreement and ser- effort shifted from air operations to ground vice componency. While the CINC can orga- operations based upon the tactical situation. nize his forces as he sees fit, service compo- I submit that the services recognize the nency (as used in Desert Shield/Desert Storm) importance of air superiority and strategic air makes sense. That is how the individual ser- operations. However, strategic air operations vices are organized, trained, and equipped. are not conducted as a means unto themselves. Despite service disagreements concerning air In his enthusiasm for strategic air operations, command and control, we collectively are com- the author ignores the key contribution that sea ing closer to resolving doctrine issues pertain- power played in strangling the Japanese econ- ing to joint doctrine without becoming doctri- omy during World War II and the part the naire. atomic bomb played in ending that conflict. Colonel Bingham’s article possesses some We must closely examine historical examples excellent points and will truly provide an to gain true insight from the total force experi- interesting vehicle for future professional dis- ence vice limiting ourselves to examining only cussions. As the size of the total force struc- one element of warfare. ture shrinks, it’s apparent that future wars will Air power alone did not defeat the enemy or be fought by a joint force. The survival of our liberate Kuwait. In the final analysis, it is the servicemen and -women on the modern battle- man on the ground with his rifle that can and field demands that all services continue to edu- will clear and hold terrain. In order to achieve cate each other. To win in the future, we must the CINC’s objective, it still required Army and fight efficiently and effectively as a joint force. Marine ground forces to seize, occupy, and liberate Kuwait. Lt Col H. P. Shores II, USMC Colonel Bingham sells the Marine Corps’ Washington. D.C. understanding of joint doctrine and air power short. The US Marine Corps clearly understands joint doctrine and the importance of air power. We are the only service that operates in all three mediums—air, land, and sea. There is no other service that is more oriented towards Colonel Bingham’s Response: joint operations or that recognizes the impor- 1 agree with Colonel Shores that the services tance of each service's contribution to the total should not selectively draw conclusions from effort. the Gulf war. Unfortunately, his letter is evi- The author criticizes the Marine Corps’ dence of the tendency of many soldiers and emphasis on close air support. The primary marines to do exactly that. These individuals reason why the US Marine Corps concentrates seek to deny aerospace power’s growing domi- on using air in a tactical role is our expedi- nance of conventional warfare by explaining tionary nature. We have designed our capabili- that the Gulf war was “exceptionally unique.” 82 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

The situation today is similar in many ways of doctrinal guidance may explain the coali- to that which existed at the turn of the century. tion’s lost opportunity at Al Khafji. Developments like the machine gun made many Marine ground forces at Al Khafji had the officers in the horse cavalry-dominated armies opportunity to play a key role in the annihila- of Europe very uncomfortable. As a result, these tion of a large Iraqi force. Such successes have officers found reasons why wars such as the been achieved in the past by Great Captains American Civil War, Boer War, and Russo- who used a “panic retreat” by a portion of their Japanese War were "unique.” Since these wars forces to draw the enemy into a reckless pur- were unique, they ignored the implications of suit. Once the enemy’s pursuit completely developing trends. As a result, European armies exposed his force and made it impossible to went off to the First World War well equipped escape, the Great Captain would spring his with lances and sabres, but not with machine trap. Such an opportunity existed at Al Khafji. guns and heavy artillery. Even after this war If Marine forces there had been directed to fake there were attempts to pretend that the arme a panic withdrawal, it is quite likely Iraqi blanche still had an important role. As one forces would have attempted a pursuit to the writer has put it, these attempts made for “sad point where coalition air power could have reading and bad history.” closed the trap and annihilated the entire Iraqi Colonel Shores’s reference to the Israelis’ force. experience is interesting since their main doctrinal problem in 1973 was the same problem Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF Maxwell AFB, Alabama we face today. Like many US soldiers and marines, Israeli army officers in 1967 did not appreciate the degree to which their success was due to the Israeli Air Force (IAF). COMPOSITE CONJECTURE However, Egypt’s soldiers did. and designed a plan to neutralize the IAF. Their temporary In making his comparison of the Air Force’s success against the IAF in 1973 was the main new composite wings with carrier air wings in reason why the Israeli army appeared to be the Spring 1992 issue (“A Carrier Air Wing for much less effective. the Air Force: Challenges for the Composite Regarding the use of ground forces and mar- Wing”), Maj Chris J. Krisinger has missed the itime operations to support the employment of boat, so to speak, in at least two fundamental air power. Colonel Shores is greatly mistaken if ways. First, it should be obvious that compos- he believes that the Iraqis made themselves ite wings are being built not to win wars by more vulnerable by staying in static positions. themselves but—like carrier air wings—to As my article points out. German officers in move quickly and efficiently as a show of force World War II were well aware that moving and, if necessary, as the appliers of force, per- made them more vulnerable to Allied air haps autonomously in a limited scenario but attack. Perhaps if joint and service doctrine only as initial contingents in conflicts of large provided better guidance regarding how aero- proportions. Composite wings will be “prein- space and surface forces can complement each tegrated” for such action, not to be inviolable other, coalition ground operations would have units but rather functional assets. To worry been designed to force the Iraqis to expose about a loss of flexibility (page 37) misses the themselves to destruction from the air. In the point. The integration of theater forces is a absence of such guidance, it was more by acci- given when the composite wing is not the dent than design that coalition aerospace forces gorilla but only a part. Second, there is no new had the opportunity to destroy Iraqi forces on degradation of combat readiness as a result of the road to A1 Basrah. the formation of composite wings, as suggested Colonel Shores asserts that because the by Major Krisinger (page 35). In this case, Marine Corps operates in the air and on the unlike carrier air wings, the elements of com- ground it understands the importance of air posite wings will not redeploy to separate loca- power. This is not necessarily true given the tions after extended deployments together. lack of guidance in Marine Corps doctrine on The composite wing is built to live together how ground maneuver can be used to enhance and to fight together, and there are no stand- the effectiveness of air interdiction. This lack down periods, along with the subsequent RICOCHETS 83 workup cycles, made necessary by extended that every airman must understand, for, as Air duty at sea. The Air Force’s new composite Vice-Marshal H. N. Wrigley of the Royal wings will build on the best of the Navy’s car- Australian Air Force explained, “The potential rier air wings and put a new and extremely of each sortie to create immediate political potent combat asset in the hands of our com- effects require[s] every airman to understand manders. the broad aspects and policy aims of the war at hand” (Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd and Lt Col Capt Eric A. Jorgensen, USAF Charles M. Westenhoff, “Air Power Thinking: Sheppard AFB, Texas ‘Request Unrestricted Climb’,” Airpower Journal, Fall 1991, 13). Finally, I again want to commend Colonel Meilinger for his thought-provoking article. It DOCTRINE DISCUSSION brought out many very valid and vital points. Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger’s article about “The I, for one, certainly applaud his professional Problem with Our Air Power Doctrine” (Spring contribution to improving our Air Force. 1992) is a very interesting history lesson, complete with a couple of sharp barbs to keep our Lt Col Jay L. Baird, USAF Naples, Italy attention. However, it misses the target with its focus on strategic, operational, and tactical missions and targets. In contrast to Colonel Meilinger’s amazement that the strategic campaign against Iraq’s indus- Colonel Meilinger’s Response: trial base during Operation Desert Storm was I appreciate Colonel Baird’s letter, but I think being conducted at the same time as the opera- there is little actual difference in our positions. tional campaign against Iraq’s army. I believe First, I was not at all amazed about our ability that strategic, operational, and tactical levels of to conduct three campaigns simultaneously in warfare should occur naturally and simultane- Desert Storm, and I don’t think the article says ously during any conflict. In fact, for airmen to that I was. On the contrary, the ability of air be efficient in a major conflict, I believe it is power to conduct such “parallel operations” is crucial that they understand this concept and one of its greatest—and unique—strengths; it is the necessary differences between these levels, a capability simply not possessed by surface as well as the criticality for the levels to have forces. harmonized objectives. Colonel Meilinger was As for the issue of strategic/tactical targets going in the right direction when he high- and objectives, I think Colonel Baird and I lighted Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg’s ideas that are in general agreement, but his observation strategic and tactical air power should be is an important one. There is clearly a differ- related to targets, not to aircraft nomenclature. ence between objectives and targets. The sim- But I believe—as I’ve suggested—that levels of ple fact that a target has strategic value does warfare (objectives and strategies) are the real not mean it will or should be struck; it must bottom line—not targets or aircraft or, for that first be included as an objective that fits in matter, campaigns. It is true that various levels with the campaign plan. The relationship of warfare objectives and strategies may have should be that once we identify the strategic-, apparent, specific targets associated with them, operational-, or tactical-level objectives, we but the apparent target’s warfare relevance can then select the targets associated with those quickly change (for example, when the specific levels. That is, our strategic objective is to target moves). In fact, the strategic, opera- eliminate Iraq’s nuclear capability, so we target tional, or tactical aspects of a target may be the Osirik reactor; our operational objective is irrelevant. The key point is that the target sup- to isolate the Iraqi army in Kuwait, so we target ports the strategic, operational, and tactical a railroad marshaling yard south of Basra. My objectives. Notwith-standing the fact that main point was that effectiveness and effi- keeping track of a target’s apparent strategic, ciency, not nomenclature, should determine operational, or tactical relevance can get con- which aircraft strike those targets. Hence, “tac- fusing, the central idea is that there are strate- tical” F-15Es may be used against the "strategic, operational, and tactical warfare objectives gic" reactor, and "strategic” B-52s may be used 84 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

to bomb the “operational” marshaling yard. the subtle but crucial difference between objec- Colonel Baird is quite correct in pointing out tives and targets. Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF Maxwell AFB, Alabama

N E T ' A S M E N T

Bougainville, 1943-1945: The Forgotten Cam- counterattacks by the Japanese 17th Army. paign by Harry A. Gailey. Lexington, Ken- Gailey separates the campaign into three tucky 40508: University of Kentucky Press, phases: (1) establishment of a beachhead and 1991, 264 pages, $27.00^ effective defense line by the end of 1943; (2) the US Army’s campaign to hold the perimeter to By any method of historical accounting, the the end of 1944; and (3) the replacement of the battle for Bougainville Island was a major cam- US force by the Australian II Corps and their paign of the Pacific war. In a campaign lasting campaign to clear the whole island in 1945. from November 1943 until the end of the war, Gailey offers a very good account of the Ameri- the 3d Marine Division: the Army’s 37th, 93d can operations, but his narrative of the Aus- and Americal divisions: and the Australian II tralian operations needs more substantiation. Corps served in turn on the island, fighting a By the time the Australians took command in Japanese garrison of over 65,000 troops. Bougainville, the Japanese had exhausted them- Bougainville was also the focus of major air and selves in poorly planned and spasmodic attacks naval actions. and were in no position to threaten the defense Harry Gailey in Bougainville, 1943-1945: perimeter. The US troops had adopted a low- The Forgotten Campaign has set out to write a casualty policy of allowing the Japanese to hold definitive history of the fight for the island in most of the island while slowly starving and the Northern Solomons and. to a great degree, dying of disease. Bougainville had become a has succeeded. Gailey’s account is a solid nar- backwater. Yet. in 1945 Lt Gen Stanley Savige, rative and analytical history that is generally commander of the Australian II Corps, would well researched. His writing style is clear, flu- initiate an aggressive offensive campaign to ent, and thoroughly readable. clear the whole island of Japanese—a plan that The book begins by outlining the Allied strat- largely succeeded but that also resulted in over egy in the Southwest Pacific and explaining 2,000 Australian casualties. Gailey places the why Bougainville was chosen as an Allied base. burden of guilt for this senseless campaign The island was strategically located and suita- upon the ego of Sir Thomas Blarney, com- ble for locating several airfields with which the mander of the Australian Army. Blarney, pre- Allies were able to extend the reach of their air sumably upset that his troops were relegated to power and complete the isolation of the Jap- fighting in a backwater, demanded an aggres- anese base at Rabaul, only 250 miles away. sive policy in order to maintain the reputation Gailey provides an interesting account of the of Australian arms in a theater of war domi- preassault planning and the Allied deception nated by Gen Douglas MacArthur and the LIS operations which ensured that when the 3d Army. Gailev’s interpretation is plausible but is Marine Division stormed ashore at Empress not backed up by adequate research. A closer Augusta Bay on 1 November 1943 there were examination of Blarney’s papers and Australian few Japanese to oppose them on the beach. documents concerning this question would be From that point on, the Allied strategy was to of great value to the history of the Pacific war. carve out and defend a perimeter large enough Another shortcoming is a too-brief outline of to accommodate three large air bases. Until the Japanese side of the story- Bougainville was 1945 a force of two US divisions would suc- a killing ground for the Japanese. Of the 65,000 cessfully hold a small part of the island against troops on the island in 1943, only 21.000 were NET ASSESSMENT 85 alive to surrender in 1945. This Japanese deba- works have even discussed, much less written cle is seen only through American and few in depth about, this crucial campaign in which Australian documents. A study of the Bougain- victory may have been almost within grasp. ville campaign should include some Japanese That is a major strength of this work. Coleman accounts. manages to pull together a fascinating record of Despite these omissions, I would strongly the 1st Cavalry Division’s role in the interdic- recommend Bougainville. 1943-1945: The For- tion campaign from late 1968 to mid-1970, gotten Campaign as a worthwhile account of an when the division pulled out of Cambodia. The important campaign. The strategic planning struggle between the sky soldiers and the Viet- and the naval and air campaign are described cong and North Vietnamese forces over War well. The author is at his best in his critique of Zone C is the core of Incursion. It is a story well the American and Australian small-unit tactics told and well worth the telling. employed on Bougainville that should make The decision by Gen Creighton Abrams to his book especially worthwhile to students of switch strategies in mid-1968 from an emphasis ground operations. on “body count” to “weighing the rice” may Dr James S. Corum have been one of the true turning points of the Maxwell AFB. Alabama war. As Coleman convincingly relates, that strategy began to get results. Abrams had one particular unit—the 1st Cavalry Division—in mind when he decided to launch his new strategy. The amazing movement of the 1st Cav Incursion: From Am erica’s Choke Hold on the from the northernmost provinces of the I Corps NVA Lifelines to the Sacking of the Cambo- area to III Corps, with an area of operations to dian Sanctuaries by J. D. Coleman. New York the north of Saigon, is one of the forgotten feats 10010: Saint Martin’s Press, 1991, 294 pages. of the war. Yet, only days after the movement $19.95. was initiated, the 1st Cav was conducting combat operations in its new area of operations. In view of the seemingly endless supply of The acceptance of this new strategy was not books on the Vietnam War, it is pleasant to find universal, as Coleman points out in his account one that covers an important topic which of the struggle that the 1st Cavalry Division had barely has been touched—and is a darn good with the new II Field Force commander, Lt Gen read to boot. It is almost as if the years 1969 Julian Ewell. The impact this general had in and 1970 never happened in Vietnam. Yet as nearly unraveling the success of the campaign J. D. Coleman, a retired US Army lieutenant is fascinating reading. colonel, makes clear in this excellent book, a When the book finally turns to Cambodia, war was definitely being waged then. that campaign seems almost anticlimactic. The In an earlier work, Pleiku: The Dawn of Heli- fact that the American and Vietnamese forces copter Warfare in Vietnam, Coleman covered could enter Cambodia because the enemy the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) during the forces in the III Corps area by and large had la Drang campaign of fall 1965, which saw the been eliminated seems to have been missed by concept of airmobility introduced to modern most observers. Ironically, the political fallout warfare on a large scale. With Incursion, Cole- from the Cambodian incursion has obscured, man picks up the 1st Cav again, but it is a very until now, the story of that campaign. As Cole- different division from the one that fought man points out in his closing, one of the true hand-to-hand with the North Vietnamese Army mysteries of the war is the historical record’s on the bloody landing zones in the Central almost complete omission of the pacification Highlands. By late 1968, it had become a con- campaign that Abrams waged so successfully in fident, cocky, hardened division used to having 1969 and 1970. the media limelight. The airmobility concept is Incursion is one of the small number of books now an established fact and has evolved far on the Vietnam War well worth reading. This is beyond the first, rather primitive efforts of the history to be enjoyed. The gallant young men early sky soldiers. who fought bravely and who performed so well The role of the Air Force in the interdiction during this campaign deserved better. Colonel campaign to stem the flow of supplies into Coleman has given them their due—an South Vietnam is probably much better known excellent account of a battle well fought. Read than the other, less spectacular role played out it and gain an understanding of the nature of on the ground by Army units. Indeed, few war as it often is: the great effort and valor of 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992 warriors rendered void by factors far removed person accounts of World War II, Bruce man- from their struggles. ages to convey the feeling and flavor of certain Maf H. Donald Capps, USA aspects of the war that remain classified to this Washington, D.C. day. Further, some of the people he was in contact with during the early days of the OSS later became famous or infamous figures in the field OSS against the Reich: The W orld W ar II of intelligence—among them Allen Dulles, Diaries of Colonel David K. E. Bruce edited William Casey, and Kim Philby. by Nelson D. Lankford. Kent, Ohio 44242: The book is divided into a notes section and Kent State University Press, 1991, 208 pages, a diary section. The notes are remarkable for $28.50. their exquisite detail, covering everything from sumptuous meals to nicknames painted on As a special operations historian, researcher, jeeps. Further, there are many interesting anec- and writer, I am always interested in and feel compelled to read any book that mentions the dotes and references to people who—unknown Office of Strategic Services (OSS), William to many readers—had a part in OSS operations. (“Wild Bill”) Donovan (founder of the OSS, They include Commander John Ford, head of precursor of today’s Central Intelligence the OSS photographic branch; Atherton C. Agency), and Ernest (“Papa") Hemingway. OSS Richards, Hawaiian pineapple executive and against the Reich is one such book. Despite its OSS deputy director; and even Ernest Heming- subtitle, it is more than a compilation of daily way, who signed a paper, “We think we took notes by Col David K. E. Bruce, Donovan's top Paris,” after dining for several hours in a cafe deputy. Superbly edited by Nelson D. Lankford, after the liberation. assistant director of the Virginia Historical All in all, I highly recommend this book to Society, the book is a revealing historical anyone who has a historical interest in World account. It takes the viewpoint of a top-level War II. especially special operations and manager, who—unlike his contemporaries— espionage. made a jeep his desk and the battlefield his TSgt James W. McClain, Jr. office. Eglin AFB, Florida OSS against the Reich is a valuable historical record because it is written by a man who was as much at home in New York corporate board- rooms as in European hostels. Indeed, Colonel Bruce had dealings with world leaders Vietnam: The Decisive Battles by John Pimlott. (Churchill and Roosevelt), military tacticians New York 10022: Macmillan, 1990, 200 (Patton and Montgomery), captains of industry pages, $39.95. (Mellon and Hurst), as well as the rich and It's the title—not what’s between the pages— famous of an era that began in the early twen- that gives this otherwise w'ell-written book its ties and stretched across war-torn Europe in the problems. Of the 17 military actions described forties. Reared in the elite circles of prewar and illustrated in John Pimlott’s “Latest and American society, Bruce moved w'ith ease most original addition to Macmillan’s through the highest levels of European govern- acclaimed ‘Great Battles’ series,” less than half ment and society. Whereas other men func- are battles and only one—Dien Bien Phu—can tioned as “controls” for various agents in the be termed truly decisive. Stubbornly trying to field, Donovan used Bruce to maintain coopera- fit the round peg of Vietnam into the square tion and communication between the American hole of this “Great Battles" series, Macmillan and Allied forces. He was destined to become and Pimlott have produced a lavish work as one of this country's most important foreign full of contradictions as the war it seeks to service diplomats in the postwar period as head define. of the Marshall Plan in France; ambassador to Lumped together as decisive battles are mili- Paris, Bonn, and London: and ultimately head tary actions such as Operation Junction City. of negotiations to the Paris peace talks in the Rach Ba Rai River, and Thanh Hoa Bridge. Vietnam era. He also served as the first Ameri- Operation Junction City—one of the longest can emissary to China and later as an ambas- ground campaigns of the wrar—was a four- sador to NATO. month US incursion into War Zone C aimed at Although some people may not find OSS destroying a major Communist sanctuary inside against the Reich as readable as other first- South Vietnam. US commanders claimed that NET ASSESSMENT 87

the operation was a turning point, demonstrat- The publisher, however, makes much of the ing that superior US firepower and mobility book’s graphics—“3-dimensional computer could yield significant Communist body counts maps, photos and color paintings that provide a (2,800 confirmed enemy dead versus 282 Amer- moment-by-raoment re-creation of the war." ican losses). However. Pimlott concludes that That’s a bit much. The photos are indeed good “the transient nature of the US ground incur- ones; the three-dimensional computer maps are sions meant that the enemy could reclaim his undulating grid-square projections with num- jungle sanctuaries” (page 107). This is hardly a bers and arrows. They don't stand alone well description of a decisive battle. and must be cross-referenced with the small Official Army history describes as merely an terrain maps and large “paintings" usually ambush the action at Rach Ba Rai River (only a found on another page. After much page turn- day in the life of the US Mobile Riverine ing, I still couldn’t match what was said about Force's larger Coronado operations). So does Ap Bac to what was on the maps. Then I dis- Pimlott when he gets down to describing the covered that item eight (three M-113s in the action: “The VC (Vietcong] ... pinned down narrative) was actually item six—Ap Bac vil- both battalions for the rest of the day before lage. The numbers in the color painting (keyed melting away during the night" (page 114). to the maps) were reversed. Several of the small There is nothing decisive about this encounter terrain maps—much better for locating and either. understanding force movements than the her- After years of attempting to destroy the alded computer graphics—were taken right out Thanh Hoa Bridge during Operation Rolling of the official US Army publication Seven Fire- Thunder (1965-68). the Air Force finally did it fights in Vietnam. That’s what the Army called on 13 May 1972 (during Operation Linebacker the 14-16 November 1965 action in the la I, May-October 1972). using 14 F-4s carrying Drang Valley and the fight along the Rach Ba newly acquired laser guided bombs. In light of Rai River—both decisive battles in Macmillan the fact that US troops were withdrawing from parlance. Vietnam in 1972, there was nothing decisive Vietnam: The Decisive Battles is a lovely about knocking out the Thanh Hoa Bridge—just package to browse through but not serious a sense of relief and mission accomplished. In enough to justify the $40 price tag unless you this case, however, Pimlott’s focus on a single collect the "Great Battles” series or have extra mission has the effect of relegating the real air space on your coffee table. The narrative is power success story of the Vietnam War— excellent but very condensed. Serious students, Operation Linebacker itself—to second billing. especially those interested in the role of air By matching precision guided munitions with power, have far better sources in Mark Clodfel- strategic conventional air power to stop a con- ter’s The Limits of Airpower: The American ventional invasion, this operation became a Bombing of North Vietnam and Earl Tilford’s true watershed in aerial warfare. In the few Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and short paragraphs Pimlott devotes to Linebacker, Why. he does judge it “ impressive" but clearly Lt Col Suzanne B. Gehri misses its military significance. Maxwell AFB. Alabama So what’s wrong with this picture book? Quite simply, the problem lies in the discrep- ancy between what the title suggests and what the book really delivers. Despite the question- Silent W arfare: Understanding the W orld of able choice (the basis of which certainly isn’t Intelligence by Abram N. Shulsky. McLean, clear) of a lengthy, inconclusive ground opera- Virginia 22102: Brassey’s, Inc., 1991, 222 tion: an ambush; and a bridge-busting mission pages, $19.95. (among several other examples) as illustrations of decisive battles, one cannot fault Pimlott’s The back cover of Silent Warfare promises description of the particulars. The military that this book is “the best place for the general actions are placed in their historic context and reader to start learning about the real world of are accompanied by interesting sidebars that intelligence” and that it is “the ideal primer on describe weapons and political events, as well intelligence.” Don’t believe it. Many other as give appropriate chronologies and statistics. works meet these claims better than this one. The author has no illusions about what went By Shulsky’s own admission, his book is too wrong in Vietnam and tells the how and why in “fundamentally theoretical” to be considered balanced, compelling prose. an ideal primer. 88 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

The author seeks to “demystify" intelligence 1991, which aims to reshape our national and encourage a “flow of ideas between the intelligence-gathering apparatus to include intelligence and academic communities.” greater focus on shortages of natural resources, While I agree that the application of “social sci- global health problems, and other areas not ence methodology” can be used to help predict previously considered central to national secu- an adversary’s behavior, we recently saw the rity. Interestingly enough, however, Shulsky limitations of such an approach in the Persian cites William Colby and Stansfield Turner, for- Gulf. The best we can usually hope for is the mer directors of the Central Intelligence development of several probable courses of Agency, who both recommended greater use of action. However, I disagree with Shulsky’s intelligence resources to project future demo- claim that “the heart of the problem of intelli- graphic, economic, and environmental trends gence failure” is “the thought process of the to serve our nation and the world. Personally, I individual analyst.” He insufficiently explores think that is a good idea, but we must beware the impact that decision makers have in the forsaking traditional military concerns. equation: if warning is rejected or not acted Although we won the cold war, there are now upon—as was the case with regard to Iraq and even more potential adversaries to watch. Kuwait—then is the analyst really at fault? I I did not find this book particularly “user think not. friendly.” Although the author includes many Perhaps I am being petty, but Shulsky’s “classics” from the field (e.g., John Barron’s avoidance of correct terminology, such as for- KGB Today, William Burrows’s Deep Black, eign area studies experts, the basic research Allen Dulles’s The Craft o f Intelligence, David that becomes intelligence preparation o f the Kahn’s The Codebreakers, and Herbert battlefield, and the fusion of all-source infor- Yardley’s The American Black Chamber) and mation, did not inspire confidence in his grasp provides thought-provoking information in of the subject matter. His comment that footnotes, the constant back and forth to the “secrecy hinders the management and control notes is distracting. A comprehensive bibliog- mechanisms that are common elsewhere in raphy, perhaps grouped by subject matter, government” also fails to acknowledge that would have provided a valuable tool that seri- auditors and inspectors general function within ous students might have used to develop coher- the intelligence community! Shulsky’s experi- ent professional reading programs. ence as minority staff director of the Senate Shulsky simply does not provide the Select Committee on Intelligence and as con- promised “unique introduction to the world of sultant to the President’s Foreign Intelligence intelligence.” On the contrary, a 27-page arti- Board seems somehow to have scarred his per- cle entitled “Intelligence: A Consumer’s ceptions. Guide,” by Col John Macartney, published Nonetheless, his observation that tension by National Defense University in 1989, does between the intelligence community and poli- an outstanding job of helping the general cymakers may result from the "failure of the reader understand intelligence. Written by an intelligence product to make clear the kind of operator-turned-intel-toad, the article comes evidence on which it is based” is a valuable much closer to being a genuine primer than point to ponder. How often do we frustrate our does Shulsky’s book. bosses with our unwillingness to tell them the Col C. J. Bohn m , USAF “whole story” because they do not have access Goodfellow AFB, Texas to the proper compartmented information? As Shulsky notes, this often leads to the conclusion that intelligence judgments are “just spec- ulative” and “not based on hard data.” Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome Furthermore, many operators simply don’t by Carlo D’Este. New York 10022: trust people in intelligence because they fre- HarperCollins Publishers, 1991, 566 pages, quently are reluctant to go out on a limb and $35.00. offer their personal assessment of what it all means. Fatal Decision is the fourth book by Carlo Something that could actually increase D'Este on World War II and his third on the that reluctance to take a stand is President Mediterranean campaign. I hope it is not his Bush's national security directive of December last. It covers material that others have covered NET ASSESSMENT 89 but adds the human touch, especially the per- ries, and prejudices frequently result in faulty sonalities and rivalries of the commanders, as execution and lost opportunities. A third is well as the appalling existence of the men "at that good, capable, aggressive leadership is crit- the sharp end.” I found it hard to put down ical to success. Another lesson that D’Este and easy to pick up at odd moments. repeatedly demonstrates is that if joint opera- D’Este traces the roots of his story back to the tions are extremely difficult, combined opera- Allied decision to invade French North Africa. tions are nearly impossible. With increasing detail, he follows the Allied General Clark, commander of the American armies through Tunisia, Sicily, and the Salerno Fifth Army, does not come off well in the book. beaches, to a stalemate on the Gustav Line at He gets out of his command post and visits his Cassino. He shows how many of the problems troops in the front lines, a characteristic that at Anzio, particularly those that plagued the D’Este admires. However, Clark’s dislike and Allies, were the result of events that occurred suspicion of the British are portrayed as his during the 12 months before the landing. reasons for not reinforcing a successful British Anzio was a gamble and a pet project of diversionary attack at the First Battle of Winston Churchill. Two Allied divisions Cassino. Furthermore, his obsession with get- landed almost unopposed behind the front ting to Rome before the British, combined with lines near Rome. Churchill hoped they would the passivity of his superior, Gen Sir Harold advance aggressively and panic the Germans Alexander, causes Clark to fumble an opportu- into retreating to northern Italy. Maj Gen John nity to trap the retreating Germans with the P. Lucas, the American commander of the forces breaking out from Anzio. landing, knew how vulnerable he was and One weakness of the book is its maps. acted cautiously. The Germans, under the cool Features have been misplaced on some, and and ever-optimistic leadership of Field Marshal one is unreadable. A single map of central Kesselring (“Smiling Albert”), did not panic Italy showing the Gustav Line, Anzio, Rome, and soon assembled a formidable force to and another possible invasion site at throw the Allies back into the sea. What Civitavecchia would have been useful. With resulted was some of the fiercest and bloodiest D’Este’s emphasis on personalities, an appen- fighting of the war. The rainy weather and the dix of biographical sketches of the major com- terrain limited the usefulness of tanks and manders also would have been helpful. The air power, and the battle came to resemble appendices covering the air and ground orders World War I trench warfare. Artillery was of battle are thorough and will be useful to king, and the infantry was fed into a meat war-gamers. grinder of attrition. D’Este has a gift for describing the interaction Both Hitler and Churchill took a personal of military personalities and the problems of interest in the battle. Hitler saw it as a chance multinational coalitions. I hope this is not his to make the Allies think twice about the last book on the Mediterranean theater. By the upcoming landing in France. Churchill was end of 1944, the multinational stew that made determined that there would not be another up the Allied armies in Italy received additions Dunkirk or—less spoken of—another Gallipoli. of black Americans, Japanese Americans, and D’Este tells each episode of his story three Brazilians. I would like to see a sequel cover- times—first in overview, then in detail, and ing the battles along the Gothic Line in north- then from the point of view of the other side. ern Italy. D'Este would probably show us a He has made extensive use of primary sources, side of the struggle we have not seen before. including Gen Mark Clark’s unedited diary, Lt Col Gregory G. Wilmoth, USAF which became available only after Clark’s Tucson, Arizona death in 1984. He delves into the personalities and relationships of the commanders, as well as the experiences of the men in the front lines. This gives the book a flavor that the official histories lack. The Intifada: Its Im pact on Israel, the Arab Several themes reappear throughout the World, and the Superpowers edited by book. One is that staff officers far removed Robert O. Freedman. Miami, Florida 32611: from the reality of combat invariably draw up Florida International University Press, 1991, faulty plans. Another is that jealousies, rival- 417 pages. 90 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

This book is a collection of 12 essays divided In Gregory Gause’s article, the relationship of into three sections that deal respectively with the Arab world to the intifada is gauged against the nature of the intifada (the Palestinian drive the often conflicting considerations of Pan- for independence), the response of external Arabism and the interests of the individual players to it, and its impact on Israeli politics Arab states. George Gruen’s work on the atti- and society. The scope of the individual con- tudes of American Jewry to the intifada contributions is wide, ranging from views concern- firms that their support for Israeli policy is ing the effect of the intifada on the Palestine slipping on specific issues but remains strong Liberation Organization (PLO), the US, the with respect to the defense of the state. The Soviet Union, the Arab world, and American author admits that his views are impressionis- Jewry, to the regional issues of Israeli public tic and would have benefited from better docu- opinion, the politics of the Israeli Labor and mentation. Caveat lector! Likud parties, and Arab Israelis. What follows In the last section of this collection, Asher is a brief synopsis and critique of each contri- Arian presents a sociologist’s analysis, com- bution in order of presentation. plete with tables, of Israeli opinion about the In the first section of the book, Kenneth intifada. He concludes that whereas Israeli Stein’s comparison between the Arab revolt of positions have hardened over the short term, 1936-39 and the intifada is very useful for the there has been a concomitant moderation of light it casts on the role that leadership, partici- opinion on security issues and a polarization of pation, religion, and duration played in the attitudes between the Israeli political Left and evolution of the two conflicts, but it does not Right. Nathan Yanai’s and Myron Aronoff’s justify the prognostication offered by way of contributions should be read together, as they conclusion. Similarly, Bard O’Neill’s concep- deal with Likud’s and Labor’s reactions to the tualization of the intifada as an example of intifada. Both essays go a long way in explain- low-intensity conflict is long overdue. He ing the mediocrity of the Israeli political sys- points out that physical limitations and dis- tem. Yanai gives us many interesting insights unity are the important factors constraining into the personalities of top Likud politicians protracted popular warfare for the Palestinians. and shows us how the Palestinian revolution Yet, he too ventures certain speculations con- served only to exacerbate divisions already pre- cerning the success and failure of the intifada sent in the coalition. Similarly, Aronoff coun- which are not borne out by his research. terpoints Labor’s tarnished luster as the peace Helena Cobban’s article on the close relation- party against its need to find politically expedi- ship of external PLO direction to the internal ent short-term solutions to its internal strug- leadership of the intifada is well reasoned. gles. Elie Rekhess’s article shows the ambiva- Logic notwithstanding, the connections she lence of Arab Israeli attitudes toward this new makes are more of a circumstantial than a form of Palestinianism. while at the same time demonstrable nature, and this betrays a bias he documents the rise of a nationalist senti- toward the strengths of the PLO in full view of ment because of it. The volume concludes its many weaknesses. with an excerpted piece by Howard Rosen on In the second section, David Pollock writes a the severe economic effects that the intifada fine-honed analysis of US responses to the has had on the Israeli and Palestinian intifada. He cautions the reader not to take the economies. snail’s pace of US initiatives as an indication of Collections of essays remain the preferred an absence of policy. Many aspects of the format for academic writings. Yet, academic problem, Pollock argues, have changed funda- essays are, nonetheless, notoriously difficult to mentally. For that reason, the author is con- put together in a consistent manner. It is to the vinced that a solution and a larger American credit of the editor, Robert Freedman, who has role in obtaining it are more possible today obviously made a judicious choice of contribu- than ever before. Certainly, recent events have tors, and to the quality of the contributions borne out his optimism. Robert Freedman’s themselves, that this collection has a seamless essay is particularly good for the insight it pro- character. The articles appear to flow easily vides into Soviet Middle East policy, but it has one from the other, the level of discourse is more to do with Soviet perceptions of Israel in always appropriate for both the lay and the the regional political constellation than it does academic reader, the writing is good, the analy- with the Soviet understanding of the intifada. sis is straightforward, and the research pro- NET ASSESSMENT 91

vides an excellent source of information that is fighter pilots of World War II and Korea. He applicable to the understanding of larger describes his first encounters against enemy issues. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned fighters, the long intervals between successful criticisms, this collection should make a wel- sorties against enemy aircraft, and the system- come addition to the libraries of professional atic evaluations of his own and other pilots’ Middle East hands and serious students of performances as they worked to improve their Middle Eastern problems. skills in air-to-air combat and the effective Dr Lewis Ware defense of Allied aircraft. Maxwell AFB, Alabama As an eyewitness to the attack on Pearl Harbor, a prisoner of war (POW) in a German camp, and as a pilot in MiG Alley, Gabreski Gabby: A Fighter Pilot’s Life by Francis offers a personal perspective of the events of Gabreski as told to Carl Molesworth. New World War II and Korea. Because of his con- York 10022: Orion Books, 1991, 277 pages. siderable experience in two wars, Gabreski is S20.00. also able to provide detailed insight into the development of teamwork and tactics as an The title of this book succinctly describes the individual pilot and as a squadron and wing text, which contains exactly what it promises— commander. an airborne focus on Francis ("Gabby”) Further, Gabreski provides a view into how Gabreski’s life. There is little broad analysis of major policies were interpreted by individual contemporary historical events, and the devel- pilots in the squadron. For example, he com- opment of tactics and the experiences that ments that the original policy of “Bring the honed Gabreski’s fighting style and leadership bombers back first, and worry about shooting are held primarily to a personal level. That is down German fighters second” made it “hard obviously what Colonel Gabreski, an ace in two to tell how many German pilots in damaged wars, intended. fighters lived to fight again another day . . . but Gabreski’s most detailed descriptions are we accepted it as best we could” (page 143). reserved for his time in the air—his difficulties Once the policy was changed to allow pilots to in learning to fly, the varied performance of the chase enemy fighters to earth, Gabreski notes aircraft he flew, and his development of per- the satisfaction with the destruction his sonal tactics and techniques in combat. In squadron was able to wreak. As for an analysis short, the book is the fast-moving, personal his- of how effective that policy change was for tory of a man who has lived an intensely active Allied forces in the theatre, Gabreski leaves it life. Honest and straightforward, the account to more comprehensive evaluations of the tac- not only provides Gabreski’s own insights, but tics and strategies followed in World War II also frequently supplies the opinions of those and Korea. His point of view remains a per- who worked and flew with him. It does this in sonal one. language that nontechnical and nonflying read- In his account, Gabreski moves from the con- ers can easily follow. clusion of World War 11 to the beginnings of Gabreski begins by recounting his initial near Korea, skimming over the intervening years. failure in mastering flight. He emphasizes that, Although he notes that Korea was a different for him, aviation had not been a lifelong dream. war, in that different motives lay behind our Rather, flying developed into an avenue, first, involvement, he found that his close-in style of for proving himself to his family and, ulti- fighting served him just as well with jet aircraft mately, for aiding his nation. as it did with World War II propeller-driven He also describes his family’s immigrant ori- aircraft. gins and their devotion to church, family, and Gabreski’s view—first and foremost that of a hard work, adding that much of his early learn- fighter pilot—remains primarily within the ing came from his father’s firm hand. There is cockpit; as such, it is a valuable supplement to a clear picture of the foundation of ethics, faith, broader overviews. In addition, he gives the and family obligations upon which he was reader a clear picture of a man whose dedica- raised and which he believes has influenced tion led him to miss his return flight to the him powerfully throughout his life. States in favor of one more flight over In telling his story. Gabreski ensures that Germany—a mission that landed him in a readers encounter the everyday routines of POW camp for the remainder of the war. 92 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

Gabreski’s story is a view into an era and into If much of this seems to be familiar stuff, it is two wars that grow more distant every year. because we have read it all before, most Capt Elise A. Rowe, USAF recently in the Time-Life aviation series, in USAF Academy, Colorado other Smithsonian publications, and in the books we read growing up. This is not to say that Farther and Faster is not worthwhile, but only that it breaks little new ground. It is, Farther and Faster: Aviation’s Adventuring however, an enjoyable tour through the adven- Years, 1909-1939 by Terry Gwynn-Jones. ture years of our profession and ends up being Washington, D.C. 20560: Smithsonian informative as well. Gwynn-Jones gives some Institution Press, 1991, 333 pages, $29.95. attention to the obscure, along with the overly familiar, and regales the reader with unusual The National Air Races. The Bennett tidbits. The latter include the 1919 Round-the- Aviation Cup. The Schneider, Bendix, and Rim flight around the periphery of the conti- Thompson Trophy races. Jimmy Doolittle. nental United States and the coast-to-coast Charles Lindbergh. Valeri Chkalov. The Army Reliability Race of the same year. If his swashbuckling early years of civil aviation are book often seems to be not much more than a revisited in this anecdotal and fast-moving compendium of gee-whiz feats based on the popular history by aviation writer Terry most popular secondary sources, it is still an Gwynn-Jones. It is devoted mostly to the entertaining read and a useful quick-reference numerous speed and distance competitions work. which stimulated the development of aeronau- It is impossible to do any justice to the sub- tical engineering during the 1920s and 1930s, ject in a mere 300 pages, and the author wisely taking the reader back to the unregulated world confines himself to a kaleidoscopic overview of of overpowered racing planes and self-taught the numerous events and feats of the era. Even pilots. The book is something more than a his- so, the effect is compressed, and the reader is tory of the Golden Age, however, in that the left wishing for more details. Because Gwynn- author also gives some attention to the pre- Jones’s descriptions of aircraft are as good as World War I period and to the fledgling airline his descriptions of personalities, he rouses a companies. But areas such as high-altitude desire to see more photos than even this well- research, lighter-than-air progress, and the air- illustrated book can reasonably provide. mail service tend to be glossed over. The book’s emphasis remains on the Gee Bees, Dr Raymond L. Puffer Mystery Ships, and Mister Mulligan. Norton AFB. California Notices of upcoming conferences, seminars, and other professional events of a noncommer- cial nature should be sent to the Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker Hall. Bldg. 1400, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit material for length and editorial content.

USAFA Instructor Opportunities Ohio, on 25-29 April 1993, sponsored by the The Military Studies Division at the United Aviation Department of Ohio State University States Air Force Academy is seeking highly and the Association of Aviation Psychologists. qualified captains for instructor duty in the The objective of the symposium is to examine summer of 1992 and beyond. This duty and improve the role, responsibility, and per- involves motivating and teaching cadets in uni- formance of human operators in the aviation versity-level courses that stress air power, the system. This year’s theme has not yet been art of war, military theory, doctrine, and force established, but it will reflect an emerging employment. Since its inception in 1980, the issue of importance in our field. General areas curriculum in professional military' studies has are cockpit technology, pilot reliability, pilot evolved into one of the most interesting and work load, pilot judgment, crew resource man- demanding areas of study at the academy. A agement, human factors in air traffic control, master’s degree is required of all applicants. simulation and training, human factors in Preferred degrees for military studies instruc- maintenance, accident investigation, and phys- tors are in history, military history, political iological factors. Anyone who wishes to pre- science, and international relations, or in area sent a paper or conduct a workshop should studies of the former Soviet Union, Eastern submit a brief (300-word) abstract by 30 Europe, or the Middle East. Experience in tac- September 1992 to Dr Richard S. Jenson, tical or strategic operations or in operationally Department of Aviation, OSU Airport, 2160 W. related specialties is highly desirable. The Case Rd., Columbus OH 43235. division can sponsor a few highly qualified applicants with the appropriate background for Recent Releases from a master’s degree through the Air Force Air University Press Institute of Technology (AFIT), with a follow- on assignment to the Military Studies Division. The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Applicants should have three to seven years of Gulf War edited by Richard H. Shultz. Jr., and commissioned service, an outstanding military Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 1992 (book). This record, and impeccable military bearing and book is a collection of essays by participants in appearance. Interested individuals should con- the 1991 conference "The United States Air sult chapter 8 of AFR 36-20, Officer Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in Assignments, for application procedures or the 1990s," sponsored by the International write Capt Jeff Cohen. Headquarters Security Studies Program at the Fletcher USAFA/CVVIS, USAF Academy CO 80840- 5421 School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts or call DSN 259-3255/3258. University, the Air Staff, and Air University. The authors focus on the following issues: Symposium on Aviation Psychology strategic factors that will influence future roles and missions, extended deterrence, power pro- The Seventh International Symposium on jection. future aerospace force structures, low- Aviation Psychology will be held in Columbus, intensity conflict, and acquisition priorities.

93 94 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1992

Other recent books, monographs, and papers: author argues that because of the ongoing downsizing of the active duty forces, the Air CADRE special series, The Future of the Air Force will have to rely more heavily on its Force. This series of essays focuses on issues that will affect the decisions that policymakers reserve organizations to meet future contingencies. In most cases, the president will not must make about the mission of the Air Force authorize reserve call-up authorities to respond in the so-called postcontainment world. These to these contingencies. Thus, Air Force com- decisions will determine the course of the Air manders will depend on individual volunteers Force not only for the rest of this decade but from ANG units as a primary alternative to pro- well into the early years of the next century. vide the necessary forces to react to these inci- The authors of the essays address a variety of dents. issues ranging from cooperation between the USAF and Soviet air forces in World War II to To get a complete list of available publica- the applicability of chance and luck to the tions, contact the Air University Press, high-technology systems utilized in space. Publications Support Branch, CADRE/PTPB, The Silent Call-Up Option: Volunteerism in Bldg. 1400, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532 or the Air National Guard by Col Michael N. call DSN 493-6452 or (205) 953-6452; FAX Killworth, ANG, 1992 (monograph). The number: DSN 493-6739 or (205) 953-6739. c N

Law] is deputy staff judge advocate, US Forces Korea. Yong San, South Korea. In previous assignments, he served as staff judge advocate at both Plattsburg AFB, New York, and Air Forces Iceland, Naval Air Station Keflavik, Iceland; as deputy chief of the Military Justice Division at Headquarters USAF, Washington. D.C.; and as chief, Operations Law Branch, International and Oper- ations Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Headquar- ters USAF.

Maj John M. Fawcett, Jr. (USAFA; MBA, Cornell University), is chief. TACOPS. European/CONUS Plans Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF. Retired Branch. Headquarters Tactical Air (BA, Willamette University: MS. Command. Langley AFB, Virginia. University of Wyoming: MA. He has more than 1,000 flying hours University of Alabama], is an Air as an F-4 weapon systems officer University (AU) professor. At the instructor. He has served as com- time of his retirement in 1992, he mander of Headquarters Squadron at was professor of military strategy USAFA. as air liaison officer during and air power doctrine and dean of Operation Desert Shield/Storm with the School of Advanced Airpower the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Studies at AU. Maxwell AFB, Division, and as action officer with Alabama. He previously served as TAC headquarters. Major Fawcett is director of the Airpower Research a graduate of Squadron Officer Institute. Air University Center for School and Air Command and Staff Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and College. Education (AUCADRE): as chief of Maj Paul G. Hough (USAFA; MS, the Strategy and Doctrine Branch University of Wisconsin-Madison; and chief of the Warfare Studies MPA, Golden Gale University) is a Division, both at AU's Air Command weapon systems cost analyst in the and Staff College; and as a missile Information Systems Division, Field combat crew commander, missile Support Branch, at the Air Force operations staff officer, and staff Cost Analysis Agency, Arlington, division chief at Headquarters SAC. Virginia. He has been a research fel- Colonel Drew is a distinguished low at the Rand Corporation, Santa graduate of Air Command and Staff Monica, California. He was a budget College and a graduate of Squadron analyst and a cost analyst in the Officer School and Air War College. comptroller's office at Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB. Virginia. Major Hough has written for several professional publications and is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College.

L» Col John G. Humphries (USAFA: JD. University of Texas School of

95 ment Center, Randolph AFB, Texas. Major Fracker is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College.

Maj Martin L. tracker (BA, Seattle Pacific University: MS. Western Washington University: PhD, University of Illinois) is a faculty member at Air Command and Staff Greg Todd (BS, West Virginia College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. University) is the associate editor of Previously, he was a program man- Parameters, the journal of the US ager with the Crew Systems Army War College. Mr Todd has Directorate, Armstrong Laboratory, also been the assistant editor of Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio, and an Army Logistician and has written occupational analyst with the US for professional magazines in both Air Force Occupational Measure- the military and civilian sectors. Tear Out and Remove PLEASE PRINT PLEASE PRINT PLEASE FEEL LIKE UP?SPEAKING Fill out one of the attachedcards comment and cardto comment onthis issue We interested always are in hearing from use this Please our readers. AIRPOWER JOURNAL JOURNAL AIRPOWER COMMENT CARD COMMENT CARD AIRPOWER JOURNAL card to comment on this issue______card toon comment issue______this We are always interested in hearing from our Pleasereaders. use this drop it indrop box. mail any F>rstrume First name C'ty City Initial ______

______ieCountry tile S Last name ______State/Country Opcode Zip Code . . AIRPOWER JOURNAL Walker Hall NO POSTAGE Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532 NECESSARY IF MAI LED OFFICIAL BUSINESS IN THE PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. MOO UNI TED STATES

BUSINESS REPLY LABEL FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO 73236 WASH DC

POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

AIRPOWER JOURNAL Airpower Research Institute Walker Hall Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532

AIRPOWER JOURNAL Walker Hall NO POSTAGE NECESSARY Maxwell AFB. AL 36112-5532 IF MAILED OFFICIAL BUSINESS IN THE PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. MOO UNI TED STATES

BUSINESS REPLY LABEL FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 73236 WASH DC

POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

AIRPOWER JOURNAL Airpower Research Institute Walker Hall Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532 BOARD OF ADVISERS

Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF, Retired, Kapos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom , U SA F, Retired Brig Gen Jam es L. Cole, Jr., U SAF, Chief of Safety, Headquarters USAF Col Keith W. Geiger, USAF, Retired Dr Richard P. Hallion, Air Force Historian Col Raymond A. Hamilton, Jr., USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University

The Airpower Journal (ISSN 0897-0823), Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2, is published quarterly. Subscriptions may be ordered from New Orders, Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954. Annual rates are $13.00 domestic and $16.25 outside the United States. The GPO stock number is 708-007-00000-5. The Journal welcomes unsolicited m anuscripts. Address them to Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. Submit double-spaced, typed manuscripts in duplicate. Journal telephone listings are DSN 493-5322 and commercial (205) 953-5322. Winter Readings • Air Base Attack in Desert Storm • Iraqi Air Power VO