1BRIEFING CARNEGIE Vol.14 MOSCOW CENTER issue 3

April 2012

Tajikistan: Civil War’s Long Echo

Alexey Malashenko Summary

n After signing the Agreement on Peace and National Accord with the opposition in 1997, President Rakhmon set about building an authoritarian regime in Tajikistan. n Today, the authorities face several internal challenges: an economic crisis, regionalism, domestic political con- frontation, and radical Islam. n It will be difficult, if not impossible, to organize “Maidan Tahrir”-type mass protests of the kind that took place on Cairo’s main square and toppled Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt in the spring of 2011. n None of the external players today has an interest in radically escalating the situation in the country, much less in provoking Tajikistan’s collapse. Russia hopes to keep the country within its sphere of influence by participat- ing in key projects there and providing military aid.

In terms of internal and external sought to build a secular state and security, Tajikistan has been among those who wanted an Islamic state. the most problematic countries in Tajikistan is an ethnic and lin- Central Asia. It is the only state in the guistic exception in Central Asia. region to have gone through a pro- Unlike most of the region’s popula- tracted civil war (1992-1997), which, tion, which is of Turkic origin, the according to various estimates, killed Tajiks belong to the Iranian group between 23,500 and 100,000 peo- and, though they have many fea- ple1 (perhaps even more) and left the tures in common with their neigh- economy in ruins. The causes of this bors, nonetheless maintain a unique war were rooted not only in political ethnic and cultural identity of their confrontation, but also in confronta- own. The Tajiks are a settled people, tion between different regions, clans, which makes their traditions, men- and personalities, as well as confronta- tality, and behavioral norms different tion within Islam between those who from those of their (until recently) 2 BRIEFING [ VOL. 14 ISSUE 3 ]

nomadic neighbors. The Tajiks are In 1997, the civil war ended in more religious, hence the earlier and a compromise between the Popu- more intensive revival of Islam that lar Front and the United Tajik Op- began during the late Soviet period position (UTO), at the foundation and steadily became politicized. It of which was the IRP. The two sides was in Tajikistan that the first and signed the Agreement on Peace and only remaining legal religious party National Accord. The Popular Front, in the post-Soviet area was formed, however, saw this deal as a victory. the Islamic Revival Party (IRP). President Emomali Rakhmonov (he Alexey Malashenko, Events in Afghanistan (where eth- later “de-russified” his last name by professor, holds a doctorate nic Tajiks make up 27-38 percent removing the “ov” at the end) set in history and is a member of the population) have a greater about building an authoritarian re- of the Carnegie Moscow impact on Tajikistan than on any gime. Three circumstances made him Center’s Research Council and other Central Asian country. The confident of success: first, ordinary co-chairman of its Religion, 1,400 km-long Tajik-Afghan border people yearned above all for security Society and Security program. zone is one of the most volatile in and stability after the civil war years, the Central Asian region. More than and most of society thought a firm any country, Tajikistan wants to see hand at the top could bring them peace in Afghanistan. The conflict in these things; second, Russia, which Afghanistan resounds in a constant in fact had supported Rakhmonov, tragic echo across Tajikistan. At the both during his battle with the oppo- same time, few remember now that sition and as a mediator at the peace in the mid-1990s, Afghan politicians talks, tacitly backed the idea of an in turn had worried about Tajikistan’s authoritarian regime (essentially a dic- civil war. It was in Kabul in 1995 that tatorship) in Tajikistan; third, Rakh- the first real peace talks took place monov, like the other Central Asian between the warring parties in Ta- presidents, had positioned himself as jikistan’s conflict, under an initiative the bulwark against Islamic extrem- organized by then Afghan President ism and the only person who could Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad- save Tajikistan from going down the shah Masoud, a distinguished Afghan Taliban road (the Taliban came to of ethnic Tajik descent. Renowned power in Afghanistan in 1996.) film director and public figure Davlat Rakhmon had been head of state Khudonazarov, who took part in the since 1992, when he became chair- talks, said that the choice of Kabul as man of the republic’s Supreme Soviet. venue for the talks was fortunate also In 1994, he was elected to a five-year in that “The very atmosphere of this term as president, was re-elected in city in ruins was a warning signal to 1999 and again in 2006, (to a 7-year the Tajiks to give up armed confron- term; the Constitution was amended tation and seek peace.”2 accordingly in 2003.) Consolidating Tajikistan: Civil War’s Long Echo 3

his regime, he set about purposefully mon… Under Rakhmon Nabiyev removing his rivals from the former [the previous president – A.M.], each UTO, thus renouncing the national time our newspaper, Charogi Ruz, reconciliation policy, and gradually came out, we’d get calls at our of- removed from power those among fice from the head of the presidential even his allies who looked capable of administration… dozens of officials becoming potential rivals. The list of were fired. Ministers trembled when politicians removed from the stage they got a visit from our paper’s jour- includes Abdumalik Abdulladzha- nalists. [President] Rakhmon’s arrival nov (prime minister in 1992-1993), Safarali Kenzhayev (founder of the In terms of internal and external security, Tajikistan Popular Front, killed in 1999), has been among the most problematic countries in Yakub Salimov (former interior Central Asia. It is the only state in the region to have minister), and Abduzhalil Samadov gone through a protracted civil war (1992-1997), which, (prime minister in 1993-1994, died according to various estimates, killed between 23,500 in Moscow in 2004). and 100,000 people (perhaps even more) and left the Rakhmon used carrot and stick economy in ruins. tactics. Many of the prominent op- position figures, including field com- manders, received large land hold- in power was the day that marked the ings, enterprises, and control of some death knell for our free press.”3 The local markets after 1997. This was freedom of the press index published payment in exchange for abandoning by Reporters without Borders placed political activities. Head of the UTO Tajikistan at number 122 of 179 Said Abdullo Nuri, who moved into countries in 2011-2012 (previously a fine villa in the center of Dushanbe, it had been at number 115.) also took a passive stance. The IRP The ruling regime faces several had two seats in the Tajik parliament. internal challenges: a permanent Gradually however, Rakhmon started economic crisis, regionalism, do- taking tougher measures in order to mestic political confrontation, and remove real and potential rivals. In the presence of radical Islam. These 2009, for example, former head of dangers are all closely interwoven. the country’s Emergency Situations To a great extent, political confron- Ministry, Mirzo Zeyev, one of the tation is rooted in contradictions most prominent figures in the UTO, between the regions (the Sogd, died under unknown circumstances. Garm, Kulyab, and Gorny Badakh- Pressure on the media increased. shan) and radical Islam, espoused As well-known opposition journalist by the opposition, which has its Dododzhon Atovulloyev put it, “Ta- base primarily in the Garm and jikistan had a free press before Rakh- Gorny Badakhshan regions. During 4 BRIEFING [ VOL. 14 ISSUE 3 ]

the civil war, separatist tendencies Abdullo Rakhimov (Sheikh Ab- even emerged in the Gorny Badakh- dullo), one of the most prominent shan Autonomous Region (though figures in the UTO, refused to sign the region’s ethnic diversity would the Peace and National Accord Agree- hardly make it realistic to actually ment in 1997. In 1999, he left for carry out such ideas). Afghanistan, returned to Tajikistan After an initial lull following the in 2009, and resumed his struggle civil war’s end, the Islamists gradu- against the current regime. There are ally stepped up their activity once around 300 armed rebels active in again. Rakhmon at first pretended the country, but, depending on the that the problem concerned no more circumstances, they could be joined than a few criminal groups, but since by tens of thousands of the discon- 2007 he has been using various pre- tented, and could receive support texts to send troops into the Rasht from abroad. Valley, where the Islamist opposition The IRP’s position influences the forces have the biggest support (in relations between the Islamic oppo- 2009, for example, troops were sent sition groups and the regime. Since there ostensibly to destroy the poppy the death of Said Abdullo Nuri in crop, although poppies had never 2006, the IRP has been headed by been grown in the valley in the first Mohiddin Kabiri, who espouses re- place.)4 The situation worsened in formist views and can be seen as a 2010 when rebels emerged in parts pragmatic opposition figure willing of the country under the leadership to engage in dialogue with the au- thorities. What is interesting is that Consolidating his regime, Rakhmon set about one of the factors prompting this purposefully removing his rivals from the former dialogue is the increasing popularity United Tajik Opposition, thus renouncing the national of the unrecognized Hizb at-Tahrir reconciliation policy, and gradually removed from party and the Bayat organization, power those among even his allies who looked capable which act independently from the of becoming potential rivals. IRP and want to establish a Central Asian caliphate. This runs counter to the ideology promoted by the of intransigent field commanders IRP, which wants to build an Is- Abdullo Rakhimov and Alovuddin lamic Tajik state. Kobiri’s influence Davlatov, who were dubbed the “Ta- among Muslims has increased in re- jik Taliban.” They engaged in armed cent years. It is telling, too, that he clashes with army forces in which has concentrated much effort of late both sides suffered losses (specifically on supporting Tajik migrants work- around 50 servicemen killed and doz- ing in Russia, coming to Russia to ens captured by the rebels). hold meetings with them. Tajikistan: Civil War’s Long Echo 5

A struggle for Islam is underway ordered 1,400 students studying in today in Tajikistan, with each side Islamic institutes abroad to return battling for the right to be the sole home (including 200 from Iran),7 true guardian of tradition, speak on and banned women from wearing behalf of Islam, and use it as a po- traditional Muslim clothing in pub- litical instrument. Rakhmon tried lic places, above all in state institu- to “monopolize” Islam and deepen tions. This de-Islamization reached its hold on society, setting up a sys- a peak in 2011 with the adoption of tem of religious education controlled the law on Parental Responsibility by him, building a huge mosque in for the Education and Upbringing of Dushanbe that can hold 100,000 Their Children, which bans children people (some say 150,000 people), and professing Hanafi Islam while There are around 300 armed rebels active in the country, trying to diminish the influence of but, depending on the circumstances, they could be other currents, above all Salafi Islam. joined by tens of thousands of the discontented, and He proclaimed 2009 the “year of the could receive support from abroad. Great Imam”5 (in this sense, one can draw a parallel between Rakhmon and Chechen leader Ramzan Kady- under 18 from attending mosques rov, who, though a secular politician, unless accompanied by older family is a proponent of Chechnya’s total members.8 The law drew fierce criti- Islamization.) cism from Muslim faithful and has However, Rakhmon’s declared Is- been violated en masse. lamization policy then began to spin Having lost in the Islamic field, out of his control. A parallel religious Rakhmon continued to strengthen education system developed that was his authoritarian regime, trying to re- not controlled by the president, and move any real competition to himself. the sermons read in the mosques A total of 70.6 percent of the voters were not always in line with Hanafi supported the presidential National Islam or with the official ideology. Democratic Party in the February Not all of the clergy has been loyal to 2010 parliamentary election, and it the regime. Rakhmon soon realized won 52 of the 85 seats. The IRP got that he had failed in his bid to bring two seats (it came in second place Islam under his own control, and as with 8.2 percent of the vote), as did a result Islam’s increasing influence the Communist Party, the Party of in society began to threaten the re- Economic Reform, and the Agrarian gime itself. He then took measures to Party. Not without justification, the curtail religion’s political influence. opposition accused the authorities In 2010, he started closing mosques of falsifying the elections, and Rakh- in which non-loyal clerics preached,6 matullo Zairov, leader of the Social 6 BRIEFING [ VOL. 14 ISSUE 3 ]

Democratic Party, which did not turned to the crisis point it was at in make it into the parliament, spoke of the early 1990s, when open struggles a “usurpation of power.”9 between the central government and the regional elites spilled over into The Tajik drug trafficking mafia, which includes civil war,”11 wrote journalist and ana- a sizeable number of bureaucrats, is also happy lyst Sanobar Shermatova in 2010. enough with the status quo. Thus, if the opposition In 2010-2011, Rakhmon ap- does succeed in organizing mass protests, they parently realized (prompted by will encounter stiff resistance. Rather than leading his survival instinct) that it would to a painless regime change, a new confrontation could be dangerous to tighten the screws usher in a new civil war. any further, all the more so with the country in such a difficult economic situation. According to the National Rakhmon’s desire for absolute Bank of Tajikistan, per capita income rule has sometimes gone to absurd in 2009 came to $879 as calculated lengths. It is now customary in Ta- at current price levels.12 Tajikistan jikistan to address the president as has 45 percent of its people living “Chanobi Oli,” an expression iden- below the poverty line. There was a tical in meaning to “Your Majesty.” slight improvement in the economy The political system has taken the in 2011, but this had practically no nepotistic turn typical of Central impact on living standards for most Asian regimes, with practically every of the population. member of Rakhmon’s family (and In any event, in a hint of the re- he has nine children) getting a high gime’s new willingness to liberalize official post. a little, it began dismantling the Tajikistan’s regime looks similar personality cult that had built up in some respects to Kurmanbek Ba- around Rakhmon. Photos and post- kiyev’s toppled regime in Kyrgyzstan. ers of Rakhmon disappeared from The Tajikistan News website features the streets in March 2011. Several very telling and even provocative rebels were amnestied at around the comparisons between the two coun- same time. In August 2011, coincid- tries. The author of one comment ing with the 20th anniversary of Ta- wrote, “The Kyrgyz agreed among jikistan’s independence, Rakhmon themselves, got together, and within a signed a law that made possible the day sent Bakiyev packing. Yes, people biggest amnesty the country had were injured, there were victims, but seen yet: 15,000 prisoners were eli- they achieved their goal, and kicked gible under its provisions, of which him out!”10 around 4,000 were freed. Makhmad- “After going through a stabilization said Abdullayev, speaker of the up- period, Tajikistan has once again re- per house of parliament and mayor Tajikistan: Civil War’s Long Echo 7

of Dushanbe, made a call to protect trafficking mafia, which includes a personal rights and act within the sizeable number of bureaucrats, is law. Rakhmon proposed remov- also happy enough with the status ing articles 135 and 136 (slander quo. Thus, if the opposition does and defamation) from the Crimi- succeed in organizing mass protests, nal Code and including them in the they will encounter stiff resistance. Civil Code instead, which could be The situation in this case would seen as opening the way to greater be more reminiscent of the con- freedom of the press (however, on frontation just before the civil war January 12, 2012, an attempt was began, when the so-called Islamic- made on the life of independent democratic opposition gathered on journalist and opposition figure Shakhidon, one of Dushanbe’s two Dododzhon Atovulloyev, though it main squares, and the regime’s sup- is practically impossible to find out porters gathered on the other main who exactly was behind this crime.) square, Ozodi. Rather than leading Finally, in response to rising food to a painless regime change, a new prices in February 2011, Rakhmon confrontation could usher in a new gave the order to top up the market civil war. with stocks of buckwheat, rice, and flour from the country’s strategic In 2010-2011, Rakhmon apparently realized (prompted reserves. These, however, have only by his survival instinct) that it would be dangerous to been half measures. Public discon- tighten the screws any further, all the more so with tent continues to grow and social the country in such a difficult economic situation. Public tension still runs high. Dodod- discontent continues to grow and social tension still zhon Atovulloyev said that the only runs high. way to change the current regime would be to “organize our own Ta- jik ‘Tahrir.’”13 Even if the opposition were suc- To replicate the mass protests on cessful, it is by no means clear who Cairo’s main square that toppled would come to power. The IRP, the Egyptian President Mubarak’s re- regional clans, who feel slighted gime in the spring of 2011, however, by Rakhmon and his team and are would be difficult, if not impos- fed up with the Kulyab clan hold- sible. Rakhmon’s regime does have ing power, and the local drug ma- its supporters, above all among the fias all have their eyes on power. A numerous bureaucrats, who in turn hypothetical victory of the opposi- are all backed by their own clans. tion would not bring down the level The president can count on the sup- of internal instability. The IRP saw port of the region around his home its influence grow considerably in town Kulyab, too. The Tajik drug 2010-2012, and its support among 8 BRIEFING [ VOL. 14 ISSUE 3 ]

the public now surpasses the 5-10 rections, and their presence could percent that experts were giving it affect the situation in neighboring before. Islamist victories following countries as well as in Russia. the Arab revolutions in the Middle Thus, no matter what the state East have clearly played a part here. of relations between outside actors The IRP sees itself as their ideologi- and Rakhmon and his regime, no cal ally and is ready to take on the one is prepared to provide support responsibility of government once to his opponents. Some experts say the authoritarian regime falls. The that Tajikistan “is trying to win itself party’s criticism of the regime has be- the status of a Chinese province,”14 come noticeably stronger and more and Beijing is perfectly happy with uncompromising in 2011-2012. this. Washington has been increas- What impact on the situation in ing financial aid to the Tajikistani Tajikistan do outside actors have: government, incorporating it into China, Russia, the United States, its security strategy for the region. and immediate neighbors, in par- Neither the United States nor China ticular Uzbekistan? None of these have any interest in a potential “Ta- countries would want to see a sharp jik spring.” escalation of the situation in Tajiki- Russia, of course, by no means stan, not to mention the country’s wants anything of the kind either. collapse. First, this would destabi- Moscow wants to keep Tajikistan lize the entire Central Asian region; within its sphere of influence by tak- second, it could open the way for ing part in key projects there (espe- cially energy projects) and providing Moscow wants to keep Tajikistan within its sphere military aid. The foundations for of influence by taking part in key projects there this military cooperation between (especially in energy) and providing military aid. the two countries were laid in the Migration is the other big factor linking Tajikistan period of civil war, when Russia paid to Russia. One in three Tajik families has at least one half the costs for defending the Ta- family member working abroad, the vast majority jik-Afghan border.15 This mutually of them in Russia. advantageous cooperation played a big part in helping Rakhmon stay in power. Rakhmon was later able radical Islamists with ties to their to count on the support, albeit tacit, ideological allies in Afghanistan to of Russia’s 201st Division, which take the stage and turn the country remained in Tajikistan and became into another base for international the backbone of the Russian mili- terrorism; and third, it would in- tary base established there in 2004. evitably provoke a new flood of After Moscow’s decision to up- refugees streaming in different di- grade the base’s arms and equip- Tajikistan: Civil War’s Long Echo 9

ment, Russian military hardware border and violating international worth an estimated $1 billion will transport regulations. The pilot was be handed over to Tajikistan, in- sentenced to eight-and-a-half years cluding 160 tanks (T-62, T-72), in prison, which provoked an ex- 140 armored personnel carriers, tremely negative reaction on behalf 169 infantry carrier vehicles, an of Russian politicians (including artillery repair and maintenance President Medvedev) and fuelled complex, a portable surface-to-air nationalist sentiment in Russian missile Igla, 30 Shilka and Osa air society. Some State Duma deputies defense systems, and 4 helicopters.16 demanded that Russia deport Tajik These weapons, though outdated, migrants and introduce visas as a nonetheless provide great support means of punishing Tajikistan. for the regime in its fight against domestic opponents and can help No foreign actors – Russia, China, the United States, to protect the borders, including and Tajikistan’s immediate neighbors, in particular by acting as “a deterrent in Tajik- Uzbekistan – would want to see a sharp escalation Uzbek relations.”17 of the situation in Tajikistan, not to mention Migration is the other big factor the country’s collapse. linking Tajikistan to Russia. One in three Tajik families has at least one family member working abroad, The tension abated after Rakhmon the vast majority of them in Rus- decided to release Sadovnichy and sia. According to the Tajikistan Mi- let him return home. Still, the fact gration Control Directorate, there that Moscow showed its willing- were 1.032 million Tajiks in Rus- ness to use migration as a means of sia at the end of 2011 (since the exerting pressure on Tajikistan will spring of 2012, a special newspaper certainly have a negative impact on for them, Mukhodzhir, even started future relations between the two coming out in Dushanbe.) In 2011, countries and force Dushanbe to the migrants sent $2.96 bln home, put more emphasis on a multi-vec- which came to 45.4 percent of Ta- tor policy and the search for alter- jikistan’s GDP.18 native partnerships. A conflict erupted between Rus- What’s more, the conflict over sia and Tajikistan in 2011 over the the Russian pilot’s arrest came at a detention and arrest of Russian pilot bad time for Moscow (in the sec- Vladimir Sadovnichy (who was ar- ond half of 2011, when the Krem- rested together with Estonian citizen lin was actively promoting the Cus- Alexey Rudenko). The two were ac- toms Union and Eurasian Union cused of smuggling aviation-related projects and trying to engage Ta- spare parts, illegally crossing the jikistan as well). The authorities in 10 BRIEFING [ VOL. 14 ISSUE 3 ]

Dushanbe have barely even con- term in office, but the practice sidered the possibility of joining in the Central Asian countries is these organizations at a high level for their rulers to get around this and have so far only hinted at the law by adopting amendments to hypothetical possibility that they the constitution to allow them to might participate. stay in power. It is not yet known On the issue of Tajikistan join- whether Rakhmon will take this ing the Customs Union, let alone road. Whatever the circumstances, the Eurasian Union, Tajik analysts if he does decide to relinquish the also take into consideration Uz- presidency to whomever it be, he bekistan’s negative attitude toward will demand firm guarantees of se- these projects, and think that it curity for himself and his relatives would not be particularly advanta- from his successor. geous for Tajikistan to join both of Another possibility would be these organizations if Uzbekistan to carry out a rotation along the is not also involved. Of course, lines of Russia’s “tandem” solution, Tajikistan’s participation would re- with the next president just filling move obstacles in the way of mi- the seat for Rakhmon, who would grants going to Russia and reduce then return to office in seven years’ the costs of energy imports, grain, time. This, however, is an unlikely and some other goods, but it would scenario because the coming years also deal a blow to cheap imports in unstable Tajikistan could bring from China, Iran, and Turkey, and events that would cut Rakhmon and spell financial ruin for the busi- his clan out of power for good. nesspeople involved in trade with If events follow the constitution, these countries. As Tajikistan’s For- Tajikistan will have a new president, eign Minister Khamrokhon Zarifi who will have the job of tackling said, “If Tajikistan were to join the the problems left by his predecessor Customs Union now the benefits and making changes to the political would be insignificant.”19 None- system. We cannot say yet whether theless, Russia still hopes to see the new president will continue to Tajikistan reach a positive decision bolster the authoritarian regime or with regard to the new forms of co- will take the risk of at least partially operation within the framework of drawing on Kyrgyzstan’s reform these organizations. experience. Tajikistan will hold a presiden- The new president will have to tial election in 2013. No one can act in two seemingly mutually ex- say yet exactly what it will look clusive directions: maintain a frag- like. Under the constitution, Rakh- ile stability, yet at the same time mon cannot stand for another carry out reforms and fight corrup- Tajikistan: Civil War’s Long Echo 11

tion and the drug mafia. To undertake these two tasks simultaneously will be quite a challenge.

Notes:

1 “The demographic consequences of ethnic and regional conflicts in the CIS [“De- mograficheskie posledstvia etnicheskikh i regionalnykh konfliktov v SNG”], Popula- tion and Society, no. 27 (April 1997); A. Niyazi, “Tajikistan: regional aspects of the conflict (1990s)” [“Tajikistan: Regionalnie aspekty konflikta (1990s)”], Ethnic and Regional Conflicts in Eurasia, Book 1: Central Asia and the Caucasus, (Moscow: Ves Mir, 1997), p. 52. 2 A. Lyakhovsky and V. Nekrasov, Citizen, politician and soldier, (Moscow: 2007), p. 270. 3 M. Yanovskaya, “100th anniversary of the press gets journalists let off going to prison” [“Tajikistan: V chest 100-letia pechati zhurnalistov reshili ne sazhat”], http:// www.fergananews.com/article.php?id=7308&print=1. 4 S. Shermatova, “What is happening in Tajikistan and how should we view it?” [“Chto proiskhodit v Tajikistane i kak k etomu sleduyet otnositsia?”], http://www. fergananews.com/article.php?id=6801. 5 Reference to founder of the Hanafi school, 8-9th century theologian and jurist Abu Hanifa. 6 Some mosques closed for purely economic reasons, as well, when some communi- ties, especially those in rural areas, could not raise the funds for their upkeep. 7 A. Dubnov, “Tajikistan: a new opposition for an old president” [“Tajikistan: No- vaya oppozitsia staromu presidentu”], Rossia v globalnoy politike, no. 2 (March-April 2011): pp. 134-137. 8 D. Sariyev, “Stable instability” [“Stabilnaya nestabilnost”], Oazis, no. 24 (164) (De- cember, 2011). 9 http://tjknews.com/?p=1497. 10 http://http://tjknews.com/?p=2060. 11 Shermatova, “What is happening?” 12 Tajikistan Country Report, http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/165- tajikistan-gdp-country-report.html#axzz1qsiT82UH. 13 http://www.fergananews.com/article.php?id=7260?print=1. 14 M. Gusarov, “Acquired Tajik-deficiency syndrome” [“Sindrom priobretennogo tajikidefitsita”], Eurasia Center, February 23, 2011. www.carnegie.ru

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with head- quarters in Washington D.C., is 15 R. Masov, Current problems in the Tajik people’s historiography and history (Dush- a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to conduct- anbe: 2005) p. 227. ing independent policy research and advancing cooperation between 16 V. Georgiyev, “Tajikistan: Russian arms will make Rakhmonov’s regime more effec- nations. In 1993, the Endowment launched the Carnegie Moscow tive” [“Tajikistan: Rossiiskoe oruzhie sdelayet rezhim Rakhmonova bolee deesposob- Center to help develop a tradition nym”], http://www.fergananews.com/article.php?id=5396. of public policy analysis in the coun- tries of the former Soviet Union and 17 A. Kazanstev, “The Russian military base in Tajikistan is needed above all for improve relations between Russia and the United States. Tajikistan’s own security” [“Rossiiskaya voyennaya baza v Tajikistane nuzhna dlya bezo- pasnosti prezhde vsego samogo Tajikistana”], Russian Council for International Affairs, In 2007, the Carnegie Endow- ment announced its New Vision http://russiancouncil.ru/?id4=234. as the first multinational and ultimately global think tank, add- 18 Cross-Media (A Euromoney Institutional Company), March 29, 2012. According ing operations in Beijing, Beirut, Brussels and Almaty to its existing to other estimates, Tajiks send home from $3.5 billion to $4 billion, which comes to offices in Moscow and Washington. 35-40 percent of the country’s GDP. The Endowment uses its experi- ence of research and discussion 19 at the Carnegie Moscow Center as D. Sariyev, “All possible alliances,” [“Vse vozmozhnye soyuzy”], Oazis, no. 23 (163) a model for its transformation into (December 2011). the first international think tank.

This Briefing represents the author’s personal views and should not be considered as representing the view of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace or the Carnegie Moscow Center.

© Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012

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