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Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI University Microfilms International A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 Nortfi Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 Order Number 9401317 An army for independence? The American roots of the Philippine Army Meixsel, Richard Bruce, Ph.D. The Ohio State University, 1993 Copyright ©1993 by Meixsel, Richard Bruce. All rights reserved. UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106 AN ARMY FOR INDEPENDENCE? THE AMERICAN ROOTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Richard Bruce Meixsel, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 1993 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Allan R. Millett Stephen F. Dale Adviser Williamson Murray Department of History Copyright by Richard Bruce Meixsel 1993 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS All of the persons whose aid is sought in the course of conducting dissertation research do not respond to inquiries, which makes it all the more pleasurable to acknowledge the assistance of those who do. Of the many archivists and librarians who suffered my impositions, I want to thank especially Edward J. Boone, Jr., Archivist of the MacArthur Memorial Archives, and Dr. Richard J. Sommers, Archivist- Historian of the United States Army Military History Institute, for their advice and encouragement. To Colonel Maximiano S. Janairo, USA, Ret., Colonel John E. Olson, USA, Ret., Lieutenant Colonel Santiago G. Guevara, USA, Ret., Carmen F. Guevara, Maud Bowers Rice, Nancy Taylor Evans, and Richard S. Schmidt go my thanks for sharing their memories of the pre-war Philippines. Finally, I want to acknowledge the support of the taxpaying citizens of the states of Georgia and Ohio, who, however unwittingly, made it all possible. 11 VITA November 12, 1955 ............. Born - Forbes A.P.B., Kansas 1985 B.A., Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas 1988 ........................... M.A., University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History 111 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................... ii VITA ......................................................... iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................. v INTRODUCTION........................... 1 CHAPTER PAGE I. THE MILITARY MISSION AND ITS P L A N .......... 26 II. DEFENDING THE INSULAR EMPIRE: -WAR PLANS ORANGE AND THE FILIPINO SOLDIER ........... 70 III. THE FILIPINO PHILIPPINE SCOUT OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES A R M Y ................ 126 IV. THE PROMISE AND PROBLEM OF THE PHILIPPINE SCOUTS ....................... 167 V. "THE 'SPINE' OF THE NEW ARMEE": THE CONSTABULARY ROOTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY . 217 VI. THE MISSION IN ACTION Part One: Getting Started, 1935-38 ......... 266 Part Two: Changing Direction? 1939-40 . 312 VII. WPO-3 AND THE PHILIPPINE ARMY, 1940-41 . 336 CONCLUSION...................................................369 APPENDICES A. Philippine Defense Projects ................... 374 B. Philippine Defense Plans (Orange) ............ 375 BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................. 376 IV LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACS Assistant Chief of Staff AG Adjutant General AGO Office of the Adjutant General BIA Bureau of Insular Affairs CGPD Commanding General Philippine Department HPA Headquarters Philippine Army HPC Headquarters Philippine Constabulary HPD Headquarters Philippine Department JAG Judge Advocate General LC Library of Congress NA National Archives Philippine Constabulary iilippine National Guard ;■ ilippine Scouts ' icord Group The Adjutant General ÜSAMHI United States Army Military History Institute USAFFE United States Army Forces Far East ÜSMA United States Military Academy WPD War Plans Division WPO War Plan Orange INTRODUCTION Government officials awaited apprehensively the approach of the Philippine Commonwealth's initial military registration period, scheduled for the first week of April 1936. Passed with much fanfare in December 1935, the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act no. 1) made "military service obligatory for all citizens" of the Philippines. Specifically, the detailed plan for the emerging nation's new army required all twenty- year old males to register for military duty. The "plan" was ready, prepared under the direction of one of America's most illustrious soldiers, former United States Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur, but was the population? Influential citizens such as Emilio Aguinaldo thought a comprehensive defense scheme unnecessary. "Radical elements" were said to be mobilizing "the masses" to oppose compulsory military training. So politicians rushed home to drum up support for registration, important landowners "urged" their workers to participate, and army spokesmen refuted the criticisms of the system's opponents. By the end of the first day's registration, apprehension had turned into exhuberance. "Brisk scenes" characterized the 2 capital city's five registration sites, and Manila surpassed its quota by the evening of 4 April, only half-way through the registration period. Among the first to sign up was José Malvar, grandson of the Philippine Revolutionary War hero. General Miguel Malvar. Nueva Ecija, "supposed to be another hotbed of communists and agitators and where registration was predicted to meet with failure," witnessed "a record enlistment." Adjacent Pangasinan Province reported an enthusiastic response to registration, as did Cebu. Even young Muslims, thought to be in a state of virtual revolt over the draft, came forward in impressive numbers. The Philippines Free Press suspended a write-in poll on the popularity of the military system. The large number of registrants, it said, was answer enough. By the end of the week, nearly 150,000 men had registered for military service. "I am beginning to think that, perhaps, there is more strength and more will power, more determination on the part of the Filipino people," Commonwealth President Manuel L . Quezon wrote to the American journalist Roy Howard, "than the world has suspected. While this response was a gratifying demonstration of Filipino willingness to bear the burden of independence, it said nothing about the appropriateness for an independent state of the military system Filipinos vere being asked to Quezon to Howard, 15 May 1936, Howard Papers, LC. Accounts of the registration are taken from the Philippines fiarald (2, 3, 6 and 8 April 1936), Manila Tribune (7 and 9 April 1936), and Philippines Free Press (11 April 1936). 3 support. A Military Mission headed by General MacArthur had arrived in Manila in October 1935 with a scheme for the defense of the archipelago in hand. Once there, members of the Mission worked with local officials and rewrote "much of [the plan's] language," while retaining intact "its basic provisions."2 Such a plan had not been seen before in the Philippines, nor in America. General MacArthur told a journalist: "I think it's the world's best defense plan, because we had the opportunity to start from scratch and cut through traditions and out-of-date methods that gum up a lot of armies."3 His observation was plausible in theory, but in practical terms, MacArthur could not avoid reliance on Filipino and American military personnel and military/semi­ military organizations already present in the Islands. They, of course, brought with them traditions and methods--out-of- date or otherwise--upon which the successful implementation of the Mission's plan would rely. Nor could he escape the Robert H. Ferrell (ed.). The Eisenhower Diaries (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Co., 1981), p. 10. This published version of the Military Mission's "official"-- although increasingly personalized--diary kept by Major Dwight Eisenhower, the Mission's chief of staff, during his four years in the Philippines (1935-39) represents only a fraction of the original. The bulk of the diary was long thought to have been destroyed but was rediscovered about a decade ago. Since then, it has been generally unavailable to researchers (including this author). The Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, has tentatively scheduled the entire diary for publication in 1993 or 1994. ^Article by Jim Marshall