ANALYSIS NOTE The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

©photo : Malick Konaté / sahelien.com

Women draw water from the bank of the Niger River near Niafunké (Timbuktu), July 2020.

An analysis of ’s security crisis through the eyes of its main actors

Baba Dakono

August 2020 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

Summary About sahélien.com

Sahelien.com is a news website created in February 2014 by Malian, Nigérien, Burkinabe and American journalists, with Executive Summary...... 4 the support of Groupe Klédu (Mali) and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). https://sahelien.com Contacts: [email protected] INTRODUCTION...... 5

1. Contexte overview...... 7 About the author 2. In the beginning was the armed rebellion in the north...... 8 Baba Dakono a) From armed rebellion to terrorist activism against the backdrop of a state crisis...... 9 is currently Executive Secretary of the Citizen Observatory on Governance and Security (OCGS). He was also a researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) at the regional office for West Africa, the Sahel and a) From fear to self-defense...... 12 the Lake Chad Basin. Prior to this position, he was Project Manager at International Alert and Program Officer at 3. Finally, the crisis reaches the center of the country...... 13 the National Democratic Institute (NDI). He worked successively as an Associate Expert at the Mission d’appui aux réformes politiques, in the office of the Minister of State Reform as Chargé de mission and at the Comité d’appui aux 4. The resurgence of local conflicts and new dynamics...... 17 réformes institutionnelles. Within this framework, he worked on issues of governance, strengthening the rule of law 5. A widespread governance crisis...... 19 and consolidating democracy in Mali. From 2008 to the present, he has worked as a consultant on several studies on public policy evaluation, security, and institutional development in Mali and the Sahel. He holds a Master’s degree in 6. Social changes, between breakdowns and permanency...... 21 Law and a Master’s degree in Political Science. 7. Continuing violence...... 25 CONCLUSION...... 26 About the Study RECOMMENDATIONS...... 27 1) Reposition the return of the State to the localities...... 27 2) Restore trust between local actors...... 27 3) Supporting mediation processes with concrete actions...... 27 4) Provide sustainable and multifaceted responses to local conflicts...... 28 5) Addressing issues of underdevelopment and securing infrastructure...... 28 6) Accompany the Malian State in strengthening the dialogue between communities...... 28 7) Facing the terrorist threat within a framework of regional cooperation...... 28 APPENDIX - BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 29

A family goes to the local market in a village between and Bourem June 2019. ©photo : Walid le berbère / sahelien.com

NOTE : The opinions expressed in this study do not necessarily reflect those of sahelien.com.

2 3 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

Executive Summary the communities themselves a poli- The various interviews highlight an mendations emerge, including the • Encourage programs to improve INTRODUCTION tical stake and, therefore, a privile- evolution of the conflict that tends to following: justice and end the cycle of impu- Mali has experienced a multidi- ged target. More fundamentally, be reduced to violent extremism. This nity. The ills of governance that The rising violence and evolution mensional security crisis that began these communities become aware violence originates both at the gover- • Help the state find a credible caused or exacerbated the crises are of the crisis in Mali highlight the on January 17, 2012, withan armed of their marginalization and claim nance level and at the endogenous governance model and focus on primarily focused on justice issues. many security, logistical and huma- rebellion, and resulted in the occu- their place on the national political level (frustrations and grievances). greater involvement of the popu- Improving governance undoubtedly nitarian difficulties faced by those pation of two-thirds of the territory chessboard, but also become aware Structurally, the nature and quality lation in the management of pu- requires improving the justice sector. who search for solutions, andpro- by various armed groups, including of the dividends of development of governance has led to chronically blic affairs. The current rule of the vide context for the population’s terrorist groupsin April of the same efforts from which they are largely strained relations between the state game of representationleads, to some • Supporting mediation processes low levels of confidence in the state year. If the crisis in the north is lar- excluded. The vision of an opposing and citizens. The litany of unpu- extent, to the appointment of elec- with concrete actions. For many and the peace process. The factors gely due to the «delegitimization» of world between old and new, farmers nished and unresolved cases of cor- ted officials who do not represent. interlocutors met during the analysis on which the crisis in Mali has thri- former president Amadou Toumani and pastoralists, generates its share ruption and human rights violations Appropriate means must be found to period, the agreements signed in the ved are multiple and complex: they Touré, it must be said that the ori- of tensions within the communities and the lack of protection and basic ensure that the opinions and percep- framework of conflict resolution are are linked to the activities of isola- gins of the grievances go back much themselves. social services, particularly in rural tions of the populations are better short-term solutions. ted armed groups, movements that further: corruption, a deteriorating communities, have slowly eroded taken into account in the decision- signed the peace agreement, and economic situation, and more. The The present work proposes a broader confidence in the state and weakened making process. • Addressing issues of underdeve- criminal networks, and have dis- violence that has gradually intensi- reflection beyond the circle of natio- the social contract between the state lopment and securing infrastruc- torted inter- and intra-community fied since 2012 is the consequence of nal and international public institu- and the people. This has made the • New strategies for the return of ture. During the study, it emerged ties. Finally, in many localities in the fragility of the state, destabilized tions. To illustrate this, we have cho- presence and authority of the state the state. The restoration of the au- that there is very little infrastructure the north and center of the country, by the decomposition of Libya and sen to include, throughout the study, highly questionable and provided thority of the State in such a context linking the South to the North of the communities, judging the institu- the proliferation of fighters, arms selected passages and stories from an environment for the emergence is important, but it should not be country. In addition, road infrastruc- tional responses to be ineffective, and trafficking that it has engende- Malians of diverse backgrounds. of alternative forces such as so-cal- envisaged in a framework of territo- ture is dilapidated in places and non- have armed themselves, leading red. The resulting Malian conflict of This approach not only enriches the led terrorist groups and self-defense rial occupation of the country. Long existent in much of the north. There to unprecedented violence in the 2012 forced the departure of the ad- analysis, but also gives people living militias. Communities rely on these before the crisis, the presence of the are no roads connecting the South to country. ministration from vast rural territo- thousands of kilometers from the forces for justice and protection, state was perceived by many commu- the North of the country. ries. Traditional chiefs, community Malian capital the opportunity to and, in the case of terrorist groups, nities as a predatory presence that, Starting in 2015, the epicenter of militias and «terrorist» groups then share their experiences, expectations socio-economic interests. This is de- without meeting the basic needs of • Promote youth employment in violence shifted from the north to fought over the place left by the state and fears. There was no question monstrated by cases in which indi- the communities, exacerbated the conflict areas (creation of income- the central regions of the country and the historic void it had left. here of aiming for completeness, nor viduals in many localities confirmed cleavages within and between them. generating activities). The issue of (Segou, ) with the rise in of placing a median line between that they were better placed under the creation of income-generating ac- power in the Inner Delta (the Niger Left to their own devices, commu- the different stories, but rather of the control of extremist groups after • Acting locally in the face of re- tivities came up in all the discussions. buckle) of a group called «Katiba nities are struggling for survival on recounting the difficulties and the being allowed to engage in certain gional issues. All partners’ strate- In Mopti, many interlocutors felt that Macina,» led by preacher Hama- many fronts: economic, with the most salient expectations raised economic activities such as hun- gies recognize the transnational and the city was the economic lung of doun Kouffa. Kouffa is a close asso- scarcity of natural resources aggra- among the populations encountered. ting, gold mining, and others that regional nature of security and deve- the region, with agropastoral activi- ciate of Iyad Ag Ghali andbecame an vated by the vagaries of the cli- This was done even though doing had been restricted by the state. The lopment issues in the Sahel. Howe- ties and tourism. Since the crisis, all important figure in the Groupe de mate; identity, as they are courted so might reveal considerable gaps state’s failure to protect communi- ver, taking this into account in the the economic activities that revolved soutien à l’islam et aux musulmans by governments and armed groups; between the top and the bottom ties led to a proliferation of vigilante formulation and implementation of around tourism have been reduced (GSIM), the main jihadist coali- and security, given the failings of a (institutions-populations), the center groups. A further proliferation is to humanitarian assistance or develop- to nothing, resulting in many young tion active in the Sahel. Thus, the submerged state force. The pattern and the periphery (decision-making be expected given the dependence of ment programs and projects is com- people joiningcriminal networks. The region of Mopti and gradually that of alliances with one or another of power-recipients). states on these groups. On the basis plex. rest are instrumentalized by armed of Ségou saw the birth and growth the actors in the conflict has made of this cross-analysis, a few recom- groups and left behind by the state. of locally active armed groups. One of the strengths of these groups is

4 5 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

their ability to establish themselves confirmed the presence of the coro- gering elements, which have been scale of the conflict. This research resurgence of local conflicts (04) in rural areas. navirus pandemic in the country. gradually put in place over the past was conducted in Bamako, Tim- before noting the social changes Then, the situation rapidly evolved decades. Growing insecurity, which buktu, Gao, Mopti and Ménaka. that have taken place over the years These groups have claimed responsi- with an average contamination rate increases the displacement and (05) as well as the violence observed ‘‘…Humanitarian partners sup- bility for several attacks against of 30%. By the end of April, the vulnerability of populations, contri- Our methodologymakes it possible (06). Finally, after a conclusion, the port actions for disease preven- the national armies of the three country had recorded more than butes to fueling tensions between to highlight the perceptions and main recommendations emerging tion and case management. In countries and the partner forces of 400 cases, including 20 deaths and socio-professional groups. In addi- reflections of the different actors. from the study are presented May, the first cases of COVID-19 the United Nations Integrated Mul- a hundred people cured. Faced with tion to these tensions over access to Decentralization wasa constant were detected at a displacement tidimensional Stabilization Mis- thishealth threat, the government natural resources, violence is linked concern. On the one hand, the aim 1. Overview of the context site/host family in the Mopti sion in Mali (MINUSMA), the G5 has taken several preventive mea- to power struggles, attempts at poli- of decentralization was to move region. The pandemic comes in a Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S), and sures since March 17. These mea- tical and social reconfiguration, and away from the state-centric format With an area of 1,241,238 km² and context of a security and huma- Operation Barkhane. Local elected sures ranged from closing borders disagreements between the state of public institutions, and on the shared borders with seven states, Mali nitarian crisis already affecting has a very large territory, two-thirds officials, traditional and religious (except for freight and transporta- and certain communities. other hand, it was to highlight the more than four million people. of which is occupied by desert. The leaders, and teachers are also vic- tion of goods) to banning public plurality of positions of the com- It thus aggravates the challenges weakness of the country’s resources tims of intimidation, threats, kid- gatherings, closing schools, and es- Based on these observations, it is munities. In order to make better related to access to basic social and the unequal geographical dis- services, food insecurity and nappings, and even assassinations. tablishing a curfew from 9:00 p.m. useful to ask to what extent the- sense of this, we have chosen to in- tribution of basic social services and highlights the vulnerability of to 5:00 a.m. This umpteenth crisis local, national and supranational clude, throughout the study, stories infrastructure are factors of vulne- Insecurity in the country has thus came on top of an already worrying responses take into account the and quotesfrom a diversity of sub- rability. This situation makes Mali a households whose socio-econo- 3 entered into metastasis. Collecti- security, economic and humanita- context (politics, specificities, will jects . The quotes are not meant to preferred location for various armed mic opportunities are increasingly vely or individually, the local ac- rian situation. of actors), the current situation (the be exhaustive, nor do they situate a groups that take advantage of the reduced... Insecurity coupled tors in the conflict have almost all evolution of the crisis and conflict median line between the different absence of the state or its weak repre- with the COVID-19 epidemic become armed actors. As a result Following the proclamation of the dynamics, particularly the signing narratives, but rather they recount sentation to establish themselves and has resulted in a decrease in the of the deteriorating security situa- final results of the legislative elec- of the peace agreement), as well as the difficulties and the most salient recruit. attendance of centers for the management of cases of gen- tion, the emergence of militias is tions, unrest broke out in many all the actors involved in the peace expectations raised among the po- der-based violence (GBV). As a most often community-based. For Malian cities. Often pointing the process. pulations encountered. This was Disparities in development and invol- reminder, more than 378,000 example, in addition to Dan Am- finger at curfews in the context of doneat the risk of sometimes dis- vement in local and national gover- children are affected by the clo- bassagou, interlocutors from the untimely power cuts or protesting To respond to this, we propose a re- covering considerable gaps between nance have led to frustration, rebel- lions and armed conflicts, and the sure of schools in areas affected Tuareg Imghad Self-Defense Group against the results of the legislative flection that will discuss several ele- the top and the bottom (institutions mismanagement of these conflicts by insecurity. In addition, the and Allies (GATIA) and the Move- elections1, the month of May 2020 ments, including the point of view vs. populations), the center and the have a lasting impact. The various economic crisis caused by res- ment for the Salvation of in Mali was also the month of inci- of the actors, the evolution of the periphery (those with decision-ma- non-state armed groups take advan- trictive measures will increase (MSA) also present their groups as dents in Bamako, Kati, Kayes, Si- crisis,and the nature of the violence king power vs. those without). tage of the vulnerability factors of ‘‘ 2 poverty... . responses to insecurity in a logic of kasso, and Ségou . that has defined the conflict. The the population, including illiteracy defending their communities, res- analysis is structured around the Based on the results, this report is and poverty, to recruit combatants, Bulletin OCHA Mali (MALI, Situa- pectively the Tuareg Imgahad and However, it is important to remem- dynamics of the conflict, in particu- structured around six (08) points. especially in the northern and central tion Report, update: June 17, 2020) Daoussahaq. ber that the crisis, whether it is a lar its causes and driving forces. The After a brief overview of the context https://reports.unocha.org/fr/ regions. country/mali… security, political or health crisis, approach was to conduct a «multi- (01) it presents the origins of the In this bleak context, on March is both the result of structural fac- situated» reflection, i.e. in different 2012 crisis (02), then the spread of Young people, who make up more 25, 2020, the Malian government tors of vulnerability, and of trig- places and at different levels in the the crisis towards the center of the than half of Mali’s population, are country (03), then takes stock of the exposed to unemployment, underem-

1 Tv5 Monde : «Two young Malians were injured by bullets on Thursday 7 May on the sidelines of a demonstration in the south of Mali ______against the final results of the legislative elections won by the ruling party, local sources reported. «https://information.tv5monde.com/ 3 The survey approach consisted of conduc- afrique/elections-legislatives-au-mali-deux-blesses-par-balles-en-marge-d-une-manifestation-358455 ting qualitative interviews based on a semi- 2 Deutch Wele: «Kayes, Kati, Sikasso, Ségou, Mopti and several neighborhoods in Bamako have been experiencing riotous nights for nearly a directive questionnaire. Most of the people week. Barricaded streets, burnt tires, burned police kiosks: according to several sources, these acts of violence have caused three deaths throu- cited were not named. ghout the country» https://www.dw.com/fr/des-tensions-sociales-embrasent-le-mali/a-53375377

6 7 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

ployment, lack of prospects, and weak rist groups, which instrumentalize boring countries. Indeed, since Janua- The origins of the security crisis this vast desert expanse, which is ments labeled as terrorists, including involvement in national and local conflicts between different commu- ry 2019, there have been more than in Mali are as remote as the birth difficult for a poor state like Mali to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb governance. The resulting frustrations nities while posing as guarantors 50,000 internally displaced persons of the Republic itself in 1960. In- control, into a rear base in the Sahel. (AQIM), the Movement for Unity make them particularly vulnerable to of social order. Insecurity generates in the , 58% of whom deed, since then, some commu- Their presence, which intensified and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) radicalization and the rhetoric of ter- inter-community conflicts, creating are children. By May 2019, the num- nities in the north of the country after the fall of former Libyan Pre- and Ançar-Eddine (created by the rorist organizations. As a result, they a growing social divide and the wit- ber of internally displaced persons in have rebelled against the backdrop sident Muammar Gaddafi, resulted Kel Tamasheq Iyad ag Ghali) began. also turn very easily to a variety of hdrawal of part of the administration Mali had reached 120,067, including of an armed insurgency against the in the occupation of all the northern The multiplication of armed actors illicit trafficking ranging from drugs from many areas. At the beginning 49,426 in the Mopti region. Accor- newly established state in 1963. This to weapons, cigarettes, migrants, and of 2020, the health crisis added to an ding to the OCHA report published in 2012. Distraught can be understoodthrough categori- protected animal and plant species, already worrisome security, economic in June 2020, the number of inter- insurrection,which was managed in the face of the threat, particularly zations based on the groups’ «stated the proceeds of which are very often and humanitarian situation. In addi- nally displaced persons reached its militarily by the authorities of the the «terrorist» threat, the Malian claims» while recalling the connec- used to finance terrorist movements. tion, frustrations, grievances and dis- highest level in the last six years, rising first Republic, laid the foundations army deserted the towns in the area tions that may exist between them. content have increased, leading to so- from 207,751 in December 2019 to for a cyclical armed rebellion in the and left the armed groups (inde- In2014, the crisis took on anew di- cial tensions and putting institutions 250,998 in April 2020, an increase of country. Unsatisfied with the results pendence fighters, terrorists, militias Mali’s half-century of independence mension with the resurgence of inse- under severe strain. 43,247 people. The number of schools of the investments made by the state and traffickers) to rule the law. has been marked by various political curity in the regions of Mopti and closed was 807 in 2018. This number and its partners, and driven by a upheavals. The most recurring were It is in this multicultural context of Segou, in the center of the country. On the humanitarian front, many decreased relatively in 2019 (750). At spirit of revenge for the exactions of the demands for independence in northern Mali that the security crisis The economic and social fragility of communities have been forced to the health level, more than 66 health the first insurrection, a new rebel- the north of the country, to which these areas has served as fertile ground move, some within the country and involving irredentist armed groups centers are closed due to insecurity. lion was launched in June 1990 in the central government in Bamako for the establishment of armed terro- others outside, particularly to neigh- such as the MNLA, and also move- northern Mali. first responded by force before favo- 2. In the beginning, armed ring political solutions. According The armed groups behind the in- rebellion in the north to the Malian anthropologist, the surgency now claim direct involve- resurgence of rebellions in the north ment in public affairs. The actors at appears to be «one of the major the time were mainly young people constants in Malian political life from nomadic communities who since the mid-1950s in what was had been exiled in Libya since 1963 ‘‘The relationships between these then French Sudan». and during the drought years of the communities are historical, even 1970s. This brief historical detour if often in conflict. Long before allows us to recall the cycle of vio- Mali’s independence, social and In 1963, the first rebellion broke out, lence present in the country and to intercommunity violence already placing the north of the country in understand what is at stake. existed between them. Arab mer- armed violence for several years. The chants and the Sonrhaï blamed Malian army’s responseleft painful a) From armed rebellion to terro- the Tuareg for the raids that raged traces in hearts and minds. Once rist activism against the backdrop in the region. In addition, clashes again, between 1990-1999, a new of a state crisis between nomadic populations, armed rebellion was born. The ma- The security crisis that Mali expe- on the one hand, and between jor demands of this rebellion did not rienced in 2012 is the result of a nomadic and sedentary popula- contrast with those of the first, but process of disintegration of the state tions, on the other, are recurrent also concerned the integration of that goes deeper than it appears. and each community claims to be the Tuaregs into the Malian army. The sanctuarization of northern master of the land‘‘. The response was initially military Mali began in the late 1990s. Begin- Qui est qui au Nord du Mali, before Algeria was chosen to act as ning in 2003, fighters of the terro- ISS Africa, 2013 mediator in the negotiations that rist group al-Qaeda in the Islamic gave rise to the Tamanrasset Agree- Maghreb (AQIM) began to settle in ment on 6 January 1991. This agree- northern Mali. The aim was to turn ment gave special status to the nor- A water source is seen in Arawane, 160 km north of Timbuktu. ©photo : Walid le berbère / sahelien.com

8 9 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

thern regions, allocated 47% of the In January 2012, a new rebellion left The entry into play of «terrorist» It is in this context that after a few In , there is no doubt about next development program and pro- Kidal, led by the National Movement groups gave yet another dynamic to weeks of hybrid management of the overlap between irredentist vided for the demilitarization of the for the Liberation of Azawad with the crisis. Since 2003, the main ter- the main cities in the occupied re- groups and certain “terrorists.” It zone. It was rendered null and void the support of the returning Gad- rorist group active in northern Mali gions, the MNLA lost ground to would even seem that the attacks following the popular revolution that dafi Islamic Legion fighters, before has been Al-Qaeda in the Islamic the steamroller of terrorist groups were jointly planned. ‘‘Since March 2017, Jamaat led to the coup d’état of 26 March declaring Azawad’s independence Maghreb (AQIM). Since 2006, the with whom co-management was Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mousli- 1991 by a group of soldiers led by on April 6, 2012. On January 17, movement has claimed to be part of becoming difficult. Eventually, the min, “Group for the Support of Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Tou- 2012, the National Movement for the Al-Qaeda network founded by separatists were chased away by ar- Islam and Muslims,” (GNIM mani Touré, known as «ATT». the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) Osama Bin Laden and since 2007 med terrorist groups from the main or GSIM), was born. It was launched the armed struggle that led has had bases in the north of Mali, cities and took refuge in neighboring born from the merger of Ançar The rebellionin the north, composed to an unprecedented multidimensio- notably in the region of Kidal. Then countries. Eddine, AQIM, Katiba Macina of Tuareg and Arabs, fragmented into nal crisis in the country. This armed came «Ançar-Eddine», an Islamist and Al-Mourabitoune. Iyad Ag four factions because of divergent Ghaly takes the lead. The merger group, formed by former combatants movement created by . Between 2010 and 2011, I was The two groups (Ançar-Eddine and aspirations, before forming together of these groups would respond to who returned from Libya after the Appearing at the beginning of 2012, a young high school student in the MNLA) signed this agreement the Coordination of Unified Move- a need to formalize a partnership fall of Muammar Gaddafi and deser- the movement is part of those who Goundam (Timbuktu region). In in order to formalize their relations, ments and Fronts of Azawad to ne- that has existed since 2011. There ters from the Malian army, launches were driven out of northern Mali by 2012, with the arrival of an armed as we drove the Malian army out gotiate with the Malian government, is a willingness to coordinate an attack against Malian armed posi- the Franco-African intervention in group called MNLA, I dropped out of Azawad together; we coordinated under pressure from Algeria. These actions, especially as AQIM seeks tions first in Ménaka and then Kidal January 2013. The movement has led of school to join their movement even before January 17. The May negotiations led to the signing of the to expand its actions in the Sahel, and , in the north of the to some offshoots since 2014, notably and I was trained in weapons han- 26th agreement was signed for our and in Libya where its great rival, national pact on April 11, 1992 to country. In order to carry out the the Katiba Macina of Hamadoun dling for a few days. We then attac- common interest and the security of the Islamic state, operates and seal unity in the country. In return, military operations, the irredentists Kouffa. Thisgroup operates in cen- ked Camp de Léré and took hostages Azawad. But we soon realized that seeks to invest on the Sahel front. the rebel movements renounced the signed an alliance with armed terro- tral Mali (Segou, Mopti). (Malian soldiers). In the aftermath, some leaders did not understand it. The two organizations are in a independence project. But tensions The lack of communication led some rist groups present in the zone since we recovered 6 combat vehicles and logic of regional competition‘‘. were far from eased because of the cadres to believe that we had fallen 2003, such as AQIM as well as An- The complex nature of the alliance killed dozens of soldiers. We then into terrorism or Salafism. But the central government’s inability to se- sar-Eddine and MUJAO. between the separatist armed groups attacked Timbuktu and occupied dialogue continues, and the agree- cure national adherence to the agree- and the terrorists overwhelmed the the city’s airport. Two days later, we ment remains valid. The MNLA ment and to bring together the tribes The conflict entered a new dynamic Malian army, which had abandoned saw Islamist groups disembark in of the north. with the coup d’état by military per- its positions, often without fighting. accepts Ançar Eddine at its side, the city and I left the MNLA to join not AQIM. And if Ançar Eddine sonnel in March 2012. The coup per- On the one hand, the terrorists pur- the group named Ançar Eddine. I In 2006, violence resumed and the appeals to AQIM, that’s their pro- petrators accused the Malian govern- sued the objective of creating an was trained there too to specialize rebels highlighted the fact that the blem. And it’s also the problem of ment of laxity and incompetence in Islamist state in the north of Mali; in P.K., in homemade bombs. I was north was lagging behind the south the people who let this group come managing the conflict. Eventually, and, on the other hand, the separa- appointed at the level of the Islamic in terms of development. They ac- here, who gave them money [in the under international pressure, they re- tists wanted the independence of the police and they were in charge of cused the Malian government of not form of ransoms for the release of turned power to a civilian-led transi- north of the country under the term applying the «Sharia». Ex-comba- hostages, editor’s note]. This is how keeping the promises made in 1992, tional government. In the meantime, «Azawad» which they used to iden- tant of the Ançar-Eddine group. AQIM became powerful. leading to a worsening situation. On however, armed separatist and terro- tify the party concerned. The alliance July 4, 2006, under the mediation rist groups, in alliance, continued to was formed against the backdrop of Ex-combattant du groupe (words of Bilal Ag Achérif, Pre- of Algeria’s neighbor, a new Algiers advance and occupied the three nor- mounting bloody clashes by armed Ançar-Eddine sident of the new Transitio- Agreement is signed. It granted grea- thern regions of the country within a terrorist, separatist and criminal nal Council of Azawad State ter political autonomy and more few months. groups. (CTEA) in June 2012). funds allocated to development.

10 11 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

In Gao, in northern Mali, disagree- a) From fear to self-defense «There are many armed groups operating in the region: Ganda Koy, Ganda Izo and other small movements. All of these ments finally led to a breakdown «In 2012, the Islamists arrived in Parallel to the rebel movements, movements commit abuses against the civilian population when they are in need. Weapons are the means of combat today in the alliance between the inde- Timbuktu. They were applauded by 2012 also saw the birth and/or reac- for all the armed groups present on the ground. The means of warfare are found through the sale of arms and also the sale pendence fighters and armed terrorist the Muslim population of Timbuk- of stolen animals». groups. At the same time, the occupa- tu. But when we began to see their tivation of self-defense groups. They mainly fell into two categories: the tion and the massive presence of wea- application of «Sharia» with ampu- Fighting member of a self-defense group in Gao. pons normalized violence in the city. tations of legs and hands, whipping, sedentary and nomadic self-defense killings, rapes ..., we told them that groups; the Ganda-Izo and the Arab In Timbuktu, the situation was com- the Muslim religion did not accept Movement of Azawad (MAA), res- plex. After the fall of Kidal, the popu- the application of «Sharia» like pectively. The Ganda-Izo, which 3. Finally, the crisis reaches the center of the country lations, particularly those who were means ‘‘Son of the Land’’, was sedentary in the city, understood the that on innocent people. Never- born from the Songhai and Peulh descent of the armed struggle of the theless, they continued to apply it. MNLA as an attempt by the Tuaregs The situation was untenable until self-defense group that existed du- to establish hegemony in the North. a Friday called “Black Friday” be- ring the rebellion of the 1990s, the Therfore, the arrival of terrorist cause it was hot between the jiha- Ganda-Koy. With the rebellion groups a few days after the MNLA dists and the inhabitants of the city unleashed in January 2012, they took the city was greeted with fervor of Timbuktu». That day, Islamists set up, under the leadership of Ibra- before degenerating. came across an “unveiled”4 woman hima Abba Kantao, several mili- carrying water on her head with her tia groups in Sevaré and Gao. The child on her back and began whip- National Front for the Liberation of «When the crisis erupted, part of ping her. When the youth leader was Azawad (FNLA), created in April the population fled the city. But we informed, he invited all the youth of 2012, became the MAA in Decem- stayed and we wanted to defend our the city to put an end to this torture. ber 2012 under the leadership of city against the MNLA rebels. So we We went out in large numbers (men Ahmed Ould Sidi Mohamed. This quickly set up a management body and women) and attacked them in that later led to the establishment Arab self-defense movement has, front of the mosque at the time of of patrol committees throughout the since the beginning of the crisis, Friday prayer. There were enough city. The MUJAO had its police, but had important armed militias in the we too wanted to ensure the peace of of us and they could not kill us all, North which are composed of cer- the inhabitants. Each neighborhood so they fled. There was no prayer tain officers who have deserted from in Gao had about fifteen young that day. The next day, they came the Malian Army such as Colonel back with reinforcements and mar- volunteers who ensured the safety of Housseïn Ould Ghoulam, Colo- Men cook on the banks of the Niger River near Mopti/January 2019. ©photo : Osman Sam / sahelien.com the inhabitants. If someone seemed tyred all the people they crossed that nel Sidi Amar Ould Mohamed and suspicious to them, they would arrest day. The village chief, neighborhood Commander Moulaye Abi. In view him, bring him to our base. We were chiefs and traditional chiefs gathe- of the dialogues begun in 2014 by In April 2012, the MNLA rebels the locality consecrates the entry of lead. This duplicity in the conflict not for the application of the Sharia, red the next day to begin discussions the Malian government, under the entered without encoun- the Mopti region into the conflict, will also amplify its complexity, but we preferred to live with the Isla- with them and asked that the youth aegis of Algerian mediation, these tering any armed resistance (the rea- always with a mix between violence including the involvement of actors mists rather than with the MNLA return the weapons they had recove- groups created the Platform of Self- sons, particularly structural, will be for independence purposes and the established in the center. people». red that day». Defense Movements - which brings explained in the third section). This armed struggle led by armed terro- together the GATIA, the MAA-Ba- descent of the armed insurgency into rist groups, with the MUJAO in the (Former member of the crisis Youth from Timbuktu mako and the «sedentary» - often management committee and referred to as «loyalists». notable of Gao, 2012).

______4 Who does not wear the Hijab (full veil).

12 13 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

the Peace and National Reconcilia- «In the localities of Boni - «I am a close relative of a Dogon «You can’t trust anyone because tion Agreement, and armed terrorist hunter who belongs to a self-defense - , there are interpersonal ‘‘I am the son of a traditional groups. With direct repercussions on they all have the same goals. What group whose objective is the pro- and intercommunity problems that chief. I can’t go 10km beyond my the population, these armed actors we understood was that it was bet- tection and security of the various are exacerbated by the presence village. If the Peulhs, now armed, maintain a spiral of violence and a ter for us to have our child among threatened villages of the circle. The of radical religious groups. There find me, they will systematically sense of injustice that is driving away the armed groups to defend the are rivalries between the Peulhs of attack me‘‘. Dogon hunters or commonly called interests of the family. Currently, ‘‘I was born in in a the prospects for dialogue and peace. Hombori and those of Mondoro. In the militia «DAN NA AMBASA- all the communities have a mili- polygamous family about 40 km Son of a Fulani leader from GOU», constitute a self-defense the last two years, the Dogon and Since 2012, clashes based on settling tia or a group of people who are from Douentza. In Gandamia, central Mali group from all over the Dogon Bamanan have been driven out of scores and attempts to overthrow so- responsible for their protection and there was only the Koranic scho- country. The first reason is that our the most important arable loca- cial order have been recurring in the that of their property. Today, to ol. When the armed groups came, community and that of the Peulhs lities. These communities, mostly Peulh community in the Douent- have a weapon of war is a question at that time the authorities were are in conflict in and around seve- farmers, are driven out by armed The Mopti region is composed of za circle (Mopti region). Starting of money because there are people absent. Those who call themselves ral areas of the circle. This conflict Peulh groups with clan and ethnic two zones: a flooded zone, towards in 2016, the situation deteriorated who sell only that. Even if the Muslims came to see me so that I requires the commitment of the claims». and Gatjiloumou, impas- with the transformation of histori- Peulhs are the most numerous, all populations facing this situation, could interpret for them. So when sable in the winter season and poorly cal conflicts between farmers and but especially the volunteers. The communities present in the Mopti there was a problem between Ambroise Dakouo, ARGA Mali controlled by the State, and a floo- herders, between communities that conflict exists in several localities of region are represented in the extre- the MUJAO members and the ded zone, which extends to the Do- lived together, and an instrumentali- the Koro circle between the commu- mist groups». population, they came to see me gon Plateau. It is in these areas that zation by terrorist groups of the com- nities (Dogon and Fulani) linked to and I would interpret. I would conflicts are stirring up in the cen- munities’ frustrations and grievances the competition over resources (agri- Village chief in the Boulikessi convey information to the people Also in the center, the MNLA has tral regions. In this part of Mali, the against the state. cultural, animal, forest). The mani- area in Arabic and Peulh. This lasted forged alliances, including with demography is diverse. For centuries, festations of this conflict are physi- a few months. When there was local traditional leaders. Using the Fulani (herders, forced to practice In the Seno (Dogon Plateau), the in- cal clashes, targeted attacks, and the military intervention in 2013, frustrations and grievances of the agriculture as a supplementary acti- tensification of violence has led to the abductions of men and livestock. some people said that I was in the communities, the strategy had been vity), Dogon (farmers) and Sonrhaïs formation, or crystallization, of self- It must be said that jihadist groups MUJAO. Those who said I was to turn people against the state. (farmers) have lived side by side. proclaimed self-defense militias, in- play a role alongside our Fulani But again, the temporary alliance They (the Fulani) ensure the care cluding DANNA AMBA SAGOU, in the MUJAO denounced me to adversaries (combat support, sup- between herders (Fulani and Toua- and exploitation of livestock (inclu- affiliated with the traditional Dozo the Malian army and they came ply of weapons and ammunition, reg) against the «sedentary» (Dogon ding the livestock of the Dogons). hunters, and claiming to protect the to arrest me at my home. Before training in the use of weapons)». ‘‘The informal use of community Dogon community. More recently, 2012, there was no problem and Bamanan) quickly fell apart, These ethnic groups alternate periods militias by the respective govern- and old tensions between herder of understanding and conflicts with the armed group Alliance for Salva- between us. But today we don’t Notable from ments, as well as numerousarbi- distant and complex roots. tion in the Sahel (ASS) was formed understand each other‘‘. groups resurfaced. This led to a new trary arrests, ill-treatment, indis- by Fulani personalities from the re- polarization, notably between the criminate raids, and extrajudicial Young citizen from Douentza Fulani and the Tuareg. The sudden While the North was the focus of gion with the objective of protecting attention, insecurity characterized This crisis revealed the fragility of executions of Fulani civilians, adherence of certain Fulani elites their communities from abuses com- mainly by the persistence of the ter- the country’s governance and secu- usually young men, were reported to the MNLA’s political project, mitted by Dogon self-defense mili- rorist threat and local conflicts spread rity systems. Already vulnerable due 5 during the period under review, although sometimes only passive, tias and the FDS . to the center of the country. Today to its extreme poverty (23rd poorest further contributing to the «eth- worried Fulani herders from vassal described as the epicenter of the cri- country in the world according to the nicization» of the conflict. The clans. In the end, the Movement sis, the localities of the center are in World Bank), Mali is experiencing a rallying of Fulani youth to violent for Unity and Jihad in West Africa a socio-economic and geopolitical confluence of security threats, inclu- extremist groups was therefore (MUJAO)exploited a sense of be- context as fragile as it is complex. ding historical conflicts between seen as a result of the inaction trayal by the elites to establish its Identity retrenchment and compe- and within communities and the and, more importantly, the bias of legitimacy. tition over natural resources, which emergence of other types of violence. the FDS in these rivalries. Such are limited in the area, have become This complex violence is perpetrated perceptions are fueled by the low sources of division and violence wit- by various isolated armed groups, representation of Fulani in the hin the communities. movements that are signatories to ______5 «Mali: two new self-defense groups are born in the Center», RFI, May 24, 2018. Available online. 14 15 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

This climate contributes to the revi- In 2018, an intensification of violence generates inter-community conflicts, FDS of the countries concerned. «We are targeted because we are val of a cycle of violence in which in the -Nampala-Karéri area creating a growing social divide and Tuaregs or Arabs or Fulani. Even In order to counter these abuses, every abuse and lack of respect for ‘‘Since January 2015, the Malian led hundreds of families into exile the withdrawal of part of the admi- Fulani associations and the poli- if we have nothing to do with it; the freedoms and lives of civilian army has been under attack from again. In February 2018, the circle of nistration from many areas. tical and military cadres of the for some, we are guilty in advance populations increases the sense of the Katiba Macina, in the Nam- , according to the mayor of ethnic group have appealed to the because of our community mem- injustice and weakens the march pala area, then in Dioura and the commune, received 11,000 new authorities, apparently in vain at bership. In Douentza, every Arab towards peace and the fight against Tenenkou. The army retaliated displaced persons. In January 2019, the time of writing this analysis. or Peulh is suspected of being violence; violence which, for some, is with an operation and arrests, about 20 Fulani families arrived in As a result, the quest for protec- close to AQIM, there was even a presented as the last resort of defense, particularly in the Gourma and Bamako, and more than 800 inter- time when when when we saw in the absence of rights, considera- tion is coupled with a sense of Nampala zones, which caused nally displaced persons fled their vil- ‘‘Attack on Sobane-Da. Sobane one, people would say “here is a tion and alternative through genuine victimization and stigmatization people to flee. At the same time, lages to take refuge in the bush. Da, a Dogon village located in political dialogue. This cycle of vio- of Fulani people that fuels the jihadist!”It resurfaces as soon as tens of thousands of people were the commune of Sangha, Bandia- lence undoubtedly contributes to the lure of violent extremism‘‘. there is the slightest problem. They displaced, mostly Fulani, women «There have always been arrests. gara circle in Mali, was the object fabrication of radicalization. These use terrorism as a scarecrow to have and children from the Bouar Last Friday, they arrested seven of an attack that left 35 people traumas maintain the cycle of fragi- the right to kill us, to diminish our community in the Tenenkou and people in the department of Sokolo dead, all from the Christian lity, amalgamation and fear and thus Finally, pressure has been exerted struggle». Nampala cercle. Several testimo- and killed four people. They dum- community, and burned attics, new displacements. nies report executions of innocent oncertain communities because they ped the bodies. People are afraid, houses, animals, etc. The attack civilians, arrests of people asso- belong to the same ethnicity as some Young Arab from Douentza they are killing us everywhere. was carried out in the village of ciated with «terrorists» by their jihadists, orthey dress in a more or- «We are not considered, we’ve been People are hiding in the bush». Sobane Da. This attack, commit- thodox manner. This leads to accu- under arrest and killing for a year community origin, and cases of ted during the night of June 9 to torture‘‘. sations of complicity or association Security operations carried out over now, it’s not just today. But no one Peul, originally from Dioura 10, 2019 by a dozen armed men, with terrorism by certain communi- the past three years in the fight speaks up to defend us or to say that took place in a context of armed 6 against terrorism, which have inten- it’s unfair, it’s as if we don’t exist. violence against a backdrop of ty and/or doctrinal groups , without Several testimonies and associations sified since the taking of hostages Even the encounters they make in growing community tensions in proof or investigation. of Peulhs deny the only explanation and the killing of the Radisson Hotel our area, we are not in it. What the area. No social class was spa- of the inter-community conflict put in Bamako in November 2015, have do we have to do to make it stop? «They came to us, they said there red: women, men, young people, forward by the media and official resulted in hundreds of arrests (or Take up arms? I don’t want to, but are rebels among us. We said we children and the elderly. One of authorities and denounce the amal- nearly 2,000 according to official -in that’s exactly what they’re doing, don’t know the rebels. The second its peculiarities has been its infan- formation). Presented as «the rise in gams nourished by the police-media getting people who have nothing time, they took two people and me ticidal nature, since 24 of the 35 power of the Malian forces,»7 these campaign on the issue. to do with these problems to go to and took us to prison in Bamako. dead were children‘‘. muscular operations have led to the war. And if this continues, that’s They came back again to take some arrest of several presumed terrorists, 4. The resurgence of local what’s going to happen». people, 4 people including our vil- some of whom have allegedly partici- lage chief X. While we were in pri- conflicts and new dynamics pated in attacks. But these operations Young Fulani breeder8 son, they all beat us up, many of us were also accompanied by abuses: even... They tied us up with a rope. It is in this context that there has been arbitrary arrests and violence. They also branded us with hot irons The security crisis in Mali has taken a resurgence of violence related to (he shows me Y’s arms and feet). on new dimensions with the advance local conflicts in the country, mainly ______They beat us with their feet, with of armed terrorist groups in the Mop- in the Mopti region. The attacks in 1 6 Throughout 2013 and 2014, several per- 7 According to General Dakouo, former De- 8 Originally from the Nampala area, this their fists, with army belts». To get ti and Segou regions in the center of Koulogon on January , 2019, with sons belonging to preaching groups or simply puty Chief of the General Staff of the Armed young Fulani farmer was arrested and put the country. The economic and social more than 20 dead, followed by the Forces, during the year 2015 «Nearly 70 ter- in prison for four months. He was allegedly out of prison, we all paid 500,000 Orthodox groups were suspected, arrested, fragility of these areas has served as attack in Ogossagou on March 23, and sometimes executed. For example, the rorists and armed bandits were neutralized, beaten and released for the sum of 300,000 CFA francs. execution of 17 people in Diabaly, including 268 arrested, 175 weapons, 9 vehicles, 40 CFA francs. fertile ground for the establishment 2019, which killed more than 160 some of Mauritanian origin, members of the motorcycles recovered, more than 50 impro- Member of the Peul Bouar com- of these armed terrorist groups, people, were the peak in this vio- jama’at-tu tabligh, a movement of peaceful vised explosive devices neutralized». https:// munity, from the Nampala area which exploit conflicts between dif- lence. On June 9, the attack that www.bbc.com/afrique/region-50451871. preachers, who were on their way to the an- ferent communities while posing as targeted the village of Sobane-Da in nual congress of the movement in Bamako. guarantors of social order. Insecurity central Mali killed 35 people. In all ______9 Figures provided by UNHCR.

16 17 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

of these localities, in addition to bur- radical armed groups and the local «psychology of situations» and poli- These phenomena induce compe- As a result of conflicts, relationships The new dynamics of conflict in the ned huts and granaries, the attackers, population bear the seeds of a parti- tical emotions, have been able to tition for access to resources on the are formed, unraveled and renewed region were seen as an opportunity who were not identified according to cularly dangerous and difficult threat forge strong links with local actors basis of the law of the strongest and according to the circumstances and for revenge to address the conse- official government reports, spared to combat. In their modus operandi, in order to maintain and consolidate migratory phenomena that generate the interests of the moment. Rela- quences of past defeats within the lo- neither women nor children. During these movements, playing on the their base. concentrations of populations in the tionships become increasingly strai- cal social structure. To this end, some 2019 and the first half of 2020, the underprivileged areas of cities and ned between actors from different are joining the «jihadists» and others violence intensified considerably, the rare viable spaces. International community groups, while they be- are joining the community armed with more than 300 civilians killed migration is added to this. Thus, come more consolidated between groups in order to benefit from ade- in at least 73 incidents. the increase in the population of members of the same ethnic com- quate means of reinforcement (provi- underprivileged neighborhoods and position. Thus, the new dynamics of sion of training and materials). Thus, the scarcity of vital resources can be relationships that are taking shape at we are witnessing unprecedented sources of radicalization and commu- the community level tend to group cycles of retaliation, sometimes based Dan Ambassagou. With the spread nity and inter-community conflicts. actors together on an ethnic basis. on historical precedents. of insecurity in the center of the country, the first reaction of the communities was to set up militias and self-defense groups to deal with Attack of Ogossagou. On March 23, 2019, about tion both inside and outside Mali. Suspicions quickly the threat. It is in this order that 100 armed men on motorcycles, dressed in hunters’ uni- turned to a self-defense militia of hunters claiming to be «DANNA AMBA SAGOU» (we forms, attacked Ogossagou, a Fulani village located a from the Dogon community, called Dan Nan Ambas- are entrusted to God), was milita- few kilometers east of the town of Bankass in Mali, near sagou, who denied any involvement. While the Malian rized. At the base, it was a simple the border with Burkina Faso. The death toll was 160, government did not explicitly affirm the responsibility of association of hunters that came Displaced residents of Mopti region of the crisis build huts outsideMopti. all from the Fulani community, granaries, houses, and this militia, its official dissolution at an extraordinary ©photo : Abdoul Salam Hama / sahelien.com into being in 2012. It was trans- animals burned. The perpetrators spared no social stra- session of the Council of Ministers on March 24, the day formed into a militia around 2015. ta: women, men, young people, children and the elderly. after the attack, is sufficient proof that it shares the sus- It claims to be part of the Dogon The conflict between Dogon and Fulani in the Seno Mango (Mopti Ogossagou’s attack remains by far the most publicized by picions against Dan Nan Ambassagou. community and carries out attacks region, Mali). The conflict between members of the Peul and Dogon com- far and the one that provoked the most popular indigna- against the Fulani in central Mali. munities in the Seno Mango (an exodus zone in the center of the country) is characterized by a multitude of hotbeds of tension. These tensions, mainly related to the exploitation of land and agro-pastoral resources, govern the co- habitation between Fulani and Dogon in this zone. This cohabitation varies between periods of conflict and peace. The conflict between Dogon and Fulani in Seno Mango has experienced numerous episodes of violence. Legal action In addition, Mali’s main environ- vity, the degradation of plant cover terized by particularisms where loyal- These conflicts, which fall into at has not been able to resolve the dispute, and the assassination of a farmer at mental challenges are the decline and biodiversity, today constitute ties are expressed across borders and least three categories, including the end of 2016 was the trigger for the conflict. The Dogon, suspecting the and increased variability of rainfall a worrying threat to the social and where peoples identify themselves power struggles at the local level and Fulani of being the perpetrators, attacked them, creating a cycle of reprisals. and water resources, the continuous economic well-being of populations. through ethnic or clan feelings, and competition over resources, have in- Several dynamics, some of which are interrelated, contribute to the exacerba- increase in temperatures and the re- on the other hand, the logic of the creased. Games of alliance and riva- tion of tensions between the actors, against a backdrop of rivalries for control surgence of extreme weather events 5. Social changes, between modern state characterized by its lry for control of power and space and management of resources. The arrival of the «jihadists,» notably the Mo- (droughts, floods, heat waves). These breakdowns and permanence concern for one authority. have led to clashes whose conse- vement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in 2012, followed by changes are accentuated by climate quences continue to effect the local the KatibaMacina in 2015, as well as the Malian army’s military campaigns change and make agricultural plan- Conflicts have distant and complex In spite of their great diversity, the population. Fear and suspicion are (particularly Operation Seno in October 2015), exacerbate the conflict. The ning increasingly difficult. The conti- roots. Before being a problem of ter- social organizations of the commu- anchored in the daily life of the inha- cycle reached its climax with the creation of self-defense groups and militias nuous reduction of arable land with ritorial boundaries and self-determi- nities in northern and central Mali bitants since 2014. The bonds of col- on a community basis. In addition, as was the case in Operation Seno, the the high population growth and the nation, it is above all a problem of havesome core similarities: caste laboration, alliances and dynamics army’s informal use of Dozo scouts, as well as the numerous arbitrary arrests, extension of cities, the reduction in identity and cohabitation between system, strong hierarchy, and chief- that are gradually being created and ill-treatment and extrajudicial executions of Fulani civilians, contribute to a the level of the water table, the silting ethnic groups. On the one hand, the taincy authority based on Islam. But strengthened between the various heightened sense of victimization and stigmatization of this community. of rivers, the drop in soil producti- logic of a traditional society charac- these similarities, instead of fostering

18 19 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

their social and political cohesion, are of Islamic movements, both non- area (because the Dogon were MNLA, GATIA and MSA, which on the contrary the source of nume- violent and violent. Indeed, militant charging them money so that 6. Continuing violence are all self-defense movements. rous internal tensions and conflicts groups have had less difficulty in they could have water for family There is a close relationship and endless rivalries in the form of a recruiting unemployed youth who and animal needs), the Peulhs ‘‘On the social level, changes are While the Peace and National Re- cannot imagine a future for them- were never able to have wells in between these groups, the pro- revolt against a sclerotic social elite. observable through the creation conciliation Agreement has put an selves. the localities. Even for commu- tection of populations, their pro- of a climate of acute suspicion end to fighting between armed in- nal ponds, the Peulhs had to pay perty and the defense of the lands and mistrust between popula- dependence groups and the Malian This crisis, although not the cause of for water for their animals. At they belong to. It is important to tions. The mistrust is such that government, peace and stabilization the disruptions, has amplified inter- the same time, the Dogon used know that everyone is armed in the different forms of inter and/or ethnic conflicts over land manage- the water to make banco bricks. appearsas a mirage. In the absence the zone, even the shepherd you intra-community solidarity and ‘‘There is an internal revolt within ment and access to natural resources These tensions persisted long of progress and concrete results in meet in the bush, the children, the traditional mechanisms of such as water and pasture. The modes before the crisis, but the weakness the implementation of the peace the women. We are all armed‘‘. the communities against the pri- mediation, within the framework of settlement (most conflict localities of the state was the trigger for the agreement (and particularly on the vileges of the former customary of conflict management, have are centers of enslavement and vas- security front), many people fear a A member of the self-defense chiefs. These privileges are consi- situation we know today‘‘. been seriously mortgaged and are dered abused by the communi- salage, with dominated families ser- relapse into conflict, recalling that group Ganda Izo from Gao even dysfunctional‘‘. ties, and the crisis has provided ving other dominant families) and Peulh farmer in the Mondoro area in the 1990s, it was after the signing an opportunity to question the cohabitation have long led the inha- of the national pact that the greatest bitants to adapt. Veterinary technician of number of summary executions of chieftaincies. There were signifi- Douentza cant abuses by traditional chiefs civilians took place. In the center of the country, which before the crisis. After 2012, The rekindling of inter-community there is an attempt to overthrow became the epicenter of the cri- conflicts is a direct impact of these Suspicion and fear are therefore de traditional chiefdoms and settle sis in 2015, one of the solutions tensions. Between April-May 2015, rigueur in Douentza, even though scores. Before, the chiefs were lis- to overcome ethnic divisions was the CMA attacked Léré, Gatielimou, the community still sets the pace tened to. They had the last word inter-ethnic marriages. The Dogon Rharous, Djenné carrefour, Mis- in disputes. Over time, things and the Peulhs were led to form and modalities of everyone’s exis- séni, Bambara-Maoudé, Boulikessi, have changed; took advantage matrimonial alliances in order to tence, from baptism to marriage Intillit, Segue, Timbuktu, Niono, avoid conflicts (access to pastures (funeral rites were not addressed of the resolution of disputes to ‘‘The origin of these tensions and Bamba, in response to army and and water points, tensions around during the survey). ‘‘The security situation is of extract money from the people‘‘. goes back to before the 2012 platform violence in Ménaka, Gour- animal corridors) by practicing clan concern to the local population. ma, and the Kidal region10. These crisis. The Dogon stigmatized Cattle theft, carjacking on transit Ali Ould Sidi, a sociologist and mistreated the Peulh com- endogamy between them, giving conflicts lasted until the end of 2018 roads, armed robberies and assas- based in Timbuktu munity, which had no defenders rise to a form of assimilation of the and resulted in hundreds of deaths sinations characterize our daily at the local level. They denied the Dogon to the Peulhs. The Dogons and injuries, as well as hundreds of lives. The perpetrators of these Peulhs the possibility of digging now speak Fulfulde, marry Fulani, ‘‘Traditional conflict management new refugees and internally displaced acts are from the area; they take wells with the complicity of the and the disappearance of the ethnic mechanisms are saturated, but persons (IDPs). As an example: the advantage of the absence of the Malian authorities because it border limits conflicts. modern justice does not fill the Idawsahak-Peulh conflict in the re- void. The erosion of customary state to attack the population. gion of Ménaka, which resulted in It is against this background of iden- was the justice of the rich. The authority in favor of modern ad- Our movement, Ganda Izo, is the death of more than 200 people, tity crisis that the Malian crisis has Dogon quickly understood that if This system, which integrates all ministrative or judicial authority 50 people reported missing, more taken shape. Poverty, unemploy- the Peulhs succeeded in digging social and cultural activities, has a self-defense group, it is not an does not inspire confidence be- ment, socioeconomic inequalities, their own wells, they would no vacillated in Douentza under the armed terrorist group. The objec- cause it is courted by people who the inability of the Malian regime to longer be dependent on them regulated control of armed radical tives of the group are, among have significant financial means maintain itself in the north, and the (the Dogon) and they would no groups (the different ethnic groups others, the protection of the po- ______inability to invest significantly in the longer control them. That is why, accusing each other of criminal acts and are willing to corrupt it‘‘. pulations, their property and the 10 During this fighting, 30 FAMA soldiers region’s infrastructure, have excluded despite the fact that they (the and collaboration with the occupier) defense of the zone they belong were killed: http://maliactu.net/mali-les- Peulhs) had the means to do so Local elected official in Timbuktu to. There are several other move- attaques-des-rebelles-de-la-cma-ont-coute- local populations and reinforced this and the lack of material/financial la-vie-a-30-soldats-maliens-en-quatre-se- identity crisis, thus favoring the rise and despite the water crisis in the means due to the precariousness. ments in the region, Ganda Koy, maines/.

20 21 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

than 12,000 new departures of po- Several other interrelated dynamics Those who remained in Zen- were tied up hand and foot with Despite the ceasefire, a number of pulations, particularly to Niger and have also contributed to the per- Zen hid at dawn and returned at their eyes blindfolded like ani- violent acts against the civilians Burkina (source: UNHCR) and si- sistence of armed violence in the night. They have lived like that mals. A few days later, we found gnificant material damage.11 were recorded. These led to many country, including state responses to ‘‘ the bodies of some of them lifeless. returnees to the return to the camps, since then for fear of reprisals . ‘‘Terrorist groups use motorcycles an insidious threat. For example, re- and transmit information through The others were said to be in Ba- The various inter-community agree- and also hindered the possible re- turning defense and security forces Testimony of two family mem- satellite phones. I joined the MU- mako prison. The worst thing is ments, established in the wake of the turn of refugees. For example, the (FDS) in the Mopti region have bers of those killed JAO to be able to protect my re- that this is not the first time. Even process, have allowed for a cer- Malian army’s serious abusesevents in the middle of the day, they kill tended to confuse ethnicity with latives and my property. Indeed, tain lull but do not durably resolve the in Zen-Zen and Farach in January the shepherds in front of everyone. ideological alignment, suspecting before they came, I was defenseless fundamental problems that originate and July 2015, led to new displace- For the people of the commune of They treat us all like jihadists here. the Peulh community as a whole of and this group offered me a way out on a larger (national) scale, or old and ments of people who had repatria- Doukouria, the capital of the village We can’t even go into public places complicity with the MUJAO Isla- by arming me. The government is complex conflicts over land, pastoral ted to Mali in 2014. of Zen-Zen, who have remained in anymore without risking being mists. primarily responsible for this situa- resources or the sharing of local politi- the area or who will return to their arrested or worse, killed‘‘. cal power12. The establishment of tran- commune in 2014, efforts have been tion and we remain confident and are ready to drop everything for a sitional authorities and what it implies made to avoid escalation, despite Peulh farmer in Mopti in terms of the distribution of local which insecurity remains: government job‘‘. power is undeniably likely to rekindle these tensions. However, the main Former MUJAO combatant in In June 2017, in Boni, after alleged lever remains the means by which the Ménaka jihadists who were racketeering car- state articulates the pro-government ‘‘I belong to the self-defense move- Two months after Operation Ser- nival-goers attacked a gendarme, the militias, which have been called upon ment MSA (Movement for the val, the Malian army began pa- ‘‘In relation to the acts committed FAMA retaliated with abuses against on several occasions to combat the Salvation of Azawad). It is a self- trolling to arrest people. We could by the army in the village of Zen- civilians. In May 2018, at the Bou- armed movements of the CMA. defense group of the people of the no longer go to the well to get Zen, the authorities were affected The impunity of the militias that likessi cattle market, Malian military The militarization of small, armed region that works with the regular water, we went there at night and and the state helped to bring calm. emerged from the insurgency in nor- 13 members of the G5 Sahel joint force groups that steal livestock and goods , army to track down small groups hid in the forests. There was also The army officials came to present thern Mali and the inability of the murdered at least twelve civilians after the circulation of arms, trafficking, of armed bandits in the region. a lot of cattle theft. That’s when their forgiveness to the community. Peulhs to access the peace dividend the death of a soldier. Following the and the settling of scores, together It has no ties to extremist groups we left with our animals, donkeys Extensive sensitization was carried exacerbated the sense of abandon- discovery of 25 corpses in June 2018, with abuses against the civilian popu- operating in the area. The security and camels, and on May 1, 2013, out to prevent the situation from ment and the need for self-protection the Ministry of Defense announced lation, contribute greatly to a growing situation in the Ansongo circle is we returned to the refugee camp. taking another more serious turn. among the Peulhs in central Mali. that «a mission dispatched to the field climate of insecurity and an unpre- untenable. Insecurity reigns here We stayed there for two years... But so far, the army continues to Communities in the Mopti region re- confirms the existence of mass graves cedented arms race in the country. and is a major burden on the After the attack on the military maintain tight control thinking ported countless cases of ill-treatment, population, including violence camp of Goundam, in January abusive violence, arbitrary arrests, ex- implicating certain FAMA personnel ______that everyone is jihadist‘‘. related to the conflict between the 2015, when the army returned, it tortion, and extrajudicial executions in serious violations resulting in the 11 Elements provided in the Ménaka com- deaths of men at Nantaka and Kobaka mune’s multisectoral rapid assessment re- Imghad, Daoussahak, and Peulh passed through the village of Zen- Notable Tuareg allegedly committed by the FDS. in the Mopti region». port, March 2016. Mossa Ag communities. In the area from An- Zen. The army realized that the Acharatoumane, a representative of the songo to the Ménaka region, things people had gone to hide in the Idawsahak community and a member of the are not going well, the populations water. The army began to shoot CMA, confirmed these figures; according to are worried, and movements are people who were in the water, but The use of violence subsequently led him, among limited for fear of being targeted. Of the 70 people killed, nearly 50 were no one was killed. They left and to a questioning of the Peulh social from his community. Socio-economic life is disrupted took one young and one old man. structure, which was traditionally 12 For example, the military encirclement of and almost all the activities (social, When they arrived in Goundam, very hierarchical: conflicts and sett- the city of Kidal by the GATIA in June 2016 economic, professional) of the we didn’t know who was dead ling of scores arose between the she- clearly shows the limits of the commitments. populations are blocked‘‘. and who was alive. In the end, taken during the Anefif process. pherds, who had taken up arms to ‘‘I was coming back from the fair 13 For example, according to humanita- there were two dead, and others protect themselves, and the custo- with a few brothers when the Ma- rian observers, coupeurs de route carry out Fighter of the self-defense group were arrested. Thanks to pressure, mary chiefdoms, who were anxious lian army stopped us. I was able flights almost regularly on the Timbuktu- MSA they were released. After that, to reaffirm their authority within the to flee into the bush but the army Goundam axis. part of the family returned to the communities in revolt, and at the arrested my companions. They camps. It scared us so much that same time to recreate a bond of trust we didn’t go back (to Zen Zen). with the Malian state. 22 23 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

of infrastructure and basic social ser- By early June 2020, the political, 7. A widespread governance vices generates a feeling of disinte- security and health situation in the crisis rest on the part of leaders and nega- country remained tense. In addition tively affects the sense of belonging to insecurity, Mali, like other countries More than five years after the si- to the same nation. It may explain in the world, is confronted with the gning of the peace agreement, the the emergence of irredentist groups Covid-19 pandemic linked. Faced Malian context is characterized by that can quickly slide into violent with this protean crisis and the out- a deteriorating security climate and come of legislative elections, organized extremism. a tense political scene. The various under difficult conditions, part of the non-state armed groups take advan- public, particularly political and reli- Demonstrations in Mali, tage of the population’s vulnerabi- gious leaders, demanded the resigna- protests against the state of lity factors and try to occupy the tion of the President of the Republic. emergency, cutbacks, and the ground left vacant by the absence This demand, variously appreciated results of legislative elections. of the state, making the population within national public opinion, came Following the proclamation of the in a tense political-social context that understand that they are «left out» final results of the legislative elec- tested for the public authorities. of the state system. At the same tions, unrest broke out in many time, local and administrative go- Malian cities. Protesters were an- First, structurally, over the years, the vernance is faced with the problems gry curfews in the context of unti- nature and quality of governance has Collective fishing in Mopti - January 2019.©photo : Osman Sam / sahelien.com of insufficient resources and reduced mely power cuts and didn’t accept led to chronically strained relations competencies, with the result that the results of the May, 2020 legisla- between the state and citizens. The According to the communities, ar- to deal with the armed groups. In In June 2018, UN Secretary-General decentralized local authorities have litany of suspected cases of corruption, tive elections. Protests broke out in med bandits rob and rob communi- the face of these repeated abuses and Antonio Guterres’ report on the secu- weak capacities to plan and manage rightly or wrongly left in the collec- Bamako, Kati, Kayes, Sikasso, and ties in the presence of the military, frequent breaches, the population rity situation in Mali indicated jihadist local development in harmony with tive memory, unpunished and unre- Ségou14. These incidents remain who do not act and justify themselves feels abandoned by ineffective DSFs attacks effect the Malian army more national orientations. The regionali- solved, and the lack of protection and symptomatic of the profound social by explaining that they do not have that even contribute to insecurity. than anyone else, particularly in the zation process is struggling to get off basic social services have slowly eroded malaise that the country is expe- sufficient manpower and equipment Mopti region. At the same time,the the ground amidst insecurity and confidence in the state and weakened riencing. They reached their peak civilian population keeps pointing an the postponement of elections. All the social contract between the state in June and July 2020. On July and the people. This has made the pre- «We are serene. We were able to expose their way of doing things. It is not accusing finger at the Malian army. of this is a source of frustration and 10, 2020 in Bamako, according to sence and authority of the state highly that we reject what’s being said, but we feel that the way of conducting these Young people from the Peulh cultural tension, which can degenerate into the website Sahelien.com, the June questionable and created an environ- investigations is not in conformity. I have never received anyone who has come association Tabital Pulaaku, quoted by armed conflict and fuel extremism. 5 Movement, which was at its 3rd ment conducive to the emergence of to ask me questions to be able to confront the information received in the field. AFP, accused the FAMA of the death demonstration at Independence protest movements. When you don’t go to the field and take the version of the decision-makers to of the 25 people whose bodies were Concessions made to the armed Square, called for «civil disobe- find out what they ordered, I think the result can be biased. We even read the discovered in three mass graves near groups during the signing of the Mopti. Despite the denial of the mili- dience». Roads were blocked, tires At the same time, despite the great last report (HRW report, editor’s note), I admit that we don’t find ourselves peace accords are not always shared tary hierarchy in Mopti, the Minister were burned, demonstrators stor- mobilization and commitment of in what it says. We don’t need to hide the truth, nor do we need to add to by a large part of the population, the international community for the of Defense confirmed the existence of med the public television station, it. Where there is no problem, there is no problem. I don’t see what the fra- whofind it difficult to accept certain country, there has been very little pro- mass graves in the localities of Nantaka the National Assembly premises mework is for gratuitous killings, since there are no ethnic problems within actions. Interlocutors met during gress in terms of development. The and Kobaka, near Mopti. were ransacked, and demonstra- Mali’s defense and security forces. So I do not understand how one can say that the analysis recalled that the secu- limited impact of development pro- The Malian authorities deny these alle- tors were dispersed in places with the defense forces are in a state of revenge against this or that ethnic group for rity threats in the country are essen- grams is largely due to their unscru- gations and believe that such accusa- 15 the simple reason that, in some of the places mentioned, the security posts are tear gas . pulous management. Embezzlement, tions would complicate their task in tially nourished by poverty, unem- commanded by people from those backgrounds. We don’t need to make it more ployment, ignorance and exclusion. fraudulent behavior and corruption complicated». said securing and pacifying the country. The unequal territorial distribution are considered widespread. People in- terviewed for this study pointed to the Major General Salif Traoré, former Minister of Homeland Security and bankruptcy of political elites and their Emergency Preparedness ______involvement in an opaque governance 14 Source: https://sahelien.com/manifesta- tion-du-mouvement-du-5-juin-situation- tendue-a-bamako/ 15 Source: https://sahelien.com/manifesta- tion-du-mouvement-du-5-juin-situation- 24 tendue-a-bamako/ 25 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

system, allowing them to appropriate Secondly, the deterioration of the traffickers of drugs, cigarettes, and bear the seeds of a particularly dan- context of territorial occupation of some humanitarian aid funding and security situation in recent years has human beings also used the country gerous and difficult threat to combat. the country. Long before the crisis, bribes. With respect to justice, many led to a steady increase in the bud- for business. Poor governance of and In their modus operandi, these mo- many communities perceived the recognize that widespread impunity gets allocated to security and defense endemic corruption further weake- vements, playing on the «psychology presence of the state as a predatory and limited access to justice are among to the detriment of certain sensitive ned the country. of situations» and political emotions, state presence that, without meeting ‘‘At the moment, there is no the root causes of the crisis taking root sectors such as youth employment, have been able to forge strong links the basic needs of the communities, conflict resolution between these in the country. health, and education. As a result, In the north and center of the with local ethnic groups, to develop exacerbated the cleavages within and communities. They can’t do it costly counter-terrorism operations country, armed movements, in- economic activities and illicit traffic- between them. because they hurt each other too «Endemic corruption is widely blamed weigh heavily on social cohesion cluding those labeled «terrorists» king of all kinds in order to maintain much and they don’t trust each for the loss of state legitimacy, contri- as the government faces resource (MNLA, Ançar-Edddine, MUJAO), and consolidate their rear base. ‘‘ buting to the 2012 crisis. Non-state other . constraints and its ability to address settled in, taking advantage of the apparatuses of proximity, including persistent vacancy of power, all the It is essential to take into account criminal providers of basic services and socio-economic priorities is reduced. Dogon farmer of the Bandia- This situation, coupled with the Co- more so since they were already pre- these ideological (return to the ori- gara zone religiously inspired millenarian move- sent in these areas and had a certain gins/source of religion and to a puri- ments, quickly filled the void. The vid-19 pandemic crisis, puts further base. Rivalry for control of the North fied Islam) and sociological (social current rise in instability in the cen- pressure on the state and reinforces led to clashes that continue to affect injustice, lack of access to infrastruc- ‘‘In order to better respond to ter of the country suggests a direct link the sense of incapacity that some the local population. ture and basic services) dimensions these phenomena, the state must between radicalization and a sense of people feel towards the government. 3) Support mediation processes of a multifaceted phenomenon that stop being partial in defending injustice. However, even though confi- with concrete actions. The transnational nature of the ac- is most often grafted onto poor social communities against others and dence in public institutions remains Finally, political or social actors di- tors, porous borders, and poverty indicators. must invite all those Peulhs and low in Mali, the Malian population vert the legitimate discontent and For many interlocutors met during seem to favor the spread of radicali- Dogons who have taken up arms seems to be largely unaware of the role frustrations in order to obtain posi- the analysis period, the conflict re- zation/extremism in Douentza/Mali. The various interviews highlight at the negotiating table as it did that trafficking plays in reinforcing tions in public affairs management. solution agreements are short-term The Malian state has limited control an evolution of the conflict with a with the MNLA bandits‘‘. corruption, injustice, and insecurity. Between March and May 2020, star- solutions. For the time being, the peace process over the situation (poor conflict tendency to reduce to violent extre- ting with the proclamation of the fi- has not found adequate solutions to management and lack of resources). mism all the conflict dynamics that Mopti national nal results of the legislative elections, On August 28, 2018, 34 Fulani and this problem. Because of its ambi- The study found that the country is nevertheless originate both at the go- unrest broke out in many Malian Dogon village chiefs signed an inter- guous place between SSR and rule of vulnerable to the threat of extremism vernance level and at the endogenous community peace agreement in Se- law programming, justice reform is cities. These incidents remain symp- and all forms of insecurity, which level (frustrations and grievances). Mali’s partners, primarily UNMI- varé to end conflicts in Koro, which not considered a priority, as evidenced tomatic of a deeper malaise than the can be based on armed insurgency With the trivialization of violence demands put forward. In reality, they SAM, and those involved in security were exacerbated by the self-defense by the limited number of financial as a means of protest. These include and its normalization, the tendency militias and violent extremist groups pledges made by donors in this sector. are the expression of an anger that support must encourage the state in political factors such as endemic cor- is to make an already difficult situa- in the area. This agreement, facili- Moreover, even though they had been has been present in the country for its efforts to improve governance and ruption and elite impunity; social tion more complex. tated by an NGO (Henry-Dunant provided for in the Peace Agreement, several years. This anger is based on its usefulness to all Malian commu- factors related to frustration with Center for Humanitarian Dialogue) truth-seeking mechanisms have been feelings of disappointment, dissatis- nities. expectations, relative deprivation, RECOMMENDATIONS engaged in government-mandated indefinitely postponed, and the need faction, and frustration. and unmet social (access to educa- mediation, came after a unilate- for reconciliation has not been ade- tion) and economic needs (youth 1) Bring back the state in localities 2) Restore trust between local actors quately compensated for by the obliga- ral cease-fire in early July that was CONCLUSION unemployment and gross inequali- from which it was absent and focus denounced within the Dogon mili- tion to deliver justice. The tendency to ties); and cultural factors, including on renewed governance and local The crisis of 2012 and the violence resort to compromises and amnesties in tia, DAN NA AMBASAGOU, an Even before the crisis, Mali was pro- religious factors. communities’ needs. that followed with the thousands favor of alleged drug traffickers with organization thatitself is divided. Al- bably the weakest link in the sub- of deaths ended up creating signifi- links to armed groups is seen as a wor- though the actions of mediation are Saharan zone because of its security The bonds of collaboration, alliances Mali and its partners, including cant societal chasms: first between risome sign of this lack of willingness to salutary, it is important to note that situation. The state had to contend and dynamics that are gradually UNAMID, are focusing efforts on socio-professional groups and then fight impunity16». they only allow for the management with the strong presence of the being established and strengthened the return of the state and its autho- between certain communities that of the immediate situation, to calm AQIM movement and armed radi- between the various radical armed rity throughout the country. The res- had a secular and historical practice Luca Raineri, Researcher tensions and save time. It would the- cal groups on its territory. Various groups and the local populations toration of state authority is impor- of living together even if it brought refore be a mistake to give them a ______tant, but it should not be seen in the conflict at times. mission they do not have. 16 Organized crime in Mali: its impact on a peaceful way out of the conflict - Luca Rai- neri, July 2016 26 27 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

7) Facethe terrorist threat within a 4) Provide sustainable and multi- APPENDIX - BIBLIOGRAPHY faceted responses to local conflicts. framework of regional cooperation. What links between Violent Extremism - Organized Crime and Local Conflicts in the Liptako gourma https://issafri- It is crucial to take into account the Recent developments confirm the ca.org/fr/recherches/rapport-sur-lafrique-de-louest/extremisme-violent-criminalite-organisee-et-conflits-locaux-dans- sociological dimensions (social injus- ‘‘As long as people’s living condi- allegations of many observers about le-liptako-gourma tice) that accompany poor socio- tions do not change, we will not the persistence of the terrorist threat economic indicators. Areas affected lay down our arms. Even if we and its spread. To address the secu- Are terrorist groups fuelling local conflicts in the Sahel? https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/les-groupes-terroristes-at- by local violence are also affected by lay down our arms, others will rity issue in its entirety, Mali, with tisent-ils-les-conflits-locaux-dans-le-sahel the reduction of grazing areas due to take them as long as things do the support of external partners, the exploitation of agricultural land not change. That’s why we fought should build on existing cooperation Another challenge for the stability of Mali https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/un-autre-defi-pour-la-stabilite-du-mali and the scarcity of water and fodder. for our territory‘‘. on security matters with countries in Growing insecurity, which increases the subregion. The development of Mali’s problems go beyond the July presidential election https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/les-problemes-du-mali-vont- the displacement and vulnerability of Young Tuareg fighter, member a regional cooperation component au-dela-de-la-presidentielle-de-juillet populations, contributes to fueling of the former armed rebellion remains central to confronting Mali’s tensions between socio-professional in the North security crisis. Armed Groups in North Mali: State of Play. Fact sheet - Julia Dufour and ClaireKupperJuly 6, 2012This GRIP Ana- groups. In addition to these ten- lysis Note provides an overview of the situation in North Mali as of July 2012. It describes the crisis situation and sions over access to natural resources, analyzes the forces at work, with a particular focus on the various armed groups, especially Islamists, that are roaming violence results from local power the area. AQIM, Ançar Eddine and the MUJAO are presented as the masters of the zone. Thus, through their modes struggles, attempts at political and of action, their foundations and ideologies, and their alliances, the author gives us a synthesis of the developments at social reconfiguration, and disagree- 6) Accompany the Malian State in the heart of the Malian conflict. ments between the state and certain strengthening dialogue between Compagnie Méditerranéenne d’Analyse et d’Intelligence Stratégique, les enjeux du conflit de l’Azawad, 14- 01-2003. communities. communities and between commu- This analytical note deciphers the Malian conflict from its origins. After a brief historical review, it presents the nities and the public authorities. different actors in this conflict, notably the MNLA, (composition and organization) Ançar Eddine (origins...), the 5) Addressing issues of underdeve- MUJAO, AQIM. It has the advantage of presenting a detailed document on the organization of these radical groups lopment and securing infrastruc- On August 28, 2018, 34 Fulani and (organization chart, recruitment method, source of funding). ture. Dogon village chiefs signed an inter- Malian crisis: origins, developments and repercussions in the subregion; Dr. BakarySambeLecturer-Researcher Gaston community peace agreement in Seva- Berger University, Saint-Louis (Senegal)SenorFellow,EuropeanFoundationforDemocracyBrusselsThe Malian crisis is Our study highlighted how little in- ré to end the conflicts in Koro, which approached here through the prism of the main movements and groups that are driving it. A large part of the discus- frastructure exists linking the south were exacerbated by self-defense mi- sion is devoted to AQMI and the MUJAO. This note sketches an analysis of the security issues of Islamic radicaliza- to the north of the country. Road litias and violent extremist groups. tion in Mali primarily and in the Sahel secondarily. infrastructure is dilapidated in places While this and previous agreements Mali: Rebuilding the Mosaic - Summary of the Oxfam Report; October 2013. This report by Oxfam, in collabora- and non-existent in much of the have not led to a definitive resolution tion with Handicap International and WILDAF (Women in Law and Development in Africa), is the result of a survey north. There are no roads connecting of the crisis in the center, efforts to- conducted in June 2012 on the impact of conflict on social relations within and between populations originating the south to the north of the country. ward dialogue must continue and be from northern Mali. It aimed to make the voices of the actors heard, in order to better understand the impact of the Moreover, the frequency of attacks supported by a commitment by the conflict on social relations and to highlight the solutions envisaged by these populations themselves. Fragile exit from on the few roads contributes to exa- Malian state to respond to the many crisis in Mali: Between internal constraints and external pressures, ISS, July 2013. Report on the political and security cerbate frustration and concern. demands. situation in Mali on the eve of the presidential elections. This study takes stock of the various internal dynamics on the issues at stake in the transition, particularly the Ouagadougou Agreements, dialogue and reconciliation, and the elections. Qui est qui in the North of Mali, ISS June 2013. On the sidelines of the signing of the preliminary agreement for the presidential election and the inclusive peace talks, this article aimed to make a sociological note of the populations of northern Mali and to identify the issues surrounding these negotiations while presenting the main actors. ABA-Rule Of Law, «Stratégie de justice transitionnelle au Mali. Analyses arising from the observations and reflections of community structures and civil society,» American Bar Association, 2015. JUPREC/Avocats Sans Frontières Canada, «État des lieux sur la justice transitionnelle au Mali,» Bamako-Québec, January 2016.

28 29 Analysis Note • Baba Dakono • August 2020 The State Must Respond to Legitimate Concerns

Autesserre, S., « Construire la paix : conceptions collectives de son établissement, de son maintien et de sa consolida- tion «, Critique Internationale, Presses de Sciences-Po n°51, 2011: 153-167 Bengaly, A., «La réforme du secteur de la justice au Mali: Enjeux, défis et perspectives,» FES Mali, Policy Paper, Nov. 2015. Lefranc S., «La professionnalisation d’un militantisme réformateur du droit: l’invention de la justice transitionnelle», Droit et Société 73-2009: 561-589. FIDH-AMDH, «Mali, la justice en marche. Analyse des procédures judiciaires portant portant sur de graves violations des droits humains commises depuis 2012,» Paris, 2014. FIDH-AMDH, «Mali: Peace in the face of insecurity, impunity and the fight against terrorism,» Situation Note, February 19, 2016. Hiil, Embassy of the Netherlands and EU, «Les besoins des maliens en matière de justice, vers plus d’équité,» Survey Study, Hiil, 2015. Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and General Secretariat, «Emergency Program for the Strengthening of the Ju- dicial System and Implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Resulting from the Algiers Process,» PU-RSJ MOA, March 2016. Republic of Mali, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, «Intervention Strategy 2016-2018», Bamako, March 2016. RDDH, Freedom House and the American Bar Association, «Documentation & Monitoring of Human Rights Vio- lations,» Joint ABA/Roli and Freedom House Project, Violations Committed in Mali between January 2012 and December 2014 (Phase 1&2), Bamako-Mali, 2015. Solidarités International, Survey of the vulnerabilities of returned populations in the commune of Gargando, May 2016. Van Veen E, Goff D and Van Damme T., «Beyond the Dichotomy: Accepting Legal Pluralism in Mali and Reconciling its Components», CRU Report, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Nov. 2015.

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August 2020 32