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Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 10 / Thursday, January 15, 1998 / Rules and Regulations 2315

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Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 10 / Thursday, January 15, 1998 / Rules and Regulations 2315 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 10 / Thursday, January 15, 1998 / Rules and Regulations 2315 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS the Commission's regulations and determines that with regard to particular COMMISSION eliminate unnecessary rules wherever matters the adoption of service-specific possible, increase the efficiency of the rules is warranted. As the Commission 47 CFR Parts 1, 21, 24, 26, 27, 90 and competitive bidding process, and indicated in the Notice, the Commission 95 provide more specific guidance to has gained significant experience in the [WT Docket No. 97±82, ET Docket No. 94± auction participants. The changes also course of the 15 auctions conducted to 32; FCC 97±413] advance the Commission's auction date. In particular, the Commission has program by reducing the burden on the found that much of the auction process Competitive Bidding Proceeding Commission and the public of can be standardized and that adopting conducting service-by-service auction service-specific rules for many aspects AGENCY: Federal Communications rule makings. In the Competitive Commission. of the competitive bidding process is Bidding Second Report and Order in PP both unnecessary and confusing. The ACTION: Final rule. Docket No. 93±253, the Commission Commission also finds that conducting stated that we would ``issue further SUMMARY: separate rule makings for each In this Third Report and Reports and Orders * * * to adopt Order, the Commission adopts uniform individual service often slows the auction rules for each auctionable delivery of service to the public because competitive bidding rules for all future service or class of service,'' and we it results in regulatory delays before the auctions. The Commission believes that identified criteria that would govern our licensing process begins. The majority these rule changes will simplify and choice of service-specific auction rules of commenters addressing this issue streamline its regulations in order to and procedures, which may be found in increase the overall efficiency of the subpart Q of part 1 of our rules. agree, emphasizing that the adoption of competitive bidding process. These rule Implementation of Section 309(j) of the uniform auction procedures will (1) changes are necessary to further the Communications ActÐCompetitive shorten the rule making process for Commission's goals of simplifying and Bidding, PP Docket No. 93±253, Second future auctions by narrowing the issues streamlining its regulations, and to Report and Order, 59 FR 22980 (May 4, on which the Commission must seek develop uniform auction rules and 1994) (``Competitive Bidding Second comment in service-specific rule procedures for all future auctions. The Report and Order''), on recon., Second makings; (2) decrease uncertainty for intended effect of this action is to adopt Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59 auction participants; (3) benefit small uniform final rules and procedures FR 44272 (August 26, 1994) businesses because uniform rules are applicable to the Commission's (``Competitive Bidding Second more easily understood and complied spectrum auction program. Memorandum Opinion and Order''). with, particularly by those with limited EFFECTIVE DATE: March 16, 1998. These rule changes result from the resources and those that participate in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Josh Commission's proposals in Amendment different auctions; and (4) enable the Roland or Mark Bollinger, Auctions and of Part 1 of the Commission's RulesÐ Commission to develop a consistent Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Competitive Bidding Proceeding, Order, body of law and precedent governing Telecommunications Bureau, at (202) Memorandum Opinion and Order, and the auction process. 418±0660. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, WT 4. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a Docket No. 97±82, 62 FR 13570 (March Pub. L. 105±33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997), to summary of the Third Report and Order 21, 1997) (``Notice''). be codified in relevant part at 47 U.S.C. in WT Docket No. 97±82, ET Docket No. 2. The Commission also released a 309(j)(2)(E) and 309(j)(4)(F) (``Balanced 94±32, adopted on December 18, 1997 Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Budget Act''), expands the and released on December 31, 1997. The Making in this Docket, in which it Commission's auction authority. Section complete Third Report and Order is sought comment on additional changes 309(j)(2) formerly stated that mutually to its general competitive bidding rules. available for inspection and copying exclusive applications for initial The Second Further Notice of Proposed during normal business hours in the licenses or construction permits were Rule Making was published in the FCC Reference Center, Room 239, 1919 auctionable if the principal use of the Federal Register on January 7, 1998. See M Street, NW., Washington, DC 20554. spectrum was for subscription-based Amendment of Part 1 of the The complete text may be purchased services and competitive bidding would Commission's RulesÐCompetitive from the Commission's copy contractor, Bidding Procedures, Allocation of promote the expressed objectives. As International Transcription Service, Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred amended, Section 309(j)(2) provides Inc., 1231 20th Street, N.W., from Federal Government Use, 4660± that, in cases of mutually exclusive Washington, D.C. 20036, (202) 857± 4685 MHz, Second Further Notice of applications, all spectrum is auctionable 3800. The complete Third Report and Proposed Rule Making, WT Docket No. except licenses or construction permits Order also is available on the 97±82, ET Docket No. 94±32 (rel. for (1) public safety services; (2) digital Commission's Internet home page January 7, 1998) (``Second Further television service given to existing (http://www.fcc.gov). Notice of Proposed Rule Making''). broadcasters to replace their analog SUMMARY OF ACTION: license; and (3) non-commercial II. Applicability of General Competitive educational or public broadcast stations. I. Background Bidding Rules In addition, the Balanced Budget Act 1. On December 18, 1997, the Federal 3. With some exceptions, the authorizes the Commission to assign Communications Commission Commission adopts its proposal in the pending broadcast license applications (Commission) adopted a Third Report Notice to apply the general competitive filed before July 1, 1997 by means of and Order making substantive bidding rules adopted herein to all competitive bidding pursuant to Section amendments and modifications to its future auctions, regardless of whether 309(j). Because these legislative changes general competitive bidding rules for all service-specific auction rules have significantly increase the number of auctionable services. These changes to previously been adopted. The Part 1 services that will be licensed by the Commission's general competitive rules will apply to all auctionable competitive bidding, we believe that bidding rules are intended to streamline services, unless the Commission adopting uniform competitive bidding VerDate 02-DEC-97 16:40 Jan 14, 1998 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\P15JA0.PT1 15jar1 2316 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 10 / Thursday, January 15, 1998 / Rules and Regulations rules for all auctionable services is even be appropriate in some circumstances. small businesses and individual users, more necessary. In a related argument, some commenters which would require a significant 5. With limited exceptions, the rules believe that, in certain instances, the adjustment in the Commission's the Commission adopts today will not rules adopted in this proceeding should traditional auction rules; (3) industry apply to the initial auction of licenses not be applied retroactively to participation would be crucial in in the paging, 220 MHz, and Local supersede previously adopted service- crafting appropriate auction and service Multipoint Distribution (``LMDS'') specific rules. For example, AirTouch rules; and (4) in light of the public services. The Commission previously and WWC suggest that when service- safety services provided using Part 90 adopted service-specific auction rules specific rules have been adopted after spectrum, auctioning such spectrum is for the auction of these services, and industry participation and based upon not in the public interest. AICC and believes that this decision is in the best particular characteristics of a specific AAA further suggest that those interest of prospective applicants for industry or spectrum to be auctioned, commenters who favor the adoption of these auctions, who may have relied those service-specific rules should general competitive bidding procedures upon the service-specific rules govern. for all spectrum might not have previously adopted by the Commission 7. With regard to the auction of considered the possibility of auctions in formulating business plans and licenses to provide paging services, for shared channels, since the making early efforts to obtain financing. AirTouch opposes the Commission's Commission is not currently authorized As discussed below, however, the proposal to apply general auction rules to award licenses for such spectrum by Commission retains the discretion to to all future auctions, regardless of means of competitive bidding. The use the revised general competitive whether service specific rules have been Commission agrees that shared bidding procedures adopted in this adopted. AirTouch argues in particular spectrum is, by definition, not proceeding for any reauction
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